

### Phase 0 – Current Situation

- Remote Site unmanned, remotely monitored and managed
- Attractive Site owned by "recognized" critical infrastructure (CI) entity
- Monitoring and Control site process and safety parameters
- Configuration modification of schematics and PLC configuration to support changing local conditions
- Industrial equipment supplied as part of a standard packaged unit for automation and control
- Unrelated national cyber security exercise took place between national government and key infrastructure providers ...



## Packaged Equipment – Third-Party Supply



#### A Web Based, Wireless, Remote Monitoring, Telemetry & Control PLC Platform

The ESD "Web2Water" (W2W) Control Platform is designed to both operate and control all types of Industrial process systems including wastewater treatment and soil and groundwater remediation systems.


W2W is designed to provide the most economical, stable and interactive remote monitoring, telemetry & system control platform available on the market today. ESD has configured the platform with the intent of providing the system operator the most user friendly and intuitive interface experience available, without sacrificing cost or uptime dependability.



W2W utilizes an Allen Bradley MicroLogix PLC, C-More color touch screen operator interface terminal (OIT) with built-in FTP server, e-mail client, and Web server, and a wireless 3G high speed modem supporting major carriers such as AT&T and Verizon Wireless at up to 7.2 Mbps. One simple compact economical platform provides local PLC control, remote control, remote alarming, automatic system status updates, remote interactive control (start / stop / modify) data-logging and trending, and can ship with all wireless communications fully established and operational prior to shipping.



### Internet Accessible + Target Attractiveness



### "Black Box" Enumeration

```
$ sudo hping3 -S -i u1000 --scan 1-65535
                                                grep .A
                                  port 1-65535
Scanning
65535 ports to scan, use -V to see all the replies
+---+
|port| serv name | flags |ttl| id | win | len |
  21 ftp : .S..A... 102 53762 32120
                                      46
9999
        : .S..A... 102 27815 33232
           : .S..A... 101 48553 33232
10900
                                      46
11102
     : .S..A... 102 45121 33232
                                      46
11110
     : .S..A... 101 28330 33232
                                      46
44818
         : .S..A... 101 11066 2000
                                      48
All replies received. Done.
```

### Phase 1 – Data Collection

#### Purpose:

- Understand current security posture
- Collect attribution data of "unauthorized" access (~1 week)




#### Technique:

- Inline collection of all network traffic
- Utilized "bridged" network interfaces
- Record all data via tcpdump throughout collection period
  \$ sudo tcpdump -i <interface> -G <seconds> -w <filename.pcap>





### Potential Adversaries (Complete Source Attribution)



More than 3100 source addresses over 7 day period



### Phase 2 – Data Analysis

#### Purpose:

- Extract attribution of potential actors
- Leverage threat intelligence in evaluating actors
- Evaluate capability of actors (determine intent)
- Evaluate extent of any breach

#### Technique:

- Evaluate network packet captures across multiple tools
  - Flow Data GeoLocation
  - Session Data Credentials + Files
  - Application Data Source Attribution + Deep Packet Inspection

















## Potential Adversaries (Complete Source Attribution)




### Actual Adversaries




# Flow Data: Target + GeoLocation



## Flow Data: Target + GeoLocation + Capability




## Flow Data: Target + GeoLocation + Capability + Intent






### Session Data: Client/Server Relationship, Files, Credentials





## Application Data: Converting Data to Intelligence



now part of proofpoint?

### Basic Attribution – Authorized versus Unauthorized Access

Source IP					Source Country	
sourceip \$	count	Country ¢	City ¢	Region \$	Country \$	count -
108,176,24,2	1523	United States	New York	New York	United States	3350
			New TOTK	New YORK	Russia	864
65.240.194.232	947	United States			United Kingdom	475
23.194.140.36	198	United States	Cambridge	Massachusetts	Argentina	167
5.188.9.25	198	Russia	Saint Petersburg	StPetersburg	China	164
5.188.11.25	196	Russia	Saint	StPetersburg	India	103
			Petersburg		Bulgaria	100
190.7.62.162	164	Argentina	Federal	Entre Rios	Beland	83
62.190.148.115	152	United Kingdom	Solihull	Solihull	Seychelles	83
100.46.50.195	97	United States			Republic of Korea	50
			CALC TO LO		France	47
46.55.209.53	95	Bulgaria	Kavarna	Oblast Dobrich	Germany	45
195.88.112.213	83	Russia			Hong Kong	45
37.215.156.231	83	Belarus	Maladzyechna	Minsk		
185.2.196.196	71	United Kingdom	Wimbledon	Merton	Netherlands   Japan	44
		Control Property of			1 (4/4) V	192





## Threat Intelligence – Source Address Reputation

SID				SID by Source IP	
sid ‡	count	percent \$	sid-msg ‡	sid \$	sourceip \$
2402000	509	39.827856	ET DROP Dshield Block Listed Source group 1	2001219	108.176.24.2
				2006402	108.176.24.2
2403303	121	9.467919	ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP group 4	2006402	70.214.68.141
2403304 104	8.137715	ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP group 5	2010935	121.224.53.136	
			2010939	70.187.149.166	
2101411	36	2.816901	GPL SNMP public access udp	2012936	46.183.219.132
2403367	20	1.564945	ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP group 68	2017174	42.202.133.28
			\$4750 (a.M.s.) = 0.00	2017616	203.162.13.243
2403361	20	1,564945	ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP group 62	2018317	108.176.24.2
2403380	2403380 18 1.4084	1.408451	ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP	2018489	108.176.24.2
			group 81	2023753	188.230.73.37
2221014	18	1.408451	SURICATA HTTP missing Host header	2023753	212.92.115.77
2403384	16	1,251956	ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP group 85	2023753	212.92.124.11
2403397	2403397 14 1.095462	1.095462	ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP	2023753	5.101.40.8
			group 98	2023753	62.102.148.173
2500045	13	1 017214	FT COMPROMISED Known Compromised or Hostile Host Traffic	2101280	173 249 22 112





## Threat Intelligence – Source Address Reputation

"Block Listed Source Group" [SID 2402000]			"Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP Group 4" [SID 2403303]		"Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP Group 5" [SID 2403304]			
sourceip ‡	count -	Country \$	anumada A		Country			Country
5.188.9.25	99	Russia	sourcelp =	count •	Country \$	sourceip \$	count •	Country #
5.188.11.25	98	Russia	5.188.11.25	98	Russia	5.188.9.25	98	Russia
77.72.82.101	39	Russia >50%	5.188.10.108	13	Russia	5.188.203.40	5	Russia
5.188.11.111	35	Russia	5.188.11.20	7	Russia	5.188.86.140	1	Russia
191.101.167.167	18	United States	5.101.40.10	1	Russia		104	
85.93.20.34	18	Germany	5.188.10.4 1 Russia 100%				, O	
		harana and the control of the contro	5.188.11.22	1	Russia			
77.72.82.98	17	Russia		121				
77.72.82.222	14	Russia	100%					
92.63.197.40	14	Russia						
5.188.10.108	13	Russia						
89.248.168.14	10	Seychelles						
77.72.82.11	9	Russia						
80.82.77.33	9	Seychelles						
5.188.11.20	7	Russia						
181.214.87.230	6	United States						
		2 (0)						








### Phase 3 – Risk Reduction and Remediation

- Replace existing switch with multi-port firewall (approx. 2" of rail space available)
- Use existing 24VDC power supply
- Basic stateful shallow-packet inspection firewall (deep-packet inspection not necessary)
- Establish role-based rules/policy
  - "user" = schematics, logs
  - "maintenance" = configuration
- Utilize digital certificates for authentication to firewall for sensitive configuration and support




### Basic Architecture ("Secured")




<sup>\*</sup> Service Exposed on Public Interface; cannot be disabled

## User Firewall – Assign Templates



### User Firewall – Implement Role-based Policy/Rules



### Improve Security, Increase Resilience, Descrease Attractiveness

