History of International Thought: Text and Context

David Boucher

The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory
Edited by Chris Brown and Robyn Eckersley

Print Publication Date: Mar 2018
Subject: Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations
Online Publication Date: Apr 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.1

Abstract and Keywords

Our attitudes to understanding past texts fall into three conceptually distinct manners of enquiry. The Emblematic Past is resistant to correction, and impervious to criticism, and its characters and events are on permanent loan to the present as symbols indicative of all the vices and virtues of humanity. The Practical Past is the predominant mode of invoking a world of ideas to assist us in working through, or understanding, current problems. In contrast, those disposed to the Historical Past adopt a disinterestedness that sometimes verges on disdain towards those whose purpose is not interpretive authenticity. These attitudes are to be distinguished from the levels at which thought about International Relations occurs. We encounter types of thinking that relate to immediate circumstances; attempts to synthesize experience into principles and recommendations, or guides to action; and philosophical considerations of the place of International Relations in experience more generally.

Keywords: Hobbes, Machiavelli, sovereignty, methodological pluralism, emblematic, practical, historical

THE history of thought in International Relations is integral to international political theory; it was always an activity fully immersed in immediate political events, and was frequently explicit about offering analyses and inferring conclusions for statesmen to draw upon in their foreign encounters. Herodotus, for example, tells us that he preserved the memory of the past by recording “the astonishing achievements both of our own and other peoples; and more particularly, to show how they came into conflict” (Herodotus 1972: 41). The whole range of “literature,” including ephemera, epic poems, plays, speeches, and other utterances ranging from the stray observation to the ideological and philosophical, are available for us to invoke in explaining and understanding past and contemporary problems in International Relations.

It is important, however, to distinguish the level of analysis at which such reflection was conducted. Each utterance implicates a world of ideas, within which it acquires greater intelligibility (Boucher 2016). At the lower levels of abstraction, it is we who have to do the work of relating various statements of policy or passing observation to the world of

ideas in which its force, or point, is realized. Such intelligibility is an achievement rather than a given, and the higher we ascend the scale of abstraction the more adept the thinker, or theorist, at providing the principles and arguments that underpin the conclusions. While Sophocles' *Antigone* relies upon the conception of a world in which there are universal duties relating to natural law, and Cicero provides glimpses of its implications for men and citizens generally, it is the likes of Grotius and Pufendorf who synthesize and provide the philosophical justifications for how individuals and states should conduct themselves in their relations with each other.

It may well be the case that one of the difficulties of studying Grotius (2005), for example, in Martin Wight's view, is the Dutchman's "ambiguity [which] stems not least from his inaccessibility" (Wight 2005: 31). If we are to bring Grotius into service, and (p. 22) assess the importance of his attempt to subject international relations to the rule of law, it is incumbent upon us to overcome the barriers to intelligibility by identifying the worlds of ideas his words invoke. Indeed, if we are to understand Grotius's importance, in the history of both political and international thought, we must not only understand his achievement in his own time but also his relation to the voluminous classic sources he cites. His contemporary relevance is comprehensible only when we understand the Grotian revival following the First Hague Conference of 1899 (Jeffery 2006).

Furthermore, there are many worlds of ideas which Thomas Hobbes's thought implicates, not all of which are relevant to International Relations, and what we now regard as his seminal contribution has not always been acknowledged. For example, his equation of international relations with the state of nature and the war of all against all, i.e. international anarchy, was eclipsed for his immediate contemporaries and successors by his contribution to the natural law tradition, represented by Pufendorf, Wolff, and Vattel, in expounding the basic principles of international law (Covell 2004; Boisen and Boucher 2011; Armitage 2013; and see Chapter 5).

In response to the frequent lament that there was an actual, or imagined, paucity of classic texts to which to introduce putative students of International Relations (Mackintosh 1843 [1799]; Wight 1966; 1987; 1991; Forsyth et al. 1970; Parkinson 1977; Williams 1990; Knutsen 1992; Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999; Keene 2005; Armitage 2013), a veritable avalanche of studies in books and learned journals has brought to light a rich and fascinating array of international relations thought. The reader will immediately be struck by the variability of the quality of this thought, and the range of uses for which it is employed.

The Emblematic, Practical, and Historical Pasts

There is a need to distinguish between the purposes for which texts in international thought were written, and these may be differentiated by the attitudes each text has to the past and its relation to the present. There is a past with which we are familiar, popu-

lated by significant events, heroes and villains who are emblematic of character traits, vices, and virtues, and momentous occasions. They represent shorthand evocations of a position or idea, which often does not, and need not, stand up to critical scrutiny—or is indeed impervious to it (Oakeshott 1983: 40–4). Despite what revisionists may say (Walker 1993), in this past such figures as Machiavelli, Mussolini, or Hitler maintain their places unvarnished, while others, such as Augustine, Francis of Assisi, and Winston Churchill, irrespective of repeated exposure of their flaws, remain untarnished. More generally in the literature, this emblematic past manifests itself in the form of significations, in which a thinker, such as Bodin, or an event, encapsulated by the term "Westphalia" (Osiander 1994) represents the idea of sovereignty (e.g. Waltz 1959; Wight 1966; 1987; Bull 1977; Bietz 1999; Wendt 1999).

(p. 23) In this vision of the past—the emblematic past—Machiavelli represents the personification of evil (Strauss, 1978), or at the very least is the most ruthless exponent of the doctrine of *raison d'état* (Meinecke 1997). One might even call it a mythic past, used for purposes of valorization, inspiration, or vilification. It is a world of simple contrasts with few shades of grey, in which Hitler is a demonic villain, Chamberlain a weak appeaser, and Churchill and Roosevelt heroic saviours. Chamberlain's speech in front of 10 Downing Street, for example, following the Munich Conference of 30 September 1938, is emblematic of self-delusion and failure: "for the second time in our history, a British Prime minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time" (Montefiore n.d.: 85). Gandhi's speech on the eve of his "Salt March" on 11 March 1930 is emblematic of non-violent civil disobedience against colonialism (see Chapter 21): "let there be no semblance of breach of peace even after all of us have been arrested. We have resolved to utilize all our resources in pursuit of an exclusively non-violent struggle [. . .] I have faith in the righteousness of our cause and the purity of our weapons" (Montefiore 2014: 66–8).

The emblematic past comprised not only statesmen and women who had made an indelible mark, but also political thinkers who were taken to represent, or were unequivocally hailed to be indicative of, a position or state of affairs. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes, for Leo Strauss, epitomize the first wave of modernity and the advent of relativism in morals by rejecting the classical tradition (Strauss 1988; 1963). The use of traditions in International Relations itself is emblematic (Walker 1993: 27–31; Der Derian 1988: 190; Clark 1996: 1; Jeffery 2005: 57–84; 2006: 17–25). Of the realist or Hobbesian tradition, Donald Hanson (1984: 331) complains: "There is, in any case, a recognisable 'Hobbesian tradition' in the study of international relations, whether it has been faithful to Hobbes or not" (Malcolm 2002: 433). Even though Martin Wight is the great exponent of traditions in the history of thought in International Relations, he was not oblivious to their shortcomings. He acknowledges that when a proper name becomes an adjective attached to a manner of thinking, "it falsifies the man possessing the name [. . .] Grotius was not a Grotian [. . .] Machiavelli was not a Machiavellian simply" (Wight 2005: 5). Such events and persons, invoked for their practical purpose in contemporary politics, are "abstracted from record in a reading which divests them of their contingent circumstances and their authentic utterance; symbolic and stereotypic *personae*, actions, exploits and

situations” (Oakeshott 1983: 38). Such events or persons are on permanent loan to the present as symbols of all the vices and virtues of humanity.

The emblematic past shares with the practical past a didactic character: while the former has achieved almost mythic status, the latter is more sensitive to historical interpretation, and critical of caricatures, with the purpose of shedding light on our present states of affairs. Because of its emphasis upon the usefulness of the past, the practical past is often open to the charge of anachronism, i.e. looking at the past through the wrong end of the telescope, not for its own sake, but because of its significance for the present. The predominant attitude of commentators on the history of thought in International Relations is practical. The ideas of the past are explored in relation to present problems to help us understand them better, or to help extract us from intractable predicaments (p. 24) (e.g. Linklater 1990; Brown 1992; 2010; 2012; Williams 1992; Walker 1993; 2010; Onuf 1998; Rawls 1999; Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999; Jahn 2000; Anghie 2004; Schmitt 2006; Pateman and Mills 2007; Boucher 2009; Rengger 2013; Lang 2015). This doesn’t mean that principles or rules are simply applied to contemporary problems in order to arrive at resolutions. The relation between theory and practice is more complicated than that. As R. G. Collingwood (1993) indicates, theory arises out of practice, and to practice returns for its resolution. The study of the past is not for its own sake, but for self-knowledge of the mind. Knowing of what human beings are capable; what achievements are attainable, somehow vicariously experiencing what they experience, enables us better to think through our own problems (Collingwood 2013). Using Aristotle and Nussbaum, and rejecting (as Collingwood did) Kant’s regularian or rule-based practice, is called by Chris Brown the “Practice Turn,” or *phronesis*, in International Relations Theory (Brown 2012: 448). He denies, for example, the Western hegemony of cosmopolitan values: they do not exist, nor could they be created, because of the cultural pluralism of the modern world. Any such project rests on a misunderstanding of the variety of cultures that constitute the contemporary world, and a misreading of what the Enlightenment was all about. Using the infamous “Requirement” (Council of Castile 1513)—which is indicative of the most significant meeting of cultures in the modern world, between European Christians and American infidels—to help him think through the modern-day tension between universal values and cultural heterodoxy, Brown (2010: 19–20) contends that it is testimony to the need for normative theory in International Relations.

Because of the linguistic incomprehension between the New World and the Old, and the frequently cynical manner of its reading, the juridical act of ordering indigenous peoples to submit to the dominion of the king of Spain has often been ridiculed as absurd. The point that Brown wants to make with respect to the reading of the “Requerimiento” to the Indians, which offered them an opportunity to submit to the Spanish Crown and receive the Gospel or be responsible for the catastrophe that would befall them, was that it was an act of self-justification and moral absolution, and in this it was an abject failure. There was no moral dialogue between the conquistadors and the Indians, but nor did it satisfy critics at home, because it failed to allay subsequent debate about the moral status of the Indians (Brown 2010: 20). Brown uses the “Requerimiento” not to attain a better understanding of the relationship between the Spanish and American Indians for its own sake,

but instead to pose and answer a practical problem: “The key question is whether at the end of the Vasco da Gama epoch it is possible to come closer to a real moral conversation than it was at the beginning” (2010: 21). The reason is to avoid rerunning the “farce” of the “Requerimiento” in the twenty-first century (Brown 2010: 27). R. B. J. Walker, for example, attempts to rescue Machiavelli from the caricature that the idealists vilify and the realists deify, not because he wants to make claims about what Machiavelli really thought, but “rather, to indicate one way of identifying some of the discursive practices that have turned an historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present” (Walker 1993: 31). Some are of the view that we may even ask of past theorists what view they would take of specific events if they were alive today (Lebow, Schouten, and Suganami, 2016).

(p. 25) The third attitude towards the past is the Historical. It claims to be a purer attitude in its faithfulness to the purposes and intentions of the authors it takes as its subject matter (Muldoon 1979; Pagden 1993; Tuck 1999; Boucher 1998; Keene 2005; Bell 2002, 2007; Covell 2009; Armitage 2000; 2013; Boisen 2013; Christov 2015). David Armitage, for example, self-consciously attempts to elevate the study of thought in International Relations to parallel the level achieved in the history of political thought as a consequence of the methodological debates precipitated by Peter Laslett, J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn, and Quentin Skinner (Boucher 1985; Tully 1988; Hall 2015). Armitage claims, somewhat hyperbolically, that up until the 1990s historians of political thought tended to ignore the international dimension, while students of International Relations “remained largely uninterested in historicising the theories invoked in their field” (Armitage 2013: 4).

In order to differentiate this attitude to the past from what I have called the emblematic and practical, Armitage refers to “international intellectual history” whose subject matter is “international thought.” Theodore Christov (2015: 4) designates it “modern international thought,” a term that was in vogue in the 1920s. The purpose of such history is to locate the foundations, or origins, of international thought in the early modern period, and by implication subject to scrutiny the claims made by contemporary scholars of International Relations about the foundational status to the discipline of such thinkers as Hobbes, Burke, and Bentham (Armitage 2013: 13; Boucher 2015).

Armitage argues that Hobbes’s canonical position among the progenitors of international thought, standing between Grotius and Kant, contrasts starkly with the relative silence of his philosophical commentators on the external relations of *Leviathan*. Indeed, among international theorists writing on Hobbes, Armitage dismissively claims: “there is little of genuine historical character” (Armitage 2013: 60). Armitage contends that, *pace* the view of International Relations theorists, Hobbes’s adoption as the paramount theorist of international anarchy is of recent origin.

The Space of Experience, Horizons of Expectations, and Levels of Analysis

Reinhart Koselleck makes a useful conceptual distinction between the “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation.” The expressions “experience” and “expectation” are formal categories and do not in themselves convey any substantive content. What is experienced and what is expected may not be deduced from the categories themselves, but no history is possible without the experiences and expectations of human agents. The concepts are mutually dependent: “No expectation without experience, no experience without expectation” (Koselleck 2004: 257). Koselleck refers to the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation” in order to distinguish between the presence of the past (experience) and the presence of the future (expectation). The space (p. 26) of experience, i.e. the range of experiences open to us, gives rise to the possibility of differing expectations, which may in certain circumstances encourage the creation of concepts that contain a prognostic potential, and which no longer “register experience” but instead generate it (p. 272). Koselleck argues: “when considered with respect to their temporal extension, the manner in which these concepts are formed testifies to a conscious separation of space of experience and horizon of expectation, and it becomes the task of political action to bridge this difference” (p. 272).

Thinking about International Relations, and most other practices, such as art, ethics, or religion, may take place at different levels of abstraction, which have their own distinctive characters. Bernard Bosanquet’s *History of Aesthetic* (1922) divides the study of aesthetics into three main pursuits. In the first place we have the works of art themselves, incorporating the experiences, thoughts, and feelings they presuppose. Secondly, Bosanquet designates criticism, including writings on art that aim to improve it, attempt to describe particular works, or attempt to direct what the artist should produce. Thirdly, there is aesthetic theory, “the aim of which is neither to describe, to improve, or direct, but simply to theorize, to put this art experience into relation with the whole” (Oakeshott 2010: 131). Translating these categories into the history of thought in International Relations, we may distinguish the type of thinking that relates immediately to circumstances; attempts to synthesize experience into principles and recommendations, or guides to action; and the philosophical consideration of the place of International Relations in experience more generally. None of these levels of consideration is immune from being invoked emblematically, practically, or historically.

At the level of immediate experience, the student of International Relations may be provided with invaluable insights by memoirs of participants; contributions to foreign policies; records of state affairs, which contribute to policy; minutes; policy papers; legislation; or records of speeches encompassing the political activity and office of governing. We may expect to find certain recommendation about ends to be pursued and means to achieve them. At this level the student of international thought attempts to discover how people thought when they addressed pressing political problems, i.e. their space of experience. In this respect, Thucydides, rather than Plato, reveals how ancient Athenians

thought about political problems (Thucydides 1972; cf. Herodotus 1972). The *codices*, which include the *icnocuicatl* (Songs of Sorrow) which together constitute *The Broken Spears* (Leon-Portillo 1992), give us the point of view of the vanquished Aztecs, the other side of the story from that of the "Requerimiento." Tenochtitlan (Mexico City) fell not so much because of Iberian cultural and military superiority, but because of the thousands of native warriors who joined Cortés against the Aztecs; the devastating European diseases; and the belief that Cortés was the returning man-god Quetzalcoatl, god of wisdom (Leon-Portillo 1992: 23–4, 92–3, 132–4). The *Codex Florentino* tells how the Spaniards were sickened by the sacrificial blood sprinkled over their food on the orders of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin, ruler of the Mexica (Aztecs) between 1502 and 1520, because he " 'believed in them" and worshipped them as deities. That is why they were called 'Gods who have come from heaven' " (Leon-Portillo 1992: 93–4), and that is why they were welcomed at first with little resistance.

(p. 27) Other such materials may include, for example, the texts of international treaties and agreements (Roberts and Guelff 2010; Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2006). Three documents in particular, collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia, have a central place in the study of International Relations thought; they are the answers to practical problems, and for modern commentators convey a horizon of expectation which contemporaneously they did not have. The terms and formal language of the treaties have to be distinguished from what they came politically to signify. The emblematic view of the Peace of Westphalia identifies the occasion of the acceptance of self-imposed constraints by states out of enlightened rational self-interest, signifying for the first time the formal recognition and equality of state sovereignty. The Peace of Westphalia has long become emblematic of formal recognition of sovereignty and the emergence of a society or system of European states of whose legal framework Grotius is the founding father (Manning 1839: 21; Covell 2009: 2). David Held, for example, contends that the Peace of Westphalia "entrenched, for the first time, the principle of territorial sovereignty in inter-state affairs" (1995: 77). Its importance, we are told, was that it embodied an "early formalisation of the idea that sovereignty was not simply a characteristic of individual states, but was also a principle that should govern relations between states" (Murphy 1996: 92). The historical character of the Peace of Westphalia was quite different from, and significantly more complex than, its emblematic or practical character (Keene 2005: 240–3; Walker 2010: 130–5). The issue of sovereignty serves to illustrate the difference between the emblematic and the historical characters of the Peace of Westphalia. The legal concept of sovereignty, however, although widely discussed among political theorists for more than a century before the Peace, was not central to the negotiations, except perhaps in Spain's recognition of the United Provinces. Instead, non-legal autonomy was the idea that dominated thinking that addressed the aspirations of states. This included self-determination of states within the German empire, as well as for the major states of Europe. The German principalities, for example, claimed their autonomy as a matter of ancient right, and looked to the settlement to acknowledge rather than grant it. The Peace reflected the interests of its architects, France, Sweden, and Holland, and did not represent the conscious establishment of

a new system or state-centred international society. The predominant view was that the settlement should re-establish the status quo that prevailed before the Thirty Years War.

The second level of thinking about International Relations takes the form of reflection in terms of general principles that arise from the immediate context but nevertheless recommend themselves as guides to political conduct, typically in the form of precepts for action, or ideological principles. Here the thinker rises above the immediate concerns of international politics, and draws general conclusions from his or her observations and reflections. In considering thought of this kind, the historian of political thought has to identify how and why these general ideas emerged and came to be erected into general principles, understand what forms of behaviour they represent, and consider the role they play.

Among such "ideological" texts are those of Confucius (1989), Sun Tzu (1993), Machiavelli (2003), and Clausewitz (1993). Machiavelli, operating at this second level, (p. 28) exhibits a practical attitude towards the past, but not for the reasons that are usually attributed to him. He thought lessons could be learnt from the past because "men have, and always have had, the same passions, whence it necessarily comes about that the same effects are produced" (Machiavelli 2003: bk III, ch. 43, 517). When Machiavelli offered his *Prince* to Lorenzo de' Medici, it contained a distillation of his experience in foreign affairs, comprising maxims by which the prince could mitigate caprice in his internal and external relations. He didn't suggest that the answers are timeless, but instead that the manner of thinking and engaging with a world in continuous flux is indicative of the universal predicament of the quest for security in a dangerous and unpredictable world. Necessity, chance, and individual personality affect circumstances, and circumstances have a tendency to deceive us. As Machiavelli admitted, "one never finds any issue that is clear cut and not open to question" (Machiavelli 2003: bk I, ch. 6, 121). He was himself recommending the "practice" turn in conceptualizing the space of experience, and realistically constraining the horizon of expectation of the prince. That does not imply, however, that we ourselves are limited to his horizon of expectation: "Machiavelli poses questions about political community and practice that may still be pursued even though his answers expose his own limited historical and conceptual horizon" (Walker 1993: 31).

In addition, thinking about politics may lend itself to philosophical reflection, the impetus for which is to place governments and their relations, and political activity in general, in the landscape of human activity as a whole, in order to identify their distinctive postulates. We expect something different from Pericles' funeral oration and Plato's *Republic*, and we do not judge them by the same criteria. For Michael Oakeshott this is political philosophy proper, and it is the sort of thinking that we encounter in Plato's *Republic*, Spinoza's *Ethics*, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, and Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (Oakeshott 1975: 3). They constitute the highest achievement in Western political thought. These are examples of grand theory, in which international relations are located within the widest possible explanatory frameworks, rooted in the development of the

mind, psychology, theology, society, and human flourishing, and more often than not in a cosmology.

Even though Hobbes represents the highest level of abstract thinking, he is not immune from occupying a place in the emblematic past: “Describing International Relations (IR) as a realm of Hobbesian anarchy” remains one of the most popular shorthand descriptions of the nature of world politics. To invoke Hobbes is to call forth the image of a world of conflict and perpetual danger, a “Realist vision of international politics as a ‘state of nature’ defined by continual insecurity, competition and conflict” (Williams 2006: 253).

In addition, some historians, such as Quentin Skinner, want to deny the character of political philosophy. No piece of political writing, Skinner claims, can rise above the second level of reflection. We must bring political philosophers back down to earth from the realms of philosophical abstraction, and acknowledge that even the most abstract are never above the fray and always part of the ideological battle itself (Skinner 2008: xv). (p. 29) Authors of philosophical systems are of less significance and importance, for Skinner, than their contributions to ideological debates surrounding, for example, the moral sciences in Renaissance culture, political obligation during the Engagement Controversy, or liberty during the English Civil Wars (Skinner 1996: 6).

Carl Schmitt takes Hobbes to be intervening in the political and opening a new horizon of expectation, one which was eventually to lead to the age of the neutralization and depoliticization of politics. Genuine political theories, he argues, presuppose that man is dangerous (Schmitt 2006: 95; 2007: 61). But man is no ordinary animal, because his weapons are far more lethal than those of any beast. This is the “Hobbesian Dangerousness-Relation” (Schmitt 2015: 44). Humanity is able to overcompensate for its biological weaknesses in monstrous ways by technological inventions. Hobbes’s horizon of expectation could hardly have envisaged the human capacity to develop weapons of annihilation on the modern scale. The space of experience in terms of which Hobbes comprehended the state was already a superhuman superpower, an artificial man, the machine that superseded all machines, and exceeding all consensus. Today, Schmitt argues, power is beyond the control of anyone, greater than the will to power, stronger than the goodness of humanity and also stronger than human evil (Schmitt 2015: 47).

The key nexus in Hobbes was for Schmitt that of “protection-obedience.” Schmitt made the bold claim: “No form of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality can exist without protection and obedience” (2007: 52). The state machine guarantees an individual’s physical security and in return demands “unconditional obedience to the laws by which it functions” (Schmitt 2008: 45). The Leviathan was not the defender, but the creator of peace. If protection ceases, the obligation to obey ceases, and the individual’s natural freedom reverts to him. The state possesses the right of war, the power to require of its citizens that they are ready to sacrifice their lives and without reservation kill the state’s enemies. It is in this respect that “the political community transcends all other associations or societies” (2007: 47). Hobbes’s sovereign stands above society, and is able to make genuine decisions about the exceptional; he is able to distinguish friends from ene-

mies; and he has the monopoly on the right of war. It was in the sphere of International Relations that the Leviathan reached its highest level of mythical force. Constant danger characterized the sphere in which the mighty Leviathans wrestled with each other. It was a technically neutral state in which the values of truth and justice were absorbed by abolishing the distinction between *auctoritas* and *potestas*. The supreme power became the supreme authority. *Auctoritas non veritas facit legem*: authority and not truth makes the law.

In summary, although Hobbes had his faults, he attracted Schmitt because he emphasized the importance of fear as a motive for the establishment of political authority, and had understood what was intrinsically political about the arena of political action, namely the ability to distinguish between friends and enemies. Conflict played a vital role in establishing the state and guaranteeing its validity. The legitimacy of the state lay in the eternal principle of protection/obedience, and failure to uphold it was fatal to (p. 30) any nation. Of particular importance, Hobbes identified the crucial distinction between the political and all other particular interests in civil society, excluding them, in his qualitative conception of the state, from political interference. He saw the need for the sovereign to exercise a form of authority unconstrained by rules, or the rule of law, in moments when decisiveness was of the essence, in circumstances for which there were no rules for guidance. In other words, Hobbes was important because he was very like Schmitt himself!

For Noel Malcolm, Hobbes's place in the emblematic and ideological pasts are inappropriate, and has resulted in the Hobbes of modern International Relations Theory becoming ossified, rendering him at best an ideal type and "at worst as a caricature" (2002: 433). Malcolm rejects the depiction of Hobbes as a portrayer of an amoral state of nature. Instead, Hobbes is claimed to envisage each individual, and by implication each state, having to examine the circumstances of each decision in relation to natural law. Hobbes's international agents are completely devoid of any of the characteristics that Machiavelli attributes to the Prince, and are "strongly against wars of aggression or aggrandisement" (p. 441). Political practices generally require to be legitimated, which entails being able to demonstrate that Hobbes's actions could be characterized with reference to accepted values or principles.

Conclusion

Attitudes to the history of thought in International Relations have been divided into the emblematic, practical, and historical, while the levels of thinking about such relations were conceived in terms of their immediacy to events; reflections which distilled principles or formulated recommendations for general guidance; and the philosophical. None of which, I suggested, was immune from being brought into service by any of the three specified attitudes to the past. Furthermore, I contended that the "practice" turn was exactly what many of the great theorists anticipated, i.e. not the application of a set of rules or principles for the resolution of present practical problems, but a set of procedures and considerations that we might employ to think our own way through the problems, cog-

nizant of the fact that their space of experience, and horizon of expectation, could not help but be more limited than our own.

All this points to a methodological pluralism, an essential tension, that invites each student of the history of thought in International Relations to test the manner of his or her use of the past against that of others, and to justify the methods of enquiry employed within the heterodoxy of reasons and uses for which the thought of past figures in International Relations is brought into service. As a consequence of this methodological pluralism, the caricatures of "great thinkers" that once populated the pages of tracts of international political theory in the postwar years are much less acceptable; they have to meet far greater degrees of academic rigour, and at the very least exhibit a methodological self-consciousness, or awareness, of interdisciplinary criteria.

References

Anghie, A. (2004). *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Armitage, D. (2000). *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Armitage, D. (2013). *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bell, D. (2002). International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3: 327–50.

Bell, D. (2007). *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bietz, C. (1999). *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Boisen, C. (2013). The Changing Moral Justification of Empire: From the Right to Colonise to the Obligation to Civilise. *History of European Ideas* 39: 335–53.

Boisen, C., and D. Boucher (2011). Hobbes and the Subjection of International Relations to Law and Morality. In R. Prokhovnik and G. Slomp (eds), *International Political Theory After Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 81–101.

Bosanquet, B. (1922). *The History of Aesthetic* (London: Allen and Unwin).

Boucher, D. (1985). *Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History of Ideas* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff).

Boucher, D. (1998). *Political Theories of International Relations from Thucydides to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Boucher, D. (2009). *The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and Human Rights in Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Boucher, D. (2015). Hobbes's Contribution to International Thought, and the Contribution of International Thought to Hobbes. *Journal of the History of European Ideas* 41(1): 29–48.

Boucher, D. (2016). Invoking a World of Ideas: Theory and Interpretation in the Justification of Colonialism. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 63: 6–24.

Brown, C. (1992). *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).

Brown, C. (2010). *Practical Judgement in International Political Theory: Selected Essays* (London: Routledge).

Brown, C. (2012). The "Practice Turn," *Phronesis* and Classical Realism: Towards a Phronetic International Political Theory? *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40(3): 439–56.

Brownlie, I., and G. S. Goodwin-Gill (2006). *Basic Documents on Human Rights*, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan).

Clark, I. (1996). Traditions of Thought and Classical Theories of International Relations. In I. Clark and B. I. Neumann (eds), *Classical Theories of International Relations* (London, Macmillan), 1–19.

Clausewitz, C. von (1993). *On War* (London: Everyman).

Collingwood, R. G. (1993). *The Idea of History*, rev. edn, ed. J. Van der Dussen (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Collingwood, R. G. (2013). *An Autobiography and Other Writings: With Essays on Collingwood's Life and Work*, ed. D. Boucher and T. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

(p. 32) Confucius (1989). *The Analects of Confucius* (New York: Vintage Books).

Council of Castile (1513). *Requerimiento* 1513. Available from: **http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/amerbegin/contact/text7/requirement.pdf**. Accessed 10 April 2017.

Covell, C. (2004). *Hobbes, Realism and the Tradition of International Law* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Covell, C. (2009). *The Law of Nations in Political Thought: A Critical Survey from Vitoria to Hegel* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Christov, T. (2015). *Before Anarchy: Hobbes and His Critics in Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Der Derian, J. (1988). Introducing Philosophical Traditions in International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17: 189–93.

Forsyth, Murray, F. M. Keens-Soper, and H. M. A. Savigear (1970). *The Theory of International Relations from Gentili to Treitschke* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970).

Grotius, H. (2005). *The Rights of War and Peace* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund).

Hall, I. (ed.) (2015). *Radicals and Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century International Thought* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Hanson, D. W. (1984). Thomas Hobbes's "Highway to Peace." *International Organization* 38(2): 329–54.

Held, D. (1995). *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Herodotus (1972). *The Histories* (London: Penguin).

Jahn, B. (2000). *The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The Invention of the State of Nature* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Jeffery, R. (2005). Traditions as Invention: The "Traditions of Tradition" and the History of Ideas in International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34: 57–84.

Jeffery, R. (2006). *Hugo Grotius in International Thought* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Keene, E. (2002). *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Keene, E. (2005). *International Political Thought: A Historical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity).

Keens-Soper, F. M., and H. M. A. Savigear (1970). *The Theory of International Relations from Gentili to Treitschke* (London: Allen and Unwin).

Knutsen, T. (1992). *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Koselleck, R. (2004). *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Lang Jr, A. F. (2015). *International Political Theory: An Introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Lebow, R. N., P. Schouten, and H. Suganami (eds) (2016). *The Return of the Theorists: Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Leon-Portilla, M. (ed.) (1992). *The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico* (New York: Beacon Press).

Linklater, A. (1990). *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan).

Machiavelli, N. (2003). *The Discourses* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

Mackintosh, J. (1843 [1799]). *A Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations* (Boston: Pratt and Company).

Malcolm, N. (2002). *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

(p. 33) Manning, W. (1839). *Commentaries on the Law of Nations* (London: Sweet).

Meinecke, F. (1997). *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction).

Montefiore, S. S. (ed.) (2014). *Speeches That Have Changed the World* (London: Quercus).

Muldoon, J. (1979). *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press).

Murphy, A. B. (1996). The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations. In T. J. Biersteker and C. Weber (eds), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 81–120.

Oakeshott, M. (1975). *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Oakeshott, M. (1983). *On History and Other Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Oakeshott, M. (2010). A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary to the Study of Political Philosophy. In L. O'Sullivan (ed.), *Early Political Writings: 1925–1930* (Exeter: Imprint).

Onuf, N. G. (1998). *The Republican Legacy in International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Osiander, A. (1994). *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Pagden, A. (1993). *European Encounters with the New World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Pangle, T. L., and P. J. Ahrensdorf (1999). *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press).

Parkinson, F. (1977). *The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage).

Pateman, C., and C. Mills (2007). *Contract and Domination* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Rawls, J. (1999). *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Rengger, N. (2013). *Just War and International Order: The Uncivil Condition and World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Roberts, A., and R. Guelff (2010). *Documents on the Laws of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Schmitt, C. (1995). *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Schmitt, C. (2006). *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* (New York: Telos Press).

Schmitt, Carl (2007). *Concept of the Political*, expanded edn, trans. with an introduction by George Schwab (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Schmitt, C. (2008). *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol* (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Schmitt, C. (2015). *Dialogues on Power and Space* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Skinner, Q. (1996). *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Skinner, Q. (2008). *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Strauss, L. (1963). *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Strauss, L. (1978) *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Sun Tzu (1993). *The Art of War* (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Reference).

Thucydides (1972). *The Peloponnesian War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

Tuck, R. (1999). *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

(p. 34) Tully, J. (ed.) (1988). *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Walker, J. B. J. (1993). *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Walker, J. B. J. (2010). *After the Globe, Before the World* (London: Routledge).

Waltz, K. (1959). *Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Wight, M. (1966). Why Is There No International Theory? In H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory of International Politics* (London: Allen and Unwin), 17–34.

Wight, M. (1987). The Anatomy of International Thought. *Review of International Studies* 13: 221–7.

Wight, M. (1991). *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabrielle Wight and Brian Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press).

Wight, M. (2005). *Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Williams, H. (1992). *International Relations in Political Theory* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press).

Williams, M. C. (2006). The Hobbesian Theory of International Relations: Three Traditions. In B. Jahn (ed.), *Classical Theory in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 253–76.

David Boucher

David Boucher is Professor of Political Philosophy and International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Cardiff University, Wales, and Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Johannesburg.