



## CRS Report for Congress

# Religion and the Workplace: Legal Analysis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as It Applies to Religious Organizations

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### Summary

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides protections against discrimination for employees of certain employers. Among other things, Title VII generally prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of religion. Title VII prohibits discriminatory treatment of employees on the basis of their religious beliefs and requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious practices. However, religious organizations may be exempt from some of the prohibitions of Title VII. This report reviews the scope of Title VII as it applies to religion and religious organizations and the requirements of both the anti-discrimination protections and the accommodations provision.

**Application of Title VII.** The Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964 created protections for civil rights across a wide spectrum, including religion. Title VII of the CRA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.<sup>1</sup> Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees, including the federal government and state and local governments. Individuals who believe they are victims of employment discrimination may file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is responsible for enforcing individual Title VII claims against private employers. The Department of Justice enforces Title VII against state and local governments but may do so only after the EEOC has conducted an initial investigation.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

<sup>2</sup> For more information on Title VII, see the EEOC website [<http://www.eeoc.gov/>] and the DOJ's Employment Litigation Section website [<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/emp/index.html>]. For general information on the Civil Rights Act and other legislation protecting civil rights, see CRS Report RL33386, *Federal Civil Rights Statutes: A Primer*, by Jody Feder.

**Definitions.** Section 701 of Title VII defines religion to include

all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.<sup>3</sup>

This definition of religion forms the basis of requirements for employers under Title VII. Under the statutory definition, employers cannot use an employee's (or applicant's) religious observance or religious practice against the employee if the employer can reasonably accommodate the observance or practice without undue hardship on the business. If an employer does consider a religious observance or practice that can be reasonably accommodated, the employer may be in violation of Title VII's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion.

Sometimes whether a particular observance or practice is religious is disputed. Religious practices and observances are generally considered "to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views."<sup>4</sup> The belief does not need to be accepted by any religious group and does not need to be accepted by the religious group to which the individual belongs in order to qualify as religious under Title VII.<sup>5</sup>

While Title VII and the related regulations provide a broad prohibition on discrimination based on religion as it is defined alone, Section 703 of Title VII more specifically defines unlawful employment practices under the CRA. This section prohibits employers from using religion as a basis for hiring or discharging any individual. It further prohibits employers from discrimination "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of the individual's religion.<sup>6</sup> The section also prohibits employers from limiting or separating employees or applicants "in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee...."<sup>7</sup>

**Exemptions.** Title VII does not apply to all situations of religious discrimination. In addition to not applying to employers with fewer than 15 employees, there are exceptions that provide for certain employers to consider religion in employment decisions. Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination does not apply to "a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment [i.e., hiring and retention] of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational

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<sup>3</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

<sup>4</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. See *United States v. Seeger*, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).

<sup>5</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.

<sup>6</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

<sup>7</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).

institution, or society of its activities.”<sup>8</sup> However, the statute does not define “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society.” Court decisions appear to indicate several factors relevant to deciding whether an organization qualifies for exemption. Courts have considered (1) the purpose or mission of the organization; (2) the ownership, affiliation or source of financial support of the organization; (3) requirements placed upon staff and members of the organization (faculty and students if the organization is a school); and (4) the extent of religious practices in or the religious nature of products and services offered by the organization.<sup>9</sup>

Title VII also provides two more specific exemptions. One separate, but similar, exemption applies specifically to religious educational institutions. That exemption allows such institutions “to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if [the institution] is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular [organization], or if the curriculum of [the institution] is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.”<sup>10</sup> The other exemption provided in Title VII allows employers to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if those factors are “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”<sup>11</sup> This exemption based on bona fide occupational qualifications has been construed narrowly.<sup>12</sup> Courts have deemed valid discriminatory qualifications to arise only in situations where religion plays an extremely significant part of the work environment, including, for example, jobs where employee safety is threatened because of the employee’s religious affiliation.<sup>13</sup>

Exemptions for religious organizations in the context of Title VII are not absolute. Once an organization qualifies as an entity eligible for Title VII exemption, it is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion in its employment decisions. The exemption does not allow qualifying organizations to discriminate on any other basis forbidden by Title VII. In other words, although a religious organization may consider an employee or applicant’s religion without violating Title VII, the organization may still violate Title VII

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<sup>8</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld this exemption, allowing a religiously affiliated, non-profit entity to make employment decisions based on religion, even if the position related to non-religious activity of the organization. *See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos*, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Faith-based service providers are also eligible for the exemption, but if they receive government funding, the funds cannot be used to directly advance the organization’s religious practices. *See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris*, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

<sup>9</sup> For a recent decision with a summary discussion of circuit courts’ interpretations of organizations that qualify under Title VII’s exemption, see *LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association*, available at 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22328, 19 (3rd Cir. 2007).

<sup>10</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2).

<sup>11</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).

<sup>12</sup> *See Dothard v. Rawlinson*, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).

<sup>13</sup> *See Kern v. Dynallectron Corp.*, 577 F.Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (allowing an employer to require that helicopter pilots convert to Islam in order to be hired for air surveillance over Mecca because Saudi Arabian law prohibited any non-Muslim from entering the holy area, a violation punishable by death), *aff’d*, 746 F.2d 810 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984).

if it considers the individual's race, color, national origin, or sex.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the exemptions in Title VII appear to apply only with respect to employment decisions regarding hiring and firing of employees based on religion. Once an organization makes a decision to employ an individual, the organization may not discriminate on the basis of religion regarding the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, privileges, etc. In other words, religious organizations that decide to hire individuals with other religious beliefs cannot later choose to discriminate against those individuals with regard to wages or other benefits that the organization provides to employees.<sup>15</sup>

It is important to note one more exemption relevant to Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination. Religious organizations' right to choose spiritual leaders is protected under the Constitution's Free Exercise Clause. Even before Title VII granted an exemption to religious organizations' hiring decisions generally, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the "freedom to select the clergy" has "federal constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state interference."<sup>16</sup> Title VII's prohibition on use of religion in employment decisions would appear to interfere with this constitutional freedom specific to clergy. The judicially created "ministerial exception," as this protection has become known, reconciles Title VII with the Free Exercise Clause by allowing religious organizations to select clergy without regard to any of Title VII's restrictions but requires that employment decisions made regarding other positions within the organization comply with Title VII's requirements or exemptions.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> See *EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g. Ass'n*, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982); EEOC Notice, N-915, September 23, 1987. In some cases, an employer may claim that a discharge has a valid discriminatory reason based on religion under the Title VII exemption, while the employee claims the discharge is based on some other Title VII prohibition and therefore improper. For example, in several cases, employees of religious organizations, particularly private religious schools, are discharged after becoming pregnant. The employer claims that the termination was based on a violation of an organization policy against extra-marital sex, stemming from the religion's teachings. The employee claims that the action is unlawful sex discrimination based on her pregnancy. If the court determines that the employer's action was taken in response to the resulting pregnancy, rather than because of a violation of the faith-based policy, the organization may be held in violation of Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination. If the court determines the discharge was based on religious teachings, the organization can claim Title VII exemption. See *Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc.*, 88 F.3d 410 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996).

<sup>15</sup> EEOC Notice, N-915, September 23, 1987.

<sup>16</sup> *Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral*, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).

<sup>17</sup> Each of the eight circuit courts to consider the ministerial exception has recognized the exception to some extent. See *Petruska v. Gannon Univ.*, 462 F.3d 294, 303-04 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2006) (citing *EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh*, 213 F.3d 795 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); *Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church*, 173 F.3d 343 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999); *Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago*, 320 F.3d 698 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp.*, 929 F.2d 360 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991); *Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church*, 375 F.3d 951 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004); *Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church*, 203 F.3d 1299 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); *EEOC v. Catholic Univ. Of Amer.*, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). *Petruska* explains that whether an employee qualifies for the ministerial exception depends on "the function of the position. As a general rule, an employee will be considered a minister if her primary duties include teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a

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**Discrimination Protections.** Title VII generally prohibits employers from treating employees of one religion differently from the way they treat employees of another religion. Employers cannot consider religion when scoring results of employment-related tests;<sup>18</sup> cannot use religion as a motivating factor for any action, even if other factors also motivated the action;<sup>19</sup> cannot retaliate against any individual who opposed an employer's action that is unlawful under Title VII or participated in the investigation of the unlawful action;<sup>20</sup> and cannot publish or advertise any preference based on religion, unless that preference is based on a bona fide occupational qualification.<sup>21</sup> The discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes harassment that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, an employee cannot be required to participate in any religious activity as part of his or her employment.<sup>23</sup>

**Accommodations Requirement.** Under Title VII, employers are prohibited only from acting on the basis of employees' observances and practices that can be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship on the employer's business. In other words, the employer may discriminate on the basis of observances and practices that cannot be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship.<sup>24</sup> EEOC regulations provide guidelines for what constitutes reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Once an employee requests religious accommodation, the employer must consider whether the requested accommodation is reasonable or what reasonable alternatives might be provided.<sup>25</sup> If more than one accommodation is possible without causing undue hardship, the EEOC determines the reasonableness of the chosen accommodation by examining the alternatives considered by the employer and the alternatives actually offered to the employee.<sup>26</sup> If more than one manner of accommodation would not cause undue hardship, "the employer ... must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities."<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> (...continued)

religious order, or supervision of participation in religious ritual and worship." Petruska, 462 F.3d at 304, footnote 6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

<sup>18</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l).

<sup>19</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

<sup>20</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

<sup>21</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b).

<sup>22</sup> *Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson*, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)(interpreting the extent of discrimination protection provided by Title VII's prohibition on discrimination in terms, conditions or privileges of employment).

<sup>23</sup> *See Young v. Sw. Sav. And Loan Ass'n*, 509 F.2d 140 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1975) (holding an employer could not discharge an employee for not attending weekly meetings that included prayers led by a minister).

<sup>24</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

<sup>25</sup> *See* 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2.

<sup>26</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2).

<sup>27</sup> *Id.*

Employee requests for accommodation arise most often because religious practices conflict with work schedules. EEOC guidelines suggest three possible accommodation alternatives in such situations. First, the employer may permit a voluntary substitute policy under which employees can find substitutes to cover their tasks during the conflict. Second, employers may create a flexible work schedule, including flexible arrival and departure times, floating holidays, flexible breaks, use of lunch time for early departure, and staggered work hours. Third, the employer may consider a lateral transfer for individuals whose religious practices cannot be accommodated in their current position.<sup>28</sup> Another common scenario in which employees request accommodations is under a provision in collective bargaining agreements that the employee must join a labor organization or pay an amount equivalent to dues to that organization. When an employee objects to this requirement on religious grounds, the EEOC recommends that the organization make an exception for that employee or allow the employee to donate the equivalent of the amount due to a charitable organization.<sup>29</sup> Requests for accommodation may also arise when an employee's religious beliefs conflict with a work requirement, such as performing abortions, treating gay patients, or complying with dress codes.<sup>30</sup>

In order for these accommodations to be appropriate under Title VII, they must not cause undue hardship to the employer. Employers cannot claim undue hardship on "a mere assumption that many more people ... may also need accommodation."<sup>31</sup> The regulations provide two general bases that may justify undue hardship: cost and seniority rights. An employer may refuse to accommodate an employee's religious practice if "the accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost."<sup>32</sup> The EEOC determines whether an accommodation exceeds a de minimis cost by evaluating the cost incurred to the particular employer and the number of employees that will need the accommodation.<sup>33</sup> Generally, administrative costs of rescheduling are considered de minimis costs.<sup>34</sup> An employer may also refuse to accommodate because the accommodation would interfere with the preference guaranteed by a seniority system.<sup>35</sup> Because seniority systems create "a neutral way of minimizing the number of occasions when an employee must work on a day that he would prefer to have off," Title VII does not require that seniority systems "must give way when necessary to accommodate religious observances."<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1).

<sup>29</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(2).

<sup>30</sup> For a discussion of how courts have decided in cases relating to these requests, see the Informal Discussion Letter prepared by the EEOC Office of Legal Counsel regarding Title VII: Religious Expression, at [[http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2004/titlevii\\_religious\\_expression.html](http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2004/titlevii_religious_expression.html)].

<sup>31</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1).

<sup>32</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (internal quotations omitted).

<sup>33</sup> *Id.*

<sup>34</sup> *Id.*

<sup>35</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(2). See also *Trans World Airlines v. Hardison*, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that employer did not violate Title VII when it used a religiously neutral seniority system to determine employee work schedules).

<sup>36</sup> *Hardison*, 432 U.S. at 78-79.