Advanced fuzzing workshop2nd edition





// WHO AM I

#define speaker

Antonio Morales

#define job

Security Researcher at (



#define twitter

@nosoynadiemas



using namespace Hackfest;

int main(int argc, char* argv[]){



September 24, 2020

GHSL-2020-113: Command injection vulnerability in limdu - CVE-2020-4066

The `trainBatch` function has a command injection vulnerability. Clients of the Limdu library are unlikely to be aware of this, so they might unwittingly write code that contains a vulnerability



Kevin Backhouse

September 22, 2020

GHSL-2020-097: Missing hostname validation in twitter-stream - CVE-2020-24392

Missing hostname validation allows an attacker to perform a monster in the middle attack against users of the library.



Agustin Gianni

September 22, 2020

GHSL-2020-096: Missing hostname validation in tweetstream - CVE-2020-24393

Missing hostname validation allows an attacker to perform a monster in the middle attack



CodeQL

Research


Advisories Get Involved Events

GitHub Security Lab


Securing the world's software, together

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https://securitylab.github.com/



In this second installment, I'll delve into the research conducted on FreeRDP (http://www.freerdp.com/).



Antonio Morales

August 6, 2020

SSTI, CVE, RCE, Security

Room for Escape: Scribbling Outside the Lines of Template Security


in this Q&A with Alvaro Muñoz, dive in a recent research that uncovered more than 30 CVEs across 20 different CMS



Motivation

CVE-2019-20176	CVE-2019-14438	CVE-2019-14777	CVE-2020-4030	CVE-2020-9273
CVE-2020-9274	CVE-2019-14498	CVE-2019-14970	CVE-2020-11096	CVE-2019-14778
CVE-2020-9365	CVE-2019-14535	CVE-2020-13396	CVE-2020-11095	CVE-2020-11097
CVE-2020-6162	CVE-2019-14534	CVE-2020-13397	CVE-2020-4032	CVE-2019-14437
CVE-2020-6835	CVE-2019-14533	CVE-2020-13398	CVE-2020-4033	CVE-2019-14779
CVE-2020-9272	CVE-2019-14776	CVE-2020-11099	CVE-2020-4031	CVE-2020-11098

The aim of this workshop



Dumb Fuzzing

Smart Fuzzing

Workshop Format

It's a hands-on CTF-style workshop (learning-by-doing method).

You will learn while facing the challenges. I'm here to guide your learning.

Tools - AFL

All you need for the workshop is AFL++
tool running on a Linux system. Please,
if you haven't download yet, do it now:
https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus/releases

Installing AFL++ ->
 https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus/Belling-afl


```
american fuzzy lop ++2.66d (test-floatingpoint) [explore]
process timina
                                                       overall results
      run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 49 sec
                                                       cycles done : 125
 last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 32 sec
                                                       total paths : 6
last uniq crash : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 32 sec
                                                      uniq crashes : 1
last unig hang : none seen yet
                                                        uniq hangs : 0
cycle progress
                                      map coverage
                                        map density : 28.12% / 50.00%
now processing : 0.125 (0.0%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
                                     count coverage : 1.00 bits/tuple
stage progress
                                      findings in depth
now trying : splice 5
                                     favored paths : 6 (100.00%)
stage execs : 31/32 (96.88%)
                                      new edges on: 6 (100.00%)
total execs : 592k
                                     total crashes : 8 (1 unique)
exec speed : 11.2k/sec
                                      total tmouts : 0 (0 unique)
fuzzing strategy yields
                                                      path geometry
 bit flips : 0/184, 0/178, 0/166
                                                        levels: 4
byte flips: 1/23, 0/17, 0/5
arithmetics : 0/1283, 0/471, 0/33
                                                      pend fav : 0
known ints: 0/121, 0/417, 0/218
                                                     own finds : 5
dictionary: 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
avoc/splice : 3/228k, 2/360k
                                                     stability : 100.00%
 py/custom : 0/0, 0/0
      trim : n/a, 0.00%
                                                              [cpu000: 50%
```



Workshop repository

Find all you need for the workshop at

https://github.com/antonio-morales/Hackfest Advanced Fuzzing Workshop



Challenges are intended to be solved by fuzzing.

... but you can use whatever method you want (good luck xD)


There may be more than one correct solution.

 After each challenge, I will show my solution and I will explain it to you.

 There will be 3 different challenges. The goal is to find a reproducible bug on each of them.

- We're looking for exploitable vulnerabilities. "Theoretical bugs" or code warnings are not welcome, sorry. Memory leaks are not valid solutions.
- In order to be the winner of a challenge, you must provide a valid crash/PoC.

- Please, don't disclose your solutions
- Send me a private message via Telegram



 I will give you some hints and tips before and during the challenge

I'll release a new hint every 5-10 minutes (approx)

So, don't despair and keep trying!


Awards

There will be 2 winners for each challenge (6 total winners).

 The winners will be the fastest ones in solving the challenge (find the vulnerability).

Prizes






https://github.myshopify.com/

QUESTIONS / PREGUNTAS

Challenge 1 - ESIF (Extremely Stupid Image Format)

RELOAD (V2.0)

Get the code at: https://github.com/antonio-morales/Hackfest_Advanced_Fuzzing_Workshop/



Convert ESIF format to PPM format

Build:

> gcc HackFest1.c -o HackFest1 -w -lcrypto -lssl

Run:

> ./ HackFest1 example.ESIF output.ppm

You can find "Example.ESIF" in the same folder

Challenge 1 - ESIF (Extremely Stupid Image Format)

Ask me any doubt via PM



LET'S GO!!!

PASSWORD: hello3487hello



Challenge 1 – TIP

That's all you need to start fuzzing with AFL:

[COMPILE] afl-gcc src/HackFest1.c -o HackFest1 -w -lcrypto -lssl

[FUZZING] afl-fuzz -i ./AFL/afl_in/ -o './AFL/afl_out' -- ./HackFest1 @@ output

- If you have any problem, first try with:
 - > sudo apt-get install libssl-dev

- I strongly advise you to link your binary with ASan (AddressSanitizer) and UBSan (Undefined Behavior Sanitizer)
- To do this, add -fsanitize=address,undefined to your compile line

Don't forget to add -m none to your AFL command line

```
afl-gcc src/HackFest1.c -o HackFest1 -w -lcrypto -lssl -fsanitize=address,undefined
```

afl-fuzz -m none -i ./AFL/afl_in/ -o './AFL/afl_out' -- ./HackFest1 @@ output

- Code coverage can be really useful here. You can enable it adding --coverage to your compile line
 - > sudo apt install lcov
- You can find a Code Coverage script in the folder: lcov.sh
- You can collect code coverage, as follows:
 - > chmod +x run files
 - > chmod +x lcov.sh
 - > ./lcov.sh

Then, open ./html_coverage/index.html to view generated LCOV code coverage report

Sometimes checksums can be a pain in the ass.

 Take a look at: https://securitylab.github.com/research/fuzzing-challenges-solutions-1

Looks like there are some obstacles in the code...

```
ch.Data = malloc(length);
memcpy(ch.Data, addr, length);

//CRC check
uint32_t crc = to_uint32(&ch.Header[4]);
if(crc != crc32(addr, length))
        goto error;

if(chunk_type(ch.Header, ch.Data, length) < 0)
        goto error;

return length+8;</pre>
```

```
data += 2;
if(glob.p == 0 || glob.d == 0)
    goto error;
MD5_Update(&context, svd, svdn-24);
MD5 Final(md5, &context);
if(memcmp(md5, data, 16))
    goto error;
data += 16;
if(memcmp(data, "\x20\x21", 2))
    goto error;
```

A little bit easier...

```
if(glob.p == 0 || glob.d == 0)
    goto error;

MD5_Update(&context, svd, svdn-24);
MD5_Final(md5, &context);
//if(memcmp(md5, data, 16))
    //goto error;

data += 16;
```

A dictionary can be useful... sometimes

```
afl-fuzz -t 500 -m none -i ../AFL/afl_in/ -o ../AFL/afl_out
-x ../AFL/mydict.txt -- ./hackfest1 @@
```

If you need more help, take a look at: https://securitylab.github.com/research/fuzzing-challenges-solutions-1 ("Providing a custom dictionary")

Which items should be included in my dict?

It's hard to guess... XD

Challenge 1 – My Solution

```
1 "\x2C\x61\x73\x75"
2 "\x2D\x41\x63\x85"
3 "\x74\x54\xDF\xDC"
4 "\x84\x83\xDF\xDC"
5 "\x98\x32\x67\x54"
```

Challenge 2 — QSSLANG (Quite Stupid Structured Language)

Get the code at: https://github.com/antonio-morales/Hackfest_Advanced_Fuzzing_Workshop/

```
#A humble tribute to IOCCC contests XD
#QSSLANG example
<QSS>
    <main> #Put here your cool comment
        <b>config</b> #Let's go
        <if><b true><n 12><SUM><n 87><endif><d 1605722137>
        <SUM>
        <AV><n 123456><n 7.8><text>hide</text><when><d 1605722111
        <MULT><n 123.21><n 7888.2><body><n 12></body>
        <t John><SIZE><n 321321>
        <TITITITE >
        <text>helloworld</text>
                        ><b><comment><t Alex>
                         0><SUB><n 122></comment><n 123.12>
                        dif>[IF]<s cool challenge><MULT><n 500><n
                         0><if><b!=text><t Hack><CONCAT><t Fest>
```

The most stupid structured-language never created

Build:

> gcc ./HackFest2.c -w -o hackfest2

Run:

> ./hackfest2 Example.xml

Challenge 2 – QSSLANG (Quite Stupid Structured Language)

Ask me any doubt via PM



Reminder

50 minutes

LET'S GO!!!

PASSWORD: fuzz9283fuzz



Pay attention to the GUI,

• Is there anything wrong?



```
american fuzzy lop ++2.66c (hackfest2) [explore] {0}
  process timing
                                                        overall results
        run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 47 sec
                                                        cycles done : 0
   last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 0 sec
                                                        total paths : 268
                                                       uniq crashes : 0
 last unig crash : none seen yet
  last uniq hang : none seen yet
                                                         uniq hangs : 0
  cycle progress -
                                       map coverage
  now processing : 0.1 (0.0%)
                                         map density : 4.95% / 12.90%
 paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
                                      count coverage : 2.58 bits/tuple
                                       findings in depth -
  stage progress
  now trying : bitflip 4/1
                                      favored paths : 1 (0.37%)
 stage execs : 484/5229 (9.26%)
                                       new edges on: 157 (58.58%)
 total execs : 22.0k
                                      total crashes : 0 (0 unique)
  exec speed : 217.5/sec
                                       total tmouts : 0 (0 unique)
  fuzzing strategy yields
                                                       path geometry
   bit flips : 221/5232, 42/5231, 0/0
                                                         levels : 2
  byte flips : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                        pending : 268
 arithmetics : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                       pend fav : 1
                                                      own finds : 267
  known ints: 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                       imported : n/a
  dictionary: 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
havoc/splice : 0/0, 0/0
                                                      stability : 24.47%
   py/custom : 0/0, 0/0
        trim: 0.00%/314, n/a
                                                               [cpu000: 50%]
```



• Stability: it measures the consistency of observed traces. If a program always behaves the same for the same input data, it will earn a score of 100%. When the value is lower but still shown in purple, the fuzzing process is unlikely to be negatively affected. If it goes into red, you may be in trouble, since AFL will have difficulty discerning between meaningful and "phantom" effects of tweaking the input file.

• Life can be random...



Ok... That's what you need:

```
void vnsi(){
    struct timespec start;
    clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &start);

    //srandom(start.tv_nsec); //RESTORE
    srandom(1);
}
```

We should avoid high drops in stability

Can you find the differences?

Binary formats

Vs Bit/bytes mutations Text-based file formats

Vs
Bit/bytes mutations

Maybe binary mutations are not the best for text-based file formats

• Take a look at: https://securitylab.github.com/research/fuzzing-software-2 ("Custom mutators")

- Have you ever heard of RADAMSA?
- https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus/tree/stable/custom mutators/radamsa

Too slow? You can try disabling ASAN and UBSAN

"MOPT is an excellent mutator..."

Using MOPT mutator you can find the bug in about 10 minutes

```
american fuzzy lop ++2.66c (hackfest2) [explore] {3}
 process timing
                                                       overall results
        run time : 0 days, 0 hrs 11 min, 39 sec
                                                       cycles done : 4
  last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, v min, i sec
                                                       total paths : 1500
 last uniq crash : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 42 sec
                                                      uniq crashes : 1
                                                        uniq hangs : 0
 last uniq hang : none seen yet
 cvcle progress
                                      map coverage
 now processing : 501.0 (33.4%)
                                        map density : 1.31% / 2.33%
 paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
                                     count coverage : 5.09 bits/tuple
                                      findings in depth
 stage progress ———
                                     favored paths : 115 (7.67%)
 now trying : MOpt-havoc
stage execs: 3166/4096 (77.29%)
                                      new edges on : 192 (12.80%)
total execs : 1.12M
                                     total crashes : 1 (1 unique)
 exec speed: 1149/sec
                                      total tmouts : 0 (0 unique)
 fuzzing strategy yields
                                                      path geometry
  bit flips : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                        levels : 8
 byte flips : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                       pending: 1500
 arithmetics : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                      pend fav : 115
 known ints : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                     own finds: 1499
 dictionary: 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                      imported : n/a
                                                     stability: 100.00%
havoc/splice : 1271/544k, 0/0
  py/custom : 0/0, 0/0
       trim: 1.94%/63.1k, n/a
                                                              [cpu003: 87%]
```

```
WRITE of size 1 at 0x7ffff9a0b830 thread T0
   #0 0x55e6247118f3 in setall src/HackFest2.h:502
   #1 0x55e624717926 in function4 src/HackFest2.c:2474
   #2 0x55e6247b7d2f in check_time src/HackFest2.h:570
   #3 0x55e6247b7d2f in Process src/HackFest2.c:2618
   #4 0x55e6246e27fa in main src/HackFest2.c:2682
   #5 0x7ff4dcf021e2 in libc start main (/lib/x86 64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x271e2)
   #6 0x55e6246e2d2d in _start (/home/antonio/eclipse-workspace/HackFest2/hackfest2+0x53d2d)
Address 0x7ffff9a0b830 is located in stack of thread TO at offset 160 in frame
   #0 0x55e6247b784f in Process src/HackFest2.c:2602
 This frame has 1 object(s):
   [32, 160) 'ascii' (line 2605) <== Memory access at offset 160 overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swa
pcontext or vfork
     (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow src/HackFest2.h:502 in setall
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
 0x10007f3396b0: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
 0x10007f3396d0: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
                                     00 f2 f2 f2
 0x10007f3396f0: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
                                00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

A Stack buffer overflow vulnerability

```
#QSSLANG example
<QSS>
    <main> #Put here your cool comment
        <b>config</b> #Let's go
        <if><b true><n 12><SUM><n 87><endif><d 1605722137>
        <SUM>
        <AV><n 123456><n 7.8><text>hide</text><when><d 1605722111>
        <MULT><n 123.21><n 7888.2><body><n 12></body>
        <t John><SIZE><n 321321>
        <MULT>
        <text>helloworld</text>
        [IF]<n 123><SIZE><b><comment><t Alex>
            [THEN] <n 1000 > < SUB > <n 122 > < / comment > <n 123.12 >
        <SIZE><n 144><endif>[IF]<s cool challenge><MULT><n 500><n 100>[ELSE]
        < n 75.5 > < SUM > < n
        122.212345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345
        6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345
        6789012345678901234567890>
        <i 100><SUM><i 50><if><b!=text><t Hack><CONCAT><t Fest>
    </main>
```


```
You can trigger with:
```

```
SIZE tag && 3<sup>rd</sup> argument
&& == float size(3<sup>rd</sup> argument) > 128
```

```
#QSSLANG example
<QSS>
    <main> #Put here your cool comment
        <b>config</b> #Let's go
        <if><b true><n 12><SUM><n 87><endif><d 1605722137>
        <SUM>
        <AV><n 123456><n 7.8><text>hide</text><when><d 1605722111>
        <MULT><n 123.21><n 7888.2><body><n 12></body>
        <t John><SIZE><n 321321>
        <MULT>
        <text>helloworld</text>
        [IF]<n 123><SIZE><b><comment><t Alex>
             [THEN] <n 1000 > < SUB > <n 122 > < / comment > <n 123.12 >
        <SIZE><n 144><endif>[IF]<s cool challenge><MULT><n 500><n 100>[ELSE]
        < n 75.5 > < SUM > < n
        122.21234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234
        6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345
        6789012345678901234567890>
        <i 100><SUM><i 50><if><b!=text><t Hack><CONCAT><t Fest>
    </main>
```

Challenge 2 – Based on

https://hackerone.com/reports/480883



Challenge 3 - My sweet parser

• I will publish it next Monday at: https://github.com/antonio-morales/Hackfest Advanced Fuzzing Workshop/ and it will last one week.

• I will announce Challenge 3 winners next week ©

If you have any doubt on it, send me a pm via Twitter
 @nosoynadiemas

CONCLUSION

Conclusion


Don't waste fuzzing iterations. Use your brain first

THE END



THANK YOU! GRACIAS!





Antonio Morales Maldonado

Twitter: @nosoynadiemas

Email: antoniomoralesmaldonado@gmail.com