Monoxide: Scale out Blockchains with Asynchronous Consensus Zones

Present by: Yi-Chen Liu (Leo Liu), Jia-Wei Liang (Jessie Liang)

Agenda2019/11/18

- Overview
- Purpose and Goal
- System Structure
- Security Discussion


Overview

Overview

Topic 1: Asynchronous consensus zone => minimize storage and communication

Topic 2: Eventual atomicity => ensure transaction atomicity across zones


Topic 3: Chu-Ko-Nu mining => ensure the effective mining power in each zone to be at the same level of the entire network





Purpose and Goal

Current Flaws of Blockchain



Why Scalability Important?

Real-World Applications

- VisaNet: 4K transaction per sec.
- Alipay: 256K transaction per sec.

Cryptocurrency

- Bitcoin: 7 transaction per sec.
- Ethereum: 15 transaction per sec.


Goals and Contributions

- Lower storage burdens and speed up!
 - Divide the whole network into several sub-network (Zones)
 - Eventual Atomicity principle
- Reinforce system's security
 - Chu-ko-nu mining protocol was introduced

System Structure


Blockchain Confirmed Block Fork Orphan Block

Blockchain - Merkle Tree




Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree


After Pruning Tx0-2 from the Block



Blockchain - Size




New Approach - Concept



New Approach - Partitioning and Naming

- Nodes' Address = public key
- The first k bit of public key indicate the zone that the node belongs to




New Approach - Miner's Rule


- Only responsible for mining transactions that happen within the zone
- Any full node only records the chain for balances of users in its own zone

New Approach - Simple Transaction Example


- Inner-Zone Transaction: follow the original blockchain approach
- Cross-Zone Transaction: (Zone A) X send \$ to (Zone B) Y
 - Miner in Zone A check X's balance
 - Miner in Zone A create confirm block in Zone A
 - o Miner in Zone A create relay block, then send to Zone B
 - Miner in Zone B receive the relay block, then create confirm block in Zone B



New Approach - Detail Block Structure




New Approach - Detail Block Structure (Cont.)




New Approach - Transaction Verification

- Attribute set y should be confirmed and matched with the originate block
 - \circ $\gamma := \langle s, k, t, p, \{hq\} \rangle$




New Approach - Block Verification

- Check 3 types of transactions:
 - Confirmed initiative transactions in its own zone.
 - Inbound relay transactions previously forwarded from other zones.
 - Outbound relay transactions forwarded to other zones.
- Any block containing illegal transactions or mismatched pairs of initiative/relay transactions will be rejected



New Approach - Eventual Atomicity

- Withdraw first, Deposit Later
 - Assumption 1: once the withdraw operation is confirmed, the deposit operation will be executed.
 - Assumption 2: withdraw operations will be picked as long as there are well-behaved miners




New Approach - Eventual Atomicity (Cont.)

- What if no one picks up the relay block?
 - The relay block will exist eternally unless the originate block has been dropped
- What if the relay block has been dropped accidentally?
 - A new relay block will be generated automatically from the original zone
- Creating multiple blocks for a single transaction means inevitable latency might occur?
 - Mining works between zones are independent

New Approach - Eventual Atomicity (Cont.)

- Malicious Miners. What can we do?
 - Creating empty blocks without confirming any transaction, neither for normal transactions and relay ones.
 - Solution: there will be someone honest to create valid block. Don't worry. And, the chance is rare!





Of the current total of 546,237 mined Bitcoin blocks, 101,215 of them were empty blocks.

Security Discussion

Per-Zone Security

- H: The mining power of the entire network
- N: The total number of Zones
- Per-Zone mining power = H/N

If a malicious participate has T mining power, which T > H/N*50%, the participant can control the zone.

Chu-ko-nu Mining

- Goal: raise the attacking bar in each Zone from H/N*50% to H*50%
- Allow miners create multiple blocks and broadcast to n Zones, where n < N
- To increase the efficiency, miners only need to calculate PoW once
- In each zone, full nodes, as well as miners, treat batch-chaining-blocks and chaining-blocks equally when accepting a new block

Chu-ko-nu Mining

50291	Batch-Chaining-Block
	Version
	Sharding Scale \pmb{k}
	Shard Index s
	Hash of Previous Chaining-Block
	Timestamp
	Merkle Root (Confirmed TX)
	Merkle Root (Outbound Relay TX)
	PoW Target
>	Merkle Tree Path $\{h_{\mathbf{j}}\}$
	Base Shard Index $m{b}$ of the Batch
$\left\{ \right $	Size of the Batch $m{n}$
	Batch Sharding Scale $k_{ t b}$
	Batch PoW Nonce $\eta_{ extsf{b}}$

Chaining-Block
Version
Sharding Scale k i
Shard Index s _i
Hash of Previous Chaining-Block
Timestamp
Merkle Root (Confirmed TX)
Merkle Root (Outbound Relay TX)
PoW Target
PoW Nonce η_i

 $hash(\langle A_i, \eta_i \rangle) < \tau,$

- τ: PoW target
- b: Zone Index
- η: Nonce

 \rightarrow hash $(\langle h_0, \mathbf{C}, \eta_b \rangle) < \tau$,

Thank You