

CHAPTER 9

WISDOM

1. Explaining that wisdom is the principal [v1]
2. It is the wisdom of the emptiness of intrinsic nature [v2-56]
3. How to engage in meditation on emptiness [v57-110]
4. Ceasing to grasp at true existence [v111-150]
5. The result of meditation on emptiness [v151-167]

1. Explaining that wisdom is the principal

1. The reason wisdom is the principal
2. Advice to strive in this

1. The reason wisdom is the principal

9.1

**All of these factors were taught
By the Sage for the sake of wisdom.**

The other five perfections, or five aspects of skilful means, have now been presented. They are called here ‘factors’, i.e. causes of wisdom, since wisdom develops by meditating on the first five perfections. Or, whilst wisdom is the antidote to saṃsāra and the defilements, the other perfections act as helpers. ‘For the sake of wisdom’ means in order to develop it. [379]

2. Advice to strive in this

**Therefore, those who wish to pacify sufferings
Should develop wisdom.**

Since only wisdom can overcome attachment to existence, the root of suffering, it should be developed.

2. It is the wisdom of the emptiness of intrinsic nature

1. Establishing the object as empty
2. Establishing the subject as the path

1. Establishing the object as empty

1. The nature of the two truths in our tradition
2. Abandoning objections¹



1. The nature of the two truths in our tradition

1. Distinguishing the two truths
2. Their characteristics
3. The valid cognitions which correctly ascertain those characteristics

1. Distinguishing the two truths

1. Basis of the distinction
2. Meaning of the distinction
3. Ascertaining the number

4. Definitions

9.2

Relative and ultimate:**These are asserted as the two truths.**

1. Basis of the distinction

The basis is mere cognoscibility. Since the ultimate is how cognizables really are and the relative is how they seem to be, both are pervaded by mere cognoscibility.

2. Meaning of the distinction

The two truths are not distinct entities because, if they were:

- The two truths would not be dharma-possessioners [*chos can*] and the true nature of dharmas themselves [*chos nyid*].
- Deluded perceptual attributes would not be overcome by the ultimate realization of emptiness.
- The complete non-establishment of the relative would not be ultimate.
- The defilements and their complete purification could be simultaneous.

Yet, they are not completely indistinct because, if they were:

- In seeing the relative, one would see truth.
- Likewise for the ultimate: the relative would be inseparable from it.
- Just as the relative is obscured perception, so the ultimate would also be obscured perception.
- Just as the relative is not to be found anywhere other than in seeing and hearing, likewise the ultimate would also not be found anywhere else. [380]

Nor are they distinct dharmas which have an identical nature or substance, like the impermanence and composition of a vase, because the ultimate is not established as a substance. What are they then? They are like hairs appearing to pass across the sky and one thinking

they are external. In this way, one cannot express the meaning of the distinction between the two truths as either identity or complete difference.²

3. Ascertaining the number

It is certain that truth and falsity are mutually exclusive. It is false that one can establish the existence of objects of conceptual discrimination with valid cognition. This is the relative. It is true that one can negate the existence of objects of conceptual discrimination with valid cognition. This is ultimate truth. Therefore, there are only two truths.

4. Definitions

- ‘Relative’: the obscured objects of deluded conceptual thought.
- ‘Relative truth’: the deluded perspective which takes those objects as true.³
- ‘Ultimate’: a sought after and undeceiving pure cognition.
- ‘Ultimate truth’: the unelaborated dharmadhātu, which is true from the perspective of realization.

2. Their essential characteristics

Ultimate truth is completely empty of deluded perceptions. Any kind of positive claim about it as existent, nonexistent, both, or neither, is a perception of deluded conceptual thought. Being completely distinct from that, it is unelaborated. The relative, appearing but untrue from the perspective of realization, is the perception of erroneous conceptual thought.

3. The valid cognitions which ascertain those characteristics

The unelaborated ultimate is a cognition that sees reality with yogic direct perception by not seeing anything. It is ascertained by the elimination of objects to be negated with inferential reasoning cutting off elaborations. [381] The illusion-like relative is ascertained by conventional valid cognition in mere appearances and by the negation of untrue appearances with inferential reasoning that cuts off elaborations upon truth.⁴ These characteristics are explained in the root text as follows:

The ultimate is not within the domain of conceptual thought.

Conceptual thought is said to be relative.

This section is explained by some⁵ as follows:

1. Distinguishing the types of conceptual thought
2. The graduations of refuter
3. Abandoning objections about these graduations

1. Distinguishing the types of conceptual thought

9.3

We can see two types of people:

Yogins and ordinary people.

‘Yogins’ are stream-entrants and those on the first bhūmi and above, who have achieved transcendental wisdom. ‘Ordinary people’ are those who have not seen reality—both the non-Buddhists, such as the followers of Kapila,⁶ and ordinary Buddhists.

2. The graduations of refuter

Ordinary, worldly people

Are opposed by worldly yogins.

Worldly ones, such as those who hold the view of self, are opposed by those who, with the direct perception which sees non-self, cognize it is not true. Among these, ordinary worldly people are opposed by ‘worldly yogins’, i.e. śrāvaka yogins who see the self of dharmas. They in turn are opposed by the insight of yogins who see the non-self of subject and object—those who have the vision of mere discriminating awareness. They are opposed in turn by those [Madhyamaka yogins] who have the wisdom without dualistic appearances.⁷

9.4

Yogins, too, have distinct conceptual thought,

With higher and higher objectors,

Why are ordinary people, who do not see reality, opposed by those with higher minds? It is because of the ascertainments of inferential

reasoning made with those higher minds. Their inferential reasoning which refutes the self of the individual ascertains that the self and so forth, conceived of as objects by ordinary minds, are not established and their inferential reasoning which refutes the self of dharmas ascertains that there is no subject, object, nor mere discriminating awareness. How are these refutations made?

Both agreeing upon examples,

[382] An agreement is established for both the proponent and the objector that reflections, etc. are free from singularity and multiplicity. For freedom from singularity and multiplicity, the pervasion by essencelessness⁸ is ascertained to establish their essencelessness and thus agree on this. By the positive establishment that appearances possess different parts, a partless singularity and multiplicity are eliminated. Thus, freedom from singularity and multiplicity is established. Thus, the qualification⁹ and pervasion are ascertained. As it is said:

It is because of their freedom from singularity and
multiplicity
That they are without intrinsic nature, like reflections.¹⁰

In this way, objections are based on inferential reasoning in dependence upon an example.¹¹

3. Abandoning objections

‘It is established that all conceptual thought—that of yogins and that of ordinary people—is deluded in regard to the nature of the relative and that there are objections between them. But if it established that all conceptual thought is deluded, those yogins who have exhausted delusion must have abandoned all conceptual thought by their ultimate realization of reality.’

And not analysing for the sake of the result.

They do not abandon conceptual thought because they do not analyse, i.e. if one does not examine the conceptual thought, one will not abandon pleasant appearances. Why do they not analyse? To achieve

results such as the perfection of the accumulations and the benefit of others.

‘Is it not a contradiction to say one can comprehend deluded appearances?’

There is no contradiction, for there are ‘agreed upon examples’, i.e. just as the proponent and objector are not in contradiction that reflections are the comprehension of untrue appearances, similarly, for the yogin, there is the comprehension of appearances as untrue.

‘In that case, it follows that yogins and ordinary people are undifferentiated in their understanding. That is to say, do deluded appearances not exist equally for both?’

There is a difference regarding the existence and nonexistence of attachment to their reality [383]:

9.5

Worldly people see existent objects

And discriminate them as reality,

Not as illusion-like. Therefore, on this,

Yogins and worldly people are in dispute.

This is how verses 3-5 are explained by some.¹² However, it is not correct. It suggests that yogins see truth but ordinary people do not see truth¹³ but that is inconsistent with line 5d, which refers to a proponent and objector being in dispute, i.e. the objections between them are not direct perceptions but are inferential.

There are no inferential objections regarding the ‘examples accepted by both’, for how could there be any such objections, either between the conceptual thought of yogins and ordinary beings, or between the conceptual thought of superior yogins and ordinary yogins? They are both in agreement on the examples, so there are no differences in this regard.

The objections of the conceptual thought of superior yogins are not direct perceptions, either. If they were, it would be unreasonable for proponents of wisdom without dualistic appearances [i.e. Mādhyamikas] to express any objections towards those who see subject and object as mere discriminating awareness [i.e.

Vijñaptimātrins] because, concerning the distinction between Mahāyāna Mādhyamikas and proponents of mere discriminating awareness, for those who have newly entered the vehicle, there are no differences amongst them in terms of their seeing truth, so a disputer and the disputee cannot be distinguished.¹⁴

Verses 3-5 are correctly explained this way:

1. Distinguishing the types of conceptual thought
2. The graduations of refuter
3. Abandoning objections about these graduations

1. Distinguishing the types of conceptual thought

9.3

**We can see two types of people:
Yogins and ordinary people.**

Yogins are those who accept the textual tradition sealed by the words of the Sugata. Ordinary people are tīrthikas, who assert the doctrine of self, and other ordinary people. [384]

2. The graduations of refuter

**Ordinary, worldly people
Are opposed by worldly yogins.**

Worldly people and non-Buddhists grasp many tiny atoms as a composite whole and take the stream of instants of cognition as a unified continuity. Since they are grasping at permanence, worldly yogins are opposed to them. These are śrāvakas who, with lower conceptual thought, have established tiny atoms and momentary instants of grasping. Furthermore, if one wonders whether there are objections among the conceptual thoughts of yogins, such as the śrāvakas:

9.4

**Yogins, too, have distinct conceptual thought,
With higher and higher objectors,**

The Vaibhāṣikas hold the position that in the appearance of a blue object, cognition and object are connected without an intervening representation. They are opposed by the Sautrāntika yogins with arguments such as the ascertainment of simultaneous perception.¹⁵

The Sautrāntikas hold that all appearances are mental representations and so they are representationalists, asserting that representations take on the shape of outer objects like reflections within a mirror. These proponents of the reality of external perceptual objects are opposed by Cittamātrin yogins who argue that if atoms were partless, they would all be combined with a central atom, so it would follow that the edges of the atoms would form a whole unified mass. Since this would constitute an agglomeration extending in all directions, there can be no partless atoms. Thus, they refute the possibility of subtle particles forming gross substances. They also object to the Sautrāntikas with a refutation of the essential characteristics of the object resembling its product.¹⁶

The True Representationalists¹⁷ claim that the true nature of everything is mind. The proponents of the doctrine of the reality of individual moments of cognition like a pure crystal [i.e. False Representationalists] object to them by saying that since there are many connected representations, there cannot be a single, partless cognition of them. [385]

The Madhyamaka yogins object to them, arguing if each moment of cognition were not comprised of many parts, it would follow that its earlier and later instants would be one, such that even an aeon would be indistinguishable from an instant. Seeing the relation between many such instants, they argue that there cannot be an indivisible moment.

Who is it that understands arguments such as these?

Both agreeing upon examples,

Both proponent and objector accept examples such as reflections in a mirror.

An extensive explanation of the differences among the conceptual thought of the [Buddhist] yogins will be given below [v6-56]. The

objections to ordinary ones [i.e. non-Buddhists] will be taught in detail in the sections on the non-self of the individual [v57-110] and on the ceasing of grasping at existence [v111-150].¹⁸

‘Are these refutations true in the Madhyamaka tradition or not? If the refutations are true, there is an infinite regress. If the refutations are not true, the Madhyamaka arguments would then be established as true, so there would be no delusion in such conceptual thought, and yet your position is that all conceptual thought is established as relative. This is a fault.’

For Mādhyamikas, although for any assertion put forth, there is a refutation, nevertheless, it is not correct to assert emptiness. As it says,

If the empty slightly existed,
The non-empty would have to slightly exist.
If the non-empty slightly existed,
Emptiness would also exist.

The emptiness of the conquerors
Truly delivers one from all views.
Whoever holds a view of emptiness
Will not attain accomplishment.¹⁹

Therefore, in the Madhyamaka, since no assertion is made, there are no refutations and therefore no infinite regress. There being no assertions, no objects of conceptual thought are established and therefore there is no erroneous consequence [386] that there could be a position with no refutation. Furthermore:

Not establishing any side as existent,
Nonexistent, or both,
Although they may try,
It is not possible to be disputed in any way.²⁰

3. Abandoning objections about these graduations

1. Abandoning the objection that practice is meaningless
2. Abandoning the objection that there are no distinctions in understanding

1. Practice is meaningless

‘If all conceptual thought is deluded, the continuity of bodhisattva conduct such as giving by yogins who are free from conceptual elaborations would cease, because for one who makes no assertions whatsoever, all conceptual engagements are delusions.’

And not analysing for the sake of the result.

Although practising the completion of the accumulations in order to attain the result—buddhahood—is an untrue cognition, appearances are left unexamined, i.e. they are not analysed.

‘If the accumulations are made for the sake of untrue appearances, why gather them?’

For example, just as one would manifest an illusory army for the sake of those who are to be freed from external objects, likewise for the sake of benefitting sentient beings, one does not reject appearances:

For example, like destroying illusory demons,
One should work with apparitions for the sake of liberation.²¹

There are similar teachings in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*.

Is it not a contradiction for an appearance to be untrue? There is no contradiction, for the appearances are like illusions, i.e. examples accepted by both [proponent and objector].

2. Abandoning the objection that there are no distinctions in understanding

‘It follows that since they have not abandoned the conceptual thought which has appearances, even the higher yogins are not different to worldly ones.’

There is a difference:

9.5

Worldly people see existent objects

And discriminate them as reality,

Not as illusion-like. Therefore, on this,

Yogins and worldly people are in dispute.


Worldly people see existent objects with a non-comprehending cognition. Those who have such conceptual discrimination [387] conceptualize reality without understanding it as illusion-like. Yogins are distinct from this because they have such illusion-like understanding. Therefore, yogins and worldly people are in dispute, since the worldly cling to reality while yogins inferentially refute truly existent objects.

2. Abandoning objections by those who cling to reality

Most of the Tibetan Geshe, such as Geshe [Ngok] Lotsawa, explain this in two sections:

1. Abandoning objections from the relative perspective
2. Abandoning objections from the ultimate perspective

However, this is not correct. If the ‘relative perspective’ is what Mādhyamikas mean by ‘relative’, then the second section also concerns the relative, so it would be part of the same section. If realists accepted this as relative, they would be in agreement with Mādhyamaka and there would be no objections. Similarly with the latter section: if the ‘ultimate perspective’ is what realists mean by ‘ultimate’, then the first section is also ultimate. If Mādhyamikas accepted this as ultimate, there would be no objections. Therefore, this whole section takes the perspective of what is relative for Mādhyamikas and ultimate for realists. Thus, it simply concerns the objections raised by realists and the abandoning of them:



1. Abandoning the objections of Vaibhāṣikas
2. Abandoning the objections of Sautrāntikas
3. Abandoning the objections of the Vijñaptimātrins

1. Abandoning the objections of Vaibhāṣikas

The Vaibhāṣikas assert there are five bases of cognizables such as form, which are established as ultimate with valid cognition.

1. Abandoning objections of contradiction with valid cognition
[388]
2. Abandoning objections of contradiction with the textual
tradition of the Bhagavān

1. Abandoning objections of contradiction with valid cognition

9.6

**Although there is direct perception of forms and so forth,
That is a consensus, not a valid cognition.
It is a delusion to accord with a consensus
Such as that something unclean is clean.**

‘You claim existent objects are not truly established, but we establish by direct perception the ultimate existence of the five bases, such as forms.’

This is existence by consensus, not by valid cognition. Although forms and so forth appear to be direct perceptions, such direct perceptions are designated by conceptual discrimination, just as appearances are only established by relative consensus and not by valid cognition of the ultimate. How so? In the direct perception of a vase, one cannot see the vase without seeing its interior or exterior etc. These conditions for what counts as ‘seeing a vase’ are a consensus in the world. It is similar with forms such as the so-called ‘silent subtle atoms of the eight substances’: we accept them, yet they are colourless and are not seen with the eyes. They only appear to the understanding and are established by consensus.

Is this consensus ultimate reality? No, it is a delusion. For example, it is according to consensus that something unclean is clean and so forth.

2. Abandoning contradiction with the textual tradition of the Bhagavān

9.7

**For the sake of introducing the worldly,
The protector taught in terms of existence. In suchness,
There is no momentariness.**

‘If everything is without reality, this would contradict the Bhagavān’s teachings that the skandhas and so forth exist.’

This is an intentional teaching. ‘Intentional’ means it has three factors: an intention, an intentional basis and a valid cognition which refutes the literal meaning.²² What is the intention? The Protector taught existence to allow worldly people to enter into the teachings. What is the intentional basis? [389] Relative existence. What is the valid cognition which refutes the literal meaning? [The following syllogism:]

The skandhas and so forth are the logical subject. The probandum: they are ‘not really existent’ and are ‘not ultimate’. The reason: there is no momentariness, so what need to mention a corporeal existence? That is to say, there is not even an infinitesimal moment, so there

cannot be something which is a composition of many of them. There is no single instant because it would comprise three parts—beginning, middle and end. If there were not these three parts, earlier and later would occur at the same instant and it would follow that even an aeon could be called an ‘instant’. As it says in the *Ratnāvali*,

Since an instant ends,
It must have a beginning and a middle.
Because of this triple nature of each instant,
The world never abides for an instant.²³

‘If momentariness is not ultimate, it must be completely nonexistent, for it is neither of the two truths: you Mādhyamikas do not allow moments as ultimate, for you do not allow an aggregate of past, present and future as ultimate, i.e. you do not allow a three-fold reality. Nor do you allow momentariness to be relative, for the relative appears even to the worldly and the worldly do not see the appearance of momentariness.’

‘This is incompatible with relative truth.’

An aggregate of past, present and future is not ultimate but it is relative. There are two relatives: this is not the relative which is the conceptual thought of ordinary people, so there is no error. It is the relative of yogins. Since it is an object of the direct perception of yogins who see the truth and an object of analytical inference, it exists in the sense of appearing in that conceptual thought and hence there is no contradiction:

9.8

There is no error, for it is the yogin’s relative.

‘There is a contradiction because śrāvakas who see momentariness are taught to be seeing truth.’

In comparison to the worldly, it is seeing reality.

The claim that to see momentariness is to see reality means to see how things are in comparison to the deluded conceptual thought of worldly people.

‘The only relative is the worldly relative, for the ultimate is the only object of yogins. You cannot say there is a “yogin’s relative”.’

**Otherwise, the ascertainment that women are impure
Would be refuted by the worldly.**

We assert that there is a yogin’s relative. If one asserted the alternative position—that ‘relative’ means only the relative of worldly people—then the yogin’s conception of the impurity of women as relative would be refuted by the relative of those worldly people.

2. Abandoning the objections of Sautrāntikas

According to the explanations of the learned commentators, the Vaibhāṣikas believe that the Buddha has cognition of the relative, since he has mastered the ten knowledges which are relative, while the Sautrāntikas assert that all nirvāṇic perceptions are ultimate. However, they both hold the position that all perceptions based on defilements are relative and therefore they both accept the following objections of the Sautrāntikas.

1. To do with the bases of accumulation
2. To do with rebirth
3. To do with karma [391]
4. To do with the distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa

1. To do with the bases of accumulation

‘If everything is only a falsity, like an illusion, then making offerings to the Conqueror would not be meritorious, for the Conqueror would also be illusion-like.’

9.9

**The merit in relation to the illusion-like Conqueror
Is just as if he really existed.**

The cause of the arising of merit in relation to your real Buddha is the power of your faith in him. Just as faith arises for your truly existent Conqueror, so it also arises for the illusion-like one. It follows that his true existence is not the basis of merit.

2. To do with rebirth

Objection:

**‘If sentient beings are illusory,
How are they reborn after death?’**

‘Sentient beings are the logical subject. If they were illusion-like, it would follow that there is no inner self to connect present and future lives, like illusionists conjuring up illusory snakes, etc.’

Response:

**9.10
For as long as the conditions are assembled,
Even an illusion will continue to arise.**

When the conditions are assembled, there is no contradiction to something arising, even if it is illusion-like. That which is illusion-like is not pervaded by non-rebirth. Therefore, the pervasion²⁴ is not established.

‘Since they persist for as long as the conditions exist and these conditions have existed for a long time, it follows that sentient beings must exist in truth.’

**How could sentient beings really be existent
Just because their continuity lasts for a long time?**

A stream of being that persists from birth for a long time is not pervaded by being existent. Truth and falsity are not determined by a length of time because a year-old illusion can be designated as false while a day-old sentient being [392] can be designated as true. Therefore, future lives, etc. can be connected without being pervaded by existence. The pervasion²⁵ is not established.

3. To do with karma

‘If everything were illusion-like, it would follow that there would be no nonvirtue, such as killing, nor any virtue in doing good. If nonvirtue or virtue existed in illusions, then it would be nonvirtuous to kill a person conjured by an illusionist and virtuous to give him food.’

9.11

**When illusory beings are killed,
There is no nonvirtue because they do not have minds.
Merit and nonvirtue originate
With those who possess an illusory mind.**

You accept that it is not nonvirtuous to destroy a heap of stones, while it is nonvirtuous to kill a person, for there is a difference in the existence or nonexistence of a mind. Similarly, though we assert that everything is like an illusion, when there is the illusion of mind-possession, we say that there is merit in the giving of food and nonvirtue in killing. If there is no mind, there is no nonvirtue or virtue in such things.

‘It is illogical to differentiate those which have a mind from those which do not among illusion-like objects.’

According to the proponents of realism, there are distinct causes for having a mind and not having a mind. Similarly, we also distinguish their distinct causes, only both are illusions:

9.12

**Since mantras and so on do not have that power,
Illusory minds do not arise from them.**

The implication here is that it is only actions and defilements which have the power to create a mind.

‘If mind and non-mind are both illusions, it would contradict the principle that different effects must have different causes.’

In that case, if both are existent, that would also contradict it.

‘But one can see their non-contradiction.’

Within illusoriness, too, one can see different effects such as horses and elephants coming from different conditions, so the differentiation of causes and their various effects is not contradicted:

**Having arisen from a variety of conditions,
Illusions are varied too,**

However, whether illusory or real [393], the arising of different effects from unvarying causes is denied:

**9.13
But nowhere is there a single condition
With the ability to create them all.**

4. Abandoning the objection that it contradicts the presentation of the distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa

**‘The ultimate is nirvāṇa.
Saṃsāra is relative truth. In this way,**

**9.14
If he is in saṃsāra despite being a Buddha,
What is the point of the bodhisattva conduct?’**

The following explanation is based on that of Ngok Lotsawa.

The objection: ‘The reality of one’s own mind is ultimate, which is naturally nirvāṇa even though one has not abandoned relative saṃsāra. If saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are therefore not mutually exclusive, although the Buddha’s attainment of buddhahood is nirvāṇa, it follows that it is also saṃsāra because saṃsāra is not distinct from the completely pure nature. According to this position, since the Buddha is in saṃsāra, practising the bodhisattva conduct is meaningless.’

The response: although not distinct from the completely pure nature, in relative truth, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are distinct. Thus, where is the contradiction? The pervasion²⁶ is not established. How are they distinguished in relative truth? They are distinguished according to whether or not the adventitious causes of the arising of the defilements have been exhausted:

**If the continuity of conditions is not interrupted,
Even an illusion will not be dispelled.**

This explains how saṃsāra is instigated.

9.15

**If the continuity of conditions is interrupted,
It will not arise, even as relative.**

This explains how it is reversed. However, this explanation is not very thorough. Now to explain it in accordance with the author of the *Great Commentary*:²⁷

The objection: ‘Our Sautrāntika school holds that nirvāṇic perception is ultimate and that defiled perception is relative.’

**‘The ultimate is nirvāṇa.
Saṃsāra is relative truth. In this way,**

9.14

**If he is in saṃsāra despite being a Buddha,
What is the point of the bodhisattva conduct?’**

‘Thus, if nirvāṇa is ultimate and saṃsāra is the elaborations of the relative, [394] are dualistic appearances existent or nonexistent for the Buddha? If nonexistent, it would follow that the Buddha is nonexistent or an inanimate object.²⁸ If existent, he is either relative or ultimate. If ultimate, it would contradict your previously stated position that “conceptual thought is said to be relative”. If relative, by the existence of the defilements in that relative, it would follow that Buddha is in saṃsāra. Therefore, what would be the point of the bodhisattva conduct?’

The Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas claim that the characteristics of relative and ultimate correspond with saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, respectively. Hence, their response is to say that the opponent’s premise—that the Buddha has conceptual thought with appearances—is not established in ultimate truth.

If the continuity of conditions is not interrupted,

Even an illusion will not be dispelled.

For example, an illusory snake conjured by an illusionist will last as long as its causes and conditions exist. Similarly, for as long as the causes of perceiving appearances exist, illusion-like conceptual thought has not been abandoned, so saṃsāra exists. However:

9.15

**If the continuity of conditions is interrupted,
It will not arise, even as relative.**

With the signs of the vajra-like samādhi and the severance of the continuity of all conceptual discrimination, the continuity of the defilements is severed. By that severance, the continuity of actions is severed. By that severance, the continuity of conceptual thought with dualistic appearances is severed, so saṃsāra ‘will not arise, even as relative’.

This response is not logical because it would follow that arhats, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas who have attained realization [but not the vajra-like samādhi] remain in saṃsāra. There are other problems, too, and these should be understood in more detail from elsewhere.²⁹

How then should this be explained? The objection is the same as above but the response is different.

We³⁰ do not assert that everything relative is saṃsāra, [395] nor do we assert that all of nirvāṇa is ultimate. Something is classified as ultimate or relative according to whether or not it is immune to analysis. What then is the distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa?

**If the continuity of conditions is not interrupted,
Even an illusion will not be dispelled.**

9.15

**If the continuity of conditions is interrupted,
It will not arise, even as relative.**

Though it is illusory, an illusion is not dispelled while the causes and conditions exist. Similarly, saṃsāra is not dispelled while actions and defilements exist. When the continuity of those conditions—actions and the defilements—is cut, saṃsāra will not arise, ‘even as relative’—i.e. even though the Buddha has relative wisdom. This is the explanation of the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas.³¹

3. Abandoning objections of the Vijñaptimātrins³²

1. Non-establishment of the subject
2. Non-establishment of the basis



1. Non-establishment of the subject

1. Abandoning objections of the False Representationalists
2. Abandoning objections of the True Representationalists
3. Abandoning objections

1. Abandoning objections of the False Representationalists

Objection:

**‘If even delusion does not exist,
What perceives the illusion?’**

‘You Mādhyamikas say that all dharmas are emptiness. If there is no deluded cognition, there is no perception of the arising of a perceived object. Perception is pervaded by a perceiver but, if for you there is no perceiving mind, what is there to perceive the representations of perceptual objects?’

Response:

9.16

**Since for you the illusion does not exist either,
What do you perceive?**

The False Representationalist denies the illusions exist. Since, for them, mental representations are completely nonexistent and, since perception is pervaded by a perceptual object, it follows that there is no perception, for the perceptual object—the illusion—does not exist. Therefore, their objection is answered with the question, ‘Since for you there is no perceptual object—the illusion—what do you perceive?’

2. Abandoning objections of the True Representationalists [396]

1. Objecting that mind is an appearance
 2. Rejecting arguments that mind is self-aware
1. Objecting that mind is an appearance
 1. Presenting the objection in brief
 2. Establishing pervasion through scriptures
 3. Settling that with reasoning
 1. Presenting the objection in brief

‘They exist as if they were external,

But they are representations, which are mind itself.'

'Reality is mind itself.'

Then what is perceived?

'Representations. A representation appears as something distinct but it is mind itself. Thus the perceptual object and the perceiver are not distinct and both exist [as mind itself]. Thus the response that applied to the False Representationalist objection does not apply here.'

The response:

9.17

**If the illusion is mind itself,
Then what is seen by what?**

If in this way they are not distinct, then what is seen—the object of awareness—and what is the seeing subject—that which has awareness?

The founding lamas have demonstrated this point with proof by svātantras. Though these svātantras are certainly flawless, svātantras, being proofs by the inerrant application of pervasion and qualification, are excessive for the purpose of refutation. Therefore, I shall apply the inerrant deduction by prasaṅga to a 'self-cognizing awareness'.

The Cittamātrīn says, 'The cognition of non-dual experience is aware of itself.' From this, it follows that either the cognition is dualistic because it is aware of itself, or it follows that it is not aware of itself because of its non-duality. Both positions [mind is dualistic, mind is not aware of itself] are untenable, for they violate the Cittamātrīn's own premises. It is also not possible for the inferences to be unestablished, for both reasons [mind is aware of itself, mind is non-dual] are their own theses.

'The second pervasion³³ is not established.'

Can something be non-dual yet also self-aware? 'Awareness' is essentially characterized by the duality of agent and patient.³⁴ It is pervaded by these two, like, for example, the chopping of wood with an axe. [397] If mind is non-dual, since there is no agent, the pervasion

is established, just as, for example, a sword's blade is unable to cut itself.

2. Showing through the scriptures that the pervasion is established

1. Scriptural reference
2. An example of the agency of cognition
3. Conclusion

1. Scriptural reference

**The protector of the world has taught
That mind does not see mind.**

This is a reference to the reasoning in the teachings of the protector of the world. What did he teach? In the *Sutra of Ratnacūḍa's Questions* it says,

When looking for mind, one does not fully see it internally and one does not fully see it externally.³⁵

And:

Is perception something separate from mind? What is perception? It is itself just mind. If a perception was perceived by another mind, there would be two minds. Therefore, if perception is mind itself, how can mind see mind? It is illogical to say that mind sees mind. For example, just as the blade of a sword cannot cut itself and a fingertip cannot touch itself, so mind cannot see itself.³⁶

2. An example of the agency of cognition

9.18

**Just as the blade of a sword
Cannot cut itself...**

3. Conclusion

... so it is with the mind.

3. Settling that with reasoning

1. Abandoning uncertainty with the illumination of a lamp
2. Abandoning uncertainty with the spontaneous arising of blue [398]

1. Abandoning uncertainty with the illumination of a lamp

**‘It is like a lamp—
Self-illuminating.’**

‘You Mādhyamikas have not established with certainty that when there is no duality of agent and patient, there is no awareness. In general, there are many examples where, although there is no agent-patient duality, it appears as if there is agent-patient duality and we refer to it as having such. For example, in a lamp, although there is no duality of agent and patient, its illumination exists. Similarly, in cognition, although there is no duality of agent and patient, awareness exists. Where is the contradiction?’

The response:

**9.19
That lamp could never be illuminated,
For it was never cloaked in darkness.**

Since the lamp is not both the agent and patient of illumination, it is not pervaded by both. While the lamp is an agent of illumination, it is not the patient. Similarly, cognition is pervaded by both agent and patient—that which is aware and that of which it is aware, which cannot be the same thing. If the lamp were itself the illuminated patient, it would have to have been originally pervaded by darkness. It could not then also be the illuminating agent, which was never originally in darkness.

2. Abandoning uncertainty with the spontaneous arising of blue

**‘The blue of a crystal, etc. depends on something external,
While naturally blue objects do not depend on anything.’**

9.20

**Similarly, seeing is in some cases other-dependent,
And in other cases, independent.'**

'Although duality of agent and patient generally exists, there is a counterexample in which there is non-duality. The blueness in something [translucent] like a crystal is seen in dependence on something blue external to it. This is a confirming example in which there is an appearance of duality in something non-dual. Blueness such as that of a lapis lazuli, however, does not depend on anything else. Similarly, in some cases, the object of awareness is something external, upon which the agent awareness depends, while in other cases, it is like the blue object and there is no dependence on an external agent awareness. Thus, not all awareness by seeing is pervaded by a separate agent awareness. By negating that an agent is aware of something external, the pervasion in your refutation of mere awareness is not established.' [399]

The response:

**Something already blue
Cannot make itself blue.**

A blue object is not pervaded by a distinct agent and patient, for it does not have agent and patient in its intrinsic nature. Why not? If it had agent and patient, it would be necessary for it to be non-blue at first and then subsequently become blue, but that is not the case here. Therefore, by negating a distinct agent and patient, blue [as a counterexample] is refuted. The presentation of a mere object is not the same as something having the characteristics of agent and patient.

2. Rejecting arguments that mind is self-aware of its own stream of being

1. The nonexistence of the general concept
2. Rejecting the perception of its existence
3. There is no inference to the conclusion

1. The nonexistence of the general concept

9.21

**A lamp, when cognized by cognition,
May be designated 'the illuminator',
But what do you claim cognizes
The mind as 'self-luminous?'**

It is reasonable to say that a lamp, as an object of awareness, is established as illuminated by the direct perception of someone possessing a discriminating mind, who can designate it as such. But this is incompatible with the self-knowing illuminating cognition mentioned above. That is knowledge by awareness of other, from which it follows that there would be both subject and object. By this error, the conclusion of self-awareness is not warranted and is incompatible. Thus, it is illogical to designate such knowledge 'self-cognizing awareness'.

2. Rejecting the perception of its existence

9.22

**If it is not seen by anyone,
Then whether it is luminous or not
Is like the looks of a barren woman's daughter—
Discussing it is meaningless.**

In particular, it is meaningless to discuss whether it is luminous or not, for there can be no ascertainment of it in anyone's understanding. Why? Because the general concept of 'self-awareness' lacks an intrinsic nature from which to draw the conclusion. An example of this is the looks of the daughter of a barren woman.

3. There is no inference to the conclusion

1. The error in the reason of the effect
2. The error in the reason of its intrinsic nature³⁷

1. The error in the reason of the effect

Objection: 'Self-experience is established by inference from its effect. [400] Memory is pervaded by having an experience similar to the remembered object, like remembering an earlier cognition of a blue

object. By having a memory of, e.g. one's earlier consciousness of blue, one experiences self-consciousness. This establishes self-consciousness by inference from the effect.'

The reverse pervasion³⁸ of that is:

9.23

**'If self-awareness did not exist,
How could consciousness be remembered?'**

'If the cause—self-awareness—did not exist, how could there be the result? Thus, from the reason of the effect—memory—self-awareness is inferred by the reverse pervasion.'

The response: while memory is pervaded merely by having a preceding experience, it is not pervaded by self-experience, i.e. a memory comes from a separate experience connected with it. It is connected but is a separate experience.

**Memory comes from its connection to another experience,
Like deducing a rat bite from an infection.**

An example is the poison of rat. Although one may not notice a rat bite which leads to an infection, one experiences a sensation of burning and, by connecting that to a rat's poison, one becomes aware of the cause. Similarly, in remembering one's earlier consciousness, although that consciousness itself is not experienced again, one experiences an object connected with it, and the memory arises in one's cognition. Where is the contradiction? Thus, the pervasion³⁹ is not established.

2. The error in the reason of its intrinsic nature

Some explain the objection this way: 'Through having cultivated the conditions of meditation, some are able to see the existence of distant objects, such as the minds of others who are far away. Therefore one may illuminate one's own cognition, which is very near.'

9.24

**'Since under the right conditions the mind can see
That of others, how can it not see itself?'**

This logic is not certain, for it may be criticized as follows: if seeing something far were pervaded by seeing what is near, then if one saw a vase deep beneath the ground with an eye to which a magical eye lotion had been applied, it would follow that the eye, which is near, would also be seen. Yet, although one may see distant objects, one will not see the eye itself, smeared with eye lotion. Seeing far is not pervaded by seeing self and [401] so the reason is not certain:

**Through applying the eye lotion of accomplishment,
One will see a vase and not the eye lotion itself.**

Others explain this verse as follows: 'The logical subject is a manifest object such as a blue object. This manifestation has the nature of cognition because the condition for such manifestations is either a cognitive condition, such as a sense power, or a mental condition, such as an inferential faculty. The pervasion is established, i.e. whatever arises merely from a cognitive condition is pervaded by the nature of cognition. Therefore, manifest objects are established as self-illuminated.' Thus, it is objected:

9.24

**'Since under the right conditions the mind can see
That of others, how can it not see itself?'**

In that case, it would follow that when the eye is smeared with magical eye lotion, the manifestation of the underground vase would also have the nature of an eye smeared with magical eye lotion because of its arising as a manifestation from that optical condition. If arising as a manifestation from an optical condition is not pervaded by the nature of the eye, arising as a manifestation from a cognitive condition is not pervaded by the nature of cognition, so the pervasion is not established:

**Through applying the eye lotion of accomplishment,
One will see a vase and not the eye lotion itself.**

We may add that if the object—the blue manifestation—is established as having the nature of cognition by its manifestation from a cognitive condition, then the underground vase, being a manifestation from an

eye lotion-condition, would also have the nature of eye lotion. If the vase does not have the same nature as eye lotion even though it is a manifestation from an eye lotion-condition, then likewise, the manifesting blue object would not have the nature of cognition even though it is a manifestation from the occurrence of a cognitive condition. Thus, self-awareness is not established.

3. Abandoning objections

‘If cognitions were not real, there would be no direct perceptions such as seeing, hearing and so forth.’

That is referring to the relative, which we do not deny: [402]

9.25

**Cognitions of seeing and hearing
Are not the objects of negation here.**

What is it then that is negated? If it is claimed to exist ultimately, that is negated:

**Here, we are preventing
The cause of suffering: their discrimination as real.**

If seeing and hearing are not negated, how does one cease to grasp them as real?

9.26

Illusions are not other than mind

The proposition that dharmas of sight and sound have a reality distinct from mind is rejected by you Cittamātrins and we agree with you in this.

But you do not think of them as not other.

Yet you do not think of them as ‘not other’ or as identical, i.e. for you, the position that sights and sounds are identical to mind is an error [because you say representations are truly existent and there is no subject mind]. If you did not think of them as such, you would not

grasp them as either true or nonexistent, because of not grasping them dualistically.

**If they were real, they would be other than mind but,
If they are not other, they cannot be real.**

Your position [that representations are real] is not established. In as far as they are real, they are other than mind. If they are not other, then necessarily they are mind. Since both positions are negated, appearances are established as neither real nor true.

‘We assert the False Representationalist Cittamātrin doctrine of the unreality of appearances.’

Showing the error in that doctrine was already completed above.

‘If you negate the true existence of mind, you are negating seeing and hearing.’

Although mind is not existent, we do not negate appearances. For example:

9.27

**An illusion is not true, yet it is seen.
So it is for the mind which sees.**

Just as it is with illusions, so it is for appearances which, when unexamined, are accepted as true.

Some have said that v26-27b is a refutation of the Jaina but this is incorrect. [403] It would be out of context for such a refutation and, moreover, the position refuted does not accord with that of the Jaina.

2. Non-establishment of the basis

1. Presenting the objection
2. The logic which refutes the objection
3. A counter objection
4. Establishing the pervasion for the counter objection

1. Presenting the objection

‘Saṃsāra must have an existent basis.

‘Just as a pile of stones is the basis for mistakenly thinking there is a person, delusion is pervaded by a basis of delusion. Therefore, because of the existence of the delusion of dual appearances, their non-dual basis—self-awareness—must exist.’ This is Ācārya Sthiramati’s objection, given as the reason clause of a svātantra.

Otherwise, it would be like space.’

‘If there were no basis, it would follow that there would be no deluded appearances.’ This is the objection given as a prasaṅga.

2. The logic which refutes the objection

9.28

**If the nonexistent were to rest on the existent,
Could it then start to function?**

The logical subject is deluded perception, which is nonexistent. By depending on something external which is its existent basis, how can the nonexistent thing have its own function? It follows that it has no function because what is nonexistent is established as having no nature. For example, by the resting of a rabbit’s horn on a vase, it would be erroneous to say that the horn could perform functions such as piercing and so on.

It is untenable to say the reason⁴⁰ is not established because it is accepted by both of us that the sights and sounds are nonexistent. It is untenable to say that the pervasion⁴¹ is not established, for if it were able to perform a function despite its being nonexistent, it would violate the premise [v27c] ‘saṃsāra must have an existent basis’, and its functioning would be indistinguishable from that basis.

‘The nonexistent thing does not perform any function.’

3. A counter objection

**Your mind would be unaided
And completely solitary.**

It is illogical that the basis mind is true while the dualistic appearances resting on it are false, for it would follow that this mind of yours is an isolated, non-dual cognition [404] unconnected to the dualistic appearances. If this position is accepted, the objection can be made:

9.29

**Being free from dualistic perception,
All would be the Tathāgata.**

Since it is free from the impurities of dualistic appearances and the subject-object mind, it would follow that all there would be is buddhahood.

‘Although mind is free from the dualistic appearance of subject and object, it has not attained buddhahood. Where is the contradiction? The pervasion⁴² is not established.’

4. Establishing the pervasion for the counter objection

**So what is achieved
By designating it mind only?**

Although everything may be conceived as mere discriminating awareness, if one is not free from the obscurations, it follows that the designations of mind only and freedom from duality would be unnecessary to achieve liberation from saṃsāra. If such designations were necessary, liberation would occur when one conceived of freedom from duality. Therefore, there is no need for the conceptual discrimination of freedom from duality.

Or, these lines may be understood as a response to the opponent saying, ‘We accept the consequence that saṃsāra is completely nonexistent.’ The designation of mere discriminating awareness was supposed to show the true basis of saṃsāric delusion. If it does not help you establish saṃsāra after all, of what advantage is it to make that designation?

Or, if mind is the Tathāgata from the very beginning, it is meaningless to accomplish buddhahood.




2. Establishing the subject as the path

It has been taught elsewhere that this section has the following three parts:

1. Establishing the relative subject as the path
2. Establishing the ultimate subject as the path
3. Conclusion: the function of the two cognitions

However, the first part does not concern establishing the relative subject as the path, [405] for verses 32-34 are not about the relative. If they were, the subsequent verses would also be about the relative and so would not be a distinct section. Therefore:

1. Establishment of subject cognition as the path (the main part)
2. Abandoning the objections of śrāvakas
3. Conclusion: the function of the two cognitions



1. Establishing subject cognition as the path

1. Objection
2. Response

1. Objection

9.30

**'How will your illusion-like understanding
End the defilements?
When an apparitional woman is conjured,
Desire for her arises even in her creator.'**

'The knowledge that defiled perceptions are like illusions is not itself an antidote to the defilements. Just as an illusionist knows that the apparitional woman is his own conjuration, nevertheless this knowledge does not function as an antidote to his desire for her.'

2. Response

1. A partial knowledge of illusion is not the antidote
2. Knowledge that everything is illusion is the antidote
3. How that is the arising of the wisdom without dualistic appearances
4. Engaging in activity does not depend on effort

1. A partial knowledge of illusion is not an antidote

If the causes of the defilements—imprints—are not overcome, objects are not overcome. If the causes of the defilements are overcome, objects are overcome. The former occurs when the seeds of the defilements are not abandoned, even though defilements towards objects may not be arising. The latter occurs when the defilements are abandoned by abandoning their seeds.

When it is understood that all objects are illusory, the seeds of the defilements—attachment to reality—are abandoned and the defilements are abandoned. But, if objects are only partially understood as illusory, one has not completely abandoned attachment to their reality and so one has not abandoned the seeds of the defilements. Therefore, the defilements continue to arise:

9.31

**That creator has not abandoned the imprints
Of the defilements in her appearance.
Thus, when he sees her,
The imprints of emptiness are weak.**

[406] When the creator of the illusion—the illusionist—sees the woman, desire for her arises. Why? Because he has not abandoned clinging to the reality of cognizables. Why not? The imprints of emptiness are weak because karmic formations of perceptual objectification remain. Therefore, a partial understanding of illusion is not the path.

2. Knowledge that everything is illusion is the antidote

1. Abandoning clinging to existence
2. Abandoning clinging to nonexistence
3. The reason for these

1. Abandoning clinging to existence

9.32

**By meditating on the imprints of emptiness,
The imprints of reality will be abandoned.**

If one meditates on the general concept⁴³ of emptiness, by the force of its opposition to clinging to existence, clinging to reality ceases.

2. Abandoning clinging to nonexistence

**By meditating it is nothing whatsoever,
That, too, will then be abandoned,**

The positive determination that something is empty is subsequently abandoned. How? By meditating with no positive or negative determination whatsoever.

How does one abandon the imputation of the positive determination that something is empty?

3. The reason for these

9.33

**For when one thinks, 'It does not exist',
There is no conception of an analysandum.
Then, its unreality has lost its basis,
So how can it remain before the conceptual mind?**

When their unreality is before the conceptual mind, how can the objects of awareness remain? They cannot. Why? Because they have lost their basis, i.e. the conception of something to be negated, which is the basis of the conception of their negation. With no thought of something to negate, there is no thought of their negation.

If one asks, 'What is it that is nonexistent?', it should be answered, 'This is nonexistent.' But, when no object of negation is identified, one is negating without any qualities to negate, so the negation is not determined. An object to be negated must be identified. But here, no basis—an object to be negated—is conceived. When does this occur?

When one thinks, ‘It does not exist’, i.e. when the unreality of the analysandum is conceived.⁴⁴

3. How that is the arising of the wisdom without dualistic appearances [407]

9.34

**When neither existence nor nonexistence
Remain before the mind,
Since there is no other category at that time,
There is a complete non-conceptual pacification.**

When existents no longer remain before the mind, the path of realization has not yet been established. It is established only when nonexistents also no longer remain before the mind and there is no establishment of a positive affirmation of nonexistence as an object of understanding. The general concepts of existence and nonexistence do not arise and since there is no attachment to their externality, there is complete pacification in non-conceptualization. With no conceptual imputation, the wisdom without dualistic appearances which cuts the continuity of conceptual discrimination arises.

‘Is there not some other kind of imputation, apart from the concepts of existence and nonexistence, that pervades appearances?’

There is no other category because there is no alternative apart from these two—existence and nonexistence.⁴⁵

4. Engaging in activity does not depend on effort

1. The appearance of the Conqueror’s kāya to trainees who have purified their streams of being
2. Those appearances engage in benefit
3. Abandoning an objection

1. The appearance of the Conqueror’s kāya to trainees who have purified their streams of being

‘How is the benefit of others enacted when the wisdom without dualistic appearances is always in equanimity in the emptiness of all dharmas?’

9.35

**Just as wish granting jewels and wish fulfilling trees
Fulfil hopes,
So, too, the conquerors appear
By the power of trainees and aspiration prayers.**

The saṃbhogakāya appears to those who have mastered the tenth bhūmi and the nirmāṇakāya appears to ordinary individuals. What causes them to arise? They arise by the power of trainees and by the power of former aspiration prayers. How can they appear when they have no conceptual discrimination? In the same way that wish granting jewels and wish fulfilling trees fulfil hopes.

2. Those appearances engage in benefit

9.36

**For example, when the creator
Of a shrine of Garuḍa had passed away,
The shrine still pacified poisons and so on,
Long after his death.**

9.37

**By holding the bodhisattva conduct,
The shrine of the Conqueror is built,
So even after the bodhisattva's nirvāṇa,
The benefit of others continues.**

Long ago, when the people of a certain place were afflicted by nāgas, Samgu,⁴⁶ who had heard there was a woman in the land of Oḍḍiyāna with mastery of vidya-mantra, set out to visit her. He saw her collecting wood and, doubting her, respectfully asked her [408] about a method to control the nāgas. She proceeded to bless eight handfuls of milk from a black bitch with the vidya-mantra of Garuḍa. Samgu drank seven handfuls of milk but was unable to drink the last handful. Thus, seven of the eight nāgas were controlled but Ananta was not controlled. Although the people were then restored to health, Samgu later died from the afflictions of Ananta. Yet, a shrine he had consecrated with the vidya-mantra continued to pacify afflictions. Thus, just as illnesses, etc. were pacified by the shrine, following the

bodhisattva's nirvāṇa, even though his conceptual discrimination has ended, all benefits continue to be performed. If one asks why, it is because by following the bodhisattva conduct—the path of establishing the benefit of others—the shrine of the Conqueror is established.⁴⁷

3. Abandoning an objection

1. Presenting the objection
2. Presenting the reason of scriptural citation
3. Establishing the pervasion of that

1. Presenting the objection

9.38

**‘How could making offerings to
Someone without a mind have any result?’**

‘If the Buddha does not have any conceptual discrimination, it follows that the act of presenting offerings to him is without merit because he does not discriminate it.’

2. Presenting the reason of scriptural citation

Although he does not have the discrimination of being pleased by offerings, this does not conflict with the existence of merit, just as there is merit in making offerings to his physical remains after his attainment of complete nirvāṇa, which also have no thoughts. How can this be?

**Remaining in the world and passing into nirvāṇa
Were taught to be equivalent.**

As it says in the *Affectionate Lion Sutra*,⁴⁸

Therefore, whether one makes offerings to
The Buddha who remains in the world
Or his mortal remains and relics,
If the intention is the same, the results will be the same.


If one argues that even though this is taught in this scripture, nevertheless, the result is not the same: [409]

3. Establishing the pervasion⁴⁹ of that

9.39

**Whether relative or in suchness,
According to the scriptures, there is a result,
Just as, for example, there is a result
In offering to a real Buddha.**

Our position is that merit is relative, while your position is that it is ultimate. Since we both hold the position that it is established in the scriptures that merit exists, it is true for both of us and thus there is the pervasion.



2. Abandoning the objections of śrāvakas

1. Presenting the objection
2. The scriptural criterion for the path
3. Establishing the [Mahāyāna] scriptures as Buddha's word
4. Establishing them as definitive meaning
5. Summarizing the meaning of this section
6. Explaining extensively the criteria for establishing the Mahāyāna scriptures as Buddha's word⁵⁰

1. Presenting the objection

9.40

**‘You will be liberated by seeing truth,
But what is the point of seeing emptiness?’**

Śrāvakas assert the Four Truths:

1. The fourfold truth of suffering: suffering, impermanence, emptiness and non-self
2. The fourfold truth of its origin: origin, cause, arising and conditionality
3. The fourfold truth of cessation: cessation, pacification, joy and renunciation
4. The fourfold truth of the path: path, establishment, reason and certainty

‘If one understands the Four Truths of the path and their sixteen aspects, emptiness is already included. Non-self, pacification and cessation are also included. Through cultivating these, nirvāṇa with remainder can be attained. Through cultivating that, nirvāṇa without remainder can be attained. Therefore, this being the path, what is the use of claiming that everything is like an illusion, or that everything in truth is without intrinsic nature, or understanding emptiness without conceptualization or discrimination? That is not the path.’

2. The scriptural criterion for the path

The scriptures teach the path of cultivating an understanding of emptiness:

**The scriptures teach
No enlightenment without this path.**

In the *Perfection of Wisdom* it says, [410] ‘If one has a conception of reality, one does not have patience, let alone unsurpassable enlightenment.’ It also says, ‘Even those who accept the training of the śrāvakas should train in this very *Perfection of Wisdom*’, and so forth.⁵¹

‘But the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s word. It was invented after the Tathāgata’s parinirvāṇa. Therefore, the criterion is unsuitable.’

3. Establishing the Mahāyāna scriptures as Buddha’s word

1. We have the same criteria for accepting [texts as scriptures]
 2. We have the same criteria for rejecting [texts as scriptures]
1. We have the same criteria for accepting [texts as scriptures]

9.41

‘The Mahāyāna is not established.’

Why are your scriptures established?

‘Because they are established for both.’

How, if the Mahāyāna is not established as the Buddha’s word, are your śrāvaka scriptures established as the Buddha’s word?

‘They are established as the Buddha’s word for both the disputer and the respondent.’

In that case, either a) they are established as the Buddha’s word for both this disputer and this respondent or else b) they are established as the Buddha’s word by the agreement of any two individuals.

If the former, then either a1) they are established as scriptural for you because they have been known as such from the outset or a2) you accepted them as scriptural through logical proof. The first of these is unacceptable:

They were not established for you at first,

Your texts are not automatically known to be scriptural.

If you assert [a2], ‘I accepted them through reasoning’:

9.42

And whatever conditions gave you confidence in them,

We have them in the Mahāyāna, too.

What are the criteria for accepting something as Buddha’s word? If one says it is ‘what is included in the sutras, what appears in vinaya and what does not contradict the truth’,⁵² then that is the same for the Mahāyāna because that also meets these conditions. [411] Therefore, you have no criteria that distinguish only your own texts as the

Buddha's word and which are not met for both the disputer and the respondent.

If you assert [b] that they are the Buddha's word because they are accepted as such by agreement between any two people, then:

**If truth is the belief of two others,
The Vedas and so forth would also be true.**

In accord with this, since the Vedas and so forth are accepted by two *tīrthikas*, it would follow that they are also proven to be scriptural.

2. We have the same criteria for rejecting [texts as scriptures]

9.43

**'But the Mahāyāna is disputed.'
Your scriptures are also in dispute—with those of the *tīrthikas*,
As well as with the other [śrāvaka] scriptures.
Therefore, you should abandon them.**

Whether or not the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's word, if it should be rejected because it is disputed, other scriptures even among the baskets of the śrāvakas should also be rejected because they are disputed, too. How are they are disputed? For *tīrthikas*, there is a dispute as to whether or not they are scriptures. Furthermore, disputations exist within the different śrāvaka schools.

4. Establishing [the Mahāyāna scriptures] as definitive meaning

Objection: 'Even if they are Buddha's word, the Mahāyāna is of provisional meaning.'

This is incorrect; the Mahāyāna is of definitive meaning. Conversely, the śrāvaka [vehicle] is of provisional meaning. How so?

1. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in the monk who has abandoned defilements
2. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in a *nirvāṇa* in which suffering is abandoned
3. Overcoming objections

4. The logical conclusion

1. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in the monk who has abandoned defilements

9.44

‘The root of the doctrine is monasticism.’

It is difficult to be such a monk.

There are five classifications of monk:

1. Monk in name only
2. Monk who has taken vows
3. Monk who has taken full ordination
4. Begging monk
5. Arhat

The first four are not what is referred to here; rather, it is the arhat which is referred to, i.e. a monk who has abandoned the defilements. Why is the arhat the root of the doctrine? Because the arhat collects the doctrine, upholds the doctrine, disseminates it and so forth.

Why is this ‘difficult’ in the śrāvaka tradition? [412] Some say that if they do not meditate upon the emptiness which is the non-self of dharmas, then although there may be no direct causes of the defilements, their seeds still exist, since they still have incorrect mental activity. However, this is not the intended meaning of these lines. Śrāvaka arhats have not merely abandoned the direct causes [but have fully abandoned the defilements]. Otherwise they would not be distinct from the states of freedom from desire attainable on the higher worldly paths.⁵³ They still have attachment to reality through the obscuration of cognizables, not of defilements. Therefore, since there is no possibility for the defilements to arise, they do not have the seeds of the defilements. Furthermore, if fully abandoning the defilements through the tradition of the śrāvakas were not possible, it would contradict v45d below which states that they do abandon the defilements.

From the point of view of the bodhisattva vehicle, the monk who has abandoned the defilements has exhausted all that is to be abandoned,

i.e. all conceptual discrimination. He is the 'root of the doctrine' which the Buddha alone has demonstrated to others out of his own profound, complete enlightenment. In the śrāvaka tradition, it is difficult to attain liberation from the self-clinging to dharmas, without which one cannot attain buddhahood and so, lacking the cause of the final result, the śrāvaka tradition is of provisional meaning and not of definitive meaning.

Furthermore, briefly, someone might say that monasticism is extremely important as the root of the doctrine because the other scriptures are in dispute. That should be rejected because there exist disputations regarding monastic discipline.

Concerning whether v44c onwards is part of this section on establishing the Mahāyāna as definitive meaning, according to Dānaśrī,⁵⁴ it is part of it.

2. The error for the śrāvaka tradition in a nirvāṇa in which suffering is abandoned

**A nirvāṇa for the perceptual mind
Is also difficult to attain.**

[413] For the śrāvaka tradition, a nirvāṇa in which suffering is abandoned is not logical because the perceptual mind still has self-clinging towards dharmas. The existence of such a nirvāṇa is difficult for them to attain because their nirvāṇa is not free from the sufferings of a mind-made body. They assert a non-final nirvāṇa that is free only from the suffering in which the skandhas are still established but the nirvāṇa being referred to here [in the root text] is final.

3. Overcoming objections to that

1. The existence of the suffering of this life
2. The existence of the suffering of future lives

1. The existence of the suffering of this life

1. Objection
2. Response
3. Response to a counter objection

1. Objection

9.45

‘One is liberated by abandoning the defilements.’

‘By the cause—the defilements, there is the result—sufferings, from which ārya śrāvakas are liberated. Similarly by the cause—no defilements, there is the result—nirvāṇa, in which suffering has been abandoned.’

2. Response

Then it would happen immediately,

The moment the defilements are abandoned, the level of an arhat would be attained. It follows that suffering has been exhausted.

‘This is our position [i.e. śrāvakas exhaust suffering by abandoning defilements].’

3. Response to a counter objection

**Yet one sees the power of karma
Even though there are no defilements.**

In the nirvāṇa in which the skandhas remain, one can see the power of karma even though there are no defilements. One can see arhats such as Vibhudatta, for example, who experienced suffering.⁵⁵

‘Although they have not exhausted the sufferings of this life, they have exhausted the sufferings of clinging to rebirth.’

Although for them, the sufferings which are directly established in the skandhas are exhausted, the sufferings of the mind-made body are not exhausted, so the sufferings of future lives still exist. There are three parts to the explanation of this:

2. The existence of the suffering of future lives

1. Presenting the objection
2. The existence of craving itself
3. The existence of its cause, sensation [414]

1. Presenting the objection

9.46

**'That is only temporary,
For there is no direct cause—craving.'**

'Without the causes of future lives—craving and clinging—there are no sufferings of future rebirths and no clinging.'

2. The existence of craving itself

Why do you say they have no craving?

'Because they have no defilements.'

Although they have no defilements, they have craving which is without defilements. How so?

**They do have craving, though it is without defilements,
For don't they still have fundamental delusion?**

They may have no defilements due to not grasping the self of the individual but, through the imprints of unawareness, they still grasp the self of dharmas. Therefore, they are still subject to nescience. Without the craving of attachment to the self among the skandhas, they have no defilements, but they still have the craving of direct attachment to mere dharmas. Thus, they still have the condition for the attainment of a mind-made body in future lives.

3. The existence of its cause, sensation

9.47

**By the condition of sensation, there is craving,
And they still have sensation.**

If the skandhas remain because one has not abandoned their basis, then five poisons are still present and wherever they arise, it is certain that sensation exists. Therefore, craving will arise because its basis is present.

4. The logical conclusion

**The objectifying mind
For such people, still remains.**

5. Summary of this section

9.48

**Minds without emptiness
May cease, but they will arise again,
Like even settling without formations.
Therefore, meditate on emptiness.**

One who has direct attachment to reality, even though their defilements may have ceased, will be reborn again. This is like entering into even settling without karmic formations, where even though the six groupings⁵⁶ cease, their seeds are not overcome, so they likewise arise again.

6. Explaining extensively the criteria for establishing the Mahāyāna scriptures as Buddha's word

1. We have the same criteria
2. To abandon it because of not understanding it is an error

1. We have the same criteria

‘That which is included in the sutra collection, appears in the vinaya and does not contradict the truth is pervaded by being the Buddha's word. [415] This is how we establish the śrāvaka scriptural collections.’

9.49

**If you accept the words included in the sutra collection
As the Buddha's teachings,
Why do you not accept the majority of the Mahāyāna
Which is the same as your sutras?**

These criteria also apply to the bodhisattva collections, the Mahāyāna. Although your collections do not include the teachings on emptiness, etc., they are otherwise the same as the Mahāyāna. Therefore, the majority of the Mahāyāna is included.

Objection: 'Although some of the Mahāyāna meets our criteria, the teachings of emptiness do not meet our criteria, so the entire category is not the Buddha's word.'

Since it is established that some of the Mahāyāna teachings were taught by the Conqueror in the śrāvaka sutras, then it would follow that all the sutras in that category are established as the Conqueror's teaching:

9.50

If all are flawed

Due to a single point not being included,

Why would all not be accepted as the Conqueror's teachings

Due to a single point corresponding to your sutras?

By teaching that emptiness is ultimate truth, one is certainly not denigrating the relative truth teachings. Though there may be a defect, it does not follow there are other defects.

2. To abandon it because of not understanding it is an error

9.51

If the depths of these words were not fathomed

Even by someone like Mahākāśyapa,

Who should reject them

For not being understood by you?

According to the author of the *Great Commentary*, verses 49-51 were not originally part of the text but were later inserted.⁵⁷ However, since they have been explained thoroughly by the masters, it is not a fault to elaborate on them here.

3. The function of the two cognitions

1. Generating the result which will become supreme
2. Therefore you have no objections to our position
3. Meditation on emptiness functions as an antidote
4. It is not something to be afraid of

1. Generating the result which will become supreme

9.52

**For the sake of those suffering due to confusion,
One remains in saṃsāra,
But is freed from the extremes of desire and fear:
This is the result of emptiness.**

By the cause—the delusion of confused ones—there is the result—suffering. Thus, one benefits others by remaining in saṃsāra for the sake of those tormented by these sufferings. This is the result which is the cognition of compassion and the illusion-like affirming negation. [416] Freedom from direct attachment towards the reality of things (desire) and being afraid of emptiness (fear) is the result which is the cognition of the non-affirming negation emptiness.

2. Therefore, you have no objections to our position

9.53

**Thus, it is incorrect to so criticize
The doctrine of emptiness.
Therefore, you should meditate on emptiness
Without entertaining doubts.**

3. Meditation on emptiness functions as an antidote

9.54

**Emptiness is the antidote to the darkness
Of the obscurations of defilements and cognizables.
How can those who wish to attain omniscience
Not hurry to meditate on it?**

4. It is not something to be afraid of

1. It is not a cause of suffering
 2. Having no fear
1. It is not a cause of suffering

9.55

Something that produces suffering

**Should produce fear,
But emptiness pacifies suffering,
So why should it produce fear?**

If it is logical to be afraid of something that is a basis for suffering, such as clinging to self, or sickness, how can one be afraid of the antidote to suffering, emptiness?

2. Having no fear

9.56

**If there were something that was 'I',
You would be right to be afraid.
But since there is no such thing as 'I',
What is there to be afraid of?**

3. How to engage in meditation on emptiness

Geshe Ngok Lotsawa and others have explained this as follows:

1. How to engage in meditation on the non-self of the individual [v57-77]
2. How to engage in meditation on the non-self of dharmas [v78-110]

However, this is not correct. If one says that the foundations of mindfulness [v78-110] comprise the non-self of dharmas, it would contradict the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, which says,

This completes the full explanation of the foundations of mindfulness.
Having taught the non-self of the individual in that way...⁵⁸

Therefore, both sections [i.e. v57-110] explain the non-self of the individual, while the previous section [v2-56] explains the non-self of dharmas. This is also how Ācārya Candrakīrti arranges the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.⁵⁹ First, by a complete presentation of the two truths, one gains certainty concerning the true nature of cognizables in general, which is called the ‘non-self of dharmas’. After that, there remains a conception of an ‘individual self’ which is the cognizer of this. [417] In order for that to cease, the non-self of the individual is subsequently taught.

‘If the self of the individual is grasping the coarse as singular, while the self of dharmas is grasping the subtle as singular, why is the non-self of dharmas taught first?’

It is nowhere taught that the individual is coarse and dharmas are subtle. Although nowadays there are many explanations that make this claim, they are erroneous. As it says in the *Abhidharmakośa*,

The stream of being is called ‘the individual’.
Grasping at characteristics is called ‘dharmas’.⁶⁰

Therefore, up to this point, the non-self of dharmas has been taught by gaining certainty in all cognizables grasped as mine through the two

truths. Now, the non-self of the individual is to be explained. This has four parts.

1. The general explanation of individual non-self in the six elements [v57 - 59]
2. Refuting the self of the skandhas and elements, etc. as designated by tīrthikas [v60 - 69]
3. Abandoning objections to non-self [v70 - 77]
4. Refuting the understanding of the skandhas and elements as self with the four foundations of mindfulness [v78 - 110]

1. The general explanation of individual non-self in the six elements

Non-self in the earth and water elements:

9.57

**Self is not the teeth, hair or nails.
It is neither the bones nor blood.
It is neither the mucus nor phlegm,
Nor is it the lymph or pus.**

9.58

**Self is neither the fat nor sweat.
Neither the lungs nor liver are the self,
Nor are any of the other inner organs.
Self is neither the excrement nor urine.**

9.59


Neither the flesh nor skin are the self,

Non-self in the fire, wind and consciousness elements:

**Nor are warmth or respiration the self.
The orifices are not the self,
And none of the six consciousnesses are the self either.**

It has been said by some earlier masters that the first eleven lines teach the non-self of the skandha of form and the final line teaches the non-

self of the other skandhas. However, since this is not how it appears in the root text, [418] it is not the intended meaning.



2. Refuting the self of the skandhas and elements, etc. as designated by tīrthikas

1. Refuting Sāṃkhyas
2. Refuting Naiyāyikas

1. Refuting Sāṃkhyas

The Sāṃkhyas assert that a primal matter exists universally in all beings. Containers of self-cognition and awareness exist within it as individual consciousnesses. Each of these has the inherent nature of a sempiternal, cognizing and aware self. When it has no appearances, representations [i.e. forms, sounds, etc.] remain within the mirror of mind.⁶¹ When it temporarily connects with manifesting representations such as the bare element of sound,⁶² it temporarily experiences objects.

1. General refutation of the individual consciousness
2. Refuting temporary multiplicity
3. Refuting its single nature

1. General refutation of the individual consciousness

1. The consequence of its permanence
2. Establishing the pervasion
3. Abandoning objections

1. The consequence of its permanence

9.60

If the cognition of sound were immutable

The sound would always be perceived.

The logical subject is the individual consciousness. It must experience sound as immutable because it is a sempiternal sound-perceiving cognition. This position is untenable. By directly perceiving a single sound, it cannot perceive any other sound. It is untenable to say the reason⁶³ is not established, for that would contradict the Sāṃkhya's own proposition that the individual consciousness is sempiternal.

'Your pervasion⁶⁴ is not established. The sempiternal nature of self-awareness is not pervaded by an immutable experience of sound, for it can have a nature of mere cognition without depending upon any object. The experience of sound depends upon a sound, so when there is no sound, there is no experience, but the mere cognition nevertheless remains. Therefore, the immutable experience of sound is

negated and the pervasion for your refutation of a sempiternal individual consciousness is not established.’

2. Establishing the pervasion

1. The violation of its intrinsic nature
2. The absurd consequence [419]
3. Conclusion

1. The violation of its intrinsic nature

**If there is no cognizable, how is that awareness?
Why call this ‘cognition?’**

The first line is a question and the second is the response. The establishment of a sound cognition depends upon there being a sound. If there is no sound, there is no sound cognition. Similarly, since the nature of a sound cognition depends upon its cognizable, without a cognizable, there is no subjective cognition. Therefore, without a perception of sound, cognition is negated. Thus, our pervasion is established.

2. The absurd consequence

‘The experience of sound may depend upon a sound, but mere cognition does not. Therefore, the experience of sound is refuted, but mere cognition is not refuted. Therefore, your pervasion is not established.’

If it were the case that the establishment of a cognition did not depend upon a cognizable, it would follow that even wood would count as cognition:

9.61

**If cognition does not cognize,
It would follow that even wood is a cognition.**

3. Conclusion

**Without a nearby cognizable,
I would definitely call that ‘not cognizing’.**

Cognition is the presence of a cognizer in proximity to the cognizable which qualifies⁶⁵ it. Without that, there is definitely no cognition.

3. Abandoning objections

1. It is unreasonable for cognition of form to perceive sound
2. This has the same fault that was previously explained
3. It is unreasonable to call it the same thing
4. The example is not established
5. Not conceivable as a singularity

1. It is unreasonable for cognition of form to perceive sound

9.62

'It is the same thing that cognizes form.'

'Although cognition without a cognizable is impossible, when the sound is no longer in proximity, that very same cognition now cognizes forms. Since at that time the form cognizable exists, we maintain that cognition exists sempiternally.'

Either the previous cognition of sound has ceased and subsequently forms are cognized, or else the previous cognition of sound has not ceased. If the former, then although it remains the same in as much as it is designated 'mere cognition', its former nature in fact has ceased. This is a fault, since a sempiternal individual consciousness is unceasing.

Then why would it not also hear at the same time?

If the sound has not ceased, then, at that time, since sound cognition [420] is pervaded by its cognizable and by self-awareness, when the forms are cognized, it follows that it would still be an awareness of sound because the grasping of the sound would not have ceased.

2. This has the same fault that was previously explained

If it is because no sound is nearby

Then there is also no cognition of it.

Since sound awareness depends upon a sound, the pervasion of a sempiternal sound awareness is not established. When there is no sound there is also no cognition. Since sound cognition is qualified by its sound, when there is no sound, there is pervasion by no sound cognition, as was previously shown, i.e. if cognition did not depend upon its cognizable, there would be the fault of the consequence that even wood would count as cognition.

3. It is unreasonable to call it the same thing

‘The sound cognition and form cognition have one nature, but the former cognition ceases.’

The response:

9.63

**How can that which has the nature
Of sound perception perceive forms?**

It is unreasonable to designate incompatible representations as having a single nature. The establishment of a cognition of form in dependence upon a form cognizable has one nature and the establishment of a cognition of sound in dependence upon sound has another.

‘An example of such a single nature that is non-contradictory is someone being established as a son in dependence upon his own father and the same person being established as a father in dependence upon having a son.’

4. The example is not established

**A single person might be called father and son,
But his intrinsic nature is neither,**

9.64

**Just as lightness, activity and darkness
Are neither father nor son.**

To call a single person a father and a son is a worldly convention. Similarly, lightness, activity and darkness—the three ultimate natures

[as posited by the Sāṃkhyas]—do not have the nature of either father or son.

5. Not conceivable as a singularity

Nobody has ever seen

Visual perception with the nature of sound perception.

If sound cognition and visual cognition existed as a singular self, it should be apparent but, since it has never been seen, it is negated.

Having refuted the individual consciousness in general:

2. Refuting temporary multiplicity

Objection:

9.65

‘Like an actor, it assumes different characteristics.’

‘The individual consciousness has a single nature, like an actor wearing masks at different times—sometimes Indra, [421] sometimes a monkey. Although it has various characters, there is one nature without any incompatibility. Although temporarily there are representations such as a perception of sound, consciousness is free from multiplicity and has a single nature.’

The response:

If it sees, it is not immutable.

In that case, its freedom from multiplicity is also temporary, for the previous perception ceases when the subsequent one arises and thus it has a new nature. Thus, it is not immutable.

‘It just appears differently.’

‘The representations are dissimilar but have a single nature.’

If the representations are dissimilar but have one nature, the attribution to them of ‘singularity’ is the introduction of a singularity previously unknown to the world:

Such singularity is something unprecedented.

3. Refuting its single nature

1. Question
2. Answer

1. Question

9.66

‘Its different characteristics are not real.’

Then describe its true nature.

‘Its multiple temporary characteristics are not real. Among these untrue characteristics, there is one nature.’

In that case, what is that nature? What kind of essential characteristics does it have?

‘It is cognition itself.’

‘Although temporarily it is designated as a sound cognition or a form cognition, it has one nature, since these both qualify as mere cognition.’

2. Answer

1. The consequence that all beings are one
2. The consequence that the mirror of mind and individual consciousnesses are one
3. The general case is not established

1. The consequence that all beings are one

Then it would follow that all beings are one.

If whatever is qualified by mere awareness is pervaded by a single nature, then, taking individual beings as the logical subject, it would follow that they are all one in nature because they all have mere awareness. [422] This consequence is erroneous.

2. The consequence that the mirror of mind and individual consciousnesses are one

9.67

**Sentient and insentient would also be one
Because they are equal merely in being existent.**

If whatever shares the same qualification is pervaded by a single nature, then it would follow that the sentient—the individual consciousness, a cognizing awareness—and the insentient—primal matter and the mirror of mind⁶⁶—have the same nature because they have the same qualification, being merely existent.

3. The general case is not established

**If the instances are delusions,
What common basis could they have?**

If all instances, such as sound cognitions and form cognitions, are untrue, then it is established that the general case—mere cognition as a singular self—is also untrue. If the instances such as pale blue are untrue, the universal [blue] is also not established, like the only son of a barren woman.

2. Refuting Naiyāyikas

1. Showing the consequence which refutes a self with a material nature
2. Since pervasion by possession of a separate mind has not been established, establishing that pervasion for sentience
3. Summarized meaning

1. Showing the consequence which refutes a self with a material nature

9.68

**Something insentient is not the self,
Because of its very insentience, like a vase.**

The Naiyāyikas assert that the self is insentient matter which becomes connected to an external mind,⁶⁷ and in this way it is an agent.

The self is the logical subject. [Contradiction:] your position is that it is an agent but it follows that it is not an agent because of its being matter, which is insentient. It is not tenable to deny that either the position [the self is an agent] or the reason [the self is insentient matter] are established, for that would contradict your own premise. If the pervasion⁶⁸ were not established, then such things as vases would be indistinct [from agents].

‘It owns a separate mind.’⁶⁹ Therefore, the pervasion is not established.’

2. Establishing the pervasion

Because of its possession of a mind,

‘Although the self is insentient matter, since it owns a separate mind, it has the sentience of premeditating intentionality.’⁷⁰ You have not shown a contradiction, since the pervasion is not established.’

[423] By owning a separate mind, either its material nature has changed or it has not changed. If it has changed, then having previously been material in nature, later it becomes an agent with intentionality. Thus, its previous material nature was impermanent:

If it then cognizes, it follows that its non-cognition has been eliminated.

If it does not change:

9.69

‘The self has not changed.’

Then how did it become sentient?

‘There was no change when its material nature was eliminated because the sempiternal self is immutable.’

If the former matter was insentient then, being mutually exclusive with sentience, it is not a sentient being with intentionality. Matter is pervaded by not being an agent—a sentient being with intentionality.

3. Summarized meaning

**Thus, being non-cognizing and free from activity,
Space would also be such a 'self'.**

If the self has no nature of cognition nor is an agent, it follows that space is also a self.



3. Abandoning objections to non-self

1. Abandoning the objection that the connection of actions and effects is not logical
 2. Abandoning the objection of objects of cultivating compassion being illogical
-
1. Abandoning the objection that the connection of actions and effects is not logical
 1. Presenting the objection

2. Our positions are the same
 3. Actual response
 4. Abandoning contradiction to scripture
 5. Abandoning another objection
 6. Summarized meaning
1. Presenting the objection

9.70

**'If the self does not exist,
A connection between actions and results is illogical.
After performing an action, it is gone,
So, for whom could there be karma?'**

'If the nature of self were not the same between this life and future lives, when the skandhas of this life and its karmic deeds are destroyed, the deeds would dissipate. Since the skandhas of the next life are newly arisen, they would not have any connection with the previous actions. Therefore, for whom could there be karma?'

2. Our positions are the same

9.71

**It is established for both of us
That action and result have different bases
And that a self does not have any role in this.**

The basis of action—the individual of this life who is the agent—and basis of the result—the experiences of a future life [424]—are distinct. All its actions are temporary manifestations, with a completely passive sempiternal self performing no function. If this is a fault, the same fault exists equally for both of us:

So, is your objection here not pointless?

3. Actual response

9.72

'The causal agent is the recipient of its result.'

If effects were experienced by the karmic causal agents themselves, then the causal agent and the effect would have to exist at the same time, however:

No one ever sees this happen.

Therefore, the karmic agent is the body of the causal agent and the experiencer of the result is the body of another person and these are distinct.

4. Abandoning contradiction to scripture

‘According to the Buddhist scriptures, the ripened results such as the result of maturation⁷¹ do not ripen for anyone other than the karmic agent.’

**It is just in dependence upon a single stream of being
That the so-called ‘agent’ and ‘experiencer’ are taught.**

Although the karmic agent and the experiencer of the result are temporally distinct, consciousness is a changing stream of moments and in this way the result ripens for the karmic agent. Therefore, there is no contradiction to the scriptures.

5. Abandoning another objection

‘That causal stream is the self.’

9.73

**The past and future minds are not the self,
Because they do not exist.
If the arising mind were the self,
Then when it ceased, there would be no more self.**

Past and future minds are not the self because the former has ceased and the latter has not yet arisen. Mind in the present moment, which has arisen but not yet ceased, is also not the self because it will cease to be. Since it becomes nonexistent, it does not have a sempiternal nature. The stream of being is nothing but a succession of many individual moments and has no real existence apart from this.

6. Summarized meaning

9.74

**For example, if you split apart
The trunks of banana trees, nothing is found.
Similarly, if you search for it thoroughly,
You will find the self to be no more real than this.**

2. Abandoning the objection that the objects of cultivating compassion are not established

1. Objection [425]
2. Response

1. Objection

9.75

**‘If sentient beings do not exist,
For whom should we have compassion?’**

‘If sentient beings, the objects of compassion, do not exist, it is unreasonable to cultivate compassion for them. Therefore, the Mahāyāna path is flawed.’

2. Response

1. Establishing that sentient beings are designated
2. Abandoning an objection to that

1. Establishing that sentient beings are designated

**Compassion is for those imputed by confusion:
They are accepted for the sake of the result.**

‘Confusion’ means grasping the illusion-like relative that a stream of many moments is a sentient being. Relative sentient beings and compassion are not incompatible. What sort of relative is this? It is an unabandoned relative acceptance of conduct for the benefit of others.

Why accept this delusion? It is for the sake of the result, i.e. we do not abandon others for the sake of benefitting them and attaining buddhahood, in accord with the earlier teaching on not abandoning conceptual thought with appearances.

2. Abandoning an objection to that

1. The independence of the substantially established individual
2. The mere designation is not to be abandoned
3. Abandoning a contradiction in our own words
4. Abandoning that they are the same

1. The independence of the substantially established individual

9.76

'If there are no sentient beings, who gets the result?'

This is true but, nevertheless, they are accepted out of confusion.

'If even sentient beings are not established, how can there be any results from benefitting them?'

It is true that in reality there are no sentient beings, i.e. the objects to be benefitted are not pervaded by being real sentient beings. Yet, while they are illusion-like and agglomerations of many moments, it is reasonable to treat these so-called 'sentient beings' as objects and to fulfil their benefit.

Objection: 'The conception of the reality of sentient beings is to be abandoned and one must abandon grasping at designations of sentient beings because they are perceptions of mistaken conceptual thought.'

2. The mere designation is not to be abandoned

For the sake of fully pacifying suffering,

One should not oppose the delusion of this result.

Since practice requires a variety of skilful methods, [426] those wise in such methods should rely upon the deluded relative.

3. Abandoning a contradiction in our own words

‘Earlier, you said,

Neither self nor other is right:
You should try to give them both up. [v8.100cd]

Are you not now contradicting yourself?’

No: that self is the self which exists as a real substance. This one exists as a designation.

‘Why should the first kind of self be abandoned?’

Because clinging to self as ultimate creates pride, which causes suffering:

9.77

**Confusion about the self increases
Pride, the cause of suffering.**

4. Abandoning the objection that they are the same

‘The conceptual thought with appearances in which there is clinging to the existence of the designated self should be abandoned, for suffering increases as a consequence of clinging to the existence of real substance.’

This kind of conceptual thought with appearances does not increase self-clinging, the cause of suffering. Why not? Because there is an antidote which destroys the seeds of clinging to self—meditating upon non-self:

**‘There is no way to resolve this [contradiction].’
The meditation on non-self is supreme.**

Alternatively, the objection and response can be understood as follows: ‘Clinging to the self as ultimate is not to be abandoned because, by doing so, one will attain the result, buddhahood.’


This is not established because the supreme means for the attainment of buddhahood is meditation upon non-self. This is how Dānaśrī⁷² explains lines 77cd.

Having refuted the erroneous conception the non-Buddhists have of a seeing and sensing self, now to present the refutation of the idea that those sights and sensations are selves.

4. Refuting the understanding of the skandhas and elements as self with the four foundations of mindfulness

1. Mindfulness of the body
2. Mindfulness of sensations
3. Mindfulness of mind
4. Mindfulness of dharmas [427]

This section is not a teaching on the four foundations of mindfulness taught elsewhere as the impurity of the body, the suffering of sensations, the impermanence of mind and the non-self of dharmas. However, one need not think there is any contradiction here to that teaching, only a different purpose. In our bodhisattva tradition, the purpose is to analyse the individual self for which grasping arises under the power of wrong views, by developing the characteristics of non-self in the meditative objects [i.e. the four foundations] to purify defilements. In the other tradition, since conduct degenerates under the influence of defilements such as attachment, one develops in one's stream of being the characteristics of abandonment of the four wrong views⁷³ as meditative objects to purify conduct.⁷⁴



1. Mindfulness of the body

1. The individual parts are not the body
2. An existent body which possesses the parts is not established
3. General summary

1. The individual parts are not the body

9.78

**The body is neither the feet nor calves,
Nor is it the thighs or waist,
Abdomen or back,
Chest or shoulders,**

9.79

**Ribs or hands,
Joints or cavities,
Internal organs,
Head or neck.
What is this body then?**

2. An existent body which possesses the parts is not established

Objection: 'Although these parts are not the body, there exists a single owner of the parts.'

1. Refuting that each part is connected to it
2. Refuting a connection throughout the entire self
3. Summarizing the logic of that
4. The body is deluded conception
5. Establishing the delusion

1. Refuting that each part is connected to it

9.80

**If this body is present as a whole
Among its individual parts
Then part of it consists in each part,**

If the so-called 'body' were a generality present in the individual parts, then either it consists partly in each part or else it is complete in each part. If the first, a single generality present within many parts is not established:

But where is the thing itself?

2. Refuting a connection throughout the entire self [428]

Regarding the second position, if in each individual part there is an individual complete body, it follows that there are many complete bodies:

9.81

**If the body consists of a complete whole
In the hands and so forth,
There would be as many bodies
As there are hands and so forth.**

3. Summarizing the logic of that

9.82

**If the body is neither inside nor out,
Neither within the hands and so forth,
Nor apart from the hands and so forth,
How does it exist at all?**

The first two lines indicate that the body is not within the parts themselves. The second two lines indicate that the body is not in something else.

4. The body is deluded conception

9.83

**Therefore, out of confusion, we think there is a body
Where there is none.
It is like thinking a heap of stones is a person
By some particularity of its arrangement.**

Like the delusion that a heap of stones is a person, it is a delusion that within many parts there is a single generality which is the body.

5. Establishing the delusion

1. The cause of the delusion
2. The deluded cognition

1. The cause of the delusion

9.84

**While the conditions are assembled,
The body will continue to appear as a person.
So, while the hands and so forth exist,
A body continues to appear.**

Just as the particularity of its shape is the cause of the delusion that a heap of stones is a person, so the assemblage of the hands and so forth cause the delusion that the so-called body is a single thing.

2. The deluded cognition

9.85

**Similarly, what more is a hand
Than a collection of fingers?
These, too, are collections of joints,
Which have their own distinct parts.**

9.86

**Even parts have distinct particles,
And those particles have distinct areas.
Even these distinct areas are not without parts;
They are like space. Therefore, not even particles exist.**


The first verse indicates the non-establishment of the coarse and the second verse indicates the non-establishment of the subtle.

3. General summary of the non-establishment of a body in the body

9.87

**Accordingly, who could make this analysis,
And still have attachment to dreamlike forms?
When there is no existent body,
What is a man and what is a woman?**

The non-establishment of the body generally is indicated in the first two lines and the non-establishment of particular bodies is indicated in the second two lines.



2. Mindfulness of sensations

1. The non-establishment of the intrinsic nature of sensations
2. The non-establishment of its cause: contact

1. The non-establishment of the intrinsic nature of sensations

1. The non-establishment of suffering as ultimate
2. The non-establishment of happiness as ultimate
3. Abandoning objections
4. Conditionality
5. Connecting with the yogic activity of analysis

1. The non-establishment of suffering as ultimate

9.88

**If suffering exists in reality,
Why does it not prevent joyfulness?**

‘Suffering’ is the logical subject and ‘exists in reality’ is the reason. Since the nature of fire is to heat, [429] it cannot become cold. Similarly, beings’ minds abide in the nature of suffering, so it follows that there should not be even an instant of unadulterated happiness. But that is not the case; it is untenable, for it is contrary to direct experience. It is untenable for the reason not to be established, for it would contradict the proposition that suffering is existent. It is untenable for pervasion⁷⁵ not to be established, for it would contradict valid cognition, just as fire cannot be cold.

2. The non-establishment of happiness as ultimate

**If there is happiness, why are those afflicted by pain and so
forth
Not made joyful by sweetness and so forth?**

The Sāṃkhyas claim, ‘Sweetness, which is of the bare element of taste,⁷⁶ has the nature of happiness.’

The bare element of the taste of sweetness is the logical subject. [Proposition:] It does not make those afflicted by pain joyful.

[Contradiction:] It follows that they should be joyful because [Reason:] it has the inherent nature of happiness. The non-establishment of the reason, pervasion and proposition are all untenable, as in the previous section.

3. Abandoning objections

1. The consequence that sensations would be experienced
2. If that reason were not established, it would be no different to happiness

1. The consequence that sensations would be experienced

9.89

**'It is not experienced because
It is overridden by the stronger force.'
If something is not experienced,
How can it be a sensation?**

'Since the sensation of suffering is ultimately existent, it follows that the suffering is sempiternal—we accept this proposition. But if you claim that therefore happiness is nonexistent, that pervasion is not established.'

If suffering is sempiternal and existent, why is it not perceived?

'It is not experienced because of being overridden by the stronger force, like a daytime star.'

The logical subject is this overridden experience. It follows that it is not a sensation because if something is not experienced, there is no experience. Since the experience is negated, the sensation has ceased. The proposition [that suffering is overridden] is untenable for it contradicts your premise [that suffering is sempiternal]. If the pervasion⁷⁷ were not established, it would contradict valid cognition.

2. If that reason were not established, [the sensation] would be no different to happiness [430]

'The reason—"[because] it is not experienced"—is not established, for it is a subtle experience.'

9.90

**'The suffering exists as a subtlety
When its coarseness has been removed.'
If this implies it is something other than suffering,**

Is the experience of that subtlety suffering or happiness? The first is negated since it is not perceived. If you say, 'It is something other'⁷⁸ than suffering', i.e. if you propose the second alternative, that is also incorrect. Just as light is incompatible with subtle darkness, so happiness is incompatible with subtle suffering. Since the experience is one of happiness, it cannot be suffering:

Then, whatever that is, that is what this 'subtlety' is.

One should also understand the corollary to this:

'Due to the intrinsic nature of happiness, even if one is afflicted by torment, although the happiness still exists, it is not experienced.'

If it is not experienced, it is not appropriate to call it a sensation.

'It is a subtle experience.'

Happiness experienced subtly but not perceived as an appearance has been refuted, i.e. if there is a subtle experience of suffering, it is incompatible with happiness and vice versa.

4. Conditionality

Sensations are not ultimate but are connected to conditions:

9.91

**If suffering cannot occur
Due to the arising of its contrary condition,
Shouldn't suffering be considered
Merely the attachment to a concept?**

'By the arising of suffering, its contrary condition—happiness—ceases.'

Since a fleeting happiness is established as a temporary artifice, it has no intrinsic nature. Therefore, sensation is fully established as the mere clinging to a discrimination.

5. Connecting with the yogic activity of analysis

9.92

Because of this, meditate upon

This analysis as the antidote.

The meditation arising from

This field of examination is the food of yogins.

‘This field of examination’ means meditative wisdom which analyses the stream of being. Samādhi arises from the cause, meditation. The ‘food of yogins’ means the content of these teachings.

2. The non-establishment of its cause: contact

1. Objects not meeting with sense organs
2. Not meeting with consciousness
3. A composite completely refuted
4. Summary conclusion
5. The point of establishing that

1. Objects not meeting with sense organs

Contact is the cause of sensation. From the connection of three things—object, sense organ and consciousness [431]—a perceptual object is classified as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. This causes happiness and so forth to arise. However, it is not logical that external objects make contact with sense organs:

1. There is no contact with the coarse
2. There is no contact with the subtle [particles]

1. No contact with the coarse

Is the gap between sense organ and object an existent thing or nonexistent? If existent:

9.93

**If an intermediary connects sense organ and object,
Where do they make contact?**

The logical subject is sense organ and object. [Proposition:] These have an intermediary object. The reason is because something exists between them. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that they have contact, it follows that they do not have contact.

If there is no intermediary object then it also follows that they do not have contact because that which has no intermediary is unified:

**If there is no intermediary, they are unified.
So, what has contact with what?**

If both positions [intermediary or no intermediary] and their reasons [something exists between them or they are unified] were not established, it would contradict the premise [that sense organ meets object]. If the pervasions⁷⁹ were not established, it would contradict valid cognition.

2. No contact with subtle particles

1. Stating the consequence
2. Establishing the reason
3. Establishing the pervasion⁸⁰
4. Conclusion

1. Stating the consequence

9.94

Particles do not impose upon other particles,

Two particles are the logical subject. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that they are in contact, it follows that they are not in contact because [Reason:] there is no imposition of either particle, i.e. one cannot impose itself upon the other.

‘This reason is not established.’

2. Establishing the reason

For they are identical in having no capacity.

Although your position is that the particles—the logical subjects—make contact, it follows that one cannot impose upon the other because it has no interior capacity.

‘Although one does not impose upon the other, they do make contact. Where is the contradiction? The pervasion⁸¹ is not established.’

3. Establishing the pervasion

Without imposition, they cannot combine.

Without combining, they cannot make contact.

4. Conclusion

9.95

‘They make contact despite being partless.’

How does this make any sense?

Making contact with something partless:

When you see it, will you show me?

If they were in contact along their entire surfaces, they would be one. If they were in contact along a single part of their surfaces, it would contradict their being partless.

2. Not meeting with consciousness

9.96

It is illogical to make contact with

Consciousness, which is bodiless,

Consciousness, the logical subject [432], cannot be in contact with anything because it is bodiless, i.e. it does not have a body.

3. A composite completely refuted

**And likewise for anything composite, because it is
nonexistent,**

As was analysed previously.

“‘Contact’ does not mean being in physical contact with a form. Contact is an effect, of which the cause is a grouping [of consciousness, sense base and object]. Thus, the faults of having contact between the surface of partless particles do not apply.’

The logical subject is the causal collection. [Contradiction:] Although your position is that it is truly existent, it follows that it is not existent because it is a multiplicity imputed as a singularity. The establishment of that pervasion⁸² was explained earlier.

‘Although the causal collection is relative, its effects—contact and sensation—are ultimately existent. Where is the contradiction?’

If an ultimately existent effect from a deluded relative cause is not a contradiction, then an existent effect from a cause unable to perform any function would also not be a contradiction [v9.28].

4. Summary conclusion

9.97

**If there is no real contact,
What are these sensations arising from?**

Because there is no contact, there is no sensation. The cause being absent:

Why go to all this trouble?

All this trouble for the sake of happiness is not sensible.

What is harmed by what?

One is not harmed by suffering.

5. The point of establishing that

9.98

**If the one who senses
And the sensations themselves are nonexistent,
Once this has been seen,
How could craving not be dispelled?**

If the one who senses—the self—and the cause—sensations—are negated, then the effect—the craving of attachment to that—will be reversed.

3. The non-establishment of the object of sensation

9.99

Even what is seen or touched

Is itself dreamlike and illusion-like.

That which is seen and touched are the first and last kinds of the five sense objects, indicating all five kinds of object. Since those objects do not ultimately exist, it is established *a priori* that the sensations of the subject relating to them also do not exist. Concerning these objects, they have already been refuted above by the negation of the body, subtle particles and so forth.

4. The non-establishment of the subject

1. No experiencing mind
2. No self-experience [433]
3. No experiencer apart from those
4. Concluding summary

1. No experiencing mind

Sensations are not perceived by mind,

Because they arise simultaneously with it.

Do sensations and their experiencing mind occur in the same moment, or do the sensations arise first and are experienced after?

If the former: the logical subject is the mind at the moment of the sensation. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that it experiences the sensation, it follows that it does not have the experience because they arise simultaneously. If one denies the establishment of the pervasion,⁸³ it would contradict valid cognition because a perceived object must cause the perception. But here the pervasion of cause and effect is contradicted because the perceived object and perception occur in the same moment.⁸⁴

‘The sensation arises first and the experience after. Since the sensation arises first, it is the cause. Since the consciousness arises subsequently, it is the effect. These are the object and subject.’

9.100

**Although something from before may be remembered after,
That is not experiencing it.**

The previous [sensation] is the logical subject. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that it is experienced, it follows that it is an object of subsequent remembering, not an object of present experience because its intrinsic nature has ended. If one doubts the establishment of the pervasion,⁸⁵ it would contradict valid cognition because that which is an object of present experience is pervaded by a nature which has not ended.

2. No self-experience

A sensation cannot experience itself,

This is because of the previous refutation of self-experience.

3. No experiencer apart from those


Nor does anything else experience it.

This is because, apart from consciousness and the sensation itself, there is nothing else to have the experience.

4. Concluding summary

9.101

**There is nothing existent that experiences sensations.
Therefore, there are no sensations.
Therefore, what could ever harm
This selfless composite?**



3. Mindfulness of mind

1. The nature of mind is not established
2. Perceptions of the five consciousnesses are not established

1. The nature of mind is not established

9.102

**Mind does not dwell in the senses,
Nor in forms, etc., nor somewhere between these.**

Mind is not in the senses because it can exist even without the senses. It is not in the object because it can exist without an object. Nor is it somewhere between these because there would be no perception. [434] This shows that its basis is not established. To show that its nature is not established:

**Mind is neither the inner nor outer,
Nor is it found anywhere else.**

9.103

**It is neither within the body, nor apart from it.
It is not combined, nor is it something distinct.**

**Because such a thing does not even slightly exist,
Sentient beings are by nature nirvāṇa.**

The sixth mind is not an inner sense organ, for it does not possess form. Nor it is an outer sense object, for it does not have a body, so it is not one of the five kinds of objects. Since it is not instantly ceasing, it is not a momentary dharma. It is not the physical basis of the outer or inner, since it does not have a body. It is not a combination of outer and inner, since they are mutually exclusive. It is not something distinct from these, since then there would be no perception. Therefore, it is inherently nirvāṇa.

2. Perception of the five consciousnesses is not established

‘The sixth mind, although not established as having an intrinsic cognizing nature, exists as nothing but the five consciousnesses themselves.’

9.104

**If the cognition exists before cognizable,
What does it arise from?**

Does cognition exist a) before its cause, the cognizable, b) simultaneously with its cognizable or c) after the cognizable?

a) If consciousness existed before its cognizable, the following consequence would result. The logical subject is the cognition. It has no producer because a cognition before its cognizable has no preceding cause. It is untenable to say that the proposition and reason⁸⁶ are not established, for that would violate your own premises. It is impossible that the pervasion⁸⁷ is not established, for it would contradict valid cognition, as there is no effect without a cause.

**If cognition is co-emergent with cognizable,
What does it arise from?**

b) If they were simultaneous, one could not say the cognition arose from its object because cognition and cognizable would occur simultaneously. Thus, the previous three faults would apply.

9.105

**If it exists after the cognizable,
In that moment, what does it arise from?**

c) If the cognition arises after the cognizable, in the moment of cognizing, cognition and object are either temporally separated or temporally unseparated. If the former, because of their temporal separation, it follows that there is no product.⁸⁸ If the latter, then either they are completely temporally unseparated or they are partially unseparated [435]. If the former, it follows that they are arising simultaneously, which is the same faulty position as b). If the latter, the cause is a composite being taken as singular and the effect is a composite being taken as singular, like a string of beads or an army taken as singular, in which case neither has an intrinsic nature, as was explained earlier.

4. Mindfulness of dharmas

1. Establishing all as non-arising
2. Abandoning objections

1. Establishing all as non-arising

**Accordingly, all dharmas
Should be understood as non-arising.**

‘All dharmas’ is the logical subject. That they are completely non-arising is the probandum. ‘Accordingly’ indicates the reason by which the arising of all dharmas is not ultimately established. Why are they not established? It is due to the faults of an effect arising before, after and at the same time as its cause, which was explained in the previous section on refuting the perception of the five consciousnesses.

2. Abandoning objections

1. Abandoning the objection that there is no relative
2. Abandoning the objection that this ascertainment entails an infinite regress

1. Abandoning the objection that there is no relative

9.106

**'In that case, there is not really any relative arising,
So how can there be two truths?**

'If it is illogical for something ultimate to arise before its cause, at the same time as it, or after it and hence ultimate arising is illogical, then it is also illogical for something relative to arise before its cause, at the same time as it, or after it. Therefore, it follows that relative arising is also illogical. If this is your position, since there is nothing but ultimate truth, there cannot be two truths.'

It might be responded that although the relative does not exist in someone's undeluded conceptual thought, it does exist in someone's deluded conceptual thought. [436] Therefore, it is logical to assert two truths when specified as such. But this is not the correct response. If it were, although the Buddha has no obscurations, it would follow that he still has obscurations due to anyone clinging to the existence of the appearance of obscurations in their deluded conceptual thought:

**If the relative exists [for the Buddha] due to others,
How can sentient beings transcend suffering?'**

The correct response is as follows:

9.107

**It is just the discrimination of those other minds.
The relative is not [the Buddha's] perspective.**

There are no defilements in the stream of being of the Buddha. The designation of his having obscurations is a designation from the perspective of someone's conceptual discrimination. It is not the relative of one who has attained nirvāṇa, for whom there are no obscurations.

'Although it exists only from the perspective of someone's delusion, that relative depends upon conceptual thought, which is not logical, for it is negated from the perspective of one who perceives its reality. Hence, there remains the error that two truths do not exist.'

From the perspective of perceiving reality, when the logic that refutes ultimate arising is applied to relative arising, the error that the relative does not exist does not follow. We do not assert that there is arising before or at the same time as the cause, but we allow that there is arising after the cause. Likewise, we do not assert arising from a temporal separation of cause and effect, but we allow that there is arising from their non-separation. Likewise, we do not assert cause and effect are wholly unseparated, but we allow that they are partially unseparated, i.e. it is taking something composite as singular. This is a relative designation:

If it is ascertained as arising after, it exists.

If not, it does not have even relative existence.

Therefore, ‘arising after’ means if an arising is ascertained as coming after its cause, the effect exists. An effect that does not occur before its cause is the deluded relative. We do not refute relative arising when the forward and reverse functions of cause and effect are established in this way.^[437]

2. Abandoning the objection that this ascertainment entails an infinite regress

1. A general comment on the division of object and subject
2. If the non-arising of the subject depends upon a further understanding, there is an infinite regress
3. Our position does not have that fault

1. A general comment on the division of object and subject

‘The non-arising of all dharmas could never be realized because, even if it were understood with conceptual thought, the subject itself would not have been understood as non-arising. In that case, there must be another understanding of that non-arising and so there would be an infinite regress.’

9.108

The understanding and its analysandum

Are mutually dependent.

All analysis is expressed

In dependence upon accord with consensus.

The understanding of the nature of the subject and that of the object is a single understanding.

‘Then what ascertains, with valid cognition, that both have no intrinsic nature?’

2. If the non-arising of the subject depends upon a further understanding, there is an infinite regress

9.109

If at that time there were an analyst

Analysing the analysis

Then there would be an infinite regress

Because that analysis, too, would have to be analyzed.

If the inference that all dharmas are non-arising itself required another inference, then that, too, would also require yet another conclusion and thus there would be an infinite regress.

3. Our position does not have that fault

9.110

However, when the analysandum has been analyzed

Then that analysis has no basis.

Because it has no basis, it is non-arising.

This is also called ‘nirvāṇa’.

The inferential analytic ascertainment that the analysandum—all dharmas—has no intrinsic nature itself has no basis. Since that inference is itself included among all dharmas, it has no pervader which is a second inference. Just as when firewood is exhausted, the fire dies, so when objects have been negated, the subject is also negated *a priori*. Thus, the analysis itself has no basis and, with no basis, it is non-arising, which is also called ‘nirvāṇa’.

This explanation is not very thorough, however. Now to explain in more detail in accordance with the *ṭīkā*:⁸⁹ [438]

‘If you assert that ultimately nothing whatsoever is established, since the valid cognition that infers no intrinsic nature is itself also not established, what makes the inference?’

Although, since it is relative, it is not a valid cognition of reality, there is no contradiction in ascertaining an analysandum, as explained in lines 108cd.

‘But then the existence of the subject’s valid cognition is in accord with the relative [i.e. is a delusion].’

We do not deny all relative existence, such as the analysanda of conceptual thought which, with inferential reasoning, grasps the essential characteristics of conceptual objects, and general concepts. Thus, it is in dependence upon an analysandum that the conception of dharmas and dharma-possessors arises, as is explained in v108ab.

‘In addition to that inferential reasoning of a relative existence without existence in reality, there must be a second analysis. What is it that makes this latter inferential analysis?’ Thus, the objection is that there would be an infinite regress, as presented in v109.

When it is directly ascertained that universally all dharmas have no intrinsic nature, that ascertainment is contrary to any individual case of an inferentially known intrinsic nature. Thus, it is ascertained *a priori* that no intrinsic nature is known inferentially. In other words, if it is understood that objects—the analysanda—are not established, then it is understood *a priori* that the analyst also has no intrinsic nature. Thus, it is not necessary to form this conclusion again with another inference, so there is no fault of an infinite regress, as presented in v110. The analysis has ‘no basis’ [v110c], i.e. the pervader is not supported. ‘It is non-arising’ [v110c] means that inferentially known existence is not ultimate. Being naturally ‘nirvāṇa’ [v110d] means that the obscurations of reality are not ultimate.⁹⁰

4. Ceasing to grasp at true existence

[439] This is explained by Ngok Lotsawa and others as:

1. Verses 111-115: There is no reason that establishes all dharmas as having inherent nature [v111-115]
2. Verses 116-150: Refuting tīrthikas

According to the commentary by Ācārya Vairocanarakṣita:

1. Verses 104–105ab is a joint explanation of the foundations of mind and dharmas.
2. Verse 105cd concerns the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas, presenting in general the ‘non-arising of all dharmas’.
3. Verses 106-110 are the abandoning of objections to this.
4. Verses 111-115 show that an inherent nature of all cognizing and cognized dharmas cannot be proven.
5. Verses 116-150, the section on showing the errors in the tīrthika accounts of arising, is a continuation of the explanation of the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas, showing that all dharmas are without arising, ceasing, intrinsic nature or self.

Other commentaries have also explained v105cd onwards as part of the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas and I accept these explanations of the root text.⁹¹



1. There is no reason that establishes all dharmas as having inherent nature

1. General presentation
2. Extensive explanation

1. General presentation

9.111

In that case, the existence of this pair

Is a reality that is extremely difficult to maintain.

What is asserted by realists—that both cognizable and cognition are true—is held as true without a valid proof. It is a designation of a reality that is extremely difficult to maintain. [440]

2. Extensive explanation

1. Refuting the reason of mutual dependence
2. Refuting the reason of cognition of the effect

1. Refuting the reason of mutual dependence

1. There is neither one
2. Applying the reason with an example⁹²

1. There is neither one

**If objects are established from the sense powers,
What supports the existence of cognition?**

9.112

**‘Cognition is established from the cognizable.’
Then what supports the existence of the cognizable?
If they are in mutual dependence,
Then neither one exists.**

If the display of objects of subjective comprehension is established by valid cognition, by what valid cognition is the subject itself established? Establishment by self-cognition was shown above to be erroneous, i.e. it is contradiction for it to function like an awareness of external objects.

‘Cognition is established by the power of the external object.’

Since they would be established by mutual dependence, neither of the two would exist.

2. Applying the reason with an example

9.113

**If there is no father without a son,
Where does the son come from?
There is no father without a son.
Accordingly, neither of them exist.**

If a designated son is not established, then his designated father is also not established. When no product is ascertained, it is contradictory to the ascertainment of its corollary—its producer. Thus, their mutual dependence is proven.

‘But the producer is not in mutual dependence because, although the arising of the son depended upon the father, the father’s arising did not depend upon the son.’

2. Refuting the reason of cognition of the effect

9.114

‘When a sprout comes from a seed,

**We acknowledge the existence of the seed.
 Since cognition arises from a cognizable,
 Why do you not acknowledge the cognizable's existence?**

'In the case of a sprout arising from a seed, the seed is established by its logical relation to the sprout. Similarly, in the case of cognition arising from its cognizable, the cause—the cognizable—is established from the effect—the cognition. Thus, there is no contradiction.'

This is erroneous:

9.115

**When it is acknowledged the seed exists,
 That cognition is independent of the sprout,
 But what independently acknowledges the cognition
 Comprehending the cognizable?**

When the seed is established through its logical relation to the sprout, that establishment is comprehended by a consciousness which sees the sprout and which is independent of the sprout. If a cognizable is established by its cognition, it cannot be established until the cognition is established. What establishes that cognition? As shown above, a cognition that is aware of itself is illogical. A cognition established by the power of the established cognizable is also erroneous because they would be mutually dependent. [441]

2. Refutation of the tīrthikas' position that the arising of the inherent nature of all dharmas is established

1. The analysis of cause: the vajra slivers
2. The analysis of self-essence: dependent origination
3. The analysis of the effect: arising and ceasing of existence and nonexistence

1. The analysis of cause: the vajra slivers


The establishment of the main syllogism⁹³ and the establishment of its pervasion are supplemental [i.e. not in the root text]. Only the establishment of the qualification for the main syllogism is given in the root text.⁹⁴

The main syllogism: the logical subject is mere appearances. They are without true inherent nature because they do not arise from self, other, both, nor without cause. The pervader is not supported.⁹⁵

Establishing the reverse pervasion:⁹⁶ Whatever has mere existence must either (a) have no cause or have a cause. If it has a cause, that cause must either be (b) a composite of self and other, or else it must be non-composite. If non-composite, *a priori* it must either be (c) self or (d) other. Hence, an arising which is not included among these four extremes is refuted. Hence, it is certain that arising is pervaded by the four extremes.

Establishing the qualification:

1. The main establishment of qualification [v116-137]
2. Without making a positive affirmation, the analysis is not contrary to valid cognition [v138-140]
3. Showing the certainty of the syllogism [v141-142b]




The explanation of the qualification is taught by the Svātantrika founding fathers through the application of further syllogisms.⁹⁷ Although their proofs by svātantra are indeed inerrant, establishing their pervasions, qualifications and so forth is very difficult, so those establishments will not be presented here. But if they are not

established, are the syllogisms not incomplete? That may be so, but the three root syllogisms [not arising from self, other or without cause] do not actually appear in the root text, [442] so it was not the intention of the Ācārya to present the non-arising of dharmas in this way. Furthermore, if they were to be established, the appropriate place for that would be before lines 105cd: 'Accordingly, all dharmas/Are not to be understood as arising...', rather than here.⁹⁸

Therefore, in this section, verses 116–137 [do not prove syllogistically the non-arising of all dharmas but] show the errors in the tīrthikas' positions on the arising of an intrinsic nature, with verses 138–140 explaining the abandonment of objections to the teaching of emptiness as the non-arising of all dharmas. Verses 141–150 show that all dharmas arise through dependent origination:

- Verses 141–142b are a summary of the non-arising and non-ceasing of all dharmas by showing their dependent origination.
- Verses 142c–144 show the relative arising of all dharmas in dependent origination to be illusion-like.
- Verses 145–148 show the refutation of the proposition that mere dependent origination itself has its own intrinsic nature.
- Verse 149–150 are an abbreviated showing of the sameness of existence and pacification.



2. Refuting the tīrthikas' positions of arising with an intrinsic nature

1. The main teaching on refuting an arising with intrinsic nature
2. Abandoning objections to the middle way

1. The main teaching on refuting an arising with intrinsic nature

1. Refuting arising from no cause
2. Refuting arising from other
3. Refuting arising from self

Concerning an arising from both self and other, it is refuted implicitly by the refutations of arising from self and from other.

1. Refuting arising from no cause

1. General explanation
2. Differences of effect in relation to cause
3. Differences of cause in relation to cause
4. Differences of power in relation to cause

1. General explanation

9.116

**Ordinary people can directly see
Everything temporal has causes.**

The proponents of things being caused by their own intrinsic nature assert arising from no [external] cause. [443] Those who accept this tradition say,

The roundness of a pea, the sharpness of a thorn,
The rising of the sun, the movement of water downstream,
The pattern of a peacock's feather and so on, whatever it
may be,
It was not created by anyone. Its cause is its own nature.

The error in this is that ordinary people can directly see that everything has causes. Since such appearances as the arising of a shoot from a seed can be directly seen, merely to be is to be pervaded by

having a cause. Therefore, existence without a cause is negated both ultimately and relatively.

2. Differences of effect in relation to cause

‘Concerning conventional designations such as the many colours in the segments of a lotus and the colourful patterns of a peacock feather, what is the cause of their creation and their being the way they are?’

To understand this, one must analyse their specific causes:

**Differences such as in the segments of a lotus
Are produced by different causes.**

3. Differences of cause in relation to cause

‘If different effects are created by different causes, what creates the different causes?’

They are created by previous different causes:

9.117

‘What creates different causes?’


They come from previous different causes.

4. Differences of power in relation to cause

‘Why do specific causes have the power to create only certain effects and not the power to create others?’

‘Why is a cause able to produce its effect?’

It comes from the power of a previous cause.



2. Refuting arising from other

1. Refuting arising from an impermanent other
2. Refuting arising from a permanent other

1. Refuting arising from an impermanent other

This section is not in the root text but is presented here as a supplement.

‘Is the effect before, at the same time as, or after the cause?’

1. Effect before the cause
2. Effect simultaneous with the cause
3. Effect after the cause

1. Effect before cause

The logical subject is the effect arising in a different moment. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that it exists before the cause, it follows that it does not exist before the cause because its cause does not yet exist. It is not tenable to say the proposition and the reason are not established, for it would contradict your own premise.⁹⁹ [444] It is not possible for the pervasion¹⁰⁰ to be unestablished: an effect without a cause cannot occur, for it would contradict valid cognition.

This proof has been presented as a *prasaṅga* and the other two alternatives will be presented in the same way.

2. Effect simultaneous with cause

[Contradiction: Although the proposition is that the effect arises from the cause,] it follows that it does not arise from the cause because of being simultaneous with the cause. This is because at any moment when neither of them exist, since no nature is established, a producer is negated.

3. Effect after cause

[Contradiction:] If the proposition is that the effect exists after the cause, [it follows that it does not arise from the cause,] because of being temporally separated from the cause.

‘Then they are not temporally separated.’

If this means there is no temporal separation whatsoever, then from the moment of the arising of the cause to the moment of the ceasing of the effect, there would be no separation, so it would follow that they would be simultaneous, and the designations of producer and produced are contrary *a priori* to their being simultaneous [as in point 2]. Since they cannot be simultaneous, it follows that they cannot be completely temporally unseparated.

If they are unseparated only partially, they are not truly existent causes and effects because of their multiplicity. These are grasped as a unity but this is like grasping something white as golden. The objects to be refuted [i.e. a truly existent cause and effect] must not be mere conceptual designations. Existence is incompatible with the grasping of a multiplicity as a singularity.

Therefore, there is no arising from an impermanent other. Since this refutation accords with the logical subject of the earlier explanation of cognition arising before its cognizable [v104-105b], it is also established there and it is not necessary to further elaborate on it here.

2. Refuting arising from a permanent other

1. Refuting arising from Īśvara
2. Refuting the Vaiśeṣika tradition of arising from sempiternal particles

1. Refuting arising from Īśvara

1. Īśvara is not established
2. Effects are impossible
3. Contradictions in his being a creator

1. Īśvara is not established

1. Refuting Īśvara as the elements
2. Refuting Īśvara as space [445]
3. Refuting Īśvara as self
4. Refuting Īśvara as inconceivable

1. Refuting Īśvara as the elements

9.118

**If Īśvara is the cause of beings,
Please explain what the temporal Īśvara is.
If you say, 'the elements', that is fine,
But why trouble yourself over a mere name?**

9.119

**Furthermore, since the earth and so forth are multiple,
Impermanent, inanimate, not deities,
Suitable to be trodden on and impure,
They are not Īśvara.**

When asked, ‘What is Īśvara?’, it is claimed Īśvara is the elements, such as earth, fire, etc. The elements are the logical subject. The probandum: whatever name they are called by, that is not what is meant by the term ‘Īśvara’. The reason: because of being multiple, impermanent, lacking the sentience of premeditating intentionality,¹⁰¹ mundane, contemptible and impure. These are the opposites of Īśvara, who is pervaded by singularity, permanence, divinity, sentience, worthiness of worship and purity.

2. Refuting Īśvara as space

9.120

Space is not Īśvara because it is inanimate.

The logical subject is space. That is not Īśvara because it does not have the sentience of intentionality. The reason here can be proven with the well-known inferences from other sources.

3. Refuting Īśvara as self

He is not the self because that was refuted previously.

4. Refuting Īśvara as inconceivable

**Since it is inconceivable to describe
A creator who is inconceivable, what would be the point of
trying?**

If he is not pervaded by conceivability, were someone to describe him, they would be describing something they cannot comprehend.

2. Effects are impossible

Showing that it is not logical for effects to be created by Īśvara comprises a question and an answer. The question:

9.121

What could he want to create anyway?

The response has two parts:

1. Refuting a permanent effect
2. Refuting an impermanent effect

1. Refuting a permanent effect

‘Īśvara created himself. He and his other creations, such as the four elements, are sempiternal.’

**Do you not claim that the self, the earth, etc.
And even Īśvara’s own nature are sempiternal?**

Is Īśvara’s nature not sempiternal? Therefore, because both creator and creation are sempiternal, [446] it follows that all the effects created by him are contemporaneous with him. Yet, this proposition is refuted by direct perception. If the reason¹⁰² were not established, it would contradict your premise.

Or, the logical subject is the sempiternal objects. [Contradiction:] although the proposition is that it is possible for them be created, it follows that they cannot be created because of their being sempiternal. If the proposition and the reason¹⁰³ were not established, it would contradict your premise.

‘The pervasion in these two [reasons] is not established.’¹⁰⁴

If a sempiternal self creates effects, it is not logical for them to have a beginning. If it does not create effects, then it is not logical for those effects to arise. This is because in neither case is there any change.

2. Refuting an impermanent effect

‘The effects [creations] of Īśvara—the five consciousnesses, sensations, happiness and suffering and so forth—are impermanent objects.’

Cognitions arise from cognizables

9.122

And beginningless happiness and suffering come from actions.

So, what is it you say he has created?

It is established by direct perception that impermanent objects arise from causes other than Īśvara. It is also established by direct perception that cognitions arise from their cognizables. It is established from both our scriptures that happiness and suffering arise from actions without beginning. Therefore, these all being the effects of Īśvara is negated.

3. Contradictions in his being a creator

This section also establishes the pervasion of the previous prasaṅgas.¹⁰⁵

1. Contradictory to a temporary effect
2. Establishing the pervasion by Īśvara's independence
3. Refuting his dependence

1. Contradictory to a temporary effect

**If the cause has no beginning,
How can the effect begin?**

The logical subject is the effects of Īśvara, such as happiness and suffering. It follows that they sempiternally exist without any beginning because of their arising from a sempiternal, beginningless causal power. This proposition is untenable, for it contradicts your premise that the effects are temporary. It is untenable for the reason¹⁰⁶ not to be established: if you say the cause is sempiternal, its power to create cannot later increase because, by your own claim, it is a primordial, beginningless causal power, as asserted in the qualification statement.¹⁰⁷

2. Establishing the pervasion by [Īśvara's] independence [447]

'Even though the cause abides sempiternally, that is not contradictory to temporary effects. The pervasion is not established.'

**How could his creations not be sempiternal,
When he depends upon nothing external?**

The sempiternal cause is the logical subject. The probandum: ‘How could his creations not be sempiternal?’, i.e. he cannot create something temporal: because he does not depend upon external conditions, it follows that Īśvara’s state of creating is immutable. Therefore, being immutable, mutability is negated and hence the creations are contemporaneous with Īśvara. Thus, the pervasion is established.

3. Refuting his dependence

‘The reason, “because of his independence from external conditions”, is not established.’

Here we refute Īśvara’s dependence:

1. Everything being an effect of Īśvara contradicts his dependence
 2. Dependence is contrary to Īśvara
1. Everything being an effect of Īśvara contradicts his dependence

**If there is nothing that was not created by him,
What could he depend upon?**

If you claim that everything was created by Īśvara and that there is nothing which he did not create, then for their cause—Īśvara—to depend on his own effect is a contradiction.

2. Dependence is contrary to Īśvara
 1. Establishing the concurrence of conditions as the cause
 2. Autonomy is violated
 3. He would be under the power of desire
1. Establishing the concurrence of conditions as the cause

9.124

If he were dependent, the concurrence itself

Would be the cause, not Īśvara.

If there is a concurrence of conditions, either it is an effect of Īśvara or it is not. If it is not, it would be the concurrence and not Īśvara's causal powers which would be the cause. Thus, it would not be established that Īśvara is the cause but rather that the concurrence is the cause.

2. Autonomy is violated

**When assembled, he is powerless not to create,
When absent, he is powerless to create.**

The possessor of autonomy subject to conditions is the logical subject. [Contradiction]: it follows that it is not autonomous because of coming under the power of the concurrence of conditions. Through this *prasaṅga*, it is established *a priori* that Īśvara is not autonomous, yet your position is that he is autonomous.

3. He would be under the power of desire

9.125

**If Īśvara creates without wanting to,
He is affected by an external power.
If he creates when he wants to, the effect depends on his
wishes.
How then is he 'The Almighty' [Īśvara]?**

'The creation of an effect [448] does not depend upon the concurrence of conditions. Rather, the effects arise from Īśvara. He creates the effects when he wishes to.'


It follows then that his wishes arise from an external power. Being subject to such wishes, his autonomy is violated, which is inappropriate for your Īśvara.

2. Refuting [the Vaiśeṣika tradition of arising from] sempiternal particles

9.126

**For those who assert sempiternal particles,
The refutation was completed previously.**

The assertion of particles referred to here is the proposal of a substance as the ultimate cause by certain non-Buddhists, such as the Vaiśeṣikas. The refutation was previously completed in the section concerning the foundation of mindfulness of the body [v86], i.e. [they are not ultimate] because they are refuted by their decomposition into parts.



3. Refuting arising from self

1. Formulating the position of the other [i.e. Sāṃkhya] tradition
2. The error in that

1. Formulating the position of the other tradition

1. A general explanation
2. The nature of the primal substance
3. The nature of its effects

1. A general explanation

The position of the Sāṃkhyas is that

The cause of beings is a permanent, primal substance.

‘The primal substance [1] is the sempiternal intrinsic nature. It is in a universal flow in which previously hidden manifestations can become manifest.¹⁰⁸ This intrinsic nature is unseen due to obscurations. When manifestations arise from their previous state of non-manifestation, temporal objects are seen. Their cause is the intrinsic nature. Since both the intrinsic nature and what arises from it are in reality one, the primal substance is both cause and effect, but the arising of the manifestations is a relative [delusion].’

2. The nature of the primal substance

9.127

Its qualities are ‘purity’, ‘activity’ and ‘darkness’.

While they remain in equilibrium,

They are called the ‘primal substance’.

‘The manifestations and sempiternal matter are pervaded by a oneness of the three qualities of the primal substance in equilibrium. This is the ultimate cause of all things. Individual consciousnesses [2] exist within that as containers of cognition and awareness. Each one is a sentient being experiencing objects. The individual consciousnesses are neither causes nor effects. [449] Since both the primal substance and the individual consciousnesses are ultimate, they are unseen, and are difficult to perceive.’

3. The nature of its effects

Manifestations are said to be their disequilibrium.

‘When there is disequilibrium, happiness, suffering and so forth manifest within the ‘Great One’ [3] by its evolution into ‘pride’ [4]. From pride arise:

- The five sense faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body [5-9]
- The five physical action organs which activate speech, arm movement, walking, digestion and reproduction [10-14]
- The conceptual mind [15]
- The five elements of space, earth, water, wind and fire [16-20]
- The five bare elements of sounds, smells, tastes, touchables and colours [21-25]

When there is equilibrium, happiness and so forth remain unmanifest within the primal substance. When there is disequilibrium, they become manifest. The five bare elements are then perceived as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. Therefore, happiness and so forth are comprised of the material primal substance. When manifestations form in the mirror of mind [3], experiences arise through the combination of the inner cognizing awareness with those manifestations.’

2. The error in that

1. A general expression of the objection
2. Refuting pleasure and so forth being external
3. A permanent primal substance is unreasonable
4. Contradictions in an existent arising

1. A general expression of the objection

1. Refuting the primal substance
2. Refuting its qualities
3. Refuting its effects

1. Refuting the primal substance

The primal substance is the logical subject. [Contradiction:] although the proposition is that its nature is singular, it follows that it is not singular because it has three qualities.

The pervasion for this inference¹⁰⁹ is expressed in the root text:

9.128

**A triple nature that is also singular
Is illogical. There is no such thing.**

2. Refuting its qualities

‘Nevertheless, the three qualities exist.’

**The three qualities also do not exist
Because each of them would also have three parts.**

The three qualities are also not real, [450] because there would have to be three parts to each of them, such as a purity of the purity and so forth.

3. Refuting its effects

9.129

**Without the qualities, the existence of sound
And so forth also becomes extremely implausible.**

Without the qualities, it follows that the elements such as sound would not exist because it is illogical to have the effect without the cause.

2. Refuting pleasure and so forth being external [to consciousness]

1. Refuting by not perceiving its appearance
2. Refuting an external cause of pleasure and so forth

1. Refuting by not perceiving its appearance

**Nor can the insentient, such as cloth,
Contain pleasure and so forth.**

Material objects such as cloth, comprised of the five bare elements, are established by external perception, whereas pleasure and so forth are established by one's inner awareness. That these are mutually exclusive is established by direct perception. Thus, the Sāṃkhya position is refuted for the wise by direct perception and refuted for the deluded by their never perceiving such an appearance [of e.g. cloth as containing pleasure].

2. Refuting an external cause of pleasure and so forth

'When pleasure and so forth arise in the mirror of mind, it has a cause external [to the individual consciousness], such as the bare element of sound.'

Refuting this has four parts:

1. Recalling the logic that was already completed
2. The idea contradicts your own words
3. Not preexisting in its basis
4. Not existing in reality

1. Recalling the logic that was already completed

9.130

'They are caused by the substantial [bare elements].'

Wasn't the analysis of such substances already completed?

If you propose that the five bare elements such as sound are the causes of pleasure and so forth, this would be a cognizable as the cause of cognition and the refutation for this was completed in the section on cognizable arising before cognition. According to the author of the *Great Commentary*, 'completed' here refers to the refutation of existence as atoms, as a composite and as a threefold nature.¹¹⁰

2. The idea contradicts your own words [451]

'You may have refuted cognizable and cognition as ultimate cause and effect but you did not refute them as relative.'

Nevertheless, if you claim that the cause is the five bare elements and the effect is pleasure and so forth, you contradict your previous

position that the primal substance with a threefold nature of pleasure, etc.¹¹¹ is the cause and the five bare elements are the effect:

Also, the pleasure and so forth [in the primal substance] were your causes, [not the bare elements].¹¹²

3. Not preexisting in its basis

‘We do not assert that the five bare elements are the causes of pleasure and so forth. The proposition is that the primal substance with the intrinsic nature of pleasure and so forth creates the five bare elements.’

Cloth and so forth do not arise from pleasure and so forth.

9.131

Rather, pleasure and so forth arise from cloth and so forth.

It is established by its incompatibility with direct perception that cloth and so forth do not arise from pleasure and so forth. Direct perception does not establish that cloth, etc. and the five bare elements arise from pleasure or the rest of the three qualities; rather, direct perception establishes the non-perception of pleasure and so forth arising from the five bare elements.¹¹³

4. Not existing in reality

Apart from this, there is no pleasure and so forth.

‘We assert that the five bare elements are the causes and pleasure and so forth are the effects.’

The five bare elements have been refuted as a reality. Pleasure, etc. do not exist as a reality because they are relative.

4. The refutation of a permanent primal substance

1. Refuting by not perceiving the appearance
2. Gross and subtle are contradictory
3. Establishing its contingent states as impermanent
4. Establishing the primal substance as impermanent

1. Refuting by not perceiving the appearance

**Semptineral pleasure and so forth
Have never been perceived.**

Pleasure and so forth are the logical subject. They are not sempiternal because they are essentially apparent yet are not always perceived.

‘They are not essentially apparent, so, when their appearance is not perceived, that does not refute their being sempiternal.’

At the time of pleasure manifesting, it is established with direct perception that it essentially appears. When it is unmanifest, its intrinsic nature has either been eliminated or has not been eliminated. If eliminated, you are asserting its impermanence. If not eliminated, [452] its essential appearance remains in its nature, so it is established as essentially apparent:

9.132

**If pleasure and so forth are essentially manifest,
Why are they not experienced?**

2. Gross and subtle are contradictory

‘The pleasure is not felt since previously it was gross and subsequently it becomes subtle.’

Either subtle and gross are of one intrinsic nature or distinct intrinsic natures. If not distinct, their inherent nature abides with contradictory dharmas, which is illogical:

‘They become subtle.’

How can something gross also be subtle?

3. Establishing its contingent states as impermanent

9.133

‘It becomes subtle by the elimination of the gross.’

Then the gross and subtle states are both impermanent.

‘Gross and subtle are contingent states and the intrinsic nature of each state is distinct.’

If the gross state is eliminated, since it possesses arising and ceasing, that contingent state is impermanent.

4. Establishing the primal substance as impermanent¹¹⁴

‘The contingent states are impermanent, but the primal substance is permanent.’

**In this way, why not accept
That all such things are impermanent?**

9.134

**If the gross state is nothing other than pleasure,
The impermanence of pleasure is evident.**

The primal substance of the three qualities (pleasure and so forth) is the logical subject. ‘Its impermanence is evident’ [in 134b] is the probandum. [The reason:] line 134a, i.e. because it is identified by its gross and subtle impermanent states, like a vase being identified by its blueness. Therefore, if it is established that the primal substance has impermanent states and that these are the intrinsic nature of everything, it is established that all dharmas are impermanent.

4. Contradictions in an existent arising

1. Presenting the position to be refuted
2. The position’s uncertainty
3. Mixing up the roles
4. Abandoning objections

1. Presenting the position to be refuted

‘At the earlier time when the Sāṃkhyas’ five bare elements are not manifesting, their subsequent state still exists within the primal substance, and later manifests. When there is a lump of clay, the pot is contained within that substance but is not manifest. It is later made to manifest by the potter and so forth. Therefore, only its nature as an

effect arises but nothing arises which was not previously present. It does not newly arise.'

**'Whatever does not already exist
Cannot arise because of its not existing.'**

'The formerly nonexistent thing is the logical subject. It cannot arise subsequently, [453] because the former does not exist, just like, for example, the horns of a hare not existing in the clay cannot arise. The former thing is nonexistent, so if it could arise, the horns of a hare also could arise from clay, but they cannot arise.'

2. The position's uncertainty

By the reason '[because of] its former nonexistence', you establish that there is no subsequent arising. Therefore, when your contingent state of pleasure and so forth manifests, that is also a latter arising from a nonexistent former, which you say is not established:

9.135

**Although you deny that manifestations can arise
From their nonexistence, you also assert it.**

3. Mixing up the roles

It also follows that to experience the cause would be to experience the effect and, therefore, the effect is mixed up with the role of the cause:

**If effects abide in their causes,
To eat food would be to eat excrement.**

9.136

**For the money you spent on cotton, you should have instead
Bought cotton seeds and worn them.**

4. Abandoning objections

1. The roles are the same
2. Contradictory to worldly confusion
3. The consequence that the role of the effect is a delusion

1. The roles [of cause and effect] are the same

‘The worldly fail to see it due to delusion.’

‘Although cotton exists in cotton seeds, it is not possible for the worldly to experience it, due to their non-realization, which is based on delusion.’

Even if the worldly do not experience it due to delusion, for the non-deluded who cognize the truth, such as Kapila, it is a contradiction to wear cotton, but not to wear cotton seeds:

Yet, someone who knows the reality is in the same predicament

The first line is the objection and the second line is the response.

2. Contradictory to worldly confusion

9.137

**And, since that knowledge of reality exists even for
The worldly, why do they not see it?**

Taking someone who has worldly delusion as the cause and an omniscient teacher who cognizes the twenty-five basic elements as the effect, since the effect abides within the cause, omniscient cognition already exists for that worldly person; in which case, how come he does not cognize the existence of cotton in cotton seeds?

3. The consequence that the role of the effect is a delusion

**‘The worldly do not have valid cognition.’
Then seeing manifestations would also be untrue.**

If the worldly person does not have valid cognition, he could not experience [454] any manifest effects. If he did see them, they would be false.

2. Abandoning objections to the middle way

According to the Svātantrika perspective, first one must establish the logic that proves there is no ultimate intrinsic nature. Then, in order to abandon the error of inferential valid cognition, it is shown that no positive affirmations are established, and this analysis does not contradict valid cognition. According to the Prāsangika perspective, one simply abandons objections to the teaching that all dharmas have no intrinsic nature.

1. Setting out the objections
2. Response to the first prasaṅga: our position is not a valid cognition with a positive affirmation
3. Response to the second prasaṅga: showing that the pervasion is not established, for even though there is an analysis, it is not contrary to valid cognition

1. Setting out the objections

9.138

**'If valid cognition is not valid,
Are its analyses not false?**

- 1) 'You Mādhyamikas hold that conceptual thought is relative. If this thought is deluded, it follows that even inferential valid cognition which cuts off elaborations is delusion.'
- 2) 'If the primal substance etc. were not real, since a refutation depends upon something to be refuted and since the object of refutation is not real, it follows that emptiness, which refutes it, is also not real.'

**If reality is emptiness,
Meditation for the sake of it is unreasonable.'**

'Therefore, it follows that meditation on emptiness is meaningless.'¹¹⁵

2. Response to the first prasaṅga

9.139

**With no connection to an object of examination
There is no grasping of its nonexistence.**

**Therefore, whatever the false object may be,
Its nonexistence is clearly false.**

Since all conceptual thought is in error, it is not valid cognition. Nor are its objects—the objects to be refuted—established. Therefore, the emptiness which negates them—the emptiness being affirmed—is itself an untrue analysandum and is also not a valid cognition. This is the meaning of ‘its nonexistence is clearly false’. Grasping the negation of the object of negation is false. Why? That conceptual thought [455] has no connection to an analysandum—the object to be examined, i.e. in not fabricating an analysandum as an object of conceptual thought, there is no grasping of its nonexistence. No conceptual thought of the negation arises.

If one asks, ‘What is it that is nonexistent?’, it should be answered, ‘This is nonexistent.’ But if no object to be negated is identified, there is no instance to negate because there is only a general concept of negation.¹¹⁶ Therefore, if the object to be negated is false, its negation is also false. This is like saying, ‘If the child of a barren woman is false, its death is also false.’

Concerning the second prasaṅga, ‘It follows that the cultivation of emptiness would be meaningless’, the response is to explain that its pervasion¹¹⁷ is not established:


3. Response to the second prasaṅga

9.140

**When the son dies in a dream,
The discrimination that ‘he does not exist’
Counters the discrimination that he exists,
Even though it is false.**

If the son within a dream is false, the discrimination that, ‘Now he has died, so he does not exist’ is also false. Nevertheless, it counters the discrimination that he exists. It functions as an antidote to the imputation that grasps him as existent, in respect of which it is not a delusion. In the same way, the explicit predicate ‘[it] is empty’ negates the object to be negated. Although that positive affirmation of the emptiness of the external object of attachment is itself false, it

overcomes the possibility for imputations to arise which could be grasped as existent. In respect of its eliminating imputations grasped as existent, there is no contradiction with the merely analytical aspect of valid cognition. This is the Svātantrika Madhyamaka argument.¹¹⁸ If one applies the Prāsangika Madhyamaka explanation, 'it is false' means it is the yogic relative, by which the erroneous understandings of others are refuted.



3. Showing that all dharmas arise merely through dependent origination

1. A summary of the refutation of the four kinds of arising
2. Showing that there is no arising or ceasing, coming or going

3. The implication of that: that which is dependently originated is mere illusion

1. A summary of the refutation of the four kinds of arising

9.141

**Therefore, on this analysis,
Nothing exists without a cause,
Nor abides in its conditions,
Whether individually or combined.**

‘Without a cause’ means existing without a cause. [456] ‘Individually’ means either self or other. ‘Combined’¹¹⁹ means both self and other.

2. Showing that there is no arising or ceasing, coming or going

9.142

**Nor does it come from other,
Nor stay, nor go.**

To ‘not come from other’ is to be without arising. To ‘not stay’ is to be free from abiding. To ‘not go’ is to be free from cessation. This is precisely to be free from the three characteristics of the composite.

3. The implication of this: that which is dependently originated is mere illusion

1. Showing that dependent origination is like an illusion
2. Showing dependent origination
3. Showing that dependent origination is not an intrinsic nature
by establishing the pervasion of dependent origination

1. Showing that dependent origination is like an illusion

**This is what deluded ones take as real,
But how is it different from an illusion?**

When an analytical cognition negates true existence, appearances are established as being like illusions.

2. Showing dependent origination

9.143

**Whatever manifests by illusion
And whatever manifests by causes,
Examine from where it could come
And to where it could go.**

9.144

**Whatever it is, it is seen in relation to something else.
Otherwise, it is not seen.
It is fabricated, like a reflection.
How can there be reality in that?**

Here I shall present the so-called ‘dependent origination analysis of inherent nature’ according to the Svātantrika treatises:¹²⁰

1. Presenting the reason
2. Showing the forward pervasion
3. The example of that
4. The logical outcome

[Proof: Appearances (the logical subject) have no intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, like illusions.]

1. Presenting the reason: [‘Because of being dependently originated’]

In line 144d, ‘in that’ refers to ‘these appearances’, the logical subject. Questioning how they could have reality is the probandum to be established, i.e. ‘they are empty of a real intrinsic nature’. Any effect whatsoever is seen to have a productive cause. If there is no such cause, there is no effect. Thus, the reason is: ‘Because of having the nature of dependent origination in their forward [causative] and reverse [caused] functions.’

2. Showing the forward pervasion: [‘Whatever is dependently originated (fabricated) has no intrinsic nature.’]

‘It is fabricated, like a reflection’ [144c] indicates that if something has an intrinsic nature, then it is illogical for it to be fabricated by causes

and conditions, since what arises from causes and conditions is pervaded by fabrication. Since that is contrary to its reality, it negates its reality. Thus, the negandum—its reality—is pervaded by non-fabrication. Since the contrary—fabrication by conditions—is supported by the logical subject, the contrary pervader is supported. [457]

3. The example of that: ['Like an illusion']

Line 143a gives an example of something fabricated by conditions being pervaded by the exclusion [of reality]—the manifestation of an illusion. To ask from where it comes [143c] means the arising of its reality is excluded. To ask where it could go to [143d] means the cessation of its reality is excluded. That its remaining is also excluded is implicit in this.

4. The logical outcome: ['They do not arise, cease, or persist.']

In general, whatever is a mere fabrication is pervaded by the exclusion of a true intrinsic nature. If one has doubts about this, the refutation [of the contrary] is implicit in these lines:

- 'Whatever manifests by causes, from where could it come?' [143bc], i.e. what is it that arises?
- 'Whatever manifests by causes, to where could it go?' [143bd], i.e. what is it that ceases?
- Therefore, there is also no abiding.

'Although they are dependent originations, dependent origination is their ultimate intrinsic nature. Where is the contraction? The pervasion is not established.'

One can establish the reverse pervasion¹²¹ by the so-called 'analysis of the effect: the arising and ceasing of its existence or nonexistence'.

3. Showing that dependent origination is not an intrinsic nature by establishing the pervasion of dependent origination

[Proof:] An ultimate intrinsic nature is the logical subject. It is not a dependent origination because it is illogical for an existent or nonexistent effect to arise. This refutation of the ultimate intrinsic nature as a dependent origination establishes that dependent

origination is not pervaded by an ultimate intrinsic nature and is pervaded by relative delusion.

1. The logic
2. Making certain of the reason

1. The logic

1. Refuting something existent arising as an effect
2. Refuting something nonexistent arising as an effect

1. Refuting something existent arising as an effect

9.145

**For something that already exists,
What cause does it require?**

That which is possible to be created by causes is pervaded by the necessary conditions for its creation. Grasping something as already existent is incompatible with grasping the necessary conditions for its creation. Since the certainty of this is established *a priori*, anything existent necessarily has no conditions for its creation.

2. Refuting something nonexistent arising as an effect

1. Presenting the logic in brief [458]
2. The contradiction in the possibility of something nonexistent being the cause for an object
3. Refuting [the cessation of] the object itself

1. Presenting the logic in brief

**And if it does not exist,
What cause does it require?**

That which has been created is pervaded by particular existent qualities. The existence of those qualities is incompatible with the non-establishment of its substantial intrinsic nature. Therefore, a

nonexistent object does not require a cause to create it, so it is not something that can be created.

2. The contradiction in the possibility of something nonexistent being the cause for an object

‘A nonexistent object cannot be created but subsequently attains a self-nature. Since this requires a cause, why do you claim it is not necessary?’

The fact that there is no such requirement is established as follows:

9.146

Even a billion causes

Cannot alter nonexistence.

A nonexistent object might have a billion causes but it is still not something that can be created because there is nothing to transform. The pervader is not supported.¹²²

‘An already existent object cannot transform into something else, but a previously nonexistent thing can subsequently attain a substantial intrinsic nature. Therefore, it transforms from nonexistent into existent.’

In subsequently becoming existent, does it do so without abandoning its previous nonexistence or not? If it does not abandon its nonexistence:

How can a state of nonexistence be existent,

Or become existent?

Since its existence and nonexistence are mutually exclusive, an intrinsic nature of nonexistence is contradictory to one of existence:

9.147

If its existence is impossible during its nonexistence,

When could it ever become something existent?

If it abandons its nonexistence: the contingent state of nonexistence is the logical subject. It cannot become existent through subsequently

abandoning its nonexistence because its nonexistence cannot be negated. That is because becoming existent is pervaded by the cessation of nonexistence and nonexistent objects have no cessation.

‘That reason is not established.’

[Contradiction:] If nonexistent objects could cease, they would be impermanent and thus would be pervaded by becoming existent, i.e. the object would be both nonexistent and existent. Therefore, because of being nonexistent, [459] it is not impermanent. Since the pervader is not supported,¹²³ the cessation of a nonexistent state is negated, by which the qualification¹²⁴ is established. This explains line 146d, as well as:

**While its existence has not yet begun,
Its nonexistence has not yet been lost.**

9.148

**If its nonexistence has not been lost,
It is impossible for it to exist.**

3. Refuting the cessation of the object itself

Having shown that a nonexistent object cannot become existent, it is next shown that an existent object cannot change into a state of nonexistence:

**Nor can the existent become nonexistent,
Because it would follow that it would have two intrinsic
natures.**

The nonexistent object is the logical subject:

- The prasaṅga from the reason based on intrinsic nature:
[Contradiction: you claim that the object is non-dual but] it follows that it is dual because of its transformation [from existent to nonexistent].
- The svātantra from the pervader not being supported:¹²⁵
because of being non-dual, there is no transformation.

2. Making certain of the reason

1. Freedom from the two extremes
2. Abiding is like an illusion
3. The sameness of existence and pacification

1. Freedom from the two extremes

9.149

**In this way, there is no cessation.
Nor is there any existence. Because of this,
All these beings
Are forever neither arising nor ceasing.**

Since beings have no cessation, all sentient beings are called 'always non-ceasing'. Since they have no existence, they are called 'always non-arising'.

2. Abiding is like an illusion

9.150


**Dreamlike beings,
When analysed, are like banana trees.**

The first line establishes they are deluded perceptions and the second line indicates the essence of the truth is emptiness.

3. The sameness of existence and pacification

**In suchness, there is no distinction
Between nirvāṇa and non-nirvāṇa.**

There is no distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. In every sense? Only in suchness, i.e. ultimately, they have the single taste of emptiness.



5. The result of meditation on emptiness

This is explained by some¹²⁶ as follows:

1. Benefit of self
2. Benefit of others

1. Benefit of self

1. Pacifying attachment
2. Pacifying suffering

1. Pacifying attachment

1. The non-establishment of the eight worldly dharmas, the objects of attachment
2. Ending conditioned existence, which depends upon these

1. The non-establishment of the eight worldly dharmas, the objects of attachment [460]

9.151

**What is there to gain and what is there to lose
Of things which are, in this way, empty?
Who exists to respect me,
Or to despise me?**

9.152

**Where do happiness and suffering come from?
What is there to be joyful or miserable about?**

In relation to the eight worldly dharmas:

- Not being gained or lost corresponds to the emptiness of gain and loss.
- Not being respected or despised corresponds to not being praised or criticized.
- Happiness and suffering are named explicitly.
- Joy and misery corresponds to being famous or infamous.

2. Ending conditioned existence, which depends upon these

**When I try to find reality itself,
Who has craving and what is there to crave?**

This is a general point that ultimately the one who has attachment and the object of attachment itself are not established.

Without going into a detailed explanation, the next lines explain that the span of life, with its happiness and unhappiness, is not established:

9.153

**When analysed, what lives in this world
And what can die in it?**

The objects of direct happiness in the future are not established:

What can arise ...

The objects of intense attachment right now and those in the past which are subsequently recollected are not established:

... and what has ever arisen?

Loved ones are not established:

What friends or relatives are there?

In summary:

9.154

**All is like space.
May we come to fully understand this.**

Being empty, may one understand this and may people who are like oneself also understand this.

This concludes the analytical instructions. The next verses concern instructions on unification with compassion.

2. Abandoning suffering

Here it will be shown explicitly that if emptiness is not realized, suffering arises and hence it is implicit that when emptiness is realized, suffering is ended. The suffering from the non-realization of emptiness has two parts:

1. An introductory summary of the visible sufferings
2. The invisible sufferings of other lives

1. An introductory summary of visible sufferings

**For those who want happiness,
The causes of conflict and excitement**

9.155

Create intense disturbance and hysteria.

**We are tormenting, fighting and arguing with one another,
Cutting and stabbing one another.**

By such nonvirtues, we endure great difficulties.

Those who have not realized emptiness but want happiness have great difficulties in just getting by, with terrible sufferings in this very life. Why are virtuous actions so difficult? Because of nonvirtue. In what way? [461] By the cause of conflict with enemies, anger and intense malice are created. From that comes fighting, arguing and cutting and stabbing one another. Thus, nonvirtues arising from anger are accumulated. By the cause of excitement towards friends, when one is with them, hysteria, fighting and arguing develop and when one is not with them, misery develops. Thus, the nonvirtues which arise from these are accumulated.

2. The invisible sufferings

1. The sufferings of the lower realms
2. Continuously experiencing suffering
3. Not knowing that one is suffering
4. The kinds of suffering which will be experienced

1. The sufferings of the lower realms

9.156

**Having enjoyed so much happiness,
In happy rebirths again and again,
After death, it ends, and one suffers,
Falling into torment for a long time.**

Having had happy rebirths again and again, one falls from them. When? At death. Where does one fall to? To the unbearable sufferings of the lower realms, which are difficult even to think about. For how long? For a long time.

2. Continuously experiencing suffering

After escaping that suffering, will there be no more suffering? Alas! One will continue to experience suffering. In dependence upon the five types of rebirth, one will constantly experience attachment to saṃsāra. Why? There are five main causes:

1. The roots of suffering have not been pacified
2. One does not have the means to dispel it
3. There are many obstacles
4. It is difficult to rely on the supports
5. It is difficult to abandon its causes

1. The roots of suffering have not been pacified

9.157

**Within conditioned existence, there are many precipices,
For there is no truth in it.
Where there is conditioned existence, there is no reality,
For they are incompatible.**

There being no reality means that, since there is no wisdom of realizing suchness, grasping at existence is not pacified, so the root of suffering is not pacified. Why is there no wisdom of realizing suchness? Because of its incompatible condition, i.e. the existence of its opposite. What is that? The many precipices of affliction by suffering. They are the effects, while non-truth—the obscuration of ignorance—is the cause. [462]

2. One does not have the means to dispel it

9.158

There is no way to truly exemplify
This unending ocean of unbearable suffering.
It is where we lack strength.
It is where life is short.

9.159

It is where we are worn out, striving to live and get by,
Where we are exhausted by hunger and sickness,
Where we sleep and where we cause harm,
And where we meaninglessly associate with the childish and
with friends.

9.160

So life swiftly passes by without any meaning,
And a remedy is extremely difficult to find.
How can we find a way
To dispel habitual distraction?

Why can we not dispel it? Because the remedy—the antidote—is extremely difficult to find and because of disturbing and mistaken habitual distractions. Why is the remedy difficult to find? Because our exertion for it is weak, so we are lacking in strength, and this opportunity is unstable, so life is short. Why are there habitual distractions? Because we are worn out by striving to live and get by, exhausted by hunger and sickness and because we pass our time meaninglessly with sleep and harmful things and are occupied meaninglessly with childish people and friends, so this life passes by without meaning.

3. There are many obstacles

1. Outer obstacles
2. Inner obstacles

1. Outer obstacles

9.161

**It is where demons are striving to cast us
Into the great lower realms.**

In conditioned existence, demons are striving. For what purpose? To cast us into the lower realms. [For example], the demon Kāmadeva fired his flower-arrow at Queen Padmavati and so forth.¹²⁷

2. Inner obstacles

**It is where overcoming doubts is hard
Among its many mistaken paths.**

With incorrect views and doubts, one clings to one's doubts about the paths of perfection.

4. It is difficult to rely on the supports

9.162

An opportunity like this will be difficult to find again,

After transmigration from this life, such an opportunity will be difficult to find again. There will be no return of the eight freedoms and the five endowments of oneself will be difficult to find.

**And the presence of Buddhas will be extremely difficult to
find.**

The five endowments of others will also be difficult to find.

5. It is difficult to abandon its causes

It is difficult to escape the river of defilements.

It is difficult to escape the river of attachment, craving, views and unawareness. Therefore: [463]

Alas! The suffering just goes on and on.

3. Not knowing that one is suffering

The point here is that the childish are suffering but they do not know they are suffering. This main point is followed by an example. The main point:

9.163

**Although the sufferings are intense,
Some cannot recognize their own misery.
Alas! It is only right to feel pity
For those who dwell in the rivers of suffering.**

Suffering without knowing that one is suffering is the suffering of karmic formations, in which one does not know one is suffering. The example:

9.164

**This is like, for example, bathing again and again,
And then stepping into a fire again and again,
Proclaiming one's happiness,
While being in immense pain.**

Bathing and then entering a fire is explained by the author of the *Great Commentary* as someone being submerged in painfully cold water and then, wishing to be warm, stepping into a fire.¹²⁸ Others say it is a reference to an actual yogic practice of certain tīrthikas.

4. The kinds of suffering which will be experienced

9.165

**So, carrying on as if
There were no old age or death,
They are first subjected to death
And then fall into the unbearable lower realms.**

Those who assume they will not grow old or die will die and be reborn in the lower realms. Thus, if one has not realized emptiness, those sufferings will arise but, if one realizes it, they will be prevented.

2. Benefit of others

1. Pacifying suffering

2. Pacifying attachment

1. Pacifying suffering

9.166

**When will I be able to pacify
These unbearable fires of suffering
With a rain of accumulated happiness
Falling from clouds of stored up merit?**

What is the means to pacify suffering? It is the rain of one's amassed happiness. From where will that rain of happiness fall? From the clouds of merit that one has well created.

2. Pacifying attachment

9.167

**Having fostered the non-conceptual
And devotedly accumulated merits,
When will I show emptiness
To those lost in conceptualization?**

Who does one do this for? For those who are lost in conceptualization. From what cause will their benefit come? From reliance upon the non-conceptual—the accumulation of primordial wisdom—and from devotion to the gathering of merit—the accumulation of merit.

According to this explanation, the dispelling of the sufferings mentioned above [v154c-165] refers to the benefit of self. This explanation does not fit the root text in one respect. [464] For one who has not realized emptiness, does the 'suffering' refer to suffering experienced by self or by others? If the former, verses 166-7 also refer to one's own suffering, so they are part of the section on the benefit of self. If the latter, even if dispelled, v154c-165 refer to the suffering of others, so should not be included in the benefit of self. Therefore, the sections on the non-establishment of the worldly dharmas and ending conditioned existence together comprise the result of realizing emptiness and what follows concerns the benefit of others, which goes from v154c through to v165 in accord with the previous explanation, then dispelling suffering is v166 and the means to dispel it is v167.



PART V

THE SUBSEQUENT RESULTS

