
```
In [7]: import copy
import cv2
import numpy as np
import os

import torch
from torch.autograd import Variable
from torchvision import models
from torch import nn
from IPython.display import Image, display
```

Adversarial Examples Homework

(Do not be intimidated by the large chunks of code, you do not need to understand all of it to do the homework. As long as you understand how adversarial examples work, to fill in the homework you just need to understand what the comment above the FILL_IN is about)

In this assignment, you will learn about adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are deliberately created inputs that fool a neural network. For example, in the picture below, by adding noise to an image of a panda that is correctly classified as a panda, we can fool a neural network into thinking it is a gibbon.



Clearly, this has very dangerous consequences, especially considering how prevalent computer vision classification systems are. For example, in the image below physical stickers have been strategically placed on a stop sign that tricks a self-driving car into thinking it is a different traffic sign.







Run the cell below, it contains helper functions that will be used. You do not need to understand the details

```
In [8]: def preprocess image(cv2im, resize im=True):
                Processes image for CNNs
            Args:
                PIL_img (PIL_img): Image to process
                resize im (bool): Resize to 224 or not
            returns:
                 im as var (Pytorch variable): Variable that contains processed float t
        ensor
            # mean and std list for channels (Imagenet)
            mean = [0.485, 0.456, 0.406]
            std = [0.229, 0.224, 0.225]
            # Resize image
            if resize im:
                 cv2im = cv2.resize(cv2im, (224, 224))
            im as arr = np.float32(cv2im)
            im_as_arr = np.ascontiguousarray(im_as_arr[..., ::-1])
            im as arr = im as arr.transpose(2, 0, 1) # Convert array to D,W,H
            # Normalize the channels
            for channel, _ in enumerate(im_as_arr):
                 im as arr[channel] /= 255
                 im_as_arr[channel] -= mean[channel]
                 im as arr[channel] /= std[channel]
            # Convert to float tensor
            im as ten = torch.from numpy(im as arr).float()
            # Add one more channel to the beginning. Tensor shape = 1,3,224,224
            im as ten.unsqueeze (0)
            # Convert to Pytorch variable
            im as var = Variable(im as ten, requires grad=True)
            return im_as_var
        def recreate_image(im_as_var):
                Recreates images from a torch variable, sort of reverse preprocessing
            Args:
                 im as var (torch variable): Image to recreate
            returns:
                recreated im (numpy arr): Recreated image in array
            reverse mean = [-0.485, -0.456, -0.406]
            reverse std = [1/0.229, 1/0.224, 1/0.225]
            recreated_im = copy.copy(im_as_var.data.numpy()[0])
            for c in range(3):
                 recreated im[c] /= reverse std[c]
                 recreated_im[c] -= reverse_mean[c]
            recreated im[recreated im > 1] = 1
            recreated im[recreated im < 0] = 0
            recreated im = np.round(recreated im * 255)
            recreated im = np.uint8(recreated im).transpose(1, 2, 0)
            # Convert RBG to GBR
```

```
recreated im = recreated im[..., ::-1]
   return recreated im
def get_params(example_index):
       Gets used variables for almost all visualizations, like the image, mod
el etc.
   Aras:
        example index (int): Image id to use from examples
   returns:
       original_image (numpy arr): Original image read from the file
       prep img (numpy arr): Processed image
        target class (int): Target class for the image
       file name to export (string): File name to export the visualizations
       pretrained_model(Pytorch model): Model to use for the operations
   # Pick one of the examples
   example_list = [['./input_images/apple.JPEG', 948],
                    ['./input images/eel.JPEG', 390],
                    ['./input images/bird.JPEG', 13]]
   selected example = example index
   img_path = example_list[selected_example][0]
   target class = example list[selected example][1]
   file_name_to_export = img_path[img_path.rfind(''')+1:img_path.rfind('.')]
   # Read image
   original image = cv2.imread(img path, 1)
   # Process image
   prep_img = preprocess_image(original_image)
   # Define model
   pretrained model = models.alexnet(pretrained=True)
   return (img_path, original_image,
            prep img,
            target class,
            file_name_to_export,
            pretrained model)
```

The idea behind this method is in a sense the reversal of backpropagation. This is because we want to calculate the gradient of the cost (same as backprop so far) with respect to the input image pixels (different since with respect to model weights for backprop). In a sense, we want to know how perturbing each pixel will affect the cost, which will in turn affect what label the machine learning model classifies an image as. Once we know this, we know exactly how to exploit and perturb the image the minimal amount in order to get the model to classify it as a different label. Mathematically, FGSM takes the gradient computed from the description above, and converts each number into either +1 or -1 depending on its sign. Then, it multiplies this by a very small epsilon value and adds it to the original image. This new resulting image will then be classified incorrectly by the model this attack was created against. Pretty terrifying how easy it is to fool these models, huh.

The loss function used in this attack is the cross entropy loss between what the model predicts, and the actual label used. To get the label the model predicts that the loss is run on, you will need to actually call the model on the input image. The result of this is what is used for the loss function described.

```
In [18]: # Fast Gradient Sign Untargeted to Fill In
         class FastGradientSignUntargeted():
                 Fast gradient sign untargeted adversarial attack, minimizes the initia
         l class activation
                 with iterative grad sign updates
             def __init__(self, model, alpha):
                 self.model = model
                 self.model.eval()
                 # Movement multiplier per iteration
                 self.alpha = alpha
                 # Create the folder to export images if not exists
                 if not os.path.exists('./generated'):
                     os.makedirs('./generated')
             def generate(self, original image, im label):
                 # image label as variable
                 im label as var = Variable(torch.from numpy(np.asarray([im label])))
                 # Define loss functions
                 ce loss = nn.CrossEntropyLoss()
                 # Process image
                 processed image = preprocess image(original image)
                 # Start iteration
                 for i in range(10):
                     print('Iteration:', str(i))
                     # zero gradients(x)
                     # Zero out previous gradients
                     # Can also use zero gradients(x)
                     processed_image.grad = None
                     # Forward pass
                     model output = self.model(processed image)
                     model output = model output
                     # Calculate CE loss
                     pred loss = ce loss(model output, im label as var.long())
                     # Do backward pass
                     pred loss.backward()
                     # Create Noise
                     # Here, processed image.grad.data is also the same thing is the ba
         ckward gradient from
                     # the first layer, can use that with hooks as well
                     adv noise = self.alpha * torch.sign(processed image.grad.data)
                     # Add Noise to processed image
                     processed image.data = processed image.data + adv noise
                     # Confirming if the image is indeed adversarial with added noise
                     # This is necessary (for some cases) because when we recreate imag
                     # the values become integers between 1 and 255 and sometimes the a
         dversariality
                     # is lost in the recreation process
                     # Generate confirmation image
                     recreated image = recreate image(processed image)
                     # Process confirmation image
```

```
prep confirmation image = preprocess image(recreated image)
            # Forward pass to make sure creating the adversarial example was s
uccessful
            confirmation out = self.model(prep confirmation image)
            # Get prediction
            _, confirmation_prediction = confirmation out.data.max(1)
            # Get Probability
            confirmation confidence = \
                nn.functional.softmax(confirmation out)[0][confirmation predic
tion].data.numpy()[0]
            # Convert tensor to int
            confirmation_prediction = confirmation_prediction.numpy()[0]
            # Check if the prediction is different than the original
            if confirmation prediction != im label:
                print('Original image was predicted as:', im_label,
                      'with adversarial noise converted to:', confirmation pre
diction,
                      'and predicted with confidence of:', confirmation confid
ence)
                # Create the image for noise, which is the difference between
the
                # adversarial example and original image
                noise image = original image - recreated image
                name noise = './generated/untargeted adv noise from ' + str(im
_label) + '_to_' + str(confirmation_prediction) + '.jpg'
                cv2.imwrite(name noise, noise image)
                # Write image
                name_image = './generated/untargeted_adv_img_from_' + str(im_l
abel) + ' to ' + str(confirmation prediction) + '.jpg'
                cv2.imwrite(name image, recreated image)
                return name noise, name image
        return 1
```

Test your implementation by running the below cell and visualizing. The first image is the original input image, second image is the noise added, and third is the adversarially perturbed image.

```
In [19]: target_example = 2
   (img_path, original_image, prep_img, target_class, _, pretrained_model) =\
        get_params(target_example)

FGS_untargeted = FastGradientSignUntargeted(pretrained_model, 0.01)
        name_noise, name_image = FGS_untargeted.generate(original_image, target_class)

original = Image(img_path)
        noise = Image(name_noise)
        adversarial = Image(name_image)


display(original, noise, adversarial)
```

Iteration: 0

C:\Users\anika\Anaconda3\lib\site-packages\ipykernel_launcher.py:60: UserWarn
ing: Implicit dimension choice for softmax has been deprecated. Change the ca
ll to include dim=X as an argument.

Original image was predicted as: 13 with adversarial noise converted to: 19 a nd predicted with confidence of: 0.96890265







What you did above was an untargeted FGSM, so what it did was make a small change to fool the classifier into thinking the image was labeled with any other label than the one it actually is. On the other hand, ~targeted~ FGSM is where the adversarial image that is created is of a very deliberate, specific label. Besides that, the same techniques are applied. Read through the code below and fill in the 5 blank spots with very similar code to what you filled in above.

```
In [26]:
         class FastGradientSignTargeted():
                 Fast gradient sign untargeted adversarial attack, maximizes the target
         class activation
                 with iterative grad sign updates
             def __init__(self, model, alpha):
                 self.model = model
                 self.model.eval()
                 # Movement multiplier per iteration
                 self.alpha = alpha
                 # Create the folder to export images if not exists
                 if not os.path.exists('./generated'):
                     os.makedirs('./generated')
             def generate(self, original_image, org_class, target_class):
                 # I honestly dont know a better way to create a variable with specific
         value
                 # Targeting the specific class
                 im label as var = Variable(torch.from numpy(np.asarray([target class
         ])))
                 # Define loss functions
                 ce loss = nn.CrossEntropyLoss()
                 # Process image
                 processed image = preprocess image(original image)
                 # Start iteration
                 for i in range(10):
                     print('Iteration:', str(i))
                     # zero gradients(x)
                     # Zero out previous gradients
                     # Can also use zero gradients(x)
                     processed image.grad = None
                     # Forward pass
                     model output = self.model(processed image)
                     # Calculate CE loss
                     pred loss = ce loss(model output, im label as var.long())
                     # Do backward pass
                     pred loss.backward()
                     # Create Noise
                     # Here, processed image.grad.data is also the same thing is the ba
         ckward gradient from
                     # the first layer, can use that with hooks as well
                     adv_noise = self.alpha * torch.sign(processed_image.grad.data)
                     # Subtract noise to processed image
                     processed image.data = processed image.data - adv noise
                     # Confirming if the image is indeed adversarial with added noise
                     # This is necessary (for some cases) because when we recreate imag
                     # the values become integers between 1 and 255 and sometimes the a
         dversariality
                     # is lost in the recreation process
                     # Generate confirmation image
                     recreated image = recreate image(processed image)
                     # Process confirmation image
```

```
prep confirmation image = preprocess image(recreated image)
            # Forward pass
            confirmation_out = self.model(prep_confirmation_image)
            # Get prediction
            _, confirmation_prediction = confirmation_out.data.max(1)
            # Get Probability
            confirmation confidence = \
                nn.functional.softmax(confirmation out)[0][confirmation predic
tion].data.numpy()[0]
            # Convert tensor to int
            confirmation prediction = confirmation prediction.numpy()[0]
            # Check if the prediction is different than the original
            if confirmation prediction == target class:
                print('Original image was predicted as:', org_class,
                      'with adversarial noise converted to:', confirmation pre
diction,
                      'and predicted with confidence of:', confirmation confid
ence)
                # Create the image for noise as: Original image - generated im
age
                noise_image = original_image - recreated_image
                name_noise = './generated/targeted_adv_noise_from_' + str(org_
class) + '_to_' + str(confirmation_prediction) + '.jpg'
                cv2.imwrite(name noise, noise image)
                # Write image
                name_image = './generated/targeted_adv_img_from_' + str(org_cl
ass) + '_to_' + str(confirmation_prediction) + '.jpg'
                cv2.imwrite(name image, recreated image)
                return name noise, name image
                break
        return 1
```


Iteration: 0

C:\Users\anika\Anaconda3\lib\site-packages\ipykernel_launcher.py:58: UserWarn
ing: Implicit dimension choice for softmax has been deprecated. Change the ca
ll to include dim=X as an argument.

Iteration: 1
Iteration: 2
Iteration: 3
Iteration: 4
Iteration: 5
Iteration: 6
Iteration: 7
Iteration: 8
Iteration: 9

Original image was predicted as: 948 with adversarial noise converted to: 62 and predicted with confidence of: 0.3593494







In []: