
Secure Multi-party computation for e-voting

Alexis Martins De Carvalho Ethan Zouzoulkowski Jean Bou Raad Romain de Javel de Villerfsrlay


Summary


- Overview of SMC
- Chosen SMC protocol
- Library choice
- Experiments and results
- Project challenges
- Conclusion






















Chosen SMC protocol


Shamir's Secret Sharing

Allows to split a secret S into n parts, so that any subset of at least t is sufficient to reconstruct the secret.



Chosen SMC protocol: Shamir

- protocol features information-theoretic security
- lightweight
- n / 2 corrupted to find the secret
- n / 3 corrupted to corrupt the secret




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Library choice

Library Name	Language	Advantages	Weaknesses
OblivC	С	Simple and lightweight language	Low-level, particular syntax to learn
МруС	Python	Shamir implementation with high level of abstraction and highly configurable	Limited types. No native client / server structures. The script is considered to be the client.
Sharemind	C++	Entire implementation of e-voting	Open-source but proprietary with limited OS support (Debian)
MP-SPDZ	C++ / Python	Large protocol support	Hard to install, complex to use
JIFF	Javascript	Web-oriented, multiparty protocol	Project is not being actively supported
ABY	C++	Gates based	Only two party protocol

Experiments and results



Project challenges

- Find the correct library to implement the wanted solution
- Maintain a level of security throughout the voting process



Conclusion