



Solana Labs – SPL Stake Pool

Solana Program Security Audit

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Visit: Halborn.com

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



1.1 INTRODUCTION

Solana Labs engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their Solana programs, beginning on December 19th, 2022 and ending on January 25th, 2023 . The security assessment was scoped to the programs provided in the Stake Pool GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The SPL Stake Pool program lets SOL holders deposit SOL into a pool where it can be staked by a designated Staker across multiple validators. This allows the depositors to earn staking rewards without having to manage stakes.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided five weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to audit the security of the programs in scope. The security engineer is a blockchain and Solana program security expert with advanced penetration testing and Solana program hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that Solana program functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues within the programs

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of multiple risks, which has been mostly addressed by Solana Labs . The main ones are the following:

- Fees can be updated before new epoch

Solana Labs solved this finding, new fee's will take effect two epochs after they are changed.

- Possible rust panics due to unsafe unwrap usage

Solana Labs solved this finding, unnecessary unwraps were removed to optimize compute usage.

- Missing cargo overflow checks

Solana Labs acknowledged this finding, most of the crate uses `clippy` to prevent developers from using integer arithmetic. In `stake-pool/program/src/big_vec.rs` checked math isn't used as it introduces too much compute usage.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
- Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
- Mapping out possible attack vectors
- Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
- Finding unsafe Rust code usage (`cargo-geiger`)

- Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (`cargo audit`).
- Local runtime testing (`solana-test-framework`)
- Scanning for common Solana vulnerabilities (`soteria`)

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

Code repositories:

1. Project Name

- Repository: XYZ
- Commit ID: eba709b9317f8c7b8b197045161cb744241f0bff
- Programs in scope:
 1. (/stake-pool/program)

Out-of-scope:

- third-party libraries and dependencies
- financial-related attacks

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	0	1	2

LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT

(HAL-01)				
(HAL-02) (HAL-03)				

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDATION DATE
HAL01 - FEES CAN BE UPDATED BEFORE NEW EPOCH	Low	SOLVED - 01/26/2023
HAL02 - POSSIBLE RUST PANICS DUE TO UNSAFE UNWRAP USAGE	Informational	SOLVED - 01/27/2023
HAL03 - MISSING CARGO OVERFLOW CHECKS	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



3.1 (HAL-01) FEES CAN BE UPDATED BEFORE NEW EPOCH – LOW

Description:

Managers charge users various fees for managing the stake pool, such as an `epoch_fee` charged for earned staking rewards, `stake_withdrawal` and `sol_withdrawal` when users withdraw their stake/SOL from the pool. The stake-pool program prevents malicious managers from rug pulling users and increasing fee's during an epoch by ensuring any fee changes take effect on the next epoch. A clever manager can wait until the last slot in the epoch and then raise fees.

This leaves unsuspecting users no time to withdraw funds before new fees are applied to the stake pool.

- `epoch_fee` is the most impacted by this as it can be raised to 100%, allowing the manager to take all new staking rewards.
- `stake_withdrawal` and `sol_withdrawal` is impacted to a lesser extent as the program limits how much a manager can increase new fee's compared to old fee's. In a worst-case scenario, the withdrawal fee can be larger than the return the user received from participating in the stake pool, causing the user to lose funds from their original deposit.

Code Location:

Listing 1: stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs (Line 2445)

```
2445 fn process_update_stake_pool_balance(
2446     program_id: &Pubkey,
2447     accounts: &[AccountInfo],
2448 ) -> ProgramResult {
2449     let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();
2450     let stake_pool_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
2451     let withdraw_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
2452     let validator_list_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)
```

```

    ↳ ?;
2453     let reserve_stake_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)
    ↳ ?;
2454     let manager_fee_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
2455     let pool_mint_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
2456     let token_program_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)
    ↳ ?;
2457     let clock = Clock::get()?;
2458
2459     check_account_owner(stake_pool_info, program_id)?;
2460     let mut stake_pool = try_from_slice_unchecked::<StakePool>(&
    ↳ stake_pool_info.data.borrow())?;
2461     if !stake_pool.is_valid() {
2462         return Err(StakePoolError::InvalidState.into());
2463     }
2464     stake_pool.check_mint(pool_mint_info)?;
2465     stake_pool.check_authority_withdraw(withdraw_info.key,
    ↳ program_id, stake_pool_info.key)?;
2466     stake_pool.check_reserve_stake(reserve_stake_info)?;
2467     if stake_pool.manager_fee_account != *manager_fee_info.key {
2468         return Err(StakePoolError::InvalidFeeAccount.into());
2469     }
2470
2471     if *validator_list_info.key != stake_pool.validator_list {
2472         return Err(StakePoolError::InvalidValidatorStakeList.into
    ↳ ());
2473     }
2474     if stake_pool.token_program_id != *token_program_info.key {
2475         return Err(ProgramError::IncorrectProgramId);
2476     }
2477
2478     check_account_owner(validator_list_info, program_id)?;
2479     let mut validator_list_data = validator_list_info.data.
    ↳ borrow_mut();
2480     let (header, validator_list) =
2481         ValidatorListHeader::deserialize_vec(&mut
    ↳ validator_list_data)?;
2482     if !header.is_valid() {
2483         return Err(StakePoolError::InvalidState.into());
2484     }
2485
2486     let previous_lamports = stake_pool.total_lamports;
2487     let previous_pool_token_supply = stake_pool.pool_token_supply;
2488     let reserve_stake = try_from_slice_unchecked::<stake::state::

```



```

    ↳ StakeState>(
2489         &reserve_stake_info.data.borrow(),
2490     )?;
2491     let mut total_lamports = if let stake::state::StakeState::
    ↳ Initialized(meta) = reserve_stake
2492     {
2493         reserve_stake_info
2494             .lamports()
2495             .checked_sub(minimum_reserve_lamports(&meta))
2496             .ok_or(StakePoolError::CalculationFailure)?
2497     } else {
2498         msg!("Reserve stake account in unknown state, aborting");
2499         return Err(StakePoolError::WrongStakeState.into());
2500     };
2501     for validator_stake_record in validator_list.iter::<
    ↳ ValidatorStakeInfo>() {
2502         if validator_stake_record.last_update_epoch < clock.epoch
    ↳ {
2503             return Err(StakePoolError::StakeListOutOfDate.into());
2504         }
2505         total_lamports = total_lamports
2506             .checked_add(validator_stake_record.stake_lamports())
2507             .ok_or(StakePoolError::CalculationFailure)?;
2508     }
2509
2510     msg!("total_lamports {}", total_lamports);
2511     msg!("previous_lamports {}", previous_lamports);
2512
2513     let reward_lamports = total_lamports.saturating_sub(
    ↳ previous_lamports);
2514     msg!("reward_lamports {}", reward_lamports);
2515
2516     // If the manager fee info is invalid, they don't deserve to
    ↳ receive the fee.
2517     let fee = if stake_pool.check_manager_fee_info(
    ↳ manager_fee_info).is_ok() {
2518         msg!("yes fee");
2519         stake_pool
2520             .calc_epoch_fee_amount(reward_lamports)
2521             .ok_or(StakePoolError::CalculationFailure)?
2522     } else {
2523         msg!("no fee");
2524         0
2525     };

```

```

2526
2527     msg!("fee is: {:?}", fee);
2528
2529     if fee > 0 {
2530         Self::token_mint_to(
2531             stake_pool_info.key,
2532             token_program_info.clone(),
2533             pool_mint_info.clone(),
2534             manager_fee_info.clone(),
2535             withdraw_info.clone(),
2536             AUTHORITY_WITHDRAW,
2537             stake_pool.stake_withdraw_bump_seed,
2538             fee,
2539         )?;
2540     }
2541
2542     if stake_pool.last_update_epoch < clock.epoch {
2543         if let Some(fee) = stake_pool.next_epoch_fee {
2544             stake_pool.epoch_fee = fee;
2545             stake_pool.next_epoch_fee = None;
2546         }
2547         if let Some(fee) = stake_pool.next_stake_withdrawal_fee {
2548             stake_pool.stake_withdrawal_fee = fee;
2549             stake_pool.next_stake_withdrawal_fee = None;
2550         }
2551         if let Some(fee) = stake_pool.next_sol_withdrawal_fee {
2552             stake_pool.sol_withdrawal_fee = fee;
2553             stake_pool.next_sol_withdrawal_fee = None;
2554         }
2555         stake_pool.last_update_epoch = clock.epoch;
2556         stake_pool.last_epoch_total_lamports = previous_lamports;
2557         stake_pool.last_epoch_pool_token_supply =
2558             ↳ previous_pool_token_supply;
2559     }
2560     stake_pool.total_lamports = total_lamports;

```

Listing 2: stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs (Line 3649)

```

3649 fn process_set_fee(
3650     program_id: &Pubkey,
3651     accounts: &[AccountInfo],
3652     fee: FeeType,
3653 ) -> ProgramResult {
3654     let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();

```

```

3655         let stake_pool_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)
3656         ↳ ?;
3657         let manager_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
3658         let clock = Clock::get()?;
3659         check_account_owner(stake_pool_info, program_id)?;
3660         let mut stake_pool = try_from_slice_unchecked::<StakePool
3661         ↳ >(&stake_pool_info.data.borrow())?;
3662         if !stake_pool.is_valid() {
3663             return Err(StakePoolError::InvalidState.into());
3664         }
3665         stake_pool.check_manager(manager_info)?;
3666         if fee.can_only_change_next_epoch() && stake_pool.
3667         ↳ last_update_epoch < clock.epoch {
3668             return Err(StakePoolError::StakeListAndPoolOutOfDate.
3669             ↳ into());
3670         }
3671         fee.check_too_high()?;
3672         stake_pool.update_fee(&fee)?;
3673         stake_pool.serialize(&mut *stake_pool_info.data.borrow_mut
3674         ↳ ())?;
3675         Ok(())
3676     }

```

Listing 3: stake-pool/program/src/state.rs (Line 826)

```

826 pub fn check_withdrawal(&self, old_withdrawal_fee: &Fee) -> Result
827 ↳ <(), StakePoolError> {
828     // If the previous withdrawal fee was 0, we allow the fee
829     ↳ to be set to a
830     // maximum of (WITHDRAWAL_BASELINE_FEE *
831     ↳ MAX_WITHDRAWAL_FEE_INCREASE)
832     let (old_num, old_denom) =
833     if old_withdrawal_fee.denominator == 0 ||
834     ↳ old_withdrawal_fee.numerator == 0 {
835         (
836             WITHDRAWAL_BASELINE_FEE.numerator,
837             WITHDRAWAL_BASELINE_FEE.denominator,
838         )
839     } else {
840         (old_withdrawal_fee.numerator, old_withdrawal_fee.
841         ↳ denominator)

```

```

837         };
838
839         // Check that new_fee / old_fee <=
840         ↳ MAX_WITHDRAWAL_FEE_INCREASE
841         // Program fails if provided numerator or denominator is
842         ↳ too large, resulting in overflow
843         if (old_num as u128)
844             .checked_mul(self.denominator as u128)
845             .map(|x| x.checked_mul(MAX_WITHDRAWAL_FEE_INCREASE.
846             ↳ numerator as u128))
847             .ok_or(StakePoolError::CalculationFailure)?
848             < (self.numerator as u128)
849             .checked_mul(old_denom as u128)
850             .map(|x| x.checked_mul(MAX_WITHDRAWAL_FEE_INCREASE.
851             ↳ denominator as u128))
852             .ok_or(StakePoolError::CalculationFailure)?
853         {
854             msg!(
855                 "Fee increase exceeds maximum allowed, proposed
856                 ↳ increase factor ({} / {})",
857                 self.numerator.saturating_mul(old_denom),
858                 old_num.saturating_mul(self.denominator),
859             );
860             return Err(StakePoolError::FeeIncreaseTooHigh);
861         }
862         Ok(())
863     }

```

Risk Level:**Likelihood - 1****Impact - 3****Recommendation:**

Similar to issue [29346](#) fee updates should be limited to the first half of an epoch or increase the delay to two epochs, so users get at least one epoch to withdraw their funds.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED The **Solana Labs team** resolved this issue in commit:

- [dc7e16cdae85defd53189d3882fef43fdd25df05](#)

Going forward, new fee's will take effect two epochs after they are changed.

3.2 (HAL-02) POSSIBLE RUST PANICS DUE TO UNSAFE UNWRAP USAGE – INFORMATIONAL

Description:

The use of helper methods in Rust, such as `unwrap`, is allowed in dev and testing environment because those methods are supposed to throw an error (also known as `panic!`) when called on `Option::None` or a `Result` which is not `Ok`. However, keeping `unwrap` functions in production environment is considered bad practice because they may lead to program crashes, which are usually accompanied by insufficient or misleading error messages.

Code Location:

Note: only `unwraps` introduced by the changes in scope are listed, justified usages such as in tests were excluded.

Listing 4

```
./stake-pool/program/src/lib.rs:120    seed.as_ref().map(|s| s.
↳ as_slice()).unwrap_or(&[]),
./stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs:1145    let mut
↳ validator_stake_info = maybe_validator_stake_info.unwrap();
./stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs:1319    let mut
↳ validator_stake_info = maybe_validator_stake_info.unwrap();
./stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs:1428    let
↳ stake_history_info = maybe_stake_history_info.unwrap();
./stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs:1576    let mut
↳ validator_stake_info = maybe_validator_stake_info.unwrap();
./stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs:1897    let mut
↳ validator_stake_info = maybe_validator_stake_info.unwrap();
./stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs:2000    let mut
↳ validator_stake_info = maybe_validator_stake_info.unwrap();
./stake-pool/program/src/processor.rs:2212, 2213    let
↳ validator_stake_info = validator_stakes.first().unwrap(); let
↳ transient_stake_info = validator_stakes.last().unwrap();
./stake-pool/program/src/state.rs:667: .unwrap()
```

```
./stake-pool/program/src/state.rs:683: u64::try_from_slice(&data
↳ [0..8]).unwrap() > *lamports
./stake-pool/program/src/state.rs:689: u64::try_from_slice(&data
↳ [8..16]).unwrap() > *lamports
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended not to use the `unwrap` function in the production environment because its use causes `panic!` and may crash any affected module, program or in the worst case the runtime without verbose error messages. Crashing the system will result in a loss of availability and, in some cases, even private information stored in the state. Some alternatives are possible, such as propagating the error with `?` instead of unwrapping, or using the `error-chain` crate for errors.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED The `Solana Labs` team resolved this issue in commits:

- [bd7a2cbb2338095e011388ae890400db30cd4aef](#)
- [254c087861e6ba94cbe53197088b92a8f4539df7](#)

Unnecessary unwraps were removed to optimize compute usage.

3.3 (HAL-03) MISSING CARGO OVERFLOW CHECKS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

It was observed that there is no `overflow-checks=true` in `Cargo.toml`. By default, overflow checks are disabled in optimized release builds. Hence, if there is an overflow on release builds, it will be silenced, leading to unexpected behavior of an application. Even if checked arithmetic is used through `checked_*`, it is recommended to have that check in `Cargo.toml`.

Code Location:

- `stake-pool/Cargo.toml`

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to add `overflow-checks=true` under your release profile in `Cargo.toml`.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The `Solana Labs Team` acknowledged this finding, most of the crate uses `clippy` to prevent developers from using integer arithmetic. In `stake-pool/program/src/big_vec.rs` checked math is not used as it introduces too much compute usage.



MANUAL TESTING



In the manual testing phase, the following scenarios were simulated. The scenarios listed below were selected based on the severity of the vulnerabilities Halborn was testing the program for.

4.1 SET DEACTIVATED VALIDATOR AS PREFERRED VALIDATOR

Description:

Tests were done to:

- 1) Set a deactivated validator to the `preferred_deposit_validator_vote_address` or `preferred_withdraw_validator_vote_address`
- 2) Deactivate an `preferred_deposit_validator_vote_address` or `preferred_withdraw_validator_vote_address`

Results:

The program prevents both scenarios, we believe successfully doing either of the above would result in a denial of service or in a worst-case scenario a loss of funds.

4.2 DENIAL OF SERVICE

Description:

Prior to commit [9aac29c250f1f5408f112720e0ff0c89fe7bf9c8](#) at the start of an epoch a malicious user can deposit the minimum stake delegation to a validator and then increase the stake on the validator. This prevented SOL deposits from being activated, tests were done to ensure that `increase_additional_validator_stake` and `decrease_additional_validator_stake` resolve this issue. This was tested in several scenarios to ensure users could always receive their funds either from SOL or Stake.

Results:

All deposits and withdrawals were successful as per the order of priority in the stake pool [operation manual](#)

4.3 INCREASE AND DECREASE VALIDATOR STAKE

Description:

The `stake-pool` operation manual states that it is impossible to increase and decrease a validators stake until an update instruction is performed. With the recent addition of the `increase_additional_validator_stake` and `decrease_additional_validator_stake` tests were done to try to bypass this limitation using the new instructions.

Results:

We were unable to bypass the restriction and were required to update the `validator_list_balance` and `stake_pool_balance` before decreasing the validator stake.

4.4 REGRESSION TESTING

Recently reported Critical and High vulnerabilities were reviewed and re-tested to confirm that no new vulnerabilities were introduced and that the previous fixes resolved the issue.

Results:

No code vulnerabilities were identified.



AUTOMATED TESTING



5.1 AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY SCANNING

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with the detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was **Soteria**, a security analysis service for Solana programs. Soteria performed a scan on all the programs in scope and sent the compiled results to analyzers to locate well-known vulnerabilities.

Results:

```
=====This account may be UNTRUSTFUL!=====
Found a potential vulnerability at line 712, column 34 in src/processor.rs
The account info is not trustful:

706|         let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();
707|         let stake_pool_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
708|         let manager_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
709|         let staker_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
710|         let withdraw_authority_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
711|         let validator_list_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
>712|         let reserve_stake_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
713|         let pool_mint_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
714|         let manager_fee_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
715|         let token_program_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
716|
717|         let rent = Rent::get()?;
718|
>>>Stack Trace:
>>>spl_stake_pool::processor::Processor::process::h9fa102d36ee60ceb [src/entrypoint.rs:19]
>>> spl_stake_pool::processor::Processor::process_initialize::ha25dd3c653c05abb [src/processor.rs:3737]

- ✓ [00m:00s] Building Static Happens-Before Graph
- ✓ [00m:00s] Detecting Vulnerabilities
detected 3 untrustful accounts in total.
detected 7 unsafe math operations in total.

-----The summary of potential vulnerabilities in spl_stake_pool.ll-----

3 untrustful account issues
7 unsafe arithmetic issues
```

5.2 AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with the detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was `cargo-audit`, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in <https://crates.io> are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. `cargo audit` is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.

Results:

ID	package	Short Description
RUSTSEC-2020-0071	time	Potential segfault in the time crate
RUSTSEC-2021-0139	ansi term	Unmaintained
RUSTSEC-2020-0016	net2	Unmaintained

5.3 UNSAFE RUST CODE DETECTION

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with the detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was `cargo-geiger`, a security tool that lists statistics related to the usage of unsafe Rust code in a core Rust codebase and all its dependencies.

Results:

Metric output format: x/y

x = unsafe code used by the build

y = total unsafe code found in the crate

Symbols:

🔒 = No 'unsafe' usage found, declares #![forbid(unsafe_code)]

? = No 'unsafe' usage found, missing #![forbid(unsafe_code)]

⚠️ = 'unsafe' usage found

Functions Expressions Impls Traits Methods Dependency

0/0	61/61	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	spl-stake-pool 0.7.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	arrayref 0.3.6
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	bincode 1.3.3
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.152
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	4/4	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	unicode-ident 1.0.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠️	syn 1.0.107
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	4/4	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	unicode-ident 1.0.6
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh-derive 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh-derive-internal 0.9.3
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠️	syn 1.0.107
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh-schema-derive-internal 0.9.3
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠️	syn 1.0.107
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	proc-macro-crate 0.1.5
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	toml 0.5.11
0/0	41/46	1/1	0/0	0/0	⚠️	indexmap 1.9.2
1/1	1223/1367	21/24	1/1	62/69	⚠️	hashbrown 0.12.3
0/0	26/30	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	ahash 0.7.6
1/4	49/175	1/1	0/0	3/3	⚠️	getrandom 0.2.8
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	⚠️	libc 0.2.139
1/1	92/138	5/9	0/0	2/4	⚠️	once_cell 1.17.0
0/16	0/1327	0/0	0/0	0/56	?	parking_lot_core 0.9.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	⚠️	libc 0.2.139
0/2	0/73	0/5	0/1	0/1	?	petgraph 0.6.2
0/0	0/70	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	fixedbitset 0.4.2
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152
0/0	41/46	1/1	0/0	0/0	⚠️	indexmap 1.9.2
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.152
0/1	0/399	0/7	0/1	0/13	?	smallvec 1.10.0
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152
4/6	437/1158	4/10	1/1	13/26	⚠️	bumpalo 3.12.0
6/6	659/659	5/5	0/0	3/3	⚠️	rayon 1.6.1
0/0	14/14	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	either 1.8.0
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152
7/7	657/660	5/5	0/0	33/33	⚠️	rayon-core 1.10.2
2/2	485/494	6/7	0/0	12/14	⚠️	crossbeam-channel 0.5.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
4/4	94/94	16/16	0/0	3/3	⚠️	crossbeam-utils 0.8.14
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/0	453/453	6/6	0/0	6/6	⚠️	crossbeam-deque 0.8.2
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
3/3	448/460	11/11	0/0	29/29	⚠️	crossbeam-epoch 0.9.13
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
4/4	94/94	16/16	0/0	3/3	⚠️	crossbeam-utils 0.8.14
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	memoffset 0.7.1
0/0	18/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	⚠️	scopeguard 1.1.0
4/4	94/94	16/16	0/0	3/3	⚠️	crossbeam-utils 0.8.14
4/4	94/94	16/16	0/0	3/3	⚠️	crossbeam-utils 0.8.14
0/0	65/72	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	num_cpus 1.15.0
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	⚠️	libc 0.2.139
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152
6/6	659/659	5/5	0/0	3/3	⚠️	rayon 1.6.1
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️	serde 1.0.152

0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	✖	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	✖	syn 1.0.107
2/2	1064/1198	19/22	1/1	51/58	✖	hashbrown 0.11.2
0/0	26/30	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	ahash 0.7.6
4/6	437/1158	4/10	1/1	13/26	✖	bumpalo 3.12.0
6/6	659/659	5/5	0/0	3/3	✖	rayon 1.6.1
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	mpl-token-metadata 1.4.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	arrayref 0.3.6
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	mpl-token-vault 0.1.0
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	✖	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	✖	syn 1.0.107
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	0/8	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	libm 0.2.6
3/3	442/442	1/1	0/0	3/3	✖	solana-program 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	base64 0.13.1
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	bincode 1.3.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bitflags 1.3.2
2/78	29/3973	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	blake3 1.3.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	arrayref 0.3.6
2/2	350/350	2/2	0/0	7/7	✖	arrayvec 0.7.2
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/0	4/4	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	constant_time_eq 0.2.4
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	digest 0.10.6
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	block-buffer 0.10.3
1/1	285/285	20/20	8/8	5/5	✖	generic-array 0.14.6
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	typenum 1.16.0
1/1	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	zeroize 1.3.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	zeroize_derive 1.3.3
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	✖	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	✖	syn 1.0.107
0/0	0/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	✖	synstructure 0.12.6
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	✖	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	✖	syn 1.0.107
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	unicode-xid 0.2.4
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	crypto-common 0.1.6
1/1	285/285	20/20	8/8	5/5	✖	generic-array 0.14.6
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	rand_core 0.6.4
1/4	49/175	1/1	0/0	3/3	✖	getrandom 0.2.8
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	typenum 1.16.0
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	subtle 2.4.1
6/6	659/659	5/5	0/0	3/3	✖	rayon 1.6.1
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh-derive 0.9.3
0/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	bs58 0.4.0
0/8	10/202	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	sha2 0.9.9
0/0	6/6	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	block-buffer 0.9.0
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	block-padding 0.2.1
1/1	285/285	20/20	8/8	5/5	✖	generic-array 0.14.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
1/1	14/14	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	cpufeatures 0.2.5
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	✖	libc 0.2.139
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	digest 0.9.0
1/1	285/285	20/20	8/8	5/5	✖	generic-array 0.14.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	opaque-debug 0.3.0
2/2	206/206	0/0	0/0	7/7	✖	bv 0.11.1
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
18/18	370/414	128/129	9/9	0/0	✖	bytemuck 1.13.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bytemuck_derive 1.4.0
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	✖	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	✖	syn 1.0.107
0/2	0/857	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	curve25519-dalek 3.2.1
1/1	193/193	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	byteorder 1.4.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	digest 0.9.0
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	rand_core 0.5.1
1/4	47/150	1/1	0/0	3/3	✖	getrandom 0.1.16
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0

[illegible]

1/1	285/285	20/20	8/8	5/5	🔒
1/4	47/150	1/1	0/0	3/3	🔒
1/1	1223/1367	21/24	1/1	62/69	🔒
1/1	122/122	2/2	0/0	4/4	🔒
0/0	100/100	0/0	0/0	9/9	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/9	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/9	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/4	0/0	0/0	0/2	?
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/1	193/193	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/32	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	🔒
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/2	165/712	0/0	0/0	16/25	🔒
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/71	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	🔒
0/0	0/79	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/66	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	🔒
0/0	0/71	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
6/6	659/659	5/5	0/0	3/3	🔒
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/1	323/643	0/0	0/0	20/39	🔒
0/0	100/100	0/0	0/0	9/9	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	🔒
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	161/293	4/6	0/0	7/7	🔒
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	🔒
1/1	92/138	5/9	0/0	2/4	🔒
1/1	92/138	5/9	0/0	2/4	🔒
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	4/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/8	4/196	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔒
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔒
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/1	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔒

```

generic-array 0.14.6
getrandom 0.1.16
hashbrown 0.12.3
im 15.1.0
  bitmaps 2.1.0
  typenum 1.16.0
proptest 1.0.0
  bit-set 0.5.3
  bit-vec 0.6.3
    serde 1.0.152
  bitflags 1.3.2
  byteorder 1.4.3
  lazy_static 1.4.0
  num-traits 0.2.15
  quick-error 2.0.1
  rand 0.8.5
    libc 0.2.139
    log 0.4.17
    rand_chacha 0.3.1
    ppv-lite86 0.2.17
    rand_core 0.6.4
    serde 1.0.152
    rand_core 0.6.4
    serde 1.0.152
  rand_chacha 0.3.1
  rand_xorshift 0.3.0
    rand_core 0.6.4
    serde 1.0.152
  regex-syntax 0.6.28
  rusty-fork 0.3.0
    fnv 1.0.7
    quick-error 1.2.3
    tempfile 3.3.0
    cfg-if 1.0.0
    fastrand 1.8.0
    libc 0.2.139
    remove_dir_all 0.5.3
    wait-timeout 0.2.0
    libc 0.2.139
  tempfile 3.3.0
  rand_core 0.6.4
  rand_xoshiro 0.6.0
    rand_core 0.6.4
    serde 1.0.152
  rayon 1.6.1
  serde 1.0.152
  sized-chunks 0.6.5
  bitmaps 2.1.0
  typenum 1.16.0
typenum 1.16.0
  lazy_static 1.4.0
  log 0.4.17
  memmap2 0.5.8
    libc 0.2.139
  once_cell 1.17.0
  once_cell 1.17.0
  rand_core 0.6.4
  serde 1.0.152
  serde_bytes 0.11.8
  serde_derive 1.0.152
  serde_json 1.0.91
  sha2 0.10.6
  solana-frozen-abi-macro 1.14.10
    proc-macro2 1.0.50
    quote 1.0.23
    syn 1.0.107
  subtle 2.4.1
  thiserror 1.0.38
    thiserror-impl 1.0.38
      proc-macro2 1.0.50
      quote 1.0.23
      syn 1.0.107
  solana-frozen-abi-macro 1.14.10
  solana-sdk-macro 1.14.10
    bs58 0.4.0
    proc-macro2 1.0.50
    quote 1.0.23
    rustversion 1.0.11
    syn 1.0.107

```

0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠	syn 1.0.107
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	tiny-bip39 0.8.2
15/18	453/460	3/3	0/0	12/12	⚠	anyhow 1.0.68
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	hmac 0.8.1
1/1	92/138	5/9	0/0	2/4	⚠	once_cell 1.17.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	pbkdf2 0.4.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	base64 0.12.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	crypto-mac 0.8.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	hmac 0.8.1
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	rand 0.7.3
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	rand_core 0.5.1
6/6	659/659	5/5	0/0	3/3	⚠	rayon 1.6.1
0/8	10/202	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	sha2 0.9.9
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	subtle 2.4.1
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	rand 0.7.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rustc-hash 1.1.0
0/8	10/202	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	sha2 0.9.9
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	20/20	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	unicode-normalization 0.1.22
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	tinyvec 1.6.0
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	tinyvec_macros 0.1.0
1/1	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	zeroize 1.3.0
12/14	438/502	13/13	2/2	10/10	⚠	wasm-bindgen 0.2.83
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	serde 1.0.152
0/0	4/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	serde_json 1.0.91
0/0	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-macro 0.2.83
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-macro-support 0.2.83
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠	syn 1.0.107
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-backend 0.2.83
4/6	437/1158	4/10	1/1	13/26	⚠	bumpalo 3.12.0
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	⚠	log 0.4.17
1/1	92/138	5/9	0/0	2/4	⚠	once_cell 1.17.0
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠	syn 1.0.107
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-shared 0.2.83
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-shared 0.2.83
1/1	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	zeroize 1.3.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	spl-token 3.5.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	arrayref 0.3.6
18/18	370/414	128/129	9/9	0/0	⚠	bytemuck 1.13.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num_enum 0.5.7
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num_enum_derive 0.5.7
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	proc-macro-crate 1.3.0
1/1	92/138	5/9	0/0	2/4	⚠	once_cell 1.17.0
1/1	24/24	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	toml_edit 0.18.0
0/0	41/46	1/1	0/0	0/0	⚠	indexmap 1.9.2
0/0	40/40	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	nom8 0.2.0
2/37	361/2144	0/0	0/0	4/21	⚠	memchr 2.5.0
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	⚠	libc 0.2.139
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	toml_datetime 0.5.1
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	serde 1.0.152
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	69/69	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠	syn 1.0.107
3/3	442/442	1/1	0/0	3/3	⚠	solana-program 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	shank 0.0.12
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	shank_macro 0.0.12
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	shank_macro_impl 0.0.12
15/18	453/460	3/3	0/0	12/12	⚠	anyhow 1.0.68
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠	proc-macro2 1.0.50
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.23
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠	serde 1.0.152

[illegible]

0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	assert_matches 1.5.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	base64 0.13.1
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bincode 1.3.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bitflags 1.3.2
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bs58 0.4.0
18/18	370/414	128/129	9/9	0/0	?	bytemuck 1.13.0
1/1	193/193	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	byteorder 1.4.3
0/0	2/48	2/2	0/0	0/0	?	chrono 0.4.23
0/2	21/147	0/0	0/0	1/1	?	iana-time-zone 0.1.53
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	2/2	?	core-foundation-sys 0.8.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-integer 0.1.45
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.152
1/1	221/221	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	time 0.1.45
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	?	libc 0.2.139
0/2	0/857	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	curve25519-dalek 3.2.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	derivation-path 0.2.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	ed25519-dalek 1.0.1
0/2	0/857	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	curve25519-dalek 3.2.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	ed25519 1.5.3
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.152
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_bytes 0.11.8
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	signature 1.6.4
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.6
0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_core 0.6.4
1/1	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	zeroize 1.3.0
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand 0.7.3
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_core 0.5.1
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.152
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_bytes 0.11.8
0/8	10/202	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha2 0.9.9
1/1	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	zeroize 1.3.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	ed25519-dalek-bip32 0.2.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	derivation-path 0.2.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	ed25519-dalek 1.0.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	hmac 0.12.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.6
0/8	4/196	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha2 0.10.6
1/1	285/285	20/20	8/8	5/5	?	generic-array 0.14.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	hmac 0.12.1
0/0	0/72	0/3	0/1	0/3	?	itertools 0.10.5
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	lazy_static 1.4.0
0/0	4/4	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	libsecp256k1 0.6.0
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	log 0.4.17
0/0	161/293	4/6	0/0	7/7	?	mmap2 0.5.8
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	pbkdf2 0.11.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	hmac 0.12.1
6/6	659/659	5/5	0/0	3/3	?	rayon 1.6.1
0/1	0/83	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha-1 0.10.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
1/1	14/14	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cpufeatures 0.2.5
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.6
0/8	4/196	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha2 0.10.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	qstring 0.7.2
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	percent-encoding 2.2.0
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand 0.7.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_chacha 0.2.2
0/1	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rustversion 1.0.11
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.152
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_bytes 0.11.8
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.152
0/0	4/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_json 1.0.91
0/8	4/196	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha2 0.10.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha3 0.10.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-frozen-abi 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-frozen-abi-macro 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-logger 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	env_logger 0.9.3
2/2	45/45	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	atty 0.2.14
1/24	10/444	0/2	0/0	5/45	?	libc 0.2.139
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	humantime 2.1.0
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	log 0.4.17
0/0	34/34	1/2	0/0	2/2	?	regex 1.7.1

0/0	34/34	1/2	0/0	2/2	✖	regex 1.7.1
0/19	33/678	0/0	0/0	1/22	✖	aho-corasick 0.7.20
2/37	361/2144	0/0	0/0	4/21	✖	memchr 2.5.0
2/37	361/2144	0/0	0/0	4/21	✖	memchr 2.5.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	regex-syntax 0.6.28
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	termcolor 1.2.0
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	✖	lazy_static 1.4.0
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	✖	log 0.4.17
3/3	442/442	1/1	0/0	3/3	✖	solana-program 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-sdk-macro 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
1/1	97/97	0/0	0/0	1/1	✖	uriparse 0.6.4
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	fnv 1.0.7
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	✖	lazy_static 1.4.0
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
12/14	438/502	13/13	2/2	10/10	✖	wasm-bindgen 0.2.83
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	subtle 2.4.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
1/1	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	zeroize 1.3.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	spl-memo 3.0.1
3/3	442/442	1/1	0/0	3/3	✖	solana-program 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	spl-token 3.5.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	spl-token 3.5.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num_enum 0.5.7
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.152
3/3	442/442	1/1	0/0	3/3	✖	solana-program 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	spl-math 0.1.0
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh-derive 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	num-traits 0.2.15
3/3	442/442	1/1	0/0	3/3	✖	solana-program 1.14.10
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	uint 0.9.5
1/1	193/193	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	byteorder 1.4.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	crunchy 0.2.2
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	hex 0.4.3
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	✖	serde 1.0.152
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	static_assertions 1.1.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	spl-token-2022 0.5.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.38
108/352	11857/26486	302/351	22/25	352/575		

error: Found 18 warnings



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

 **HALBORN**

