

The substantial parts of the body, such as the hands, are equal in that they should all be protected even though they are distinct, since they are pervaded by the same self-clinging. Similarly, individual streams of being should be protected even though they are distinct, since they are likewise pervaded by the same self-clinging.

## 2. Accomplishing it

8.92

**Though my suffering doesn't harm  
The bodies of others,  
Nevertheless, it is my suffering,  
And clinging to it as 'mine' makes it intolerable to me.**

8.93

**Similarly, though the suffering of others  
Does not befall me,  
Nevertheless, it is my suffering,  
And clinging to it as 'mine' will make it hard for me to  
tolerate.**

The first two lines establish the reverse pervasion, i.e. if there is no self-clinging, [sufferings] do not arise as unbearable. The second two lines establish the forward pervasion, i.e. if there is self-clinging, [sufferings] arise as intolerable [i.e. to be dispelled]. The second verse concludes from this that if one grasps the streams of being of others as one's own, [sufferings] will arise as hard to tolerate.

## 3. Equality in suffering as the object of abandonment

1. Brief presentation of the proof
2. Establishing the pervasion of that
3. Establishing the necessary criterion of the pervasion
4. Abandoning objections
5. Summarizing the definitive meaning of valid cognition
6. Abandoning objections that it is not definitive

### 1. Brief presentation of the proof

8.94

**I should expel the suffering of others  
 Because it is suffering, like my own suffering,  
 And I should benefit others  
 Because they are sentient beings, like I am.**

The suffering of others is the logical subject. This term is related to 'I should' and 'expel', i.e. to form the proposition, 'I should expel that'. [The reason:] because it is suffering, like one's own suffering. Next, taking the benefit of others as the logical subject, the probandum is, 'I should perform that'. [The reason:] because it is the happiness of a sentient being, which is like one's own physical happiness.

2. Establishing the pervasion<sup>4</sup> of that

**8.95  
 When you and I  
 Are the same in wanting to be happy,  
 What is so special about me  
 That I work only for myself?**

**8.96  
 When you and I  
 Are the same in not wanting to suffer,  
 What is so special about me  
 That I look after myself and not you?**

'Such suffering does not warrant abandonment. Where is the contradiction?'

What is the criterion for regarding the sufferings of one's own stream of being as warranting abandonment? [363]

'The criterion is not wanting them for oneself.'

In that case, the sufferings of others are the same in also not being wanted. Since the criterion for warranting abandonment is satisfied, all sufferings should be abandoned. This is the pervasion. Hence, why would one look after oneself but not others?

This logic is now repeated in relation to establishing happiness:

‘The happiness [of others] is not an object to be established. Where is the contradiction? The pervasion<sup>5</sup> is not established.’

What is the criterion for regarding one’s own happiness as an object to be established?

‘It is an object to be established because I want it.’

If that is so, since the happiness of others also has that criterion, it is also pervaded by being an object to be established. Therefore, all happiness is to be established—the pervasion. When oneself and another are the same in wanting happiness, why work for oneself alone and not for the other? Here, lines 96cd repeat the point of 95cd.

### 3. Establishing the criterion of the pervasion

‘The criterion for something to warrant my protection against is its doing harm to myself. Something that is unwanted only by others does not satisfy that criterion. Therefore, since the sufferings of others do me no harm, they do not warrant protection against.’

The explicit refutation presented here is of doing no harm to oneself alone as the criterion for not warranting protection against. This will implicitly establish that being unwanted *per se* is the criterion for warranting protection against. This has four parts:

1. The error that follows from the different times
2. Establishing that grasping the self as singular is error
3. The error that follows from the parts of the body
4. Abandoning the consequence that the example is not established

### 1. The error that follows from the different times

8.97

**‘Their suffering doesn’t hurt me,  
So why should I care about them?’  
Future sufferings don’t hurt you either,  
So why protect yourself from them?**

The first two lines are the objection and the second two are the response. If non-harm to oneself is pervaded by not needing

protection against and the logical subject is the sufferings of future lives, one's old age, etc., it follows that there is no need to protect oneself from them because right now there is no physical harm. So it is for the sufferings of others. Yet, one protects the body even though there is no harm to it right now. Thus, non-harm to oneself is not pervaded by not needing protection, i.e. the pervasion is not established.

## 2. Establishing that grasping the self as singular is error

'There is harm to the present body because the self of present and future are one. Therefore, I should protect it from such experiences.'

8.98

**To think, 'I'm the one who will experience it',  
Is a mistake.**

The oneness of the self is not established. Concerning this supposed oneness:

**It is someone else who dies after this,  
And someone else again who is born.**

The momentary mind ceases and its continuity ceases. Therefore, it is an error to think that harm will be experienced by oneself.

## 3. The error that follows from the parts of the body

8.99

**'The ones with the suffering  
Should look after themselves.'  
The suffering of the feet is not that of the hands,  
So why should the hands protect them?**

If the experiencer of suffering is pervaded by not warranting the protection of one who is not experiencing suffering, since the suffering of the feet is not experienced by the hands, it follows that the hands should not protect them. Yet, in that case, the unharmed one protects the one warranting protection from harm.

## 4. Abandoning the consequence that the example is not established

## 8.100

**'It may not be right,  
But I do it out of self-clinging.'  
Neither self nor other is right:  
You should try to give them both up.**

'Since the sufferings of others do not harm me, it is not right to protect others from them. It is not right to protect myself from experiencing the sufferings of the future either but, nevertheless, I do it out of self-clinging.'

If self-clinging is not right, one should try to give it up. [365]

'Self-clinging is right, even though the self is momentary and with distinct parts.'

In that case, it is right to have self-clinging towards the distinct streams of being of others, too, so one should protect them from suffering.

'Self-clinging is right, but that is other-clinging.'

Other-clinging is not right either; one should try to abandon it.

## 4. Abandoning objections

'Self-clinging to the future self is right because, despite being in a different time, there is a single cause. Clinging to other sentient beings is not right because they have distinct causes. Self-clinging is right because, despite having separate parts, the body is a unified composite. Clinging to the bodies of others is not right because they are distinct composites. Therefore it is not true that "neither self nor other is right".'

## 8.101

**A 'stream' and a 'composite' are false,  
Like a string of beads or an army.**

The so-called 'stream of being' of self is the logical subject. That it is false is the probandum. [Reason:] because it is a sequential multiplicity grasped as singular, like grasping a string of beads as singular. Next, the so-called 'composite' is the logical subject. It is false because it is a

multiplicity of moments grasped as singular, like grasping a manifold army as singular.

5. Summarizing the consistency with valid cognition

**Suffering is not owned by anyone,  
So, who should be the one to remove it?**

Since the bodies of others and one's own body are distinct, one's mind is not the owner of the sufferings of the bodies of others. Similarly, though each particle and moment of those others are distinct, each one has the nature of suffering but none of them is the owner of that suffering, i.e. nothing constitutes an experiencer. So who is it that is subjected to that suffering? There is no self that is subjected to suffering.

8.102

**Sufferings have no owner:  
None of them is unique.  
If it is suffering, it should be eradicated.  
Why be inconsistent about this?**

8.103

**There is no disagreement about the reason  
For preventing everyone's suffering.**

Therefore, [366] just as one's own stream of being is not the owner of others' sufferings, neither is there an experiencer of the sufferings of one's own stream of being. Therefore, sufferings have no owner, i.e. 'none of them is unique'.

Therefore, the criterion for warranting abandonment is not that it harms one's own stream of being but simply that it is suffering—i.e. if it is suffering, it should be abandoned. So why inconsistently abandon one's own suffering but not the suffering of others? This establishes the sufferings of others as warranting abandonment.

The summary:

**If you prevent it at all, prevent it for all.**

**Otherwise, don't do it for yourself or others, either.**

## 6. Abandoning objections

**8.104**

**'Compassion will bring me a lot of suffering,  
So why should I develop it?'  
If you think about the sufferings of living beings,  
How can compassion be considered a lot of suffering?**

'If suffering is pervaded by warranting abandonment, it follows that suffering undertaken for the sake of others warrants abandonment. If it did not warrant abandonment, there would be the error of the pervasion not being established.'

Although the practices to be undertaken for others are difficult, they do not satisfy the criterion for being abandoned as it is presented here. Here, the reason for abandonment is 'because it is endowed with suffering', but these difficulties are not suffering, so compassion is not suffering.

'How can the difficulties not be suffering?'

They are not suffering if one 'thinks of the sufferings of living beings', i.e. having considered how one should prevent the sufferings of sentient beings, one will not grasp the suffering of benefitting others as suffering. Even if one were to enter the Avīci Hell for the benefit of others, one would take joy in it as if one were diving into a lotus pool. Or, having considered how great the sufferings of the lower realms and the sufferings of conditionality are, the suffering one has from such difficulties will seem comparatively minor. Or, just because the difficulties are suffering, their nature does satisfy the general reason for abandonment; nevertheless, it is a suffering which has a result, [367] i.e. since it is not a suffering which does not have a result, it does not satisfy the more specific reason for abandonment:

**8.105**

**If one person's suffering  
Can stop many sufferings,  
A kind-hearted person would take on that suffering**

**For his own sake and the sake of others.**

Presentation of an instance of this:

**8.106**

**It was for this reason that Supuśpacandra,  
Though he knew the king would harm him,  
Did not evade his own suffering  
In order to exhaust many sufferings.**

According to the *Sutra Requested by Candrapradipa*,<sup>6</sup> the dharma teacher Supuśpacandra, in the forest of Samantabhadra, perceived that if he were to go alone, he would subdue King Vīradatta,<sup>7</sup> but the king would kill him. Despite knowing this, without any fear, he proceeded to the king's palace, where he proclaimed the dharma. Why did he disregard his own suffering? In order to exhaust many sufferings.

4. The qualities of meditating on equality

1. Undertaking the benefit of others with happiness
2. Establishing that to accomplish the benefit of others is the supreme happiness
3. Pacifying one's own arrogance
4. Disregarding the results
5. Advice to strive in practising this

1. Undertaking the benefit of others with happiness

**8.107**

**One who cultivates this in their being,  
With the joy of pacifying the suffering of others,  
Would enter the Avīci Hell  
As if they were diving into a lotus pool.**

The first line indicates the cause of grasping the benefit of others as happiness. The second line indicates the intent and the last two lines give an example.

2. Establishing that to accomplish the benefit of others is the supreme happiness



8.108

**When sentient beings are completely liberated,  
It is an ocean of joy.  
Is that not enough?  
What use is it wanting my own liberation?**

For someone accomplishing the benefit of others, that is enough. Mere individual liberation is not a cause of joy.

3. Pacifying one's own arrogance

8.109

**In this respect, though I am benefitting others,  
I will do it without conceit or thinking it is a big deal.**

Without the conception that they are other, one will not develop the arrogance of thinking, 'I am benefitting others'.

4. Disregarding the results

**By taking joy solely in their benefit,  
I will not expect the ripening of any results.**

5. Advice to strive in practising this

8.110

**Therefore, just as I protect myself  
From the slightest criticism,  
So I should have a protective attitude towards others,  
And a compassionate intent.**

5. The possibility of meditating on equality

8.111

**Just as out of habit I regard  
The drops of semen and blood  
Of others as 'myself',  
Even though they have no substance,**

8.112