

Automated System Call Interpretation

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BSides Luxembourg, October 2018

Introduction

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- Software developer

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- OS/virtualization background

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- Co-Founder of Cyberus
 - Product platform featuring NOVA

Motivation


Motivation

- Tycho Malware Analysis Platform



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


Application behavior


Application behavior

Application


Application behavior



Application behavior



Application behavior



System calls

System calls

- Interface between kernel and user application

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- Service requests

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System calls


- Interface between kernel and user application
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 - Memory requests
 - Process/Thread control

System calls

- Interface between kernel and user application
- Service requests
 - File access
 - Network access
 - Registry modifications
 - Memory requests
 - Process/Thread control
 - ...

System call: Example

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System call: Example

→ObjectAttributes	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES*	0x22F618
RootDirectory	VOID*	0x0
ObjectName	UNICODE_STRING*	0x22F600
Buffer	USHORT*	0x751AA0
\\?\C:\Users\Administrator\startme.bat		
Length	USHORT	0x4C
MaximumLength	USHORT	0x21A
SecurityQualityOfService	VOID*	0x22F5B8
SecurityDescriptor	VOID*	0x0
Length	ULONG	0x30
Attributes	ULONG	0x42

Feeling the pain

Interpreting a system call

How to interpret a system call on Windows

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- System call number and result: RAX

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How to interpret a system call on Windows

- System call number and result: RAX
- Microsoft calling convention: first four parameters in RCX, RDX, R8, R9
- SYSCALL instruction needs RCX internally -> swap with R10
- Additional parameters on stack

What do we need to know?

- Windows version (e.g., Windows 7 SP1)
- Architectural state (registers)
- Memory dumps

Example

Example

syscall no.	rax	0x52
	rbx	0x80
	rcx	0x22f3d8
param 1	rdx	0x40100080
	rdi	0x2
	rsi	0x0
	rbp	0x40100080
	rsp	0x22f358
	r8	0x22f428
param 2	r9	0x22f3e8
param 3	r10	0x22f3d8
param 0	r11	0x731a88
	r12	0x5
	r13	0x0
	r14	0x0
	r15	0x731a80
	rip	0x777e9df8

Example

The diagram illustrates the state transition of registers from their initial values during a syscall to their final values after the syscall has completed.

Initial State (syscall no.):

rax	0x52
rbx	0x80
rcx	0x22f3d8
param 1	rdx 0x40100080
rdi	0x2
rsi	0x0
rbp	0x40100080
rsp	0x22f358
param 2	r8 0x22f428
param 3	r9 0x22f3e8
param 0	r10 0x22f3d8
r11	0x731a88
r12	0x5
r13	0x0
r14	0x0
r15	0x731a80
rip	0x777e9df8

Final State (result):

rax	0x0
rbx	0x80
rcx	0x777e9dfa
rdx	0x0
rdi	0x2
rsi	0x0
rbp	0x40100080
rsp	0x22f358
r8	0x22f358
r9	0x40100080
r10	0x0
r11	0x10202
r12	0x5
r13	0x0
r14	0x0
r15	0x731a80
rip	0x777e9dfa

Example

syscall no.	rax	0x52	result	rax	0x0
param 1	rbx	0x80		rbx	0x80
	rcx	0x22f3d8		rcx	0x777e9dfa
	rdx	0x40100080		rdx	0x0
	rdi	0x2		rdi	0x2
	rsi	0x0		rsi	0x0
	rbp	0x40100080		rbp	0x40100080
	rsp	0x22f358		rsp	0x22f358
	r8	0x22f428		r8	0x22f358
	r9	0x22f3e8		r9	0x40100080
	r10	0x22f3d8		r10	0x0
	r11	0x731a88		r11	0x10202
	r12	0x5		r12	0x5
	r13	0x0		r13	0x0
	r14	0x0		r14	0x0
	r15	0x731a80		r15	0x731a80
	rip	0x777e9dfa		rip	0x777e9dfa



?

The internet knows things

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- MSDN (incomplete, sometimes difficult to parse)

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- Third-party websites

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Windows X86-64 System Call Table (XP/2003/Vista/2008/7/2012/8/10)

Author: Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk (j00ru.vexillium.org/)

See also: Windows System Call Tables in CSV/JSON formats on [GitHub](https://github.com/j00ru/windows-syscalls)

Special thanks to: MeMek, Wandering Glitch

Layout by Metasploit Team

Enter the Syscall ID to highlight (hex):

Highlight

Show all Hide all

System Call Symbol	Windows XP (show)	Windows Server 2003 (show)	Windows Vista (show)	Windows Server 2008 (show)	Windows 7 (hide)	Windows Server 2012 (hide)	Windows 8 (hide)	8.0	8.1	1507
	SP0	SP1	SP0	R2						
NtAcceptConnectPort					0x0060 0x0060	0x0001 0x0001	0x0001 0x0001			
NtAccessCheck					0x0061 0x0061	0x0062 0x0062	0x0062 0x0062	0x0000		
NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm					0x026 0x026	0x0027 0x0027	0x0028 0x0028	0x0028 0x0029		
NtAccessCheckByType					0x0062 0x0062	0x0063 0x0063	0x0064 0x0063	0x0063 0x0063		
NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm					0x0056 0x0056	0x0057 0x0057	0x0058 0x0057	0x0058 0x0058	0x0059	
NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarmNoResult					0x0063 0x0063	0x0064 0x0064	0x0064 0x0064	0x0064 0x0064		

<https://j00ru.vexillium.org/syscalls/nt/64/>

The internet knows things

- MSDN (incomplete, sometimes difficult to parse)
- Third-party websites

The screenshot shows two side-by-side web pages. On the left is the "Windows X86-64 System Call Table (XP)" page, which lists system call symbols and their addresses for various Windows versions from XP to Win7. On the right is the main page for "The Undocumented Functions Microsoft Windows NT/2000/XP/Win7", featuring a green header and a yellow warning box about the software's license.

Windows X86-64 System Call Table (XP)

Author: Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk ([j0](#))
See also: Windows System Call Tables in CSV/[CSV](#)
Special thanks to: MeMek, WanderingOwls
Layout by Metasploit Team

The Undocumented Functions
Microsoft Windows NT/2000/XP/Win7

Currently includes: UserMode (Kernel Mode soon)
This is an advanced, low-level programmer's guide to Windows NT Kernel, Native API and drivers.
All remarks, fixes and comments are very welcome.

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Source of all informations and materials noticed inside
Web release by Antoni Sawicki <[as@griftstore.com](#)>
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<https://j00ru.vexillium.org/syscalls/nt/64/>

First assessment

```
NtCreateFile(
    OUT PHANDLE          FileHandle,
    IN ACCESS_MASK        DesiredAccess,
    IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
    OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK  IoStatusBlock,
    IN PLARGE_INTEGER     AllocationSize OPTIONAL,
    IN ULONG              FileAttributes,
    IN ULONG              ShareAccess,
    IN ULONG              CreateDisposition,
    IN ULONG              CreateOptions,
    IN PVOID              EaBuffer OPTIONAL,
    IN ULONG              EaLength );

```

rax	0x52
r10	0x22f3d8
rdx	0x40100080
r8	0x22f428
r9	0x22f3e8

First assessment

NtCreateFile(


```

OUT PHANDLE           FileHandle,
IN ACCESS_MASK        DesiredAccess,
IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK  IoStatusBlock,
IN PLARGE_INTEGER     AllocationSize OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG              FileAttributes,
IN ULONG              ShareAccess,
IN ULONG              CreateDisposition,
IN ULONG              CreateOptions,
IN PVOID              EaBuffer OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG              EaLength );


```

rax	0x52
r10	0x22f3d8
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
First assessment




First assessment



First assessment



First assessment



Follow the pointers

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- POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES is a pointer to a data structure

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Follow the pointers

- POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES is a pointer to a data structure
- Read from memory dump
- Struct layout?
 - Website does not provide this info.. :(
- Symbol files (ntkrnlmp.pdb) contain type information

Follow the pointers

```
0x13a7 : Length = 162, Leaf = 0x1203 LF_FIELDLIST
    list[0] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T_ULONG(0022), offset = 0
        member name = 'Length'
    list[1] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T_64PVOID(0603), offset = 8
        member name = 'RootDirectory'
    list[2] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = 0x10D2, offset = 16
        member name = 'ObjectName'
    list[3] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T_ULONG(0022), offset = 24
        member name = 'Attributes'
    list[4] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T_64PVOID(0603), offset = 32
        member name = 'SecurityDescriptor'
    list[5] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T_64PVOID(0603), offset = 40
        member name = 'SecurityQualityOfService'

0x10d3 : Length = 66, Leaf = 0x1203 LF_FIELDLIST
    list[0] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T USHORT(0021), offset = 0
        member name = 'Length'
    list[1] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T USHORT(0021), offset = 2
        member name = 'MaximumLength'
    list[2] = LF_MEMBER, public, type = T_64PUSHORT(0621), offset = 8
        member name = 'Buffer'
```

Memory dump

Memory dump

↓ 0x22f428: OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES

0022f420	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	00	30	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	. . . @ . . . 0
0022f430	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	f4	22	00	00	00	00	00 "
0022f440	42	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	B
0022f450	c8	f3	22	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	. . "

Memory dump

↓ 0x22f428: OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES

0022f420	00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00	30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	...@....0.....
0022f430	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	10 f4 22 00 00 00 00 00 00".....
0022f440	42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	B.....
0022f450	c8 f3 22 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	...".....

↓ 0x22f410: UNICODE_STRING

0022f410	4c 00 1a 02 00 00 00 00 00	80 1a 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00	L.....-.....
----------	----------------------------	----------------------------	--------------

Memory dump

↓ 0x22f428: OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES

0022f420	00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00	30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	...@....0.....
0022f430	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	10 f4 22 00 00 00 00 00 00".....
0022f440	42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	B.....
0022f450	c8 f3 22 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	..".....

↓ 0x22f410: UNICODE_STRING

0022f410	4c 00 1a 02 00 00 00 00 00	80 1a 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00	L.....-.....
----------	----------------------------	----------------------------	--------------

↓ 0x2d1a80: T_64PUSHORT (aka UTF-16 string)

002d1a80	5c 00 3f 00 3f 00 5c 00	43 00 3a 00 5c 00 55 00	\.?.?\.\C...\.U.
002d1a90	73 00 65 00 72 00 73 00	5c 00 41 00 64 00 6d 00	s.e.r.s.\A.d.m.
002d1aa0	69 00 6e 00 69 00 73 00	74 00 72 00 61 00 74 00	i.n.i.s.t.r.a.t.
002d1ab0	6f 00 72 00 5c 00 73 00	74 00 61 00 72 00 74 00	o.r.\s.t.a.r.t.
002d1ac0	6d 00 65 00 2e 00 62 00	61 00 74 00 00 00 00 00	m.e...b.a.t.....

Decoding the memory

Decoding the memory

- Cumbersome process:

Decoding the memory

- Cumbersome process:
 - Find memory location

Decoding the memory

- Cumbersome process:
 - Find memory location
 - Decode structure

Decoding the memory

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 - Follow pointers

Decoding the memory

- Cumbersome process:
 - Find memory location
 - Decode structure
 - Follow pointers
 - Repeat

Decoding the memory

- Cumbersome process:
 - Find memory location
 - Decode structure
 - Follow pointers
 - Repeat
- Tailored to specific situation

Decoding the memory

- Cumbersome process:
 - Find memory location
 - Decode structure
 - Follow pointers
 - Repeat
- Tailored to specific situation
- Generic script needs machine-readable knowledge base!

Semantic interpretation

Semantic interpretation

001001010

100100101

011010010

Semantic interpretation



Semantic interpretation

001001010
100100101
011010010



→ObjectAttributes	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES*	0x22F618
RootDirectory	VOID*	0x0
ObjectName	UNICODE_STRING*	0x22F600
Buffer	USHORT*	0x751AA0
\??\C:\Users\Administrator\startme.bat		
Length	USHORT	0x4C
MaximumLength	USHORT	0x21A
SecurityQualityOfService	VOID*	0x22F5B8
SecurityDescriptor	VOID*	0x0
Length	ULONG	0x30
Attributes	ULONG	0x42

OS internals scraping toolkit


Taking it all in




web




custom



.pdb





Current sources

Current sources

- <https://j00ru.vexillium.org> (system call list)

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- <https://j00ru.vexillium.org> (system call list)
- <https://undocumented.ntinternals.net> (signature definitions)

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- <https://undocumented.ntinternals.net> (signature definitions)
- <http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols> (type definitions)

Output format: System call list

- CSV

System Call Name	Windows 10 1607	Windows 7 SP0	...
...			
NtCreateFile	85	82	...
...			

Output format: System call signatures

- JSON

```
...
"NTSTATUS": [
    [
        [ "OUT", "PHANDLE" ],
        "FileHandle"
    ],
    [
        [ "IN", "ACCESS_MASK" ],
        "DesiredAccess"
    ],
    [
        [ "IN", "POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES" ],
        "ObjectAttributes"
    ],
    ...
],
...
]
```

Output format: Type definitions

- JSON

```
"OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES": [
    "0x30",
    [
        [ "Length",                 "0x0",      "T_ULONG"          ],
        [ "RootDirectory",          "0x8",      "T_64VOID"         ],
        [ "ObjectName",             "0x10",     "UNICODE_STRING*" ],
        [ "Attributes",              "0x18",     "T_ULONG"          ],
        [ "SecurityDescriptor",     "0x20",     "T_64VOID"         ],
        [ "SecurityQualityOfService", "0x28",     "T_64VOID"         ]
    ]
],
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de/bsides/syscall.zip>

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de/bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de/bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp  
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
        Found pointer argument to OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
        Found pointer argument to OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
T_ULONG Length: 0x30
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
        Found pointer argument to OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
        T_ULONG Length: 0x30
        T_64PVOID RootDirectory: 0x0
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
    Found pointer argument to OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
    T_ULONG Length: 0x30
    T_64VOID RootDirectory: 0x0
    UNICODE_STRING* ObjectName: 0x22f410
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
    Found pointer argument to OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
    T_ULONG Length: 0x30
    T_64VOID RootDirectory: 0x0
    UNICODE_STRING* ObjectName: 0x22f410
        UTF-16 length 76: \??\C:\Users\Administrator\startme.bat
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
    Found pointer argument to OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
    T_ULONG Length: 0x30
    T_64VOID RootDirectory: 0x0
    UNICODE_STRING* ObjectName: 0x22f410
        UTF-16 length 76: \??\C:\Users\Administrator\startme.bat
    T_ULONG Attributes: 0x42
```

Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

```
$ ./syscall.py states.json before.dmp after.dmp
SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
PARAM1: IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess: 0x40100080
PARAM2: IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes: 0x22f428
    Found pointer argument to OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
    T_ULONG Length: 0x30
    T_64VOID RootDirectory: 0x0
    UNICODE_STRING* ObjectName: 0x22f410
        UTF-16 length 76: \??\C:\Users\Administrator\startme.bat
    T_ULONG Attributes: 0x42
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Run the script!

<https://cyberus-technology.de-bsides/syscall.zip>

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SYSTEM CALL NtCreateFile START
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SYSTEM CALL RESULT: 0
PARAM0: OUT PHANDLE FileHandle: 0x22f3d8
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PARAM0: OUT PHANDLE FileHandle: 0x22f3d8
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PARAM3: OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock: 0x22f3e8
```

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    Found pointer argument to IO_STATUS_BLOCK
    T_LONG Status: 0x0
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PARAM3: OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock: 0x22f3e8
    Found pointer argument to IO_STATUS_BLOCK
    T_LONG Status: 0x0
    T_64VOID Pointer: 0x0
    T_UQUAD Information: 0x2
```

The Good, The Bad, The Ugly

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```
NtQueryMultipleValueKey(  
    IN HANDLE                 KeyHandle,  
    IN OUT PKEY_MULTIPLE_VALUE_INFORMATION ValuesList,  
    IN ULONG                  NumberOfValues,  
    OUT PVOID                 DataBuffer,  
    IN OUT ULONG               BufferLength,  
    OUT PULONG                RequiredLength OPTIONAL );
```

The Good, The Bad, The Ugly

- Missing entries (e.g., NtOpenKeyEx)
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- Quirk infrastructure for corrections and additions until fixed

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NtQueryMultipleValueKey(  
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- **Wanna play?** Micro-CTF around system call interpretation at our Cyberus booth

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- <https://gitlab.com/cyberus/os-generation>
 - <https://cyberus-technology.de/bsides/syscall.zip>
 - Twitter: @kleeparty, @cyberustech

References

- <https://gitlab.com/cyberus/os-generation>
- <https://j00ru.vexillium.org>
- <https://undocumented.ntinternals.net>
- <https://blog.cyberus-technology.de>
- <https://cyberus-technology.de/bsides/syscall.zip>