

Exploitable Vulnerabilities Hidden Deep in OT

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Emerging Threat Landscape



Traditional IT Hacker



OT Domain Expertise



Chemical Engineer



Havoc


OT Configuration: The Next Frontier

Top Vulnerabilities in OT Today

- Scope of Analysis
 - 10,000+ industrial endpoints
 - 380,000+ vulnerabilities
 - Variety of operating environments



Oil & Gas



Refining & Chemicals



Power Generation



Pulp & Paper



Metals, Mining &
Minerals




Microsoft



OT Configuration (Programming) 101

Component	Description	Example
Control Function	Library of pre-programmed objects	Flow Controller: Model equation, data acquisition, error handling, alarms.....
Application	Embedded or third-party	Embedded: AMCL, SFC, HLBL..... Third Party: APC, Optimizers...
HMI	Graphical interface	



Exploitable Weaknesses Designed into OT

**Ubiquitous
Weaknesses**



They're Everywhere!!

**Unique
Weaknesses**



Specific to OT Make & Model

The Reverse



- Control Function Parameter – Output Characteristic
 - Name of parameter unique to each control system
- Binary Setting
 - Determines direct or indirect action based upon error (Setpoint-Process Value)

Flip the Setting, Watch the Fun!

- Valve that was 20% open will now be 20% closed
- Fail safe valve will do the opposite of intended action

Example

```
LOCAL t : TIME      -- Time variable
...
SET t = now         -- Get current time in t

IF T > 86350 THEN GOTO SET_REVERSE
ELSE GOTO LAST_ST

WAIT 15 Mins
GOTO SET_FORWARD
|
SET_REVERSE: SET FC_9290_23A.OPTDIR =REVERSE 'CTILACTN =REVERSE also work
SET FC_9290_23B.OPTDIR =REVERSE
SET FC_9290_23C.OPTDIR =REVERSE
...
GOTO LAST_ST
...
SET_FORWARD: SET FC_9290_23A.OPTDIR =FORWARD 'CTILACTN =FORWARD also works
SET FC_9290_23B.OPTDIR =FORWARD
SET FC_9290_23C.OPTDIR =FORWARD
...
GOTO LAST_ST
...
LAST_ST:
END OPTUDIR
```


Behold, I Am King!

Unique



X _KEY()

- Inject this line into control system HMI
- Grants admin privileges on the entire network

*Windows Account Privileges?
HA! Don't Care!*

Code Invaders!



- Today's HMI – Most Use HTML
- Non-versioned, Free Format
- Implemented on Stations with Elevated Privileges
- Can Inject Code to Do Almost Anything You Want
 - Change Flow Controller Settings? Done!
 - SQL Injections into Configuration Database? Easy Peasy!
 - Hover Over a Page Corner, Be Directed to Porn Website? Sounds Fun!

Gonna Use Code Invaders to Run a Reverse Today...!

Come on Baby, Light My Fire!

Unique

Settings to Balance Computer Loading



Flow Indicator

Tag 1

Sample Rate: 0.5 seconds
Calculation Period: 1 second



Flow Controller

Tag 2

Sample Rate: 0.5 seconds
Calculation Period: 1 second

- Tags that talk better have the same settings
- Mix them up, control problems ensure (conflicting values in calculations)
- Line them up — see ya CPU!

*Use that Code Invader to Change It Back...
Who's Gonna Know?*

Default, Are You Kidding Me?

Unique

User Names, Profiles, & Password Hash Stored in Configuration Database

user_profile_name	password_hash	user_full_name
SystemEngineer	-9**9	NULL
Admin	866167787	
Default	-1804721073	NULL
Engin	-115131539	Engineer
C*****\sy***4_c	-805374805	*****, Da****
C*****\d****1_c	-1340616663	Ty***, Jo****



1 Duplicate user name & password hash at every location

2 Changing either can create service disruptions

So, WADDYA GONNA DO?

You Can't Lock It All Down

Owner Operators: Do the Basics

1. Implement Configuration Management on Crown Jewels
2. Routinely Audit for Unexpected Change

OT Security Community: Develop Best Practices

1. Leverage CIS (formerly SANS Top 20)
2. Develop Best Practices for OT Configuration Management (general & specific)

**Improving Configuration Management
Improves Safety & Reliability
While Reducing Cyber Risk**





Thank You

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