

#### 4. Ceasing to grasp at true existence


[439] This is explained by Ngok Lotsawa and others as:

1. Verses 111-115: There is no reason that establishes all dharmas as having inherent nature [v111-115]
2. Verses 116-150: Refuting tīrthikas

According to the commentary by Ācārya Vairocanarakṣita:

1. Verses 104–105ab is a joint explanation of the foundations of mind and dharmas.
2. Verse 105cd concerns the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas, presenting in general the ‘non-arising of all dharmas’.
3. Verses 106-110 are the abandoning of objections to this.
4. Verses 111-115 show that an inherent nature of all cognizing and cognized dharmas cannot be proven.
5. Verses 116-150, the section on showing the errors in the tīrthika accounts of arising, is a continuation of the explanation of the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas, showing that all dharmas are without arising, ceasing, intrinsic nature or self.

Other commentaries have also explained v105cd onwards as part of the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas and I accept these explanations of the root text.<sup>91</sup>



1. There is no reason that establishes all dharmas as having inherent nature

1. General presentation
2. Extensive explanation

1. General presentation

### 9.111

**In that case, the existence of this pair**

**Is a reality that is extremely difficult to maintain.**

What is asserted by realists—that both cognizable and cognition are true—is held as true without a valid proof. It is a designation of a reality that is extremely difficult to maintain. [440]

2. Extensive explanation

1. Refuting the reason of mutual dependence
2. Refuting the reason of cognition of the effect

1. Refuting the reason of mutual dependence

1. There is neither one
2. Applying the reason with an example<sup>92</sup>

1. There is neither one

**If objects are established from the sense powers,  
What supports the existence of cognition?**

**9.112**

**‘Cognition is established from the cognizable.’  
Then what supports the existence of the cognizable?  
If they are in mutual dependence,  
Then neither one exists.**

If the display of objects of subjective comprehension is established by valid cognition, by what valid cognition is the subject itself established? Establishment by self-cognition was shown above to be erroneous, i.e. it is contradiction for it to function like an awareness of external objects.

‘Cognition is established by the power of the external object.’

Since they would be established by mutual dependence, neither of the two would exist.

## 2. Applying the reason with an example

**9.113**

**If there is no father without a son,  
Where does the son come from?  
There is no father without a son.  
Accordingly, neither of them exist.**

If a designated son is not established, then his designated father is also not established. When no product is ascertained, it is contradictory to the ascertainment of its corollary—its producer. Thus, their mutual dependence is proven.

‘But the producer is not in mutual dependence because, although the arising of the son depended upon the father, the father’s arising did not depend upon the son.’

## 2. Refuting the reason of cognition of the effect

**9.114**

**‘When a sprout comes from a seed,**

**We acknowledge the existence of the seed.  
 Since cognition arises from a cognizable,  
 Why do you not acknowledge the cognizable's existence?**

'In the case of a sprout arising from a seed, the seed is established by its logical relation to the sprout. Similarly, in the case of cognition arising from its cognizable, the cause—the cognizable—is established from the effect—the cognition. Thus, there is no contradiction.'

This is erroneous:

**9.115**

**When it is acknowledged the seed exists,  
 That cognition is independent of the sprout,  
 But what independently acknowledges the cognition  
 Comprehending the cognizable?**

When the seed is established through its logical relation to the sprout, that establishment is comprehended by a consciousness which sees the sprout and which is independent of the sprout. If a cognizable is established by its cognition, it cannot be established until the cognition is established. What establishes that cognition? As shown above, a cognition that is aware of itself is illogical. A cognition established by the power of the established cognizable is also erroneous because they would be mutually dependent. [441]

2. Refutation of the tīrthikas' position that the arising of the inherent nature of all dharmas is established

1. The analysis of cause: the vajra slivers
2. The analysis of self-essence: dependent origination
3. The analysis of the effect: arising and ceasing of existence and nonexistence

1. The analysis of cause: the vajra slivers


The establishment of the main syllogism<sup>93</sup> and the establishment of its pervasion are supplemental [i.e. not in the root text]. Only the establishment of the qualification for the main syllogism is given in the root text.<sup>94</sup>

The main syllogism: the logical subject is mere appearances. They are without true inherent nature because they do not arise from self, other, both, nor without cause. The pervader is not supported.<sup>95</sup>

Establishing the reverse pervasion:<sup>96</sup> Whatever has mere existence must either (a) have no cause or have a cause. If it has a cause, that cause must either be (b) a composite of self and other, or else it must be non-composite. If non-composite, *a priori* it must either be (c) self or (d) other. Hence, an arising which is not included among these four extremes is refuted. Hence, it is certain that arising is pervaded by the four extremes.

Establishing the qualification:

1. The main establishment of qualification [v116-137]
2. Without making a positive affirmation, the analysis is not contrary to valid cognition [v138-140]
3. Showing the certainty of the syllogism [v141-142b]




The explanation of the qualification is taught by the Svātantrika founding fathers through the application of further syllogisms.<sup>97</sup> Although their proofs by svātantra are indeed inerrant, establishing their pervasions, qualifications and so forth is very difficult, so those establishments will not be presented here. But if they are not

established, are the syllogisms not incomplete? That may be so, but the three root syllogisms [not arising from self, other or without cause] do not actually appear in the root text, [442] so it was not the intention of the Ācārya to present the non-arising of dharmas in this way. Furthermore, if they were to be established, the appropriate place for that would be before lines 105cd: 'Accordingly, all dharmas/Are not to be understood as arising...', rather than here.<sup>98</sup>

Therefore, in this section, verses 116–137 [do not prove syllogistically the non-arising of all dharmas but] show the errors in the tīrthikas' positions on the arising of an intrinsic nature, with verses 138–140 explaining the abandonment of objections to the teaching of emptiness as the non-arising of all dharmas. Verses 141–150 show that all dharmas arise through dependent origination:

- Verses 141–142b are a summary of the non-arising and non-ceasing of all dharmas by showing their dependent origination.
- Verses 142c–144 show the relative arising of all dharmas in dependent origination to be illusion-like.
- Verses 145–148 show the refutation of the proposition that mere dependent origination itself has its own intrinsic nature.
- Verse 149–150 are an abbreviated showing of the sameness of existence and pacification.



## 2. Refuting the tīrthikas' positions of arising with an intrinsic nature

1. The main teaching on refuting an arising with intrinsic nature
2. Abandoning objections to the middle way

1. The main teaching on refuting an arising with intrinsic nature

1. Refuting arising from no cause
2. Refuting arising from other
3. Refuting arising from self

Concerning an arising from both self and other, it is refuted implicitly by the refutations of arising from self and from other.

1. Refuting arising from no cause

1. General explanation
2. Differences of effect in relation to cause
3. Differences of cause in relation to cause
4. Differences of power in relation to cause

1. General explanation

**9.116**

**Ordinary people can directly see  
Everything temporal has causes.**

The proponents of things being caused by their own intrinsic nature assert arising from no [external] cause. [443] Those who accept this tradition say,

The roundness of a pea, the sharpness of a thorn,  
The rising of the sun, the movement of water downstream,  
The pattern of a peacock's feather and so on, whatever it  
may be,  
It was not created by anyone. Its cause is its own nature.

The error in this is that ordinary people can directly see that everything has causes. Since such appearances as the arising of a shoot from a seed can be directly seen, merely to be is to be pervaded by

having a cause. Therefore, existence without a cause is negated both ultimately and relatively.

2. Differences of effect in relation to cause

‘Concerning conventional designations such as the many colours in the segments of a lotus and the colourful patterns of a peacock feather, what is the cause of their creation and their being the way they are?’

To understand this, one must analyse their specific causes:

**Differences such as in the segments of a lotus  
Are produced by different causes.**

3. Differences of cause in relation to cause

‘If different effects are created by different causes, what creates the different causes?’

They are created by previous different causes:

**9.117**

**‘What creates different causes?’**

**They come from previous different causes.**


4. Differences of power in relation to cause

‘Why do specific causes have the power to create only certain effects and not the power to create others?’

**‘Why is a cause able to produce its effect?’**

**It comes from the power of a previous cause.**





## 2. Refuting arising from other

1. Refuting arising from an impermanent other
2. Refuting arising from a permanent other

### 1. Refuting arising from an impermanent other

This section is not in the root text but is presented here as a supplement.

‘Is the effect before, at the same time as, or after the cause?’

1. Effect before the cause
2. Effect simultaneous with the cause
3. Effect after the cause

#### 1. Effect before cause

The logical subject is the effect arising in a different moment. [Contradiction:] Although the proposition is that it exists before the cause, it follows that it does not exist before the cause because its cause does not yet exist. It is not tenable to say the proposition and the reason are not established, for it would contradict your own premise.<sup>99</sup> [444] It is not possible for the pervasion<sup>100</sup> to be unestablished: an effect without a cause cannot occur, for it would contradict valid cognition.

This proof has been presented as a *prasaṅga* and the other two alternatives will be presented in the same way.

#### 2. Effect simultaneous with cause

[Contradiction: Although the proposition is that the effect arises from the cause,] it follows that it does not arise from the cause because of being simultaneous with the cause. This is because at any moment when neither of them exist, since no nature is established, a producer is negated.

#### 3. Effect after cause

[Contradiction:] If the proposition is that the effect exists after the cause, [it follows that it does not arise from the cause,] because of being temporally separated from the cause.

‘Then they are not temporally separated.’

If this means there is no temporal separation whatsoever, then from the moment of the arising of the cause to the moment of the ceasing of the effect, there would be no separation, so it would follow that they would be simultaneous, and the designations of producer and produced are contrary *a priori* to their being simultaneous [as in point 2]. Since they cannot be simultaneous, it follows that they cannot be completely temporally unseparated.

If they are unseparated only partially, they are not truly existent causes and effects because of their multiplicity. These are grasped as a unity but this is like grasping something white as golden. The objects to be refuted [i.e. a truly existent cause and effect] must not be mere conceptual designations. Existence is incompatible with the grasping of a multiplicity as a singularity.

Therefore, there is no arising from an impermanent other. Since this refutation accords with the logical subject of the earlier explanation of cognition arising before its cognizable [v104-105b], it is also established there and it is not necessary to further elaborate on it here.

## 2. Refuting arising from a permanent other

1. Refuting arising from Īśvara
2. Refuting the Vaiśeṣika tradition of arising from sempiternal particles

### 1. Refuting arising from Īśvara

1. Īśvara is not established
2. Effects are impossible
3. Contradictions in his being a creator

### 1. Īśvara is not established

1. Refuting Īśvara as the elements
2. Refuting Īśvara as space [445]
3. Refuting Īśvara as self
4. Refuting Īśvara as inconceivable

### 1. Refuting Īśvara as the elements

9.118

**If Īśvara is the cause of beings,  
Please explain what the temporal Īśvara is.  
If you say, 'the elements', that is fine,  
But why trouble yourself over a mere name?**

9.119

**Furthermore, since the earth and so forth are multiple,  
Impermanent, inanimate, not deities,  
Suitable to be trodden on and impure,  
They are not Īśvara.**

When asked, 'What is Īśvara?', it is claimed Īśvara is the elements, such as earth, fire, etc. The elements are the logical subject. The probandum: whatever name they are called by, that is not what is meant by the term 'Īśvara'. The reason: because of being multiple, impermanent, lacking the sentience of premeditating intentionality,<sup>101</sup> mundane, contemptible and impure. These are the opposites of Īśvara, who is pervaded by singularity, permanence, divinity, sentience, worthiness of worship and purity.

## 2. Refuting Īśvara as space

**9.120**

**Space is not Īśvara because it is inanimate.**

The logical subject is space. That is not Īśvara because it does not have the sentience of intentionality. The reason here can be proven with the well-known inferences from other sources.

## 3. Refuting Īśvara as self

**He is not the self because that was refuted previously.**

## 4. Refuting Īśvara as inconceivable

**Since it is inconceivable to describe  
A creator who is inconceivable, what would be the point of  
trying?**

If he is not pervaded by conceivability, were someone to describe him, they would be describing something they cannot comprehend.

## 2. Effects are impossible

Showing that it is not logical for effects to be created by Īśvara comprises a question and an answer. The question:

## 9.121

**What could he want to create anyway?**

The response has two parts:

1. Refuting a permanent effect
2. Refuting an impermanent effect

## 1. Refuting a permanent effect

‘Īśvara created himself. He and his other creations, such as the four elements, are sempiternal.’

**Do you not claim that the self, the earth, etc.  
And even Īśvara’s own nature are sempiternal?**

Is Īśvara’s nature not sempiternal? Therefore, because both creator and creation are sempiternal, [446] it follows that all the effects created by him are contemporaneous with him. Yet, this proposition is refuted by direct perception. If the reason<sup>102</sup> were not established, it would contradict your premise.

Or, the logical subject is the sempiternal objects. [Contradiction:] although the proposition is that it is possible for them be created, it follows that they cannot be created because of their being sempiternal. If the proposition and the reason<sup>103</sup> were not established, it would contradict your premise.

‘The pervasion in these two [reasons] is not established.’<sup>104</sup>

If a sempiternal self creates effects, it is not logical for them to have a beginning. If it does not create effects, then it is not logical for those effects to arise. This is because in neither case is there any change.

## 2. Refuting an impermanent effect

‘The effects [creations] of Īśvara—the five consciousnesses, sensations, happiness and suffering and so forth—are impermanent objects.’

**Cognitions arise from cognizables**

## 9.122

**And beginningless happiness and suffering come from actions.**

**So, what is it you say he has created?**

It is established by direct perception that impermanent objects arise from causes other than Īśvara. It is also established by direct perception that cognitions arise from their cognizables. It is established from both our scriptures that happiness and suffering arise from actions without beginning. Therefore, these all being the effects of Īśvara is negated.

### 3. Contradictions in his being a creator

This section also establishes the pervasion of the previous prasaṅgas.<sup>105</sup>

1. Contradictory to a temporary effect
2. Establishing the pervasion by Īśvara's independence
3. Refuting his dependence

#### 1. Contradictory to a temporary effect

**If the cause has no beginning,  
How can the effect begin?**

The logical subject is the effects of Īśvara, such as happiness and suffering. It follows that they sempiternally exist without any beginning because of their arising from a sempiternal, beginningless causal power. This proposition is untenable, for it contradicts your premise that the effects are temporary. It is untenable for the reason<sup>106</sup> not to be established: if you say the cause is sempiternal, its power to create cannot later increase because, by your own claim, it is a primordial, beginningless causal power, as asserted in the qualification statement.<sup>107</sup>

#### 2. Establishing the pervasion by [Īśvara's] independence [447]

'Even though the cause abides sempiternally, that is not contradictory to temporary effects. The pervasion is not established.'

**How could his creations not be sempiternal,  
When he depends upon nothing external?**

The sempiternal cause is the logical subject. The probandum: ‘How could his creations not be sempiternal?’, i.e. he cannot create something temporal: because he does not depend upon external conditions, it follows that Īśvara’s state of creating is immutable. Therefore, being immutable, mutability is negated and hence the creations are contemporaneous with Īśvara. Thus, the pervasion is established.

**3. Refuting his dependence**

‘The reason, “because of his independence from external conditions”, is not established.’

Here we refute Īśvara’s dependence:

1. Everything being an effect of Īśvara contradicts his dependence
  2. Dependence is contrary to Īśvara
1. Everything being an effect of Īśvara contradicts his dependence

**If there is nothing that was not created by him,  
What could he depend upon?**

If you claim that everything was created by Īśvara and that there is nothing which he did not create, then for their cause—Īśvara—to depend on his own effect is a contradiction.

2. Dependence is contrary to Īśvara
    1. Establishing the concurrence of conditions as the cause
    2. Autonomy is violated
    3. He would be under the power of desire
1. Establishing the concurrence of conditions as the cause

**9.124**

**If he were dependent, the concurrence itself**

**Would be the cause, not Īśvara.**

If there is a concurrence of conditions, either it is an effect of Īśvara or it is not. If it is not, it would be the concurrence and not Īśvara's causal powers which would be the cause. Thus, it would not be established that Īśvara is the cause but rather that the concurrence is the cause.

2. Autonomy is violated

**When assembled, he is powerless not to create,  
When absent, he is powerless to create.**

The possessor of autonomy subject to conditions is the logical subject. [Contradiction]: it follows that it is not autonomous because of coming under the power of the concurrence of conditions. Through this *prasaṅga*, it is established *a priori* that Īśvara is not autonomous, yet your position is that he is autonomous.

3. He would be under the power of desire

9.125

**If Īśvara creates without wanting to,  
He is affected by an external power.  
If he creates when he wants to, the effect depends on his  
wishes.  
How then is he 'The Almighty' [Īśvara]?**

'The creation of an effect [448] does not depend upon the concurrence of conditions. Rather, the effects arise from Īśvara. He creates the effects when he wishes to.'

It follows then that his wishes arise from an external power. Being subject to such wishes, his autonomy is violated, which is inappropriate for your Īśvara.


2. Refuting [the Vaiśeṣika tradition of arising from] sempiternal particles

9.126

**For those who assert sempiternal particles,  
The refutation was completed previously.**



The assertion of particles referred to here is the proposal of a substance as the ultimate cause by certain non-Buddhists, such as the Vaiśeṣikas. The refutation was previously completed in the section concerning the foundation of mindfulness of the body [v86], i.e. [they are not ultimate] because they are refuted by their decomposition into parts.



### 3. Refuting arising from self

1. Formulating the position of the other [i.e. Sāṃkhya] tradition
2. The error in that

### 1. Formulating the position of the other tradition

1. A general explanation
2. The nature of the primal substance
3. The nature of its effects

### 1. A general explanation

**The position of the Sāṃkhyas is that**

**The cause of beings is a permanent, primal substance.**

‘The primal substance [1] is the sempiternal intrinsic nature. It is in a universal flow in which previously hidden manifestations can become manifest.<sup>108</sup> This intrinsic nature is unseen due to obscurations. When manifestations arise from their previous state of non-manifestation, temporal objects are seen. Their cause is the intrinsic nature. Since both the intrinsic nature and what arises from it are in reality one, the primal substance is both cause and effect, but the arising of the manifestations is a relative [delusion].’

### 2. The nature of the primal substance

**9.127**

**Its qualities are ‘purity’, ‘activity’ and ‘darkness’.**

**While they remain in equilibrium,**

**They are called the ‘primal substance’.**

‘The manifestations and sempiternal matter are pervaded by a oneness of the three qualities of the primal substance in equilibrium. This is the ultimate cause of all things. Individual consciousnesses [2] exist within that as containers of cognition and awareness. Each one is a sentient being experiencing objects. The individual consciousnesses are neither causes nor effects. [449] Since both the primal substance and the individual consciousnesses are ultimate, they are unseen, and are difficult to perceive.’

### 3. The nature of its effects

### **Manifestations are said to be their disequilibrium.**

‘When there is disequilibrium, happiness, suffering and so forth manifest within the ‘Great One’ [3] by its evolution into ‘pride’ [4]. From pride arise:

- The five sense faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body [5-9]
- The five physical action organs which activate speech, arm movement, walking, digestion and reproduction [10-14]
- The conceptual mind [15]
- The five elements of space, earth, water, wind and fire [16-20]
- The five bare elements of sounds, smells, tastes, touchables and colours [21-25]

When there is equilibrium, happiness and so forth remain unmanifest within the primal substance. When there is disequilibrium, they become manifest. The five bare elements are then perceived as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. Therefore, happiness and so forth are comprised of the material primal substance. When manifestations form in the mirror of mind [3], experiences arise through the combination of the inner cognizing awareness with those manifestations.’

#### **2. The error in that**

1. A general expression of the objection
2. Refuting pleasure and so forth being external
3. A permanent primal substance is unreasonable
4. Contradictions in an existent arising

#### **1. A general expression of the objection**

1. Refuting the primal substance
2. Refuting its qualities
3. Refuting its effects

#### **1. Refuting the primal substance**

The primal substance is the logical subject. [Contradiction:] although the proposition is that its nature is singular, it follows that it is not singular because it has three qualities.

The pervasion for this inference<sup>109</sup> is expressed in the root text:

**9.128**

**A triple nature that is also singular  
Is illogical. There is no such thing.**

## 2. Refuting its qualities

‘Nevertheless, the three qualities exist.’

**The three qualities also do not exist  
Because each of them would also have three parts.**

The three qualities are also not real, [450] because there would have to be three parts to each of them, such as a purity of the purity and so forth.

## 3. Refuting its effects

**9.129**

**Without the qualities, the existence of sound  
And so forth also becomes extremely implausible.**

Without the qualities, it follows that the elements such as sound would not exist because it is illogical to have the effect without the cause.

## 2. Refuting pleasure and so forth being external [to consciousness]

1. Refuting by not perceiving its appearance
2. Refuting an external cause of pleasure and so forth

### 1. Refuting by not perceiving its appearance

**Nor can the insentient, such as cloth,  
Contain pleasure and so forth.**

Material objects such as cloth, comprised of the five bare elements, are established by external perception, whereas pleasure and so forth are established by one's inner awareness. That these are mutually exclusive is established by direct perception. Thus, the Sāṃkhya position is refuted for the wise by direct perception and refuted for the deluded by their never perceiving such an appearance [of e.g. cloth as containing pleasure].

## 2. Refuting an external cause of pleasure and so forth

'When pleasure and so forth arise in the mirror of mind, it has a cause external [to the individual consciousness], such as the bare element of sound.'

Refuting this has four parts:

1. Recalling the logic that was already completed
2. The idea contradicts your own words
3. Not preexisting in its basis
4. Not existing in reality

### 1. Recalling the logic that was already completed

9.130

**'They are caused by the substantial [bare elements].'**

**Wasn't the analysis of such substances already completed?**

If you propose that the five bare elements such as sound are the causes of pleasure and so forth, this would be a cognizable as the cause of cognition and the refutation for this was completed in the section on cognizable arising before cognition. According to the author of the *Great Commentary*, 'completed' here refers to the refutation of existence as atoms, as a composite and as a threefold nature.<sup>110</sup>

### 2. The idea contradicts your own words [451]

'You may have refuted cognizable and cognition as ultimate cause and effect but you did not refute them as relative.'

Nevertheless, if you claim that the cause is the five bare elements and the effect is pleasure and so forth, you contradict your previous

position that the primal substance with a threefold nature of pleasure, etc.<sup>111</sup> is the cause and the five bare elements are the effect:

**Also, the pleasure and so forth [in the primal substance] were your causes, [not the bare elements].<sup>112</sup>**

### 3. Not preexisting in its basis

‘We do not assert that the five bare elements are the causes of pleasure and so forth. The proposition is that the primal substance with the intrinsic nature of pleasure and so forth creates the five bare elements.’

**Cloth and so forth do not arise from pleasure and so forth.**

**9.131**

**Rather, pleasure and so forth arise from cloth and so forth.**

It is established by its incompatibility with direct perception that cloth and so forth do not arise from pleasure and so forth. Direct perception does not establish that cloth, etc. and the five bare elements arise from pleasure or the rest of the three qualities; rather, direct perception establishes the non-perception of pleasure and so forth arising from the five bare elements.<sup>113</sup>

### 4. Not existing in reality

**Apart from this, there is no pleasure and so forth.**

‘We assert that the five bare elements are the causes and pleasure and so forth are the effects.’

The five bare elements have been refuted as a reality. Pleasure, etc. do not exist as a reality because they are relative.

### 4. The refutation of a permanent primal substance

1. Refuting by not perceiving the appearance
2. Gross and subtle are contradictory
3. Establishing its contingent states as impermanent
4. Establishing the primal substance as impermanent

## 1. Refuting by not perceiving the appearance

**Semptineral pleasure and so forth  
Have never been perceived.**

Pleasure and so forth are the logical subject. They are not sempiternal because they are essentially apparent yet are not always perceived.

‘They are not essentially apparent, so, when their appearance is not perceived, that does not refute their being sempiternal.’

At the time of pleasure manifesting, it is established with direct perception that it essentially appears. When it is unmanifest, its intrinsic nature has either been eliminated or has not been eliminated. If eliminated, you are asserting its impermanence. If not eliminated, [452] its essential appearance remains in its nature, so it is established as essentially apparent:

**9.132**

**If pleasure and so forth are essentially manifest,  
Why are they not experienced?**

## 2. Gross and subtle are contradictory

‘The pleasure is not felt since previously it was gross and subsequently it becomes subtle.’

Either subtle and gross are of one intrinsic nature or distinct intrinsic natures. If not distinct, their inherent nature abides with contradictory dharmas, which is illogical:

**‘They become subtle.’**

**How can something gross also be subtle?**

## 3. Establishing its contingent states as impermanent

**9.133**

**‘It becomes subtle by the elimination of the gross.’**

**Then the gross and subtle states are both impermanent.**

‘Gross and subtle are contingent states and the intrinsic nature of each state is distinct.’

If the gross state is eliminated, since it possesses arising and ceasing, that contingent state is impermanent.

#### 4. Establishing the primal substance as impermanent<sup>114</sup>

‘The contingent states are impermanent, but the primal substance is permanent.’

**In this way, why not accept  
That all such things are impermanent?**

9.134

**If the gross state is nothing other than pleasure,  
The impermanence of pleasure is evident.**

The primal substance of the three qualities (pleasure and so forth) is the logical subject. ‘Its impermanence is evident’ [in 134b] is the probandum. [The reason:] line 134a, i.e. because it is identified by its gross and subtle impermanent states, like a vase being identified by its blueness. Therefore, if it is established that the primal substance has impermanent states and that these are the intrinsic nature of everything, it is established that all dharmas are impermanent.

#### 4. Contradictions in an existent arising

1. Presenting the position to be refuted
2. The position’s uncertainty
3. Mixing up the roles
4. Abandoning objections

#### 1. Presenting the position to be refuted

‘At the earlier time when the Sāṃkhyas’ five bare elements are not manifesting, their subsequent state still exists within the primal substance, and later manifests. When there is a lump of clay, the pot is contained within that substance but is not manifest. It is later made to manifest by the potter and so forth. Therefore, only its nature as an



effect arises but nothing arises which was not previously present. It does not newly arise.'

**'Whatever does not already exist  
Cannot arise because of its not existing.'**

'The formerly nonexistent thing is the logical subject. It cannot arise subsequently, [453] because the former does not exist, just like, for example, the horns of a hare not existing in the clay cannot arise. The former thing is nonexistent, so if it could arise, the horns of a hare also could arise from clay, but they cannot arise.'

## 2. The position's uncertainty

By the reason '[because of] its former nonexistence', you establish that there is no subsequent arising. Therefore, when your contingent state of pleasure and so forth manifests, that is also a latter arising from a nonexistent former, which you say is not established:

9.135

**Although you deny that manifestations can arise  
From their nonexistence, you also assert it.**

## 3. Mixing up the roles

It also follows that to experience the cause would be to experience the effect and, therefore, the effect is mixed up with the role of the cause:

**If effects abide in their causes,  
To eat food would be to eat excrement.**

9.136

**For the money you spent on cotton, you should have instead  
Bought cotton seeds and worn them.**

## 4. Abandoning objections

1. The roles are the same
2. Contradictory to worldly confusion
3. The consequence that the role of the effect is a delusion

1. The roles [of cause and effect] are the same

**‘The worldly fail to see it due to delusion.’**

‘Although cotton exists in cotton seeds, it is not possible for the worldly to experience it, due to their non-realization, which is based on delusion.’

Even if the worldly do not experience it due to delusion, for the non-deluded who cognize the truth, such as Kapila, it is a contradiction to wear cotton, but not to wear cotton seeds:

**Yet, someone who knows the reality is in the same predicament**

The first line is the objection and the second line is the response.

2. Contradictory to worldly confusion

9.137

**And, since that knowledge of reality exists even for  
The worldly, why do they not see it?**

Taking someone who has worldly delusion as the cause and an omniscient teacher who cognizes the twenty-five basic elements as the effect, since the effect abides within the cause, omniscient cognition already exists for that worldly person; in which case, how come he does not cognize the existence of cotton in cotton seeds?

3. The consequence that the role of the effect is a delusion

**‘The worldly do not have valid cognition.’  
Then seeing manifestations would also be untrue.**

If the worldly person does not have valid cognition, he could not experience [454] any manifest effects. If he did see them, they would be false.

2. Abandoning objections to the middle way

According to the Svātantrika perspective, first one must establish the logic that proves there is no ultimate intrinsic nature. Then, in order to abandon the error of inferential valid cognition, it is shown that no positive affirmations are established, and this analysis does not contradict valid cognition. According to the Prāsangika perspective, one simply abandons objections to the teaching that all dharmas have no intrinsic nature.

1. Setting out the objections
2. Response to the first prasaṅga: our position is not a valid cognition with a positive affirmation
3. Response to the second prasaṅga: showing that the pervasion is not established, for even though there is an analysis, it is not contrary to valid cognition

1. Setting out the objections

9.138

**'If valid cognition is not valid,  
Are its analyses not false?**

- 1) 'You Mādhyamikas hold that conceptual thought is relative. If this thought is deluded, it follows that even inferential valid cognition which cuts off elaborations is delusion.'
- 2) 'If the primal substance etc. were not real, since a refutation depends upon something to be refuted and since the object of refutation is not real, it follows that emptiness, which refutes it, is also not real.'

**If reality is emptiness,  
Meditation for the sake of it is unreasonable.'**

'Therefore, it follows that meditation on emptiness is meaningless.'<sup>115</sup>

2. Response to the first prasaṅga

9.139

**With no connection to an object of examination  
There is no grasping of its nonexistence.**

**Therefore, whatever the false object may be,  
Its nonexistence is clearly false.**

Since all conceptual thought is in error, it is not valid cognition. Nor are its objects—the objects to be refuted—established. Therefore, the emptiness which negates them—the emptiness being affirmed—is itself an untrue analysandum and is also not a valid cognition. This is the meaning of ‘its nonexistence is clearly false’. Grasping the negation of the object of negation is false. Why? That conceptual thought [455] has no connection to an analysandum—the object to be examined, i.e. in not fabricating an analysandum as an object of conceptual thought, there is no grasping of its nonexistence. No conceptual thought of the negation arises.

If one asks, ‘What is it that is nonexistent?’, it should be answered, ‘This is nonexistent.’ But if no object to be negated is identified, there is no instance to negate because there is only a general concept of negation.<sup>116</sup> Therefore, if the object to be negated is false, its negation is also false. This is like saying, ‘If the child of a barren woman is false, its death is also false.’

Concerning the second prasaṅga, ‘It follows that the cultivation of emptiness would be meaningless’, the response is to explain that its pervasion<sup>117</sup> is not established:


### 3. Response to the second prasaṅga

9.140

**When the son dies in a dream,  
The discrimination that ‘he does not exist’  
Counters the discrimination that he exists,  
Even though it is false.**

If the son within a dream is false, the discrimination that, ‘Now he has died, so he does not exist’ is also false. Nevertheless, it counters the discrimination that he exists. It functions as an antidote to the imputation that grasps him as existent, in respect of which it is not a delusion. In the same way, the explicit predicate ‘[it] is empty’ negates the object to be negated. Although that positive affirmation of the emptiness of the external object of attachment is itself false, it

overcomes the possibility for imputations to arise which could be grasped as existent. In respect of its eliminating imputations grasped as existent, there is no contradiction with the merely analytical aspect of valid cognition. This is the Svātantrika Madhyamaka argument.<sup>118</sup> If one applies the Prāsangika Madhyamaka explanation, 'it is false' means it is the yogic relative, by which the erroneous understandings of others are refuted.



3. Showing that all dharmas arise merely through dependent origination

1. A summary of the refutation of the four kinds of arising
2. Showing that there is no arising or ceasing, coming or going

3. The implication of that: that which is dependently originated is mere illusion

1. A summary of the refutation of the four kinds of arising

**9.141**

**Therefore, on this analysis,  
Nothing exists without a cause,  
Nor abides in its conditions,  
Whether individually or combined.**

‘Without a cause’ means existing without a cause. [456] ‘Individually’ means either self or other. ‘Combined’<sup>119</sup> means both self and other.

2. Showing that there is no arising or ceasing, coming or going

**9.142**

**Nor does it come from other,  
Nor stay, nor go.**

To ‘not come from other’ is to be without arising. To ‘not stay’ is to be free from abiding. To ‘not go’ is to be free from cessation. This is precisely to be free from the three characteristics of the composite.

3. The implication of this: that which is dependently originated is mere illusion

1. Showing that dependent origination is like an illusion
2. Showing dependent origination
3. Showing that dependent origination is not an intrinsic nature  
by establishing the pervasion of dependent origination

1. Showing that dependent origination is like an illusion

**This is what deluded ones take as real,  
But how is it different from an illusion?**

When an analytical cognition negates true existence, appearances are established as being like illusions.

## 2. Showing dependent origination

9.143

**Whatever manifests by illusion  
And whatever manifests by causes,  
Examine from where it could come  
And to where it could go.**

9.144

**Whatever it is, it is seen in relation to something else.  
Otherwise, it is not seen.  
It is fabricated, like a reflection.  
How can there be reality in that?**

Here I shall present the so-called ‘dependent origination analysis of inherent nature’ according to the Svātantrika treatises:<sup>120</sup>

1. Presenting the reason
2. Showing the forward pervasion
3. The example of that
4. The logical outcome

[Proof: Appearances (the logical subject) have no intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, like illusions.]

1. Presenting the reason: [‘Because of being dependently originated’]

In line 144d, ‘in that’ refers to ‘these appearances’, the logical subject. Questioning how they could have reality is the probandum to be established, i.e. ‘they are empty of a real intrinsic nature’. Any effect whatsoever is seen to have a productive cause. If there is no such cause, there is no effect. Thus, the reason is: ‘Because of having the nature of dependent origination in their forward [causative] and reverse [caused] functions.’

2. Showing the forward pervasion: [‘Whatever is dependently originated (fabricated) has no intrinsic nature.’]

‘It is fabricated, like a reflection’ [144c] indicates that if something has an intrinsic nature, then it is illogical for it to be fabricated by causes

and conditions, since what arises from causes and conditions is pervaded by fabrication. Since that is contrary to its reality, it negates its reality. Thus, the negandum—its reality—is pervaded by non-fabrication. Since the contrary—fabrication by conditions—is supported by the logical subject, the contrary pervader is supported. [457]

### 3. The example of that: ['Like an illusion']

Line 143a gives an example of something fabricated by conditions being pervaded by the exclusion [of reality]—the manifestation of an illusion. To ask from where it comes [143c] means the arising of its reality is excluded. To ask where it could go to [143d] means the cessation of its reality is excluded. That its remaining is also excluded is implicit in this.

### 4. The logical outcome: ['They do not arise, cease, or persist.']

In general, whatever is a mere fabrication is pervaded by the exclusion of a true intrinsic nature. If one has doubts about this, the refutation [of the contrary] is implicit in these lines:

- 'Whatever manifests by causes, from where could it come?' [143bc], i.e. what is it that arises?
- 'Whatever manifests by causes, to where could it go?' [143bd], i.e. what is it that ceases?
- Therefore, there is also no abiding.

'Although they are dependent originations, dependent origination is their ultimate intrinsic nature. Where is the contraction? The pervasion is not established.'

One can establish the reverse pervasion<sup>121</sup> by the so-called 'analysis of the effect: the arising and ceasing of its existence or nonexistence'.

### 3. Showing that dependent origination is not an intrinsic nature by establishing the pervasion of dependent origination

[Proof:] An ultimate intrinsic nature is the logical subject. It is not a dependent origination because it is illogical for an existent or nonexistent effect to arise. This refutation of the ultimate intrinsic nature as a dependent origination establishes that dependent



origination is not pervaded by an ultimate intrinsic nature and is pervaded by relative delusion.

1. The logic
2. Making certain of the reason

#### 1. The logic

1. Refuting something existent arising as an effect
2. Refuting something nonexistent arising as an effect

#### 1. Refuting something existent arising as an effect

##### 9.145

**For something that already exists,  
What cause does it require?**

That which is possible to be created by causes is pervaded by the necessary conditions for its creation. Grasping something as already existent is incompatible with grasping the necessary conditions for its creation. Since the certainty of this is established *a priori*, anything existent necessarily has no conditions for its creation.

#### 2. Refuting something nonexistent arising as an effect

1. Presenting the logic in brief [458]
2. The contradiction in the possibility of something nonexistent being the cause for an object
3. Refuting [the cessation of] the object itself

#### 1. Presenting the logic in brief

**And if it does not exist,  
What cause does it require?**

That which has been created is pervaded by particular existent qualities. The existence of those qualities is incompatible with the non-establishment of its substantial intrinsic nature. Therefore, a

nonexistent object does not require a cause to create it, so it is not something that can be created.

2. The contradiction in the possibility of something nonexistent being the cause for an object

‘A nonexistent object cannot be created but subsequently attains a self-nature. Since this requires a cause, why do you claim it is not necessary?’

The fact that there is no such requirement is established as follows:

**9.146**

**Even a billion causes**

**Cannot alter nonexistence.**

A nonexistent object might have a billion causes but it is still not something that can be created because there is nothing to transform. The pervader is not supported.<sup>122</sup>

‘An already existent object cannot transform into something else, but a previously nonexistent thing can subsequently attain a substantial intrinsic nature. Therefore, it transforms from nonexistent into existent.’

In subsequently becoming existent, does it do so without abandoning its previous nonexistence or not? If it does not abandon its nonexistence:

**How can a state of nonexistence be existent,**

**Or become existent?**

Since its existence and nonexistence are mutually exclusive, an intrinsic nature of nonexistence is contradictory to one of existence:

**9.147**

**If its existence is impossible during its nonexistence,**

**When could it ever become something existent?**

If it abandons its nonexistence: the contingent state of nonexistence is the logical subject. It cannot become existent through subsequently

abandoning its nonexistence because its nonexistence cannot be negated. That is because becoming existent is pervaded by the cessation of nonexistence and nonexistent objects have no cessation.

‘That reason is not established.’

[Contradiction:] If nonexistent objects could cease, they would be impermanent and thus would be pervaded by becoming existent, i.e. the object would be both nonexistent and existent. Therefore, because of being nonexistent, [459] it is not impermanent. Since the pervader is not supported,<sup>123</sup> the cessation of a nonexistent state is negated, by which the qualification<sup>124</sup> is established. This explains line 146d, as well as:

**While its existence has not yet begun,  
Its nonexistence has not yet been lost.**

9.148

**If its nonexistence has not been lost,  
It is impossible for it to exist.**

### 3. Refuting the cessation of the object itself

Having shown that a nonexistent object cannot become existent, it is next shown that an existent object cannot change into a state of nonexistence:

**Nor can the existent become nonexistent,  
Because it would follow that it would have two intrinsic  
natures.**

The nonexistent object is the logical subject:

- The prasaṅga from the reason based on intrinsic nature:  
[Contradiction: you claim that the object is non-dual but] it follows that it is dual because of its transformation [from existent to nonexistent].
- The svātantra from the pervader not being supported:<sup>125</sup>  
because of being non-dual, there is no transformation.

## 2. Making certain of the reason

1. Freedom from the two extremes
2. Abiding is like an illusion
3. The sameness of existence and pacification

### 1. Freedom from the two extremes

**9.149**

**In this way, there is no cessation.  
Nor is there any existence. Because of this,  
All these beings  
Are forever neither arising nor ceasing.**

Since beings have no cessation, all sentient beings are called 'always non-ceasing'. Since they have no existence, they are called 'always non-arising'.

### 2. Abiding is like an illusion

**9.150**

**Dreamlike beings,  
When analysed, are like banana trees.**

The first line establishes they are deluded perceptions and the second line indicates the essence of the truth is emptiness.

### 3. The sameness of existence and pacification

**In suchness, there is no distinction  
Between nirvāṇa and non-nirvāṇa.**

There is no distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. In every sense? Only in suchness, i.e. ultimately, they have the single taste of emptiness.

