Securing openHAB Smart Home through User Authentication and Authorization

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Overview

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Security Challenges in OpenHAB
- 3 Proposed Security Mechanisms
- 4 Conclusion and Future Research Directions

Introduction: Internet of Things

Internet of Things. Dynamic and heterogenous environment where *sensing* devices interact with each other.

- Devices: smartphones, smart watches, smoke alarm, security camera, heartbeat and temperature monitor, etc.
- Applications: Smart home, smart transportation, smart healthcare, intelligent transportation, etc.
- Challenges: interoperability, architecture, device naming, usability, security and privacy.

A Smart Home Application: OpenHAB

"a vendor and technology agnostic open source automation software for your home" (openHAB Community, 2010)

- May be deployed on very modest devices (e.g., Raspberry Pi)
- Mostly works without an Internet connection.
- Uses thing-specific bindings to connect to devices.
- Made up of individual projects, e.g. Eclipse SmartHome.
- Written in Java under the OSGi architecture.

Problem Statement

- To review the existing security mechanisms of the openHAB smart home automation software.
- To study and implement a JSON Web Token-based authenticator for Eclipse SmartHome, the core of openHAB, as a base for access control mechanisms.
- To propose a usable authorization model to manage access permissions to things and resources in openHAB.

Motivation

- Developments of IoT applications focus mostly on functional requirements, leaving usability, performance, security, etc., for later.
- Consequences in smart home range from mere user discomfort to identity theft, or worse.
- Lack of security deters adoption of IoT applications, halts progress.

Objectives

- I To analyze the security mechanisms in use for the openHAB automation software.
- 2 To implement a client authenticator based on the JSON Web Token for Eclipse Smarthome.
- 3 To propose a fine-grained, yet usable authorization model for openHAB to manage usage permissions.

Security Challenges in OpenHAB

- Intranet of Things
- Bindings
- Access Control

Intranet of Things

- Aims to contain private data locally.
- Puts a limitation on use cases.
- Assumes security of the private network.
- Secure remote access: a challenge.

Security of Bindings

Binding. Logical modules to support inter-device interaction inside openHAB.

- Each binding is defined for things that use a certain protocol,
 e.g.: KNX, Z-Wave, ZigBee, Panasonic TV, etc.
- Some bindings use an API for remote connection to the vendor.
- Remote communication may be done under HTTPS if specified by binding.

Access Control

- Whoever gains access to private network gains access to smart home management.
- Long-discussed topic in the openHAB community.
- Not trivial: previous attempts have failed.
- Preferably to be implemented inside the core framework: Eclipse SmartHome.
- Main challenge: single *authentication context* recognizable in all end points (servlets).
- Community discussion led to a requirements document.

Misuse Cases




Figure 1: Misuse Cases for Access Control in ESH.

- JSON Web Token-based Authenticator
- RBAC-inspired Authorization Model

Token-based Authentication Procedure




Figure 2: Addition of authenticators into the architecture.

- Header: type of token (JWT), hashing algorithm (e.g., HMAC SHA256, RSA).
- 2 Payload: claims about the user (e.g., username, roles).
- Signature: Using a secret key creates a signature of the previous parts.

Architectural Implications




Figure 3: Addition of authenticators into the architecture.

Implementation of Authenticators

Some remarks:

- Prepared to work for a shared authentication context.
- JWT authentication when token is provided in request (cookie or HTTP header).
- Nimbus used as JWT library.
- RSA key pair is created during runtime and stored in memory.
- Basic authentication (username:password) as fallback authentication mechanism.
- Implements the handleSecurity method present in the HttpContext interface for servlets. 4 D > 4 A > 4 B > 4 B >

Proposed Authorization Model

- As a smart home application, an authorization model should be fine grained and usable.
- Tasks that may be done on openHAB are grouped as capability sets.
- Registered users are assigned one or more capability sets to reflect their privilege in the system.
- Permissions range from: REST endpoints, sitemaps, traditional servlets, automation rules, third-party add-ons, system settings, etc.

User-Assigned Capability Sets

Table 1: Sample relation of user and capability sets

User	Capability Sets	
Marian	(speakers-quiet, lights-on, doors-close, sitemaps-paper)	
Erika	(speakers-playback, lights-all, doors-all, sitemaps-all)	

Table 2: Sample listings of operations involved for each capability set

Capability Set	Involved Operations
	yamahareceiver.internal.state.
speakers-playback	NavigationControlState.getCurrentItemName()
	ZoneControlState.volume
things all	rest.core.internal.thing.ThingResource.getAll()
things-all	rest.core.internal.thing.ThingResource.create()

Evaluation

Authenticator was evaluated in two OSGi runtimes: Karaf (Apache Felix), and Eclipse SmartHome (Eclipse Equinox).

- Karaf deployment supported OSGi R6. Servlet and context registration was made through Whiteboard pattern. Successfully restricts access to servlet resource if credentials are not given.
- ESH deployment supported up to OSGi R4.2. Servlet and context registration was made through Http Service and Http Tracker. Class-loading problems initially prevented the use of the Nimbus library. Problems were fixed and resulting solution shows the same behavior as the Karaf deployment.

Contributions:

- Analysis of the security mechanisms in use for the openHAB automation software.
- Implementation of a client authenticator based on the JSON Web Token for Eclipse Smarthome.
- Proposal of a fine-grained, yet usable authorization model for openHAB to manage usage permissions.

Future Research Directions

- Incorporation of form-based authentication in the OSGi architecture.
- Expiration and renewal of JWT issued by Eclipse SmartHome.
- Encryption of JWT.
- Unique generation and storage RSA key pair.
- Local storage of user credentials (e.g., LDAP).
- Integration with external authentication providers (e.g., OAuth).
- Design access for first-time users.
- Implementation of the proposed authorization model.