

**NAME**

systemd-cryptsetup@.service, systemd-cryptsetup – Full disk decryption logic

**SYNOPSIS**

systemd-cryptsetup@.service

system-systemd\x2dcryptsetup.slice

/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup

**DESCRIPTION**

systemd-cryptsetup@.service is a service responsible for setting up encrypted block devices. It is instantiated for each device that requires decryption for access.

systemd-cryptsetup@.service instances are part of the system-systemd\x2dcryptsetup.slice slice, which is destroyed only very late in the shutdown procedure. This allows the encrypted devices to remain up until filesystems have been unmounted.

systemd-cryptsetup@.service will ask for hard disk passwords via the [password agent logic](#)<sup>[1]</sup>, in order to query the user for the password using the right mechanism at boot and during runtime.

At early boot and when the system manager configuration is reloaded, /etc/crypttab is translated into systemd-cryptsetup@.service units by **systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8)**.

In order to unlock a volume a password or binary key is required. systemd-cryptsetup@.service tries to acquire a suitable password or binary key via the following mechanisms, tried in order:

1. If a key file is explicitly configured (via the third column in /etc/crypttab), a key read from it is used. If a PKCS#11 token, FIDO2 token or TPM2 device is configured (using the *pkcs11-uri=*, *fido2-device=*, *tpm2-device=* options) the key is decrypted before use.
2. If no key file is configured explicitly this way, a key file is automatically loaded from /etc/cryptsetup-keys.d/*volume*.key and /run/cryptsetup-keys.d/*volume*.key, if present. Here too, if a PKCS#11/FIDO2/TPM2 token/device is configured, any key found this way is decrypted before use.
3. If the *try-empty-password* option is specified it is then attempted to unlock the volume with an empty password.
4. The kernel keyring is then checked for a suitable cached password from previous attempts.
5. Finally, the user is queried for a password, possibly multiple times, unless the *headless* option is set.

If no suitable key may be acquired via any of the mechanisms describes above, volume activation fails.

**SEE ALSO**

**systemd(1)**, **systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8)**, **crypttab(5)**, **systemd-cryptenroll(1)**, **cryptsetup(8)**

**NOTES**

1. password agent logic  
[https://systemd.io/PASSWORD\\_AGENTS/](https://systemd.io/PASSWORD_AGENTS/)