

grasp them as either true or nonexistent, because of not grasping them dualistically.

**If they were real, they would be other than mind but,
If they are not other, they cannot be real.**

Your position [that representations are real] is not established. In as far as they are real, they are other than mind. If they are not other, then necessarily they are mind. Since both positions are negated, appearances are established as neither real nor true.

‘We assert the False Representationalist Cittamātrin doctrine of the unreality of appearances.’

Showing the error in that doctrine was already completed above.

‘If you negate the true existence of mind, you are negating seeing and hearing.’

Although mind is not existent, we do not negate appearances. For example:

9.27

**An illusion is not true, yet it is seen.
So it is for the mind which sees.**

Just as it is with illusions, so it is for appearances which, when unexamined, are accepted as true.

Some have said that v26-27b is a refutation of the Jaina but this is incorrect. [403] It would be out of context for such a refutation and, moreover, the position refuted does not accord with that of the Jaina.

2. Non-establishment of the basis

1. Presenting the objection
2. The logic which refutes the objection
3. A counter objection
4. Establishing the pervasion for the counter objection

1. Presenting the objection

‘Saṃsāra must have an existent basis.

‘Just as a pile of stones is the basis for mistakenly thinking there is a person, delusion is pervaded by a basis of delusion. Therefore, because of the existence of the delusion of dual appearances, their non-dual basis—self-awareness—must exist.’ This is Ācārya Sthiramati’s objection, given as the reason clause of a svātantra.

Otherwise, it would be like space.’

‘If there were no basis, it would follow that there would be no deluded appearances.’ This is the objection given as a prasaṅga.

2. The logic which refutes the objection

9.28

**If the nonexistent were to rest on the existent,
Could it then start to function?**

The logical subject is deluded perception, which is nonexistent. By depending on something external which is its existent basis, how can the nonexistent thing have its own function? It follows that it has no function because what is nonexistent is established as having no nature. For example, by the resting of a rabbit’s horn on a vase, it would be erroneous to say that the horn could perform functions such as piercing and so on.

It is untenable to say the reason⁴⁰ is not established because it is accepted by both of us that the sights and sounds are nonexistent. It is untenable to say that the pervasion⁴¹ is not established, for if it were able to perform a function despite its being nonexistent, it would violate the premise [v27c] ‘saṃsāra must have an existent basis’, and its functioning would be indistinguishable from that basis.

‘The nonexistent thing does not perform any function.’

3. A counter objection

**Your mind would be unaided
And completely solitary.**

It is illogical that the basis mind is true while the dualistic appearances resting on it are false, for it would follow that this mind of yours is an isolated, non-dual cognition [404] unconnected to the dualistic appearances. If this position is accepted, the objection can be made:

9.29

**Being free from dualistic perception,
All would be the Tathāgata.**

Since it is free from the impurities of dualistic appearances and the subject-object mind, it would follow that all there would be is buddhahood.

‘Although mind is free from the dualistic appearance of subject and object, it has not attained buddhahood. Where is the contradiction? The pervasion⁴² is not established.’

4. Establishing the pervasion for the counter objection

**So what is achieved
By designating it mind only?**

Although everything may be conceived as mere discriminating awareness, if one is not free from the obscurations, it follows that the designations of mind only and freedom from duality would be unnecessary to achieve liberation from saṃsāra. If such designations were necessary, liberation would occur when one conceived of freedom from duality. Therefore, there is no need for the conceptual discrimination of freedom from duality.

Or, these lines may be understood as a response to the opponent saying, ‘We accept the consequence that saṃsāra is completely nonexistent.’ The designation of mere discriminating awareness was supposed to show the true basis of saṃsāric delusion. If it does not help you establish saṃsāra after all, of what advantage is it to make that designation?

Or, if mind is the Tathāgata from the very beginning, it is meaningless to accomplish buddhahood.

Chapter overview (recap):

1. Explaining that wisdom is the principal
2. It is the wisdom of the emptiness of intrinsic nature
 1. Establishing the object as empty
 1. The nature of the two truths
 2. Abandoning objections
 2. Establishing the subject as the path
3. How to engage in meditation on emptiness
4. Ceasing to grasp at true existence
5. The result of meditation on emptiness

2. Establishing the subject as the path

It has been taught elsewhere that this section has the following three parts:

1. Establishing the relative subject as the path
2. Establishing the ultimate subject as the path
3. Conclusion: the function of the two cognitions

However, the first part does not concern establishing the relative subject as the path, [405] for verses 32-34 are not about the relative. If they were, the subsequent verses would also be about the relative and so would not be a distinct section. Therefore:

1. Establishment of subject cognition as the path (the main part)
2. Abandoning the objections of śrāvakas
3. Conclusion: the function of the two cognitions

Section overview: Establishing subject cognition as the path [v30-39]

1. Objection
2. Response
 1. A partial knowledge of illusion is not the antidote
 2. Knowledge that everything is illusion is the antidote
 1. Abandoning clinging to existence
 2. Abandoning clinging to nonexistence
 3. The reason for these
 3. How that is the arising of the wisdom without dualistic appearances
 4. Engaging in activity does not depend on effort
 1. The appearance of the Conqueror's kāya to trainees who have purified their streams of being
 2. Those appearances engage in benefit
 3. Abandoning an objection
 1. Presenting the objection
 2. Presenting the reason of scriptural citation
 3. Establishing the pervasion of that

1. Establishing subject cognition as the path

1. Objection
2. Response

1. Objection

9.30

**'How will your illusion-like understanding
End the defilements?
When an apparitional woman is conjured,
Desire for her arises even in her creator.'**

'The knowledge that defiled perceptions are like illusions is not itself an antidote to the defilements. Just as an illusionist knows that the apparitional woman is his own conjuration, nevertheless this knowledge does not function as an antidote to his desire for her.'

2. Response

1. A partial knowledge of illusion is not the antidote
2. Knowledge that everything is illusion is the antidote
3. How that is the arising of the wisdom without dualistic appearances
4. Engaging in activity does not depend on effort

1. A partial knowledge of illusion is not an antidote

If the causes of the defilements—imprints—are not overcome, objects are not overcome. If the causes of the defilements are overcome, objects are overcome. The former occurs when the seeds of the defilements are not abandoned, even though defilements towards objects may not be arising. The latter occurs when the defilements are abandoned by abandoning their seeds.

When it is understood that all objects are illusory, the seeds of the defilements—attachment to reality—are abandoned and the defilements are abandoned. But, if objects are only partially understood as illusory, one has not completely abandoned attachment to their reality and so one has not abandoned the seeds of the defilements. Therefore, the defilements continue to arise:

9.31

That creator has not abandoned the imprints

Of the defilements in her appearance.

Thus, when he sees her,

The imprints of emptiness are weak.

[406] When the creator of the illusion—the illusionist—sees the woman, desire for her arises. Why? Because he has not abandoned clinging to the reality of cognizables. Why not? The imprints of emptiness are weak because karmic formations of perceptual objectification remain. Therefore, a partial understanding of illusion is not the path.

2. Knowledge that everything is illusion is the antidote

1. Abandoning clinging to existence
2. Abandoning clinging to nonexistence
3. The reason for these

1. Abandoning clinging to existence

9.32

**By meditating on the imprints of emptiness,
The imprints of reality will be abandoned.**

If one meditates on the general concept⁴³ of emptiness, by the force of its opposition to clinging to existence, clinging to reality ceases.

2. Abandoning clinging to nonexistence

**By meditating it is nothing whatsoever,
That, too, will then be abandoned,**

The positive determination that something is empty is subsequently abandoned. How? By meditating with no positive or negative determination whatsoever.

How does one abandon the imputation of the positive determination that something is empty?

3. The reason for these

9.33

**For when one thinks, 'It does not exist',
There is no conception of an analysandum.
Then, its unreality has lost its basis,
So how can it remain before the conceptual mind?**

When their unreality is before the conceptual mind, how can the objects of awareness remain? They cannot. Why? Because they have lost their basis, i.e. the conception of something to be negated, which is the basis of the conception of their negation. With no thought of something to negate, there is no thought of their negation.

If one asks, 'What is it that is nonexistent?', it should be answered, 'This is nonexistent.' But, when no object of negation is identified, one is negating without any qualities to negate, so the negation is not determined. An object to be negated must be identified. But here, no basis—an object to be negated—is conceived. When does this occur?

When one thinks, ‘It does not exist’, i.e. when the unreality of the analysandum is conceived.⁴⁴

3. How that is the arising of the wisdom without dualistic appearances [407]

9.34

**When neither existence nor nonexistence
Remain before the mind,
Since there is no other category at that time,
There is a complete non-conceptual pacification.**

When existents no longer remain before the mind, the path of realization has not yet been established. It is established only when nonexistents also no longer remain before the mind and there is no establishment of a positive affirmation of nonexistence as an object of understanding. The general concepts of existence and nonexistence do not arise and since there is no attachment to their externality, there is complete pacification in non-conceptualization. With no conceptual imputation, the wisdom without dualistic appearances which cuts the continuity of conceptual discrimination arises.

‘Is there not some other kind of imputation, apart from the concepts of existence and nonexistence, that pervades appearances?’

There is no other category because there is no alternative apart from these two—existence and nonexistence.⁴⁵

4. Engaging in activity does not depend on effort

1. The appearance of the Conqueror’s kāya to trainees who have purified their streams of being
2. Those appearances engage in benefit
3. Abandoning an objection

1. The appearance of the Conqueror’s kāya to trainees who have purified their streams of being

‘How is the benefit of others enacted when the wisdom without dualistic appearances is always in equanimity in the emptiness of all dharmas?’

9.35

**Just as wish granting jewels and wish fulfilling trees
Fulfil hopes,
So, too, the conquerors appear
By the power of trainees and aspiration prayers.**

The saṃbhogakāya appears to those who have mastered the tenth bhūmi and the nirmāṇakāya appears to ordinary individuals. What causes them to arise? They arise by the power of trainees and by the power of former aspiration prayers. How can they appear when they have no conceptual discrimination? In the same way that wish granting jewels and wish fulfilling trees fulfil hopes.

2. Those appearances engage in benefit

9.36

**For example, when the creator
Of a shrine of Garuḍa had passed away,
The shrine still pacified poisons and so on,
Long after his death.**

9.37

**By holding the bodhisattva conduct,
The shrine of the Conqueror is built,
So even after the bodhisattva's nirvāṇa,
The benefit of others continues.**

Long ago, when the people of a certain place were afflicted by nāgas, Samgu,⁴⁶ who had heard there was a woman in the land of Oḍḍiyāna with mastery of vidya-mantra, set out to visit her. He saw her collecting wood and, doubting her, respectfully asked her [408] about a method to control the nāgas. She proceeded to bless eight handfuls of milk from a black bitch with the vidya-mantra of Garuḍa. Samgu drank seven handfuls of milk but was unable to drink the last handful. Thus, seven of the eight nāgas were controlled but Ananta was not controlled. Although the people were then restored to health, Samgu later died from the afflictions of Ananta. Yet, a shrine he had consecrated with the vidya-mantra continued to pacify afflictions. Thus, just as illnesses, etc. were pacified by the shrine, following the

bodhisattva's nirvāṇa, even though his conceptual discrimination has ended, all benefits continue to be performed. If one asks why, it is because by following the bodhisattva conduct—the path of establishing the benefit of others—the shrine of the Conqueror is established.⁴⁷

3. Abandoning an objection

1. Presenting the objection
2. Presenting the reason of scriptural citation
3. Establishing the pervasion of that

1. Presenting the objection

9.38

**'How could making offerings to
Someone without a mind have any result?'**

'If the Buddha does not have any conceptual discrimination, it follows that the act of presenting offerings to him is without merit because he does not discriminate it.'

2. Presenting the reason of scriptural citation

Although he does not have the discrimination of being pleased by offerings, this does not conflict with the existence of merit, just as there is merit in making offerings to his physical remains after his attainment of complete nirvāṇa, which also have no thoughts. How can this be?

**Remaining in the world and passing into nirvāṇa
Were taught to be equivalent.**

As it says in the *Affectionate Lion Sutra*,⁴⁸

Therefore, whether one makes offerings to
The Buddha who remains in the world
Or his mortal remains and relics,
If the intention is the same, the results will be the same.

If one argues that even though this is taught in this scripture, nevertheless, the result is not the same: [409]

3. Establishing the pervasion⁴⁹ of that

9.39

**Whether relative or in suchness,
According to the scriptures, there is a result,
Just as, for example, there is a result
In offering to a real Buddha.**

Our position is that merit is relative, while your position is that it is ultimate. Since we both hold the position that it is established in the scriptures that merit exists, it is true for both of us and thus there is the pervasion.

Section overview: Abandoning the objections of śrāvakas [v40-51]

1. Presenting the objection
2. The scriptural criterion for the path
3. Establishing the [Mahāyāna] scriptures as Buddha's word
 1. We have the same criteria for accepting [texts as scriptures]
 2. We have the same criteria for rejecting [texts as scriptures]
4. Establishing them as definitive meaning
 1. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in the monk who has abandoned defilements
 2. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in a nirvāṇa in which suffering is abandoned
 3. Overcoming objections to that
 1. The existence of the suffering of this life
 1. Objection
 2. Response
 3. Response to a counter objection
 2. The existence of the suffering of future lives
 1. Presenting the objection
 2. The existence of craving itself
 3. The existence of its cause, sensation
 4. The logical conclusion
5. Summarizing the meaning of this section
6. Explaining extensively the criteria for establishing the Mahāyāna scriptures as Buddha's word
 1. We have the same criteria
 2. To abandon it because of not understanding it is an error

2. Abandoning the objections of śrāvakas

1. Presenting the objection
2. The scriptural criterion for the path
3. Establishing the [Mahāyāna] scriptures as Buddha's word
4. Establishing them as definitive meaning
5. Summarizing the meaning of this section
6. Explaining extensively the criteria for establishing the Mahāyāna scriptures as Buddha's word⁵⁰

1. Presenting the objection

9.40

**‘You will be liberated by seeing truth,
But what is the point of seeing emptiness?’**

Śrāvakas assert the Four Truths:

1. The fourfold truth of suffering: suffering, impermanence, emptiness and non-self
2. The fourfold truth of its origin: origin, cause, arising and conditionality
3. The fourfold truth of cessation: cessation, pacification, joy and renunciation
4. The fourfold truth of the path: path, establishment, reason and certainty

‘If one understands the Four Truths of the path and their sixteen aspects, emptiness is already included. Non-self, pacification and cessation are also included. Through cultivating these, nirvāṇa with remainder can be attained. Through cultivating that, nirvāṇa without remainder can be attained. Therefore, this being the path, what is the use of claiming that everything is like an illusion, or that everything in truth is without intrinsic nature, or understanding emptiness without conceptualization or discrimination? That is not the path.’

2. The scriptural criterion for the path

The scriptures teach the path of cultivating an understanding of emptiness:

**The scriptures teach
No enlightenment without this path.**

In the *Perfection of Wisdom* it says, [410] ‘If one has a conception of reality, one does not have patience, let alone unsurpassable enlightenment.’ It also says, ‘Even those who accept the training of the śrāvakas should train in this very *Perfection of Wisdom*’, and so forth.⁵¹

‘But the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s word. It was invented after the Tathāgata’s parinirvāṇa. Therefore, the criterion is unsuitable.’

3. Establishing the Mahāyāna scriptures as Buddha’s word

1. We have the same criteria for accepting [texts as scriptures]
2. We have the same criteria for rejecting [texts as scriptures]

1. We have the same criteria for accepting [texts as scriptures]

9.41

‘The Mahāyāna is not established.’

Why are your scriptures established?

‘Because they are established for both.’

How, if the Mahāyāna is not established as the Buddha’s word, are your śrāvaka scriptures established as the Buddha’s word?

‘They are established as the Buddha’s word for both the disputer and the respondent.’

In that case, either a) they are established as the Buddha’s word for both this disputer and this respondent or else b) they are established as the Buddha’s word by the agreement of any two individuals.

If the former, then either a1) they are established as scriptural for you because they have been known as such from the outset or a2) you accepted them as scriptural through logical proof. The first of these is unacceptable:

They were not established for you at first,

Your texts are not automatically known to be scriptural.

If you assert [a2], ‘I accepted them through reasoning’:

9.42

And whatever conditions gave you confidence in them,

We have them in the Mahāyāna, too.

What are the criteria for accepting something as Buddha’s word? If one says it is ‘what is included in the sutras, what appears in vinaya and what does not contradict the truth’,⁵² then that is the same for the Mahāyāna because that also meets these conditions. [411] Therefore, you have no criteria that distinguish only your own texts as the

Buddha's word and which are not met for both the disputer and the respondent.

If you assert [b] that they are the Buddha's word because they are accepted as such by agreement between any two people, then:

**If truth is the belief of two others,
The Vedas and so forth would also be true.**

In accord with this, since the Vedas and so forth are accepted by two tīrthikas, it would follow that they are also proven to be scriptural.

2. We have the same criteria for rejecting [texts as scriptures]

9.43

'But the Mahāyāna is disputed.'

**Your scriptures are also in dispute—with those of the tīrthikas,
As well as with the other [śrāvaka] scriptures.**

Therefore, you should abandon them.

Whether or not the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's word, if it should be rejected because it is disputed, other scriptures even among the baskets of the śrāvakas should also be rejected because they are disputed, too. How are they are disputed? For tīrthikas, there is a dispute as to whether or not they are scriptures. Furthermore, disputations exist within the different śrāvaka schools.

4. Establishing [the Mahāyāna scriptures] as definitive meaning

Objection: 'Even if they are Buddha's word, the Mahāyāna is of provisional meaning.'

This is incorrect; the Mahāyāna is of definitive meaning. Conversely, the śrāvaka [vehicle] is of provisional meaning. How so?

1. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in the monk who has abandoned defilements
2. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in a nirvāṇa in which suffering is abandoned
3. Overcoming objections

4. The logical conclusion

1. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in the monk who has abandoned defilements

9.44

‘The root of the doctrine is monasticism.’

It is difficult to be such a monk.

There are five classifications of monk:

1. Monk in name only
2. Monk who has taken vows
3. Monk who has taken full ordination
4. Begging monk
5. Arhat

The first four are not what is referred to here; rather, it is the arhat which is referred to, i.e. a monk who has abandoned the defilements. Why is the arhat the root of the doctrine? Because the arhat collects the doctrine, upholds the doctrine, disseminates it and so forth.

Why is this ‘difficult’ in the śrāvaka tradition? [412] Some say that if they do not meditate upon the emptiness which is the non-self of dharmas, then although there may be no direct causes of the defilements, their seeds still exist, since they still have incorrect mental activity. However, this is not the intended meaning of these lines. Śrāvaka arhats have not merely abandoned the direct causes [but have fully abandoned the defilements]. Otherwise they would not be distinct from the states of freedom from desire attainable on the higher worldly paths.⁵³ They still have attachment to reality through the obscuration of cognizables, not of defilements. Therefore, since there is no possibility for the defilements to arise, they do not have the seeds of the defilements. Furthermore, if fully abandoning the defilements through the tradition of the śrāvakas were not possible, it would contradict v45d below which states that they do abandon the defilements.

From the point of view of the bodhisattva vehicle, the monk who has abandoned the defilements has exhausted all that is to be abandoned,

i.e. all conceptual discrimination. He is the 'root of the doctrine' which the Buddha alone has demonstrated to others out of his own profound, complete enlightenment. In the śrāvaka tradition, it is difficult to attain liberation from the self-clinging to dharmas, without which one cannot attain buddhahood and so, lacking the cause of the final result, the śrāvaka tradition is of provisional meaning and not of definitive meaning.

Furthermore, briefly, someone might say that monasticism is extremely important as the root of the doctrine because the other scriptures are in dispute. That should be rejected because there exist disputations regarding monastic discipline.

Concerning whether v44c onwards is part of this section on establishing the Mahāyāna as definitive meaning, according to Dānaśrī,⁵⁴ it is part of it.

2. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in a nirvāṇa in which suffering is abandoned

**A nirvāṇa for the perceptual mind
Is also difficult to attain.**

[413] For the śrāvaka tradition, a nirvāṇa in which suffering is abandoned is not logical because the perceptual mind still has self-clinging towards dharmas. The existence of such a nirvāṇa is difficult for them to attain because their nirvāṇa is not free from the sufferings of a mind-made body. They assert a non-final nirvāṇa that is free only from the suffering in which the skandhas are still established but the nirvāṇa being referred to here [in the root text] is final.

3. Overcoming objections to that

1. The existence of the suffering of this life
2. The existence of the suffering of future lives

1. The existence of the suffering of this life

1. Objection
2. Response
3. Response to a counter objection

1. Objection

9.45

‘One is liberated by abandoning the defilements.’

‘By the cause—the defilements, there is the result—sufferings, from which ārya śrāvakas are liberated. Similarly by the cause—no defilements, there is the result—nirvāṇa, in which suffering has been abandoned.’

2. Response

Then it would happen immediately,

The moment the defilements are abandoned, the level of an arhat would be attained. It follows that suffering has been exhausted.

‘This is our position [i.e. śrāvakas exhaust suffering by abandoning defilements].’

3. Response to a counter objection

**Yet one sees the power of karma
Even though there are no defilements.**

In the nirvāṇa in which the skandhas remain, one can see the power of karma even though there are no defilements. One can see arhats such as Vibhudatta, for example, who experienced suffering.⁵⁵

‘Although they have not exhausted the sufferings of this life, they have exhausted the sufferings of clinging to rebirth.’

Although for them, the sufferings which are directly established in the skandhas are exhausted, the sufferings of the mind-made body are not exhausted, so the sufferings of future lives still exist. There are three parts to the explanation of this:

2. The existence of the suffering of future lives

1. Presenting the objection
2. The existence of craving itself
3. The existence of its cause, sensation [414]