



# IRONCLAD APPS

End to End Security Via Automated Full System Verification


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# INFORMATION

- What is Ironclad?
- Working Model
- Verification Goals
- Verification Methodology
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- Advantages/Limitations/Challenges
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# HOW DATA BREACH OCCURS



- However software's or apps uses Secure Socket Layer (SSL) technology to protect data even with a small code error or end user error here may be a data breach.

IRONCLAD APP

An Ironclad app guarantees to remote parties that every instruction it executes adheres to a high-level security spec.

CHARACTERISTICS

This does more than eliminate implementation vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, parsing errors, or data leaks

HISTORY

This was a research activity carried out by Microsoft by Chris Hawblitzel, Jon Howell, and Jacob R. Lorch.

HOW THEY ACHIEVE THIS

They achieve this by using complete, low-level software verification.

They then use cryptography and secure hardware to enable secure channels from the verified software to remote users.

## WHAT IS IRONCLAD?

Ironclad apps : End to End Security Via Automated Full System Verification

# Ironclad Combines

## LATE LAUNCH

It is a feature developed by Intel and AMD drivers to run software stack in protected environment.

## TRUSTED COMPUTING

This actually means that we are bring up software and cryptographic key together.

## SOFTWARE VERIFICATION

This is used to prove that the software has some desirable property to turn up by some high level specifications.

## SECURE REMOTE EQUIVALENCE

By the combination of all the above three features this secure remote equivalence property is created.

By this property a secure channel is created so that user can have a secure communication directly without any data leak.

## WORKING MODEL

Ironclad apps : End to End Security Via Automated Full System Verification

# VERIFICATION GUARANTEES

- No buffer overflows
- No code injection
- No type safety flaws
- No information disclosures
- No crypto implementation flaws



We always know what app will do with our private data!



## END TO END SECURITY

This proposed model don't trust any of the other software running on machine or drivers or libraries or OS or app itself.

## COMPLETE SECURITY


They will verify the entire system including OS to provide complete security.

## LOW LEVEL

As they don't trust compiler or runtime they maintain low level to verify actual assembly instructions.


# VERIFICATION GOALS

# VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY






# ARCHITECTURE



# RAPID VERIFICATION



## ADVANTAGES

Ironclad guarantees end-to-end security to remote parties: Every instruction meets the app's security spec

## APPLICATIONS

- Password Protector
- Notary
- Differentially Private DB
- Trusted Incrementer

## CHALLENGES

- They can't verify existing code
- For this model they are focusing on performance

## LIMITATIONS

- They don't prove absence of side channels
- Liveness
- Physical Security

## FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Currently, they prove the functional correctness and noninterference of our system, but their future developments include proofs that could be extended in two directions that constitute ongoing work:

1. proving liveness and
2. connecting our guarantees to even higher-level cryptographic protocol correctness proofs.

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
## SUMMARY

- By using automated tools, they have verified full-system, low-level, end-to-end security guarantees about Ironclad Apps.
- To get better usage we expect to see full-system verification scale to larger systems and higher-level properties in the years to come.
- Achieved via: New and modified tools
- A methodology for rapid verification of systems software
- Verification of systems code is quite feasible!



## REFERENCES

1. Chris Hawblitzel, Jon Howell, and Jacob R. Lorch, Microsoft Research; Arjun Narayan, University of Pennsylvania; Bryan Parno, Microsoft Research; Danfeng Zhang, Cornell University; Brian Zill, Ironclad Apps: End-to-End Security via Automated Full-System Verification, 11th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI '14), USENIX Association.



# THANKYOU

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