Exploring CVE-2015-2545 and its users

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Executive Summary

This report, available at TLP:GREEN to researchers and network defenders, gives an overview of different attacks using CVE-2015-2545. Specifically we look at the different ways attackers are triggering the vulnerability, and the possibility that the exploit is shared amongst various groups. Based on overlaps in the samples analysed, our findings show that there are several clusters of documents, with the majority of the document-based builders sharing similar constructs in terms of how the final payload is discovered and executed. We also found that more recently some attackers are triggering the vulnerability through the use of MHTML files with .doc extensions.

Background

Back in November 2015, FireEye published a report titled 'Two For One'[11] detailing two new zero days, one affecting Microsoft (MS) Word and the other affecting the Windows operating system. Our report focuses on the former, CVE 2015-2545.

The vulnerability stems from a flaw in the processing of Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) files and allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code. We have been tracking samples exploiting this vulnerability as well as tracking the associated malware, much of which has been already discussed in public reporting.




Figure 1: Examples of decoy documents used in conjunction with the exploit

The report summarises our findings based on samples collected in 2016, and explores similarities and differences in the shellcode between different documents exploiting this vulnerability.

To request your copy, e-mail <u>threatintelligence@uk.pwc.com</u> - note this is not for lead generation purposes, but is rather to avoid disclosing to adversaries how their attacks can be linked.

The samples analysed & their command & control addresses are given below:

Samples (initial MD5s):

3fe0cbedec6969803a72b8c76a4a0a03 50064d33625970a8145add7e3e242fe3 6a6a8cb2e59439891e53b04024573d37 e1b4a5a565fdfcec52346d3b6063c587 9b6af5f8878a3fde32a3e8ff3cf98906 6d55eb3ced35c7479f67167d84bf15f0 21bb2d447247fd81c42d4262de36adb6 375e51a989525cfec8296faaffdefa35 445886e6187cb36ee33ef7e27b7d5dbe f4c1e96717c82b14ca76384cb005fbe5 aae962611da956a26a76d185455f1d44 c591263d56b57dfadd06a68dd9657343 03a537ff04deaf2c30b23122d795fee2 a4144b9bc99ab39d16c8125a19382316 bfc4133a64a8a8a53c02f9d471c79c16 07614906c9b0ed9cfae07306c32555b9 e63896f2dfcc2ee2173944ef16ddc131 805a522481056441e881c46c69b808f6 c48521d427f40148ee6e5a953ea23622 ebc3f26c0bfc473c840c9e4f3393671d 238ca1ab29f191b767837748fb655c8e 2689515f0bbdf4f3fd4448d0fdc9f2a7 f89c4fb64edc993604d53e5fad6585d4 e95f65bfe3e54d58dcbef3275d0c3f49

e61211931319ece42ec4755a6f6fc815

b49de68758f2c1c2f7dfe60fe67d1516

d0533874d7255b881187e842e747c268 e560dfba68e5bd9a84aeb7b79c9b11ea edde511d4872c4b2551e7ad22e746fb6 40fdca3c932b12b6740cea1266021c6e 07614906c9b0ed9cfae07306c32555b9 03726d30ebffaf5455a932dee69ce6e7 03726d30ebffaf5455a932dee69ce6e7 07614906c9b0ed9cfae07306c32555b9 **C2s**: sent[.]leeh0m[.]org found[.]leeh0m[.]org 64[.]62[.]238[.]73 newsupdate.dynssl[.]com 121[.]127[.]249[.]74 carwiseplot[.]no-ip[.]org goback[.]strangled[.]net win7_8d90f[.]dns04[.]com 37[.]10[.]71[.]35 www[.]kashiwa-js[.]com 78[.]128[.]92[.]49 news[.]rinpocheinfo[.]com 59[.]188[.]13[.]204 coffeol[.]com

updo[.]nl

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