Critical Infrastructure-as-Code (ClaC)

Matthew R. Backes

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Asserting Control by Improving Manageability

- **Safety requires positive control. Positive control requires integrity. Integrity requires well-managed systems. Cybersecurity underpins these properties.**
- **Current approaches to CM are *ad hoc* and vendor-specific**
  - **System configurations need to be well-understood and manageable by the end users**
  - **False dichotomy between active and passive methods**
- **We need to make our management approaches:**
  - **Principled**
  - **Systematic**
  - **Operator/Engineer-friendly**
  - **Enable identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery**

We need to elevate configuration management as a first-class objective

CM: Configuration Management

Configuration Management Philosophies





Impetus

- Systems in operation are rarely well-managed across the system lifecycle
- Dynamic hardware-in-the-loop testbed reveals configuration management nightmare that could benefit from systematic code-based approach
- Could we do this similarly to how modern IT infrastructure is managed?
- "Critical infrastructure": any device or machine reachable via IP or serial networks
- Purpose of talk:
  - Share lessons learned
  - Propose a way forward
  - Solicit feedback

Unknown baselines and unmanaged devices leave control systems in a fragile state that is less than weakly defensible

Challenges with Managing Infrastructure

- **It's not managed**
  - **"I've commissioned a good bit of [field device type], never had anybody doing backup on the settings files."**
- **Machine and device heterogeneity**
- **As-builts are commonly the only source of documentation (if they exist)**
- **Fragile infrastructure: access mechanisms are primitive**
- **Many dependencies: vendor software**
- **Configuration drift:**
  - **"…Those entities typically did not incorporate configuration changes into baselines due to *overlooking a manual component* of the workflow process." – FERC[1]**

[1] https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2019/2018-report-audits.pdf

Configuration is Cumbersome











Configuration Management Improvements

Status Quo		Desired End State
• Almost always require another piece of software	→	• Reduced complexity – Eliminate application software; minimize the TCB
• Retrieve from multiple interfaces, each w/ distinct functionality	→	• Standardized interface – A single, well-defined interface, e.g., NETCONF
• Cannot be retrieved securely	→	• Secured Comms – Public key SSH
• Proprietary, non-human-readable file formats	→	• Interoperable Data Formats – YAML, JSON
• Cannot quickly be compared via text processing tools	→	• Revision Controlled with secured fallback – git, diff, RAUC

TCB: Trusted Computing Base
SSH: Secure Shell

YAML: Yet Another Markup Language
JSON: Javascript Object Notation
RAUC: Robust Auto-Update Controller

Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) Goals and Practices





Control System Configuration Management Deployment

ANSIBLE

JSON

Config template database

Host definitions

Service definitions

Config file

Standardized API

Telnet FTP

Web scraping

Vendor DLL

Web manager

Protection Relays

RTUs

Genset controllers

Serial-to-Ethernet Converters

API: Application Programming Interface
RTU: Remote Terminal Unit

FTP: File Transfer Protocol
DLL: Dynamical Link Library

Defining a Configuration Workflow: Leveraging Ansible

Standardize Templates	Define Environment	Define Device and Service Functionality	Generate Artifacts

ANSIBLE

Configuration template

```
networking:
    ip_addr: '{{ ip_addr }}'
    default_gateway: '{{ gateway }}'
    enable_web: '{{ enable_web_access }}'
    enable_nic: '{{ enable_nic }}'
    enable_dhcp: '{{ enable_dhcp }}'
users:
    names: {{ user_names }}
    account_state: {{ account_states }}
    default_role: {{ system_roles }}
    description: {{ descriptions }}
syslog:
    ip_addr: '{{ syslog_server }}'
    threshold: '{{ syslog_threshold }}'
```

jinja2

Host inventory

```
[sel]
sel-3505 ansible_host=192.168.1.100

[woodward]
easYgen-3400XT ansible_host=192.168.1.12

[pcan]
can_gateway ansible_host=192.168.1.11

[grid-connect]
rs485_gateway ansible_host=192.168.1.2

[endpoint]
rtu ansible_host=192.168.1.3

[firewall]
cisco_asa ansible_host=192.168.10.4
```

YAML

Variables:
- Global
- Vendor
- Device

```
syslog_server: '192.168.1.10'
syslog_threshold: 'INFO'
gateway: '192.168.10.254'
syslog_path: '/dev/log'
device_data_path: '/home/s4x2020/devices'
device_config_path: '/home/s4x2020/configs'
```

```
device_name: 'SEL-2241 RTAC at AAA'
device_location: 'Located in Substation ZZZ at BBB'
user_names: ["tim"]
account_states: ["enabled"]
system_roles: ["engineer"]
descriptions: ["account created to fix problem"]
enable_dhcp: 'N'
enable_ping: 'Y'
enable_nic: 'Y'
```

YAML

Generated Configuration File

```
networking:
    ip_addr: '192.168.1.100'
    default_gateway: '192.168.1.254'
    enable_ping: 'Y'
    enable_web: 'Y'
    enable_odbc: 'Y'
    enable_nic: 'Y'
    enable_dhcp: 'N'
users:
    names: [u'tim']
    account_state: [u'enabled']
    default_role: [u'engineer']
    description: [u'account created to fix problem']
    complex_passwds: [u'Y']
    password: [u'1234']
syslog:
    ip_addr: '192.168.1.10'
    threshold: 'INFO'
```

YAML

Configurations can be expressed in human-readable format!

Interface Operations

```
positional arguments:
  {LS-511,easYgen-3400XT,easYgen-3500,ALL}
                        specify the Woodward device type. ALL will connect to
                        all devices in the inventory file.
  {CAN,Serial,IP}       specify the communication method with the device(s).
  comm_port             specify the IP address for IP, or the COM port (e.g.,
                        COM1) for CAN/Serial communications

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  -u UPLOAD, --upload UPLOAD
                        upload configuration file(s) to the specified
                        device(s)
  -d DOWNLOAD, --download DOWNLOAD
                        download configuration file(s) from the specified devi
                        ce(s)
  -f, --fingerprint     collect a Woodward device fingerprint
  -c, --compare         compare active device settings to a reference
  -a, --alarms          download alarms from a Woodward device
  -e, --events          download events alarms from a Woodward device
  -l, --logs            download logs from a Woodward device
```

Specifying device and communication method

Defined a minimum set of operations to interact with device configuration and logged info

Device Translators

	Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories		Woodward	Grid Connect PCAN
Hardware Devices				
Existing Config Mechanisms	**telnetlib ftp**	**selenium**	**pythonnet automation.dll**	**requests telnetlib**
	• Text files available via ftp • Telnet CLI running SEL ASCII • No SSH	• Can upload files via a browser • Can obtain and parse the firewall ruleset	• Library with methods for automating config • Provides config compare feature	• One provided a REST-like API • Saves settings in .ini format • Provides settings compare feature

CLI: Command Line Interface

ClaC: Lessons Learned

Tread Carefully:

- Interaction mechanisms are not always secure, and are rarely standardized
- Configuration file parsers can be extremely fragile
- Misconfiguring network parameters may affect entire device functionality
- Enabled management interfaces expose additional (sometimes extreme) risk
- Different firmware versions of same device can have different interaction mechanisms

Moving Forward:

- Work is needed by vendors to support secure and safe CM functionality
- Existing IaC tools can be used, but will likely require modification
- Community needs to come together to define requirements and build interoperable toolsets and APIs

Three *Separate* Functions



ClaC Tool requirements:

- Scriptable interface
- Externalized configuration
- Minimize software dependencies

CM Protocol requirements:

- RPC Paradigm
- Secure access
- Well-defined CM functions ('get-config')

API requirements:

- Simple (RESTful) and secure
- Configs are human-readable
- Event and log retrieval

IED: Intelligent Electronic Device

RPC: Remote Procedure Call

Building on a Solid Foundation

Defensible systems require positive control. We must enforce simplicity and regain control through better manageability

This enables defenders to:

- **Facilitate configuration control boards**
- **Backup and revision-control all device configurations**
- **Easily declare network-wide policies**
- **Automatically generate firewall and application whitelist rules**
- **Provide a way to easily manage Digital Twins – configurations are easily reproduced**
- **IT/OT integration…we can speak a common language for configuration management**

Questions?

- **Thanks!**