

Cybersecurity Challenges in Transportation Systems

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Acknowledgement



This research is supported by the National Science Foundation NSF CRISP Award No. 1638301:
CRISP Type 2: Integrative Decision Making Framework to Enhance the Resiliency of Interdependent Critical Infrastructures.



In collaboration with the City of Tampa Transportation Management Center

Motivation: Transportation and Technology

- Current status
 - Adapt technology to usage
- Emerging
 - Connected vehicles
 - Autonomous vehicles

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Tech and transportation are changing the future of transportation. From here to there


Transportation is about to get a technology-driven reboot. The details are still taking shape, but future transport systems will certainly be connected, data-driven and highly automated.

Cyber-security problem.


Outline

- Case study: City of Tampa Transportation Management Center
 - Overview of the current transportation system
 - Cyber risk analysis
- Demo
- Conclusion and Take away

Overview of the Transportation System




Signal Cabinet




- Role: Control the intersection
- Brain: Controller
 - OS: Linux(2.6.3x or greater) based
 - Driven by:
 - Programmed signal timing
 - Detector inputs
 - External requests: Transit Signal Priority (TSP), pre-emption (trains)
 - Ways to program:
 - Direct: Front panel, LAN connection with laptop, data-key, USB
 - Wireless: Wi-Fi Connection with tablet
 - TMC: Centracs, client applications
- Watch dog: Malfunction Management Unit (MMU)
 - Role: Enforce the safety/conflict policies
 - Driven by: soldered circuit board
- GPS: Account for time drift to maintain coordination
- Communication: Fiber optics, wireless, twisted copper

Signal Cabinet: Safety features



- Controller:
 - Powered through MMU so that it cannot be taken out of the loop
 - Username and password (Not used).
 - 3 access levels: administrator, data change level, data display level (Default is admin).
 - Has a backup database.
- MMU:
 - Hardwired/soldered input.

Transportation Management Center (TMC)




- Role: Monitor and control ALL intersections
- Communication:
 - Protocol: NTCIP level 2 compliant
 - Wireless: Mesh network, single hub in TMC can manage 20 spokes
 - Third party access through VPN
- Applications:
 - MTCS:
 - MS-DOS based (legacy twisted copper support)
 - Command and Control type system.
 - If command and feedback vary: Controller runs its stored timings.
 - Centracs 2.0:
 - Advice and Consent type system (Controller is stand alone)
 - Can view status of each controller, view reports for single controller or for a zone, check logs
 - Connected Signals:
 - Mobile app that shows signal timings (red light notifier).
 - Have a network sniffer in the main switch.

TMC: Safety features



- Transportation network is isolated from the outside world.
- Network:
 - Firewall
 - Virtual Private Network (VPN)
- MTCS:
 - Easy detection of command and feedback inconsistency.
- Centracs:
 - Username and password
 - Logs every change made to signal timing (version control like)
 - Provides alerts, logs and reports.

Risk Analysis: Intersection




- Vehicle detection:
 - Cerrudo (2015) and Ghena et al (2014) have shown that wireless vehicle detectors can be hacked.
 - Impact: Congestion
 - Always runs a full cycle. Equivalent to a stuck pedestrian button.
 - Side street never gets serviced.
 - Resolution: Can be detected using monitoring tools (Waze, Bluetoad, CCTV)
- Fiber optics:
 - Impact: Loss of communication.
 - Resolution: Easily detected.
- Connected Vehicles:
 - Miller et al (2015) showed that cars can be hacked.
 - Challenges:
 - Vehicles get a bigger say.
 - More devices to hack.
- Other issues:
 - Privacy issues.
 - Transmitting massive amount of data.

References:


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2. Ghena, Branden, William Beyer, Allen Hillaker, Jonathan Pevarnek, and J. Alex Halderman. "Green Lights Forever: Analyzing the Security of Traffic Infrastructure." *WOOT 14* (2014): 7-7.
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Risk Analysis: Signal Cabinet




- Wireless Communication:
 - Outcome: Gain access to controller.
 - Resolution: Disable SSID broadcast, enable encryption, do not use default configuration/credential
- Controller:
 - Ghena et al (2014) have shown it can be compromised.
 - Outcome: Change signal timing, update firmware.
 - Impacts: Congestion, diminished safety
 - But MMU maintains safety.
 - Resolution: Disable debug port, enable password protection, enable access control
- Network:
 - Outcome: Gain access to all communication
 - Impacts: Denial of Service (DoS) attack
 - Resolution: Firewalls

Risk Analysis: TMC



- Control stations:
 - Social engineering.
- Third party access:
 - Are they following security practices?
 - Outcome: Access to entire infrastructure.


Demo



Conclusion

- Cybersecurity is **currently** not a major concern for transportation systems.
 - reliance on the isolated network and physical protection of devices.
 - i.e. all the systems are within the trust boundary.
- However existing architecture poses serious cybersecurity threats for the **emerging** transportation technologies.
 - With connected and autonomous technologies, the isolation assumption is no longer valid.
 - Plus the gap between current and emerging technologies is vast.
 - The stakes are much higher in transportation than in traditional IT systems.

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**Technology Is Changing
Transportation, and Cities
Should Adapt**

by Stefan M. Knupfer, Eric Hannon, and Shannon Bouton

Questions ?

