

Homework 1

Released: 12/10/2022

Due: 23/10/2022

Instructions. You may work with other students, but you must individually write your solutions **in your own words**. If you work with other students or consult outside sources (such as Internet/book), cite your sources.

Submissions. Submit a pdf file through odtuclass. LaTeX or Word typed submission is required.

1. **Stable Matching.** Consider the following stable matching instance.

Men	Preference List	Women	Preference List
X	C, D, A, B	A	X, Y, Z, W
Y	D, A, B, C	B	X, Y, Z, W
Z	A, B, C, D	C	Y, Z, X, W
W	D, C, A, B	D	Z, X, Y, W

- (a) Use the Gale and Shapley algorithm to find a man-optimal stable matching.
- (b) Find a woman-optimal stable matching in this instance.
- (c) Suppose we are given n men and n women where each man has a preference list of all women and every woman has preference list of all men. On a stable matching instance, prove that if we run the Gale-Shapley algorithm twice, once with men proposing and once with women proposing and we obtain the same matching, then the instance has a unique stable solution.
- (d) Show that the Gale-Shapley algorithm terminates within $(n - 1)^2 + 1$ iterations for n boys and n girls and this bound is tight.

2. **Alternative matchings.** Consider the following stable matching instance.

Men	Preference List	Women	Preference List
X	B, A, D, C	A	W, Y, X, Z
Y	C, B, A, D	B	Z, Y, W, X
Z	D, A, C, B	C	X, Z, Y, W
W	C, B, D, A	D	X, W, Z, Y

(a) In addition to man-optimal and woman-optimal matchings suppose we have an alternative matching $S = \{(X - A), (Y - B), (Z - C), (W - D)\}$. Is S a stable matching? Explain.

(b) How can we find all stable matchings for a problem where there are n men and n women? Is there a polynomial time algorithm to find all stable matchings? If so, describe it.

(c) Can a woman can end up better off by lying about her preferences? More concretely, suppose a woman w falsely switches the order of m and m' although she prefers m to m' . Prove that this is possible by giving an example of a set of preference lists (for $n \geq 3$) for which there is a switch that would improve the partner of a woman who falsely switched preferences.

3. **Order of growth**]. Analyze the growth of $n!$.

(a) Prove that $n! = O(n^n)$ and $n! = \Omega(2^{n-1})$.

(b) Prove that for any fixed $k > 1$, $n! = \Omega(k^{n-k})$, or find a counter example.

(c) Prove that for any fixed $k > 1$, $n! = \Omega(k^n)$, or find a counter example.

4. **Asymptotics.** Given an array A of n integers, you'd like to output a two-dimensional $n \times n$ array B in which for all $i < j$, $B[i, j] = \max \{A[i], A[i + 1], \dots, A[j]\}$. For $i \geq j$ the value of $B[i, j]$ can be left as is.

```

for  $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$  do
  for  $j = i + 1, \dots, n$  do
    compute the maximum of the entries  $A[i], A[i + 1], \dots, A[j]$ .
    store the maximum value in  $B[i, j]$ .
  end for
end for

```

(a) Find a function f such that the running time of the algorithm is $O(f(n))$, and clearly explain why.

(b) For the same function f argue that the running time of the algorithm is also $\Omega(f(n))$. (This establishes an asymptotically tight bound $\Theta(f(n))$.)

(b) Design and analyze a faster algorithm for this problem. You should give an algorithm with running time $O(g(n))$, where $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} g(n)/f(n) = 0$.

5. **Big O and Ω .** For each function $f(n)$ below, find (1) the smallest integer constant H such that $f(n) = O(n^H)$, and (2) the largest positive real constant L such that $f(n) = \Omega(n^L)$. Otherwise, indicate that H or L do not exist. All logarithms are with base 2. Your answer should consist of: (1) the correct value of H , (2) a proof that $f(n)$ is $O(n^H)$, (3) the correct value of L , (4) a proof that $f(n)$ is $\Omega(n^L)$.

(a) $f(n) = \frac{1}{2}n^2$.

(b) $f(n) = n(\log n)^3$.

(c) $f(n) = \sum_{i=0}^{\lceil \log n \rceil} \frac{n}{2^i}$.

(d) $f(n) = \sum_{i=1}^n i^3$.

(e) $f(n) = 2^{(\log n)^2}$.