

CHAPTER 10

DEDICATION

To realize the results attained from practising the bodhisattva conduct in this way, one must perfect the benefit of self and others. The means for doing so is to take that benefit as the object of one's virtuous intention and dedicate it as follows:


1. Dedication related to the means
2. Dedication for the benefit of others
3. Dedication for the benefit of self
4. Dedication for the teachings to remain as a source of happiness
5. Homage of remembrance of kind ones

1. Dedication related to the means

10.1

**By whatever virtue there is
In my undertaking
To enter the bodhisattva conduct,
May all beings enter the bodhisattva conduct.**

The first three lines indicate the object to be dedicated. 'All beings' indicates to whom it is dedicated. The result is their becoming bodhisattvas.



2. Dedication for the benefit of others

1. Dedication for worldly benefit
 2. Dedication for transcendental benefit
-
1. Dedication for worldly benefit
 1. General dedication

2. Dedication for the benefit of specific lower realms
 3. Dedication for the benefit of the higher realms
1. General dedication [465]

10.2

**By my merit,
May all those in all directions
Afflicted with physical and mental suffering
Attain oceans of happiness and joy.**

10.3

**As long as they remain in samsara,
May their happiness never fail.
May beings attain the uninterrupted
Happiness of a bodhisattva.**

The first verse is a dedication for them to be free from suffering and to attain happiness—the aspects of compassion and loving kindness, respectively. The next two lines are a dedication for them never to be separated from happiness—the aspect of joy. The last two lines are a dedication for them to attain benefit—the aspect of equanimity.

2. Dedication for the benefit of specific lower realms

1. Dedication for the benefit of hell-beings
2. Dedication for the benefit of animals
3. Dedication for the benefit of ghosts

1. Dedication for the benefit of hell-beings

1. Dedication for their own pacification of suffering
2. Dedication for their pacification by others

1. Dedication for their own pacification of suffering

1. Dedication for general pacification
2. Dedication for pacifying the cold hells
3. Dedication for pacifying the hot hells

1. Dedication for general pacification

10.4

**In however many hells
There may be in existence,
May all those living creatures
Have the bliss and joy of Sukhāvatī.**

2. Dedication for pacifying the cold hells

10.5

May those tormented by the cold find warmth,

3. Dedication for pacifying the hot hells

1. Dedication for pacifying the suffering of the main hells
2. Dedication for pacifying the neighbouring hells

1. Dedication for pacifying the suffering of the main hells

**And may boundless waters pour
From the clouds of bodhisattvas,
Cooling those tormented by the heat.**

2. Dedication for pacifying the neighbouring hells

The harms of the hell-forests:

10.6

**May the forests of razors
Become divine groves.
May the trees of Śālmari
Grow into wish fulfilling trees.**

The harms of the hell-realms:

10.7

**May the realms of hell become places of joy,
Covered with vast pools, fragrant with lotus flowers,**

With calls of wild ducks, geese and swans
Resounding gently in the air.

10.8

May its burning pyres become heaps of jewels.
May its molten earth become a clear, crystal floor.
May its crushing mountains become
Celestial palaces of worship, filled with Buddhas.

10.9

May its showers of embers, burning rocks and fiery
razors
From now on be a rain of flowers.

The harms of internal conflict in hell:

May the conflict of armed violence
From now on be a casting of flowers.

The harms of the hell-rivers:

10.10

May those submerged in the torrents of hell,
Their flesh completely incinerated from their lily-white
bones,
Attain, from this virtue, the bodies of gods,
And dwell among goddesses in gentle, divine rivers.

2. Dedication for their pacification by others

1. Pacification by Vajrapāṇi's power
 2. Pacification by Padmapāṇi's compassion
 3. Pacification by Mañjughoṣa's emanation
 4. Pacification by the force of the other bodhisattvas' proximity
- [466]

1. Pacification by Vajrapāṇi's power

10.11

'Why are the servants of the Lord of Death and his dreadful
 crows and vultures suddenly afraid?
 Whose power clears away the enveloping darkness, bringing
 joy and happiness?'
 When they look up, may they see the blazing form of
 Vajrapāṇi in the sky,
 And the power of their intense joy clearing away all
 negativities, may they go to join him.

The first line indicates the terrors of hell; the second, being filled with joy; and the last two lines indicate seeing one's protector and overcoming negative actions.

2. Pacification by Padmapāṇi's compassion

10.12

Seeing the glittering fires of hell
 Extinguished by rains of flowers mixed with scented water,
 May they wonder what could have brought such happiness,
 And may these denizens of hell see Padmapāṇi himself.

The first two lines indicate pacifying the harms of fires. The next line indicates attaining happiness and the last line indicates finding refuge.

3. Pacification by Mañjughoṣa's emanation

10.13

'Friends, come here quickly. Don't be afraid.
 He forcefully dispels all our suffering and brings the power
 of joy!
 A protector of all beings, who has generated bodhicitta and
 kindness,
 A blazing youth with hair in knotted locks delivers us from
 these horrors.'

10.14

'See one hundred gods offer their crowns at his lotus feet.
 A rain of flowers falls upon his head, his eyes moist with
 compassion.'

Thousands of goddesses sing his praises atop magnificent pavilions.'

Upon seeing Mañjughoṣa, may the denizens of hell cry out in joy.

There are two points here—finding hope and being held by the protector. The first is indicated in 13a, comprising assembling friends and abandoning fear. This is what is cried out by the denizens of hell, indicated in 14d. The second point connects ‘our’ [13b] with ‘delivers’ [13d].¹ How are beings delivered? Through the destruction of the horrors of hell. How are they destroyed? By forcefully dispelling suffering and bringing the power of joy, thus protecting beings. With what intention does he protect them? With the generation of bodhicitta and kind affection. In what form does he deliver this? As the blazing youth with hair in knotted locks. To whom does this emanation appear? To those who ‘see’ [14a] him. What is his emanation like? There are four aspects: ‘One hundred gods...’ indicates the array of gods worshipping him; ‘a rain...’ indicates a rain of flowers descending upon him; ‘singing his praises...’ indicates music; and ‘magnificent pavilions’ indicates his lavish surrounds.

4. Pacification by the force of the other bodhisattvas’ proximity

10.15

**By the roots of my virtue, may the denizens of hell,
Seeing the cooling, fragrant rains of happiness fall
From the stainless clouds of the bodhisattvas such as
Samantabhadra,
Be filled with joy.**

May the cooling and scented rain from the unobscured clouds of the tenth bhūmi bodhisattvas bring joy to the denizens of hell. [467]

2. Dedication for the benefit of animals

10.16

**May animals be freed
From the horrors of preying upon one another.**

3. Dedication for the benefit of ghosts

**May ghosts have happiness
Like that of the Northern Continent.**

10.17

**May their hunger be sated,
And may they always be bathed and refreshed
By streams of milk
Flowing from the hands of Avalokiteśvara.**

3. Dedication for the benefit of the higher realms

1. Freedom from suffering
2. Attaining wishes

1. Freedom from suffering

Impaired senses:

10.18

**May the blind see
And may the deaf hear.**

Painful childbirth:

**May mothers give birth without any pain
Like Māyādevī herself.**

Poverty:

10.19

**May the naked find clothes,
The hungry find food,
And the thirsty find water
And delightful, refreshing drinks.**

10.20

May the poor acquire wealth.

Discontent:

May the unhappy and miserable find joy.
May the distressed be placated,
And may they have confidence and stability.

Sickness:

10.21

Wherever sentient beings are unwell,
May their sicknesses quickly disappear.
May the diseases affecting every living creature
Cease and never occur again.

Unseen sufferings:

10.22

May those who are afraid be without fear.
May those who are bound be freed.
May the weak find strength
And may their minds be calmed.

The sufferings of travellers:

10.23

May all those travelling abroad
Be happy wherever they may go and,
For whatever purpose they are travelling,
May they achieve it without any difficulties.

10.24

May all those aboard boats and ships
Achieve whatever they set out to do and,
Having happily returned to their own shores,
May they be reunited with their loved ones.

10.25

May those who have lost their paths
Encounter fellow travellers,
And proceed to their destinations with ease,
Unmolested by bandits, wild animals and so on.

Harm from spirits:

10.26

**May those who are lost and alone in wildernesses,
Children and the elderly without any protector,
Those who are unconscious, mentally disturbed or insane,
Be protected by the gods.**

2. Attaining wishes

1. General dedication
2. Dedication specific to monastics

1. General dedication

1. Attaining wealth and possessions
2. Entering the path of perfection
3. Attaining worldly happiness

1. Attaining wealth and possessions

Wealth of the basis:

10.27

**May they never lack the eight freedoms.
May they have faith, wisdom and kindness,
Eat appropriate food, have good conduct,
And remember their former rebirths.**

Material wealth:

10.28

**May they have inexhaustible wealth
Like that of the bodhisattva Gaganagañja.²**

Non-violence:

**May they be able to do as they please,
Without conflict or violence.**

Perfect splendour:

10.29

**May beings with little splendour
Come to have magnificent glory.**

Perfect form:

**May those who are emaciated or ugly
Come to have radiant beauty.**

Inferior becoming superior:

10.30

**May women everywhere in the world
Be reborn as men.
May the lowly achieve highness
And crush any arrogance.**

Perfect virtue:

10.31

**By my merit,
May all sentient beings without exception
Abandon all nonvirtue
And always practise virtue.**

2. Entering the path of perfection

10.32

**May they never be separated from bodhicitta
And may they practise the bodhisattva conduct.
May they be supported by the Buddhas
And abandon the actions of Māra.**

These four lines indicate respectively the intention, practice, presence of harmonious conditions and absence of opposing conditions. [468]

3. Attaining worldly happiness

Long life:

10.33

May all sentient beings
Have immeasurably long lives.
May they live in constant happiness
Where the word ‘death’ is never even heard.

Perfect abode:

10.34

Everywhere may there be
Gardens of wish fulfilling trees
Filled with Buddhas and bodhisattvas
And resounding with the delightful sounds of dharma.

10.35

Everywhere may the land be
Without stones, etc.,
Smooth like the palm of a hand,
And even like a lapis lazuli.

Being populated by the beneficent:

10.36

May many mandala circles
Of many bodhisattvas
Adorn the face of the earth,
Beautifying it with their natural radiance.

Virtuous conduct:

10.37

May all embodied beings
Continuously hear sounds of dharma
From all the birds, trees,
Rays of light and even space itself.

10.38

May they always meet
With the Buddhas and their sons,
And with limitless clouds of offerings
May they pay homage to the supreme ones among all beings.

Good fortune in abundance:

10.39

May the gods bring timely rains,
And may crops be abundant.
May kings reign in accord with dharma,
And may the people prosper.

10.40

May medicines be effective
And may mantra recitation bring accomplishment.

Pacifying harms:

May dākinīs and ogres
Have compassionate minds.

10.41

May no sentient being ever
Be in pain, practise nonvirtue,
Be afraid or abused.
May they never be unhappy.

2. Dedication specific to monastics

10.42

In the monasteries, may reading
And recitation flourish and endure.
May the saṅgha always be harmonious,
And may they be firmly established.

For the benefit of monks:

10.43

**May monks who wish to train
Find places of solitude and,
Abandoning all distraction,
May they meditate with peace of mind.**

For the benefit of nuns:

**10.44
May nuns have material support,
And may they be free from conflict or danger.**

For perfecting moral conduct:

**May all monastics
Never let their moral conduct be damaged.**

**10.45
May the immoral tire of their ways
And may their nonvirtues come to an end.
Attaining a happy rebirth,
May their conduct never be damaged.**

For perfecting wisdom:

**10.46
May the learned be respected
And find the support they need.
May their minds be pure
And may they be renowned in every direction.**

For fruition of freedom from suffering:

**10.47
In future lives may nobody experience suffering,
And may whatever they do be without difficulties.
May they quickly achieve buddhahood
With a physical form surpassing that of a god.**

10.48

**May all sentient beings
Make many offerings to all the Buddhas.
May their happiness
Be the inconceivable bliss of a Buddha.**

2. Dedication for transcendental benefit

Dedication for the intentions of bodhisattvas:

10.49

**May the wishes of bodhisattvas
For the benefit of beings be accomplished,**

Dedication for the intentions of Buddhas:

**And may all beings have everything
The Protectors wish for them.**

Dedication for the intentions of śrāvakas:

10.50

**Similarly, may all śrāvakas
And pratyekabuddhas have happiness.**

3. Dedication for the benefit of self

Temporal results:

10.51

**Until I have reached the 'Joyous' bhūmi,
Through the kindness of Mañjughoṣa,
May I remember my previous lives
And attain ordination.**

10.52

**May I live with simple food
And have simple needs,
And throughout all my lives
May I find perfect solitude.**

The vision of Mañjughoṣa:

10.53

If I ever wish to look upon him
 Or ask him the slightest question,
 May I see the protector
 Mañjughoṣa himself, without any hindrance.

Practising the bodhisattva conduct:

10.54

In order to accomplish the benefit
 Of all sentient beings, as limitless as space,
 May my conduct
 Be like that of Mañjughoṣa.

Accomplishing the benefit of others:

10.55

As long as space endures
 There will be living beings.
 For that long may I remain
 To dispel their suffering.

10.56

However they may be suffering,
 May all their suffering ripen in me.
 May the bodhisattva saṅgha
 Bring happiness to the world.

4. Dedication for the teachings to remain as a source of happiness

10.57

May the teachings, which are the only
 Medicine for suffering and which are the source of all
 happiness,
 Be honoured and respected,
 And may they long remain.

5. Homage of remembrance of kind ones

10.58

I prostrate to Mañjughoṣa,
By whose kindness my mind turned to virtue,
And I prostrate to my spiritual masters,
By whose kindness I matured.

COLOPHON

Thinking respectfully of the dust beneath the feet
Of the teacher of dharma, the monk Loden Zangpo [Ngok
Lotsawa], upholder of the tripitaka,
I composed this aid for illuminating the meaning
Of these words on the conduct of the conquerors' sons.
By the light rays of teaching and explanation
May it light up the bodhisattva path,
And seeing the way with the eye of wisdom,
May all beings travel this path.

Although there were already very clear explanations written by
learned ones,
Nevertheless, I wanted to make some minor corrections and
propagate this teaching.
Though it would not be of interest to ordinary people,
Nevertheless, I wrote it for my own understanding and for
those like me.

Being just a synopsis, certain sections of the ninth chapter [of the root text] from the explanation of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* composed by the monk [Chapa] Chokyi Sengge remained hard to understand. To make them easier, this detailed guide was composed by the layman Sonam

Tsemo.¹ May it bring vast benefit to the precious doctrine and to many sentient beings.

TRANSLATOR'S AFTERWORD: LOGIC

The use of logic in the Buddhist tradition is dealt with authoritatively in classic works on the topic by such scholars as Dharmakīrti and Sakya Pandita. What follows is a limited attempt to help the lay reader unfamiliar with such works get the gist of the logical terminology used in the present text. Familiarity with the basics of first order predicate logic in the Western tradition would be an advantage in some of what follows, for there are instructive parallels.

Inferences can be presented either as svātantras—the establishment of a proposition's truth or falsity by proof from a given premise—or prasaṅgas—the refutation of a proposition by demonstrating an internal contradiction. Svātantras prove or disprove a proposition ('*dod pa*) or premise (*dam bca'*)—typically, the existence or nonexistence of some metaphysical type, such as a creator deity or a partless atom. In their disproving or negating mode, svātantras are used to establish the emptiness of all dharmas by arguments such as 'the refutation from existence or nonexistence'.¹ The term 'svātantra' means 'autonomous' (*rang rgyud*) in the sense of independently establishing a position from a given premise. Prasaṅgas prove that a proposition or premise asserted by a philosophical opponent leads to a contradiction and so is to be rejected. The term 'prasaṅga' means 'consequential' (*thal ba*) in the sense of making explicit the internal consequences of a proposition

or premise. Sonam Tsemo uses both svātantras and prasaṅgas in the present text.² Svātantras and prasaṅgas share certain formal elements:

- A ‘logical subject’ (*chos can*—more literally, ‘dharma possessor’, i.e. something which bears properties): the subject of the inference, e.g. ‘the self’.
- A ‘reason’ or antecedent (*probans*) predicate (*gtan tshigs, rtags*, or *sgrub byed*, all synonymous): a property to be attributed to the logical subject antecedent to the conclusion. It is typically suffixed to a ‘because’ clause, e.g. ‘because it (the logical subject) is matter, which is insentient’.
- A consequent (*probandum*) predicate (*bsgrubs pa'i chos*): a property attributed to the logical subject as a consequence of the reason. The probandum or conclusion itself (*bsgrubs bya*) is the proposition to be established as the conclusion of the inference, e.g. ‘it (the logical subject) is not an agent’.

Such inferences must satisfy the ‘three forms’ (*trairūpya*) of logical felicity:

1. Qualification: the logical subject must satisfy the reason predicate (*phyogs chos*, Skt. *pakṣadharma*)³
2. Forward pervasion: satisfaction of the reason predicate must imply satisfaction of the consequent predicate (*rjes khyab*, Skt. *anvayavyāpti*)
3. Reverse pervasion: the lack of the consequent predicate must imply the lack of the antecedent predicate (*ldog khyab*, Skt. *vyatirekavyāpti*)

The two key terms to be elaborated here are ‘pervasion’ (*khyab pa*, Skt. *vyapti*) and ‘qualification’. A pervasion is an inferential relation between the antecedent and consequent predicates. To give an example in the form of a prasaṅga:

The causal collection is the logical subject. Contradiction: although your proposition is that it is truly existent, it follows that it is not truly existent (the consequent predicate) because of singularity being imputed onto a multiplicity (the antecedent predicate). (See commentary to v9.96)

The pervasion here is the conditional relation between being 'a merely imputed singularity' and being 'nonexistent (*dngos med*)', i.e. if something is a merely imputed reality, it is nonexistent. This pervasion must be 'established', i.e. demonstrated as true.⁴

A pervasion can be a relation of cause and effect (e.g. 'where there is fire there is smoke') or a 'natural' relation between two associated properties (e.g. 'what is a merely imputed singularity is nonexistent'). There is also a third, negative case of pervasion in which the absence of one quality implies the absence of a corresponding quality (e.g. 'a non-substance is non-transforming and therefore it cannot be created'). This is called the 'non-supporting of the pervader' (*khyab byed dmigs med*, Skt. vyapaka-anupalabdhi, see below).

As a general relation between two predicates, a pervasion can be expressed as a universally quantified statement or conditional in accord with familiar grammatical forms. For example, these are all logically equivalent expressions of the above pervasion:

- Everything multiple onto which singularity is imputed is nonexistent
- Whatever is multiple but is imputed as singular, is nonexistent
- If something is multiple but is imputed as singular, then it is nonexistent
- $(x) (x \text{ is multiple but imputed as singular} \rightarrow \sim x \text{ is existent})$

The latter representation of pervasion using the quantificational operator (x) and the material implication sign \rightarrow has been highlighted by Matilal and I will continue to use it here.⁵

A pervasion involves a 'pervader' (*khyab byed*, Skt. vyapaka)—the antecedent predicate F in $(x) (Fx \rightarrow Gx)$ —and a 'pervaded' (*khyab bya*, Skt. vyāpya)—the consequent predicate G. In the case of 'the pervader is not supported'—the third of the three kinds of pervasion mentioned above—the 'pervader' is a quality which the logical subjects lacks. 'The pervader is not supported' refutes an opponent's claim Gx by demonstrating $(x) (\sim Fx \rightarrow \sim Gx) \& \sim Fx$. For example:

The logical subject is mere appearances. They are without true inherent nature because they do not arise from self, other, both, nor without cause. The pervader is not supported. (See commentary above v9.116.)

Here, ‘arising from self, other, both, nor without cause’ is the composite pervader, F, and ‘true inherent nature’ is the pervaded, G. ‘The pervader is not supported’ means that mere appearances lack F and hence also lack G.⁶

Establishing that the logical subject has a particular property is called ‘qualification’. Qualification obtains when it is established that the logical subject ‘supports’ or has the property attributed to it in a reason clause, i.e. it satisfies the antecedent predicate. A qualification may need to be established by introducing further antecedent premises. This implies a possible infinite regress of premises also requiring establishment, but the chain of argument typically terminates when it reaches a premise that can be seen to be true by direct perception (e.g. ‘It is established by direct perception that impermanent objects arise from causes other than Īśvara’, see commentary to v9.122) or which the opponent must accept or has already accepted as true, or which he cannot deny without contradicting his overall thesis, position or world view (e.g. ‘It is untenable for you to deny consciousness abides sempiternally, for that would contradict the Sāṃkhya’s own proposition that the individual consciousness is sempiternal’, see commentary to v9.60).

In simple cases, pervasion and qualification play similar roles to the Aristotelian major and minor premise, respectively:

- Major premise (pervasion): Everything multiple that is imputed as singular is not truly existent.
- Minor premise (qualification): A causal collection is a multiplicity imputed as singular.
- Conclusion: A causal collection is not truly existent.

Formally, the forward and reverse modes of pervasion are as follows:

- Forward pervasion (*rjes khyab*) is the inference from antecedent to consequent, i.e. ($Fx \rightarrow Gx$)

- Reverse pervasion (*ldog khyab*) is the pervasion in the contrapositive form: ($\sim Gx \rightarrow \sim Fx$).

Since establishing or proving the contrapositive of an inference is logically equivalent to establishing the original (positive) inference itself (and vice versa), to establish the reverse pervasion is sufficient to establish the forward pervasion and we see examples of this method of proof in the text. Similarly, refuting the reverse pervasion is equivalent to refuting the forward pervasion. In short, forward and reverse pervasion stand or fall together as an incontrovertible rule of logic.

A third kind of pervasion is its general negation:

- Counter pervasion ('*gal khyab*) is the negation of the pervasion:
 $\sim(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$

Establishing the counter pervasion is equivalent to refuting the forward (and reverse) pervasion and hence rejecting the inference.

GLOSSARY

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF KEY TIBETAN TERMS

kun rdzob: Relative

bka': Buddha's words

bkag pa: Negate

skyes bu: Sāṃkhya philosophy: individual consciousness

kha na ma tho ba: Misdeed

khas len: Assert, claim

'khrul pa: Error, delusion, confusion

'gal ba: Logic: Contradiction, incompatibility

grangs can: Sāṃkhya

gus pa: 1. Respect 2. Faith

dgag pa: Refute

dge ba'i bshes gnyen: Spiritual friend

rgol ba: Dispute, disputant

rgyu mtshan: Essential characteristic, criterion

rgyud: Stream of being, stream

sgrib pa: Obscuration

sgro 'dogs: Imputation

bsgom pa: Cultivation, meditation

bsgrubz bya: Logic: probandum

nges pa: Ascertainment, certainty

ngo bo,

rang bzhin: Intrinsic nature, nature

dngos med: 1. nonexistent 2. Insubstantial

dngos po: 1. Existent 2. Substantial

mngon sum: Direct perception, juxtaposed with inference (*rjes drag*)

mngon zhen: Attachment

chags pa: Attachment, desire

ched du bya ba: Object of intention

mchod pa: Esteem, worship, make offerings, venerate, homage

rjes dpag: Inference, juxtaposed with direct perception (*mngon sum*)

brjod pa: Claim, say

nyams: Damage

nyes pa: Negative action, fault, evil

nyon mongs: Defilements

snyan: Praise, pleasant speech

gtan med: Nonexistent

gti mug: Ignorance, stupidity

rtag pa: Permanent, sempiternal, immutable

rtogs pa: Conception, understanding

ltung ba: Downfall

'thad pa: Logical, reasonable

dam bca': Premise, thesis

de kho na: Reality

dom dam: Ultimate

don: 1. Perceptual object 2. Meaning, purpose

don spyi: Predicate, universal

bden pa: True, real

ldog pa: Reversed, prevented, stopped, ended

sdig pa: Nonvirtue

'dod chags: Attachment

'dod pa: Proposition, belief

'du shes: Karmic formations

'dzin pa: 1. Grasping 2. (Perceptual) subject

gnod pa: 1. Harm, problem 2. Logic: opposition, objection

rnam pa: 1. Representation 2. Type, kind

rnam pa 'jog pa po: Representationalist

rnam par gcod: Logic: Elimination

rnam par shes pa,

rnam shes: Consciousness

rnam rtog: Discrimination, conceptual discrimination

snang ba: (Dualistic) appearance

spro ba: Enthusiasm, excitement, elaboration

- phas pham,*
pham pa: (Monastic) defeat
phyi: Outer, external
phyi rol pa: Non-Buddhist
bag yod: Concern
dben pa: 1. Solitude 2. Logic: incompatibility, exclusion
sbyor: Practice, application
mi snyan: Complain, unpleasant speech
mi 'thad: Unreasonable
mi nus pa: Untenable, impossible, unable
mi rigs pa: Illogical, not sensible
mu stegs pa: Tīrthika
dmigs pa: 1. Perception 2. Logic: predicate support (see appendix)
smod: Criticize
smra ba: Assert, say, claim
rtsod pa: Disagreement, disputation, objection
gtso bo: Sāṃkhya philosophy: primal substance
tshad ma: Valid cognition
tshor ba: Sensation
mtshan nyid: Essential (as opposed to accidental) characteristic
rdzas yod: Substance
brdzun pa: False
zhi gnas: Calm abiding
zhugs: 1. Enter, engage 2. Logic: (predicate) satisfaction
yid: Conceptual mind
ye shes: Wisdom
yongs su bcad: Positive establishment
rang bzhin: Intrinsic nature (syn. *ngo bo*)
rang rig pa'i shug las,
rig pa'i shugs,
shugs las: Implicit, *a priori*
rig pa,
rigs pa: 1. Awareness, realization 2. Logic, logical, making sense, reasonable
srid pa: Conditioned existence
sred pa: Craving
las kyi sgrib: Karmic obscuration
len pa: Clinging
blo: 1. Conceptual thought 2. Sāṃkhya philosophy: Mirror of Mind

sems pa: Mind, attitude, intention, sentient

sems med: Insentient

bsam gten: Meditation

bsrung: Look after, protect, guard, maintain

shes pa: Understanding, cognizing

shes rab: Wisdom

lhag mthong: Insight

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations

D: *Bka' 'gyur* and *bstan 'gyur* (Derge edition)

H: *Bka' 'gyur* (Lhasa edition)

W: Buddhist Digital Resource Center (tbrc.org)

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Avataṃsaka Sutra, *buddha-avataṃsaka-nāma-mahāvaipūlya-sūtra*, sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen pa'i mdo, D44, H94

Bodhisattva Pitaka Sutra, *ārya-bodhisattva-piṭaka-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*, 'phags pa byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod ces bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, H56

Cloud of Jewels Sutra, *ārya-ratnamegha-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra* 'phags pa dkon mchog sprin ces bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, H232

Dharmasaṃgīti Sutra, *ārya-dharmasaṃgīti-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*, 'phags pa chos yang dag par sdud pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, H239

Display of Completely Definitive Pacification Sutra, *ārya-prasāntaviniścaya-prātiḥārya-samādhi-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*, 'phags pa rab tu zhi ba rnam par nges pa'i cho 'phrul gyi ting nge 'dzin zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, H131

Eight Thousand Verse Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, *ārya-aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*, 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa khri brgyad stong pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, H12

Foundations of Mindfulness Sutra, *ārya-saddharmasmṛty-upasthāna*, 'phags pa dam pa'i chos dran pa nye bar gzhag pa, D287

Mahaparinirvāṇa Sutra, *ārya-mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*, 'phags pa yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo, H368

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Sutra of the Great Lion's Roar of Maitreya, *ārya-maitreya-mahāsiṃhanāda-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*, 'phags pa byams pa'i seng ge'i sgra chen po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, H67

Sutra Requested by Akṣayamati, *ārya-akṣayamati-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*, 'phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, H176

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NOTES

Introduction

1. *Byang chub kyi sems dpa' spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel ba*. Adding an ornamental or poetic title later became customary in the Tibetan tradition, but the title used here follows the extant Indian commentaries, such as that of Prajñākaramati and Vairocanarakṣita, which are styled simply as 'Commentary on the Difficult Points (*dka'* 'grel) of *Caryāvatāra*'. The early Kadampa commentaries found in the *bka'* *gdams gsung 'bum*, such as that of Chapa Chokyi Sengge and Tsangnakpa Tsöndru Sengge (*gtsang nag pa brtson 'grus sengge*), likewise have no ornamental title.
2. Tāranātha, 2004 edition, pp. 214-220.
3. For further biographical details, see Ronald M. Davidson, *Tibetan Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture*, 2005, pp. 338-343 and 359-369.
4. See Dhongthog Rinpoche, 2016, p. 103.
5. Brunnholzl (2004, p. 855, n.47) notes that the original meaning of the Sanskrit term *kleśa* is 'defilement', 'pollution' or 'impurity', while its interpretation as 'affliction' is a later development from which the Tibetan translation *nyon mongs* comes. However, I will offer a few points here concerning the common translation of *kleśa* and *nyon mongs* as kinds of 'emotion'.

The anglophonic conception of emotion has evolved through the Western literary canon, from dramatic and biblical origins through Shakespeare and the 19th-20th century novelists, to present day forms of secular drama and entertainment, as well having a long and rich history in art, poetry and music. Emotions in this tradition are related conceptually to expressions of the things we care about. Emotions include jealousy (*Othello*), pride (*Coriolanus*), rage and bitterness (*Lear*), humiliation and shamelessness (*Falstaff*), guilt (*Henry IV*) and romantic love (*Romeo and Juliet*), to name but a few. There are many more. The limits of what counts as an emotion are not definitively circumscribed. The Buddhist term '*kleśa*' has had a variety of uses and formulations throughout the two and a half millennia of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna traditions, but is usually circumscribed to a specific number (e.g. the 'three poisons' or 'five poisons', the 'six root and twenty subsidiary' *kleśas*) and is always grounded in a soteriological context. Perhaps the lack of circumscription among the emotions provides the motivation for sometimes translating '*kleśa*' as a specific *kind* of emotion, such as '*disturbing emotion*' or '*negative emotion*'. Nevertheless, certain *kleśas* are not any kind of emotion. If the *kleśas* are specified as including attachment and aversion, these are not emotions in the ordinary sense of the English word, but attitudes or prejudices. If the *kleśas* include desire, then this may include sexual desire, hunger, ambition, thirst, greed, avarice, covetousness etc., some of which are not emotions. Of the six root and twenty secondary *kleśas*, several are not emotions, such as ignorance, doubts, wrong views, laziness, unalertness, lack of faith, heedlessness and forgetfulness (for a full list of these *kleśas* in English, see Jamgon Mipham Rinpoche, 2004, p. 25 - 29). There is something awry, it seems, in calling ignorance or laziness a '*disturbing emotion*'.

It is because there is an important logical or conceptual difference between '*kleśa*' and 'emotion' that we should keep these two concepts apart and not conflate them, even metaphorically or metonymically. Etymologically, the English

word ‘emotion’ is related to motion, being *moved* to feel something or *motivated* to act. Motion is not a truly distinctive characteristic of the emotions, however, for intellectual and cognitive capacities such as knowledge, belief and perception—which are in no sense emotions—are also conceptually related to motivation and action: emotional, intellectual and cognitive capacities are all *reasons* for action. However, while actions based on intellectual and cognitive capacities (as well as their opposites or absences, such as ignorance, disbelief and misperception) can be carried out with indifference, casualness and disinterest, actions based on emotions cannot. Emotions and their related actions *express what we care about* and are conceptually coupled to personal interest and intensity of feeling. It is because of this distinctive characteristic that the emotions conceptually exclude certain kleśas. For, unlike the emotions, the kleśas express not only what we care about (hence attachment, craving, desire, aversion, hatred, anger, jealousy, pride and so forth) but also, and essentially, they express what we do *not* care about and what we are unmoved, unmotivated, unconcerned and unaffected by. This is our unawareness, ignorance, unconcern, indifference, lack of compassion and so forth towards certain (most) objects and beings. The English term ‘emotion’ logically excludes all these but they comprise an essential part of the kleśas. Indeed it is clear that the kleśas comprise not only many emotions but also many unemotional capacities and dispositions, intellectual, cognitive and otherwise. To think of the kleśas as ‘emotions’ of any kind is to obfuscate or exclude these, which are some of the most important and powerful kleśas.

Nevertheless, certain kleśas, such as anger, pride and jealousy, are emotions. There is also a functional sense in which the emotions and kleśas overlap, and it is particularly well evidenced in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Emotions express what we care about but allow a normative gap to exist between what we *actually* care about and what we *ought to* care about. We are taught from an early age to refine and improve the things we care about and thus to handle our emotions properly and with appropriate maturity. For example, when a child refuses to share its toys or throws a tantrum over some slight proscription, or is aggressive towards another child, we correct this behaviour and the child matures. As adults, we often criticize and justify the feeling of certain emotions, including negative emotions such as anger and pride, to ourselves and to others according to circumstances. Feeling a certain emotion is often answerable to reasons—we are responsible, to a degree, for our emotions, and we can give reasons for feeling certain emotions, positive or negative. Emotions ought to be felt for the right reasons towards the right objects on the right occasions to the right degree. (This way of putting it has its origins in Aristotle, but acceptance of the connection between the emotions and reasons has been obscured in modernity by the persistent influence of empiricism, rationalism and neo-Stoicism, all of which have characterized the relationship between reason and emotion primarily as one of opposition.) To fail in any these can make us subject to criticism or censure but, when maintained properly, our emotions are *reasonable*, even though we cannot feel emotions at will. This is not true of all emotions: romantic love, for example, is licensed liberally in societies influenced by the Western canon. On the other hand, anger and pride, which are concerns of chapters 6 and 7 respectively in the present text, are usually treated, in the canon as in ordinary life, as being supported by good or bad reasons. Equally, *lacking* the proper emotions makes one liable to criticism. Emotional underreaction, lack of compassion, pity or sympathy makes one ‘unfeeling’ or ‘heartless’, even ‘sociopathic’, even outside of the Mahāyāna. In the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* we see an emotional education in pride, anger, desire, selfishness and ignorance, and the inculcation of mindfulness, patience, compassion and bodhicitta, all based on justification and criticism—*reasonableness*, as before but now from the Mahāyāna

perspective. The warrants and justifications are being changed to a higher set of norms than those applied outside of the Mahāyāna. The usual reasons we give for, say, getting angry ('I don't deserve to be treated this way') or acting selfishly ('I deserve to have this'), or lacking compassion ('he deserves what he's got coming to him, why should I care?') or feeling proud ('I really am very clever') are no longer deemed reasonable or justifiable. For bodhisattvas, there is *no* excuse, reason or justification for anger, pride or selfishness, and no excuse for lacking compassion. Therefore, the emotions, as feelings for which it is possible, by the application of reasons, to bridge the gap between what we do feel and what we ought to feel, are similar to the kleśas. Nevertheless, the kleśas ought to be distinguished from the emotions, which are more numerous and more various, and yet which lack part of what is essential—the indifferent and unmotivated responses of ignorance and unawareness. These reflections on the nature of the emotions are informed by Peter Hacker's thorough analysis of them in *The Passions: A Study of Human Nature* (2018).

1. In Praise of Bodhicitta

1. *Dgos 'brel yan lag bzhi*, Skt. anubandha-catuṣṭaya: an explanatory system from the Sanskrit literary tradition concerning the purpose of a textual composition. The four branches are the explanandum (*brjod bya*) or topic to be explained, the immediate purpose (*dgos pa*) or reason for explaining, the metapurpose (*dgos pa'i dgos pa*) or reason why the immediate purpose is sought and the relation ('*brel ba*), i.e. how the explanans (*rab tu byed* or *rjod byed*) relates to or brings about the immediate purpose. These 'implicit' points are set out by Sonam Tsemo after the explaining the first three 'explicit' points.
2. These three points are based on Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* (D406, pp.30-31), a system widely followed in explanatory texts, e.g. in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālankāravatīloka*. See Buton's description of this system in Obermiller, 1931, pp. 71-2. Vasubandhu also adds 'connections between sections' (*mtshams sbyar*) and 'objections and replies' (*brgal ba dang lan*) to these three points. All five are present throughout the text, though these three are emphasized in the introductory section.
3. Lhopa Rinchen Pal expands on this topic in some detail (pp. 23-26). Here I have slightly elaborated the outline given by Sonam Tsemo based on these comments.
4. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 26) notes the standard (*sor bzhag*) Tibetan translation of 'Sugata' is *bde gshegs*, i.e. 'one gone to bliss', which treats the syllable 'su' of 'Sugata' as signifying 'sukha' (bliss, Tib. *bde ba*). However, he gives examples where Tibetans translate 'su' not as *bde ba* but as *legs pa* (excellence, beauty, goodness) and thus explains the meaning of 'Sugata' as 'those who have gone (to abandonment and realization) excellently'. In the extant Tibetan editions of Sonam Tsemo's text, this point is not clear; rather the three terms 'excellent', 'without exception' and 'irreversible' all seem related to 'su'. This is probably a typographical error caused by a subsequent repetition of *legs pa* in relation to 'gata', omission of repetition being the most common detectable typographical error throughout the present text. Hence, I have altered this passage slightly in light of Lhopa Rinchen Pal's explanation.
5. According to certain śrāvaka doctrines, continuity of their vows has a subtle physical form while maintained. See Sapan, *A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes*, trans. Rhoton, p. 73 n.1. Note the Tibetan text has *spong ba* here, a misprint for *sbyong ba*.
6. See note 1 in this chapter.

7. The three aspirations of the main part of the bodhisattva vow—the aspiration to give up all, to be an inexhaustible source of goodness and to be the causes of enjoyment. See chapter 3.
8. This verse in Śāntideva's text is a quote from the *Samādhiraṇḍa Sutra*. See also *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, pp. 329-330.
9. Ibid., appearing as the last of the text's twenty-seven root verses.

In Praise of Bodhicitta (2)

1. *Bram ze rgyal ba'i drod kyi skye mched kyi rnam par thar pa'i gzhung*, found in the *Avatamsaka Sutra*, wherein the bodhisattva Sudhana receives instruction from over fifty teachers, including Brahmin Jayosmayatana, a non-Buddhist ascetic practising heat endurance by sitting among four large fires. The sutra provides a list of eight difficulties (the difficulties of acquiring the opposite of the eight non-freedoms, of acquiring human birth itself, of acquiring pure and abundant freedoms, of the Buddha appearing, of unimpaired senses, of hearing the Buddhadharma, of associating with holy persons and of meeting pure spiritual friends), of which the first and third are referred to here. See *The Flower Ornament Scripture: A Translation of the Avatamsaka Sutra*, p. 1218.
2. *Chos 'dir gtogs pa la 'jug pa*, c.f. Lhopa Rinchen Pal, *rnam gzhag 'dir la 'jug pa* (p. 40)

In Praise of Bodhicitta (3)

1. *Gzung ba'i cho ga*—later this section is styled more generally as 'Generating bodhicitta in one's stream of being'.
2. To kill one's father, mother, or an arhat, to maliciously shed the blood of a Buddha, or to cause a schism in the saṅgha.
3. H94, p. 248b
4. See *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, pp. 10-12.
5. This is a reference to Jetāri's text, *A Ritual for Generating Bodhicitta and Receiving the Commitments* (D3968). In Jetāri's liturgy (p. 243a), one first vows three times to 'take hold of the mind of aspiration and application', and then vows three times to undertake the bodhisattva training:

‘Just as the Sugatas of the past
Generated bodhicitta,
And maintained bodhicitta,
At all times,
Likewise for the benefit of beings,
I will generate bodhicitta,
And likewise at all times,
I will maintain bodhicitta.’

Recite this three times to take hold of the bodhicittas of aspiration and application. When one has the stability in holding this bodhisattva vow, this vow is given:

‘Just as the Sugatas of the past
Held the bodhisattva trainings—
Gradually practising
Training in bodhicitta,
Likewise for the benefit of beings,
I, too, will hold the vow of enlightenment’

And likewise I will gradually
Practise the trainings."

'Recite this three times to take the vow.'

Jetāri's ritual is based on v3.23-24 of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and Jetāri himself is considered a lineage holder of Śāntideva's vow (see e.g. Lhopa Rinchen Pal, p. 76) but, nevertheless, differs slightly from Sonam Tsemo on treating application bodhicitta as protection from decline rather than the latter's 'pursuit of the means to achieve the result'.

6. The practice of generating application bodhicitta, as distinct from undertaking the bodhisattva training, is not emphasised in the present text. However it is taught elsewhere, just as the practice of generating aspiration bodhicitta is often taught separately. See Sapan, *Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, trans. David Jackson (2015), pp. 412-413. Lhopa Rinchen Pal concurs that application bodhicitta is not the training itself and cites Sapan:

'My own lama said, "For the Ācārya [Śāntideva], the vow of aspiration is the promise to complete the bodhisattva training [*bslabs pa mtha' dag gzung ba*] and the vow of application is the promise to practise in accord with that undertaking [*ji ltar gzung ba ltar spyad pa*]."' Some say that application is the training itself, however that is not correct. That is taught separately, as Ācārya Asaṅga explains [in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*]... Therefore, aspiration and application bodhicitta are the pursuit [*don du gnyer*] of the result and pursuit of the conduct which is the means for the result.' (p.51-52)

Lhopa Rinchen Pal adds that according to Sapan, it is not merely that the intention of aspiration bodhicitta is incomplete without application, but that aspiration and application are generated and maintained separately.

7. These three 'bases' (*brten*) or 'supports' (*gzhi*) are set out in the opening section of Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. See *The Bodhisattva Path to Unsurpassed Enlightenment: A Complete Translation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi*, pp. 3-5.
8. The version of these lines in the Kangyur more clearly distinguishes the generation of bodhicitta from the training in accord with the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*:

'Son of noble family, it is very rare for a sentient being to generate the unsurpassable, completely perfect bodhicitta. For those who have generated the unsurpassable, completely perfect bodhicitta, it is even rarer for them to undertake the bodhisattva conduct.' (H94, 94b-95a.2)

'To undertake the conduct' (*spyod pa yongs su tshol ba*) is, in Sonam Tsemo's version of this quotation, *spyod pa don du gnyer*, and in Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 51) *spyod pa chas pa*.

9. *Lhan cig skyes pa'i lha*
10. H129, p. 182b.4-182b.5
11. H72, 352b.4
12. H131, 331b.6-7

2. Confession of Faults

1. This suggests the existence of a commentary by Ratnākaraśānti (c. 1000 CE) at the time of Sonam Tsemo, though no such text is known. It may be one of the anonymous Indian commentaries on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (see Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 831). If someone were to make a careful comparison the relevant passages in these texts (indicated here and at chapter 5, note 14), the author of one them might be discovered to be Ratnākaraśānti.
2. Causal refuge (*rgyu'i skyabs 'gro*), taking refuge in the Three Jewels as objects who provide protection, is juxtaposed with resultant refuge ('*bras bu'i skyabs 'gro*'),

- indicated below as taking refuge in buddhahood as the state to be attained.
3. These two lists are found together in Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi-viniścayasaṃgraha*, styled as the 'perfected practice of refuge' (*yang dag pa'i bsgrubs*) and 'perfecting practice' (*yang dag par bsgrubs*), respectively. See W1PD95844, p. 465. The former list is also found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. See *Abhidharmasamuccaya: The Compendium of the Higher Teaching*, trans. Walpola Rahula and Sara Boin-Webb, p. 46.
 4. *Dge bsnyen*, i.e. lay holder of the prātimokṣa vows.
 5. H368, 183b.2-3
 6. The pervasion here is the universally quantified conditional, 'Whatever passes away will never be seen again.' See appendix for details of logical subject, pervasion, etc., in the context of logic.
 7. *Mahāyānasūtrālankāra*, ch.10 v.8. See *Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutras: Maitreya's Mahāyānasūtrālankāra with Commentaries by Khenpo Shenga and Ju Mipham*, p.189.
 8. Sapan, *sdom gsom rab byed*, chapter 1, verse 204-5: 'Therefore, the sutras and śāstras explain evil deeds with two classifications: inherent misdeeds and attendant misdeeds. Inherent misdeeds are misdeeds for all beings, while attendant misdeeds are subsequent downfalls attendant to [vows].' See Sapan, *A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes*, trans. Rhoton, 2002, p.67.

3. Fully Holding Bodhicitta

1. I have corrected an apparent textual corruption here, where two similar references to the root text have been elided— '*bdag la zhes pa dang*' should be repeated to indicate both 3.15c and 3.16a.
 2. See commentary and notes to v1.16. Though Sonam Tsemo references Jetāri here, there remains a slight difference in their understanding of application bodhicitta. Jetāri and Sonam Tsemo agree however that the two parts of v3.23-24 are: (1) generating both aspects of bodhicitta together—aspiration and application, and (2) undertaking the training, which is distinct from generating (application) bodhicitta.
- Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 78) and other commentators have noted that taking the vows of aspiration and application together in this way is characteristic of the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna lineage of the vow, while taking them separately is characteristic of the Maitreya-Asaṅga lineage. Thus if the second part of the vow comprised application bodhicitta, then Jetāri's system, which separates it, would violate the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna (Madhyamaka) tradition of the vow.
3. These causes of losing the prātimokṣa vows are listed by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmaśāśa*. See Sapan, *A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes*, trans. Rhoton, p.41 and p.74, n.2.
 4. While a defeat (*phas pham pa*, Skt. *pārājika*) warrants expulsion from the monastic sangha, a resembling downfall has only the appearance of a violation of the vow. Resembling downfalls are presented in detail below, at the beginning of chapter four.
 5. The prātimokṣa, bodhisattva and *vidyādhara* vows. See Sapan, *A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes*, trans. Rhoton.
 6. H232, p. 21b.4-21b.5
 7. *Spang ba'i sems pa*. Though some editions of the text have this as *sems dpa'* (and the term is even repeated), the edition with *sems pa* is evidently correct as can be seen from its close resemblance to Gampopa's discussion of this topic in the *Ornament of Precious Liberation*, which uses the term '*sems pa*'. That resemblance also suggests a common Kadampa origin for these points.

8. According to the vinaya, following the ceremony of full ordination (*bsnyen rdzogs pa*, Skt. upasampadā), the monk preserves the over two hundred rules of monastic observance. After ten years, he may become an 'elder monk' (*gnas pa brten pa*, Skt. sthavira) who gains certain distinct obligations as well as being relieved of certain others.
9. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, v5.102
10. *Sdom pa sna 'ga' spyod pa tsam*
11. The five exemptions (*nges pa lnga*), are restrictions upon or exceptions to the maintenance of the vow for specific individuals, acts, places, times or circumstances. See Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakosabhāsyam*, trans. Leo M. Pruden (English), vol. 2, p. 609-610:

'He who undertakes [any of the five exemptions] does not acquire the discipline [i.e. vow]; rather, he does a good action similar to the acquisition of the discipline.'

The suggestion is that since the training is intermittent (c.f. *Bodhicaryāvatāra* v1.18-19) the exemption of time is present. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 79), who repeats much of this section on 'method', adds a reference to Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi-viniścayasamgraha* in which vows of abandonment are distinguished as lesser, middling, greater and perfected according to the limits of their duration, scope, etc. and says that here one should train in applying antidotes in a similar way. See also Sapan's comments on the bodhisattva prātimokṣa:

'Train in abstaining from the ten nonvirtuous deeds by gradually accustoming yourself to longer and longer periods of practice...' (*Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, trans. David Jackson, p. 432)
12. In the *Śikṣī-samuccaya*, Śāntideva relates this as follows:

'On this topic, one should not be afraid to take a vow that lasts for all time due to concern about downfalls that may occur in another life, for, in the *Aspiration Prayer of Akṣobhya*, it says:

"When the Tathāgata Akṣobhya was still a bodhisattva, he said this:
 'If in all my future births I am not ordained, I will have lied to the
 Blessed Ones, the Buddhas.
 Intelligent ones may purify
 One life through effort,
 But they will purify the rest of their lives
 Through understanding.'" (*The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣī-samuccaya*, pp. 15-16)
13. Deceiving the lama or those worthy of offerings, causing someone to regret something which should not be regretted, disparaging a bodhisattva who is generating bodhicitta, conducting oneself with pretense and deceit. See Sapan, *Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, trans. David Jackson (2015), pp. 412-413.
14. '*gro ba gzhān gyi rnām rten dge slong gi 'du shes med pa*. Karma Thinley Rinpoche confirmed that this refers to cases such as gods, eunuchs, etc. to whom celibacy does not apply.
15. In certain extreme circumstances, misdeeds such as killing may be committed by bodhisattvas who have a perfectly pure intention. See the section on 'Inherent misdeeds in the moral conduct of the vow' at the beginning of chapter four.
16. While the text here adds *de 'dus ma byas pa yin pa'i phyir* ('because of its being non-composite'), this appears to be a corruption, when compared to Lhopa Rinchen Pal who has *de'ang byas yod yin pas so*, 'because that very function exists' (p. 84).
17. *Shes pa rang bzhin du ma gnas*: the general condition which includes 'beings who are unable to hold a monastic position' (see chapter 3, note 14).
18. Several examples are given in the vinaya texts of Upananda misrepresenting the scriptures in order to trick others, typically old monks (*rgan zhugs*, Skt. mahallaka),

- into violating the monastic rules for his personal gain.
19. Lhopa Rinchen Pal, p. 85.
 20. *Mos pa spyod pa ba*, i.e. the second of the five paths of the Mahāyāna. See e.g. Sapan, *Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, chapter 11.

4. Concern

1. These are given in the *Ākāśagarbha Sutra* and quoted in full by Śāntideva in the *Śikṣāt-samuccaya*. See *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣāt-samuccaya*, pp. 63-68.
2. *Bzlog pa*, c.f. *cho ga 'jam pos bzlogs* in Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 102).
3. *Nyes pa sbom po*, i.e. not a downfall but nevertheless an extremely negative action.
4. *Cho ga btsan po yod kyang sbyor ba las bag yangs su byas*, i.e. a dispensation on the prohibition of killing etc. can apply but only under very special circumstances such as in this example. This type of fault has a homonymic parallel in the vinaya, mentioned in e.g. Dharmamittra's commentary on the *Vinayasūtra*:

'A formal rule [*cho ga btsan po*] is a strict observance [*bkas bcad dam po*] specified by the Bhagavān, such as bathing in the two-weeks of the full moon which, if not confessed, is a root downfall. There are certain circumstances when this observance is dispensed: during the rainy season, during an illness, when working, when going on a journey, during heavy wind or rain. One may dispense with it at that time.' (D4120, p. 368b-369a).

In the Mahāyāna, practising the dispensation when it does not apply is a 'heavy fault' of the bodhisattva vow, whereas in the vinaya it is a downfall of the monastic vows.

5. A resembling downfall is an act or omission which seems to be a downfall but is not actually one. A resembling non-downfall is an act or omission which seems to be permissible but is in fact a downfall.
6. The implied attendant misdeed here is destroying plants, one of the monastic rules that can be repaid by confession.
7. Lhopa Rinchen Pal, p. 103:

'If it was possible to benefit them in some other way but one gave up samādhi, it is practising a dispensation even though a formal rule is available. If in order to accomplish their vast benefit, one abandons yoga, it is resembling downfall. If one remains in yoga having abandoned their benefit, it is a resembling non-downfall.'

8. Lhopa Rinchen Pal, p. 103:
9. In other commentaries, line 4.3d is explained as unhesitatingly practising the bodhisattva conduct, e.g. Prajñākaramati (W21708, p. 79): 'What doubts could remain? Therefore, it is logical to exert oneself fully in such a promise.'
- C.f. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 88): 'Although one may have promised to do something which one has not examined, one should examine it, i.e. analyse whether or not it is beneficial.'
10. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 89) has 'Bhimasena'.

11. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p.89-90) identifies the *Great Commentary* ('grel chen las) as the source of this opinion. Prajñākaramati's *Great Commentary* relates that Ārya Śāriputra abandoned perfect enlightenment but, attaining the 'enlightenment of the śrāvakas', worked for many aeons to benefit sentient beings who were the objects of his former vow to liberate them from samsāric suffering (W21708, pp. 81-82). Sapan notes that the śrāvakas had a tradition of 'generating bodhicitta' (*sems bskyed*) where they resolved to attain the results of arhat, pratyekabuddha or Buddha but this tradition had declined (see Sapan, *A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes*, trans. Rhoton, p.81). For comments on whether 'grel chen' is indeed W21708, see chapter 6, note 14.
12. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (pp. 89-90) adds,
 'My own lama [Sapan] said that since such cases are inconceivable, one should never abandon bodhicitta... In the *White Lotus of Holy Dharma Sutra* (H116, p.52-53) Śāriputra's final enlightenment as the completely perfect Buddha Padmaguru [c.f. 'Padmaprabha (*padma'i 'od*' in H116)] is predicted. Since it is impossible for a Buddha not to previously generate bodhicitta, it seems Śāriputra only appeared to abandon [bodhicitta].'
13. From the *Eight Thousand Verse Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* (H12, 278b). That version has 'morality' (*tshul khrims*) in place of 'the development of bodhicitta' in the third line.
14. I.e. the 'four similar defeats' (*pham pa'i gnas lta bu bzhi*): According to the tradition (see e.g. Sakya Pandita, *Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, trans. David Jackson, p. 412-413), there are four specific acts which violate the bodhisattva vow. They are 'similar' to the four defeats of the śrāvakas in that they constitute breakages of a vow, but they differ in that the bodhisattva vow, unlike the Hinayāna vows, can be retaken and restored. Thus, abandoning the vow simpliciter is more serious than breaking the vow by these four means.
15. H332, p. 392b

5. Clear Comprehension

1. H232, p. 129b
2. The 'women' here are explained by other commentators including Prajñākaramati (W21708, p. 104) and Thokme Zangpo (W1KG1795, p. 64) to be denizens of the Śālmari (or Śālmali) hell, who entice one into tortures, manifesting as the result of sexual misconduct. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 95) glosses the point as 'one's own nonvirtues are the appearances of mind' and gives a quote from the same sutra:
 'One's mind is an enemy, a great enemy. There is no enemy other than the mind. Just like a stick on fire will burn itself, one's own mind is burned by mind itself.'
 See also Śāntideva's reference to this in *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, pp. 240-241.
3. This section heading was previously given as 'The reason ('thad pa) for guarding the mind'.
4. *Tshangs skud*, known as yajnopavita.
5. *Skyes po bslu ba'i sgyu sum cu so gnyis*—Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 97) uses a similar expression, *skyes po bslu ba'i sgyu thabs sum bcu rtsa gnyis dang ldan pa*.
6. Restrictions on monastic eating times are dispensed with in certain cases of sickness and famine. The downfall is afterwards, when the sickness or famine is removed and the monk neglects to apply the restriction again.
7. Sonam Tsemo has *rjes su bstén pa* ('serve') here, while the root text is normally *rjes su brtan pa* ('instruct'), i.e. receive teachings.

8. *Rang bzhin*, i.e. body or mind. Some editions of the Tibetan text erroneously have *rang bzhin med*. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 98) has *rang bzhin*.
9. H176, 209b
10. The text has giving (*sbyin pa*) here, but presumably the intent is to match v5.42d. Lhopa Rinchen Pal, on this same point, has moral conduct (p. 99).
11. There is a minor textual corruption here, with three headings indicated but only two given. I have replaced the missing second heading based on Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 99) who, in the other headings, has followed Sonam Tsemo.
12. Here I have followed Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 101) for whom *lus kyi spyod pa* (bodily conduct) becomes *las kyi spyod pa* (conduct of action) and by whom the titles of sections two and three are reversed. Since this seems to fit the content here better than having section two entitled 'bodily conduct', I have assumed a typographical error in the Tibetan version of Sonam Tsemo's text.
13. I.e. six antidotes correlating to the six perfections.
14. See chapter 2, note 1. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 104) also gives this quote.
15. *Ma dad pa'i gnas mang ba*: The translation of this expression is informed by Lhopa Rinchen Pal's comment (p.105), '*gzhän ma dad pa dang nyes spyod gyi rgyur 'gyur bas skyes pa med par zhes so'*: "Unaccompanied" becomes a cause of lacking faith and negative conduct in others.'
16. In Prajñākaramati (W21708, p. 137): '*dpung pa gnyi ga mnyam pa ste dus gcig tu mi mnye ba'o*', i.e. shoulders or upper arms.
17. The text here mentions only confession and dedication, but since Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 106) and other commentators have confession, rejoicing and dedication, I have assumed a typographical error.
18. H67, p. 175
19. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 106):
 'Therefore, because one should subdue [*tshar gcad*] and protect others and be knowledgeable oneself, one should endeavour in this.'
20. Sadaprarudita's extraordinary devotion and dedication to receiving the Prajñāpāramitā teachings from the bodhisattva Dharmodgata are related in, e.g. Patrul Rinpoche, *Words of My Perfect Teacher*, pp. 153-157.
21. The passage on Śrisambhava in the *Avataṃsaka Sutra* (H94, p. 227b) contains the detailed instructions given by the boy and girl bodhisattvas Śrisambhava and Śrimati to Sudhana, including the famous instruction:
 'Noble son, you should look upon yourself as sick, the spiritual friend as the doctor, the teaching as medicine and practice as the cure.' (*The Flower Ornament Scripture: A Translation of the Avatamsaka Sutra*, pp. 1444-1452)
22. As noted above, these are also quoted in full by Śāntideva in chapter four of the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*. See *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, pp. 63-68.
23. This refers to the *Śikṣā-samuccaya* and the *Sutra-samuccaya* of Śāntideva and two works of the same titles by Nāgārjuna, of which only Śāntideva's *Śikṣā-samuccaya* (D3940) and Nāgārjuna's *Sutra-samuccaya* (D3934) are extant.

6. Patience

1. See commentary to verse 6.11
2. Primal substance is *gtso bo* (Skt. *prakṛti*). Individual consciousness is *skye bu* (Skt. *puruṣa*).
3. Universal flow is '*gro ba* or '*gro ba thams cad* (Skt. *jagat*). Manifestations are *gsal ba* or *rnam 'gyur* (Skt. *vikāra*).

4. Outer objects and inner experiences exist like reflections within the two sides of a double-sided mirror, which is itself a material evolution of the primal substance. According to Mipham (*The Wisdom Chapter: Jamgon Mipham's Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of The Way of the Bodhisattva*, p. 133), the 'Great One' itself is the mirror of mind.
5. The Great One (*chen po* or *blo*, Skt. *mahat* or *buddhi*) is the first evolution of the disequilibrium of the primal matter. Pride, *nga rgyal*, means misidentifying the manifestations as self. The five bare elements, *de tsam*, are sounds, smells, tastes, touchables and colours. The five elements, *'byung ba*, are the gross elements of fire, water, earth, air and space. The eleven organs, *dbang po*, are the five senses, five action organs and the mind (*yid*). These twenty-three manifestations, in addition to the primal substance and the individual consciousness, comprise the twenty-five ontological enumerations of this school. See commentary to v9.127 for a more detailed description of this system.
6. The example of the self autonomously creating harm relates to the chapter topic, i.e. patience, and section topic, i.e. 'Stopping impatience with the establishment of suffering for oneself' etc.
7. *Blo sngon du btang*, cognates *blo sngon du gtong ba'i sems pa*, *bsam blo sngon nas gtong ba*, *blo sngon du btang ba*, Skt: buddhī-purvaka, 'preceded by design, intentional' or 'preceded by intelligence' (Monier-Williams). This term is used in Sonam Tsemo's discussion of the Naiyāyikas.
8. Though the text here has 'not matter' (*bems po yang ma yin*), the negation must be a typographical error, for it would not accord with the Naiyāyika doctrine (e.g. Prajñākaramati: '*sems pa med pa yang sems med pa'i rang bzhin te bem po zhe bya ba'o*', W21708, p. 163) or indeed Sonam Tsemo's own subsequent remarks (see commentary to v9.68).
9. The pervader is 'gradual and instantaneous function'. It not supported by the sempiternal self.
10. Qualification: 'The sempiternal self has no gradual or instantaneous function.'
11. Pervasion: 'Whatever has no (gradual or instantaneous) function is not an agent (producing an effect).'
12. The ability to change is not supported by the sempiternal self.
13. Qualification: 'The sempiternal self is unchanging.'
14. In support of this point, Sonam Tsemo quotes the root text at v6.27b here as '*bdag ces rtag pa'*, i.e. 'sempiternal self', rather than the more usual '*bdag ces brtags pa*', i.e. 'designated self', found in the extant Tibetan editions of the root text. Lhopa Rinchen Pal, (p. 116) reiterates Sonam Tsemo's point here and attributes it to the author of the *Great Commentary* (*grel chen mkhan po*). However, he corrects v6.27b to 'designated self'. In the extant Tibetan translation of Prajñākaramati's *Great Commentary*, v6.27b is quoted as '*brtags pa*' (W21708, p. 162) but the treatment of this line seems to be associated with the Sāṃkhyas and not the Naiyāyikas. However, this is the only notable point of difference among several points of direct correspondence between the 'author of the *Great Commentary*' and the extant Tibetan edition of the *Great Commentary* (see chapter 9, note 27). Within the present section, the three topics identified by Sonam Tsemo—refuting the primal substance, manifestations and individual consciousnesses—correspond with Prajñākaramati's commentary. Here they are represented with formal logic, which is absent from Prajñākaramati, but this is a difference of style rather than substance. The Tibetan colophon to the *Great Commentary* (W21708, p. 534) notes that chapters 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9 were translated by the Indian pandita Sumatikirti and the Tibetan translator Darma-drak (dar ma grags), while the remaining chapters, including the present one, were translated by one Lodro Zangdragpa (blo gros bzang grags pa). It is possible a version of chapter six of the *Great Commentary*

- other than the extant Lodro Zangdragpa translation was available to Sonam Tsemo.
15. The primal substance supports the ‘contrary’ property of being material, i.e. contrary to intentionality.
 16. The individual consciousness does not support the property of being a creator.
 17. The creator of experience is temporary.
 18. The text here indicates six but gives only five headings. I have treated the title of the fifth section as the missing one and replaced it. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 119) uses a different schema here, so his text cannot be consulted.
 19. Previously this heading was ‘...the production of negative actions towards my side’.
 20. The text here has ‘*gzhan la mi 'dod pa'*, but it is evidently correct in Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 122) as ‘*gzhan la mi gnod pa'*.
 21. Pervasion: ‘Whatever is a cause of virtue is not an obstruction to merit.’
 22. H239, 97b.7

7. Effort

1. H232, p.33a. Sonam Tsemo adds ‘and so forth’ here, i.e. the passage continues, as quoted in the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*:

‘They did not attain enlightenment while already being tathāgatas. In the same way, I shall strive and in the same way I shall practise diligently. With effort shared with all sentient beings, with effort that takes all sentient beings as its object, I will completely awaken to unsurpassable complete enlightenment.’ (*The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, p. 58)

2. Reverse pervasion: ‘Where there is no virtue, the cause (i.e. motivation) was absent.’ Forward pervasion: ‘Where there is motivation, the result will be present.’
3. H94, 174a. That version is slightly more descriptive and hence longer than the one quoted here. This sutra passage is also quoted in the *Śikṣā-samuccaya* (D3940, 153a, under v24 of the root verses) in the longer form, though with yet another translation. All the Tibetan editions of Sonam Tsemo’s commentary here erroneously have *ri mo myams* for *ri mi myams* (‘the rugged mountains’).
4. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 135):

‘Weakening other actions means ceasing conduct, i.e. action diminishing the unattained. Weakening results means not attaining the results themselves, i.e. action diminishing the attained.’

C.f. Sthiramati’s *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkārāṭikā* (D4034, 85a.2-3):

‘If a shameless person commits actions such as killing, although he may have virtuous dharmas in the past such as faith and moral conduct, they will be lost. This is called action damaging attained virtuous dharmas (*thob pa las nyams*). Though in future lives one would have attained virtuous dharmas such as faith and moral conduct, they will not be attained. This is called action damaging unattained virtuous dharmas (*ma thob pa las nyams*).’

5. The Tibetan text here has ‘*thad* (logic, reason) for the second heading (the first being *bsten par rigs pa*) but later has *thabs* (means), which is confirmed by Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 136).
6. Just as the defilement of anger can be productively turned against the defilements (v4.29, 4.43 and 6.46), so pride can be productively used against them. The English word ‘pride’ is particularly suitable here in having proper (productive, virtuous) and improper (nonvirtuous, defiled) applications. As Thomas Reid expressed it in his *Essays on the Active Powers of Man* (1788):

'When it is grounded upon a vain conceit of inward worth that we do not possess, it is arrogance and deceit. But when a man, without thinking of himself more highly than he ought to think, is conscious of that integrity of heart, and uprightness of conduct, which he most highly esteems in others, and values himself upon this account; this perhaps may be called pride of virtue, but it is not a vicious pride. It is a noble and magnanimous disposition, without which there can be no steady virtue.' (Quoted in P.M.S. Hacker, *The Passions: A Study of Human Nature*, p. 139. See also pp. 140-151)

7. I have altered the text's apparently erroneous *rkyen nyin* to *rkyen nyen* in accord with Lhopa Rinchen Pal's (p. 137) *nyon mongs nyen gnyen po stobs bskyed*.

8. Meditation

1. Though this section is not listed here, a section of this name is found later covering verses 85-88. Lhopa Rinchen Pal's (p. 145) equivalent section in this list is entitled 'The qualities of solitude', confirming that it belongs here and that its loss in Sonam Tsemo's text is a typographical error.
2. Non-distraction (*mi g.yeng ba*) earlier; here, solitude (*dben pa*).
3. The time taken on the Mahāyāna path to attain buddhahood.
4. Pervasion: 'Whatever is suffering should be abandoned.'
5. Pervasion: 'Whatever is happiness should be established'
6. H129, 200b-222b.
7. *Dpa' bas sbyin*. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 149) has *dpa' sbyin*. H129 has *dpa' bas byin*.
8. The text indicates four sections but only names three; here I have assumed the second one is missing and offered its title.
9. This list is slightly corrupted in the Tibetan text and has been corrected here by reference to Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 155). The first heading was missing and the fifth appeared as two separate sections.
10. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p.156) attributes this interpretation to Puṇyaśrīmitra.

9. Wisdom

1. Sonam Tsemo actually mentions two subsections here—abandoning objections from the relative perspective and from the ultimate perspective. However, he explains later that this distinction, from Ngok Lotsawa, is not correct and adopts the schema presented here.
2. This passage is based on an earlier presentation of the same four *prasaṅgas* by Chapa Chokyi Sengge, formalizing a passage in the third chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana Sutra*. See Tauscher 2003, pp. 213-218. See also Sapan, *Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, trans. David Jackson, pp. 518-519, who gives a brief presentation of the same points.
3. Though I use the generally accepted term 'relative' to translate the Tibetan '*kun rdzob*' (Skt. *saṃvṛtti*), it does not convey the sense of concealment and deception in the original Sanskrit and Tibetan terms. A possible translation of *kun rdzob dben pa* (Skt. *saṃvṛti-satya*) here could be 'deluded truth'; though this term at first glance may seem paradoxical, it captures the sense of delusion *mistaken for truth*. Distinctions can be made within this kind of 'truth': Candrakīrti, for example, distinguishes between clear and defective perceptual faculties (see Lama Jampa Thaye, *Rain of Clarity*, p. 66-67) and elsewhere consensus is invoked as a differentiator. In the present text, a distinction between the 'yogin's relative' and 'ordinary (person's) relative' is invoked, this being the most soteriologically

relevant differentiator. The subtle question of whether the relative truth, especially the relative truth of emptiness, is always a *mere* delusion or whether it can be true in some degree or some sense, is a recurrent concern in the present chapter (see, e.g. v7-8, v106-107, v138-140).

- Though the qualified comprehension of the ultimate by inferential reasoning is a motif of Svātantrika Madhyamaka, Sonam Tsemo does not use the usual Svātantrika term for this—‘approximate ultimate’—but rather distinguishes it from direct perception of the ultimate by calling it an ‘ascertainment’ or ‘making certain’ (*nges pa*), rather than a ‘cognition’ (*shes pa*). In a slightly later Sakya account of the two truths according to Svātantrika Madhyamaka, Sapan says in *Clarifying the Sage’s Intent*:

‘The Svātantrika Mādhyamikas say that each of the two truths are approximate and non-approximate, i.e. four in total: Appearances from the perspective of a non-analytical ordinary person are the non-approximate relative. Truth from the perspective of analysis is the approximate ultimate. Non-conceptual wisdom [*mi rtog pa'i ye shes*] of the three kinds of āryas is the non-approximate ultimate [See notes to v9.15 in the present text for more on this point]. Pure worldly wisdom [*dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes*] is the approximate relative.

‘This is the position that Buddhas possess wisdom, which is certainly not incorrect [*skyon med*] but the Buddhas’ wisdom is beyond existence and nonexistence. Also, the distinction between non-conceptual and pure worldly wisdom is made from the perspective of how we see it, whereas on the level of a Buddha, they are non-dual.’ (W4CZ2193, p. 338)

See also Sapan’s definition of the two truths in the same text:

‘Therefore, in our tradition, the relative is what is established from the perspective of non-analytical conceptual thought [*ma dpyad pa'i blo*], the ultimate is what is not established from the perspective of analytical conceptual thought, and truth [i.e. relative truth and ultimate truth as opposed to merely relative and ultimate] is what is not opposed [*gnod pa med*] from one’s own perspective.’ (ibid. p. 337. See also the translation of these two passages by David Jackson, 2015, pp. 515-517)

- The account that follows is presented provisionally. Subsequently, Sonam Tsemo criticizes certain aspects of it, then gives a revised account. The revision concerns whether the differences between higher yogins and those of lower understanding are direct perceptions (first exegesis) or conceptual/inferential (second exegesis). The first exegesis, which treats them as direct perceptions (or non-conceptual realizations), corresponds with that of Prajñākaramati but is probably intended to also include other Indian and Tibetan exegeses. See chapter 9, note 14.
- Ser skyā* (c.f. *ser skyā gzegs zan* in Lhopa Rinchen Pal, p. 174), the founder of the sāṃkhya school.
- Snang med pa'i shes rab*. Wisdom not having appearances is juxtaposed with conceptual thought (*blo*) which perceives dualistic appearances (*snang med/snang bcas*). This distinction relates directly to a fundamental issue in Mahāyāna philosophy addressed in this chapter—how Buddhas and bodhisattvas can act for the benefit of beings in samsāra without themselves becoming subject to samsāric defilements. ‘Appearance’ in this sense has the essential connotations of delusion, duality and non-analysis, while ‘without appearance’ means non-duality and wisdom. Thus, non-appearance is not to be understood as mere non-perception or an inert blankness of mind incompatible with the active enlightenment of Mahāyāna.
- Pervasion: ‘Whatever is free from singularity and multiplicity has no essence.’
- Qualification: ‘Appearances are free from singularity and multiplicity.’

10. *Gcig dang du ma dang bral ba'i phyir ro / rang bzhin med de gzugs brnyan bzhin.* This syllogism and its formulation closely resemble the first stanza of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṇkārakārikā* (D3884, p. 53a).
11. While the example is mentioned in the root verse, Tibetan logic seems to have loosened this requirement, i.e. syllogisms can be established without one and indeed this is the norm for subsequent syllogistic applications in the present text. See Tillemans, 1999, p. 15.
12. See chapter 9, note 5.
13. See Sonam Tsemo's section headed 'Distinguishing the types of mind', above.
14. Lhopa Rinchen Pal rehearses the two perspectives but does not specify a preference. The first side, attributed to Prajñākaramati's *Great Commentary*, holds that yogins are āryas and ordinary ones are ordinary people and that the objections (or differences) are direct perceptions, with examples used for abandoning those objections. The second side, unattributed though clearly corresponding to Sonam Tsemo's position, claims, 'Yogins are those who accept the Four Seals as the mark of the Buddha's words and take refuge in the Three Jewels and ordinary ones are those who reject this.' In expressing this latter position, Lhopa Rinchen Pal gives a similar objection to the one set out here:
 'Āryas and ordinary people are not appropriate as opponent and objector. If truth distinguishes those on the path of seeing, how are śrāvakas distinct from Cittamātrins and Mādhyamikas? Moreover, how can one object before or after to the ārya wisdom? It is a contradiction to say someone with wisdom which sees the ultimate is [at first] the objected to and [later] the objector.' (ibid. pp. 173-174)
15. Later commentators on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* seem to have overwhelmingly followed Prajñākaramati's explanation without responding to the objection raised here.
16. *Lhan cig dmigs pa'i nges gnod.* Jamgon Ju Mipham (2005, p. 237) mentions this argument, though from the perspective of the Cittamātra school. Here, the objection to the Vaibhāśikas is that a blue object and the cognition of it are simultaneous, so the object cannot be a cause of the cognition, for cause and effect must be ordered in time. The Sautrāntika conclusion is that representations must exist as intermediaries between objects and cognitions.
17. *Skyes la 'dra ba la sogs pa'i yul gyi mtshan nyid bkag pa.* Jamgon Ju Mipham (ibid. p. 236) mentions this argument as refuting imperceptible outer objects as the cause of representations of those objects, such as in the example of pressing the eye and seeing two moons but there only being one moon.
18. *Rnam pa bden pa*, often translated as 'True Aspectarians'.
19. Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamakālaṇkārakārikā*, v29-30, D3884, 8a6-7.
20. Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṇkārakārikā*, v68, D3884, 55b.
21. Kamalaśīla, *Bhavanakrama*, D3916, p. 54a2.
22. The intention is the motive for teaching the indirect meaning. The intentional basis is the teaching device used. The valid cognition refuting the literal interpretation is self-explanatory. See Mathes, 2008, p.13-14.
23. Nāgārjuna, D4158, p. 109b.
24. Pervasion: 'Whatever is illusion-like cannot persist across rebirths.'
25. Pervasion: 'Whatever exists for a long time is real.'
26. Pervasion: 'Whatever is not distinct from samsāra in the pure nature is not distinct from samsāra.'

27. This is Prajñākaramati's *Great Commentary*. Vose (2009b, p. 304) translates 'grel chen mdzad pa' here as 'Great Commentator' and suggests this is Chapa Chokyi Sengge. I believe this can be ruled out. 'Great Commentator' would surely be 'grel pa chen po', while 'grel chen' means *Great Commentary*. For further evidence that Prajñākaramati is the 'grel chen mdzad pa', see notes 14, 57, 90 and 131 to chapter 9. In Sonam Tsemo's commentary, the 'grel chen' is represented as the source of the present objection that Buddhas would be subject to delusion, whereas Prajñākaramati in fact expresses the objection in terms of Buddhas having suffering. This is, however, a distinction that makes no difference, for delusion and suffering are internally related. For an observation on one notable difference between the 'grel chen mdzad pa' and Prajñākaramati, see chapter 6, note 14.

28. C.f. Sakya Pandita, *Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, trans. David Jackson, p. 573–574.

29. Though not an antecedent text, a related criticism of the Prāśangika position is made by Sapan concerning the Buddha's knowledge of relative truth:

'That [Prāśangika] position would be acceptable if the Buddha remained in nirvāṇa and did not have wisdom [of the relative] but, since we do not accept that the Buddha is only in nirvāṇa, it is not logical to say he does not have wisdom [of the relative]. Because of this, [the Prāśangika position] is slightly illogical [*cung zad mi 'thad do*]' (*Clarifying the Sage's Intent*, W4CZ2193, p. 338, my translation.)

Sapan, as mentioned above, also slightly faults the Svātantrika position for reifying the wisdom of the relative. His preferred position is that 'the appearance aspect is relative, the emptiness aspect is ultimate and the indistinguishable [*bdyer mi phyed*] aspect is their unification regardless of the individual [i.e. regardless of whether it is sentient beings, āryas or Buddhas]'. (*ibid.*)

30. In using the term 'we' (*kho bo cag*) here, Sonam Tsemo might be thought to be including himself among the Svātantrikas. I do not think such a conclusion is warranted, for this passage begins with an obvious textual corruption (*rnam bdzun pa'i gnod pa spangs pa dang*, a line belonging to the next page and erroneously copied here) and ends with a quotation or attribution indicator (*zhes bya ba*). Though Sonam Tsemo clearly prefers the Svātantrika position to the Prāśangika one on this point, elsewhere he impartially presents both the Svātantrika and Prāśangika perspectives and represents some of Śāntideva's arguments as prāśangas despite extant Svātantrika exegeses (see his commentary on v9.17 and preceding v9.116). See also the (second) exegesis of v9.4c in which he responds to an objection that any argument or refutation is conceptual and therefore a delusion, an objection which pertains directly to the use of svātantras to prove emptiness. Given his general impartiality in presenting both Svātantrika and Prāśangika perspectives, Sonam Tsemo probably did not strictly consider himself either a Svātantrika or a Prāśangika, a position in accord with that of Sapan in *Clarifying the Sage's Intent*. Even if Sonam Tsemo were to be counted as a Svātantrika, this should not be understood merely as a preference for svātantras over prāśangas, but should be viewed in the broader context of a doctrinal position on how Buddhas, āryas and ordinary beings each perceive relative and ultimate truth (see note 31 below).

31. Lhopa Rinchen Pal also describes both the Prāśangika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka perspectives here but without mentioning the objection to the Prāśangika position, reflecting his teacher Sakya Pandita's impartial stance towards Svātantrika and Prāśangika (see above):

'There are two responses to the objection. According to the Svātantrikas, just as when the causes and conditions of an illusion are not reversed, so it is not reversed, when the causes, etc. of saṃsāra are not reversed, it is not reversed. When the continuity of that which is to be abandoned is reversed, though merely relative, conceptual thought of deluded saṃsāra does not arise, i.e. one abandons

its causes. Therefore, since there is no conceptual wisdom [*rtoq bcas kyi ye shes med*], there is no remaining in samsara and since non-conceptual wisdom is mastered, there is no remaining in nirvana.

'According to the Prasangikas, while on the temporary path one has not exhausted karma etc.—the causes of conceptual thought, the various transmigrations are not stopped. When the temporary resultant unawareness, etc. is interrupted, the Buddha does not master a wisdom with appearances as the merely relative—the first two lines. That he has knowledge of what appears is the illusion-like relative and his knowledge of what is is unelaborated like space. By abandoning the causes of delusion, there is fundamentally nothing to master—the second two lines.' (ibid. p. 183)

Earlier, he describes the different opinions of Asanga, Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti on the relative and ultimate truth and their relation to Buddhas, aryas and ordinary beings, noting the three natures of Asanga's works and the two ultimates of Bhavaviveka. Of Candrakirti, he says,

'Acarya Candrakirti says the Buddha and nirvana are only ultimate, the meditative absorptions of the three aryas are ultimate, but their post-meditation is relative and ordinary people are solely [‘ba’ zhig] relative. In the commentary [dgongs ‘grel, though this quote is also v6.30 of the *Madhyamakavatara* root text, reiterated in the auto-commentary, W1KG3407, p. 180] it says, "Thus, if the worldly had valid cognition, since they would see reality [de nyid mthong], they would already be aryas, so what would be the point of the arya path? It is a contradiction to say the ignorant have valid cognition." He says the conceptual thought which cognizes emptiness, etc. is the yogin's relative... My own lama [Sapan] did not think there was a difference between the intentions [dgongs] of the earlier and later acaryas.' (ibid. p. 172)

Thus, according to Lhopa Rinchen Pal, Candrakirti and Madhyamikas generally allow that the three aryas perceive the ultimate, though only while in meditation and not in post-meditation. Hence, Lhopa Rinchen Pal does not accept the criticism made by Sonam Tsemo that Prasangikas deny that the three kinds of aryas perceive the ultimate. This corresponds with the view of the Sakya hierarch Jetsun Drakpa Gyaltsen (1147-1216) that Svatantrika and Prasangika agree that the cognitions of the three arya are all ultimate when in meditation and relative when in post-meditation (see Tauscher, 2003, p. 210).

The idea that aryas perceive the ultimate in meditation and relative in post-meditation is also found in certain commentators of Candrakirti, including the ninth Karmapa, Wangchuk Dorje (2008, p. 213) and Jamgon Ju Mipham (2002, p. 199). Strictly speaking, Candrakirti's auto-commentary does not mention the meditation/post-meditation (*mnyam gzhag/rjes thob*) distinction in relation to the cognitions of aryas. Rather, in commenting on v6.28, Candrakirti says in the *Madhyamakavatara-bhasya*,

'Sravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas have abandoned defiled vision. Visible objects for them are karmic formations—like reflections, etc., their nature fabricated and untrue because truth is not something pretended. The childish are deluded but, for these others, it is the mere relative, arising through dependent origination, like an illusion. Yet, because of mere unawareness, they still have the essential characteristic of the obscurations of cognizables. These aryas remain within the domain of dualistic appearances. They are not the ones who have mastered the domain without dualistic appearances. Those are the Buddhas, who have achieved complete, perfect enlightenment in all dharmas in all their aspects. Mind and mental events are always in error. Therefore, the Bhagavan taught both relative truth [*kun rdzob kyi bden pa*] and the mere relative [*kun rdzob tsam*]. What is the ultimate of ordinary people [*so so'i skye bo rnams kyi don dam pa*]? It is this mere

relative of āryas whose domain is dualistic appearances. What is the emptiness of the intrinsic nature of that? It is their [the āryas'] ultimate. The ultimate of Buddhas is the natural state itself [*rang bzhin nyid*] and the ultimate truth of those who have no delusion. Each of these should be known separately. Relative truth, because it is a delusion, is not ultimate truth. Therefore, having presented relative truth, ultimate truth is presented. But, because it is inexpressible, is a cognition and is not an object, it is not possible to show it directly but, because it is possible to experience it in one's own mind by hearing about it and its nature being clarified, the examples are taught.' (W1KG3407, p. 173-5)

Here, Candrakīrti in one sense allows that āryas experience the ultimate by saying the 'mere relative' of āryas is ultimate, i.e. 'the ultimate of ordinary people'. This position evolved, perhaps in response to the kind of objection raised here by Sonam Tsemo, into a broad consensus among Candrakīrti's commentators that āryas experience the ultimate whilst in meditation and the relative in post-meditation.

In any case, what is certain is that for the early Sakya Mādhyamikas, a central issue in the Svātantrika-Prāśangika distinction is how relative and ultimate are related to Buddhas, āryas and ordinary beings, respectively. For Buddhas, the controversial or difficult point is their cognition of the relative without being subject to delusion; for ordinary beings, it is their cognition of the ultimate while being subject to delusion and, for āryas, it is both. That the Svātantrika-Prāśangika distinction subsequently, from the fourteenth century onwards, became more focussed on the question of whether the Svātantrikas conceptualize emptiness and reify relative truth through their use of logic and negation was, therefore, a centering of the issue solely around its conceptual characteristics—i.e. how the two truths relate to ordinary beings—and away from the questions which encompass the minds and activities of Buddhas and āryas.

32. Sonam Tsemo uses the term 'Yogācārins' (*rnal 'byor spyod pa*) here as synonymous with the term Vijñaptimātrins (*rnam par rig par smra ba*), used earlier.
33. Pervasion: 'Whatever is non-dual is not aware of itself.'
34. *Bya byed/bya ba*. This not the juxtaposition of *gzung bya/dzin pa*, i.e. beheld/beholder, sometimes translated as object/subject, which relates to primarily to perception. Rather, this juxtaposition relates to acting and being acted upon, so agent/patient is a more accurate dichotomy than subject/object. It should be understood that agency here is not meant in a moral or intentional sense but merely in the sense of active and passive participants.
35. H91, 375b.3
36. H91, 375b.6
37. These are two of the three kinds of reason, i.e. reasoning from a causal property and from an inherent property. See appendix.
38. Forward pervasion from effect to cause: 'Whatever has memory has self-awareness.' Reverse pervasion: 'Whatever does not have self-awareness cannot have memory.'
39. I.e. the reverse pervasion above.
40. Reason: '[Because of] being nonexistent.'
41. Pervasion: 'Whatever is nonexistent has no nature (and hence no function).'
42. Pervasion: 'Whoever is free from duality is a Buddha.'
43. *Don spyi*, which technically can refer to the pramāṇa notion of a universal or abstract object. Less formally, it means any general concept or predicate.
44. Lhopa Rinchen Pal is very brief on these lines: 'Negation depends on a negandum. By its absence, dependent origination.' (p.192)
45. Lhopa Rinchen Pal comments here on the Svātantrika and Prāśangika perspectives on whether Buddhas have primordial wisdom. He comments that the opinion of

his own lama (Sapan) is that the two systems have the same intent and there is no real contradiction. Conceptual thought overcomes conceptual thought like an illusory king defeating another illusory king (*Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* XII.29). Buddha's wisdom, like conceptual thought, is non-arising and presented from the perspective of convention (*Madhyamakīvatāra*, XII.4). He concludes:

'Therefore, objections such as that delusion is not abandoned [by Buddhas] are rejected, as well as the other claims that wisdom is solely equipoise, or an alternation [between equipoise and conceptualization], or that the post-meditation stage is conceptualization, or that kāya and wisdom are distinct. This presents briefly the discrimination of what is reasonable and unreasonable in the nature of omniscience of the three times, etc. Although ultimately all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, relative appearances are unceasing, their nature free from all extremes, the great self. Such is the opinion of my lama.' (ibid., p.193-195)

It is evident here, as above, that the Svātantrika-Prāsangika distinction for early Sakypas essentially concerns the question of the Buddhas' cognition and not merely that of sentient beings.

46. *Sam gu*. In other early Tibetan commentaries, including that of Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 197) and Biston Rinchen Drup (p. 420), this is 'Brahmin Shanku' (*bram ze shang ku*) and later commentators have followed them, thereby identifying the protagonist of this story with the author of a short tantric work on Garuḍa in the Tengyur, *Siddhagaruḍaśāstra*, D3703. According to Pawo Tsuglag Trengwa, 'Brahmin Shangku' was the name given in notes (*zin 'bris*) written by Atīśa Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna (see Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 661, and Pawo Tsuglag Trengwa, W7500, spelt '*bram ze sha ngku*').
47. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 197-198) comments again (see chapter 9, note 31) here on distinction between Prāsangika and Svātantrika doctrines. For the former, the appearances of the Buddha kāyas and wisdoms appear to trainees from the practice of previous bodhisattva conduct and they remain in the vajra-like samādhi without any mental events. Svātantrikas say they exhaust conceptual discrimination (*rnam par rtog pa zad*), but the Buddha kāyas and wisdoms accomplish the benefit of others by manifesting spontaneous and uninterrupted activities—a position with clear affinity to the *Uttaratantrāśāstra*.
48. *Seng ge rnam par rtse ba'i mdo*—this is not to be taken as the *Ārya-maitreya-mahāsiṃhanāda Sutra*, where the quote is not to be found, but is the *Ārya-bodhisattva-pitaka Sutra* (H56), p. 379a. Some commentaries correctly give the *Puṣpakiṭṭadharanī Sutra* (H605, 467b) as an alternative source for this point.
49. Pervasion: 'Offering to the Buddha generates merit.'
50. Though these six sections are listed here, in the subsequent elaboration, section 2 is elided with section 1 and subsequent sections are numbered as 2 to 5.
51. H9, p. 352b and p. 460a, as well as many other similar instances.
52. We find these criteria for the Buddha's teaching in, e.g. *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, v2.5 (D4020, p. 2b). Other commentaries say this is the Buddha's own definition (*sangs ryas gyi bka'*).
53. '*dod chags dang bral ba*', Skt. kamavitaraga, i.e. those who are temporarily reborn outside of the desire realm, in the form or formless realms, which is attainable by non-Buddhist paths.
54. This Dānaśrī is probably to be identified with one Dānaśila who co-translated the first Tibetan edition of Śāntideva's *Śikṣā-samuccaya* during the 8th-9th century and who was invited to Tibet around that time (see *The Sakya School of Tibetan Buddhism: A History*, p. 42, and *The Blue Annals*, p. 229). This is not to be confused with the Dānaśrī who accompanied Śākyasrībhadra to Tibet in the early 13th century.

Dānaśīla is possibly the author of one of the anonymous Indian commentaries on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (see Brunnhölzl, 2004, p. 831). If someone were to make a careful comparison with the relevant passages in these texts (indicated here and at chapter 9, note 72), the author of one them might be discovered to be Dānaśīla.

55. Vibhudatta (*sgur chung*) was an arhat who was unable to take alms due to his negative karma and subsequently died of hunger.
56. *Tshogs drug*, the six kinds of cognition comprising five sense consciousnesses and mental cognition.
57. Prajñākaramati, W21708, p. 397
58. The D3940 edition of the text has:

'This completes the explanation of the foundations of mindfulness. Having prepared the mind in that way, one should then engage in emptiness. Concerning the emptiness of the individual, it is thoroughly established in that way. Because of that, by cutting the root, all the defilements will not arise.' (D3940, p. 133a, my translation. See also *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, p. 233)

This is the edition co-translated by Ngok Loden Sherab (1059-1109), revising the earlier 9th century version of Yeshe De et. al. Sonam Tsemo presumably had access to the Ngok translation, indicating Sonam Tsemo's reference is a paraphrase. The D3940 version of Ngok's translation also elides the extant Sanskrit edition, most notably where 'engage in emptiness' originally reads 'engage in the emptiness of all', i.e. of the individual and of dharmas (see *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, p. 403, n. 1). Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 161), whose quotation of the *Śikṣā-samuccaya* is almost identical to that of Sonam Tsemo, makes the same point. Indeed, the point is later repeated with the comment, 'Others have it explained it in the same way and it is also the opinion of my own lama [Sapan]' (p. 211).

59. The sixth chapter of the *Mādhyamakāvatāra* comprises these two sections, i.e. non-self of dharmas and the individual, in that order. See e.g. *Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakīrti's Mādhyamakāvatāra with Commentary by Jamgon Mipham*, p. ix-x.
60. Though Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 162) also attributes this quotation to the Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmaśā*, it is found in Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi-bhūmivastu* (W1PD95844, p. 206b). Other authors identify its source as a 'scriptural fragment' (*lung sil bu*) or 'sutra fragment' (*mdo sil bu*), e.g. Gampopa, *Ornament of Precious Liberation*, pp. 313-314.
61. See chapter 6, note 4.
62. The Sāṃkhya assert five 'bare elements' (*de tsam Inga*), which correspond to the five senses.
63. Reason: '[Because] it is sempiternal.'
64. Pervasion: 'Whatever is an immutable cognition of sound experiences an immutable, single sound.'
65. *Khyad par du byas*, i.e. the type of sound determines the type of sound cognition.
66. See chapter 6, note 4.
67. *Sens pa gzhan rjes su 'brel ba*, i.e. subsequently 'joined' or 'connected to' a mind.
68. Pervasion: 'Whatever is insentient matter is not an agent.'
69. *Sens can gzhan dang ldan*, i.e. 'have', 'possess', or 'own' a mind. C.f. note 67. Both ways of presenting mind's relation to matter are clearly problematic.
70. See chapter 6, note 7.
71. There are different kinds of ripening karma; the result of maturation refers specifically to the kind of rebirth one takes. Other kinds of ripening karma include the result similar to the action and general results.
72. See chapter 9, note 54.

73. The opposites of the four foundations: the purity of the body, happiness of sensations, permanence of mind and self of dharmas.
74. Lhopa Rinchen Pal:
 'In teaching in detail the meditation of non-self from the perspective of the four foundations, i.e. of the body, sensations, mind and dharmas, each of the four foundations applies to the body, etc. of both self and others... Previously, they were an antidote to decline in conduct under the power of the defilements. Subsequently, they are an antidote to self-grasping under the power of wrong views.' (ibid. p. 211)
- He quotes Maitreya's *Madhyāntavibhāga* v4.1 in support of this perspective on the four foundations of mindfulness (D4021, p.43a).
75. Pervasion: 'Where suffering exists, there cannot be joy.'
76. See chapter 9, note 62.
77. Pervasion: 'Whatever is not experienced is not a sensation.'
78. Sonam Tsemo paraphrases the root verse here with the term *gzhan 'ga'*, 'some other', while some editions of the text have *gzhan dga'*, 'another joy'.
79. Pervasion: 'If separated, they do not make contact' and 'If unified, they do not make contact.'
80. There is a textual corruption here in the Tibetan text, with four sections numbered but only three named. Based on Lhopa Rinchen Pal's similar four section headings (p. 214) and the content of this passage, it is apparent that Sonam Tsemo's third section heading has been lost.
81. Pervasion: '(x)(y) (~x penetrates y → ~x makes contact with y).'
82. Pervasion: 'Whatever is multiple is not truly existent.'
83. Pervasion: '(x)(y) (x is simultaneous with y → ~x experiences y).'
84. It is a matter of valid cognition and logic that cause and effect are so ordered in time.
85. Pervasion: '(x) (x's nature has ended → ~x is experienced).'
86. Proposition: 'Consciousness exists before its cognizable.' Reason: '[Because] it has no preceding cause.'
87. Pervasion: 'Whatever has no preceding cause has no producer.'
88. *Bskyed bya*, as in cause and effect as produced and producer (*bskyed bya skyed byed kyi rgyu 'bras*).
89. Lhopa Rinchen Pal:
 'Objection: "If there is no arising, relative truth is not established, since of the two truths, the arising of existent objects is relative. Therefore, the assertion that there are two truths is not logical. If [objects arise] through someone else's designation, they would be obscured by their obscurations, so how could there be nirvāṇa?"'
- Response: They may be obscured in their own stream of being but that is the deluded designation of others, not our Madhyamaka mere relative, since the cause of delusion in one's own stream of being is abandoned. If the causes and conditions of delusion such as unawareness are complete, appearances are harmful. Otherwise, they are not.' (ibid. p. 216)
- This explanation treats the 'after' in the root text (i.e. v107c, 'If it [a relative truth] is ascertained as arising after, it exists') as referring to 'after' the causes of delusion have been abandoned. This interpretation is in accord with most of the Indian and Tibetan commentaries, but here draws with subtlety upon Candrakīrti's distinction of the 'mere relative' from 'relative truth' to overcome the objection. According to Sonam Tsemo, 107cd is a response to a further objection (i.e. 'that relative depends upon conceptual thought, which is not logical, for it is negated from the perspective of one who perceives its reality'). This explanation treats 'after' as referring to the effect 'after' the cause, recalling the analysis of

verses 9.104-105b. In doing so Sonam Tsemo is consistent with the (anonymously authored) *Small Commentary on the Knowledge Chapter Only* (P5278, see the excerpt from this text in *The Center of the Sunlit Sky*, pp. 740-741). The idea is of an internal relation between relative truth and the analytical understanding of emptiness (achieved through the analysis of cause and effect) as distinct from relative truth as mere delusion. This distinction is acceptable from the Svātantrika perspective but not the Prāśangika, which treats all analysis as delusion (see v138-140). The argument simplified runs as follows:

Objection: The relative is nonexistent, so there is only ultimate truth.

Response: It exists as a delusion.

Objection: Then it does not exist for one who sees reality, so it is nonexistent. If it existed for the Buddha, he would be deluded, so how could there be any nirvāna?

Response: It exists only for the deluded person, not for the Buddha. It exists if the effect arises after cause (as a composite taken as a singular).

90. The explanation which is 'not thorough' probably derives from Ngok Lotsawa, for the same expression (*ha cang ma yin*) is made in reference to him earlier, in the commentary to v9.15. The 'ṭīkā', a term normally referring to an extensive commentary, is probably that of Prajñākaramati, where the exegesis of this verse broadly corresponds with the one given here (see W21708, pp. 470-471).
91. Lhopa Rinchen Pal distinguishes the Svātantrika and Prāśangika perspectives here:

'According to the Svātantrikas, this means that since there is no basis of conceptual discrimination in appearances, it is not saṃsāric. As Ācārya Dignāga says, "Since you [Mañjuśrī] are free from discrimination of reality, you are indeed in nirvāna [D2712, p. 79b]." The Prāśangikas do not speak of Buddhas having wisdom but claim that the analyst's understanding that the analysandum has no intrinsic nature is itself not established.'

'Objection: "If this understanding requires another valid cognition that it also has no intrinsic nature, there is an infinite regress. If it does not require that, the agent and patient [analyst and analysandum] would be one."

'This is just a designation. What need is there for another analyst? If the object is not established, the subject is not established. Just as when firewood is exhausted, there is no need for more firewood, so when the object of abandonment is cut off, there is no need for a further antidote.' (ibid., p. 217)

This passage is also notable for associating Dignāga with the Svātantrikas.

92. *Gzhung yi ge'i don du 'di nyid zhugs so*. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 162) reiterates the structure attributed here to Vairocanarakṣita and quotes one 'ga po zhabs' as saying, 'These are the *only* explanations I accept ['di kho na gzhung la zhugs]', surely referring to Sonam Tsemo. Lhopa Rinchen Pal adds that the 'Lord of Dharma himself [Sapan] also corroborates this.'
93. *Deng* in the Tibetan editions has been corrected to *dpe*, i.e. an example.
94. *Rtsa ba'i gtan tshigs*—the syllogism which proves that all dharmas are not established, i.e. the vajra slivers.
95. Pervasion: 'Whatever does not arise from self, other, both, without cause has no intrinsic nature.' Qualification: 'Appearances do not arise from self, other, both, without cause.'
96. The pervader is the composite predicate: '(x) arises from self, other, both, or without cause.' The pervader is not true of *x*, the logical subject ('mere appearances').
97. Establishing the reverse pervasion (contrapositive) establishes the forward pervasion *a priori* (see appendix). Reverse pervasion: 'Whatever has an intrinsic nature arises from self, other, both, without cause.'

98. The text deals with arising from self, other and without cause separately in the following sections.
99. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 218-219) restates most of the points here from the identification of the three root syllogisms (as explained 'by the commentators', '*chad pa po dag gis*) to the criticism that they are not compatible with Śāntideva's intent. He remarks in addition that svātantras are incompatible with several of Śāntideva's verses, such as the ultimate not being an object of conceptual thought, as well as verse 34c. He also adds that v118 is 'clearly a proof by *prasaṅga* rather than establishing a svātantra (*zhes thal' gyur du gsal gyi rang rgyud bsgrubs pa'i ngag ma gsungs so*)'. The point by both Sonam Tsemo and Lhopa Rinchen Pal that this section is a negative refutation of tīrthika doctrines rather than a positive proof of emptiness is a move away from Svātantrika interpretation towards the Prāśangika, the intention being to accurately represent Śāntideva's text rather than express any general preference on the part of the commentators.
100. Proposition: 'The effect exists without its cause.' Reason: '[Because] the cause does not exist.'
101. Pervasion: 'Every effect has a cause.'
102. See chapter 6, note 7.
103. Reason: '[Because] creator and creation are sempiternal.'
104. Proposition: 'Īśvara's creations can be created/are creatable.' Reason: '[Because] they are sempiternal.'
105. Pervasion: 'Whatever is created by a sempiternal self is contemporaneous with it.' Pervasion: 'Whatever is sempiternal cannot be created/is not creatable.'
106. Pervasion: 'The creations of a sempiternal creator have no beginning/are sempiternal/are contemporaneous with their creator.'
107. Reason: '[Because] it arises from a sempiternal causal power.'
108. Qualification: 'The effects (e.g. happiness and suffering) arise from a sempiternal causal power.'
109. For notes on terminology and Sāṃkhya ontology, see chapter 6, notes 2-5.
110. Pervasion: 'Whatever has three qualities is not singular.'
111. Prajñākaramati (W21708, p. 496):
 Such things as cloths have no essence of composition [*yan lag can*], have no nature of atoms and have no self of the threefold qualities. In this way, when substances are analyzed and examined, the wise see that although substances appear, they are like illusions.'
112. The three primordial qualities of purity, activity and darkness correspond to the experience by individual consciousnesses of dullness, pleasure and pain respectively. Henceforth in this section 'pleasure' refers to the Sāṃkhya idea that unmanifest pleasure pre-exists in the primal substance as a cause of manifest pleasure, thus allowing them to claim pleasure is self-arising, i.e. both cause and effect.
113. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 226):
 That the five bare elements create [pleasure, etc.] is contradictory to claiming the primal substance, which has the intrinsic nature of pleasure and so forth, is their cause, for then the five bare elements would be their cause, while pleasure and so forth would be the effect.'
114. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 226):
 'Objection: "The proposition is not that sound and so forth are the cause [of pleasure, etc.] but that they are transformations of the primal substance, which is their intrinsic nature." Then sound and so forth would not be the causes of pleasure and so forth, which violates your own premise.'
- The objections here centre on the Sāṃkhya *satkāryavāda* theory that effects pre-exist within their causes, i.e. if all existence is merely modifications within an

existing material reality, which is the ultimate cause of everything, nothing new ever comes into being. Although the Sāṃkhya is a dualist school, their beliefs about the evolution of the material basis into higher order perceptible phenomena is a commitment held in common with all materialist philosophies, including contemporary mainstream philosophical materialism.

115. The heading here is enumerated as *gnyis pa* (2), but it corresponds to the title of section 4 previously given.
116. According to Vose (2009a, p. 57) these two objections (*prasaṅgas*) are Prāśangika objections to the Svātantrika claim that Madhyamaka analysis is a worldly valid cognition. However, it is clear from the expressions ‘You Mādhyamikas say...’ (*khyod dbu ma pas blo ni kun rdzob yin par 'dod ces*) and ‘If a primal substance were not real...’ (*gtso bo la sogs pa mi bden pa na*) that these are substantialist or realist objections made from outside both the Svātantrika and Prāśangika perspectives. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 228) attributes the objections to ‘all substantialists’ (*dngos po smra ba thams cad*).
117. *Bye brag med pa spyir bkag pa*—c.f. the commentary to 9.33: ‘Since one would be negating something without any qualities, the negation is indeterminate, for the object to be negated must be identified.’
118. Pervasion: ‘For any x , if x is false, then cultivation of x is meaningless.’
119. C.f. ‘The valid cognitions which ascertain those characteristics’ near the beginning of the chapter which states that the ‘elimination of objects to be negated with inferential reasoning cutting off elaborations’ is a valid cognition, i.e. the ‘merely analytical aspect’. Here it is said, in accord with the Prāśangika view, that a proof of emptiness is *not* a valid cognition and is, as Śāntideva incontrovertibly says, ‘false’. But, according to the Svātantrika view, in just this one respect it is ‘not a delusion’ (*khrul pa med pa'i cha yod*), i.e. it is not incompatible (*mi 'gal*) with *analytical* valid cognition.
120. The Tibetan text here has *lus pa*, a misprint for *'dus pa*, as it is in the root text.
121. This section is not found in Lhopa Rinchen Pal (see p. 229).
122. Reverse pervasion (contrapositive): ‘Whatever has an intrinsic nature is not dependent (or fabricated).’
123. Transforming (alteration, change) is not supported by a nonexistent object.
124. A nonexistent object does not support cessation or impermanence. A nonexistent object cannot cease.
125. Qualification: ‘The nonexistent object cannot abandon its nonexistence.’
126. A nonexistent object does not support duality (of existence and nonexistence).
127. An alternative structure, differing only slightly to this one, is given at the end of this section.
128. Possibly a reference to the story in the Purāṇas where Kāmadeva (*dga' rab dbang phyug*) fired a flower arrow at Maheśvara to cause him to desire Uma, though the correspondence is not exact.
129. Prajñākaramati, W21708, p. 528

10. Dedication

1. *Yu'u thang du* here is in various versions of the root text *u bu'i thad du*, '*u bu'i thad du* or *yi bu'i thad du*. Lhopa Rinchen Pal (p. 234) divides this section into finding hope (*dbugs dbyungs pa*) and finding refuge (*skyabs rnyed*), corresponding to the first three lines and remainder, respectively.
2. A bodhisattva whose generosity is unconditional, like space. See *The Training Anthology of Śāntideva: A Translation of the Śikṣā-samuccaya*, p. 257-258.

Colophon

1. Sonam Tsemo's remark here seems to be a reference to the brevity of Chapa's text, the extant W1PD89051 version in the *bka' gdams gsung bum* being just fourteen pages.

Translator's Afterword: Logic

1. See Lama Jampa Thaye, *Rain of Clarity*, p. 71.
2. See chapter 9, note 30 on classifying Sonam Tsemo as a Svātantrika. On one occasion (see commentary to v9.148) he presents a syllogism in both logical forms, where the transformation is apparently merely grammatical.
3. The English phrase 'the reason is a property (or quality) of the subject' has been used in this context in certain English translations (e.g. Tillemans 1999, p. 39, Tauscher 2003, p. 234 and *passim*), to define qualification. This phrase is ungrammatical in that it treats a singular nominal term ('the reason') as an adjective ('is a property'). It would be more grammatical, not to say correct, to define qualification as obtaining when the reason's *predicate* is a property of the subject.
4. There is a difference in the positions of Svātantrikas and Prāśangikas here, in which the former maintain that pervasion can be known by valid cognition, while the latter assert that only āryas and not ordinary beings can have such knowledge. See Tauscher 2003, p. 225–230. Sonam Tsemo is apparently on the Svātantrika side here (e.g. 'It is untenable for the pervasion not to be established, for it would contradict valid cognition', see commentary to v9.88, and elsewhere). This matter invokes ancient philosophical questions on what makes universally quantified statements true and how they can be known to be true, questions common to the Western and Buddhist philosophical traditions. It is beyond the scope of this essay to touch on this vexed metaphysical topic.
5. Matilal, 1998, pp. 14–18. Tillemans (1988, p. 163) has noted that, since first order predicate logic has quantifiers which 'taken normally (as in an elementary logic textbook)' range over existent objects, it does not meet the requirements of Tibetan logic, which refers to nonexistent objects, like a 'sky-flower' or the 'horns of a rabbit', or space, or as in existence-negating (or emptiness proving) syllogisms, the *sine qua non* of Svātantrika Madhyamaka. Thus, a variant logic in which quantifiers are ontologically neutral and existence is permitted as a predicate (as proposed by e.g. Richard Routley) is required for the formalization of such pervasion statements. Tillemans also proposes that to interpret quantifiers as ranging over a domain composed of mental proxies for existent and nonexistent particulars would be consistent with Dignāga's epistemology. See also Mipham, 2005, p. 155–6, for some comments from the tradition on the relation of 'nonexistence' to lack of intrinsic nature in the context of logic.
6. 'The pervader is not supported' is treated as the third of three kinds of pervasion and hence akin to the relations of the first two kinds, e.g. like the general relation between fire and smoke, or between conceptual imputation and nonexistence. However, 'the pervader is not supported' is the non-satisfaction of the antecedent predicate by the logical subject (i.e. the negation of qualification), not a relation between two predicates. That is to say, 'the pervader is not supported' is not a universally quantified conditional but a singularly quantified negation on *x*. But then *x* is often not a singular term but a general kind or mass term and hence in such cases 'the pervader is not supported' is not singularly quantified after all.

