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## HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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### Undergraduate Studies:

B.A. in Economics and Mathematics, Williams College, 2014  
*Highest Honors in Economics, Magna Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa*

### Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2016 to present  
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics  
Thesis Title: "Money, technology, and reform in the criminal justice system"  
Expected Completion Date: May 2022

### References:

Professor Lawrence Katz	Professor Edward Glaeser	Professor Winnie van Dijk
Harvard University	Harvard University	Harvard University
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### Teaching and Research Fields:

Fields: Labor Economics, Law & Economics, Criminal Justice, Economic History

### Teaching Experience:

2020-2021	Undergraduate Thesis Writer Seminar (Harvard Economics), <i>Seminar Leader</i>
2018-2019	Undergraduate Thesis Writer Seminar (Harvard Economics), <i>Seminar Leader</i>
Fall 2014	Empirical Debates in Law and Policy (Stanford Law), <i>Teaching Assistant</i>

### Pre-Doctoral Research Experience:

2014-2016	Research Fellow for John Donohue, Stanford Law School
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### Professional Activities:

#### **Presentations (including upcoming):**

2021	ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization, Vancouver School of Economics Economic History Seminar, Junior Scholar Workshop on Economics of Crime, NBER Decentralization Conference ( <i>discussant</i> )
2020	Southern Economic Association Annual Conference, Judicial Council of California Research Seminar, Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association ( <i>accepted; conference canceled</i> )
2018-2019	Eighth Meeting for the Study of Economic Inequality (Paris School of Economics), R-Ladies Boston Invited Talk

**Refereeing:** *Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Urban Economics*

### **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**

2021	Irving Louis Horowitz Award ( <i>most outstanding project</i> ) & Dissertation Prize, Horowitz Foundation
2018-Present	James M. and Cathleen D. Stone Ph.D. Scholar, Harvard's Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality & Social Policy
2018-2021	Certificate of Distinction in Teaching (x4), Harvard Bok Center
2019	Law and Economics Fellows Writing Prize, Harvard Law School
2018-2020	Terence M. Considine Fellow in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School
2019	Harvard Foundations of Human Behavior Initiative Grant ( <i>with Nathan Nunn &amp; James Feigenbaum</i> )
2019	Harvard Inequality in America Initiative Grant ( <i>with Nathan Nunn &amp; James Feigenbaum</i> )
2016	Christophe Baron Prize, American Association of Wine Economists
2015	Best Lightning Talk Presenter, Oxford University Connected Life Conference
2014	Carl Van Dyne Prize in Economics ( <i>top thesis</i> ), Williams College

### **Research Papers:**

#### **"No Money Bail, No Problems? Evidence from an Automatic Release Program"** (JOB MARKET PAPER)

Are the effects of money bail on pretrial misconduct large enough to justify its costs? Money bail advocates argue that its usage is critical for averting misconduct, while skeptics counter that its effects are small and not worth the human costs of pretrial detention. I examine these tradeoffs using a program in Kentucky that eliminated financial bail (money bail or unsecured bail) for a subset of low-level cases. I use administrative data and a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the program's effects on misconduct and detention. The program decreased the usage of financial bail by 50.5 p.p. and increased the rate of failure to appear by 3.3 p.p. The program's effect on pretrial rearrest is indistinguishable from zero, and the data rules out even modest sized increases. Effects on misconduct are primarily driven by substitution away from money bail, rather than from unsecured bail, suggesting that threats of future fines may not effectively deter pretrial misconduct. The program also reduced hours in detention despite modest money bail requirements (\$360 on average) in its absence, meaning that inability to put up even small bail amounts is an important constraint on release. Consistent with this interpretation, effects on release are larger in lower-income zip codes and among unemployed defendants. Taken together, the results suggest that one instance of misconduct needs to be at least 18 times as costly as one day in detention for money bail to justify its costs.

#### **"If You Give a Judge a Risk Score"**

Prediction tools, such as risk scores, often serve as decision aids rather than entirely overriding human discretion. How does the implementation of risk scores impact human decisions? I study a policy change that recommended no money bail for defendants below a set risk threshold. The policy decreased the money bail rate for defendants with risk scores slightly lower than the risk threshold but did not change rates for defendants with scores slightly higher than the threshold. As such, the policy changed the overall rate of money bail rather than simply shifting its allocation across cases. I argue this is consistent with a model where prediction-based recommendations shift the costs of mistakes from individual decision-makers (judges) to the social planners who set recommendations. Black defendants benefit less than white defendants with identical risk scores from the no money bail recommendation. Disparate benefits by race are driven by variation in behavior between (rather than within) judges – judges who see more white defendants are more likely to comply with the no money bail recommendation. The relationship between defendant population and judicial behavior

is not explained by judge covariates. Results are consistent with a model where recommendations decrease the costs of mistakes more in racially homogeneous populations.

**“After the Burning: The Economic Effects of the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre”**

*with Jeremy Cook, James Feigenbaum, Laura Kincaide, Jason Long, and Nathan Nunn*

*NBER Working Paper No. 28985 (July 2021)*

The 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre resulted in the looting, burning, and leveling of 35 square blocks of a once-thriving Black neighborhood. Not only did this lead to severe economic loss, but the massacre also sent a warning to Black individuals across the country that similar events were possible in their communities. We examine the economic consequences of the massacre for Black populations in Tulsa and across the United States. We find that for the Black population of Tulsa, in the two decades that followed, the massacre led to declines in home ownership and occupational status. Outside of Tulsa, we find that the massacre also reduced home ownership. These effects were strongest in communities that were more exposed to newspaper coverage of the massacre or communities that, like Tulsa, had high levels of racial segregation. Examining effects after 1940, we find that the direct negative effects of the massacre on the home ownership of Black Tulsans, as well as the spillover effects working through newspaper coverage, persist and actually widen in the second half of the 20th Century.

**Research Papers in Progress:**

**“Does Bias Training Change Bail Decisions?”**

Bias training programs are a popular low-cost approach to addressing racial disparities in the labor market as well as the criminal justice system. Despite their growing prevalence, the magnitude and permanence of their effects on high-stakes decision-making are uncertain. I investigate the effects of a brief bias training program on racial gaps in bail outcomes. The training was provided to a subset of judges who set bail but not others. Leveraging differential treatment over judges as well as time variation, I provide estimates of the training effect using difference-in-difference and triple differences approaches. In the month immediately following training, racial gaps in bail decisions decreased. However, the initial effects dissipated in the second and third months after training, suggesting that brief trainings are unlikely change judicial decision-making in the long run.

**Community Engagement:**

Founding member	Harvard Graduate Women in Economics (2018-2021) ( <i>Core team member, treasurer, website manager &amp; developer</i> )
Mentor	Economics Graduate Student Peer Mentorship Program (2017-2018)
MC	Annual Harvard Economics Department Holiday Party (2018, 2020)