



Autocratization Turns Viral

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2021



UNIVERSITY OF
GOTHENBURG

V-Dem is a unique approach to measuring democracy – historical, multidimensional, nuanced, and disaggregated – employing state-of-the-art methodology.

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) produces the largest global dataset on democracy with almost 30 million data points for 202 countries from 1789 to 2020. Involving over 3,500 scholars and other country experts, V-Dem measures hundreds of different attributes of democracy. V-Dem enables new ways to study the nature, causes, and consequences of democracy embracing its multiple meanings.

We are very grateful for our funders' support over the years, which has made this venture possible. To learn more about our funders, please visit: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/about/funders/>.

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect an official position of the V-Dem Project or the V-Dem Steering Committee.

Produced by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg

Democracy Report Team: Nazifa Alizada, Rowan Cole, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Sebastian Hellmeier, Palina Kolvani, Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Shreeya Pillai.

V-Dem Data and Management Team: Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Dafni Kalafati, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer.

Editor: Staffan I. Lindberg.

Editing/Proof-Reading: Katherine Stuart, ToEnglish Pty Ltd.

Design and Final Art: Harald Schörnig, Frank&Earnest.

Printing: GU Intertryckeri.

Cover photo: Pro-democracy protest in Bangkok, Thailand. Picture by Varit Soponis, Shutterstock.

Suggested citation: Nazifa Alizada, Rowan Cole, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Sebastian Hellmeier, Palina Kolvani, Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Shreeya Pillai, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2021. Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute.

March 2021

Copyright ©2021 by V-Dem Institute. All rights reserved.

V-Dem Institute:

Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Språngkullsgatan 19, P.O. box 711
SE-405 30 Gothenburg Sweden
contact@v-dem.net
+46 (0)31 786 30 43
www.v-dem.net

Follow us on social media



Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| A Word from the Team | 5 |
| Executive Summary | 6 |
| State of the World: Autocratization Turns Viral | 9 |
| Pandemic Backsliding: Does Covid-19 Put Democracy at Risk? | 10 |
| Another Year of Decline for Liberal Democracy | 13 |
| Advancers and Decliners | 18 |
| Threat to Freedom of Expression Intensifies | 24 |
| From Year of Protest to Year of Lockdown | 28 |
| V-Dem Data Details | |
| V-Dem in Numbers | 30 |
| Regimes of the World, 2010–2020 | 31 |
| Liberal Democracy Index, All Countries in 2020 and 2010 | 32 |
| Detailed Data, All Countries' LDI and its Components, 2020 | 34 |
| What is Democracy Good for? Introducing "The Case for Democracy" | 36 |
| New Global Data on Political Parties: V-Party | 38 |
| Publications from the V-Dem Team | 41 |
| V-Dem Indices | 42 |
| V-Dem Methodology | 49 |
| References | 50 |



Pro-democracy protest in Bangkok, Thailand. Photo by Kan Sangtong, Shutterstock.

A Word from the Team

WE ARE PLEASED TO PRESENT Democracy Report 2021, the fifth annual report from the V-Dem Institute. Our report comes at uncertain times, as the world is combating the Covid-19 pandemic and democratic principles continue to decline. It is our hope that this report will contribute to a greater understanding of these global challenges.

With the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, we started the *Pandemic Backsliding project* (PanDem) with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, in March 2020. The project tracks state responses to Covid-19 and their potential effects on democracy in 144 countries until December 2020. To make the data more easily accessible, we have also developed an interactive online dashboard which can be accessed [on our website](#).

We are also pleased that during 2020 we became part of, and host the team building **Demscore**. Demscore brings together some of the world's leading research infrastructures and databases at various Swedish universities. The objective is to advance national and international research on complex societal challenges facing the world.

The launch of the **Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) dataset** in November 2020 was another significant moment for the V-Dem Institute. V-Party is the largest ever study of political parties highlighting shifts and trends within 3,489 political parties in 178 countries since 1970, with funding from the Swedish Research Council. This dataset offers a unique opportunity to compare how different political parties respond to socio-economic and political pressures.

Like many other observers around the world, we are deeply concerned with the decline of democratic attributes over the past decade or so, and this year's Democracy Report documents that this trend continues during 2020. This intensifying wave of autocratization across the world highlights the need for new programs to defend democracy. That is why in November 2020, we started *the Case for Democracy initiative* with the financial support from the European Commission. *The Case for Democracy* collates state-of-the-art research on the benefits of democracy for economic and human development, health and socio-economic protections, environmental protection and climate action, as well as international and domestic security. We are looking forward to carry on and expand this effort in the coming years.

In order to better understand the patterns that lead to regime change, this year we are also publishing the new Regimes survey in the V-Dem dataset version 11. This survey is part of Professor Knutsen's European Research Council grant on the "**Emergence, Life, and Demise of Autocratic Regimes**". It provides an opportunity to track the main actors who keep a regime in power and those who want to remove the regime by looking at the size, geographic location and social composition of both support coalitions and regime opposition groups.

The data presented in this report is the result of an internationally collaborative effort. We are immensely grateful to the 3,500 country experts without whose contribution the data and this report would not have been possible, and to the Country Coordinators, Regional Managers, Project Managers, and Steering Committee Members for their active engagement.

The V-Dem Institute Team





Executive Summary

PANDEMIC BACKSLIDING LOOMS

- Most democracies acted responsibly but 9 democracies register major and 23 moderate violations of international norms.
- 55 autocratic regimes engaged in major or moderate violations.
- 2/3 of all countries imposed restrictions on the media.
- 1/3 of all countries have had emergency measures without a time limit.
- The final toll on democracy may turn out to be high unless restrictions are eliminated immediately after the pandemic ends.

ANOTHER YEAR OF DECLINE FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

- The global decline during the past 10 years is steep and continues in 2020, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
- The level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2020 is down to levels last found around 1990.

AUTOCRACIES: HOME TO 68% OF THE POPULATION

- Electoral autocracy remains the most common regime type. Together with closed autocracies they number 87 states, home to 68% of the world population.
- The world's largest democracy turned into an electoral autocracy: India with 1.37 billion citizens.
- Liberal democracies diminished over the past decade from 41 countries to 32, with a population share of only 14%.

AUTOCRATIZATION ACCELERATES

- The “third wave of autocratization” accelerates, now engulfing 25 countries and 34% of the world population (2.6 billion).
- Over the last ten years the number of democratizing countries dropped by almost half to 16, hosting a mere 4% of the global population.

THE DECLINE IN 2020 AND COVID-19

- The pandemic’s direct effects on global levels of liberal democracy were limited in 2020.
- Longer-term consequences may be worse and must be monitored closely.

ADVANCERS AND DECLINERS

MAJOR AUTOCRATIZERS

- Several G20 nations such as Brazil, India, and Turkey are among the top 10 decliners.
- Poland takes a dubious first place and three new nations join this group: Benin, Bolivia, and Mauritius.
- Six of the top-10 decliners became autocracies.

HOW AUTOCRATIZATION UNFOLDS

- Autocratization typically follows a similar pattern. Ruling governments first attack the media and civil society, and polarize societies by disrespecting opponents and spreading false information, only to then undermine formal institutions.

RAYS OF HOPE: TOP-10 ADVANCERS

- Democratization is still occurring but small countries dominate this trend.
- Four countries among the top-10 advancers turned into new democracies during the last 10 years.
- Tunisia and Armenia are the two best performers and South Korea and Ecuador are resurging after a period of decline.


THREAT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INTENSIFIES

- The threat to freedom of expression and media intensifies. 32 countries are declining substantially, compared to only 19 just three years ago.
- Freedom of expression and the media make 8 of the 10 indicators declining in the greatest number of countries over the past 10 years.
- Repression of civil society is also intensifying. The V-Dem data register substantial deterioration in 50 countries over the past 10 years.


FROM YEAR OF PROTEST TO YEAR OF LOCKDOWN

- From an all-time high in 2019, mass mobilization declined to its lowest level in over a decade.
- However, even a global pandemic and forceful state-imposed restrictions could not dissuade pro-democracy forces.
- The decline in pro-democracy mass mobilization in 2020 may well prove to be short-lived.


SHARE OF WORLD POPULATION
LIVING IN AUTOCRACIES



NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
THREATENING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION



SHARE OF WORLD POPULATION
LIVING IN AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES





Anti-government demonstrators in São Paulo, Brazil. Photo by Ettore Chiaregiani, Shutterstock.

State of the World: Autocratization Turns Viral

THIS IS THE 5TH ANNUAL DEMOCRACY REPORT from the V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg. It summarizes the state of liberal democracy in the world in 2020 against the backdrop of developments over the last 10 years, but we open with a special section on the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The title “*Autocratization Turns Viral*” reflects what we see as the main developments. In brief, this is what we find:

Summary of Report

The “year of lockdown” in 2020 replaced the 2019 “year of protest” that was the focus of last year’s *Democracy Report*. While the data shows that most democracies have acted responsibly in the face of the pandemic, 9 register major, and 23 moderate, violations of international norms. The situation is worse in autocracies: 55 were involved in major or moderate violations in response to the pandemic. The V-Dem data suggests that the direct impact on democracy has been limited so far, but the final toll may turn out to be much higher unless restrictions are eliminated immediately after the pandemic is over.

While the world is still more democratic than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, the global decline of liberal democracy continues in 2020. To put this into perspective, the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2020 is down to the levels around 1990. Electoral autocracies continue to be the most common regime type. A major change is that the world’s largest democracy turned into an electoral autocracy: India with 1.37 billion people. Together, electoral and closed autocracies are home to 68% of the world’s population. Meanwhile, the number of liberal democracies is decreasing to 32, with a population share of only 14%. Electoral democracies account for 60 nations and the remaining 19% of the population.¹

This reflects an accelerating wave of autocratization engulfing 25 nations that hold 1/3 of the world’s population – 2.6 billion people. Several G20 nations such as Brazil, India, Turkey, and the United States of America are part of this drift. Poland takes a dubious “lead” as the country which declined the most during the last decade and three new nations join the major autocratizers: Benin, Bolivia, and Mauritius. The report shows that autocratization typically follows a pattern. Ruling governments first attack the media and civil society and polarize societies by disrespecting opponents and spreading false information, then undermine elections.

The number of democratizing countries is also dwindling, down almost by half compared to ten years ago – now 16 that are home to 4% of the global population. But on the bright side, we find that four countries among the top 10 with the greatest advances have transitioned to become democracies, with Tunisia and Armenia as the best performers.

The threat to freedom of expression and the media intensifies – 32 countries are declining substantially, compared to only 19 just three years ago. Repression of civil society is also severe now and the V-Dem data register substantial deterioration in 50 countries.

From a record high in 2019, mass mobilization declined to its lowest level in over a decade in 2020. Yet the decline in pro-democratic mass mobilization in 2020 may well prove to be short-lived. The “year of lockdown” demonstrated that pro-democracy forces cannot be dissuaded. Activists rose above adverse conditions and several movements found alternative ways of furthering their cause.

The *Democracy Report* 2021 reflects analyses conducted at the Institute, and should not necessarily be assumed to have the full endorsement of the international V-Dem team. This report is released alongside these findings, and reports on the 11th version of the V-Dem dataset.² Based on the assessments of over 3,500 country experts, the dataset provides nearly 30 million data points on aspects of democracy such as the liberties and independence of the media and civil society, legislatures, judiciaries, human rights, and many related topics. The V-Dem data and visualization tools are freely available at <https://v-dem.net>.

At the end of this year’s *Democracy Report*, readers can find **Figure 16** listing the exact values and rankings of all countries in the V-Dem dataset as at year-end 2020, as well as how each has fared in terms of liberal democracy over the last decade. In the section **Country Scores and V-Dem Indices**, readers can find the values and rankings for all countries also on other democracy indices in the V-Dem database.

¹ Percentages are rounded.

² V-Dem improves the quality of the released data every year by engaging a large number of global experts. This process of constant improvement may lead to a correction of scores reported in earlier versions of the dataset and the Democracy Report.

Pandemic Backsliding: Does Covid-19 Put Democracy at Risk?

- Most democracies acted responsibly in the face of the pandemic but 9 democracies register major and 23 moderate violations of international norms.
- 55 autocratic regimes engaged in major or moderate violations of international norms in response to the pandemic.
- Restrictions on media freedom are most common by far – 2/3 of all countries imposed moderate or major ones. Almost 1/3 of nations (31%) have (or had) emergency measures without a time limit.
- The final toll on democracy may turn out to be higher unless restrictions are eliminated immediately after the pandemic ends.

Reports about the [excessive use of emergency powers](#) and [limitations on media freedoms](#) created widespread concerns that responses to Covid-19 would shut down democracy itself.³ From March to December 2020, the V-Dem Institute's Pandemic Backsliding Project (PanDem) monitored the extent to which 144 governments violated international standards for emergency provisions in response to the pandemic.⁴ PanDem data suggests that the most pessimistic predictions did not materialize during 2020.


The majority of severe violators were already autocracies before the pandemic and their violations therefore meant going from a bad situation to a slightly worse situation. Yet, a few governments in democracies do seem to be using the pandemic to erode democratic institutions. This risk of pandemic backsliding is high in **El Salvador** and **Sri Lanka**, and to a lesser extent in **Nepal** and **Paraguay** (see Figure 3).

What does it mean to respect international standards during an emergency? Based on international human rights law,⁵ emergency measures may alter democratic institutions, rights, and proceedings only within certain boundaries. For example, while responses to Covid-19 may ensure physical distancing by restricting freedom of movement and assembly, they may not infringe on non-derogable rights like the right to life or freedom from torture. In short, emergency measures must be “[proportionate, necessary and non-discriminatory](#)”, have a clear time limit, and not be implemented in an excessive manner.⁶

With these standards as benchmarks, the PanDem project measured seven types of violations: (1) discrimination against minorities, (2) violations of fundamental rights (non-derogable rights), (3) excessive use of force, (4) absence of a time limit for emergency measures, (5) limitations on the legislature’s ability to constrain the executive, (6) official disinformation campaigns, and (7) restrictions on media freedoms. The composite Pandemic Democratic Violations Index (PanDem) assesses the extent to which state responses to Covid-19 contravene the standards, ranging from zero (no violation) to one (maximum number of violations).⁷

The map in Figure 1 shows the maximum score each country recorded on the PanDem Index between March and December 2020. On the bright side, there were no violations in 14 countries (dark blue in Figure 1), 13 of which are democracies such as Botswana, Canada, Finland, and Taiwan. Another 35 countries (light blue), committed only minor violations, such as a few isolated instances of limitations on access to information. In total about 55% of all democracies and 34% of the countries coded have committed no or only minor violations of democratic standards in their response to Covid-19.

FIGURE 1: PANDEMIC DEMOCRATIC VIOLATIONS INDEX, 11 MARCH–10 DECEMBER 2020



The map displays the maximum score for each country recorded at some point during the period. No data available for countries in grey.
Source: PanDem Project ([Edgell et al. 2021](#)).

Create similar maps using V-Dem data.


3 <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus-governments-power.html> and <https://ipi.media/european-media-freedom-suffers-covid-19-response/>

4 The PanDem data covers all countries with a population of over two million. Based on academic sources, official documents and credible newspaper articles, trained research assistants assessed the extent of violations on a range of specifically-phrased indicators. The sources are documented at <https://github.com/vdeminstitute/pandem>. For more information see <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/PanDem/>, Kolvani et al. (2020), and <https://www.v-dem.net/en/publications/briefing-papers/>.

5 United Nations ICCPR (2020).

6 <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25722&LangID=E>

7 The PanDem index is the weighted sum of all violations. For details, see documentation at <https://github.com/vdeminstitute/pandem>.

FIGURE 2: VIOLATIONS BY TYPE, 11 MARCH–10 DECEMBER 2020Source: PanDem Project ([Edgell et al. 2021](#)).

However, no less than 95 other countries (66%) committed either moderate or major violations during this time period. The 63 countries marked in light red exhibit moderate violations, out of which the 40 autocracies make up the majority (63%) but 23 are democracies. Of particular concern are the 32 countries (dark red) – 23 autocracies but also 9 democracies – with major violations as measured by the PanDem Index.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of violations across types. Restrictions on media freedom have been most common by far, with about two-thirds of all countries imposing moderate ones. Abusive enforcement of emergency measures was also quite common with almost half of the countries recording at least minor levels, and almost a third of the countries (31%) have (or had) emergency measures without a time limit. A quarter (25%) engaged in some form of disinformation campaigns, while the legislature's role was limited during the pandemic (or there was no legislative check to begin with) in 17% of countries. Discriminatory measures occurred in 15% of the countries, and violations of non-derogable rights in 7% of countries.

Figure 3 demonstrates that violations were more common in closed autocracies and electoral autocracies. For instance, the **Saudi** government detained hundreds of migrant workers in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions,⁸ and the **Venezuelan** authorities detained thousands of its citizens who were returning from abroad in makeshift facilities.⁹ There are alarming reports of harassment of journalists covering Covid-19 in **India**,¹⁰ which is now an electoral autocracy as this report documents below. In other

electoral autocracies like **Turkey** authorities arrested journalists for their reporting on the pandemic and detained hundreds of citizens for discussing the issue on social media.¹¹ In **Uganda**, the authorities invoked social distancing regulations to target LGBT communities and intimidate journalists.¹² In **Serbia**, the government imposed excessive restrictions on movements in refugee camps.¹³

Violations also occurred in electoral democracies, most notably in Sri Lanka and El Salvador, where they caused a substantial decline in democracy compared with the previous year (see below). The **Sri Lankan** government used the pandemic to impose new restrictions on the media, intimidate and silence critics, and repress civil society organizations.¹⁴ V-Dem data also recorded a noticeable decline in judicial independence and in the autonomy of the election management body. Likewise, in **El Salvador** the government detained hundreds of people for violating lockdown regulations and held them in unsanitary conditions, while ignoring injunctions by the country's Supreme Court to protect fundamental rights.¹⁵

To a lesser extent, there were also violations in **Nepal**,¹⁶ **Paraguay**,¹⁷ and **South Africa**,¹⁸ with reports of security forces employing humiliating tactics or excessive forces against those who violated social distancing rules. In **Tunisia** bloggers faced prosecution for criticizing the government's approach to the pandemic.¹⁹ The government in **Slovakia** imposed restrictions on Roma communities that raised criticisms of discriminatory treatment.²⁰ Violations even occurred in a couple of liberal democracies such as the **United States of America**, where the government frequently engaged

⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/15/saudi-arabia-migrants-held-inhuman-degrading-conditions>

⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/americas/coronavirus-venezuela.html>

¹⁰ <https://www.dw.com/en/can-indian-media-report-freely-about-the-covid-19-crisis/a-53728264>

¹¹ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/06/turkey-stifling-free-expression-during-the-covid19-pandemic/>

¹² <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/23/nowhere-to-go-the-young-lgbt-ugandans-outed-during-lockdown>

¹³ <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR0125112020ENGLISH.PDF>

¹⁴ https://github.com/vdeminstitute/pandem/blob/master/by_country/Sri%20Lanka.md

¹⁵ https://github.com/vdeminstitute/pandem/blob/master/by_country/El%20Salvador.md


¹⁶ <https://thehindu.com/national/police-use-improvised-man-catcher-stick-to-detain-lockdown-offenders-in-banke>

¹⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/01/extreme-coronavirus-lockdown-controls-raise-fears-for-worlds-poorest>

¹⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-un-rights/u-n-raises-alarm-about-police-brutality-in-lockdowns-idUSKCN2291X9>

¹⁹ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/tunisia-end-prosecution-of-bloggers-for-criticizing-governments-response-to-covid19/>


²⁰ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-slovakia-roma/slovakia-closes-off-five-roma-settlements-due-to-coronavirus-idUSKCN21R28U>

FIGURE 3: AUTOCRACIES VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL NORMS MORE THAN DEMOCRACIES IN 2020

in disinformation about the pandemic,²¹ and **Greece** where lockdown measures disproportionately affected refugee camps.²²

In addition, 43 countries – 24 democracies and 19 autocracies – still had emergency measures without a time limit by December 2020, including **Albania, Mexico**, and **The Gambia**.²³ Other countries – including **Brazil, Jamaica**, and **Kyrgyzstan** – have set a

time limit for specific emergency measures, but not for the overall emergency response.²⁴ Despite **international pressure** to set an end-date for emergency measures only eight countries have done so.²⁵ For democracy to endure the pandemic without long-term damages, it is vital that governments lift the measures once the pandemic tapers off.

FIGURE 4: THE STATE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN 2020

21 <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/11/trumps-lies-about-coronavirus/608647/>

22 <https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/greece-extends-lockdown-more-120000-migrants-refugees>

23 <https://shendetesia.gov.al/nivel-i-larte-risku-komiteti-teknik-i-eksperteve-vijone-te-mbeten-ne-fuqi-masat-e-marra-pa-afat/>; https://github.com/vdeminstitute/pandem/blob/master/by_country/Mexico.md; https://github.com/vdeminstitute/pandem/blob/master/by_country/The%20Gambia.md

24 <https://www.in.gov.br/web/dou/-/portaria-n-188-de-3-de-fevereiro-de-2020-241408388>; https://github.com/vdeminstitute/pandem/blob/master/by_country/Jamaica.md; <https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/340411/kyrgyzstan-authorities-extend-state-of-emergency-indefinitely-may-8-update-10>

25 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/EmergencyMeasures_Covid19.pdf

Another Year of Decline for Liberal Democracy

- The world is still more democratic than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, but the global decline in liberal democracy has been steep during the past 10 years and continues in 2020.
- The level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2020 is down to levels last found around 1990.
- The decline is especially prominent in the Asia-Pacific region, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America.
- Electoral autocracies continue to be the most common regime type. A major change is that India – formerly the world's largest democracy with 1.37 billion inhabitants – turned into an electoral autocracy. With this, electoral and closed autocracies are home to 68% of the world's population. Liberal democracies diminished from 41 countries in 2010 to 32 in 2020, with a population share of only 14%. Electoral democracies account for 60 nations and the remaining 19% of the population.²⁶
- The “third wave of autocratization” accelerates – 25 countries, home to 34% of the world’s population (2.6 billion people), are in democratic decline by 2020. At the same time, the number of democratizing countries drop by almost half down to 16 that are home to a mere 4% of the global population.

- The pandemic's direct effects on levels of liberal democracy in 2020 were limited, but the longer-term consequences may be worse and must be monitored closely.


The map in Figure 4 shows the state of democracy in 2020 based on V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index (LDI).²⁷ Western Europe and North America, as well as parts of Latin America, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan have the highest levels of liberal democracy. The least democratic countries in the world include parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region, as well as China, Russia, and Venezuela.

Figure 5 provides a perspective on the current state of the world with global and regional breakdowns of liberal democracy from 1972 to 2020. The left panel of Figure 5 is based on country averages and the thick black line represents the global average of the LDI along with confidence intervals. The Figure captures the gradual increase in democracy that began in 1974, often labelled the “third wave of democratization”. The level of liberal democracy in the world and in most regions then started to decline around 2010, but the decline is still within the confidence intervals as indicated by the grey area around the world average.

However, an issue with this conventional approach is that it treats countries with small and large populations equally. Since democracy is *rule by the people*, it arguably matters how many people are enjoying democratic rights and freedoms. The right-hand panel

FIGURE 5: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1972–2020

(Left side – number of countries; Right side – share of world population)




26 Percentages are rounded.

27 V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) captures both electoral and liberal aspects of democracy and goes from the lowest (0) to the highest (1). The electoral component is measured by the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) that captures the extent to which all elements of Robert Dahl's (1971, 1989) famous articulation of “polyarchy” are present, including the quality of elections, individual rights, as well as the media and freedoms of association. The Liberal Component Index (LCI) captures the liberal aspects including checks and balances on the executive arm of government, respect for civil liberties, the rule of law, and the independence of the legislature and the judiciary.

FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF COUNTRIES VS SHARE OF POPULATION, BY REGIME TYPE, 1972–2020

(Left side – number of countries; Right side – share of world population)



Naturally, uncertainty remains about the classification of countries exhibiting similar degrees of authoritarian and democratic traits and thus are close to the thresholds between regime types. Taking this uncertainty into account, the number of autocracies in 2020 could range from 79 to 98, with 87 being our best estimate. For more details on the Regimes of the World measure, see Lührmann et al. (2018).

in Figure 5 therefore shows levels adjusted for population size. The magnitude of the decline in democracy is much larger when accounting for population size, indicating that many more people live in autocratizing than in democratizing countries. By this measure, the democratic rights and freedoms of the average global citizen in 2020 are similar to the level found around 1990. The decline in liberal democracy has been steep during the past 10 years, remarkably so in the Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America.

AUTOCRACIES: HOME TO 68% OF THE WORLD POPULATION

What do the trends in democracy look like if we switch to the perspective of regime types? For most parts of the *Democracy Report* the focus is on gradual changes in the LDI. However, it is useful to analyze the current state of the world and its trajectory from varying perspectives. In this section, we take an alternative perspective and approach the world in terms of regime types while using the same underlying indicators and data from V-Dem as the LDI.²⁸ Figure 6 portrays the development over time since 1972 by the four regime types: closed and electoral autocracies, along with electoral and liberal democracies. Once more the left-hand panel is based on the number of countries, while the right-hand panel depicts shares of the world's population. For a complete list of all countries' regime classifications and regime transitions for 2010–2020, see Table 3 on page 31 of this report.

This perspective reminds us again that the world used to be a lot less democratic than it is today, despite relapses over the past

decade. The world is more democratic compared to the 1970s and 1980s, even with the 87 autocracies at the end of 2020. The dark red lines demonstrate that closed autocracies dominated the world both in terms of number of countries and as the share of the population they harbored back in the 1970s and 1980s. The numbers then fell gradually to reach a record low when these dictatorships were found in only 20 countries by 2013. Their number has since increased again to 25 as of 2020.

Electoral autocracies (light red lines) have almost doubled in number since 1972 (when there were only 36) and became the world's most common regime type with the end of the Cold War. Peaking with 64 last year, the number is now down to 62 but it remains the most common regime type in the world. Smaller and larger countries have transitioned in and out of this category so their share of the world's population has varied. **India's** democratic decline, which led to a transition to an electoral autocracy in 2019²⁹ is especially visible on the right-hand side of Figure 6. The autogolpe of Indira Gandhi in 1975 is also reflected in the figure. With India's 1.37 billion people, electoral autocracies now hold 43% of the global population, and autocracies together more than two-thirds (68%), among the highest recorded since 1972.

The number of electoral democracies (dashed light blue lines) has remained around 55 to 60 countries over the past decade and in 2020 **Albania**, **Malawi** and **Ukraine** transitioned from electoral autocracies to join this type of democracy.


The number of liberal democracies (dashed dark blue lines) was on a steady upward path for many years, starting from 20 in 1972 and peaking at 41 in 2010. The right-hand panel in Figure 6

²⁸ The typology and indicator "Regimes of the World" published in Lührmann et al. (2018) uses V-Dem data but is not officially endorsed by the V-Dem Steering Committee.

²⁹ V-Dem measures uncertainty associated with underlying data in a meticulous way (see "Methodology" at the end of this report). This resulted in the classification of India being highly uncertain last year but with more and better data this year, India is classified with a higher degree of certainty as an electoral autocracy from 2019.

FIGURE 7: AUTOCRATIZING VS DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES, 1972–2020

(Left side – number of countries; Right side – share of world population)



demonstrates that the uptake in the number of countries over the years was not matched by increasing shares of the population of the world, reflecting that many liberal democracies have relatively small populations such as **Barbados, Belgium, Costa Rica, Latvia, Taiwan, and Uruguay**. Since 2010, a series of liberal democracies have also been marked by the global wave of autocratization and their numbers diminished to 32 in 2020 when countries such as Chile, Portugal, Slovenia, and South Africa have gone from being liberal to more limited electoral democracies.

AUTOCRATIZATION ACCELERATES

Here we leave the regime perspective and switch back to analyze the trends based on changes in the LDI over time. Figure 7 shows the number of countries undergoing autocratization or democratization³⁰ by year since 1972. The left-hand panel is based on the number of countries while the right-hand panel displays population shares.

The dashed dark blue line in the left-hand panel demonstrates how a wave of democratization built up through the 1970s and 1980s, and broke in the early 1990s to slowly subside. At its peak in 1999, 72 countries with about 30% of the global population were in a process of democratization. While the number of countries undergoing autocratization (red solid line) fell off during the period that democratization wave was building, it has been on the rise since around 2000 in an uneven but

pronounced upward trajectory. However, the pace of this “third wave of autocratization”³¹ escalated in the last few years. In 2020, there were 25 countries undergoing autocratization compared to less than ten a decade ago. Meanwhile only 16 registered as in a process of democratization by 2020, a drop by almost half compared to ten years ago.


The accelerating pace at which the world is being taken over by processes of autocratization is manifest in bold relief when population size is taken into account, as in the right-hand panel of Figure 7. The sharp increase in the last few years is the result of autocratization in large countries like **India, Brazil, and the United States of America**. By 2020, more than one-third (34%) of the world’s population were living in countries undergoing autocratization while a minuscule 4% were living in democratizing nations.

THE DECLINE IN 2020 AND COVID-19

What was the toll of Covid-19 on democracy in 2020? How much of the decline described above is a direct effect of responses to the pandemic? The data described in the first section of this report suggests that the direct and immediate effects have been limited. Similarly, Figure 5 suggests that the global average of the LDI has not decreased dramatically from 2019 to 2020. Figure 8 details the average changes from 2019 to 2020 for all indicators used to measure liberal democracy. The only indicators with really substantive negative changes are freedom of domestic

³⁰ In the Democracy Report we use a simplified metric to capture which countries are autocratizing or democratizing. We simply measure the difference between the country score at time t and time t-10 years. If the difference is statistically significant (confidence intervals do not overlap) and substantial (a difference greater than 0.05), we count the country as being in a process of autocratization or democratization. For a more sophisticated approach, see the “Episodes of Regime Transformation” data and codebook (Edgell et al. 2020, Maerz et al. 2021), www.github.com/vdeminstiute/ert.

³¹ Lührmann and Lindberg (2019).

FIGURE 8: CHANGE ON INDICATORS COMPOSING THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX, 2019–2020

and international movement – reflecting the lockdown measures during the pandemic – or three out of the 46 indicators forming the LDI. The effect on the overall index score is minuscule.³² In short, the pandemic seems to have had a marginal impact on the global level of liberal democracy, at least in this short-term perspective.

Even so, holding elections during the pandemic presented many challenges, from ensuring voter safety to organizing election observers amidst travel restrictions. Some countries managed the difficulties exceptionally well, such as **South Korea** where voter turnout in the legislature elections reached the highest level in 16 years.³³ In other countries, the pandemic made it harder to observe the quality of elections such as in **Burundi** where, in addition to domestic electoral observers, international observers were not allowed to monitor the presidential elections in May 2020.³⁴

Restrictions on international observers also reduced the integrity of the **Belarusian presidential elections** in August 2020.³⁵ In addition, some governments postponed elections without indicating a reliable alternative date, for instance in **Ethiopia**. Finally, a series of countries witnessed an upsurge of violence around elections, such as in the **Central African Republic**³⁶ and in **Guinea**,³⁷ which explains why the indicator for electoral violence is the fourth most affected in Figure 8.

While it seems that in the short term the pandemic has not been used to substantially increase autocratization in most countries, the longer-term consequences are uncertain. The continued violations documented above are a reason for serious concerns however, and for close monitoring of the coming months and years in order to ensure that measures are removed once the pandemic subdues.

³² We also calculated an LDI without those indicators, but the difference between the average of the original LDI (0.3990) and the one without the freedom of movement indicators (0.3998) is minuscule. Only one country has an LDI value that is more than 0.01% greater without the freedom of movement indicators (Timor Leste; LDI: 0.4636; adjusted LDI: 0.4746) than with them; for a further eleven countries the index value would be between 0.005% and 0.01% greater (United Arab Emirates; Burma/Myanmar; Luxembourg; Croatia; United Kingdom; Bhutan; Palestine/Gaza; Norway; Slovenia; Ethiopia; Burkina Faso). For all other countries, the difference is below 0.005%.

³³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52275993>

³⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-election-idUSKBN22Y2NE>; <https://www.dw.com/en/ohrcr-burundis-elections-arent-credible-and-free/a-53513705>

³⁵ <https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/23/who-is-making-sure-belarus-presidential-election-is-free-and-fair>

³⁶ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081682>

³⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/19/guinea-post-election-violence-repression>



All-Russian vote on the approval of amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, June 25 2020. Tver region, Russia.
Photo by Aleksandr Beliakov, Shutterstock.

Advancers and Decliners

- Several G20 nations such as Brazil, India, and Turkey are among the top 10 decliners. Poland takes a dubious first place, and three new nations join the group: Benin, Bolivia, and Mauritius. Six of the top decliners became autocracies.
- Autocratization typically follows a similar pattern across very different contexts. Ruling governments first attack the media and civil society, and polarize societies by disrespecting opponents and spreading false information, then undermine elections.
- Democratization is still occurring but small countries dominate this trend. Tunisia is the greatest democratizer over the past ten years followed by Armenia, while South Korea and Ecuador are resurging after a period of decline.
- Four countries among the top 10 advancers turned into new democracies during the last 10 years.


While autocratization is the dominant trend in the world, the demand for democracy remains high in many quarters and positive regime transitions have taken place. The world map in Figure 9 shows where liberal democracy has advanced (blue) and declined (red) over the past 10 years. It demonstrates that countries moving toward autocratization outnumber advancing countries and they cover broad swathes of territory globally as well as in most regions of the world. In North America, and Western and Eastern Europe, no country has advanced in democracy in the past 10 years while **Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, and the United States of America** have declined substantially.

In Figure 10, countries above the diagonal line have democratized based on an improvement on the LDI while states below the diagonal line have autocratized. There are labels (country names) only for markers of countries where the difference from 2010 to 2020 is statistically significant and substantially meaningful.


The upper diagonal of Figure 10 shows the 16 countries advancing over the last ten years, including **Armenia, The Gambia, and Tunisia** with records of relatively free and fair elections, and stronger civil societies. **South Korea** stands out as one of the few cases ever recorded where a process of autocratization started in a liberal democracy but was turned around thus avoiding a breakdown. **Ecuador** is another recent instance of such a rare “U-turn” during a process of change and together these two cases could be studied in further detail for clues about what it takes to stop and turn around a process of autocratization before it goes too far. However, since the democratizing countries – with the exception of South Korea – are typically small they can only play a marginal role in influencing regional and world trajectories.

Contrast this with the 25 autocratizing nations where we find major G20 nations such as **Brazil, India, Turkey, and the United States of America**. The data also shows that other populous, influential states such as **Bangladesh, Hungary, Philippines, and Tanzania** belong to this group of autocratizers, as does **Hong Kong**. Some of these are large, influential countries found across the major regions in the world, making it a truly global trend. Notably, the majority of countries with such substantial and significant declines on the LDI, no less than 15, are electoral autocracies where rights and freedoms are deteriorating.

FIGURE 9: COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIZING OR AUTOCRATIZING SUBSTANTIALLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY, 2010–2020



Key to colors: Red marks countries where the LDI has declined substantially and significantly over the past ten years. Blue marks countries where the level of democracy has advanced. Countries in grey are substantially unchanged.

FIGURE 10: COUNTRIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ON THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI), 2010–2020

As noted above, **India** recently lost its status as an electoral democracy and its LDI declines from 0.57 in 2010 to 0.34 in 2020, following the government led by Prime Minister Modi placing restrictions on multiple facets of democracy such as civil society and free speech (see box on **India** and tables at the end of this report for details).

States in Eastern Europe such as **Hungary**, **Poland**, and **Serbia** have continued their downward decline after continued assaults on the judiciary and restrictions on the media and civil society. The **United States of America** declines substantially on the LDI from 0.86 in 2010 to 0.73 in 2020, in part as a consequence of President Trump's repeated attacks on the media, opposition politicians, and the substantial weakening of the legislature's de facto checks and balances on executive power.

THE MAJOR AUTOCRATIZERS

The top 10 major decliners are listed in Table 1. The most notable finding at the general level is that nine out of these ten were electoral or even liberal democracies in 2010. Only three (**Brazil**, **Mauritius**, and **Poland**) of those nine remain democracies, but all are now only electoral democracies. This presents a worrying trend, which is corroborated by a recent study analyzing all instances of autocratization in democracies from 1900 to 2019 and showing that almost 80% lead to democratic breakdown.³⁸

In this year's *Democracy Report*, **Benin**, **Bolivia**, and **Mauritius** are new cases among the top 10 autocratizing countries and our data documents substantial declines for all three.

Otherwise, the countries among the top 10 are the same identified by the analyses in last year's *Democracy Report*. While **Hungary**'s ongoing autocratization is still conspicuous, **Poland** has taken over the dubious first position with a dramatic 34 percentage-points decline on the LDI, most of which has occurred since 2015. **Turkey** is still found in the very top group among the major decliners, closely followed by **Brazil** and **Serbia**.

TABLE 1: TOP-10 AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES, 2010–2020

| | CHANGE | LDI 2010 | LDI 2020 | REGIME TYPE 2010 | REGIME TYPE 2020 | |
|----|-----------|----------|----------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1 | Poland | -0.34 | 0.83 | 0.49 | Liberal Democracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 2 | Hungary | -0.32 | 0.68 | 0.37 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 3 | Turkey | -0.29 | 0.40 | 0.11 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 4 | Brazil | -0.28 | 0.79 | 0.51 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 5 | Serbia | -0.27 | 0.51 | 0.24 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 6 | Benin | -0.26 | 0.55 | 0.29 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 7 | India | -0.23 | 0.57 | 0.34 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 8 | Mauritius | -0.23 | 0.73 | 0.50 | Liberal Democracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 9 | Bolivia | -0.18 | 0.41 | 0.231 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 10 | Thailand | -0.17 | 0.34 | 0.17 | Electoral Autocracy | Closed Autocracy |


The classification of regime type is not only based on the LDI score but also the Electoral Democracy Index, as well as the extent to which elections overall have been free and fair. See Lührmann et al. (2018) for details.

Democracy Broken Down: India

Shreya Pillai and Staffan I. Lindberg

The world's largest democracy has turned into an electoral autocracy. India's autocratization process has largely followed the typical pattern for countries in the "Third Wave" over the past ten years: a gradual deterioration where freedom of the media, academia, and civil society were curtailed first and to the greatest extent (see the figure below in this box).

AUTOCRATIZATION IN INDIA COMPARED TO ITS NEIGHBORS, 2010–2020



Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to victory in India's 2014 elections (marked with a vertical dashed line in the figure above) and most of the decline occurred following BJP's victory and their promotion of a Hindu-nationalist agenda. India's level of liberal democracy registered at 0.34 by the end of 2020 after a steep decline since its high at 0.57 in 2013. That represents a 23-percentage point drop on the 0 to 1 LDI scale, making it one of the most dramatic shifts among all countries in the world over the past 10 years, alongside autocratizing countries like Brazil, Hungary, and Turkey. The latter two became (electoral) autocracies in 2018 and 2014 respectively, and India now joins their ranks.

The figure to the right provides evidence of how far India's autocratization has driven down various indicators that go into the LDI, between 2010 and 2020. The indicators typically range

from "0" to "4" and a drop of two full points on that scale represents a dramatic shift towards autocracy. Notably, the autonomy of the election management body is found in the top group. This captures a severe depreciation since around 2013 and signals the decline in the quality of critical formal institutions. The overall freedom and fairness of elections ("Elections free and fair") also was hard hit, with the last elections held under Prime Minister Modi's reign in 2019, precipitating a downgrading to an electoral autocracy.

Yet, the diminishing of freedom of expression, the media, and civil society have gone the furthest. The Indian government rarely, if ever, used to exercise censorship as evidenced by its score of 3.5 out of 4 before Modi became Prime Minister. By 2020, this score is close to 1.5 meaning that censorship efforts are becoming routine and no longer even restricted to sensitive (to the government) issues. India is, in this aspect, now as autocratic as is Pakistan, and worse than both its neighbors Bangladesh and Nepal. In general, the Modi-led government in India has used laws on sedition, defamation, and counterterrorism to silence critics.¹ For example, over 7,000 people have been charged with sedition after the BJP assumed power and most of the accused are critics of the ruling party.²

The law on defamation, upheld in India's Supreme Court on May 2016, has been used frequently to silence journalists and news outlets that take exception to policies of the BJP government.³ The punishments for critical messaging range from two years in prison to life imprisonment for "words, spoken or written, or signs or visible representation that can cause "hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection" toward the government.⁴

Modi and his party have also placed constraints on civil society and have gone against the constitution's commitment to secularism.⁵ Recently, the **Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act** (UAPA) from 1967 and amended in August 2019 is being used to harass, intimidate, and imprison political opponents, as well as people mobilizing to protest government policies.⁶ The UAPA has been used also to silence dissent in academia.⁷ Universities and authorities have also punished students and activists in universities engaging in protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).⁸ The CAA was passed by India's parliament in

1 <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/india>

2 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openindia/india-turning-colonial-era-laws-silence-journalists/>

3 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/25/india-stop-treating-critics-criminals>

4 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/24/how-indias-archaic-laws-have-chilling-effect-dissent>

5 Ding and Slater (2020).

6 <https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1967-37.pdf>; <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/india-release-human-rights-defenders-at-risk-in-the-context-of-covid>; <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/india#>; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56111289>

7 <https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Scholars-at-Risk-Free-to-Think-2020.pdf>

8 <https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Scholars-at-Risk-Free-to-Think-2020.pdf>


December 2019.⁹ It makes it possible for illegal immigrants that are Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian to become citizens while denying it to Muslims. Arguably, the bill violates the constitution, which prohibits discrimination by religion.¹⁰

Civil society is also being muzzled in the autocratization process. The indicators gauging the level of repression of civil society organizations (CSO) and the government's control of which organizations are allowed to exist ("CSO entry and exit") capture that severe deterioration. Meanwhile, civil society organizations aligning themselves with the Hindutva movement have gained more freedom.¹¹ The BJP have increasingly used the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) to restrict the entry, exit and functioning of Civil Society Organisations (CSO).¹² The FCRA was amended in September 2020 to further constrain the use of foreign contributions to NGOs within India.¹³ These developments are among the instances contributing to the descent into electoral authoritarianism in what used to be the world's largest democracy.



Police personnel conduct a flag march to spread awareness of the coronavirus pandemic in Beawar, Rajasthan, India. Photo by Sumit Saraswat, Shutterstock.

DEGREE OF CHANGE ON INDICATORS OF LDI, INDIA 2010–2020




9 <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-citizenship-idINKBN1YF0QA>

10 <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/09/shoot-traitors/discrimination-against-muslims-under-indias-new-citizenship-policy; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50670393>

11 Basu (2015).

12 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/08/india-foreign-funding-law-used-harass-25-groups; https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Anti-national-acts-25-NGOs-lose-foreign-fund-licences/articleshowprint/55254613.cms?null>

13 <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0d92af5-6817-419f-a58d-7597b5c68904>

FIGURE 11: HOW AUTOCRATIZATION UNFOLDS – COUNTRY EXAMPLES, 2010–2020

Vertical lines mark year of regime transition to electoral autocracy.

HOW AUTOCRATIZATION UNFOLDS

When V-Dem data on the indicators comprising the LDI are analyzed to decipher how contemporary autocratization unfolds, a striking pattern emerges. The playbook of “wannabe” dictators seems to have been shared widely among leaders in (former) democracies. First, seek to restrict and control the media while curbing academia and civil society. Then couple these with disrespect for political opponents to feed polarization while using the machinery of the government to spread disinformation. Only when you have come far enough on these fronts is it time for an attack on democracy’s core: elections and other formal institutions.

Figure 11 shows those indicators that tended to deteriorate first and ultimately the most, among the top 10 autocratizing countries. Vertical dashed lines indicate if a democratic breakdown took place, meaning that autocratization has gone so far that the country is downgraded to an electoral autocracy.

The commonalities in the way autocratization unfolds across these varying contexts is notable. Media and academic freedoms, and civil society, are typically repressed first. Alongside that, ruling governments often engage in polarization by official disinformation campaigns disseminated via social media³⁹ and by increasing disrespect for counterarguments from political opponents.⁴⁰ Only then are formal institutions such as the quality of elections undermined in a further step towards autocracy. Making these early and often slow-moving attributes observable is a key feature of V-Dem’s highly disaggregated data.

Eight of the top 10 major autocratizers over the last ten years follow this pattern: **Brazil, Bolivia, Hungary, India, Poland, Turkey**, as well as **Benin** and **Serbia**, although the latter two show some more variation. Only **Mauritius** and **Thailand** stand out.

Thailand was in a process of limited liberalization when the military coup occurred on 22nd May 2014, which was a very different situation. The recent developments in **Mauritius** come as a surprise to many observers. The island has been a democracy for over 40 years. The sharp decline in the indicator for quality of elections in 2019 is likely related to [widespread allegations](#) of electoral fraud in the November 2019 parliamentary elections.⁴¹ The electoral period also saw complaints of [false information](#) being disseminated by both government and opposition.⁴² With the Covid-19 pandemic, further anti-democratic measures were enacted, including the [suspension of parliament](#) in December 2020 and dispersion of peaceful protests.⁴³

But among the more typical processes is that in **Hungary** with the deterioration of freedom of expression and civil society repression dating back to as early as 2010 when right-wing government led by Viktor Orbán and his Fidez party enacted several media laws that curtailed media freedom substantially. The [establishment](#) of a national media authority gave the government greater control over news media.⁴⁴ Subsequently, the government [limited academic freedom](#) and further limited pluralism by the formation of a [pro-government news conglomerate](#).⁴⁵

The decay in freedom of the press, academia, civil society, and increasing spread of false information in **Turkey** predates 2010 but has continued since, with legal restrictions to further limit civil society activity and freedom of expression, for example.⁴⁶

³⁹ The indicator on “Government Disinformation of Domestic False Information” is part of the Digital Society Survey in the V-Dem dataset.

⁴⁰ This is an indicator on deliberation (the extent to which political elites respect counterarguments) as another component of democracy which has been identified as being targeted already during early phases of autocratization, see Gora and de Wilde (2020).

⁴¹ <https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishandegnarin/2021/01/11/mauritius-in-crisis-as-militarized-police-deployed-against-peaceful-protestors/>

⁴² <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-06-mauritius-polls-marred-by-hacking-allegations/>

⁴³ <https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishandegnarin/2021/01/11/mauritius-in-crisis-as-militarized-police-deployed-against-peaceful-protestors/>

⁴⁴ <https://www.economist.com/eastern-approaches/2010/12/23/all-eyes-on-orban>

⁴⁵ [https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view/](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view;); <https://rsf.org/en/news/unprecedented-merger-poses-threat-survival-media-pluralism-hungary>

⁴⁶ Yilmaz and Turner (2019).

Key developments under the BJP government led by Prime Minister Modi in India are detailed in a special box above/below).

In **Serbia** it was declining electoral integrity alongside deteriorating academic, civil society, and media freedoms that among other things contributed to the backsliding into authoritarianism by 2013.⁴⁷ The quality of elections has been deteriorating since then and further worsened in 2020, when many opposition parties **boycotted** the parliamentary elections held amidst the pandemic.⁴⁸

The MAS (Movement for Socialism) party led by Evo Morales undermined independent journalism in **Bolivia** by passing legislation that limited media freedom.⁴⁹ It included the **Supreme Decree 181** that allowed government discretionary control over state funding to media outlets.⁵⁰ Increasing government censorship then preceded a steep decline in the quality of elections in 2019 when Evo Morales ran for a fourth term and subsequently had to leave the country following mass protests. From then until the 2020 election, Bolivia was in a turbulent phase but the quality of elections seems to have partly recovered in 2020.

Government censorship and hostility to non-partisan media is **steadily increasing** in **Brazil**, in particular after right-wing populist Bolsonaro became President in January 2019,⁵¹ including **government dissemination** of false information.⁵² In **Poland**, media laws from **2015/16** place new limitations on freedom of expression and the media.⁵³ Following the 2016 election of Patrice Talon as President, measures limiting political dissent and competition intensified in **Benin**. A **new Penal Code** adopted in 2018 penalised civil society organisations and opposition parties, in addition to a 2017 law on digital publications that targeted independent journalists.⁵⁴ Free and fair elections are declining in Benin. In 2019, **electoral laws** made participation in parliamentary elections prohibitively expensive and opposition activists and journalists were subject to arrest.⁵⁵

RAYS OF HOPE: TOP 10 ADVANCERS

This year we register 16 nations that made substantially meaningful and statistically significant advances on the LDI between 2010 and 2020. For the full list and the extent of changes, see **Figure 10** and **Figure 16** in this report.

Table 2 below lists the top 10 advancing countries on the LDI during the last decade. Of these ten nations, four transitioned to democracy during the last 10 years while two democracies and four autocracies improved in significant ways in their democratic qualities.

Georgia is the new addition to the list this year. The improvements compared to 10 years ago are especially pronounced in areas such as freedom from torture and freedom of expression. Yet Georgia's score on the LDI is in decline again since 2019, and there are **concerns** that further reversals could come. The recent arrest of an opposition leader in February 2021 raises **questions** about the state of the rule of law in Georgia, and its future.⁵⁶

TABLE 2: TOP-10 DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES, 2010–2020

| | CHANGE | LDI 2010 | LDI 2020 | REGIME TYPE 2010 | REGIME TYPE 2020 |
|--------------|--------|----------|----------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1 Tunisia | 0.54 | 0.10 | 0.64 | Electoral Autocracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 2 Armenia | 0.41 | 0.19 | 0.60 | Electoral Autocracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 3 The Gambia | 0.30 | 0.12 | 0.42 | Electoral Autocracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 4 Myanmar | 0.24 | 0.03 | 0.27 | Closed Autocracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 5 Niger | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.39 | Closed Autocracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 6 Madagascar | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.27 | Closed Autocracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 7 Ecuador | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.48 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 8 Fiji | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.28 | Closed Autocracy | Electoral Autocracy |
| 9 Georgia | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.51 | Electoral Democracy | Electoral Democracy |
| 10 Sri Lanka | 0.14 | 0.24 | 0.38 | Electoral Autocracy | Electoral Democracy |

The classification of regime type is not only based on the LDI score but also the Electoral Democracy Index, as well as the extent to which elections overall have been free and fair. See Lührmann et al (2018) for details.

As in last year's *Democracy Report*, **Tunisia** is the most prominent case of a successful transition to democracy over the past decade and continues to be the greatest advance on the LDI in the group. Eight more nations also reappear from last year: **Armenia, Ecuador, Fiji, The Gambia, Madagascar, Myanmar, Niger, Sri Lanka**. Their relative advances were similar as of year-end 2020 to that which we reported then for 2019.

The recent events in February 2021 when the **military seized control** in **Myanmar**, threw the process of democratization overboard. This unfortunate turn of events followed the general elections on 8th November 2020 won by Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy.⁵⁷ We also note the concerning developments in **Sri Lanka** and project that it might suffer from further declines due to its actions in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, as discussed earlier in this report.

47 The difference in reporting on Serbia compared to last year's Democracy Report is due to a change in the indicators used for the vertical and horizontal lines.

48 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53107011>

49 Sánchez-Sibony (2021).

50 <https://rsf.org/en/news/no-state-advertising-politicized-media-bolivia>

51 <https://rsf.org/en/news/brazil-quarterly-analysis-media-face-censorship-multiple-fronts>

52 <https://www.ft.com/content/ea62950e-89c0-4b8b-b458-05c90a55b81f>

53 <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35257105>

54 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/benin-crackdown-on-protests-and-wave-of-arrests-fuel-tense-election-period/>

55 <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48084124>

56 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/georgia-police-storm-opposition-headquarters-to-arrest-leader-nika-melia/>; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/georgia-democracy-putin-nika-melia/2021/02/26/0c16a3bc-7791-11eb-8115-9ad5e9c02117_story.html

57 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55902070>

Threat to Freedom of Expression Intensifies

- The threat to freedom of expression and the media intensifies – 32 countries are declining substantially and significantly, compared to only 19 just three years ago.**
- Freedom of expression and the media make 8 of the 10 indicators declining in the greatest number of countries over the past 10 years.**
- Repression of civil society is also intensifying. V-Dem data register substantial deterioration in 50 countries over the past ten years.**

Figure 12 bears evidence of the continuation of trends identified in several previous editions of the *Democracy Report* and also when it comes to varying democratic component indices. Many more countries are regressing significantly than those advancing on many key democratic aspects. In this figure we simply count how many countries register significant changes on key democratic indices over the last ten years. Indices above the diagonal line indicate that more countries improved than declined, while indices with more states registering negative changes are placed below the diagonal.


Freedom of expression, deliberation, rule of law and elections show the most substantial net declines in the last decade. Notably, every key component of democracy registers fewer or at most an equal number of countries improving compared to the 2020 *Democracy Report*.

The broadscale attack on freedom of expression including the media continues with significant deterioration in a record 32 countries compared to 31 in last year's *Democracy Report* but only 19 nations in the 2018 report. This is exacerbated by a reduction in the number of countries advancing the rights of expressing opinions and unconstrained media from 16 in 2019 to just 12 in 2020.


Deliberation also shows a distressing development. This component captures the extent to which public speech, including counterarguments and respect for political opponents, is respected by political leaders. By 2020 it was declining in 23 countries over the last ten years. This is a minor reduction from 24 in 2019 but constitutes a continuation of the accelerated negative trend from years earlier in the decade. Declines include significant negative changes in the **United States of America** from 0.91 in 2016 to 0.61 in 2020 during the Trump administration.

Also, the trend we reported on over the last couple of years for Rule of Law continues, with a slightly accelerated decline. The data shows a substantial worsening in respect for the rule of law by governments in 16 countries compared to only 11 in 2018. Ongoing decline in this area was compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 due to discriminatory measures and the derogation of non-derogable rights in some countries.

FIGURE 12: KEY DEMOCRACY ASPECTS, SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGE, 2010–2020



An index changes substantially and significantly if its 2020 value is at least 0.05 points different from its 2010 value on a scale ranging from 0 to 1 and the confidence intervals do not overlap (see Methods section towards the end of this report).

FIGURE 13: INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY DECLINING, SUBSTANTIALLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY, 2010–2020

We count an indicator as declining substantially and significantly if its 2020 value is at least 0.5 points lower than its 2010 value on a scale ranging from 0 to 4; and the confidence intervals do not overlap (see Methods section towards the end of this report), except elected officials and suffrage.

Freedom of association, in which the extent to which civil society can function is measured, followed the accelerating trend depicted for the areas above. This year, we registered substantial and significant declines in 14 countries compared to ten years ago. The corresponding figure in the 2019 *Democracy Report* was only eight.

Following a period of advancement during which all component indices related to elections continued to record improvements in more countries than where they had declined, the concerning downturn in the quality of elections first identified in last year's *Democracy Report* continues. The index measuring how clean elections are records a substantive decline in 15 countries and improvements in just 12.

The component indices of different aspects of democracy are each composed of a series of indicators. In Figure 13, we count the number of countries where V-Dem has registered significant and substantial declines between 2010 and 2020 on 25 core indicators.

The graph puts repression of civil society right up there in an uppermost position among the indicators worst affected by the wave of autocratization over the past decade. The V-Dem data registers substantial and statistically significant increases in civil society repression in no less than 50 countries by 2020 compared to 2010. This is a dramatic increase from the findings in previous reports that found only 23 nations in decline on this indicator in the 2017 report and 25 in the 2019 report.

Similar to last year's report, we also find that many indicators directly measuring media's independence and ability to function are in marked decline, and that they make up eight of the ten most commonly declining indicators. Government efforts to censor media occurred in 42 countries, and media self-censorship in 39, for example. The broadscale attack on the media as an independent actor and provider of information critical to the functioning of any democracy is intensifying.

Ten Years After the Arab Uprisings


Sebastian Hellmeier, Jean Lachapelle and Staffan I. Lindberg

On 18 December 2010 the Arab uprisings commenced with **Mohamed Bouazizi's** self-immolation in protest against police corruption and maltreatment in Tunisia.¹ Pro-democratic mass mobilizations quickly spread to Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen and then fanned out across much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Following what was often labelled as "revolutions", protesters ousted decades-old dictators in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. In other countries the protests did not overthrow authoritarian regimes but prompted some concessions to the pro-democratic protesters. The Moroccan and Jordanian governments both amended their constitutions, the Algerian government ended an almost two-decade old state of emergency, and the government of Kuwait resigned in response to protests. This period saw rising hopes of a region-wide wave of democratization. Yet, while mass mobilization in favor of political liberalization emerged across the region, these hopes for more far-ranging political change were often dashed. Autocrats responded to mass mobilization with violent repression perhaps most forcefully in Bahrain and Syria. Civil war with the involvement of international forces eventually resulted in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

One decade has passed since the first demonstrations erupted and we use this anniversary as an opportunity to revisit the region ten years after these historical events. The figure in this box shows the state of liberal democracy in the MENA region at the end of 2020 compared to the state before the wave of uprisings began in 2010. The size of the bubble for each country shows the maximum extent of pro-democratic mobilization in 2010-2012 with the exception of Iraq for which we lack reliable data.

All but one country – Tunisia – failed to democratize despite the desire for political change expressed in the uprisings. For instance, there are few if any improvements in Morocco compared to the situation in 2010. Although the reformed constitution recognizes new rights for its citizens such as the rights to life, and to physical and moral integrity, it does little to change the balance of power between the King and the elected legislature. In practice, Mohammed VI continues his reign for more than two decades. Likewise, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah ruled the country until his death in September 2020 without implementing meaningful democratic reforms in response to the protests after the government's resignation in November 2011. The closed autocracies like Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates continued with business largely as usual throughout the period.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE MENA REGION, 2010 AND 2020



This pro-democracy mobilization variable captures the extent to which events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims have been frequent and large.

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Bouazizi; <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-immolation>



Tahrir Square, Egypt. Wikimedia Commons.

Only Tunisia went from being an autocracy to a democracy during the past ten years. After protesters ousted President Ben Ali on January 14th, a civilian-led interim government steered the country towards elections for a Constituent Assembly in October 2011. Despite deep tensions between Islamists and secularists and mounting insecurities, the Assembly adopted a new Constitution in January of 2014, paving the way for largely free and fair elections in late 2014 and again in 2019. Other countries experienced only marginal improvements. Jordan slightly improved its Liberal Democracy Index score after it implemented reforms that broadened electoral representation, but these reforms fell short of making elections truly competitive. Likewise, we note a slight improvement in Libya's score, which was a highly repressive autocracy under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi in 2010. Yet Libya still faces vast security challenges in the wake of a civil war even after the ceasefire in October 2020.

Some countries are faring worse than they did before the uprisings. Egypt's democracy score is slightly lower today than it was in 2010 on the eve of the Egyptian uprising. Former army chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi has tightened his grip on the country since

overthrowing President Mursi in 2013, who had been elected a year prior. Although the 2014 constitution is on paper more democratic than previous constitutions, human rights organizations have raised the alarm over widespread torture by security forces and the escalating use of the death penalty. In 2019 the Egyptian parliament approved constitutional amendments that weakened restrictions on presidential term limits, giving Sisi the possibility of staying in power until 2030. The largest decline the LDI since 2010 among all the Arab countries, was seen for Yemen where following the demise of long-time president Ali Abdullah Saleh, a civil war with international involvement has been ravaging since 2014.

Renewed hopes for political liberalization are now resurfacing following a second wave of pro-democratic protests that in the last couple of years toppled leaders in both Algeria and Sudan. Thus, despite the fact that democracy has not improved much beyond Tunisia so far, pro-democratic mobilization continues to raise hopes.

From Year of Protest to Year of Lockdown

- From an all-time high in 2019, mass mobilization declined to its lowest level in over a decade.
- However, mass protests in countries such as Belarus, Nigeria and Thailand show that even a global pandemic and forceful state-imposed restrictions cannot dissuade pro-democracy forces.
- The decline in pro-democracy mass mobilization in 2020 may well prove to be short-lived.

The spread of Covid-19 and government responses to the pandemic challenged the organization of collective action. Participation at mass events is associated with considerable risk for activists. Governments put in place heavy restrictions on the freedom of assembly in 2020 by limiting the number of people allowed to gather in public and sometimes ordering curfews. While pro-democracy mass mobilizations naturally declined significantly, the developments in 2020 still demonstrated that pro-democratic forces cannot be deterred from pursuing their aspirations even by a pandemic or lockdowns.

We reported in the *Democracy Report* last year that 2019 saw unprecedented levels of street protests worldwide. The data seemed to tell a hopeful story about a counter-movement to the wave of autocratization. The pandemic then came to constrain

democratic rights in one particular way. Compared to the high level of mobilization we reported in last year's *Democracy Report*, Figure 14 shows a steep decline in the number of protest events in general and of pro-democracy protests in particular. The 2020 year of lockdown registers the lowest levels of mass mobilization in over a decade in the V-Dem data, and a substantial drop in protest events at the beginning of the global spread of the pandemic is corroborated by other studies.⁵⁸

Even so, the drop is perhaps smaller than expected. Numerous protests took place, and pro-democracy activists took to the streets despite the pandemic and state-imposed restrictions. The Covid-19 pandemic led to the emergence of new grievances with accompanying "pandemic protests", socially distanced protests by health care personnel, anti-lockdown protests, and even riots.⁵⁹


Figure 15 provides more detail on the countries where large-scale, pro-democracy protests took place in 2020. The upper part of the first two subdivisions in the graph features the closed and electoral autocracies where citizens mobilized in favor of democracy despite the pandemic. In the upper part of the last two sections are the names of electoral and liberal democracies with high levels of pro-democracy mobilization in 2020.

FIGURE 14: MOBILIZATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND AUTOCRACY, 1972–2020



⁵⁸ Bloem and Salemi (2020).

⁵⁹ Gerbaudo (2020, 63).

FIGURE 15: MOBILIZATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN 2020

This indicator of mass mobilization for democracy captures the extent to which events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims have been frequent and large.

Unprecedented pro-democracy mobilization erupted in August 2020 in **Belarus**. Demonstrators protested against the official results of the elections that “Europe’s last dictator” Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed he won in a landslide. Despite a violent crackdown by security forces, thousands took to the streets for months demanding the resignation of Lukashenko.⁶⁰

In **Thailand**, thousands of pro-democracy protesters demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chanocha, a new constitution, and a reform of the monarchy. Elevated to power in the 2014 military coup, Chanocha has rejected the demands, and some of the protestors face **criminal charges** under an antiquated lèse-majesté law that prohibits defaming the royal family.⁶¹

Young people in **Nigeria** mobilized against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) after several videos of police brutality went viral. The protests grew to a larger movement against bad governance under the Twitter hashtag #EndSARS. Although the government eventually disbanded the SARS police unit, both protests and **repression** of protestors including the use of lethal force continued.⁶²

The anti-government protests abounding in **Iraq** during 2019 subsided in the early part of the Covid-19 pandemic only to resume in October 2020. The protestors’ demands include political reforms to reduce rampant corruption and the creation of better economic opportunities for ordinary people. Violence led to the **death** of one of the leading female activists, the doctor Riham Yaqoob.⁶³

The **United States of America** saw the highest number of protests in recent **history** with more than half a million participants on June 6 2020 alone.⁶⁴ Spurred by the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, the Black Lives Matter movement and its supporters took to the streets. The movement denounced police brutality and demanded far-reaching police reforms. The mass mobilization persisted for months in various parts of the country.

The events of last year show that even a global pandemic and forceful state restrictions cannot dissuade pro-democracy forces. Activists rose above the adverse conditions and several movements also found alternative ways of drawing attention to their cause. The decline in pro-democratic mass mobilization in 2020 may well prove to be short-lived.

⁶⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/belarus-unprecedented-crackdown>

⁶¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/world/asia/thailand-protests.html>

⁶² <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/10/21/peaceful-protesters-against-nigerian-police-violence-are-shot>

⁶³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53847648>

⁶⁴ <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>

V-Dem in Numbers

V-Dem is an international effort comprised of:

- ▶ **5** Principal Investigators
- ▶ **23** Personnel at the V-Dem Institute
- ▶ **18** Project Managers
- ▶ **33** Regional Managers
- ▶ **134** Country Coordinators
- ▶ **3,500** Country Experts

All working together to produce

29,759,876

data points in the v11 dataset

NEW MEASURES IN THE v11 DATASET

9

New Indicators on Regimes

WHERE IS V-DEM DATA USED?




The V-Dem dataset has been downloaded by **users in 176+ countries** since 2016.



7 million graphs created using the online tools by users in 176+ countries since 2016.

While the majority of the dataset downloads in 2020 come from Europe and Americas, users from all regions of the world have accessed the data and used the online tools since 2016.

DATASET DOWNLOADS (2016–2020)



V-DEM PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS TO ACADEMIC AND POLICY COMMUNITIES

- ▶ **730+** presentations across the world by V-Dem scholars since 2007.
- ▶ **106 visiting scholars** presented at the V-Dem Institute since 2014.



TABLE 3: REGIMES OF THE WORLD, 2010–2020

The countries are sorted by regime type in 2020, and after that in alphabetical order.

They are classified based on the Regimes of the World measure.

We incorporate V-Dem's confidence estimates in order to account for the uncertainty and potential measurement error due to the nature of the data but also to underline that some countries are placed in the grey zone between regime types.

This builds on the regime-classification by Lührmann et al. (2018). While using V-Dem's data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).

LD Liberal Democracy

ED Electoral Democracy

EA Electoral Autocracy

CA Closed Autocracy

– indicates that taking uncertainty into account, the country could belong to the lower category

+ signifies that the country could also belong to the higher category

↑ indicates that the country sees a movement upwards from one level to another

↓ indicates that the country sees a movement downwards from one level to another

| COUNTRY | 2020 | CHANGE FROM 2010 | COUNTRY | 2020 | CHANGE FROM 2010 | COUNTRY | 2020 | CHANGE FROM 2010 | COUNTRY | 2020 | CHANGE FROM 2010 |
|----------------|--|------------------|---------------------|--|------------------|---------------------|--|------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| Austria | LD | | Trinidad and Tobago | ED+ | | Sierra Leone | ED- | | Papua New Guinea | EA | |
| Belgium | LD | | Vanuatu | ED+ | | Ukraine | ED- | | Philippines | EA | ↓ |
| Costa Rica | LD | | Argentina | ED | | Armenia | EA+ | | Russia | EA | |
| Estonia | LD | | Brazil | ED | | Hungary | EA+ ↓ | | Rwanda | EA | |
| Finland | LD | | Bulgaria | ED | | India | EA+ ↓ | | Serbia | EA | ↓ |
| France | LD | | Burkina Faso | ED | | Kenya | EA+ | | Singapore | EA | |
| Germany | LD | | Cape Verde | ED | | Lebanon | EA+ ↓ | | Somaliland | EA | |
| Ireland | LD | | Colombia | ED | | Madagascar | EA+ ↑ | | Tajikistan | EA | |
| Israel | LD | | Croatia | ED | | Mali | EA+ ↓ | | Tanzania | EA | ↓ |
| Japan | LD | | Czech Republic | ED ↑ | | Montenegro | EA+ ↓ | | Togo | EA | |
| Luxembourg | LD | | Dominican Republic | ED | | Afghanistan | EA | | Turkey | EA | ↓ |
| Netherlands | LD | | Ecuador | ED | | Algeria | EA | | Uganda | EA | |
| New Zealand | LD | | El Salvador | ED | | Angola | EA | | Venezuela | EA | |
| Spain | LD | | Georgia | ED | | Azerbaijan | EA | | Zambia | EA | ↓ |
| Sweden | LD | | Guatemala | ED | | Bangladesh | EA | | Zanzibar | EA | |
| Switzerland | LD | | Indonesia | ED | | Belarus | EA | | Zimbabwe | EA | |
| Taiwan | LD | | Jamaica | ED | | Benin | EA ↓ | | Egypt | EA- | |
| United Kingdom | LD | | Kosovo | ED | | Bolivia | EA ↓ | | Guinea | EA- | |
| USA | LD | | Liberia | ED | | Burundi | EA | | Turkmenistan | EA- | |
| Australia | LD- ↑ | | Maldives | ED | | Cambodia | EA | | Kuwait | CA+ | |
| Barbados | LD- ↑ | | Mexico | ED | | Cameroon | EA | | Uzbekistan | CA+ ↓ | |
| Canada | LD- | | Moldova | ED | | CAR | EA | | Vietnam | CA+ | |
| Cyprus | LD- | | Mongolia | ED | | Chad | EA | | Bahrain | CA | |
| Denmark | LD- | | Nepal | ED | | Comoros | EA ↓ | | China | CA | |
| Ghana | LD- | | North Macedonia | ED | | Congo | EA | | Cuba | CA | |
| Greece | LD- | | Panama | ED | | Djibouti | EA | | Eritrea | CA | |
| Iceland | LD- | | Paraguay | ED | | DRC | EA | | Eswatini | CA | |
| Italy | LD- | | Peru | ED | | Equatorial Guinea | EA | | Hong Kong | CA | |
| Latvia | LD- | | Poland | ED ↓ | | Ethiopia | EA | | Jordan | CA | |
| Norway | LD- | | Romania | ED | | Fiji | EA ↑ | | Laos | CA | |
| South Korea | LD- | | S.Tomé & P. | ED | | Gabon | EA | | Libya | CA | |
| Uruguay | LD- | | Solomon Islands | ED | | Haiti | EA | | Morocco | CA | |
| Botswana | ED+ ↓ | | Sri Lanka | ED ↑ | | Honduras | EA | | North Korea | CA | |
| Chile | ED+ ↓ | | Suriname | ED | | Iran | EA | | Oman | CA | |
| Lesotho | ED+ | | Timor-Leste | ED | | Iraq | EA | | Palestine/Gaza | CA | |
| Lithuania | ED+ ↓ | | Tunisia | ED ↑ | | Ivory Coast | EA | | Qatar | CA | |
| Malta | ED+ | | Albania | ED- | | Kazakhstan | EA | | Saudi Arabia | CA | |
| Mauritius | ED+ ↓ | | Bhutan | ED- | | Kyrgyzstan | EA | | Somalia | CA | |
| Namibia | ED+ | | BiH | ED- | | Malaysia | EA | | Sudan | CA ↓ | |
| Portugal | ED+ ↓ | | Gambia | ED- ↑ | | Mauritania | EA | | Syria | CA ↓ | |
| Senegal | ED+ | | Guinea-Bissau | ED- ↑ | | Mozambique | EA | | Thailand | CA ↓ | |
| Seychelles | ED+ ↑ | | Guyana | ED- | | Myanmar | EA ↑ | | UAE | CA | |
| Slovakia | ED+ ↓ | | Malawi | ED- | | Nicaragua | EA | | Yemen | CA ↓ | |
| Slovenia | ED+ ↓ | | Niger | ED- ↑ | | Pakistan | EA | | Palestine/West Bank | EA | |
| South Africa | ED+ ↓ | | Nigeria | ED- ↑ | | Palestine/West Bank | EA | | | | |

FIGURE 16: COUNTRIES BY SCORE ON V-DEM'S LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI), 2010 COMPARED TO 2020**Top 50% of countries**


- Score
- Confidence interval
- Autocratizing countries
- Democratizing countries
- 2010
- 2020

Red country names signify cases of significant and substantial autocratization.

Blue country names indicate cases of significant and substantial democratization.

The graph divides all countries' LDI scores into ranks of top 10% to 50% and bottom 50% to 10%. Lines indicate the confidence intervals around the point estimates.

Countries with overlapping confidence intervals are statistically indistinguishable.

Score and Confidence Intervals

Bottom 50% of countries

- Score
- Confidence interval
- Autocratizing countries
- Democratizing countries
- 2010
- 2020



TABLE 4: COUNTRY SCORES FOR THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI) AND ALL COMPONENTS INDICES, IN 2020

↑ Indicates that the country's score has improved over the past 10 years, substantively and at a statistically significant level
 ↓ Indicates that the country's score has decreased over the past 10 years, substantively and at a statistically significant level
 SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty

| COUNTRY | LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI) | | | ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (EDI) | | | LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX (LCI) | | | EGALITARIAN COMPONENT INDEX (ECI) | | | PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT INDEX (PCI) | | | DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX (DCI) | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- |
| Denmark | 1 | 0.88 | 0.042 | 1 | 0.91 | 0.038 | 1 | 0.98 | 0.014 | 1 | 0.97 | 0.025 | 9 | 0.71 | 0.013 | 4 | 0.97 | 0.64 |
| Sweden | 2 | 0.87 | 0.042 | 2 | 0.9 | 0.038 | 2 | 0.98 | 0.015 | 15 | 0.9 | 0.047 | 28 | 0.65 | 0.025 | 12 | 0.94 | 0.624 |
| Norway | 3 | 0.86 | 0.044 | 4 | 0.9 | 0.039 | 5 | 0.96 | 0.02 | 2 | 0.96 | 0.026 | 27 | 0.66 | 0.018 | 1 | 0.99 | 0.641 |
| Costa Rica | 4 | 0.85 | 0.042 | 3 | 0.9 | 0.036 | 10 | 0.95 | 0.024 | 16 | 0.9 | 0.051 | 20 | 0.67 | 0.034 | 6 | 0.96 | 0.64 |
| Switzerland | 5 | 0.85 | 0.048 | 6 | 0.89 | 0.042 | 6 | 0.96 | 0.024 | 3 | 0.94 | 0.041 | 1 | 0.87 | 0.018 | 3 | 0.98 | 0.649 |
| New Zealand | 6 | 0.85 | 0.044 | 5 | 0.89 | 0.038 | 9 | 0.96 | 0.026 | 22 | 0.88 | 0.057 | 5 | 0.73 | 0.036 | 34 | 0.86 | 0.629 |
| Finland | 7 | 0.84 | 0.049 | 12 | 0.88 | 0.044 | 3 | 0.97 | 0.022 | 11 | 0.92 | 0.041 | 25 | 0.66 | 0.02 | 14 | 0.93 | 0.634 |
| Germany | 8 | 0.83 | 0.048 | 11 | 0.88 | 0.043 | 8 | 0.96 | 0.022 | 6 | 0.93 | 0.039 | 23 | 0.66 | 0.013 | 2 | 0.98 | 0.639 |
| Estonia | 9 | 0.83 | 0.045 | 7 | 0.89 | 0.039 | 13 | 0.94 | 0.029 | 19 | 0.89 | 0.054 | 36 | 0.64 | 0.041 | 68 | 0.75 | 0.634 |
| Netherlands | 10 | 0.82 | 0.046 | 16 | 0.87 | 0.042 | 4 | 0.96 | 0.021 | 13 | 0.9 | 0.05 | 43 | 0.61 | 0.038 | 7 | 0.95 | 0.636 |
| Belgium | 11 | 0.82 | 0.049 | 8 | 0.89 | 0.042 | 18 | 0.92 | 0.038 | 5 | 0.93 | 0.039 | 33 | 0.65 | 0.024 | 9 | 0.95 | 0.638 |
| Ireland | 12 | 0.82 | 0.052 | 10 | 0.88 | 0.046 | 15 | 0.94 | 0.032 | 17 | 0.9 | 0.049 | 18 | 0.68 | 0.031 | 18 | 0.93 | 0.645 |
| Spain | 13 | 0.8 | 0.047 | 9 | 0.89 | 0.038 | 27 | 0.9 | 0.041 | 10 | 0.92 | 0.041 | 26 | 0.66 | 0.034 | 28 | 0.88 | 0.64 |
| United Kingdom | 14 | 0.8 | 0.049 | 15 | 0.87 | 0.044 | 19 | 0.92 | 0.032 | 29 | 0.84 | 0.062 | 16 | 0.68 | 0.025 | 35 | 0.86 | 0.627 |
| France | 15 | 0.8 | 0.051 | 13 | 0.88 | 0.044 | 22 | 0.91 | 0.037 | 26 | 0.87 | 0.058 | 38 | 0.63 | 0.037 | 19 | 0.92 | 0.637 |
| Uruguay | 16 | 0.8 | 0.048 | 19 | 0.86 | 0.042 | 16 | 0.93 | 0.031 | 30 | 0.84 | 0.063 | 2 | 0.78 | 0.043 | 38 | 0.85 | 0.636 |
| South Korea | 17 | 0.79 | 0.051 | 21 | 0.86 | 0.046 | 17 | 0.93 | 0.031 | 25 | 0.87 | 0.058 | 39 | 0.63 | 0.038 | 17 | 0.93 | 0.632 |
| Portugal | 18 | 0.79 | 0.049 | 14 | 0.88 | 0.042 | 25 | 0.9 | 0.037 | 27 | 0.87 | 0.056 | 44 | 0.61 | 0.046 | 27 | 0.88 | 0.632 |
| Iceland | 19 | 0.79 | 0.052 | 22 | 0.85 | 0.047 | 14 | 0.94 | 0.033 | 21 | 0.89 | 0.059 | 11 | 0.69 | 0.023 | 11 | 0.94 | 0.646 |
| Australia | 20 | 0.79 | 0.049 | 25 | 0.84 | 0.046 | 7 | 0.96 | 0.021 | 28 | 0.85 | 0.059 | 19 | 0.68 | 0.037 | 23 | 0.9 | 0.633 |
| Italy | 21 | 0.78 | 0.048 | 20 | 0.86 | 0.042 | 20 | 0.92 | 0.035 | 12 | 0.92 | 0.044 | 3 | 0.77 | 0.032 | 22 | 0.91 | 0.637 |
| Luxembourg | 22 | 0.78 | 0.053 | 18 | 0.87 | 0.045 | 26 | 0.9 | 0.042 | 4 | 0.94 | 0.04 | 42 | 0.61 | 0.068 | 5 | 0.97 | 0.64 |
| Lithuania | 23 | 0.76 | 0.057 | 30 | 0.82 | 0.055 | 11 | 0.95 | 0.025 | 23 | 0.88 | 0.054 | 6 | 0.72 | 0.046 | 30 | 0.87 | 0.63 |
| Austria | 24 | 0.76 | 0.055 | 24 | 0.84 | 0.052 | 24 | 0.9 | 0.037 | 8 | 0.92 | 0.047 | 15 | 0.68 | 0.027 | 37 | 0.85 | 0.624 |
| Chile | 25 | 0.76 | 0.051 | 34 | 0.81 | 0.049 | 12 | 0.95 | 0.024 | 81 | 0.66 | 0.085 | 31 | 0.65 | 0.04 | 31 | 0.87 | 0.628 |
| Slovakia | 26 | 0.76 | 0.055 | 26 | 0.84 | 0.05 | 21 | 0.92 | | 49 | 0.76 | 0.074 | 12 | 0.69 | 0.045 | 61 | 0.77 | 0.626 |
| Greece | 27 | 0.74 | 0.053 | 23 | 0.84 | 0.045 | 36 | 0.88 | 0.047 | 33 | 0.84 | 0.065 | 22 | 0.67 | 0.038 | 16 | 0.93 | 0.642 |
| Canada | 28 | 0.74 | 0.056 | 17 | 0.87 | 0.045 | 47 | 0.84 | 0.057 | 24 | 0.88 | 0.056 | 30 | 0.65 | 0.02 | 26 | 0.89 | 0.64 |
| Latvia | 29 | 0.74 | 0.06 | 31 | 0.82 | 0.056 | 23 | 0.91 | 0.041 | 32 | 0.84 | 0.064 | 17 | 0.68 | 0.045 | 45 | 0.82 | 0.63 |
| Japan | 30 | 0.73 | 0.054 | 29 | 0.82 | 0.048 | 34 | 0.88 | 0.046 | 7 | 0.93 | 0.048 | 64 | 0.58 | 0.052 | 20 | 0.92 | 0.629 |
| USA | 31 | 0.73 | 0.054 | 22 | 0.81 | 0.05 | 30 | 0.9 | 0.04 | 59 | 0.73 | 0.073 | 24 | 0.66 | 0.014 | 106 | 0.61 | 0.622 |
| Cyprus | 32 | 0.72 | 0.056 | 28 | 0.82 | 0.051 | 35 | 0.88 | 0.047 | 18 | 0.89 | 0.053 | 69 | 0.57 | 0.062 | 71 | 0.74 | 0.641 |
| Taiwan | 33 | 0.72 | 0.054 | 32 | 0.82 | 0.05 | 33 | 0.88 | 0.044 | 9 | 0.92 | 0.046 | 4 | 0.74 | 0.033 | 25 | 0.89 | 0.636 |
| Czech Republic | 34 | 0.71 | 0.054 | 36 | 0.8 | 0.049 | 32 | 0.88 | 0.044 | 14 | 0.9 | 0.054 | 56 | 0.59 | 0.05 | 65 | 0.76 | 0.624 |
| Jamaica | 35 | 0.7 | 0.06 | 35 | 0.81 | 0.056 | 37 | 0.87 | 0.046 | 53 | 0.76 | 0.08 | 40 | 0.63 | 0.037 | 46 | 0.82 | 0.628 |
| Peru | 36 | 0.69 | 0.056 | 37 | 0.8 | 0.053 | 40 | 0.86 | 0.046 | 107 | 0.56 | 0.092 | 13 | 0.69 | 0.046 | 88 | 0.68 | 0.629 |
| Cape Verde | 37 | 0.69 | 0.057 | 40 | 0.78 | 0.055 | 28 | 0.9 | 0.039 | 46 | 0.77 | 0.075 | 89 | 0.54 | 0.06 | 44 | 0.82 | 0.629 |
| Barbados | 38 | 0.68 | 0.059 | 38 | 0.8 | 0.057 | 42 | 0.86 | 0.046 | 35 | 0.82 | 0.071 | 149 | 0.3 | 0.031 | 32 | 0.86 | 0.625 |
| Argentina | 39 | 0.67 | 0.061 | 27 | 0.83 | 0.052 | 57 | 0.79 | 0.06 | 50 | 0.76 | 0.073 | 54 | 0.59 | 0.048 | 50 | 0.81 | 0.628 |
| Slovenia | 40 | 0.65 | 0.057 | 46 | 0.75 | 0.056 | 38 | 0.87 | 0.049 | 41 | 0.79 | 0.075 | 10 | 0.69 | 0.048 | 78 | 0.71 | 0.624 |
| Israel | 41 | 0.65 | 0.059 | 49 | 0.74 | 0.06 | 31 | 0.89 | 0.042 | 37 | 0.8 | 0.072 | 65 | 0.58 | 0.052 | 69 | 0.74 | 0.628 |
| Tunisia | 42 | 0.64 | 0.06 | 51 | 0.73 | 0.062 | 29 | 0.9 | 0.035 | 48 | 0.77 | 0.07 | 52 | 0.6 | 0.046 | 10 | 0.95 | 0.639 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 43 | 0.64 | 0.063 | 43 | 0.76 | 0.062 | 45 | 0.85 | 0.052 | 38 | 0.8 | 0.077 | 67 | 0.57 | 0.052 | 15 | 0.93 | 0.639 |
| Croatia | 44 | 0.64 | 0.058 | 44 | 0.75 | 0.056 | 43 | 0.85 | 0.051 | 52 | 0.76 | 0.078 | 32 | 0.65 | 0.053 | 72 | 0.73 | 0.626 |
| Vanuatu | 45 | 0.64 | 0.061 | 48 | 0.74 | 0.061 | 41 | 0.86 | 0.046 | 58 | 0.73 | 0.086 | 94 | 0.53 | 0.065 | 36 | 0.85 | 0.637 |
| Malta | 46 | 0.61 | 0.061 | 41 | 0.77 | 0.058 | 60 | 0.78 | 0.063 | 20 | 0.89 | 0.061 | 14 | 0.68 | 0.056 | 58 | 0.79 | 0.631 |
| Armenia | 47 | 0.6 | 0.059 | 39 | 0.79 | 0.052 | 75 | 0.73 | 0.068 | 40 | 0.79 | 0.072 | 103 | 0.51 | 0.066 | 55 | 0.8 | 0.631 |
| Ghana | 48 | 0.6 | 0.061 | 54 | 0.7 | 0.065 | 39 | 0.86 | 0.05 | 65 | 0.7 | 0.078 | 134 | 0.39 | 0.055 | 41 | 0.84 | 0.63 |
| Suriname | 49 | 0.6 | 0.066 | 50 | 0.74 | 0.067 | 52 | 0.81 | 0.058 | 72 | 0.69 | 0.084 | 86 | 0.54 | 0.06 | 49 | 0.81 | 0.634 |
| S.Tomé & P. | 50 | 0.59 | 0.06 | 55 | 0.7 | 0.062 | 44 | 0.85 | 0.053 | 68 | 0.69 | 0.079 | 72 | 0.57 | 0.055 | 70 | 0.74 | 0.627 |
| Senegal | 51 | 0.58 | 0.065 | 47 | 0.75 | 0.066 | 64 | 0.76 | 0.066 | 62 | 0.72 | 0.077 | 127 | 0.44 | 0.063 | 43 | 0.82 | 0.635 |
| South Africa | 52 | 0.58 | 0.06 | 53 | 0.7 | 0.064 | 49 | 0.82 | 0.052 | 89 | 0.63 | 0.077 | 81 | 0.55 | 0.056 | 29 | 0.88 | 0.639 |
| Panama | 53 | 0.56 | 0.061 | 45 | 0.75 | 0.059 | 81 | 0.71 | 0.068 | 90 | 0.62 | 0.095 | 76 | 0.56 | 0.061 | 67 | 0.75 | 0.637 |
| Romania | 54 | 0.55 | 0.06 | 42 | 0.76 | 0.055 | 50 | 0.81 | 0.055 | 79 | 0.66 | 0.089 | 7 | 0.72 | 0.056 | 127 | 0.5 | 0.633 |
| Namibia | 55 | 0.52 | 0.062 | 58 | 0.65 | 0.068 | 53 | 0.8 | 0.06 | 119 | 0.51 | 0.09 | 96 | 0.52 | 0.061 | 76 | 0.72 | 0.634 |
| Brazil | 56 | 0.51 | 0.058 | 56 | 0.69 | 0.059 | 79 | 0.71 | 0.065 | 140 | 0.4 | 0.086 | 63 | 0.58 | 0.049 | 136 | 0.46 | 0.634 |
| Burkina Faso | 57 | 0.51 | 0.063 | 52 | 0.7 | 0.065 | 86 | 0.7 | 0.072 | 97 | 0.59 | 0.082 | 83 | 0.54 | 0.044 | 53 | 0.8 | 0.641 |
| Georgia | 58 | 0.51 | 0.06 | 61 | 0.64 | 0.068 | 63 | 0.76 | 0.066 | 39 | 0.8 | 0.076 | 58 | 0.59 | 0.051 | 47 | 0.82 | 0.624 |
| Mauritius | 59 | 0.5 | 0.062 | 68 | 0.62 | 0.071 | 55 | 0.8 | 0.058 | 44 | 0.77 | 0.08 | 66 | 0.58 | 0.057 | 24 | 0.9 | 0.647 |
| Mongolia | 60 | 0.5 | 0.06 | 63 | 0.63 | 0.066 | 61 | 0.77 | 0.061 | 67 | 0.7 | 0.08 | 123 | 0.46 | 0.069 | 54 | 0.8 | 0.632 |
| Lesotho | 61 | 0.5 | 0.057 | 66 | 0.63 | 0.065 | 59 | 0.78 | 0.062 | 47 | 0.77 | 0.075 | 68 | 0.57 | 0.057 | 48 | 0.81 | 0.627 |
| Bulgaria | 62 | 0.49 | 0.056 | 74 | 0.6 | 0.063 | 54 | | | | | | | | | | | |

| COUNTRY | LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI) | | | ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (EDI) | | | LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX (LCI) | | | EGALITARIAN COMPONENT INDEX (ECI) | | | PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT INDEX (PCI) | | | DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX (DCI) | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|---------------------------------|-------|----------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- | RANK | SCORE | SD+/- |
| Nigeria | 91 | 0.36 | 0.051 | 88 | 0.54 | 0.063 | 1 | 0.61 | 0.072 | 127 | 0.48 | 0.086 | 57 | 0.59 | 0.05 | 99 | 0.63 | 0.624 |
| Ukraine | 92 | 0.35 | 0.05 | 86 | 0.54 | 0.066 | 107 | 0.57 | 0.067 | 77 | 0.67 | 0.083 | 55 | 0.59 | 0.049 | 62 | 0.77 | 0.63 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 93 | 0.35 | 0.052 | 89 | 0.54 | 0.066 | 103 | 0.58 | 0.076 | 136 | 0.44 | 0.091 | 144 | 0.32 | 0.056 | 146 | 0.35 | 0.634 |
| Montenegro | 94 | 0.35 | 0.044 | 100 | 0.45 | 0.057 | 85 | 0.7 | 0.068 | 63 | 0.72 | 0.082 | 73 | 0.56 | 0.058 | 81 | 0.7 | 0.63 |
| Dominican Republic | 95 | 0.34 | 0.052 | 76 | 0.59 | 0.07 | 115 | 0.55 | 0.066 | 144 | 0.38 | 0.086 | 48 | 0.6 | 0.043 | 64 | 0.77 | 0.639 |
| BiH | 96 | 0.34 | 0.049 | 85 | 0.54 | 0.062 | 112 | 0.56 | 0.075 | 85 | 0.64 | 0.089 | 77 | 0.55 | 0.055 | 120 | 0.54 | 0.636 |
| India | 97 | 0.34 | 0.042 | 101 | 0.45 | 0.055 | 1 | 0.69 | 0.068 | 124 | 0.48 | 0.088 | 91 | 0.54 | 0.06 | 126 | 0.51 | 0.628 |
| Papua New Guinea | 98 | 0.34 | 0.039 | 105 | 0.42 | 0.052 | 77 | 0.72 | 0.066 | 147 | 0.37 | 0.087 | 105 | 0.5 | 0.061 | 124 | 0.52 | 0.631 |
| Tanzania | 99 | 0.33 | 0.038 | 108 | 0.41 | 0.051 | 67 | 0.75 | 0.06 | 56 | 0.74 | 0.08 | 126 | 0.45 | 0.08 | 74 | 0.73 | 0.638 |
| Mali | 100 | 0.32 | 0.045 | 97 | 0.47 | 0.054 | 102 | 0.59 | 0.077 | 106 | 0.56 | 0.091 | 100 | 0.52 | 0.057 | 57 | 0.79 | 0.629 |
| Ivory Coast | 101 | 0.31 | 0.045 | 92 | 0.51 | 0.059 | 128 | 0.45 | 0.073 | 110 | 0.55 | 0.09 | 29 | 0.65 | 0.047 | 115 | 0.57 | 0.64 |
| Singapore | 102 | 0.31 | 0.037 | 114 | 0.39 | 0.045 | 87 | 0.69 | 0.072 | 42 | 0.78 | 0.076 | 172 | 0.13 | 0.057 | 59 | 0.79 | 0.626 |
| Benin | 103 | 0.3 | 0.042 | 102 | 0.44 | 0.057 | 1 | 0.59 | 0.071 | 54 | 0.76 | 0.074 | 115 | 0.49 | 0.065 | 107 | 0.6 | 0.623 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 104 | 0.29 | 0.037 | 112 | 0.4 | 0.046 | 99 | 0.6 | 0.074 | 93 | 0.61 | 0.092 | 119 | 0.47 | 0.071 | 129 | 0.49 | 0.629 |
| Kuwait | 105 | 0.29 | 0.025 | 130 | 0.32 | 0.027 | 69 | 0.74 | 0.067 | 86 | 0.64 | 0.087 | 164 | 0.18 | 0.058 | 80 | 0.71 | 0.632 |
| Lebanon | 106 | 0.29 | 0.044 | 99 | 0.46 | 0.058 | 118 | 0.54 | 0.077 | 133 | 0.45 | 0.093 | 113 | 0.49 | 0.065 | 85 | 0.69 | 0.636 |
| Malaysia | 107 | 0.28 | 0.038 | 110 | 0.4 | 0.053 | 98 | 0.61 | 0.074 | 75 | 0.69 | 0.088 | 101 | 0.52 | 0.061 | 95 | 0.64 | 0.634 |
| Philippines | 108 | 0.28 | 0.042 | 104 | 0.43 | 0.055 | 113 | 0.56 | 0.078 | 151 | 0.36 | 0.098 | 53 | 0.59 | 0.051 | 51 | 0.81 | 0.64 |
| Fiji | 109 | 0.28 | 0.04 | 106 | 0.42 | 0.054 | 106 | 0.58 | 0.076 | 73 | 0.69 | 0.085 | 139 | 0.36 | 0.06 | 92 | 0.66 | 0.634 |
| Myanmar | 110 | 0.27 | 0.039 | 103 | 0.44 | 0.05 | 105 | 0.58 | 0.077 | 123 | 0.5 | 0.094 | 79 | 0.55 | 0.06 | 63 | 0.77 | 0.628 |
| Zambia | 111 | 0.27 | 0.032 | 126 | 0.34 | 0.04 | 95 | 0.66 | 0.071 | 141 | 0.4 | 0.092 | 120 | 0.47 | 0.064 | 89 | 0.67 | 0.628 |
| Madagascar | 112 | 0.27 | 0.046 | 95 | 0.49 | 0.064 | 127 | 0.46 | 0.076 | 155 | 0.33 | 0.09 | 110 | 0.5 | 0.07 | 130 | 0.49 | 0.635 |
| Morocco | 113 | 0.26 | 0.025 | 136 | 0.28 | 0.024 | 80 | 0.71 | 0.069 | 111 | 0.55 | 0.09 | 122 | 0.46 | 0.075 | 66 | 0.76 | 0.628 |
| Mozambique | 114 | 0.25 | 0.032 | 117 | 0.37 | 0.041 | 108 | 0.57 | 0.073 | 116 | 0.53 | 0.085 | 109 | 0.5 | 0.061 | 109 | 0.58 | 0.625 |
| Hong Kong | 115 | 0.25 | 0.023 | 132 | 0.31 | 0.021 | 110 | 0.56 | 0.064 | 55 | 0.74 | 0.082 | 161 | 0.21 | 0.058 | 157 | 0.27 | 0.623 |
| Pakistan | 116 | 0.25 | 0.033 | 119 | 0.37 | 0.045 | 111 | 0.56 | 0.071 | 175 | 0.21 | 0.075 | 80 | 0.55 | 0.075 | 40 | 0.84 | 0.642 |
| Somaliland | 117 | 0.25 | 0.035 | 111 | 0.4 | 0.049 | 120 | 0.52 | 0.072 | 164 | 0.3 | 0.091 | 98 | 0.52 | 0.064 | 135 | 0.47 | 0.632 |
| Jordan | 118 | 0.24 | 0.024 | 140 | 0.27 | 0.024 | 91 | 0.67 | 0.072 | 84 | 0.65 | 0.088 | 151 | 0.3 | 0.07 | 102 | 0.62 | 0.623 |
| Serbia | 119 | 0.24 | 0.032 | 125 | 0.34 | 0.042 | 119 | 0.52 | 0.072 | 61 | 0.73 | 0.081 | 78 | 0.55 | 0.058 | 101 | 0.62 | 0.63 |
| Haiti | 120 | 0.23 | 0.034 | 113 | 0.39 | 0.049 | 123 | 0.49 | 0.066 | 177 | 0.17 | 0.068 | 125 | 0.45 | 0.064 | 113 | 0.58 | 0.63 |
| Bolivia | 121 | 0.23 | 0.028 | 129 | 0.32 | 0.028 | 114 | 0.55 | 0.071 | 117 | 0.52 | 0.087 | 34 | 0.64 | 0.052 | 128 | 0.49 | 0.626 |
| Honduras | 122 | 0.23 | 0.031 | 118 | 0.37 | 0.041 | 122 | 0.5 | 0.07 | 167 | 0.27 | 0.088 | 90 | 0.54 | 0.054 | 111 | 0.58 | 0.634 |
| Uganda | 123 | 0.23 | 0.028 | 131 | 0.31 | 0.035 | 104 | 0.58 | 0.072 | 143 | 0.38 | 0.091 | 107 | 0.5 | 0.066 | 105 | 0.61 | 0.623 |
| Iraq | 124 | 0.22 | 0.033 | 121 | 0.36 | 0.047 | 126 | 0.47 | 0.072 | 145 | 0.38 | 0.096 | 104 | 0.51 | 0.064 | 114 | 0.57 | 0.637 |
| CAR | 125 | 0.21 | 0.035 | 116 | 0.38 | 0.049 | 134 | 0.41 | 0.073 | 152 | 0.34 | 0.085 | 152 | 0.29 | 0.064 | 137 | 0.45 | 0.65 |
| Angola | 126 | 0.21 | 0.033 | 124 | 0.35 | 0.043 | 125 | 0.48 | 0.076 | 165 | 0.29 | 0.081 | 167 | 0.16 | 0.06 | 141 | 0.41 | 0.632 |
| Gabon | 127 | 0.21 | 0.028 | 115 | 0.38 | 0.044 | 132 | 0.42 | 0.059 | 57 | 0.73 | 0.086 | 59 | 0.59 | 0.053 | 90 | 0.67 | 0.633 |
| Togo | 128 | 0.2 | 0.035 | 107 | 0.42 | 0.055 | 139 | 0.36 | 0.071 | 51 | 0.76 | 0.077 | 97 | 0.52 | 0.066 | 73 | 0.73 | 0.63 |
| Afghanistan | 129 | 0.19 | 0.033 | 120 | 0.37 | 0.041 | 135 | 0.4 | 0.077 | 170 | 0.25 | 0.086 | 153 | 0.28 | 0.053 | 87 | 0.68 | 0.631 |
| Zimbabwe | 130 | 0.19 | 0.026 | 134 | 0.29 | 0.033 | 124 | 0.49 | 0.071 | 137 | 0.43 | 0.093 | 111 | 0.5 | 0.067 | 122 | 0.53 | 0.626 |
| Mauritania | 131 | 0.18 | 0.034 | 109 | 0.4 | 0.055 | 137 | 0.38 | 0.077 | 159 | 0.32 | 0.093 | 62 | 0.58 | 0.069 | 77 | 0.71 | 0.653 |
| Zanzibar | 132 | 0.18 | 0.025 | 145 | 0.25 | 0.027 | 121 | 0.51 | 0.076 | 91 | 0.62 | 0.091 | 140 | 0.36 | 0.085 | 84 | 0.69 | 0.648 |
| Thailand | 133 | 0.17 | 0.022 | 156 | 0.19 | 0.021 | 117 | 0.54 | 0.074 | 120 | 0.51 | 0.09 | 148 | 0.31 | 0.063 | 167 | 0.15 | 0.639 |
| Comoros | 134 | 0.17 | 0.028 | 122 | 0.36 | 0.043 | 141 | 0.35 | 0.066 | 87 | 0.64 | 0.09 | 61 | 0.58 | 0.057 | 93 | 0.65 | 0.63 |
| Palestine/West Bank | 135 | 0.16 | 0.022 | 144 | 0.26 | 0.02 | 129 | 0.44 | 0.066 | 99 | 0.59 | 0.101 | 102 | 0.51 | 0.061 | 98 | 0.63 | 0.658 |
| Ethiopia | 136 | 0.16 | 0.026 | 127 | 0.34 | 0.039 | 142 | 0.35 | 0.066 | 109 | 0.55 | 0.098 | 141 | 0.36 | 0.069 | 75 | 0.72 | 0.635 |
| DRC | 137 | 0.16 | 0.028 | 123 | 0.36 | 0.04 | 147 | 0.31 | 0.068 | 142 | 0.39 | 0.087 | 117 | 0.48 | 0.063 | 86 | 0.69 | 0.651 |
| Libya | 138 | 0.15 | 0.023 | 139 | 0.27 | 0.018 | 136 | 0.39 | 0.07 | 118 | 0.52 | 0.093 | 145 | 0.32 | 0.064 | 91 | 0.67 | 0.637 |
| Algeria | 139 | 0.15 | 0.022 | 137 | 0.28 | 0.033 | 140 | 0.36 | 0.063 | 70 | 0.69 | 0.084 | 155 | 0.24 | 0.064 | 131 | 0.48 | 0.626 |
| Iran | 140 | 0.14 | 0.02 | 157 | 0.19 | 0.022 | 131 | 0.43 | 0.065 | 108 | 0.56 | 0.093 | 171 | 0.14 | 0.059 | 144 | 0.37 | 0.649 |
| Oman | 141 | 0.14 | 0.021 | 164 | 0.18 | 0.016 | 130 | 0.44 | 0.071 | 94 | 0.61 | 0.081 | 136 | 0.38 | 0.066 | 166 | 0.15 | 0.635 |
| Guinea | 142 | 0.14 | 0.026 | 128 | 0.33 | 0.037 | 156 | 0.26 | 0.066 | 139 | 0.41 | 0.089 | 128 | 0.44 | 0.086 | 156 | 0.28 | 0.641 |
| Kazakhstan | 143 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 148 | 0.24 | 0.028 | 144 | 0.34 | 0.06 | 102 | 0.58 | 0.087 | 165 | 0.17 | 0.061 | 149 | 0.33 | 0.635 |
| Djibouti | 144 | 0.12 | 0.021 | 143 | 0.26 | 0.027 | 146 | 0.31 | 0.062 | 126 | 0.48 | 0.088 | 138 | 0.36 | 0.07 | 147 | 0.34 | 0.634 |
| Cameroon | 145 | 0.12 | 0.021 | 133 | 0.3 | 0.031 | 155 | 0.27 | 0.059 | 104 | 0.56 | 0.092 | 156 | 0.24 | 0.067 | 142 | 0.38 | 0.629 |
| Egypt | 146 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 161 | 0.18 | 0.016 | 138 | 0.37 | 0.069 | 157 | 0.32 | 0.085 | 157 | 0.23 | 0.053 | 143 | 0.37 | 0.628 |
| Eswatini | 147 | 0.12 | 0.022 | 170 | 0.14 | 0.017 | 133 | 0.42 | 0.082 | 166 | 0.28 | 0.093 | 154 | 0.25 | 0.089 | 159 | 0.23 | 0.641 |
| Congo | 148 | 0.12 | 0.023 | 147 | 0.25 | 0.026 | 150 | 0.3 | 0.071 | 150 | 0.36 | 0.093 | 82 | 0.55 | 0.065 | 112 | 0.58 | 0.634 |
| Turkey | 149 | 0.11 | 0.022 | 135 | 0.29 | 0.031 | 157 | 0.24 | 0.062 | 129 | 0.46 | 0.092 | 133 | 0.4 | 0.055 | 168 | 0.14 | 0.623 |
| Rwanda | 150 | 0.11 | 0.021 | 152 | 0.21 | 0.023 | 152 | 0.29 | 0.07 | 98 | 0.59 | 0.096 | 132 | 0.41 | 0.104 | 123 | 0.53 | 0.629 |
| Vietnam | 151 | 0.11 | 0.019 | 151 | 0.22 | 0.02</td | | | | | | | | | | | | |

What is Democracy Good for? Introducing “The Case for Democracy”

Vanessa A. Boese and Staffan I. Lindberg

As evidenced in this and previous years *Democracy Reports*, the world is currently experiencing a wave of autocratization, with one-third of the world’s population – 2.6 billion people – living in countries undergoing autocratization. Confronted with more and more overt attacks on democracy, world leaders have rejuvenated the idea of a global coalition of democracies. For instance, new US President Joe Biden announced his intention to convene an **International Democracy Summit**.¹ Boris Johnson has proposed a **D(emocracy)10** bringing together the G7 states with Australia, India and South Korea.² German foreign minister Heiko Maas recently suggested a **Marshall Plan for Democracy**³, and Sweden launched the ‘Drive for Democracy’ as a new foreign policy priority.


The V-Dem Institute is now launching a new program: *The Case for Democracy*. It is a drive to translate and distribute knowledge from the academic sphere to policymakers and practitioners on the dividends of democracy. Its goal is to actively distill and disseminate what we know about the benefits of democracy for economic and human development, health and socio-economic protections, environmental protection and climate action, as well as international and domestic security. Providing an evidence-based case for democracy is of utmost importance in the present era of “fake news” that is often generated in support of autocratization.

A successful defense of democracy, internationally and at home, is predicated on hard evidence on the ways that democracy is better than autocracy for its peoples beyond intrinsic values. Through a series of webinars, publications⁴ and eventually an on-site conference, the V-Dem Institute hopes to actively bring together top academics and policymakers in a dialogue based on state-of-the-art scientific research on the dividends of democracy for a series of development outcomes.

A recent publication from the V-Dem Institute demonstrates that democracy functions as an economic safety net - ensuring stable growth and a lower probability of economic crises.⁵ The team has previously evidenced that greater electoral democracy leads to a substantial reduction in infant mortality.⁶ In terms of democracies’ responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, a recent study from the V-Dem Institute shows that countries enacting the drastic measures violating international norms are typically worse at fighting the spread of Covid-19. A number of countries seem to

be using the pandemic as a pretext for further autocratization.⁷ Thus, greater violations of democratic standards cannot be justified by better public health outcomes.

THE ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY AND MORTALITY RATE



Source: Wang, Mechkova, and Andersson (2019).

The next step for *The Case for Democracy* is the “Case for Democracy Week” – a series of five 1.5-hour webinars from March 22nd – 26th, 2021 presenting state-of-the-art research findings on the dividends of democracy for a series of development outcomes: 1) economic development, 2) human development and infrastructures, 3) human development and health, 4) security, and 5) combating climate change. Rohini Pande (Yale University), James Robinson (University of Chicago), Scott Gates (PRIO & University of Oslo), Amanda Murdie (University of Georgia), Thomas Bernauer (ETH & ISTP), and Thomas J. Bollyky (Council of Foreign Relations & Georgetown University) are among the list of speakers. The full list of speakers and preliminary program can be found on the V-Dem website [here](#).⁸ The sessions will be broadcast live on [V-Dem’s YouTube channel](#) where you can also watch them later.⁹

1 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again>

2 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/g7-d10-democracy-trump-europe/>

3 <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-wants-us-eu-to-forge-marshall-plan-for-democracy/a-56181438>

4 Knutsen (2020).

5 Knutsen (2020).

6 Wang, Mechkova and Andersson (2019).

7 Maerz et al. (2020).

8 <https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/case-democracy/>

9 <https://www.youtube.com/user/VDemProject>



Photo by Ink Drop, Shutterstock.

Deepening the dialogue on democracy's dividends between academics, policy makers and practitioners and providing evidence-based facts, will translate academic research into the real world and have a long-lasting impact on international democracy promotion and protection.

Follow us on [social media](#)¹⁰ to view the sessions from the "Case for Democracy Week" and to stay tuned for more activities to come as part of the broader *The Case for Democracy* program.

¹⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/vdeminstitute/>; <https://twitter.com/vdeminstitute>

New Global Data on Political Parties: V-Party

Anna Lührmann, Juraj Medzihorsky, and Staffan I. Lindberg

Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) is a new dataset from the V-Dem Institute, chronicling the policy positions and organizational structures of political parties across the world.¹ The largest ever resource of its kind, the data highlight shifts and trends within and between parties since 1970.

The data set includes nine distinctive indicators of the organizational capacity of parties such as local party offices, internal cohesion and party resources. An additional 17 expert-coded indicators offer unique prospects to study trends such as populism, anti-pluralism, party positions on cultural and economic issues, as well as clientelism.

The Anti-Pluralism Index² gauges parties' commitments to democratic norms. It is the first comparative measure of Juan Linz' famous "litmus test" that Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt propagated in their 2018 book on "How Democracies Die": Lack of commitment to democratic process, demonization of political opponents, disrespect for fundamental minority rights, and encouragement of political violence.³

DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES IN AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES SINCE 2000 IN TERMS OF ANTI-PLURALISM AND ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT POSITIONING




Figure 1 shows selected governing parties in autocratizing countries on the Anti-Pluralism Index. The Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), the Hungarian Fidesz Party, and the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) were still loyal, democratic parties around 2000, while the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) already assented to some level of anti-pluralism at that point. The data demonstrate how all four parties turned to unyielding anti-pluralism over the past 20 years, reminiscent of ruling parties in pure autocracies. In the wake of this, all four countries became increasingly autocratic and Turkey lost its status as democracy in 2014, followed by Hungary in 2018, and India by 2019. Only Poland still qualifies as a democracy.⁴ The US Republican Party has developed in a similar direction under Donald Trump (see reporting about V-Party data in [The Guardian](#) and [Washington Post](#)).⁵

The V-Party dataset is the result of a truly collaborative endeavor. Building on the experiences and the infrastructure of the V-Dem Project and Institute, we developed the questionnaire in a series of consultative meetings between 2017 and 2019. We joined forces with PartyFacts⁶ who provided factual data on all political parties represented in parliaments from 1900 to 2019, including their vote and seat shares.

In January 2020, 665 carefully selected V-Dem country experts assessed all political parties with a vote share of more than 5% in a legislative election between 1970 and 2019, across 169 countries. Observations capture 1,955 political parties across 1,560 elections – or 6,330 party-election units with 183,570 expert-coded data. Typically, at least four locally-based experts contributed to each question. Coder responses were aggregated using V-Dem's custom-built item-response theory model to ensure comparability across countries and time.⁷ The data set can be downloaded free of charge [here](#).⁸

¹ Lührmann et al. (2020).

² In V1 of the V-Party dataset this index was labelled "Illiberalism", in V2 (to be released in spring 2021) the label will be changed to "Anti-Pluralism". For more discussion of the concept see Lührmann, Medzihorsky, and Lindberg (2021).

³ Linz (1978), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).

⁴ See elsewhere in this report and Coppedge et al. (2021).

⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/26/republican-party-autocratic-hungary-turkey-study-trump>; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/11/12/republican-party-trump-authoritarian-data/>

⁶ Döring and Regel (2019), Döring and Dupont (2020).

⁷ Pemstein et al. (2020).

⁸ Lührmann et al. (2020), https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-party-dataset/?edit_off=true





Photo by Stratos Brilakis, Shutterstock.

Publications from the V-Dem Team



Varieties of Democracy: Measuring a Century of Political Change

Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Adam Glynn, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Fernando Bizzarro Neto, Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Matthew Maguire, Kyle Marquardt, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Josefine Pernes, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Eitan Tzelgov, and Yi-ting Wang. 2020 | Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

This book is an essential user's guide to the V-Dem project. It creates opportunities for V-Dem data to be used in education, research, news, analysis, advocacy, policy work, and elsewhere.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108347860>

Gendered Accountability: When and Why do Women's Policy Priorities get Implemented?

Valeriya Mechkova and Ruth Carlitz

2020 | European Political Science Review: 1-9. #OpenAccess

Increased female representation in the legislature promotes implementation of policies that women prioritize, such as reduced infant and child mortality and greater spending on health.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773920000272>

Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability

Anna Lührmann, Kyle Marquardt, and Valeriya Mechkova

2020 | American Political Science Review. #OpenAccess

Introduces a conceptual and empirical framework for vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability, and uses V-Dem data and innovative Bayesian methods to capture these concepts.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000222>

Explaining the Homogeneous Diffusion of COVID-19

Nonpharmaceutical Interventions across Heterogeneous Countries

Abiel Sehatou, Karl Wennberg, Stefan Arora-Jonsson, and Staffan I. Lindberg 2020 | *PNAS: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. #OpenAccess

Policies initiated by other countries drive the adoption of COVID-19 restrictive policies, which is also mediated by the level of democracy: strong democracies are slower to initiate restrictive policies, but more likely to follow the policies of nearby countries.

<https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2010625117>

Claiming the Right to Rule: Regime Legitimation Strategies from 1900 to 2019

Marcus Tannenberg, Michael Bernhard, Johannes Gerschewski, Anna Lührmann, and Christian von Soest.

2020 | European Political Science Review, 1-18. #OpenAccess

Introduces new V-Dem measures of regime legitimation strategies based on performance, the person of the leader, rational-legal procedures, and ideology, covering 183 countries from 1900-2019.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773920000363>

BRIEFING PAPER #6
Bogita Seim, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill & Project Manager for Experiments

Does Corruption Undermine Democracy?

KEY FINDINGS:

- Countries in the midst of democratization have the highest levels of corruption.
- Fewer countries are more robustly linked to lower rates of corruption.
- More evidence is needed surrounding whether democracy reduces corruption or corruption undermines democracy.

While the strongest democracies typically have the lowest levels of corruption, certain components of democracy may actually increase corruption as countries transition away from authoritarianism. It also unclear how citizens perceive ongoing changes as they are informed about the nature of corruption. This briefing paper explores what evidence does work with the people to hold officials accountable, corruption declines. A closer look into some case studies in Africa shows that there is still no definitive causal explanation for how democratic elections and corruption affect one another, although promising research methods could uncover more of the truth in the near future.

Understanding the relationship between corruption and democracy has been a long-standing goal of political scholars and practitioners. In this paper, the authors present a murky picture in the closest analysis, countries with higher levels of corruption tend to have lower rates of corruption. However, new democracies are certainly not entirely free of corruption (Koltstad and Wig 2016; Drapalova, 2019). More nuanced analysis indicates that corruption tends to be higher in new democracies and then tends to decline as democratic institutions consolidate. However, there is no definitive causal explanation for this trend. One argument is that the propensity for corruption is more likely under authoritarian rulers than in fledgling democracies with low voter participation and knowledge (Koltstad and Wig 2016). Another is that certain components of democracy affect corruption in different ways. While limited freedom of expression and freedom of association seem to generate higher corruption, corruption decreases at those

BRIEFING PAPER #7
Bogita Seim, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill & Open Access

Participation and Influence as Pillar of Democracy

KEY FINDINGS:

- Institutions such as gender quotas and proportional representation are among the most effective mechanisms for improving political representation.
- Democracies are better than autocracies at safeguarding women's rights.
- Political empowerment of women is associated with economic development and positive gains such as economic growth and improved population health.

All women represent the majority in most countries, they exercise considerably more than men. The most prominent explanations for this phenomenon include factors such as gender quotas and proportional electoral systems are also very often much easier to change. While democracies do not necessarily have more viral processes than autocracies, the former are significantly better at protecting women. Yet, the authors argue that the lack of representation of women is a major obstacle for democratic transition. Finally, there is strong evidence that women's empowerment promotes long-term human development, further motivating the need for representation of women.

women represent the majority in most countries, they exercise considerably more than men. The most prominent explanations for this phenomenon include factors such as gender quotas and proportional electoral systems are also very often much easier to change. While democracies do not necessarily have more viral processes than autocracies, the former are significantly better at protecting women. Yet, the lack of representation of women is a major obstacle for democratic transition. Finally, there is strong evidence that women's empowerment promotes long-term human development, further motivating the need for representation of women.

Women represent the majority in most countries, they exercise considerably more than men. The most prominent explanations for this phenomenon include factors such as gender quotas and proportional electoral systems are also very often much easier to change. While democracies do not necessarily have more viral processes than autocracies, the former are significantly better at protecting women. Yet, the lack of representation of women is a major obstacle for democratic transition. Finally, there is strong evidence that women's empowerment promotes long-term human development, further motivating the need for representation of women.

Data for Politics: Creating an International Research Infrastructure Measuring Democracy

Staffan I. Lindberg and Juraj Medzihorsky 2020 | *Cell: Patterns*, 1(4). #OpenAccess

Introduces the V-Dem research infrastructure with over 3000 country expert coders, advanced statistical techniques and the resulting dataset covering 202 political units from 1789.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2020.100056>

Caught Between Stability and Democracy in the Western Balkans: a Comparative Analysis of Paths of Accession to the European Union

Adea Gafuri and Meltem Muftuler-Bac 2020 | *East European Politics*.

Focusing on the case studies of Serbia and North Macedonia, the authors argue that EU's democracy aid and progress on accession stages legitimized the political regimes in the Western Balkans despite their democratic backsliding.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1781094>

Charm Offensive or Offensive Charm? An Analysis of Russian and Chinese Cultural Institutes Abroad

Milos Popovic, Erin K. Jenne, and Juraj Medzihorsky

2020 | *Europe-Asia Studies*: 1-23. #OpenAccess

Drawing on policy diffusion theory, this paper argues that Russia and China's cultural institutes in foreign countries engage in both policy emulation and decoupling.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1785397>

How Foreign Pressure Affects Mass Mobilization in Favor of Authoritarian Regimes

Sebastian Hellmeier

2020 | *European Journal of International Relations*. #OpenAccess

Investigates the link between foreign pressure and domestic mobilization in favor of ruling autocrats, finding empirically that sanctions and threats significantly increase pro-government mobilization.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066120934527>

No Easy Way Out: The Effect of Military Coups on State Repression

Jean Lachapelle

2020 | *The Journal of Politics* 82 (4).

Estimates the effect of coups on state repression by exploiting the element of chance in whether an attempted coup succeeds or fails, finding in contrary to popular view that coups have no pacifying effect on state repression.

<https://doi.org/10.1086/707309>

Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability

Jean Lachapelle, Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way and Adam E. Casey.

2020 | *World Politics* 72 (4).

Analyzing all authoritarian regimes between 1900 and 2015 with a novel data set, the authors find that regimes founded in violent social revolution are especially durable.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000106>

POLICY BRIEF
No. 402 | July 2018

Democracy, Autocracy and Economic Development

KEY FINDINGS

- Democracy and autocracy states **do not affect** economic development negatively.
- Democracy and autocracy are predictable economic growth. Authoritarianism disrupts growth, but also much less than democracy.
- Democracy is **less likely** to experience economic crises than autocracies.

Gordon et al. discuss the relationship between the political system and economic development. They find that there is no clear negative relationship between democracy and economic development. In fact, they find that democracy does not deter growth even in countries with low initial income levels. The other study, Kuran (1998), finds that economic development is not caused by democracy but that there is such a trade-off that the cost of providing democracy becomes high.

Vanessa A. Boese, Amanda B. Edgell, Sebastian Hellmeier, Seraphine F. Maerz, Staffan I. Lindberg

POLICY BRIEF
No. 402 | July 2018

Vertical, Horizontal, and Agents on Governments

KEY FINDINGS

- Sub-Saharan African countries that have more women in the legislature have lower rates of economic growth.
- Higher civil society and broader participation of women along with higher female representation in the legislature reduce infant and child mortality.
- Having more women in parliaments has a stronger effect on economic growth than having more women in the executive branch, which have gender quota and a proportional electoral system.

Gordon et al. discuss the relationship between the political system and economic development. They find that there is no clear negative relationship between democracy and economic development. In fact, they find that democracy does not deter growth even in countries with low initial income levels. The other study, Kuran (1998), finds that economic development is not caused by democracy but that there is such a trade-off that the cost of providing democracy becomes high.

Vanessa A. Boese, Amanda B. Edgell, Sebastian Hellmeier, Seraphine F. Maerz, Staffan I. Lindberg

An Interactive Model of Democratic Peace

David Altman, Federico Royas-de-Galarreta, and Francisco Urdinez
2020 | *Journal of Peace Research*.

This article introduces the interactive model of democratic peace, arguing and empirically verifying that the interaction of the democratic level and democratic spread of two countries provide nuance to the likelihood of conflict between the two.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319883672>

State of the World 2019: Autocratization Surges, Resistance Grows

Seraphine Maerz, Anna Lührmann, Sandra Grahn, Sebastian Hellmeier, and Staffan I. Lindberg.
2020 | Feature article, *Democratization*, 27. #OpenAccess
Analyses the state of democracy in the world in 2019, demonstrating that the third wave of autocratization is accelerating and deepening.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1758670>

The Matthew Effect in Political Science: Head Start and Key Reforms Important for Democratization

Patrik Lindenfors, Matthew Wilson, and Staffan Lindberg.
2020 | *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*. #OpenAccess
Comparing successful and failed episodes of liberalization between 1900-2018, the authors find that liberalization in autocracies was more likely to succeed in countries that had more developed institutions, GDP and education.

<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00596-7>

Explaining Subnational Regime Variation: Country-Level Factors

Kelly M. McMann, Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Matthew Maquire, and Staffan I. Lindberg.
2020 | *Comparative Politics*.
Using V-Dem data from 1900-2018, the article demonstrates that subnational regime variation exists in all world regions in both the present and past, as well as how and why such subnational variation is promoted.

<https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521X16007785801364>

How Democracies Prevail: Democratic Resilience as a Two-Stage Process

Vanessa A. Boese, Amanda B. Edgell, Sebastian Hellmeier, Seraphine F. Maerz, and Staffan I. Lindberg.
Forthcoming 2021. *Democratization*.
Conceptualizing democratic resilience as a two-stage process, the article introduces the Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset tracking autocratization since 1900, and also empirically tests what contributes to democratic regression and breakdown.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891413>

Berker Kavasoglu. (2021). **"Autocratic Ruling Parties During Regime Transitions: Investigating the Democratizing Effect of Strong Ruling Parties"**. *Party Politics*, 1-12. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068820985280>

Valeriya Mechkova and Steven L. Wilson. (2021). **"Norms and Rage: Gender and Social Media in the 2018 U.S. Mid-Term Elections"**. *Electoral Studies*, 69: 1-13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102268>

Kyle L. Marquardt. (2020). **"How and How Much does Expert Error Matter? Implications for Quantitative Peace Research"**. *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(6) 692-700. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320959121>

Szu-Ning Ping, Yi-Ting Wang, and Wen-Yang Chang. (2020). **"The Effects of China's Development Projects on Political Accountability"**. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-20. 10.1017/S0007123420000381

Hanne Fjelde, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård. (2020). **"Which Institutions Matter? Reconsidering the Democratic Civil Peace"**. *International Studies Quarterly*: 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa076>

Steven L. Wilson and Charles Wiysonge. (2020). **"Social Media and Vaccine Hesitancy"**. *BMJ Global Health*, 5(10). <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmigh-2020-004206>

John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Matthew Maguire, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, and Michael Coppedge. (2020). **"Democracy and Human Development: Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement"**. *Democratization*: 1-25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1818721>

Matthew C. Wilson and Carl Henrik Knutsen. (2020). **"Geographical Coverage in Political Science Research"**. *Perspectives on Politics*: 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002509>

David Altman. (2020). **"Checking Executive Personalism: Collegial Governments and the Level of Democracy"**. *Swiss Political Science Review*. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12406>

Michael Bernhard. (2020). **"What do we know about civil society and regime change thirty years after 1989?"** *East European Politics* 36(3): 341-362. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1787160>

Sokhol Lleshi. (2020). **"Reconstructing the past in a state-mandated historical memory institute: the case of Albania"**. *European Politics and Society*, 21(3): 277-291. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2019.1645420>

Carie A. Steele, Daniel Pemstein, and Stephen A. Meserve. (2020). **"Democracy Promotion and Electoral Quality: A Disaggregated Analysis"**. *Governance*: 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12526>

Matthew Wilson and Josef Woldense. (2019). **"Contested or Established? A Comparison of Legislative Powers Across Regimes"**. *Democratization*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1564282>

V-Dem Indices

The Liberal Democracy Index

The V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) captures both liberal and electoral aspects of democracy based on the 71 indicators included in the Liberal Component Index (LCI) and the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). The EDI reflects a relatively ambitious idea of electoral democracy where a number of institutional features

guarantee free and fair elections such as freedom of association and freedom of expression. The LCI goes even further and captures the limits placed on governments in terms of two key aspects: The protection of individual liberties, and the checks and balances between institutions.

FIGURE A1.1: THE V-DEM LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2020





FIGURE A1.2: EXPLANATION OF THE V-DEM LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX



The Electoral Democracy Index

For several decades, scholars and practitioners alike depicted democracy in the world as though the extant measures really captured what is meant by the concept "electoral democracy". Yet, we have all known that they did not. V-Dem is the first systematic effort to measure the *de facto* existence of all the institutions in Robert Dahl's famous articulation of "polyarchy" as electoral

democracy. The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) captures not only the extent to which regimes hold clean, free and fair elections, but also their actual freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and association, as well as male and female suffrage and the degree to which government policy is vested in elected political officials.

FIGURE A2.1: THE V-DEM ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2020





FIGURE A2.2: THE V-DEM ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX



The Liberal Component Index

In V-Dem's conceptual scheme the liberal principle of democracy embodies the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against both the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. It also captures the "horizontal" methods of accountability between more or less equally standing institutions that ensure the effective checks and balances between institutions and in particular limit the exercise of executive power. This is achieved by strong rule of law and constitutionally protected civil liberties,

independent judiciary and strong parliament that are able to hold the executive to account and limit its powers. The three indices that capture these dimensions are: the equality before the law and individual liberties (*v2xcl_rol*), judicial constraints on the executive (*v2x_jucon*), and legislative constraints on the executive (*v2xlg_legcon*). Taken together they measure the V-Dem Liberal Component Index (*v2x_liber*).

FIGURE A3.1: THE V-DEM LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2020





FIGURE A3.2: THE V-DEM LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX (LCI)



The Egalitarian Component Index

The egalitarian principle of democracy measures to what extent all social groups enjoy equal capabilities to participate in the political arena. It relies on the idea that democracy is a system of rule “by the people” where citizens participate in various ways, such as making informed voting decisions, expressing opinions, demonstrating, running for office or influencing policy-making in

other ways. The egalitarian principle of democracy is fundamentally related to political participation, as systematic inequalities in the rights and resources of citizens of specific social groups limit capabilities to participate in the political and governing processes. Therefore, a more equal distribution of resources across groups results in political equality and hence democracy.

FIGURE A4.1: THE V-DEM EGALITARIAN COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2020





FIGURE A4.2: THE V-DEM EGALITARIAN COMPONENT INDEX



The Participatory Component Index

The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. This principle prefers direct rule by citizens as practicable. The V-Dem Participatory Component Index (PCI) takes into account four important aspects of citizen participation:

civil society organizations, mechanisms of direct democracy, and participation and representation through local and regional governments. Four different V-Dem indices capture these aspects and are the basis for the PCI.

FIGURE A5.1: THE V-DEM PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2020





FIGURE A5.2: THE V-DEM PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT INDEX (PCI)



The Deliberative Component Index

The V-Dem Deliberative Component Index (DCI) captures to what extent the deliberative principle of democracy is achieved. It assesses the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning, focused on the common good, motivates political decisions – as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests

or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels – from preference formation to final decision – among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

FIGURE A6.1: THE V-DEM DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2020




FIGURE A6.2: THE V-DEM DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX (DCI)





Pro-democracy protesters by the Democracy Monument in Bangkok, Thailand. Photo by Bule Sky Studio, Shutterstock.

V-Dem Methodology: Aggregating Expert Assessments

Author: Kyle L. Marquardt

V-DEM USES INNOVATIVE METHODS TO aggregate expert judgments and thereby produce estimates of important concepts. We use experts because many key features of democracy are not directly observable. For example, it is easy to observe whether or not a legislature has the legal right to investigate an executive. However, assessing the extent to which the legislature actually does so requires evaluation by experts with extensive conceptual and case knowledge.

V-Dem typically gathers data from five experts per country-year observation, using a pool of over 3,500 country experts who provide judgment on different concepts and cases. Experts hail from almost every country in the world, allowing us to leverage diverse opinions.

Despite their clear value, expert-coded data pose multiple problems. Rating concepts requires judgment, which varies across experts and cases; it may also vary systematically across groups of experts. We address these concerns by aggregating expert-coded data with a measurement model, allowing us to account for uncertainty about estimates and potential biases.

The logic of the V-Dem measurement model is that an unobserved concept exists (e.g. a certain level of academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression) but we only see imperfect manifestations of this concept in the form of ordinal categories which experts use to code their judgments. By analyzing these manifest items (expert ratings) together, we can estimate the concept itself, converting the expert categories to continuous latent scale.

In the process, the model algorithmically estimates both the degree to which an expert is reliable relative to other experts, as well as the degree to which their perception of the response scale differs from other experts. Similarly, we use patterns of overlapping coding – both in the form of experts who code multiple countries and experts who code hypothetical cases (anchoring vignettes) – to estimate the degree to which differences in scale perception are systematic across experts who code different sets of cases. Given the iterative nature of the estimation process, these estimates are used to weight an expert's contribution to the estimation of the unobserved concept.

In the resulting V-Dem dataset, we present users with a best estimate of the value for an observation (the point estimate), as well as an uncertainty estimate (the credible regions, a Bayesian corollary of confidence intervals). More precisely, the output of the measurement model is an interval-level point estimate of the latent trait that typically varies from -5 to 5, and its associated measurement error. These estimates are the best for use in statistical analysis.

However, the interval-level estimates are difficult for some users to interpret substantively. We therefore also provide interval-level point estimates that we have linearly transformed back to the original coding scale that experts originally use to code each case. These estimates typically run from 0 to 4, and users can refer to the V-Dem codebook to substantively interpret them. Finally, we provide ordinal versions of each variable. Each of the latter two data versions are also accompanied by credible regions.

VERSIONS OF THE V-DEM INDICATORS

| Suffix | Scale | Description | Recommended use |
|----------------------|----------|--|---|
| None | Interval | Original output of the V-Dem measurement model | Regression analysis |
| _osp | Interval | Linearized transformation of the measurement model output on the original scale | Substantive interpretation of graphs and data |
| _ord | Ordinal | Most likely ordinal value taking uncertainty estimates into account | Substantive interpretation of graphs and data |
| _codelow / _codehigh | Interval | One standard deviation above (_codehigh) and below (_codelow) the point estimate | Evaluating differences over time within units |
| _sd | Interval | Standard deviation of the interval estimate | Creating confidence intervals based on user needs |

The result of this process is a set of versions of indicators of democratic institutions and concepts, which allow academics and policymakers alike to understand the different features of a polity. The box summarizes the output with which we provide users.

Key Terms

Point Estimate: A best estimate of a concept's value.

Confidence Intervals: Credible regions for which the upper and lower bounds represent a range of probable values for a point estimate. These bounds are based on the interval in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the probability mass for each score, which is generally approximately equivalent to the upper and lower bounds of one standard deviation from the median.

Significant Differences or Changes: When the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals for two point estimates do not overlap, we are confident that the difference between them is real and not a result of measurement error.

References

- Marquardt, Kyle L. and Daniel Pemstein. 2018. "IRT Models for Expert-Coded Panel Data." *Political Analysis*. 26(4):431-456.
- Pemstein, Daniel, et al. 2021. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data." *Varieties of Democracy Institute*: Working Paper No. 21, 6th edition.
- Pemstein, Daniel, Eitan Tzelgov and Yi-ting Wang. 2015. "Evaluating and Improving Item Response Theory Models for Cross-National Expert Surveys." *Varieties of Democracy Institute*: Working Paper No. 1.

References

This Publication Builds on the Following Key References

V-Dem Dataset v11

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerlow, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. (2021).

"V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v11". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. (2021).

"The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 6th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

V-Dem Codebook v11

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerlow, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. (2021).

"V-Dem Codebook v11". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

V-Dem Methodology v11

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Juraj Medzihorsky, Daniel Pemstein, Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Garry Hindle, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Steven Wilson. (2021).

"V-Dem Methodology v11". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Basu, Amrita (2015). "Violent conjunctures in democratic India." New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bloem, Jeffrey R. & Salemi, Colette. (2020). "COVID-19 and Conflict. World Development 140." Online first.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105294>

Boese, Vanessa A., Amanda B. Edgell, Sebastian Hellmeier, Seraphine F. Maerz, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (Forthcoming 2021). "How democracies prevail: Democratic resilience as a two-stage process." Democratization.

Open access: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1350347.2021.1891413>

Dahl, R. A. (1971). "Polyarchy: Participation and opposition." Yale University Press, New Haven.

Dahl, Robert A. (1989). "Democracy and Its Critics." New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ding, Iza., & Slater, D. (2020). "Democratic decoupling." Democratization, 28 (1), 63-80.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1350347.2020.1842361>

Döring, H., & Dupont, N. (2020). "Elections Global: Election results in 207 countries, 1880–2015." Harvard Dataverse, V2.

<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OGOURC>

Döring, H., & Regel, S. (2019). "Party facts: A database of political parties worldwide." Party Politics, 25(2), 97–109.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/135068818820671>

Edgell, A. B., Maerz, S. F., Maxwell, L., Morgan, R., Medzihorsky, J., Wilson, M. C., Boese, V. A., Hellmeier, S., Lachapelle, J., Lindenfors, P., Lührmann, A., and Lindberg, S. I. (2020). "Episodes of regime transformation dataset and codebook, v2.2."
<https://github.com/vdeminstitute/ERT>

Edgell, A., A. Lührmann, S. Maerz, J. Lachapelle, S. Grahn, A. Good God, M. Lundstedt, N. Natsika, S. Kaiser, P. Kolveni, S. Pillai, A. Aljila, T. Fernandes, H. Tung, M. Wilson and S. I. Lindberg. (2020). "Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy During Covid-19 (PanDem), Version 5." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute.
<https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding/>

Gerbaudo, Paolo. (2020). "The Pandemic Crowd." Journal of International Affairs 73 (2), p. 61-76.

Gora, A., and de Wilde, P. (2020). "The essence of democratic backsliding in the European Union: deliberation and rule of law." Journal of European Public Policy.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1855465>

Knutsen, C. H. (2020). "The Business Case for Democracy." V-Dem Working Paper 2020:111.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710437>

Kolveni, P., Lundstedt, M., Maerz, S. F., Lührmann, A., Lachapelle, J., Grahn, S., and Edgell, A. B. (2020). "Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy and Disinformation Seven Months into the Covid-19 Pandemic." V-Dem Policy Brief no.25.
<https://www.v-dem.net/en/publications/briefing-papers/>

Levitsky, S., and Ziblatt, D. (2018). "How Democracies Die." Penguin Books.

Linz, Juan J. (1978). "Crisis, breakdown & reequilibration." Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lührmann, A., Dupont, N., Higashijima, M., Kavasoglu, Y.B., Marquardt, K.L., Bernhard, M., Döring, H., Hicken, A., Laebens, M., Lindberg, S.I., Medzihorsky, J., Neundorf, A., Reuter, O.J., Ruth-Lovell, S., Weghorst, K.R., Wiesehomeier, N., Wright, J., Alizada, N., Bederke, P., Gastaldi, L., Grahn, S., Hindle, G., Ilchenko, N., von Römer, J., Pemstein, D., and Seim, B. (2020). "Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V1." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-party-dataset/?edit_off=true

Lührmann, A. and Lindberg, S. I. (2019). "A third wave of autocratization is here: What is new about it?" Democratization, 26(7).

Lührmann, A., Medzihorsky, J., and Lindberg, S. I. (2021). "Walking the Talk: How to Identify Anti-Pluralist Parties". V-Dem Working Paper No. 116.

Lührmann, A., Tannenberg, M., and Lindberg, S. I. (2018). "Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes." Politics & Governance, 6(1).

Maerz, S. F., Edgell, A. B., Wilson, M. C., Hellmeier, Sebastian., and Lindberg, S. I. (2021). "A Framework for Understanding Regime Transformation: Introducing the ERT Dataset." Working Paper 113, V-Dem Working Papers.

Maerz, S. F., Lührmann, A., Lachapelle, J., Edgell, A. B. (2020). "Worth the Sacrifice? Illiberal and Authoritarian Practices during Covid-19." V-Dem Working Paper No. 110.

Pemstein, D., Marquardt, K.L., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y. T., Medzihorsky, J., Krusell, J., Miri, F., and von Römer, J. (2020). "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data." V-Dem Working Paper 21: 2020. 5th edition.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3595962>

Sánchez-Sibony, Omar. (2021). "Competitive Authoritarianism in Morales's Bolivia: Skewing Arenas of Competition." Latin American Politics and Society 63 (1).

United Nations ICCPR (2020). "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cspr.aspx>

Wang, Y.T., Mechkova, V., Andersson, F. (2019). "Does Democracy Enhance Health? New Empirical Evidence 1900–2012." Political Research Quarterly, 72(3), 554-569.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918798506>



Aerial view of a city street featuring a large, colorful mural on the side of a building. The mural consists of the words "LA VIE DES NOIR·ES" in white, with "COMPTE" in blue, green, and red stacked above it. Below the main text, "#BLACKLIVESMATTER" is written in smaller letters. The building has a blue and grey facade. The surrounding area includes a parking lot with several cars and a sidewalk with small trees.

LA VIE DES NOIR·ES
#BLACKLIVESMATTER

Montreal, Canada. Photo by Martin Reisch on Unsplash.

Global Standards, Local Knowledge



Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Språngkullsgatan 19, PO 711
SE 405 30 Gothenburg Sweden
contact@v-dem.net
+46 (0) 31 786 30 43
www.v-dem.net
www.facebook.com/vdeminststitute
www.twitter.com/vdeminstitute