

Lesson 11 - Risc Zero / Axiom / Circom

Today's topics

- Risc Zero
- Powdr
- Axiom
- Circom

Risc Zero

Introduction

The RISC Zero zkVM is an open-source, zero-knowledge virtual machine designed for constructing trustless, verifiable software applications.

Risc Zero's goal is to integrate existing programming languages and developer tools into the zero-knowledge realm. This is accomplished through a high-performance ZKP prover, which provides the performance allowance necessary to create a zero-knowledge virtual machine (zkVM) implementing a standard RISC-V instruction set.

In practical terms, this allows for smooth integration between "host" application code, written in high-level languages running natively on host processors (e.g., Rust on arm64 Mac), and "guest" code in the same language executing within the zkVM.


A zero-knowledge virtual machine is a virtual machine that runs trusted code and generates proofs that authenticate the zkVM output.

RISC Zero's zkVM implementation, based on the RISC-V architecture, executes code and produces a computational receipt.

Risc-V is an open standard instruction set architecture (ISA) based on established reduced instruction set computer (RISC) principles

In a RISC Zero zkVM program, guest code written for the zkVM is compiled to an ELF binary and executed by the **prover**, which returns a computational receipt to the host program

Anyone possessing a copy of this receipt can verify the program's execution and access its publicly shared outputs.



Before being executed on the zkVM, guest source code is converted into a RISC-V ELF binary. The binary file is hashed to create a **image ID** that uniquely identifies the binary being executed. The binary may include code instructions to publicly commit a value to the **journal**. Later, the journal contents can be read by anyone with the receipt.

After the binary is executed, an execution trace contains a complete record of zkVM operation.

The trace is inspected and the ELF file's instructions are compared to the operations that were actually performed.

A valid trace means that the ELF file was faithfully executed according to the rules of the RISC-V instruction set architecture.

The execution trace and the journal are then used to generate a seal, a blob of cryptographic data that shows the receipt is valid.

The seal has properties that reveal whether itself or the journal have been altered.

When the receipt is verified, the seal will be checked to confirm the validity of the receipt.

To check whether the correct binary was executed, the seal can be compared to the image ID of the expected ELF file.

Risc Zero in detail

Proof System

When a the RISC Zero zkVM executes, it produces a computational receipt that consists of:

- a journal which contains the public outputs of the computation, and
- a seal which is a zkSTARK

Given a `receipt` and an `Image ID` a skeptical third party can verify the purported output of the computation.

Further details

This includes

- Code to emulate RISC-V, including decoding RISC-V instructions and constructing the execution trace.
- Code to evaluate the constraint polynomials that check the execution trace.

The image ID is the SHA-2 hash of the image of the initial zkVM memory state.

Checking the Image ID

The image ID can be determined from the compiled ELF source code. Someone wishing to confirm that a receipt corresponds to Rust source code can compile that code targeting the RISC Zero zkVM and verify that the image ID resulting from this compilation matches the image ID in the receipt.

Like other zk-STARKs, RISC Zero's implementation makes it cryptographically infeasible to generate an invalid receipt:

- If the binary is modified, then the receipt's seal will not match the image ID of the expected binary.
- If the execution is modified, then the execution trace will be invalid.
- If the output is modified, then the journal's hash will not match the hash recorded in the receipt.

Once the proof receipt has been generated it can be sent via side channel to the verifier. The verifier does not need access to the host code, but they do need the image ID.

In typical use cases, a RISC Zero zkVM program will actually be structured with three components:

- Source code for the *guest*,
- Code that *builds* the guest's source code into executable methods, and
- Source code for the *host*, which will call these built methods.

The code for each of these components uses its own associated RISC Zero crate or module:

- The *guest* code uses the `guest` module of the `risc0-zkvm` [crate](#)
- The *build* code for building guest methods uses the `risc0-build` [crate](#)
- The *host* code uses the `risc0-zkvm` [crate](#)

Example program

In the [repo](#) we have 3 example programs.

Password checker

Overall process

Alice wants to create a password, that complies with Bob's password requirements without revealing her password.

The program is divided between a [host driver](#) that runs the zkVM code and a [guest program](#) that executes on the zkVM.

Alice can run a password validity check and her password never needs to leave her local machine.

The process is as follows :

- Alice's `host driver program` shares a password and salt with the `guest zkVM` and initiates the guest program execution.
- The `guest zkVM program` checks Alice's password against a set of validity requirements, such as minimum length, inclusion of special characters.
- If the password is valid, it is hashed with the provided salt using SHA-256. If not, the

program panics and no computational receipt is generated.

- The guest program generates a salted hash of Alice's password and commits it to a `journal`, part of a computational `receipt`.
- Alice sends the receipt to Bob's Identity Service.

The `image ID` and the `journal` on the receipt provide Bob assurance that:

The program Alice executed within the zkVM was actually Bob's Password Checker, and Bob's Password Checker approved Alice's password

It demonstrates that the guest zkVM program has executed, which tells Bob `his password requirements were met`.

It also provides a tamper-proof `journal` for public outputs, the integrity of which tells Bob that *the shared outputs are the result of running the password program*.

We split the code between guest and host, if there is a part of the computation that doesn't need to be performed securely, then it can be run outside the zkVM.

For optimisation, when using cryptographic operations, it is possible to build 'accelerator' circuits such as the Risc zero implementation of SHA26.

Fast cryptography is sufficient to support many 'DeFi' applications. For many other applications, it is possible to perform most computation on the host (outside the zkVM) and then verify the results in the zkVM.


In terms of program size, although there is a theoretical maximum size is 128 MB, with the current implementation programs should be kept to at most ~ 1MB.

Proving the validity of two RISC Zero receipts currently takes ~10 seconds.

Rust compatibility

Risc zero are working to include the rust standard library, until that is complete it is advised to use the `no_std` option

Bonsai



See [lite paper](#)

Bonsai is a versatile zero-knowledge proof network designed to facilitate the integration of ZK proofs for scalability, privacy, and other benefits across any chain, protocol, or application. This includes ETH, L1 Blockchains, Cosmos App Chains, L2 Rollups, and DApps.

The unique Bonsai network is built on three essential components, paving the way for the development of innovative applications in both blockchain and traditional application domains:

- A flexible zkVM that can operate any VM within a zero-knowledge/verifiable context


- A proving system that seamlessly connects to any smart contract or chain
- A universal rollup that distributes all computations proven on Bonsai across every chain

```
// Without Bonsai
contract simulation_normal {
    function some_really_hard_work() {
        // A large amount of gas heavy code
        // code ...
        // code ...
        // code ...
        // code ...
        // code ...
        //
    }
}
```

```
// With Bonsai
contract simulation_bonsai {
    function some_really_hard_work() {

bonsai_proving_network.call("some_really_ha
rd_work");
    }
}
```


powdr




Powdr brings modularity, flexibility, security and excellent developer experience to zkVMs.

How it works

Design a new zkVM in hours, through a user-defined ISA, which powdr compiles into a zkVM.

Generate proofs using eSTARK, Halo2, Nova, and whatever comes next.



See [Docs](#)

powdr is a modular compiler stack to build

zkVMs. It is ideal for implementing existing VMs and experimenting with new designs with minimal boilerplate.

- Domain specific languages are used to specify the VM and its underlying constraints, not low level Rust code
- Automated witness generation
- Support for multiple provers as well as aggregation schemes
- Support for hand-optimized co-processors when performance is critical
- Built in Rust 🦀

See [video](#) from Christian Reitwiessner

Installation

Rust is a prerequisite

Instructions are [here](#)

Front Ends

A Risc V frontend is available and others are under development.

Backends

[Halo 2](#) and [eSTARK](#) are supported

Axiom

The ZK Coprocessor for Ethereum.



See [Demo](#)

Axiom is a ZK coprocessor designed for Ethereum. It allows smart contracts to access on-chain data in a trustless manner and perform various computations on that data. Developers can submit queries to Axiom and utilise the ZK-verified results directly in their smart contracts.

Axiom operates in three steps:

1. Read: Axiom employs ZK proofs to securely retrieve data from block headers, states, transactions, and receipts in past Ethereum blocks. Since all on-chain data is stored in one of these forms, Axiom can access any information available to archive nodes.
2. Compute: Once the data is obtained, Axiom applies verified compute operations on top of it. These operations range from basic

analytics like sum, count, max, and min, to cryptographic tasks such as signature verification and key aggregation, as well as machine learning algorithms like decision trees, linear regression, and neural network inference. Each compute operation's validity is confirmed through a ZK proof.

3. Verify: Axiom provides a ZK validity proof with the result of each query, ensuring two things: (1) the input data was accurately fetched from the chain, and (2) the compute operations were correctly executed. This ZK proof is then verified on-chain within the Axiom smart contract, making the final result securely available for use by other smart contracts downstream.
-

Circom

See [Documentation](#)

CIRCOM & SNARKJS


- 1 Design your arithmetic circuit and write your circuit using **circom**
 - Use your own code
 - Use our **safe** templates
- 2 Compile the circuit to get a low-level representation (R1CS)

```
$ circom circuit.circom --r1cs --wasm --sym
```
- 3 Use **snarkjs** to compute your witness

```
$ snarkjs calculatewitness --wasm circuit.wasm  
--input input.json --witness witness.json
```
- 4 Generate a trusted setup and get your zk-SNARK proof

```
$ snarkjs setup  
$ snarkjs proof
```
- 5 Validate your proof or have a smart-contract validate it!

```
$ snarkjs validate  
$ snarkjs generateverifier
```



Installation

Dependencies

- Rust - use rustup

```
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2
```

```
https://sh.rustup.rs -sSf | sh
```

- Circom

```
git clone
```

```
https://github.com/iden3/circom.git
```

```
cd circom
```

```
cargo build --release
```

```
cargo install --path circom
```

- Snarkjs

```
npm install -g snarkjs
```

Circom Lib

See [Repo](#)

CircomLib

Description

- This repository contains a library of circuit templates.
- All files are copyrighted under 2018 OKIMS association and part of the free software [circom](#) (Zero Knowledge Circuit Compiler).
- You can read more about the circom language in [the circom documentation webpage](#).

Organisation

This repository contains 5 folders:

- `circuits` : it contains the implementation of different cryptographic primitives in circom language.
- `calcpedersenbases` : set of functions in JavaScript used to find a set of points in [Baby Jubjub](#) elliptic curve that serve as basis for the [Pedersen Hash](#).
- `doc` : it contains some circuit schemes in ASCII (must be opened with Monodraw, an ASCII art editor for Mac).
- `src` : it contains similar implementation of circuits in JavaScript.
- `test` : tests.

A description of the specific circuit templates for the `circuit` folder will be soon updated.

Circom coding

Writing circuits

Taken from the [documentation](#)

Circom allows programmers to define the [constraints](#) that define the arithmetic circuit. All constraints must be of the form $A * B + C = 0$, where A , B and C are linear combinations of signals.

You can define constraints in this way

```
pragma circom 2.0.0;

/*This circuit template checks that c is
the multiplication of a and b.*/

template Multiplier2 () {

    // Declaration of signals.
    signal input a;
    signal input b;
    signal output c;

    // Constraints.
```



```
c <== a * b;  
}
```

Signals

The arithmetic circuits built using circom operate on signals

Signals can be named with an identifier or can be stored in arrays and declared using the keyword signal.

Signals can be defined as input or output, and are considered intermediate signals otherwise. Signals are by default private.

The programmer can distinguish between public and private signals only when defining the main component, by providing the list of public input signals.

```
pragma circom 2.0.0;  
  
template Multiplier2(){  
    //Declaration of signals  
    signal input in1;  
    signal input in2;  
    signal output out;  
    out <== in1 * in2;  
}
```

```
component main {public [in1,in2]} =  
Multiplier2();
```

- Field Element

Integers mod the max field value, these are the default type.

- Arrays

These hold items of the same type

```
var x[3] = [2,8,4];  
var z[n+1]; // where n is a parameter of a  
template  
var dbl[16][2] = base;  
var y[5] = someFunction(n);
```

Templates and components

The mechanism to create generic circuits in Circom is the so-called templates.

They are normally parametric on some values that must be instantiated when the template is used.

The instantiation of a template is a new circuit object, which can be used to compose other circuits, so as part of larger circuits.

```
template tempid ( param_1, ... , param_n )
{
    signal input a;
    signal output b;

    .....
}
```

The instantiation of a template is made using the keyword component and by providing the necessary parameters.

```
component c = tempid(v1,...,vn);
```

The values of the parameters should be known constants at compile time.

Components

A component defines an arithmetic circuit has input signals, output signals and intermediate signals, and can have a set of constraints.

Components are immutable once instantiated.

```
template A(N){
    signal input in;
    signal output out;
    out <== in;
}
```

```
template C(N){
    signal output out;
    out <== N;
}
```

```
template B(N){
    signal output out;
    component a;
    if(N > 0){
        a = A(N);
    }
    else{
        a = A(0);
    }
}
```

```
}  
}
```

```
component main = B(1);
```

We can create arrays of components.

```
template MultiAND(n) {  
    signal input in[n];  
    signal output out;  
    component and;  
    component ands[2];  
    var i;  
    if (n==1) {  
        out <== in[0];  
    } else if (n==2) {  
        and = AND();  
        and.a <== in[0];  
        and.b <== in[1];  
        out <== and.out;  
    } else {  
        and = AND();  
    }  
    var n1 = n\2;  
    var n2 = n-n\2;  
    ands[0] = MultiAND(n1);
```

```
        ands[1] = MultiAND(n2);
        for (i=0; i<n1; i++) ands[0].in[i]
<== in[i];
        for (i=0; i<n2; i++) ands[1].in[i]
<== in[n1+i];
        and.a <== ands[0].out;
        and.b <== ands[1].out;
        out <== and.out;
    }
}
```

The main component

In order to start the execution, an initial component has to be given. By default, the name of this component is "main", and hence the component main needs to be instantiated with some template.

This is a special initial component needed to create a circuit and it defines the global input and output signals of a circuit. For this reason, compared to the other components, it has a special attribute: the list of public input signals. The syntax of the creation of the main component is:

```
component main {public [signal_list]} =  
  tempid(v1,...,vn);
```

```
pragma circom 2.0.0;
```

```
template A(){  
  signal input in1;  
  signal input in2;  
  signal output out;  
  out <== in1 * in2;  
}
```



```
component main {public [in1]}= A();
```

zkRepl. from 0xPARC



REPL for circom

main.circom x + Add File

```
1 pragma circom 2.1.2;
2
3 include "circomlib/poseidon.circom";
4 // include "https://github.com/0xPARC/circom-secp256k1/blob/master/circuits/bigint.circom";
5
6 template Example () {
7   signal input a;
8
9   // The value assigned to `unused` here is never read.
10  View Problem (^F8) No quick fixes available
11  var unused = 4;
12  c <== a * b;
13  assert(a > 2);
14
15  component hash = Poseidon(2);
16  hash.inputs[0] <== a;
17  hash.inputs[1] <== b;
18
19  log("hash", hash.out);
20 }
21
22 component main { public [ a ] } = Example();
23
24 /* INPUT = {
25   "a": "5",
26   "b": "77"
27 } */
```

SHIFT-ENTER TO RUN
CMD-S TO SAVE AS GITHUB GIST

zk

STDOUT:

template instances: 69
non-linear constraints: 241
linear constraints: 0
public inputs: 1
public outputs: 1
private inputs: 1
private outputs: 0
wires: 244
labels: 1111
Written successfully: ./main.r1cs
Written successfully: ./main.sym
Written successfully: ./main_js/main.wasm
Everything went okay, circom safe
Compiled in 3.17s

LOG:

hash 6008246173323011098915936938805752727781568490
715388424063708882447636047656

OUTPUT:

c = 385

ARTIFACTS:

Finished in 3.45s
• main.wasm (1027.06KB)
• main.js (9.18KB)
• main.wtns (7.88KB)
• main.r1cs (110.08KB)
• main.sym (37.71KB)

PLONK KEYS:

• main.plonk.zkey (6996.84KB)
• main.plonk.vkey.json (2.14KB)
• main.plonk.sol (25.63KB)
• main.plonk.html (11111.18KB)

KEYS + SOLIDITY + HTML:

Groth16 PLONK Verify

See [repo](#) and take note of the caveats

Allows circom projects to be verified on Ethereum by exporting to Cairo

First write and compile a circuit and compute the witness through circom, then generate a validation key through snarkjs (this process is properly explained at <https://docs.circom.io/getting-started/installation/>), this will yield a .zkey, which we can use to generate a solidity verifier through the command:

```
snarkjs zkey export solidityverifier [name of your key].zkey [nme of the verifier produced]
```

