

Kerala State Electricity Board And ... vs Valsala K And Another on 16 September, 1999

Equivalent citations: II(1999)ACC656, 2000ACJ5, AIR1999SC3502, 1999(6)ALT6(SC), 2000(1)BLJR8, 2000(1)CTC563, JT1999(7)SC292, 1999(3)KLT348(SC), (1999)IILLJ1112SC, 1999(6)SCALE31, (1999)8SCC254, [1999]SUPP2SCR657, (1999)3UPLBEC2450, AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 3502, 1999 (8) SCC 254, 1999 AIR SCW 3496, 1999 LAB. I. C. 3290, 2000 (1) BLJR 8, 2000 (2) LRI 620, 2000 BLJR 1 8, (1999) 7 JT 292 (SC), 1999 (3) UPLBEC 2450, 1999 (6) SCALE 31, 1999 (8) ADSC 113, 1999 LAB LR 1186, 1999 (9) SRJ 494, 1999 (7) JT 292, (1999) 2 ACC 656, (1999) 3 KER LT 348, (1999) 2 LABLJ 1112, (1999) 6 ANDH LT 6, (1999) 2 CURLR 868, (1999) 3 UPLBEC 2450, (1999) 4 CURCC 251, (1999) 4 LAB LN 1183, (1999) 95 FJR 521, (1999) 83 FACLR 508, (2000) 2 MAD LW 77, (1999) 5 SERVLR 209, (2000) 1 TAC 6, (1999) 8 SUPREME 362, (1999) 6 SCALE 31, (2000) 1 ACJ 5, (2000) 1 ANDHWR 39, 2000 SCC (L&S) 50

Bench: Chief Justice, S. Rajendra Babu, R.C. Lahoti

ORDER

1. The neat question involved in these special leave petitions is whether, the amendment of Sections 4 and 4A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, made by Act No. 30 of 1995 with effect from 15.9.1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to 15.9.1995?
2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of the accident.
3. A four judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivs Sabata and Anr. speaking through Shinghal. J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workmen by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation, is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim.
4. A two judge Bench of this Court in The New India Assurance Company Limited v. V.K. Neelakandan and Ors. etc, etc.--Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-16906 of 1996, decided on 6.11.1996, however, took the view that Workmen's Compensation Act, being a special legislation for the benefit of the Workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the

workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. Two judge Bench in Neelakandan's case (*supra*), however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Naraian Singh Deo's case, as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case the view expressed by the two judge Bench in Neelakandan's case is not correct.

5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in *United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi* (1998) 1 KLT 951 (FB) wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workmen becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the larger bench of this Court in *Pratap Singh Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata and Anr.* (*supra*) lays down the correct law and we approve it.

6. Having answered the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment in the negative, we shall take up this batch of special leave petitions for consideration.

7. In so far as these special leave petitions are concerned, we find that the accident took place long time back. Compensation became payable to the workmen, as it is not disputed that the accidents occurred during the course of employment, as per the law prior to the amendment made in 1995. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, pettiness of the amounts involved in each of the cases and the time that has since elapsed, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders, decided on the basis of the 1995 amendment, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, dismiss the special leave petitions, but, after clarifying the law, as noticed above.

8. This appeal by special leave calls in question the judgment of the High Court of Kerala, dated 22.10. 1996. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. The view taken by the High Court is unexceptionable and is in accord with the judgment of this Court in *Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata and Anr.* as also the Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in *United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi* (1998) 1 KLT 951 (FB). There is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed. No costs.