

3. How to engage in meditation on emptiness

Geshe Ngok Lotsawa and others have explained this as follows:

1. How to engage in meditation on the non-self of the individual [v57-77]
2. How to engage in meditation on the non-self of dharmas [v78-110]

However, this is not correct. If one says that the foundations of mindfulness [v78-110] comprise the non-self of dharmas, it would contradict the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, which says,

This completes the full explanation of the foundations of mindfulness.
Having taught the non-self of the individual in that way...⁵⁸

Therefore, both sections [i.e. v57-110] explain the non-self of the individual, while the previous section [v2-56] explains the non-self of dharmas. This is also how Ācārya Candrakīrti arranges the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.⁵⁹ First, by a complete presentation of the two truths, one gains certainty concerning the true nature of cognizables in general, which is called the ‘non-self of dharmas’. After that, there remains a conception of an ‘individual self’ which is the cognizor of this. [417] In order for that to cease, the non-self of the individual is subsequently taught.

‘If the self of the individual is grasping the coarse as singular, while the self of dharmas is grasping the subtle as singular, why is the non-self of dharmas taught first?’

It is nowhere taught that the individual is coarse and dharmas are subtle. Although nowadays there are many explanations that make this claim, they are erroneous. As it says in the *Abhidharmakośa*,

The stream of being is called ‘the individual’.
Grasping at characteristics is called ‘dharmas’.⁶⁰

Therefore, up to this point, the non-self of dharmas has been taught by gaining certainty in all cognizables grasped as mine through the two

truths. Now, the non-self of the individual is to be explained. This has four parts.

1. The general explanation of individual non-self in the six elements [v57 - 59]
2. Refuting the self of the skandhas and elements, etc. as designated by tīrthikas [v60 - 69]
3. Abandoning objections to non-self [v70 - 77]
4. Refuting the understanding of the skandhas and elements as self with the four foundations of mindfulness [v78 - 110]

1. The general explanation of individual non-self in the six elements

Non-self in the earth and water elements:

9.57

**Self is not the teeth, hair or nails.
It is neither the bones nor blood.
It is neither the mucus nor phlegm,
Nor is it the lymph or pus.**

9.58

**Self is neither the fat nor sweat.
Neither the lungs nor liver are the self,
Nor are any of the other inner organs.
Self is neither the excrement nor urine.**

9.59


Neither the flesh nor skin are the self,

Non-self in the fire, wind and consciousness elements:

**Nor are warmth or respiration the self.
The orifices are not the self,
And none of the six consciousnesses are the self either.**

It has been said by some earlier masters that the first eleven lines teach the non-self of the skandha of form and the final line teaches the non-

self of the other skandhas. However, since this is not how it appears in the root text, [418] it is not the intended meaning.



2. Refuting the self of the skandhas and elements, etc. as designated by tīrthikas

1. Refuting Sāṃkhyas
2. Refuting Naiyāyikas

1. Refuting Sāṃkhyas

The Sāṃkhyas assert that a primal matter exists universally in all beings. Containers of self-cognition and awareness exist within it as individual consciousnesses. Each of these has the inherent nature of a sempiternal, cognizing and aware self. When it has no appearances, representations [i.e. forms, sounds, etc.] remain within the mirror of mind.⁶¹ When it temporarily connects with manifesting representations such as the bare element of sound,⁶² it temporarily experiences objects.

1. General refutation of the individual consciousness
2. Refuting temporary multiplicity
3. Refuting its single nature

1. General refutation of the individual consciousness
 1. The consequence of its permanence
 2. Establishing the pervasion
 3. Abandoning objections

1. The consequence of its permanence

9.60

**If the cognition of sound were immutable
The sound would always be perceived.**

The logical subject is the individual consciousness. It must experience sound as immutable because it is a sempiternal sound-perceiving cognition. This position is untenable. By directly perceiving a single sound, it cannot perceive any other sound. It is untenable to say the reason⁶³ is not established, for that would contradict the Sāṃkhya's own proposition that the individual consciousness is sempiternal.

'Your pervasion⁶⁴ is not established. The sempiternal nature of self-awareness is not pervaded by an immutable experience of sound, for it can have a nature of mere cognition without depending upon any object. The experience of sound depends upon a sound, so when there is no sound, there is no experience, but the mere cognition nevertheless remains. Therefore, the immutable experience of sound is

negated and the pervasion for your refutation of a sempiternal individual consciousness is not established.'

2. Establishing the pervasion

1. The violation of its intrinsic nature
2. The absurd consequence [419]
3. Conclusion

1. The violation of its intrinsic nature

**If there is no cognizable, how is that awareness?
Why call this 'cognition?'**

The first line is a question and the second is the response. The establishment of a sound cognition depends upon there being a sound. If there is no sound, there is no sound cognition. Similarly, since the nature of a sound cognition depends upon its cognizable, without a cognizable, there is no subjective cognition. Therefore, without a perception of sound, cognition is negated. Thus, our pervasion is established.

2. The absurd consequence

'The experience of sound may depend upon a sound, but mere cognition does not. Therefore, the experience of sound is refuted, but mere cognition is not refuted. Therefore, your pervasion is not established.'

If it were the case that the establishment of a cognition did not depend upon a cognizable, it would follow that even wood would count as cognition:

9.61

**If cognition does not cognize,
It would follow that even wood is a cognition.**

3. Conclusion

**Without a nearby cognizable,
I would definitely call that 'not cognizing'.**

Cognition is the presence of a cognizor in proximity to the cognizable which qualifies⁶⁵ it. Without that, there is definitely no cognition.

3. Abandoning objections

1. It is unreasonable for cognition of form to perceive sound
 2. This has the same fault that was previously explained
 3. It is unreasonable to call it the same thing
 4. The example is not established
 5. Not conceivable as a singularity
1. It is unreasonable for cognition of form to perceive sound

9.62

'It is the same thing that cognizes form.'

'Although cognition without a cognizable is impossible, when the sound is no longer in proximity, that very same cognition now cognizes forms. Since at that time the form cognizable exists, we maintain that cognition exists sempiternally.'

Either the previous cognition of sound has ceased and subsequently forms are cognized, or else the previous cognition of sound has not ceased. If the former, then although it remains the same in as much as it is designated 'mere cognition', its former nature in fact has ceased. This is a fault, since a sempiternal individual consciousness is unceasing.

Then why would it not also hear at the same time?

If the sound has not ceased, then, at that time, since sound cognition [420] is pervaded by its cognizable and by self-awareness, when the forms are cognized, it follows that it would still be an awareness of sound because the grasping of the sound would not have ceased.

2. This has the same fault that was previously explained

If it is because no sound is nearby

Then there is also no cognition of it.

Since sound awareness depends upon a sound, the pervasion of a sempiternal sound awareness is not established. When there is no sound there is also no cognition. Since sound cognition is qualified by its sound, when there is no sound, there is pervasion by no sound cognition, as was previously shown, i.e. if cognition did not depend upon its cognizable, there would be the fault of the consequence that even wood would count as cognition.

3. It is unreasonable to call it the same thing

'The sound cognition and form cognition have one nature, but the former cognition ceases.'

The response:

9.63

**How can that which has the nature
Of sound perception perceive forms?**

It is unreasonable to designate incompatible representations as having a single nature. The establishment of a cognition of form in dependence upon a form cognizable has one nature and the establishment of a cognition of sound in dependence upon sound has another.

'An example of such a single nature that is non-contradictory is someone being established as a son in dependence upon his own father and the same person being established as a father in dependence upon having a son.'

4. The example is not established

**A single person might be called father and son,
But his intrinsic nature is neither,**

9.64

**Just as lightness, activity and darkness
Are neither father nor son.**

To call a single person a father and a son is a worldly convention. Similarly, lightness, activity and darkness—the three ultimate natures

[as posited by the Sāṃkhyas]—do not have the nature of either father or son.

5. Not conceivable as a singularity

Nobody has ever seen

Visual perception with the nature of sound perception.

If sound cognition and visual cognition existed as a singular self, it should be apparent but, since it has never been seen, it is negated.

Having refuted the individual consciousness in general:

2. Refuting temporary multiplicity

Objection:

9.65

'Like an actor, it assumes different characteristics.'

'The individual consciousness has a single nature, like an actor wearing masks at different times—sometimes Indra, [421] sometimes a monkey. Although it has various characters, there is one nature without any incompatibility. Although temporarily there are representations such as a perception of sound, consciousness is free from multiplicity and has a single nature.'

The response:

If it sees, it is not immutable.

In that case, its freedom from multiplicity is also temporary, for the previous perception ceases when the subsequent one arises and thus it has a new nature. Thus, it is not immutable.

'It just appears differently.'

'The representations are dissimilar but have a single nature.'

If the representations are dissimilar but have one nature, the attribution to them of 'singularity' is the introduction of a singularity previously unknown to the world:

Such singularity is something unprecedented.

3. Refuting its single nature

1. Question
2. Answer

1. Question

9.66

'Its different characteristics are not real.'

Then describe its true nature.

'Its multiple temporary characteristics are not real. Among these untrue characteristics, there is one nature.'

In that case, what is that nature? What kind of essential characteristics does it have?

'It is cognition itself.'

'Although temporarily it is designated as a sound cognition or a form cognition, it has one nature, since these both qualify as mere cognition.'

2. Answer

1. The consequence that all beings are one
2. The consequence that the mirror of mind and individual consciousnesses are one
3. The general case is not established

1. The consequence that all beings are one

Then it would follow that all beings are one.

If whatever is qualified by mere awareness is pervaded by a single nature, then, taking individual beings as the logical subject, it would follow that they are all one in nature because they all have mere awareness. [422] This consequence is erroneous.

2. The consequence that the mirror of mind and individual consciousnesses are one

9.67

Sentient and insentient would also be one

Because they are equal merely in being existent.

If whatever shares the same qualification is pervaded by a single nature, then it would follow that the sentient—the individual consciousness, a cognizing awareness—and the insentient—primal matter and the mirror of mind⁶⁶—have the same nature because they have the same qualification, being merely existent.

3. The general case is not established

**If the instances are delusions,
What common basis could they have?**

If all instances, such as sound cognitions and form cognitions, are untrue, then it is established that the general case—mere cognition as a singular self—is also untrue. If the instances such as pale blue are untrue, the universal [blue] is also not established, like the only son of a barren woman.

2. Refuting Naiyāyikas

1. Showing the consequence which refutes a self with a material nature
2. Since pervasion by possession of a separate mind has not been established, establishing that pervasion for sentience
3. Summarized meaning

1. Showing the consequence which refutes a self with a material nature

9.68

Something insentient is not the self,

Because of its very insentience, like a vase.

The Naiyāyikas assert that the self is insentient matter which becomes connected to an external mind,⁶⁷ and in this way it is an agent.

The self is the logical subject. [Contradiction:] your position is that it is an agent but it follows that it is not an agent because of its being matter, which is insentient. It is not tenable to deny that either the position [the self is an agent] or the reason [the self is insentient matter] are established, for that would contradict your own premise. If the pervasion⁶⁸ were not established, then such things as vases would be indistinct [from agents].

'It owns a separate mind.⁶⁹ Therefore, the pervasion is not established.'

2. Establishing the pervasion

Because of its possession of a mind,

'Although the self is insentient matter, since it owns a separate mind, it has the sentience of premeditating intentionality.⁷⁰ You have not shown a contradiction, since the pervasion is not established.'

[423] By owning a separate mind, either its material nature has changed or it has not changed. If it has changed, then having previously been material in nature, later it becomes an agent with intentionality. Thus, its previous material nature was impermanent:

If it then cognizes, it follows that its non-cognition has been eliminated.

If it does not change:

9.69

'The self has not changed.'

Then how did it become sentient?


'There was no change when its material nature was eliminated because the sempiternal self is immutable.'

If the former matter was insentient then, being mutually exclusive with sentience, it is not a sentient being with intentionality. Matter is pervaded by not being an agent—a sentient being with intentionality.

3. Summarized meaning

**Thus, being non-cognizing and free from activity,
Space would also be such a ‘self’.**

If the self has no nature of cognition nor is an agent, it follows that space is also a self.



3. Abandoning objections to non-self

1. Abandoning the objection that the connection of actions and effects is not logical
2. Abandoning the objection of objects of cultivating compassion being illogical

1. Abandoning the objection that the connection of actions and effects is not logical

1. Presenting the objection

2. Our positions are the same
 3. Actual response
 4. Abandoning contradiction to scripture
 5. Abandoning another objection
 6. Summarized meaning
1. Presenting the objection

9.70

**'If the self does not exist,
A connection between actions and results is illogical.
After performing an action, it is gone,
So, for whom could there be karma?'**

'If the nature of self were not the same between this life and future lives, when the skandhas of this life and its karmic deeds are destroyed, the deeds would dissipate. Since the skandhas of the next life are newly arisen, they would not have any connection with the previous actions. Therefore, for whom could there be karma?'

2. Our positions are the same

9.71

**It is established for both of us
That action and result have different bases
And that a self does not have any role in this.**

The basis of action—the individual of this life who is the agent—and basis of the result—the experiences of a future life [424]—are distinct. All its actions are temporary manifestations, with a completely passive sempiternal self performing no function. If this is a fault, the same fault exists equally for both of us:

So, is your objection here not pointless?

3. Actual response

9.72

'The causal agent is the recipient of its result.'

If effects were experienced by the karmic causal agents themselves, then the causal agent and the effect would have to exist at the same time, however:

No one ever sees this happen.

Therefore, the karmic agent is the body of the causal agent and the experiencer of the result is the body of another person and these are distinct.

4. Abandoning contradiction to scripture

'According to the Buddhist scriptures, the ripened results such as the result of maturation⁷¹ do not ripen for anyone other than the karmic agent.'

**It is just in dependence upon a single stream of being
That the so-called 'agent' and 'experiencer' are taught.**

Although the karmic agent and the experiencer of the result are temporally distinct, consciousness is a changing stream of moments and in this way the result ripens for the karmic agent. Therefore, there is no contradiction to the scriptures.

5. Abandoning another objection

'That causal stream is the self.'

9.73

**The past and future minds are not the self,
Because they do not exist.
If the arising mind were the self,
Then when it ceased, there would be no more self.**

Past and future minds are not the self because the former has ceased and the latter has not yet arisen. Mind in the present moment, which has arisen but not yet ceased, is also not the self because it will cease to be. Since it becomes nonexistent, it does not have a sempiternal nature. The stream of being is nothing but a succession of many individual moments and has no real existence apart from this.

6. Summarized meaning

9.74

**For example, if you split apart
The trunks of banana trees, nothing is found.
Similarly, if you search for it thoroughly,
You will find the self to be no more real than this.**

2. Abandoning the objection that the objects of cultivating compassion are not established

1. Objection [425]
2. Response

1. Objection

9.75

**'If sentient beings do not exist,
For whom should we have compassion?'**

'If sentient beings, the objects of compassion, do not exist, it is unreasonable to cultivate compassion for them. Therefore, the Mahāyāna path is flawed.'

2. Response

1. Establishing that sentient beings are designated
2. Abandoning an objection to that

1. Establishing that sentient beings are designated

**Compassion is for those imputed by confusion:
They are accepted for the sake of the result.**

'Confusion' means grasping the illusion-like relative that a stream of many moments is a sentient being. Relative sentient beings and compassion are not incompatible. What sort of relative is this? It is an unabandoned relative acceptance of conduct for the benefit of others.

Why accept this delusion? It is for the sake of the result, i.e. we do not abandon others for the sake of benefitting them and attaining buddhahood, in accord with the earlier teaching on not abandoning conceptual thought with appearances.

2. Abandoning an objection to that

1. The independence of the substantially established individual
 2. The mere designation is not to be abandoned
 3. Abandoning a contradiction in our own words
 4. Abandoning that they are the same
1. The independence of the substantially established individual

9.76

'If there are no sentient beings, who gets the result?'
This is true but, nevertheless, they are accepted out of confusion.

'If even sentient beings are not established, how can there be any results from benefitting them?'

It is true that in reality there are no sentient beings, i.e. the objects to be benefitted are not pervaded by being real sentient beings. Yet, while they are illusion-like and agglomerations of many moments, it is reasonable to treat these so-called 'sentient beings' as objects and to fulfil their benefit.

Objection: 'The conception of the reality of sentient beings is to be abandoned and one must abandon grasping at designations of sentient beings because they are perceptions of mistaken conceptual thought.'

2. The mere designation is not to be abandoned

**For the sake of fully pacifying suffering,
 One should not oppose the delusion of this result.**

Since practice requires a variety of skilful methods, [426] those wise in such methods should rely upon the deluded relative.

3. Abandoning a contradiction in our own words

'Earlier, you said,

Neither self nor other is right:
You should try to give them both up. [v8.100cd]

Are you not now contradicting yourself?'

No: that self is the self which exists as a real substance. This one exists as a designation.

'Why should the first kind of self be abandoned?'

Because clinging to self as ultimate creates pride, which causes suffering:

9.77

**Confusion about the self increases
Pride, the cause of suffering.**

4. Abandoning the objection that they are the same

'The conceptual thought with appearances in which there is clinging to the existence of the designated self should be abandoned, for suffering increases as a consequence of clinging to the existence of real substance.'

This kind of conceptual thought with appearances does not increase self-clinging, the cause of suffering. Why not? Because there is an antidote which destroys the seeds of clinging to self—meditating upon non-self:

**'There is no way to resolve this [contradiction].'
The meditation on non-self is supreme.**

Alternatively, the objection and response can be understood as follows: 'Clinging to the self as ultimate is not to be abandoned because, by doing so, one will attain the result, buddhahood.'

This is not established because the supreme means for the attainment of buddhahood is meditation upon non-self. This is how Dānaśrī⁷² explains lines 77cd.

Having refuted the erroneous conception the non-Buddhists have of a seeing and sensing self, now to present the refutation of the idea that those sights and sensations are selves.

4. Refuting the understanding of the skandhas and elements as self with the four foundations of mindfulness

1. Mindfulness of the body
2. Mindfulness of sensations
3. Mindfulness of mind
4. Mindfulness of dharmas [427]

This section is not a teaching on the four foundations of mindfulness taught elsewhere as the impurity of the body, the suffering of sensations, the impermanence of mind and the non-self of dharmas. However, one need not think there is any contradiction here to that teaching, only a different purpose. In our bodhisattva tradition, the purpose is to analyse the individual self for which grasping arises under the power of wrong views, by developing the characteristics of non-self in the meditative objects [i.e. the four foundations] to purify defilements. In the other tradition, since conduct degenerates under the influence of defilements such as attachment, one develops in one's stream of being the characteristics of abandonment of the four wrong views⁷³ as meditative objects to purify conduct.⁷⁴



1. Mindfulness of the body

1. The individual parts are not the body
2. An existent body which possesses the parts is not established
3. General summary

1. The individual parts are not the body

9.78

**The body is neither the feet nor calves,
Nor is it the thighs or waist,
Abdomen or back,
Chest or shoulders,**

9.79

**Ribs or hands,
Joints or cavities,
Internal organs,
Head or neck.
What is this body then?**

2. An existent body which possesses the parts is not established

Objection: 'Although these parts are not the body, there exists a single owner of the parts.'

1. Refuting that each part is connected to it
2. Refuting a connection throughout the entire self
3. Summarizing the logic of that
4. The body is deluded conception
5. Establishing the delusion

1. Refuting that each part is connected to it

9.80

**If this body is present as a whole
Among its individual parts
Then part of it consists in each part,**

If the so-called ‘body’ were a generality present in the individual parts, then either it consists partly in each part or else it is complete in each part. If the first, a single generality present within many parts is not established:

But where is the thing itself?

2. Refuting a connection throughout the entire self [428]

Regarding the second position, if in each individual part there is an individual complete body, it follows that there are many complete bodies:

9.81

**If the body consists of a complete whole
In the hands and so forth,
There would be as many bodies
As there are hands and so forth.**

3. Summarizing the logic of that

9.82

**If the body is neither inside nor out,
Neither within the hands and so forth,
Nor apart from the hands and so forth,
How does it exist at all?**

The first two lines indicate that the body is not within the parts themselves. The second two lines indicate that the body is not in something else.

4. The body is deluded conception

9.83

**Therefore, out of confusion, we think there is a body
Where there is none.
It is like thinking a heap of stones is a person
By some particularity of its arrangement.**

Like the delusion that a heap of stones is a person, it is a delusion that within many parts there is a single generality which is the body.

5. Establishing the delusion

1. The cause of the delusion
2. The deluded cognition

1. The cause of the delusion

9.84

**While the conditions are assembled,
The body will continue to appear as a person.
So, while the hands and so forth exist,
A body continues to appear.**

Just as the particularity of its shape is the cause of the delusion that a heap of stones is a person, so the assemblage of the hands and so forth cause the delusion that the so-called body is a single thing.

2. The deluded cognition

9.85

**Similarly, what more is a hand
Than a collection of fingers?
These, too, are collections of joints,
Which have their own distinct parts.**

9.86

**Even parts have distinct particles,
And those particles have distinct areas.
Even these distinct areas are not without parts;
They are like space. Therefore, not even particles exist.**

The first verse indicates the non-establishment of the coarse and the second verse indicates the non-establishment of the subtle.

3. General summary of the non-establishment of a body in the body

9.87

**Accordingly, who could make this analysis,
And still have attachment to dreamlike forms?
When there is no existent body,
What is a man and what is a woman?**

The non-establishment of the body generally is indicated in the first two lines and the non-establishment of particular bodies is indicated in the second two lines.



2. Mindfulness of sensations

1. The non-establishment of the intrinsic nature of sensations
2. The non-establishment of its cause: contact

1. The non-establishment of the intrinsic nature of sensations

1. The non-establishment of suffering as ultimate
2. The non-establishment of happiness as ultimate
3. Abandoning objections
4. Conditionality
5. Connecting with the yogic activity of analysis

1. The non-establishment of suffering as ultimate

9.88

**If suffering exists in reality,
Why does it not prevent joyfulness?**

'Suffering' is the logical subject and 'exists in reality' is the reason. Since the nature of fire is to heat, [429] it cannot become cold. Similarly, beings' minds abide in the nature of suffering, so it follows that there should not be even an instant of unadulterated happiness. But that is not the case; it is untenable, for it is contrary to direct experience. It is untenable for the reason not to be established, for it would contradict the proposition that suffering is existent. It is untenable for pervasion⁷⁵ not to be established, for it would contradict valid cognition, just as fire cannot be cold.

2. The non-establishment of happiness as ultimate

**If there is happiness, why are those afflicted by pain and so forth
Not made joyful by sweetness and so forth?**

The Sāṃkhyas claim, 'Sweetness, which is of the bare element of taste,⁷⁶ has the nature of happiness.'

The bare element of the taste of sweetness is the logical subject. [Proposition:] It does not make those afflicted by pain joyful.

[Contradiction:] It follows that they should be joyful because [Reason:] it has the inherent nature of happiness. The non-establishment of the reason, pervasion and proposition are all untenable, as in the previous section.

3. Abandoning objections

1. The consequence that sensations would be experienced
 2. If that reason were not established, it would be no different to happiness
1. The consequence that sensations would be experienced

9.89

**'It is not experienced because
It is overridden by the stronger force.'
If something is not experienced,
How can it be a sensation?**

'Since the sensation of suffering is ultimately existent, it follows that the suffering is sempiternal—we accept this proposition. But if you claim that therefore happiness is nonexistent, that pervasion is not established.'

If suffering is sempiternal and existent, why is it not perceived?

'It is not experienced because of being overridden by the stronger force, like a daytime star.'

The logical subject is this overridden experience. It follows that it is not a sensation because if something is not experienced, there is no experience. Since the experience is negated, the sensation has ceased. The proposition [that suffering is overridden] is untenable for it contradicts your premise [that suffering is sempiternal]. If the pervasion⁷⁷ were not established, it would contradict valid cognition.

2. If that reason were not established, [the sensation] would be no different to happiness [430]

'The reason—'[because] it is not experienced"—is not established, for it is a subtle experience.'

9.90

**'The suffering exists as a subtlety
When its coarseness has been removed.'
If this implies it is something other than suffering,**

Is the experience of that subtlety suffering or happiness? The first is negated since it is not perceived. If you say, 'It is something other⁷⁸ than suffering', i.e. if you propose the second alternative, that is also incorrect. Just as light is incompatible with subtle darkness, so happiness is incompatible with subtle suffering. Since the experience is one of happiness, it cannot be suffering:

Then, whatever that is, that is what this 'subtlety' is.

One should also understand the corollary to this:

'Due to the intrinsic nature of happiness, even if one is afflicted by torment, although the happiness still exists, it is not experienced.'

If it is not experienced, it is not appropriate to call it a sensation.

'It is a subtle experience.'

Happiness experienced subtly but not perceived as an appearance has been refuted, i.e. if there is a subtle experience of suffering, it is incompatible with happiness and vice versa.

4. Conditionality

Sensations are not ultimate but are connected to conditions:

9.91

**If suffering cannot occur
Due to the arising of its contrary condition,
Shouldn't suffering be considered
Merely the attachment to a concept?**

'By the arising of suffering, its contrary condition—happiness—ceases.'

Since a fleeting happiness is established as a temporary artifice, it has no intrinsic nature. Therefore, sensation is fully established as the mere clinging to a discrimination.

5. Connecting with the yogic activity of analysis

9.92

**Because of this, meditate upon
This analysis as the antidote.
The meditation arising from
This field of examination is the food of yogins.**

'This field of examination' means meditative wisdom which analyses the stream of being. Samādhi arises from the cause, meditation. The 'food of yogins' means the content of these teachings.

2. The non-establishment of its cause: contact

1. Objects not meeting with sense organs
2. Not meeting with consciousness
3. A composite completely refuted
4. Summary conclusion
5. The point of establishing that

1. Objects not meeting with sense organs

Contact is the cause of sensation. From the connection of three things—object, sense organ and consciousness [431]—a perceptual object is classified as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. This causes happiness and so forth to arise. However, it is not logical that external objects make contact with sense organs:

1. There is no contact with the coarse
2. There is no contact with the subtle [particles]

1. No contact with the coarse

Is the gap between sense organ and object an existent thing or nonexistent? If existent:

9.93

**If an intermediary connects sense organ and object,
Where do they make contact?**

The logical subject is sense organ and object. [Proposition:] These have an intermediary object. The reason is because something exists between them. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that they have contact, it follows that they do not have contact.

If there is no intermediary object then it also follows that they do not have contact because that which has no intermediary is unified:

**If there is no intermediary, they are unified.
So, what has contact with what?**

If both positions [intermediary or no intermediary] and their reasons [something exists between them or they are unified] were not established, it would contradict the premise [that sense organ meets object]. If the perversions⁷⁹ were not established, it would contradict valid cognition.

2. No contact with subtle particles

1. Stating the consequence
2. Establishing the reason
3. Establishing the pervasion⁸⁰
4. Conclusion

1. Stating the consequence

9.94

Particles do not impose upon other particles,

Two particles are the logical subject. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that they are in contact, it follows that they are not in contact because [Reason:] there is no imposition of either particle, i.e. one cannot impose itself upon the other.

'This reason is not established.'

2. Establishing the reason

For they are identical in having no capacity.

Although your position is that the particles—the logical subjects—make contact, it follows that one cannot impose upon the other because it has no interior capacity.

'Although one does not impose upon the other, they do make contact. Where is the contradiction? The pervasion⁸¹ is not established.'

3. Establishing the pervasion

Without imposition, they cannot combine.

Without combining, they cannot make contact.

4. Conclusion

9.95

'They make contact despite being partless.'

How does this make any sense?

Making contact with something partless:

When you see it, will you show me?

If they were in contact along their entire surfaces, they would be one. If they were in contact along a single part of their surfaces, it would contradict their being partless.

2. Not meeting with consciousness

9.96

**It is illogical to make contact with
Consciousness, which is bodiless,**

Consciousness, the logical subject [432], cannot be in contact with anything because it is bodiless, i.e. it does not have a body.

3. A composite completely refuted

**And likewise for anything composite, because it is
nonexistent,
As was analysed previously.**

“Contact” does not mean being in physical contact with a form. Contact is an effect, of which the cause is a grouping [of consciousness, sense base and object]. Thus, the faults of having contact between the surface of partless particles do not apply.’

The logical subject is the causal collection. [Contradiction:] Although your position is that it is truly existent, it follows that it is not existent because it is a multiplicity imputed as a singularity. The establishment of that pervasion⁸² was explained earlier.

‘Although the causal collection is relative, its effects—contact and sensation—are ultimately existent. Where is the contradiction?’

If an ultimately existent effect from a deluded relative cause is not a contradiction, then an existent effect from a cause unable to perform any function would also not be a contradiction [v9.28].

4. Summary conclusion

9.97

**If there is no real contact,
What are these sensations arising from?**

Because there is no contact, there is no sensation. The cause being absent:

Why go to all this trouble?

All this trouble for the sake of happiness is not sensible.

What is harmed by what?

One is not harmed by suffering.

5. The point of establishing that

9.98

**If the one who senses
And the sensations themselves are nonexistent,
Once this has been seen,
How could craving not be dispelled?**

If the one who senses—the self—and the cause—sensations—are negated, then the effect—the craving of attachment to that—will be reversed.

3. The non-establishment of the object of sensation

9.99

**Even what is seen or touched
Is itself dreamlike and illusion-like.**

That which is seen and touched are the first and last kinds of the five sense objects, indicating all five kinds of object. Since those objects do not ultimately exist, it is established *a priori* that the sensations of the subject relating to them also do not exist. Concerning these objects, they have already been refuted above by the negation of the body, subtle particles and so forth.

4. The non-establishment of the subject

1. No experiencing mind
2. No self-experience [433]
3. No experiencer apart from those
4. Concluding summary

1. No experiencing mind

**Sensations are not perceived by mind,
Because they arise simultaneously with it.**

Do sensations and their experiencing mind occur in the same moment, or do the sensations arise first and are experienced after?

If the former: the logical subject is the mind at the moment of the sensation. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that it experiences the sensation, it follows that it does not have the experience because they arise simultaneously. If one denies the establishment of the pervasion,⁸³ it would contradict valid cognition because a perceived object must cause the perception. But here the pervasion of cause and effect is contradicted because the perceived object and perception occur in the same moment.⁸⁴

'The sensation arises first and the experience after. Since the sensation arises first, it is the cause. Since the consciousness arises subsequently, it is the effect. These are the object and subject.'

9.100

**Although something from before may be remembered after,
That is not experiencing it.**

The previous [sensation] is the logical subject. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that it is experienced, it follows that it is an object of subsequent remembering, not an object of present experience because its intrinsic nature has ended. If one doubts the establishment of the pervasion,⁸⁵ it would contradict valid cognition because that which is an object of present experience is pervaded by a nature which has not ended.

2. No self-experience

A sensation cannot experience itself,

This is because of the previous refutation of self-experience.

3. No experiencer apart from those

Nor does anything else experience it.

This is because, apart from consciousness and the sensation itself, there is nothing else to have the experience.

4. Concluding summary


9.101

There is nothing existent that experiences sensations.

Therefore, there are no sensations.

Therefore, what could ever harm

This selfless composite?



3. Mindfulness of mind

1. The nature of mind is not established
 2. Perceptions of the five consciousnesses are not established
1. The nature of mind is not established

9.102

**Mind does not dwell in the senses,
Nor in forms, etc., nor somewhere between these.**

Mind is not in the senses because it can exist even without the senses. It is not in the object because it can exist without an object. Nor is it somewhere between these because there would be no perception. [434] This shows that its basis is not established. To show that its nature is not established:

**Mind is neither the inner nor outer,
Nor is it found anywhere else.**

9.103

**It is neither within the body, nor apart from it.
It is not combined, nor is it something distinct.**

**Because such a thing does not even slightly exist,
Sentient beings are by nature nirvāṇa.**

The sixth mind is not an inner sense organ, for it does not possess form. Nor is it an outer sense object, for it does not have a body, so it is not one of the five kinds of objects. Since it is not instantly ceasing, it is not a momentary dharma. It is not the physical basis of the outer or inner, since it does not have a body. It is not a combination of outer and inner, since they are mutually exclusive. It is not something distinct from these, since then there would be no perception. Therefore, it is inherently nirvāṇa.

2. Perception of the five consciousnesses is not established

'The sixth mind, although not established as having an intrinsic cognizing nature, exists as nothing but the five consciousnesses themselves.'

9.104

**If the cognition exists before cognizable,
What does it arise from?**

Does cognition exist a) before its cause, the cognizable, b) simultaneously with its cognizable or c) after the cognizable?

a) If consciousness existed before its cognizable, the following consequence would result. The logical subject is the cognition. It has no producer because a cognition before its cognizable has no preceding cause. It is untenable to say that the proposition and reason⁸⁶ are not established, for that would violate your own premises. It is impossible that the pervasion⁸⁷ is not established, for it would contradict valid cognition, as there is no effect without a cause.

**If cognition is co-emergent with cognizable,
What does it arise from?**

b) If they were simultaneous, one could not say the cognition arose from its object because cognition and cognizable would occur simultaneously. Thus, the previous three faults would apply.

9.105

**If it exists after the cognizable,
In that moment, what does it arise from?**

- c) If the cognition arises after the cognizable, in the moment of cognizing, cognition and object are either temporally separated or temporally unseparated. If the former, because of their temporal separation, it follows that there is no product.⁸⁸ If the latter, then either they are completely temporally unseparated or they are partially unseparated [435]. If the former, it follows that they are arising simultaneously, which is the same faulty position as b). If the latter, the cause is a composite being taken as singular and the effect is a composite being taken as singular, like a string of beads or an army taken as singular, in which case neither has an intrinsic nature, as was explained earlier.

4. Mindfulness of dharmas

1. Establishing all as non-arising
2. Abandoning objections

1. Establishing all as non-arising

**Accordingly, all dharmas
Should be understood as non-arising.**

'All dharmas' is the logical subject. That they are completely non-arising is the probandum. 'Accordingly' indicates the reason by which the arising of all dharmas is not ultimately established. Why are they not established? It is due to the faults of an effect arising before, after and at the same time as its cause, which was explained in the previous section on refuting the perception of the five consciousnesses.

2. Abandoning objections

1. Abandoning the objection that there is no relative
2. Abandoning the objection that this ascertainment entails an infinite regress

1. Abandoning the objection that there is no relative

9.106

**'In that case, there is not really any relative arising,
So how can there be two truths?'**

'If it is illogical for something ultimate to arise before its cause, at the same time as it, or after it and hence ultimate arising is illogical, then it is also illogical for something relative to arise before its cause, at the same time as it, or after it. Therefore, it follows that relative arising is also illogical. If this is your position, since there is nothing but ultimate truth, there cannot be two truths.'

It might be responded that although the relative does not exist in someone's undeluded conceptual thought, it does exist in someone's deluded conceptual thought. [436] Therefore, it is logical to assert two truths when specified as such. But this is not the correct response. If it were, although the Buddha has no obscurations, it would follow that he still has obscurations due to anyone clinging to the existence of the appearance of obscurations in their deluded conceptual thought:

**If the relative exists [for the Buddha] due to others,
How can sentient beings transcend suffering?'**

The correct response is as follows:

9.107

**It is just the discrimination of those other minds.
The relative is not [the Buddha's] perspective.**

There are no defilements in the stream of being of the Buddha. The designation of his having obscurations is a designation from the perspective of someone's conceptual discrimination. It is not the relative of one who has attained nirvāna, for whom there are no obscurations.

'Although it exists only from the perspective of someone's delusion, that relative depends upon conceptual thought, which is not logical, for it is negated from the perspective of one who perceives its reality. Hence, there remains the error that two truths do not exist.'

From the perspective of perceiving reality, when the logic that refutes ultimate arising is applied to relative arising, the error that the relative does not exist does not follow. We do not assert that there is arising before or at the same time as the cause, but we allow that there is arising after the cause. Likewise, we do not assert arising from a temporal separation of cause and effect, but we allow that there is arising from their non-separation. Likewise, we do not assert cause and effect are wholly unseparated, but we allow that they are partially unseparated, i.e. it is taking something composite as singular. This is a relative designation:

**If it is ascertained as arising after, it exists.
If not, it does not have even relative existence.**

Therefore, ‘arising after’ means if an arising is ascertained as coming after its cause, the effect exists. An effect that does not occur before its cause is the deluded relative. We do not refute relative arising when the forward and reverse functions of cause and effect are established in this way.⁹⁰⁸ [437]

2. Abandoning the objection that this ascertainment entails an infinite regress

1. A general comment on the division of object and subject
2. If the non-arising of the subject depends upon a further understanding, there is an infinite regress
3. Our position does not have that fault

1. A general comment on the division of object and subject

‘The non-arising of all dharmas could never be realized because, even if it were understood with conceptual thought, the subject itself would not have been understood as non-arising. In that case, there must be another understanding of that non-arising and so there would be an infinite regress.’

9.108

The understanding and its analysandum

Are mutually dependent.

All analysis is expressed

In dependence upon accord with consensus.

The understanding of the nature of the subject and that of the object is a single understanding.

'Then what ascertains, with valid cognition, that both have no intrinsic nature?'

2. If the non-arising of the subject depends upon a further understanding, there is an infinite regress

9.109

If at that time there were an analyst

Analysing the analysis

Then there would be an infinite regress

Because that analysis, too, would have to be analyzed.

If the inference that all dharmas are non-arising itself required another inference, then that, too, would also require yet another conclusion and thus there would be an infinite regress.

3. Our position does not have that fault

9.110

However, when the analysandum has been analyzed

Then that analysis has no basis.

Because it has no basis, it is non-arising.

This is also called 'nirvāṇa'.

The inferential analytic ascertainment that the analysandum—all dharmas—has no intrinsic nature itself has no basis. Since that inference is itself included among all dharmas, it has no pervader which is a second inference. Just as when firewood is exhausted, the fire dies, so when objects have been negated, the subject is also negated *a priori*. Thus, the analysis itself has no basis and, with no basis, it is non-arising, which is also called 'nirvāṇa'.

This explanation is not very thorough, however. Now to explain in more detail in accordance with the ṭīkā:⁸⁹ [438]

'If you assert that ultimately nothing whatsoever is established, since the valid cognition that infers no intrinsic nature is itself also not established, what makes the inference?'

Although, since it is relative, it is not a valid cognition of reality, there is no contradiction in ascertaining an analysandum, as explained in lines 108cd.

'But then the existence of the subject's valid cognition is in accord with the relative [i.e. is a delusion].'

We do not deny all relative existence, such as the analysanda of conceptual thought which, with inferential reasoning, grasps the essential characteristics of conceptual objects, and general concepts. Thus, it is in dependence upon an analysandum that the conception of dharmas and dharma-possessors arises, as is explained in v108ab.

'In addition to that inferential reasoning of a relative existence without existence in reality, there must be a second analysis. What is it that makes this latter inferential analysis?' Thus, the objection is that there would be an infinite regress, as presented in v109.

When it is directly ascertained that universally all dharmas have no intrinsic nature, that ascertainment is contrary to any individual case of an inferentially known intrinsic nature. Thus, it is ascertained *a priori* that no intrinsic nature is known inferentially. In other words, if it is understood that objects—the analysanda—are not established, then it is understood *a priori* that the analyst also has no intrinsic nature. Thus, it is not necessary to form this conclusion again with another inference, so there is no fault of an infinite regress, as presented in v110. The analysis has 'no basis' [v110c], i.e. the pervader is not supported. 'It is non-arising' [v110c] means that inferentially known existence is not ultimate. Being naturally 'nirvāṇa' [v110d] means that the obscurations of reality are not ultimate.⁹⁰