

Insights to Hadoop Security Threats

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Outline

- Attacks
 - DOS attack Rate Limiting
 - Impersonation
- Implementation
 - Sandbox HDP version 2.1
 - Cluster Set-up
 - Kerberos Security Setup
- Insights
- Conclusion

Motivation

User Reviews In Bug Repository

Make NameNode resilient to DoS attacks (malicious or otherwise) defective applications cause havoc on the NameNode, for e.g. by doing 100k+ 'listStatus' on very large directories (60k files) etc

It seems there are a number of DoS scenarios to worry about:

RPC flooding (as you noted above)

Malformed packets (it's probably not too hard to find a spot where you can make the NN allocate way too much memory and crash some important thread)

Open socket limit exhaustion - what if a client just opened thousands of connections to the NN's RPC ports without actually sending commands? At some point you'll hit the ulimit -n lots of others

solutions- 1: Any type of rate-limiting should be either optional or configurable on perapplication basis. rate-limiting——QoS reservation

2.apps within trusted network that does not need to be paranoid about this——ignore this problem

3. focus on detection of such attacks and counter acts with, say, iptables filtering to cut off an intruder or an honest fool.——detection

Motivation

HADOOP-9194—duplicated with HDFS-945-----2.1.0-beta(fixed)----2.0.2-alpha(affected)

Hadoop performance is QoS (Quality of Service)

RPC Support for QoS

----HDFS has a separate port for "service" IPC, allows you do to port-based QOS (see HDFS-599)

Dos attack on server communication ports: hdfs, name node, datanode...(what is a secure port??)

HADOOP-9640-----Enable optional RPC-level priority to combat congestion and make request latencies more consistent.

RPC Congestion Control with FairCallQueue replacing the FIFO call queue with a Fair Call Queue


Attacks


- DOS attack Rate Limit
 - RPC Congestion Failure
- Impersonation
 - How to impersonate?
 - Figured out a way, could not evaluate it
 - HDFS access

Implementation


- Sandbox HDP-2.1 Provider HortonWorks
 - Cluster setup of 3 VM on virtual-box
 - CentOS Installed
 - Ambari Configuration
 - Kerberos Enabled Cluster
- Hadoop-2.5.0, Hadoop-1.2.1
 - -3 Hgcc nodes, 2 VMs each
 - -Ubuntu 10.04
 - -Separate KDC node


Setup






```
[server]
hostname=vagrant-centos66.vagrantup.com
url port=8440
secured_url_port=8441
[agent]
prefix=/var/lib/ambari-agent/data
; loglevel=(DEBUG/INFO)
loglevel=INFO
data_cleanup_interval=86400
data_cleanup_max_age=2592000
ping port=8670
cache_dir=/var/lib/ambari-agent/cache
tolerate_download_failures=true
hostname script=/tmp/hostname.sh
[command]
maxretries=2
sleepBetweenRetries=1
[security]
```






Sandbox Ambari





Security/Oozie



Rate Limiting

- <mark>r</mark> W-rr	peipei	supergroup	12.72 KB	3	128 MB	69998
-[W-[[peipei	supergroup	12.72 KB	3	128 MB	69999
-[W-[[peipei	supergroup	12.72 KB	3	128 MB	7
-rw-rr	peipei	supergroup	12.72 KB	3	128 MB	70
-[W-[[peipei	supergroup	12.72 KB	3	128 MB	700
	19991 0751	1.00 1.00 1.00	18 111111111111111111111111111111111111		101 - 11 11	

- → 70000 files created for RPC Congestion
- → Commands used: dfs -lsr, fsck
- → 10 rounds, 13 secs, 12 secs respectively
- → Failure in both Hadoop-1.2.1, Hadoop-2.5.0



Kerberos Tests

- → 2 Tests made:
- → Hadoop client without kerberos to access HDFS. HDFS recognized this illegal operation in its output messages.

peipei@ubuntu10045:~/hadoop-2.5.0/bin\$./hadoop dfs -ls hdfs://10.76.2.127:9000/

DEPRECATED: Use of this script to execute hdfs command is deprecated. Instead use the hdfs command for it.

14/12/01 16:25:31 WARN util.KerberosName: Kerberos krb5 configuration not found, setting default realm to empty

Is: Authorization (hadoop.security.authorization) is enabled but authentication (hadoop.security.authentication) is configured as simple. Please configure another method like kerberos or digest.



Kerberos Tests

→ Client access in a Hadoop cluster with a kerberos enabled Datanode which is not predefined in Hadoop cluster. Hadoop does not allow nodes to join Hadoop cluster randomly. It requires the user principals to be added before joining it:

```
2014-12-01 18:40:29,887 INFO
org.apache.hadoop.ipc.Server: IPC Server listener on
9000: readAndProcess threw exception
org.apache.hadoop.security.AccessControlException:
Connection from 152.14.92.184:53152 for protocol
org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.protocol.DatanodeProtocol
is unauthorized for user peipei/peipei-optiplex-
9010@HADOOP.DOMAIN (auth:KERBEROS) from client
152.14.92.184. Count of bytes read: 0
```

Kerberos Pain

- Problems in creating Kerberos principal Database
 - Program hangs in "Loading Random Data"
- Fully Qualified Domain Names(FQDN) needed for kerberos authentication
- * Kerberos enabled DataNodes needs to be started with root and jsvc
- Slow running hadoop cluster
 - * KDC and hadoop cluster under different subnet
 - Lumpy Kerberos Authentication??



Hard to start secure datanode

DataNode

Configuration for conf/hdfs-site.xml


Parameter	Value	Notes
dfs.datanode.data.dir.perm	700	
dfs.datanode.address	0.0.0.0:1004	Secure DataNode must use privileged port in order to assure that the server was started securely. This means that the server must be started via jsvc.
dfs.datanode.http.address	0.0.0.0:1006	Secure DataNode must use privileged port in order to assure that the server was started securely. This means that the server must be started via jsvc.
dfs.datanode.https.address	0.0.0.0:50470	
dfs.datanode.keytab.file	/etc/security/keytab/dn.service.keytab	Kerberos keytab file for the DataNode.
dfs.datanode.kerberos.principal	dn/_HOST@REALM.TLD	Kerberos principal name for the DataNode.
dfs.datanode.kerberos.https.principal	host/_HOST@REALM.TLD	HTTPS Kerberos principal name for the DataNode.
dfs.encrypt.data.transfer	false	set to true when using data encryption

WALLIDEC

- → Use root privilege and jsvc to start secure data node
- → Jsvc separate installation needed, absent in jdk

Oozie

Oozie Impersonation



Conclusions

- → Kerberos fit for simple authentication
- → Kerberos Painful Deployment
- → Third party vendor easier deployment
- Degraded performance in a Virtualized cluster
- Oozie Impersonation
- Commercial Product HDP or Hadoop specific tightly coupled authentication better choice than Kerberos like third party software
- Sandbox or Hadoop native cluster ?? Sandbox

Thank you