OAuth2, OpenID Connect and JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

Outline

- The new security stack for modern applications
- JSON Web Tokens
- OAuth2
- OpenID Connect

- OAuth2 security discussion
- Resources

Enterprise Security



The mobile Revolution

No SOAP
No SAML
No WS*

HTTP
JSON

Scenario 1: Mobile Enterprise Apps

Scenario 2: Business to Customer

- Software vendors jump on the "apps bandwagon"
- Reach and cross-platform design becomes much more important



OAuth2


Authorization Server
(1) Request token for backend consumption
(2) Forward token to backend (Web API)
Client

OpenID Connect



- **"Classic" security is intranet-only**
  - plus maybe special customer facing (web) applications in the DMZ
- **B2B federation using protocols like WS-Federation, SAML2p and WS-Trust**

- **Mobile devices are a game changer**
  - no "enterprise security" integration
  - less powerful
  - …but increasingly popular and business criticial
- **New "common denominator" technologies**
  - presentation (e.g. HTML5)
  - authentication & authorization

Purpose of a security token

- **Security tokens are (protected) data structures**
  - contain information about issuer and subject (claims)
  - signed (tamper proof & authenticity)
  - typically contain an expiration time

- **A client requests a token**
- **An issuer issues a token**
- **A resource consumes a token**
  - has a trust relationship with the issuer

History

- **SAML 1.1/2.0**
  - XML based
  - many encryption & signature options
  - very expressive
- **Simple Web Token (SWT)**
  - Form/URL encoded
  - symmetric signatures only
- **JSON Web Token (JWT)**
  - JSON encoded
  - symmetric and asymmetric signatures (HMACSHA256-384, ECDSA, RSA)
  - symmetric and asymmetric encryption (RSA, AES/CGM)
  - (the new standard)

JSON Web Token

- **On its way to official standardization**
  - http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token.html

- **Header**
  - metadata
  - algorithms & keys used
- **Claims**
  - Issuer (iss)
  - Audience (aud)
  - IssuedAt (iat)
  - Expiration (exp)
  - Subject (sub)
  - …and application defined claims

Structure

Header

```
{
  "typ": "JWT",
  "alg": "HS256"
}
```

Claims

```
{
  "iss": "http://myIssuer",
  "exp": "1340819380",
  "aud": "http://myResource",
  "sub": "alice",

  "client": "xyz",
  "scope": ["read", "search"]
}
```



Producing a token

- **Microsoft library on Nuget**
  - http://nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.JWT/

```
var token = new JWTSecurityToken(
     issuer: "http://myIssuer",
     audience: "http://myResource",
     claims: GetClaims(),
     signingCredentials: GetKey(),
     validFrom: DateTime.UtcNow,
     validTo: DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(1));


// serialize
var tokenString =
 new JWTSecurityTokenHandler().WriteToken(token);
```

Consuming a token

- **Retrieve serialized token**
  - from HTTP header, query string etc…
- **Validate token**
  - and turn into claims

```
var token = new JWTSecurityToken(tokenString);
var validationParams = new TokenValidationParameters
{
     ValidIssuer = "http://myIssuer",
     AllowedAudience = "http://myResource",
     SigningToken = GetSigningKey()
};

var handler = new JWTSecurityTokenHandler();
var principal = handler.ValidateToken(token, validationParams);
```

- **JWT is easy to**
  - create
  - transmit
  - parse
  - validate

- **Quickly becomes the standard for web based tokens**
- **Mandatory in OpenID Connect**

Outline

- Overview
- History
- Flows

What is OAuth2 ?



The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework

Abstract

The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849.

High level overview

Resource Server

Client

Resource Owner

High level overview

Resource Server

Client

Resource Owner

OAuth2: The Players



OAuth2 Flows - with User Interaction

- **Authorization Code Flow**
  - Web application clients
    1. Request authorization
    2. Request token
    3. Access resource
- **Implicit Flow**
  - Native / local clients
    1. Request authorization & token
    2. Access resource

OAuth2 Flows - no User Interaction

- **Resource Owner Password Credential Flow**
  - "Trusted clients"
    1. Request token with resource owner credentials
    2. Access resource
- **Client Credential Flow**
  - Client to Service communication
    1. Request token with client credentials
    2. Access resource

- **OAuth2 makes it HTTP/JSON friendly to request and transmit tokens**
  - typically for delegated authorization (access tokens)
- **Takes "multiple client" architectures into account**
  - clients can have varying trust levels

- **Since v2 of the spec is quite new, there's currently quite a discussion about its pros & cons. See Appendix A**

Outline

- **Authorization Code Flow**
- **Implicit Flow**
- **Resource Owner Credential Flow**
- **Client Credential Flow**

Authorization Code Flow
(Web Application Clients)



Step 1a: Authorization Request

Web Application
(Client)

Authorization Server

```
GET /authorize?
  client_id=webapp&
  scope=resource&
  redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb&
  response_type=code&
  state=123
```





Resource Owner

Step 1b: Authentication



Step 1c: Consent



Twitter Consent



Evernote Consent



The Consent Screen is important!

twitter

An application would like to connect to your account

The application **KanyeAnalysis™** by **imma-let-u-finish** would like the ability to **access and update** your data on Twitter. This application also plans to **murder all of your children.**

Allow KanyeAnalysis™ to murder your children?

Deny | Allow

http://zachholman.com/2011/01/oauth_will_murder_your_children/

Step 1d: Authorization Response

Web Application
(Client)

Authorization Server

```
GET /cb?
   code=xyz&
   state=123
```

Resource Owner

Step 2a: Token Request

Web Application
(Client)

Authorization Server

```
POST /token
 Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=authorization_code&
authorization_code=xyz&
redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb
```

Resource Owner

Step 2b: Token Response

Web Application
(Client)

Authorization Server

```
{
  "access_token" : "abc",
  "expires_in" : "3600",
  "token_type" : "Bearer",
  "refresh_token" : "xyz"
}
```

Resource Owner

Step 3: Resource Access

Web Application
(Client)

Resource Server

```
GET /resource

Authorization: Bearer access_token
```

Resource Owner

Access Token

- **The resource server will authorize the client & resource owner based on the contents of the access token**
  - after validation of issuer, signature and expiration

- **Typical claims for an access token are**
  - resource owner identifier
  - client identifier
  - granted scopes
  - …anything additional that makes sense for your application

(Step 4: Refreshing the Token)

Web Application
(Client)

Authorization Server

```
POST /token
 Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=refresh_token&
refresh_token=xyz
```

Resource Owner

Client Management (Flickr)

leastprivilege

Apps By You | **Apps You're Using** | Your Favorite Apps

Below is a list of applications that you've given permission to interact with your Flickr account. It doesn't include apps that only use public photos and don't need to be authorized.

If you want to stop using one of these apps, click its "Remove permission" link.

Application	Permissions	
Adobe Photoshop Lightroom http://www.adobe.com/products/photoshoplightroom/	delete	Remove permission?
Flickr for Windows Phone 7 http://social.zune.net/redirect?type=phoneApp&id=2e49fb07-592b-e011-854c-00237de2db9e	delete	Remove permission?
Photorank.me	read	Remove permission?
Microsoft http://aka.ms/flickr	write	Remove permission?

Client Management (Dropbox)



Client Management (Microsoft Live)



- **Designed for server-based applications**
  - Client can store secret securely on the server
- **Accountability is provided**
  - access token never leaked to the browser
- **Long-lived access can be implemented**

Implicit Flow (Native / Local Clients)



Step 1a: Authorization Request

Resource Server

Authorization Server

```
GET /authorize?
  client_id=nativeapp&
  scope=resource&
  redirect_uri=http://localhost/cb&
  response_type=token&
  state=123
```



Resource Owner

Client

Step 1b: Token Response



Step 2: Resource Access

Resource Server

```
GET /resource

 Authorization:
   Bearer access_token
```

Resource Owner

Client

- **Simplified handshake**
  - no authorization code
- **Token is exposed to browser / local OS**
- **No client authentication**
  - no refresh tokens

- **Heavily debated and many "non-standard" variations**

Resource Owner Password Credential Flow (Trusted Application)



Step 1a: Token Request



Step 1b: Token Response

Resource Server

Authorization Server



```
{
  "access_token" : "abc",
  "expires_in" : "360",
  "token_type" : "Bearer",
  "refresh_token" : "xyz"
}
```

Resource Owner

Client

Step 2: Resource Access

Resource Server

```
GET /resource

 Authorization:
   Bearer access_token
```

Resource Owner

Client

Summary – Resource Owner Credential Flow

- **Resource owner credentials are exposed to client**
  - users should not become accustomed to that
- **Still better to store access/refresh token on device than password**
  - if the developer is using that feature

Client Credentials Flow –
No human involved at all

Client   Authorization Server

```
POST /token
 Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=client_credentials&
scope=resource
```

- **The OAuth2 flows describe the various options for**
  - request authorization
  - request tokens

- **A separate spec (RFC 6750) describes how to transmit bearer access tokens to the resource server**

Outline

- OAuth2 and authentication
- OpenID Connect
- Flows

OAuth2 & Authentication

- **OAuth2 is for (delegated) authorization**
  - authentication is a pre-requisite for that
  - access token is for some back-end service

- **Sometimes you "just" need authentication**
  - (at least to begin with)
  - identify user in an application
  - control access to application features

- **OAuth2 is regularly "abused" for that**

OAuth2 for Authentication: Request

UserInfo RS

Authorization Server

```
GET /authorize?
  client_id=nativeapp&
  redirect_uri=http://localhost/cb&
  scope=signin&
  response_type=token&
  state=123
```

Resource Owner

Client

OAuth2 for Authentication: Response



OAuth2 for Authentication: Accessing User Data

The Problem

userid,
access token

1. User logs into malicious app (app steals token)

Impersonated!

2. Malicious developer uses stolen access token in legitimate app

The Solution?



OpenID Connect



OpenID Connect Flows

- **OpenID Connect builds on top of OAuth2**
  - Authorization Code Flow
  - Implicit Flow
- **Adds some new concepts**
  - ID Token
  - UserInfo endpoint
- **..and some additional protocols, e.g.**
  - discovery & dynamic registration
  - session management

http://openid.net/connect/

OpenID Connect: The Players

Identity Provider | **Authorization Endpoint** | **Token Endpoint** | **UserInfo Endpoint**

User Agent **Client**

Step 1a: Authorization Request

Identity Provider | Authorization Endpoint | Token Endpoint | UserInfo Endpoint



```
GET /authorize?
  client_id=webapp&
  redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb&
  scope=openid profile&
  response_type=code&
  state=123
```

User Agent

Client

Scopes & Claims

- **OpenID defines a set of standard scopes and claims**

Scope	Claims
profile	name, family_name, given_name, middle_name, nickname, preferred_username, profile, picture, website, gender, birthdate, zoneinfo, locale, and updated_at.
email	email, email_verified
address	address
phone	phone_number, phone_number_verified
offline_access	requests refresh token

Step 1b: Authentication

Identity Provider | Authorization Endpoint | Token Endpoint | UserInfo Endpoint



User Agent | Client

Step 1c: Consent

Identity Provider | **Authorization Endpoint** | **Token Endpoint** | **UserInfo Endpoint**

OpenID Connect

Application **WebApp** asks
for permission to access your profile

User Agent **Client**

Step 1d: Authorization Response

Identity Provider | Authorization Endpoint | Token Endpoint | UserInfo Endpoint



User Agent Client

Step 2a: Token Request

Identity Provider | Authorization Endpoint | Token Endpoint | UserInfo Endpoint

```
POST /token
 Authorization: Basic (client_id:secret)

grant_type=authorization_code&
authorization_code=abc&
redirect_uri=https://webapp/cb
```

User Agent Client

Step 2b: Token Response

Identity Provider | Authorization Endpoint | Token Endpoint | UserInfo Endpoint

```
{
  "access_token" : "abc",
  "id_token": "uvw",
  "expires_in" : "3600",
  "token_type" : "Bearer",
  "refresh_token" : "xyz"
}
```

User Agent Client

ID Token

- **JWT that contains claims about the authentication event**
  - Issuer (iss)
  - Subject (sub)
  - Audience (aud)
  - Expiration (exp)

- **Client must validate the ID token at this point**

Step 3a: UserInfo Request

Identity Provider | Authorization Endpoint | Token Endpoint | UserInfo Endpoint

```
GET /userinfo

 Authorization:
   Bearer access_token
```

User Agent | Client

Step 3b: UserInfo Response

Identity Provider | Authorization Endpoint | Token Endpoint | UserInfo Endpoint

```
{
   "sub": "248289761001",
   "name": "Jane Doe",
   "email": "janedoe@example.com"
}
```

User Agent Client

- **OpenID Connect standardizes how authentication with OAuth2 works**
  - standard scopes and claims
  - token type is JWT
  - ID token
  - UserInfo endpoint
- **Goal is to allow a client to use an arbitrary OpenID Connect provider without code modifications**
  - as opposed to how it works with homegrown OAuth2 authentication today

- **Not done yet, but "basic profile" pretty stable**
- **Additional specs are under development**

Group

Name:	Web Authorization Protocol
Acronym:	oauth
Area:	Security Area (sec)
State:	Active
Charter:	charter-ietf-oauth-04 (Approved)

[Docs] [txt|pdf] [draft-ietf-oauth-v2] [Diff1] [Diff2]

PROPOSED STANDARD

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Request for Comments: 6749
Obsoletes: 5849
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721

D. Hardt, Ed.
Microsoft
October 2012

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework

"A Framework to build Protocols"



2.3.1. Client Password

Clients in possession of a client password MAY use the HTTP Basic authentication scheme as defined in [RFC2617] to authenticate with the authorization server. The client identifier is encoded using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" encoding algorithm per Appendix B, and the encoded value is used as the username; the client password is encoded using the same algorithm and used as the password. The authorization server MUST support the HTTP Basic authentication scheme for authenticating clients that were issued a client password.

For example (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

```
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
```

Alternatively, the authorization server MAY support including the client credentials in the request-body using the following parameters:

client_id
: REQUIRED. The client identifier issued to the client during the registration process described by Section 2.2.

client_secret
: REQUIRED. The client secret. The client MAY omit the parameter if the client secret is an empty string.

JSON Web Token (JWT)

JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
JSON Web Signatures (JWS)
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)

Assertion Framework for OAuth2
JWT Bearer Token Profiles
SAML 2.0 Bearer Token Profiles
Token Revocation
MAC Tokens

The OAuth2 Authorization Framework
(RFC 6749)

OAuth2 Bearer Token Usage
(RFC 6750)

Threat Model and Security Considerations
(RFC 6819)

Core (proposed standards)

Informational

OAuth2 Resource Set Registration
Dynamic Client Registration
User-Managed Access
Chaining and Redelegation
Metadata & Introspection

http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect
basic-1_0-23.html
implicit-1_0-06.html
messages-1_0-15.html
standard-1_0-16.html
discovery-1_0-12.html
registration-1_0-14.html
session-1_0-11.html

http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/oauth/

Bearer Token

A security token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession of it can. Using a bearer token does not require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key material (proof-of-possession).

Infrastructure & SSL



http://gigaom.com/2013/01/10/nokia-yes-we-decrypt-your-https-data-but-dont-worry-about-it/

Security Theater




OAUTH2
ATTACK SURFACE EVERYWHERE

Attack Surface

```
GET /authorize?
   client_id=nativeapp&
   redirect_uri=http://localhost/cb&
   scope=resource&
   response_type=token&
   state=123
```

http://leastprivilege.com/2013/03/15/common-oauth2-vulnerabilities-and-mitigation-techniques/
http://leastprivilege.com/2013/03/15/oauth2-security/
http://homakov.blogspot.de/2012/08/saferweb-oauth2a-or-lets-just-fix-it.html

Some Facebook Hacks

- http://www.darkreading.com/blog/240148995/the-road-to-hell-is-authenticated-by-facebook.html
- http://homakov.blogspot.no/2013/02/hacking-facebook-with-oauth2-and-chrome.html
- www.nirgoldshlager.com/2013/03/how-i-hacked-any-facebook-accountagain.html

- **The OAuth2 "approach" is useful for many typical applications scenarios**

- **Spec needs some refinement**
  - "basic profile"
  - MAC tokens
- **Current implementations are lacking**
  - even by the big guys
  - let alone the myriad of DIY implementations

- **Very good & balanced view**
  - https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/201x/2013/01/23/OAuth

JWT

- **JWT debugger**
  - http://openidtest.uninett.no/jwt
- **Microsoft JWT**
  - http://nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.JWT/
- **Specs**
  - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-08
  - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-11
  - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-11
- **Java JWT**
  - https://bitbucket.org/nimbusds/nimbus-jose-jwt/wiki/Home

OAuth2

- **Specs**
  - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
  - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750
- **Threat Model**
  - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819

- **Thinktecture.IdentityModel**
  - https://github.com/thinktecture/Thinktecture.IdentityModel.45
- **Thinktecture.IdentityServer**
  - https://github.com/thinktecture/Thinktecture.IdentityServer.v2
- **DotNetOpenAuth**
  - http://dotnetopenauth.net/

OpenID Connect

- **Specs**
  - http://openid.net/connect/
- **Google "OpenID Connect" signin**
  - https://developers.google.com/accounts/docs/OAuth2Login
  - https://developers.google.com/accounts/cookbook/technologies/OpenID-Connect
- **Reference implementation**
  - https://github.com/mitreid-connect/OpenID-Connect-Java-Spring-Server