RingBFT: Resilient Consensus over Sharded Ring Topology

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Roadmap

- 1. Introduction (Yu)
 - a. Something about Sharding in common database system
 - b. Background of cross-shard transactions and why we need ringBFT
- 2. Single-Shard protocol (Yu)
- 3. Cross-Shard protocol (Chen, Fu)
- 4. Uncivil Executions and Attacks (Yang)


- Why data partitioning? Improve scalability.
- Strategies of data partitioning:

Horizontal Partitioning - separate by entities

Vertical Partitioning - separate by features

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- Strategies of data partitioning:


Horizontal Partitioning - separate by entities



https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/best-practices/data-partitioning

- Why data partitioning? Improve scalability.
- Strategies of data partitioning:

Horizontal Partitioning - separate by entities Vertical Partitioning - separate by features




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- Why data partitioning? Improve scalability.
- Strategies of data partitioning:

 Horizontal Partitioning separate by entities
 - Vertical Partitioning separate by features

Shard is usually referred to a **horizontal partition** of data in a database. Each shard is held on a separate database server instance.

Federated Data System



- Correlate data from local tables and remote data sources, as if all the data is stored locally in a single database
- Update data in relational data sources, as if the data is stored in a single database
- Move data to and from relational data sources
- Take advantage of data source's processing strengths, by sending requests to particular data sources for processing
- Compensate for SQL limitations at a data source by having the federated server process parts of a distributed request

https://www.altoros.com/blog/data-federation-vs-data-integration/

Cross-Shard Transactions

- In federated database system, the cross-shard transactions are common.
- Cross-shard transactions require not only <u>communication between</u> <u>shards</u>, but also <u>their fate depends on the consent of each of the involved shards</u>.
- Traditional BFT not work.

- Designated Committee (AHL)
- Initiator Shard (Sharper)



Require all-to-all communication between replicas of each shard

Why RingBFT?

- 1. linear communication between replicas
- 2. secure against byzantine attacks
- 3. high throughputs
- 4. low latencies
- 5. scalable for cross-shard transactions
- 6. inexpensive when transactions require access to multiple shards

Safety and Liveness

Involvement

Each $S \subseteq \mathfrak{S}$ processes a transaction if $S \subseteq \mathfrak{I}$.

• Termination

Each non-faulty replica in \Re_s executes a transaction.

• Non-divergence

All non-faulty replicas in \Re_s execute the same transaction.

Consistence

Each non-faulty replica in Sexecutes a conflicting transaction in same order.

Traditional Replicated System

- Involvement
 - Each $S \subseteq \mathfrak{S}$ processes a transaction if $S \subseteq \mathfrak{I}$.
- Termination ——liveness

 Each non-faulty replica in \Re s executes a transaction.
- Non-divergence \longrightarrow safety All non-faulty replicas in \Re_s execute the same transaction.
- Consistence
 - Each non-faulty replica in S executes a conflicting transaction in same order.

Single-shard Transactions

- Involvement Each $S \subseteq \mathfrak{S}$ processes a transaction if $S \subseteq \mathfrak{I}$.
- Termination liveness

 Each non-faulty replica in \Re_s executes a transaction.
- Non-divergence \longrightarrow safety All non-faulty replicas in \Re s execute the same transaction.
- Consistence


 Each non-faulty replica in \mathfrak{S} executes a conflicting transaction in same order.

Cross-shard Transactions


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 - All non-faulty replicas in \Re_s execute the same transaction.
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Single-Shard Protocol

- No communication among the shards.
- Each transaction only need to requires access to data in one shard.




PBFT-request



- 1 _____
- 2 _____
- 3


PBFT-preprepare




Preprepare message:

- (1) sequence number
- (2) digest of the client transaction


PBFT-prepare



PBFT-commit



PBFT-reply



Problem

Cross-shard transactions require not only <u>communication between shards</u>, but also <u>their fate depends on the consent of each of the involved shards</u>.

Prior work

- Designated Committee (AHL)
- Initiator Shard (Sharper)



Require all-to-all communication





Improvements

- Linear Communication between replicas
- Lock
- Ring order

Network Situations:

- Normal-case (stable / no faulty replicas)
- Uncivil executions



Cross-shard Cases

- Simple Case
- Complex Case





Clarification:

- Simple Case: Each shard can independently run consensus and execute its fragment
- Complex Case: An involved shard may require access to data from other involved shards to execute its fragment.

Cross-shard Cases

- Simple Case
- Complex Case





Ring order: S-U-V-W


Problem:

Both client C1 and C2 will access shard U and shard V.

Scenarios:(eg. Shard U)

1. Each client requires different data from shard U.

Result: No conflict, each runs independently.




• The first access to data-item a in shard U will lock data-item a so that others can not access the same data.

Scenarios (eg Shard U):

2. What if two clients require the same data from shard U?










How does the protocol run in normal cases? What does Linear Communication Primitive mean? Why shards need ring order to deal with deadlock?


Assumption


- 1. A system of four shards: S, U, V, and W, the ring order is $S \to U \to V \to W$.
- 2. The number of replicas in each shard $\geq 3f+1$.
- 3. Byzantine replicas are unable to impersonate non-faulty replicas.
























Deadlock



Uncivil Executions

FLP Impossibility:

"In a fully asynchronous system, is there a deterministic consensus algorithm that can be safe, live, and fault tolerant?"

Premise of RingBFT:

Any BFT protocol can provide safety under asynchronous settings but liveness in the period of synchrony even if up to f replicas are byzantine

Main question:

How can we guarantee liveness during periods of synchrony


Solution:

3 Timers(Replicas) + Recovery Protocols

Uncivil Executions(Single Shard)

Client behavior and attacks:

Situation: Client does not receive sufficient message



Note: Malicious client could always forward transaction to all replicas to blame primary However, if primary responses to replicas on time, attacks will fail

Uncivil Executions(Single Shard)

Situation: Primary is faulty(Easy) and/or Unreliable network

Solution: View change

Quite similar to the previous example and situation in PBFT


Main reasons for timeout of local timer:

- 1. Replicas do not receive sufficient commit messages
- 2. Primary fails to propose a request from client

Uncivil Executions(Single Shard)

Situation: Primary is malicious

Solution: Checkpoint




Primary keeps up to f non-faulty replicas in the dark. Such replicas will send view change messages although will not succeed in the end.

Uncivil Executions(Cross Shard)

Situation 1: No Communication

Solution: Message retransmission(Transmit timer)




Uncivil Executions(Cross Shard)

Situation 2: Partial Communication

Reason: Byzantine Primary of previous shard or unreliable network

Solution: Remote timer of replica in next shard




Evaluations

Benchmark: Yahoo Cloud Serving Benchmark(YCSB)

Included experiments:


- 1. Scaling number of shards
- 2. Scaling number of replicas per shard
- 3. Varying percentage of Cross-shard Txns
- 4. Varying the Batch size
- 5. Varying number of involved shards
- 6. Varying number of clients
- 7. Impact of Primary Failure
- 8. Impact of Complex Cross-Shard Transactions


Evaluations



Evaluations







Cross-Shard Workload Rate

Conclusions

RingBFT, a novel BFT protocol for sharded blockchains.

For a single-shard transaction, it performs as efficient as any state-of-the-art sharding BFT consensus protocol.

For a cross-shard transaction, it resolves throughput drop by requiring each shard to participate in at most 2 rotations around the ring

RingBFT achieves 25x higher throughput than the most recent sharding protocols and easily scales to nearly 500 globally-distributed nodes.

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The End

