Principles of Layered Attestation

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Abstract. Systems designed with measurement and attestation in mind are often layered, with the lower layers measuring the layers above them. Attestations of such systems, which we call layered attestations, must bundle together the results of a diverse set of application-specific measurements of various parts of the system. Some methods of layered attestation are more trustworthy than others, so it is important for system designers to understand the trust consequences of different system configurations. This paper presents a formal framework for reasoning about layered attestations, and provides generic reusable principles for achieving trustworthy results.

1 Introduction

Security decisions often rely on trust. Many computing architectures have been designed to help establish the trustworthiness of a system through remote attestation. They gather evidence of the integrity of a target system and report it to a remote party who appraises the evidence as part of a security decision. A simple example is a network gateway that requests evidence that a target system has recently run antivirus software before granting it access to a network. If the virus scan indicates a potential infection, or does not offer recent evidence, the gateway might decide to deny access, or perhaps divert the system to a remediation network. Of course the antivirus software itself is part of the target system, and the gateway may require integrity evidence for the antivirus for its own security decision. This leads to the design of layered systems in which deeper layers are responsible for generating integrity evidence of the layers above them.

A simple example of a layered system is one that supports "trusted boot" in which a chain of boot-time integrity evidence is generated for a trusted computing base that supports the upper layers of the system. A more complex example might be a virtualized cloud architecture. The virtual machines (VMs) at the top are supported at a lower layer by a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor. Such an architecture may be augmented with additional VMs at an intermediate layer that are responsible for measuring the main VMs to generate integrity evidence. These designs offer exciting possibilities for remote attestation. They allow for specialization and diversity of the components involved, tailoring the capabilities of measurers to their targets of measurement, and composing them in novel ways.

However, the resulting layered attestations are typically more complex and challenging to analyze. Given a target system, what set of evidence should an appraiser request? What extra guarantees are provided if it receives integrity evidence of the measurers themselves? Does the order in which the measurements are taken matter? Can the appraiser tell if the correct sequence of measurements was taken?

This paper begins to tame the complexity surrounding attestations of these layered systems. We provide a formal model of layered measurement and attestation systems that abstracts away the underlying details of the measurements and focuses on the causal relationships among component corruption, measurement, and reporting. The model allows us to provide and justify generic, reusable strategies both for measuring system components and reporting the resulting integrity evidence.

Limitations of measurement. Our starting point for this paper is the recognition of the fact that measurement cannot *prevent* corruption; at best, measurement only *detects* corruption. In particular, the runtime corruption of a component can occur even if it is launched in a known good state. An appraiser must therefore always be wary of the gap between the time a component is measured and the time at which a trust decision is made. If the gap is large then so is the risk of a time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attack in which an adversary corrupts a component during the critical time window to undermine the trust decision. A successful measurement strategy will limit the risk of TOCTOU attacks by ensuring the time between a measurement and a security decision is sufficiently small. The appraiser can then conclude that if the measured component is currently corrupted, it must be because the adversary performed a *recent* attack.

Shortening the time between measurement and security decision, however, is effective only if the measurement component can be trusted. By corrupting the measurer, an adversary can lie about the results of measurement making a corrupted target component appear to be in a good state. This affords the adversary a much larger window of opportunity to corrupt the target. The corruption no longer has to take place in the small window between measurement and security decision because the target can already be corrupted at the time of (purported) measurement. However, in a typical layered system design, deeper components such as a measurer have greater protections making it harder for an adversary to corrupt them. This suggests that to escape the burden performing a recent corruption, an adversary should have to pay the price of corrupting a deep component.

Formal model of measurement and attestation. With this in mind, our first main contribution is a formal model designed to aid in reasoning about what an adversary must do in order to defeat a measurement and attestation strategy. Rather than forbid the adversary from performing TOCTOU attacks in small windows or from corrupting deep components, we consider an attestation to be successful if the only way for the adversary to defeat its goals is to

perform such difficult tasks. Thus our model accounts for the possibility that an adversary might corrupt (and repair) arbitrary system components at any time. The model also features a true concurrency execution semantics which allows us to reason more directly about the causal effects of corruptions on the outcomes of measurement without having to reason about unnecessary interleavings of events. It has an added benefit of admitting a natural, graphical representation that helps an analyst quickly understand the causal relationships between events of an execution.

We demonstrate the utility of this formal model by validating the effectiveness of two strategies, one for the order in which to take measurements, the other for how to report the results in quotes from Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs). TPM is not the only technology available that provides a hardware root of trust for reporting. Indeed solutions may be conceived that use other external hardware security modules or emerging hardware support for trusted execution environments such as Intel's SGX. However, most of the research on attestation is based on using a TPM as the hardware root of trust for reporting, and in this work, we follow that trend. We formally prove that under some assumptions about measurement and the behavior of uncorrupted components, in order for the adversary to defeat an attestation, he must perform some corruption which is "difficult." The result is relatively concrete advice that can be applied by those building and configuring attestation systems. By implementing our general strategies and assumptions, layered systems can engage in more trustworthy attestations than might otherwise result.

Strategy for measurement. An intuition manifest in much of the literature on measurement and attestation is that trust in a system should be based on a bottom-up chain of measurements starting with a hardware root of trust for measurement. This is the core idea behind trusted boot processes, in which one component in the boot sequence measures the next component before launching it. Theorem 1, which we refer to as the "recent or deep" theorem, validates this common intuition and solidifies exactly how an adversary can defeat such bottom-up measurement strategies. It roughly says the following:

If a system has measured deeper components before more shallow ones, then the only way for the adversary to corrupt a component t without detection is either by *recently* corrupting one of t's dependencies, or else by corrupting a component even *deeper* in the system.

Strategy for bundling evidence. Given the importance of the order of measurement, it is also important for an attestation to reliably convey not only the outcome of measurements, but the order in which they were taken. This point is frequently overlooked in the literature on TPM-based attestation. Unfortunately, the structure of TPM quotes does not always reflect this ordering information, especially if some of the components depositing measurement values might be dynamically corrupted. We thus propose a particular strategy for creating a bundle of evidence in TPM quotes designed to give evidence that measurements were

indeed taken bottom up. We show in Theorem 3 that, under certain assumptions about the uncorrupted measurers in the system, this strategy preserves the guarantees of bottom-up measurement in the following sense:

If the system satisfies certain assumptions, and the TPM quote formed according to our bundling strategy indicates no corruptions, then either the measurement were really taken bottom-up, or the adversary recently corrupted one of t's dependencies, or else the adversary corrupted an even deeper component.

Thus, any attempt the adversary makes to avoid the conditions for the hypothesis of Theorem 1 force him to validate its conclusion nonetheless.

Paper structure. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 puts this paper in the context of related research from the literature. We motivate our intuitions and informally introduce our model in Section 3. We formalize these intuitions with definitions in Section 4, and also apply the formalism to justify the intuition that it is better to measure "bottom-up." In Section 5, we discuss the basics of TPMs and provide examples of how TPMs can be misused, not providing the guarantees one might expect. We extend our model with more definitions in Section 6 and in Section 7 we demonstrate an effective strategy for using TPMs to bundle evidence. We conclude in Section 8 pointing to directions for future work.

2 Related work.

There has been much research into measurement and attestation. While a complete survey is infeasible for this paper, we mention the most relevant highlights in order to describe how the present work fits into the larger context of research in this area. We divide the work into several broad categories. Although the boundaries between the categories can be quite blurry, we believe it helps to structure the various approaches.

Measurement techniques. Much of the early work was focused on techniques for measuring low-level components that make up a trusted computing base (TCB). These ideas have matured into implementations such as Trusted Boot [12]. Recognizing that many security failures cannot be traced back to the TCB, Sailer et al. [14] proposed an integrity measurement architecture (IMA) in which each application is measured (by hashing its code) before it is launched. More recently, there has been work trying to identify and measure dynamic properties of system components in order to create a more comprehensive picture of the runtime state of a system [11,10,5,15]. All these efforts try to establish what evidence is useful for inferring system state relevant to security decisions. The present work takes for granted that such special purpose measurements can be taken and that they will accurately reflect the system state. Rather, our focus is on developing principles for how to combine a variety of these measurers in a layered attestation. We envision a system designer choosing the measurement

capabilities that best suit her needs and using our work to ensure an appraiser can trust the integrity of the result.

Modular attestation frameworks. Cabuk and others [1] have proposed an architecture designed to support layered platforms with hierarchical dependencies. Their design introduces trusted software into the TCB as a software-based root of trust for measurement (SRTM). Although they explain how measurements by the SRTM integrate with the chain of measurements stored in a TPM, they do not study the effect corruptions of various components have on the outcome of attestations. In [2], Coker et al. identify five guiding principles for designing an architecture to support remote attestation. They also describe the design of a (layered) virtualized system based on these principles, although there does not appear to be a publicly available implementation at the time of writing. Of particular interest is a section that describes a component responsible for managing attestations. The emphasis is on the mechanics of selecting measurement agents by matching the evidence they can generate to the evidence requested by an appraiser. There is no discussion or advice regarding the relative order of measurements or the creation of an evidence bundle to reflect the order. More recently, modular attestation frameworks instantiating [2]'s principles have been implemented [9,7,3]. These are integrated frameworks that offer plug-and-play capabilities for measurement and attestation for specific usage scenarios. It is precisely these types of systems (in implementation or design) to which our analysis techniques would be most useful. We have not been able to find a discussion of the potential pitfalls of misconfiguring these complex systems. Our work should be able to help guide the configuration of such systems and analyze particular attestation scenarios for each architecture.

Attestation Protocols. Finally, works such as [2,6,4,13] study the properties of attestation protocols, typically protocols that use a TPM to report on integrity evidence provided by measurement agents. They tend to focus on the cryptographic protections required to secure the evidence as it is sent over a network. [2] proposes a protocol that binds the evidence to a session key, so that an appraiser can be guaranteed that subsequent communications will occur with the appraised system, and not a corrupted substitute. [6] and [13] examine the ways in which cryptographic protections for network events interact with the long-term state of a TPM. None of these consider the measurement activities on the target platform itself and how corruptions of components can affect the outcome of the protocol. In [4], Datta et al. introduce a formalism that accounts for actions local to the target machine as well as network events such as sending and receiving messages. Although they give a very careful treatment of the effect of a corrupted component on an attestation, their work differs in two key ways. First, the formalism represents many low-level details making their proof rather complex, sometimes obscuring the underlying principles. Second, their framework only accounts for static corruptions, while ours is specifically designed around the possibility of dynamic corruption and repair of system components.

3 Motivating Examples of Measurement

Consider an enterprise that would like to ensure that systems connecting to its network provide a fresh system scan by the most up-to-date virus checker. The network gateway should ask systems to perform a system scan on demand when they attempt to connect. We may suppose the systems all have some component A_1 that is capable of accurately reporting the running version of the virus checker. Because this enterprise values high assurance, the systems also come equipped with another component A_2 capable of measuring the runtime state of the kernel. This is designed to detect any rootkits that might try to undermine the virus checker's system scan. We may assume that A_1 and A_2 are both measured by a root of trust for measurement (rtm) as part of a secure boot process.

We are thus interested in a system consisting of the following components: $\{sys, vc, ker, A_1, A_2, rtm\}$, where sys represents the collective parts of the system scanned by the virus checker vc, and ker represents the kernel. Based on the scenario described above, we may be interested in the following set of measurement events


$$\{ \mathsf{ms}(\mathsf{rtm}, A_1), \mathsf{ms}(\mathsf{rtm}, A_2), \mathsf{ms}(A_1, vc), \mathsf{ms}(A_2, ker), \mathsf{ms}(vc, sys) \}$$


where $\mathsf{ms}(o_1, o_2)$ represents the measurement of o_2 by o_1 . These measurement events generate the raw evidence that the network gateway can use to make a determination as to whether or not to admit the system to the network.

If any of the measurements indicate a problem, such as a failed system scan, then the gateway has good reason to believe it should deny the system access to the network. But what if all the evidence it receives looks good? How confident can the gateway be that the version and signature files are indeed up to date? The answer will depend on the order in which the evidence was gathered. To get some intuition for why this is the case, consider the three different specifications pictured in Fig. 1 for how to order the measurements. (The bullet after the first three events is inserted only for visible legibility, to avoid crossing arrows.)

Specification S_1 ensures that both vc and ker are measured before vc runs its system scan. Specifications S_2 and S_3 each relax one of those ordering requirements. Let's now consider some executions that respect the order of measurements in each of these specifications in which the adversary manages to avoid detection.

Execution E_1 of Fig. 2 is compatible with Specification S_1 . The adversary manages to corrupt the system by installing some user-space malware sometime in the past. If we assume the up-to-date virus checker is capable of detecting this malware, then the adversary must corrupt either vc or ker before the virus scan represented by $\mathsf{ms}(vc,sys)$. That is, either a corrupted vc will lie about the results of measurement, or else a corrupted ker can undermine the integrity of the system scan, for example, by hiding the directory containing the malware from vc. In the case of E_1 , the adversary corrupts vc in order to lie about the results of the system scan, but it does so after $\mathsf{ms}(A_1,vc)$ in order to avoid detection by this measurement event.






Specification S_3

Fig. 1. Three orders for measurement

In Execution E_2 , which is consistent with Specification S_2 , the adversary is capable of avoiding detection while corrupting vc much earlier. The system scan $\mathsf{ms}(vc,sys)$ is again undermined by the corrupted vc. Since vc will also be measured by A_1 , the adversary has to restore vc to an acceptable state before $\mathsf{ms}(A_1,vc)$. Execution E_3 is analogous to E_2 , but the adversary corrupts ker instead of vc, allowing it to convince the uncorrupted vc that the system has no malware. Since Specification S_3 allows $\mathsf{ms}(A_1,vc)$ to occur after the system scan, the adversary can leverage the corrupted vc to lie about the scan results, but must restore vc to a good state before it is measured.

Execution E_1 is ostensibly harder to achieve for the adversary than either E_2 or E_3 , because the adversary has to work quickly to corrupt vc during the attestation. In E_2 and E_3 , the adversary can corrupt vc and ker respectively at any time in the past. He still must perform a quick restoration of the corrupted component during the attestation, but there are reasons to believe this may be easier than corrupting the component to begin with. Is it true that all executions respecting the measurement order of S_1 are harder to achieve than E_2 and E_3 ? What if the adversary corrupts vc before the start of the attestation? It would seem that he would also have to corrupt A_1 to avoid detection by A_1 's measurement of vc, $\mathsf{ms}(A_1, vc)$.

One major contribution of this paper is to provide a formal framework in which to ask and answer such questions. Within this framework we can begin to characterize what the adversary must do in order to avoid detection by measurement. We will show that there is a precise sense in which Specification S_1 is strictly stronger than S_2 or S_3 . This is an immediate corollary of a more general






Fig. 2. Three system executions

result (Theorem 1) that validates a strong intuition that pervades much of the literature on measurement and attestation: Attestations are more trustworthy if the lower-level components of a system are measured before the higher-level components. The next section lays the groundwork for this result.

4 Measurement Systems

4.1 Preliminaries and Definitions

In this section we formalize the intuitions we used for the examples in the previous section. We start by defining measurement systems which perform the core functions of creating evidence for attestation.

System architecture.

Definition 1. We define a measurement system to be a tuple $\mathcal{MS} = (O, M, C)$, where O is a set of objects (e.g. software components) with a distinguished element rtm. M and C are binary relations on O. We call

M the measures relation, and C the context relation.

We say M is rooted when for every $o \in O \setminus \{\mathsf{rtm}\}$, $M^+(\mathsf{rtm}, o)$, where M^+ is the transitive closure of M.

M represents who can measure whom, so that $M(o_1,o_2)$ iff o_1 can measure o_2 , rtm is the root of trust for measurement. For this reason we henceforth always assume M is rooted and M^+ is acyclic (i.e. $\neg M^+(o,o)$ for any $o \in O$). This guarantees that every object can potentially trace its measurements back to the root of trust, and there are no measurement cycles. As a consequence, rtm cannot be the target of measurement, i.e. for rooted, acyclic M, $\neg M(o, \text{rtm})$ for any $o \in O$. The relation C represents the kind of dependency between ker and vc in the example above in which one object provides a clean runtime context for another. Thus, $C(o_1, o_2)$ iff o_1 contributes to maintaining a clean runtime context for o_2 . (C stands for context.) We henceforth always assume C is transitive (i.e. if $C(o_1, o_2)$ and $C(o_2, o_3)$ then $C(o_1, o_3)$) and acyclic. This means that no object (transitively) relies on itself for its own clean runtime context.

Given an object $o \in O$ we define the measurers of o to be $M^{-1}(o) = \{o' \mid M(o', o)\}$. We similarly define the context for o to be $C^{-1}(o)$. We extend these definitions to sets in the natural way.

We additionally assume $M \cup C$ is acyclic. This ensures that the combination of the two dependency types does not allow an object to depend on itself. Such systems are stratified, in the sense that we can define an increasing set of dependencies as follows.

$$D^{1}(o) = M^{-1}(o) \cup C^{-1}(M^{-1}(o))$$
$$D^{i+1}(o) = D^{1}(D^{i}(o))$$

So $D^1(o)$ consists of the measurers of o and their context. As we will see later, $D^1(o)$ represents the set of components that must be uncompromised in order to trust the measurement of o.

We can represent measurement systems pictorially as a graph whose vertices are the objects of \mathcal{MS} and whose edges encode the M and C relations. We use the convention that $M(o_1, o_2)$ is represented by a solid arrow from o_1 to o_2 , while $C(o_1, o_2)$ is represented by a dotted arrow from o_1 to o_2 . The representation of the system described in Section 3 is shown in Figure 3.




Fig. 3. Visual representation of an example measurement system.

Terms and derivability. It is called a measurement system because the primary activity of these components is to measure each other. The results of measurement are expressed using elements of a term algebra, the crucial features of which we present next.

Terms are constructed from some base V of atomic terms using constructors in a signature Σ . The set of terms is denoted $\mathcal{T}_{\Sigma}(V)$. We assume Σ includes at least some basic constructors such as pairing (\cdot, \cdot) , signing $[(\cdot)]_{(\cdot)}$, and hashing $\#(\cdot)$. The set V is partitioned into public atoms \mathcal{P} , random nonces \mathcal{N} , and private keys \mathcal{K} .

Our analysis will sometimes depend on what terms an adversary can derive (or construct). We say that term t is derivable from a set of term $T \subseteq V$ iff $t \in \mathcal{T}_{\Sigma}(T)$, and we write $T \vdash t$. We assume the adversary knows all the public atoms \mathcal{P} , and so can derive any term in $\mathcal{T}_{\Sigma}(\mathcal{P})$ at any time. For each $o \in O$, we assume there is a distinguished set of (public) measurement values $\mathcal{MV}(o) \subset \mathcal{P}$.

Events, outputs, and executions. The components $o \in O$ and the adversary on this system perform actions. In particular, objects can measure each other and the adversary can corrupt and repair components in an attempt to influence the outcome of future measurement actions. Additionally, an appraiser has the ability to inject a random nonce $n \in \mathcal{N}$ into an attestation in order to control the recency of events.

Definition 2 (Events). Let MS be a target system. An event for MS is a node e labeled by one of the following.

- a. A measurement event is labeled by $\mathsf{ms}(o_2,o_1)$ such that $M(o_2,o_1)$. We say such an event measures o_1 , and we call o_1 the target of e. We let Supp(e) denote the set $\{o_2\} \cup C^{-1}(o_2)$.
- b. An adversary event is labeled by either cor(o) or rep(o) for $o \in O \setminus \{rtm\}$.
- c. The attestation start event is labeled by att-start(n), where n is a term.

When an event e is labeled by ℓ we will write $e = \ell$. We will often refer to the label ℓ as an event when no confusion will arise.

An event e touches o, iff either

i. o is an argument to the label of e, or ii. $o \in Supp(e)$.

The att-start(n) event will serve to bound events in time. It represents the random choice by the appraiser of the value n. The appraiser will know that anything occurring after this event can reasonably be said to occur "recently". Regarding the measurement events, the rtm is typically responsible for measuring components at boot-time. All other measurements are load-time or runtime measurements of one component in O by another. Adversary events represent the corruption ($\text{cor}(\cdot)$) and repair ($\text{rep}(\cdot)$) of components. Notice that we have excluded rtm from corruption and repair events. This is not because we assume the rtm to be immune from corruption, but rather because all the trust in the system relies on the rtm: Since it roots all measurements, if it is corrupted, none of the measurements of other components can be trusted.

As we saw in the motivational examples, an execution can be described as a partially ordered set (poset) of these events. We choose a partially ordered set rather than a totally ordered set because the latter unnecessarily obscures the difference between *causal* orderings and *coincidental* orderings. However, due to the causal relationships between components, we must slightly restrict our partially ordered sets in order to make sense of the effect that corruption and repair events have on measurement events. To that end, we next introduce a sensible restriction to these partial orders.

A poset is a pair (E, \prec) , where E is any set and \prec is a transitive, acyclic relation on E. When no confusion arises, we often refer to (E, \prec) by its underlying set E and use \prec_E for its order relation. Given a poset (E, \prec) , let $e \downarrow = \{e' \mid e' \prec e\}$, and $e \uparrow = \{e' \mid e \prec e'\}$. Given a set of events E, we denote the set of adversary events of E by adv(E) and the set of measurement events by meas(E).

Let (E, \prec) be a partially ordered set of events for $\mathcal{MS} = (O, M, C)$ and let (E_o, \prec_o) be the substructure consisting of all and only events that touch o. We say (E, \prec) is adversary-ordered iff for every $o \in O$, (E_o, \prec_o) has the property that if e and e' are incomparable events, then neither e nor e' are adversary events.

Lemma 1. Let (E, \prec) be a finite, adversary-ordered poset for \mathcal{MS} , and let (E_o, \prec_o) be its restriction to some $o \in O$. Then for any non-adversarial event $e \in E_o$, the set $adv(e\downarrow)$ (taken in E_o) is either empty or has a unique maximal element.

Proof. Since (E, \prec) is adversary-ordered, $adv(E_o)$ is partitioned by $adv(e\downarrow)$ and $adv(e\uparrow)$. Suppose $e\downarrow$ is not empty. Then since E_o is finite, it has at least one maximal element. Suppose e' and e'' are distinct maximal elements. Thus they must be \prec_o -incomparable. However, since (E, \prec) is adversary-ordered, either $e' \prec_o e''$ or $e'' \prec_o e'$, yielding a contradiction.

Definition 3 (Corruption state). Let (E, \prec) be a finite, adversary-ordered poset for \mathcal{MS} . For each event $e \in E$ and each object o the corruption state of o at e, written cs(e, o), is an element of $\{\bot, \mathsf{r}, \mathsf{c}\}$ and is defined as follows. $cs(e, o) = \bot$ iff $e \notin E_o$. Otherwise, we define cs(e, o) inductively:

$$cs(e,o) = \begin{cases} & \texttt{c} & : e = \mathsf{cor}(o) \\ & \texttt{r} & : e = \mathsf{rep}(o) \\ & \texttt{r} & : e \in meas(E) \land adv(e\downarrow) \cap E_o = \emptyset \\ & cs(e',o) : e \in meas(E) \land e' \text{ maximal in } adv(e\downarrow) \cap E_o \end{cases}$$

When cs(e, o) takes the value c we say o is corrupt at e; when it takes the value c we say c is uncorrupt or regular at c; and when it takes the value c we say the corruption state is undefined.

We assume measurement events produce evidence of the corruption state of the component. The question of measurement is tricky though, because what counts as evidence of corruption for one appraiser might pass as evidence of regularity by another. It is the job of measurement to produce evidence not to evaluate it. Furthermore, evidence of regularity (or corruption) might take many forms. In our analysis we bracket most of these questions by making a simplifying assumption about measurements. In particular, we assume a given appraiser can accurately determine the corruption state of a target given that the measurement was taken by a regular component with a regular context. More formally, we assume the following.

Assumption 1 (Measurement Accuracy) Let $\mathcal{G}(o)$ and $\mathcal{B}(o)$ be a partition for $\mathcal{MV}(o)$. Let $e = \mathsf{ms}(o_2, o_1)$. The output of e, written out(e), is defined as follows. out $(e) = v \in \mathcal{B}(o_1)$ iff $cs(e, o_1) = \mathsf{c}$ and for every $o \in \{o_2\} \cup \{o' \mid C(o', o_2)\}, cs(e, o) = \mathsf{r}$. Otherwise out $(e) = v \in \mathcal{G}(o_1)$.

If $out(e) \in \mathcal{B}(o_1)$ we say e detects a corruption. If $out(e) \in \mathcal{G}(o_1)$ but $cs(e, o_1) = c$, we say the adversary avoids detection at e.

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If e = \mathsf{att}\mathsf{-start}(n), then out(e) = n.
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Thus, the appraiser partitions the possible measurement values of o into those that she believes indicate regularity $(\mathcal{G}(o))$ and those that indicate corruption $(\mathcal{B}(o))$. The output of a measurement by regular components is in $\mathcal{G}(o)$ if o is regular at the measurement event, and in $\mathcal{B}(o)$ if it is corrupt. We view this assumption as allowing us to explore the best one can hope for with measurement. Of course, in reality, things are not so rosy. Simple measurement schemes like hashing the code can cause components to look corrupt when, in fact, a small change that is irrelevant to security has changed the outcome of the hash.

Conversely, a runtime measurement scheme that only looks at a subset of the component's data structures may fail to detect a corruption and report a measurement value that looks acceptable. One could imagine relaxing this assumption by accounting for probabilities of detection depending on which components have been corrupted. We leave such investigations for future work with the understanding that the results in this paper represent, in a sense, the strongest conclusions one can expect from any measurement system.

We can now define what it means to be an execution of a measurement system.

Definition 4 (Executions, Specifications). Let MS be a measurement system.

- 1. An execution of MS is any finite, adversary-ordered poset E for MS.
- 2. A specification for MS is any execution that contains no adversary events.

Specification S admits an execution E iff there is an injective, label-preserving map of partial orders $\alpha: S \to E$. The set of all executions admitted by S is denoted $\mathcal{E}(S)$.

Measurement specifications are the way an appraiser might ask for measurements to be taken in a particular order. The set $\mathcal{E}(S)$ is just the set of executions in which the given events have occurred in the desired order. The appraiser can thus analyze $\mathcal{E}(S)$ in advance to determine what an adversary has to do to avoid detection, given that the events in S were performed as specified.

The question of how an appraiser learns whether or not the actual execution performed is in $\mathcal{E}(S)$ is an important one. The second half of the paper is dedicated to that problem. For now, we consider what an appraiser can infer about an execution E given that $E \in \mathcal{E}(S)$.

4.2 A Strategy for Measurement

We now turn to a formalization of the rule of thumb at the end of Section 3. By ensuring that specifications have certain structural aspects, we can conclude the executions they admit satisfy useful constraints. In particular, it is useful to measure components from the bottom up with respect to the dependencies of the system. That is, if whenever o_1 depends on o_2 we measure o_2 before measuring o_1 , then we can usefully narrow the range of actions the adversary must take in order to avoid detection. For this discussion we fix a target system \mathcal{MS} . Recall that $D^1(o)$ represents the measurers of o and their runtime context.

Definition 5. A measurement event $e = ms(o_2, o_1)$ in execution E is well-supported iff either

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i. o_2 = \mathsf{rtm}, \ or
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ii. for every $o \in D^1(o_1)$, there is a measurement event $e' \prec_E e$ such that o is the target of e'.

When e is well-supported, we call the set of e' from Condition ii above the support of e. An execution E measures bottom-up iff each measurement event $e \in E$ is well-supported.

Theorem 1 (Recent or deep). Let E be an execution with well-supported measurement event $e = \mathsf{ms}(o_1, o_t)$ where $o_1 \neq \mathsf{rtm}$. Suppose that E detects no corruptions. If the adversary avoids detection at e, then either

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1. there exist o \in D^1(o_t) and o' \in M^{-1}(o) such that \mathsf{ms}(o', o) \prec_E \mathsf{cor}(o) \prec_E e
2. there exists o \in D^2(o_t) such that \mathsf{cor}(o) \prec_E e.
```

Proof. Since the adversary avoids detection at e, o_t is corrupt at e, and there is some $o \in \{o_1\} \cup C^{-1}(o_1) \subseteq D^1(o_t)$ that is also corrupt at e. Also, since e is well-supported, and $o_1 \neq \mathsf{rtm}$, we know there exists $e' = \mathsf{ms}(o', o)$ with $e' \prec_E e$. We now take cases on cs(e', o).

If cs(e', o) = r then there must be a corruption cor(o) between e' and e satisfying Clause 1 to change its corruption state from r to c.

If cs(e',o) = c, then since E detects no corruptions, there must be some $o^* \in \{o'\} \cup C^{-1}(o') \subseteq D^2(o_t)$ such that $cs(e',o^*) = c$. Thus there must be a previous corruption $cor(o^*) \prec_E e' \prec_E e$ satisfying Clause 2.

This theorem says, roughly, that if measurements indicate things are good when they are not, then there must either be a recent corruption or a deep corruption. This tag line of "recent or deep" is particularly apt if the system dependencies also reflect the relative difficulty for an adversary to corrupt them. By ordering the measurements so that more robust ones are measured first, it means that for an adversary to avoid detection for an easy compromise, he must have compromised a measurer since it itself was measured, or else, he must have previously (though not necessarily recently) compromised a more robust component. In this way, the measurement of a component can raise the bar for the adversary. If, for example, a measurer sits in a privileged location outside of some VM containing a target, it means that the adversary would also have to break out of the target VM and compromise the measurer to avoid detection. The skills and time necessary to perform such an attack are much greater than simply compromising the end target.

Let's illustrate this result in the context of the example of Section 3. The specification S_1 satisfies the main hypothesis of Theorem 1. Execution E_1 illustrates an example of the first clause of the conclusion being satisfied. There is a "recent" corruption of vc in the sense that vc is corrupted after it is measured. Since the measurement of vc occurs after the start of the attestation, this is truly recent, in that the adversary has very little time to work. The appraiser can control this by ensuring that attestations time out after some fixed amount of time.

Theorem 1 also indicates other possible executions in which the adversary can undetectably corrupt sys. There could be a recent corruption of vc, or else there could be some previous corruption of either A_1 or A_2 . All the various options are shown in Figure 4 in which the measurement events at which the adversary avoids




Fig. 4. Executions that do not detect corruption of sys.

detection are marked with an asterisk, and the corruption events guaranteed by the theorem are boxed. Our theorem allows us to know that these executions essentially characterize all the cases in which a corrupted sys goes undetected.

5 Motivating Examples of Bundling

The previous section discusses how to constrain adversary behavior using the order of measurements. However, implicit in the analysis is the assumption that an appraiser is able to verify the order and outcome of the measurement events. Since a remote appraiser cannot directly observe the target system, this assumption must be discharged in some way. A measurement system must be augmented with the ability to record and report the outcome and order of measurement events. We refer to these additional activities as bundling evidence. Our focus for this paper is on using the Trusted Platform Module for this purpose. While there are techniques and technologies that can be used as roots of trust for reporting (e.g. hardware-based trusted execution environments such as Intel's SGX) there has been a lot of research into TPMs and their use for attestation. Much of that work does not pay close attention to the importance of faithfully reporting the order in which measurements have taken place. Thus, we believe that studying TPM-based attestation is a fruitful place to start, and we leave investigations of other techniques and technologies for future work.

5.1 TPM Background

Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) are small hardware processors that are designed to provide secure crypto processing and limited storage of information isolated from software. Its technical specification was written by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [8]. While TPMs have many features designed to support subtle properties, we only briefly review those features relevant for our purposes.

TPMs have a bank of isolated storage locations called Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) designed to store measurements of a platform's state. These PCRs have a very limited interface. They start in some well-known state and each PCR can only be updated by extending a new value v which has the effect of updating the contents of the PCR to be the hash of v with the previous contents. Thus the contents of each PCR serve as a historical record of all the measurements extended into them since the most recent system boot.

TPMs also have the ability to securely report the values in their PCRs by creating a digital signature over their contents using a private key that is only accessible inside the TPM. This operation is known as a *quote*. Since the PCRs are isolated from software, any remote party that has access to the corresponding public key can verify the contents of the PCRs. In order to protect against replay attacks and ensure the recency of the information, TPM quotes also sign some externally provided data, typically a random nonce chosen by an appraiser.

Finally, TPMs have a limited form of access control for their PCRs known as *locality*. Some PCRs may only be extended by particular privileged components. Thus if a PCR with access control enabled contains some sequence of measurements, it must have been (one of) the privileged component(s) that extended those values. Currently TPMs have five localities so that they can differentiate between five groups of components.

Currently TPMs are widely available in commodity computers although the surrounding architectures are such that they are rarely easy to access and use. There has been some research into "virtualizing" TPMs. This entails providing robust protections for a software TPM emulator that ensure it can achieve comparable levels of isolation among other properties. Such a technology would be particularly useful in virtualized cloud environments where one would like to provide the benefits of a TPM to virtual machines that may be instantiated on different physical hardware. Virtual TPMs (vTPMs) are currently unavailable, however the TCG is currently producing a specification that details the necessary protections, and there are some preliminary implementations that will likely be modified as the details of the specification become more clear.

vTPMs provide two additional benefits over hardware TPMs (assuming the necessary protections are guaranteed) that we will take advantage of here. While hardware TPMs typically only have 24 PCRs, there is essentially no limit on the number of PCRs a vTPM might have. Furthermore, vTPMs would be able to implement many more than five localities. These two features combine to allow many components to each have dedicated access to their own PCRs. As we will see, this is advantageous. However, given the current state of the technology, assuming these features exist is "forward thinking." The distinction between hardware TPMs and vTPMs will not affect the core of our analysis, so we henceforth use TPM without specifying if it is a hardware TPM or vTPM.

PCR values and quotes. We represent both the values stored in PCRs and the quotes as terms in $\mathcal{T}_{\Sigma}(V)$. Since PCRs can only be updated by extending new values, their contents form a hash chain $\#(v_n,\#(...,\#(v_1,\mathsf{rst})))$. We abbreviate such a hash chain as $\mathsf{seq}(v_1,\ldots,v_n)$. So for example, $\mathsf{seq}(v_1,v_2)=\#(v_2,\#(v_1,\mathsf{rst}))$. We say a hash chain $\mathsf{seq}(v_1,\ldots,v_n)$ contains v_i for each $i\leq n$. Thus the contents of a PCR contain exactly those values that have been extended into it. We also say v_i is contained before v_j in $\mathsf{seq}(v_1,\ldots,v_n)$ when $i< j\leq n$. That is, v_i is contained before v_j in the contents of p exactly when v_i was extended before v_j .

A quote from TPM t is a term of the form $[n, (p_i)_{i \in I}, (v_i)_{i \in I}]_{sk(t)}$. It is a signature over a nonce n, a list of PCRs $(p_i)_{i \in I}$ and their respective contents $(v_i)_{i \in I}$ using sk(t), the secret key of t. We always assume $sk(t) \in \mathcal{K}$ the set of non-public, atomic keys. That means the adversary does not know sk(t) and hence cannot forge quotes.

5.2 Pitfalls of TPM-Based Bundling.

The two key features of TPMs (protected storage and secure reporting) allow components to store the results of their measurements and later report the results

to a remote appraiser. The resulting quote (or set of quotes) is a bundle of evidence that the appraiser must use to evaluate the state of the target system. Indeed, this bundle is the only evidence the appraiser receives. In the rest of this section we present various examples that demonstrate how the structure of this bundle affects the trust inferences a remote appraiser is justified in making about the target.

Consider \mathcal{MS}_1 found in Section 3, and pictured in Fig. 3. Ideally a remote appraiser would be able to verify that an execution that produces a particular set of quotes \mathcal{Q} is in $\mathcal{E}(S_1)$ (from Fig. 1). The appraiser must be able to do this on the basis of \mathcal{Q} only. The possibilities for \mathcal{Q} depend somewhat on how \mathcal{MS}_1 is divided. For example, if \mathcal{MS}_1 is a virtualized system, rtm might sit in an administrative VM, and A_1 and A_2 could be in a privileged "helper" VM separated from the main VM that hosts ker, vc, and sys. If each of these VMs is supported by its own TPM, then \mathcal{Q} would have to contain at least three quotes just to convey the raw measurement evidence. However, if \mathcal{MS}_1 is not virtualized, they might all share the same TPM and a single quote might suffice. For our purposes it suffices to consider a simple architecture in which all the components share a single TPM.

Strategy 1: A single hash chain. Since PCRs contain an ordered history of the extended values, the first natural idea is for all the components to share a PCR p, each extending their measurements into p. The intuition is that the contents of p should represent the order in which the measurements occurred on the system. To make this more concrete, assume the measurement events of S_1 have the following output: $out(\mathsf{ms}(\mathsf{rtm},A_1)) = v_1, out(\mathsf{ms}(\mathsf{rtm},A_2)) = v_2, out(\mathsf{ms}(A_1,vc)) = v_3, out(\mathsf{ms}(A_2,ker)) = v_4, out(\mathsf{ms}(vc,ker)) = v_5$. Then this strategy would produce a single quote $Q = [n, p, \mathsf{seq}(v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4, v_5)]_{sk(t)}$. To satisfy the order of S_1 , any linearization of the measurements would do, so the appraiser should also be willing to accept $Q' = [n, p, \mathsf{seq}(v_2, v_1, v_3, v_4, v_5)]_{sk(t)}$ in which v_1 and v_2 were generated in the reverse order.

Figure 5 depicts an execution that produces the expected quote Q, but does not satisfy the desired order. Since all the measurement components have access to the same PCR, if any of those components is corrupted, it can extend values to make it look as though other measurements were taken although they were not. This is particularly troublesome when a relatively exposed component like vc can impersonate the lower-level components that measure it.

This motivates our desire to have strict access control for PCRs. This would allow the appraiser to correctly infer which component has provided each piece of evidence. The locality feature of TPMs could be used for this purpose. Given the limitations of locality in the current technology, however, it may be necessary to introduce another component that is responsible for disambiguating the source of each measurement into a PCR. Such a strategy would require careful consideration of the effect of a corruption of that component, and to include measurement evidence that it is functioning properly. For simplicity of our main analysis we freely take advantage of the assumption that TPMs can provided dedicated access to one PCR per component of the system it supports, leaving

$$\mathsf{cor}(sys) \qquad \mathsf{cor}(vc)$$

$$\mathsf{att-start}(n) \qquad \mathsf{ext}(vc,p,v_1) \qquad \mathsf{ext}(vc,p,v_2) \qquad \mathsf{ext}(vc,p,v_3) \qquad \mathsf{ext}(vc,p,v_4) \qquad \mathsf{ext}(vc,p,v_5) \qquad \mathsf{ext}(vc,p,v_5) \qquad \mathsf{ext}(n,p) = Q$$

Output of quote is $Q = [n, p, seq(v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4, v_5)]_{sk(t)}$.

Fig. 5. Defeating Strategy 1

an analysis of the more complicated architecture for a more complete treatment of the subject.

Strategy 2: Separate hash chains. A natural next attempt given this assumption would be to produce a single quote over the set of PCRs that contain the measurement evidence. This would produce quotes with the structure $Q = [n, (p_r, p_1, p_2, p_{vc}), (s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4)]_{sk(t)}$, in which $s_1 = \text{seq}(v_1, v_2), s_2 = \text{seq}(v_3), s_3 = \text{seq}(v_4), s_4 = \text{seq}(v_5)$. Figure 6 demonstrates a failure of this strategy. The problem, of course, is that, since the PCRs may be extended concurrently, the relative order of events is not captured by the structure of the quote.

$$\begin{split} & \operatorname{ms}(\mathsf{rtm}, A_1) & \operatorname{ms}(\mathsf{rtm}, A_2) & \operatorname{ms}(A_1, vc) & \operatorname{ms}(A_2, ker) & \operatorname{ms}(vc, sys) \\ & \mathsf{Y} & \mathsf{Y} & \mathsf{Y} & \mathsf{Y} & \mathsf{Y} \\ & \operatorname{ext}(\mathsf{rtm}, p_r, v_1) & \underbrace{\mathsf{ext}(\mathsf{rtm}, p_r, v_2)}_{\mathsf{qt}(n, (p_i)_{i \in I})} & \operatorname{ext}(A_1, p_1, v_3) & \operatorname{ext}(A_2, p_2, v_4) & \operatorname{ext}(vc, p_{vc}, v_5) \\ & & \mathsf{Y} & \\ & & \mathsf{qt}(n, (p_i)_{i \in I}) = Q \\ & & \operatorname{Output} \text{ of quote is } Q = \llbracket n, (p_r, p_1, p_2, p_{vc}), (s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4) \rrbracket_{sk(t)} \\ & s_1 = \operatorname{seq}(v_1, v_2), s_2 = \operatorname{seq}(v_3), s_3 = \operatorname{seq}(v_4), s_4 = \operatorname{seq}(v_5)). \end{split}$$

Fig. 6. Defeating Strategy 2

Strategy 3: Tiered, nested quotes. We thus require a way to re-introduce evidence about the order of events while maintaining the strict access control on

PCRs. That is, we should incorporate measurement evidence from lower layers before generating the evidence for higher layers. This suggests a tiered and nested strategy for bundling the evidence. In the case of \mathcal{MS}_1 , to demonstrate the order specified in S_1 , our strategy might produce a collection of quotes of the following form.

$$\begin{split} Q_1 &= [\![n, p_r, \mathsf{seq}(v_1, v_2)]\!]_{sk(t)} \\ Q_2 &= [\![n, (p_1, p_2), (\mathsf{seq}(Q_1, v_3), \mathsf{seq}(Q_1, v_4))]\!]_{sk(t)} \\ Q_3 &= [\![n, p_{vc}, \mathsf{seq}(Q_2, v_5)]\!]_{sk(t)} \end{split}$$

The quote Q_1 provides evidence that rtm has measured A_1 and A_2 . This quote is itself extended into the PCRs of A_1 and A_2 before they take their measurements and extend the results. Q_2 thus represents evidence that rtm took its measurements before A_1 and A_2 took theirs. Similarly, Q_3 is evidence that vc took its measurement after A_1 and A_2 took theirs since Q_2 is extended into p_{vc} before the measurement evidence.

Unfortunately, this quote structure is not quite enough to ensure that the proper order is respected. Figure 7 illustrates the problem. In that execution, all the measurements are generated concurrently at the beginning, and each component waits to extend the result until it gets the quote from the layer below. The quotes give accurate evidence for the order in which evidence was recorded but not for the order in which the evidence was generated. It must be the job of regular components to ensure that the order of extend events accurately reflects the order of measurement events. We make precise our assumptions for regular components in Section 7. Under those extra assumptions we can prove that a quote generated according to this final strategy is sufficient to ensure that the execution it came from meets the guarantees of Theorem 1.

6 Attestation Systems

In this section we augment the earlier definitions for measurement systems to account for the use of TPMs to record and report on the evidence generated by measurement. The following definitions closely parallel those of Section 4. We begin by expanding a measurement system into an attestation system.

Definition 6. We define an attestation system to be $\mathcal{AS} = (O, M, C, P, L)$ where $\mathcal{MS} = (O, M, C)$ is a measurement system, $P = T \times R$ for some set T of TPMs and some index set R of their PCR registers, and L is a relation on $O \times P$.

Elements of P have the form p = t.i for $t \in T$ and $i \in R$. The relation L represents the access control constraints for extending values into TPM PCRs. Each component in O can only access a single TPM, so we assume that if L(o, t.i) and L(o, t'.i'), then t = t'. As we discussed in the previous section, it is advantageous to assume the access control mechanism dedicates a PCR to each




Fig. 7. Defeating Strategy 3

component that needs one. We formalize this by assuming L is injective in the sense that if L(o, p) and L(o', p) then o = o'.

The extra structure of an attestation system over a measurement system allows us to formalize the activities of recording and reporting evidence using events for extending values into PCRs and quoting the results.

Definition 7 (Events). Let AS be an attestation system. An event is either an event of the included measurement system or it is a node labeled by one of the following.

- a. An extend event is labeled by ext(o, v, p), such that L(o, p) and v is a term.
- b. A quote event is labeled by $qt(v, t_I)$, where v is a term, and $t_I = \{t.i \mid i \in I\}$ is a sequence of PCRs belonging to the same TPM t. We say a quote event reports on p, or is over p, if $p \in t_I$.

The second argument to extend events and the first argument to quote events is called the input.

An event e touches PCR p, iff either

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i. e = \text{ext}(o, v, p) for some o and v, or ii. e = \text{qt}(v, t_I) for some v and p \in t_I.
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Notice that a quote event has no corresponding component $o \in O$. This is because TPMs may produce quotes in response to a request by any component that has access to it.

Just as with measurement systems, we must impose some constraints on the partially ordered sets of these events if we expect the result of quote and extend events to accurately represent the effects of prior extend events. The following restriction is completely analogous to our definition of adversary-ordered sets of events, this time focusing on the state changes of PCRs.

Recall that for $e \in (E, \prec)$, $e \downarrow$ is the set of events preceding e in E, and $e \uparrow$ is the set of events occurring after e in E. Let ext(E) denote the set of extend events of E and qt(E) denote the set of quote events of E.

Let (E, \prec) be a partially ordered set of events for $\mathcal{AS} = (O, M, C, P, L)$ and let (E_p, \prec_p) be the substructure consisting of all and only events that touch PCR p. We say (E, \prec) is *extend-ordered* iff for every $p \in P$, (E_p, \prec_p) has the property that if e and e' are incomparable events, then they are both quote events.

Lemma 2. Let (E, \prec) be a finite extend-ordered poset for \mathcal{AS} , and let (E_p, \prec_p) be its restriction to some $p \in P$. Then for every event $e \in E_p$, $ext(e\downarrow)$ is either empty, or it has a unique maximal event e'.

Proof. Because (E, \prec) is extend-ordered, $ext(E_p)$ is partitioned by $ext(e\downarrow)$, $\{e\}$, and $ext(e\uparrow)$ for any $e \in E_p$. (The singleton $\{e\}$ forms part of the partition exactly when e is an extend event.) Suppose $ext(e\downarrow)$ is not empty. Since E is finite, $ext(e\downarrow)$ has at least one maximal element. Suppose e' and e'' are two distinct maximal elements. Thus they are \prec_p -incomparable. However, since (E, \prec) is extend-ordered, either $e' \prec_p e''$ or $e'' \prec_p e'$, yielding a contradiction.

This lemma allows us to unambiguously define the value in a PCR at any event that touches the PCR.

Definition 8 (PCR Value). We define the value in a PCR p at event e touching p to be the following, where $e \downarrow is$ taken in E_p .

$$val(e,p) = \begin{cases} \mathsf{rst} & : \mathit{ext}(e\mathord{\downarrow}) = \emptyset, e = \mathsf{qt}(n,t_I) \\ \#(v,\mathsf{rst}) & : \mathit{ext}(e\mathord{\downarrow}) = \emptyset, e = \mathsf{ext}(o,v,p) \\ \mathit{state}(e',p) & : e' = \mathit{max}(\mathit{ext}(e\mathord{\downarrow})), e = \mathsf{qt}(n,t_I) \\ \#(v,\mathit{state}(e',p)) : e' = \mathit{max}(\mathit{ext}(e\mathord{\downarrow})), e = \mathsf{ext}(o,v,p) \end{cases}$$

When e = ext(o, v, p) we say e is the event recording the value v.

We next formalize the output of a quote event. Definition 8 allows us compute all the relevant information that must be included in a digital signature. Recall that, to ensure the signature cannot be forged, we must assume the signing key is not available to the adversary.

Definition 9 (Quote Outputs). Let $e = \operatorname{qt}(n, t_I)$. Then its output is $\operatorname{out}(e) = [n, (t.i)_{i \in I}, (v_i)_{i \in I}]_{sk(t)}$, where for each $i \in I$, $\operatorname{val}(e, t.i) = v_i$, and $\operatorname{sk}(t) \in \mathcal{K}$ (the set of atomic, non-public keys). We say a quote Q indicates a corruption iff some v_i contains a $v \in \mathcal{B}(o)$ for some o.

Definition 10 (Executions). Let \mathcal{AS} be a target system. An execution of \mathcal{AS} is any adversary-ordered and extend-ordered poset E for \mathcal{AS} such that whenever e has input v, then v is derivable from the set $\mathcal{P} \cup \{out(e') \mid e' \prec_E e\}$, i.e. the public terms together with the output of previous events.

An execution E produces a quote Q (written $E \in \mathcal{E}(Q)$), iff E contains a quote event with output Q.

7 Bundling Evidence for Attestation

In this section we present several results that demonstrate some key inferences an appraiser can make about an execution that produces a given quote. We then formalize Strategy 3 from Section 5 for bundling evidence. Another sequence of results demonstrates that, under certain assumptions about the design of regular components, the guarantees of Theorem 1 are preserved for executions producing quotes according to Strategy 3. In particular, if a corrupted component o avoids detection, then the adversary must either have performed a recent corruption or a deep corruption (relative to o).

7.1 Principles for TPM-based bundling.

For the remainder of this section we fix an arbitrary attestation system $\mathcal{AS} = (O, M, C, P, L)$. Our first lemma allows us to infer the existence of some extend events in an execution.

Lemma 3. Let e be a quote event in execution E with output Q. For each PCR p reported on by Q, and for each v contained in val(e, p) there is some extend event $e_v \prec_E e$ recording v.

Proof. By definition, the values contained in a PCR are exactly those that were previously extended into it. Thus, since ext events are the only way to extend values into PCRs, there must be some event $e_v = \text{ext}(o, v, p)$ with $e_v \prec_E e$. \square

Lemma 4. Let $e \in E$ be an event with input parameter v. If $v \in \mathcal{N}$ or if v is a signature using key $sk(t) \in \mathcal{K}$, then there is a prior event $e' \prec_E e$ such that out(e') = v.

Proof. Definition 10 requires v to be derivable from the public terms \mathcal{P} and the output of previous messages. Call those outputs \mathcal{O} .

First suppose $v \in \mathcal{N}$. Since v is atomic, the only way to derive it is if $v \in \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{O}$. Since $\mathcal{P} \cap \mathcal{N} = \emptyset$, $v \notin \mathcal{P}$, hence $v \in \mathcal{O}$ as required.

Now suppose v is a signature using key $sk(t) \in \mathcal{K}$. Then v can be derived in two ways. The first is if $v \in \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{O}$. In this case, since $v \notin \mathcal{P}$ it must be in \mathcal{O} instead as required. The other way to derive v is to construct it from the key sk(t) and the signed message, say m. That is, we must first derive sk(t). Arguing as above, the only way to derive sk(t) is to find it in \mathcal{O} , but there are no events that output such a term.

Lemma 5. Let E be an execution producing quote Q. Assume v_i is contained before v_j in PCR p reported on by Q, and let e_i and e_j be the events recording v_i and v_j respectively. Then $e_i \prec_E e_j$.

Proof. This is an immediate consequence of how PCR state evolves according to ext events. \Box

Corollary 1. Let E be an execution producing quotes Q, and Q' where Q reports on PCR p. Suppose Q' is contained in p before v. Then every event recording values contained in Q' occurs before the event recording v.

Proof. By Lemma 5, the event $e_{Q'}$ recording Q' is before the event e_v recording $v.\ Q'$ is an input to $e_{Q'}$ satisfying the hypotheses of Lemma 4, hence there must be a prior quote event $e_q \prec_E e_{Q'}$ with $out(e_q) = Q'$. By Lemma 3 all events e_{v_i} recording values v_i contained in Q' must occur before e_q . By the transitivity of \prec_E we conclude $e_{v_i} \prec_E e_v$ for each v_i .

7.2 Formalizing and justifying a bundling strategy.

Using these lemmas, we aim to understand the properties of an execution E if it produces a set of quotes constructed according to Strategy 3 from Section 5. We first formalize the tiered, nested structure of this bundling strategy.

Definition 11. Let e = ext(o, v, p) be an extend event in execution E such that $v \in \mathcal{MV}(o_t)$ for some $o_t \in O$. We say e is well-supported iff either

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i. o = rtm, or
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ii. for every $o \in D^1(o_t)$ there is an extend event $e' \prec_E e$ such that e' = ext(o', v', p') with $v' \in \mathcal{MV}(o)$.

A collection of extend events X extends bottom-up iff each $e \in X$ is well-supported.

Bundling Strategy. Let Q be a set of quotes. We describe how to create a measurement specification S(Q). For each $Q \in Q$, and each p that Q reports on, and each p that p contained in p, p contains an event p ms p where p denote the p contains the event att-start p at p denote the set of events derived in this way from p complete p complete with the bundling strategy iff p we assure bottom-up.

Proposition 1. Suppose $E \in \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{Q})$ where $S(\mathcal{Q})$ measures bottom-up. Then E contains an extension substructure $X_{\mathcal{Q}}$ that extends bottom-up.

Proof. Let $X_{\mathcal{Q}}$ be the subset of events of E guaranteed by Lemma 3. That is, $X_{\mathcal{Q}}$ consists of all the events $e = \mathsf{ext}(o, v, p)$ that record measurement values v reported in \mathcal{Q} . For any such event e, if $o = \mathsf{rtm}$ then e is well-supported by definition. Otherwise, since $S(\mathcal{Q})$ measures bottom-up, Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 ensure $X_{\mathcal{Q}}$ contain events $e' = \mathsf{ext}(o', v', p')$ for every $o' \in D^1(o)$ where $e' \prec_E e$. Thus e is also well supported in that case.

We make two key assumptions about executions of attestation systems.

Assumption 2 If E contains an event e = ext(o, v, p) with $v \in \mathcal{MV}(t)$, where o is regular at that event, then there is an event e' = ms(o, t) such that $e' \prec_E e$. Furthermore, the most recent such event e' satisfies out(e') = v.

Assumption 3 Suppose E has events $e \prec_E e'$ where $e = \mathsf{ms}(o_2, o_1)$ and $e' = \mathsf{ext}(o, v, p)$ where $v \in \mathcal{MV}(t)$, $o_1 \in D^1(t)$. Then either

```
1. o is corrupt at e', or
2. there is some e'' = ms(o, t) with e \prec_E e'' \prec_E e'.
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The first assumption says that when extending measurement values regular components only extend the value they most recently generated through measurement. The second assumption is more complex. It is meant to guarantee that measurements at higher layers are at least as fresh as the measurements of the lower layers they depend on. Thus, whenever a deeper component takes a measurement, there must be some signal to the upper layer to tell those components to expire any measurements they have taken.

These two assumptions will not be validated in all attestation systems. These are relatively subtle properties that can be expressed in, say, SELinux policies, but would be difficult to implement in a less constrained architecture based on a more commodity operating system. We show that these assumptions are

sufficient to ensure Strategy 3 for bundling evidence is a good one, but they may not be necessary. Furthermore, if a technology other than a TPM is used for bundling, say Intel's SGX, then another set of assumptions may be more appropriate.

Theorem 2. Let E be an execution satisfying Assumptions 2 and 3 that also contains an extension substructure X that extends bottom-up. For each extend event $e = \text{ext}(o_1, v_t, p_1)$, suppose that $v_t \in \mathcal{G}(o_t)$. Then for each such e, either

- 1. e reflects a measurement event that is well-supported by measurement events reflected by the support of e.
- 2. a. some $o_2 \in D^2(o_t)$ gets corrupted in E, or
 - b. some $o_1 \in D^1(o_t)$ gets corrupted in E after being measured.

Proof. The proof considers an exhaustive list of cases, demonstrating that each one falls into one of Conditions 1, 2a, or 2b. The following diagram summarizes the proof by representing the case structure and indicating which condition each case satisfies.

Consider any extend event $e = \text{ext}(o_1, v_t, p_1)$ of X extending a measurement value for some $o_t \in O$. The first case distinction is whether or not $o_1 = \text{rtm}$.

Case 1: Assume $o_1 = \text{rtm}$. Since rtm cannot be corrupted, it is regular at e, and by Assumption 2, e reflects the measurement event $ms(rtm, o_t)$ which is trivially well-supported, so Condition 1 is satisfied.

Case 2: Assume $o_1 \neq \text{rtm}$. Since X extends bottom-up, it has events $e_i = \text{ext}(o_2^i, v_2^i, p_2^i)$ extending measurement values v_2^i for every $o^i \in D^1(o_t)$, and for each $i, e_i \prec_E e$. Now either some o_2^i is corrupt at e_i (Case 2.1), or each o_2^i is regular at e_i (Case 2.2).

Case 2.1: Assume some o_2^i is corrupt at e_i . Then there must have been a prior corruption of $o_2^i \in D^2(o_t)$, and hence we are in Condition 2a.

Case 2.2: Assume each o_2^i is regular at e_i . Then Assumption 2 applies to each e_i , so each one reflects a measurement event e'_i . In this setting, either o_1 is regular at e (Case 2.2.1), or o_1 is corrupt at e (Case 2.2.2).

Case 2.2.1: Assume o_1 is regular at e. Then since the events e'_i together with e satisfy the hypothesis of Assumption 3, we can conclude that e reflects a measurement event $e' = \mathsf{ms}(o_1, o_t)$ such that $e'_i \prec_E e'$ for each i. That is, e' is well-supported by the e'_i events which are reflected by the support of e, putting us in Condition 1.

Case 2.2.2: Assume o_1 is corrupt at e. Since $o_1 \in D^1(o_t)$ one of the e'_i is a measurement event of o_1 with output $v_1 \in \mathcal{G}(o_1)$ since X only extends measurement values that do not indicate corruption. Call this event e'_* . The final case distinction is whether o_1 is corrupt at this event e'_* (Case 2.2.2.1) or regular at e'_* (Case 2.2.2.2).

Case 2.2.2.1: Assume o_1 is corrupt at e'_* . Since the measurement outputs a good value, some element $o_2 \in D^1(o_1) \subseteq D^2(o_t)$ is corrupt at e'_* . This satisfies Condition 2a.

Case 2.2.2.2: Assume o_1 is regular at e'_* . By the assumption of Case 2.2.2, o_1 is corrupt at e with $e'_* \prec_E e$. Thus there must be an intervening corruption event for o_1 . Since e'_* is a measurement event of o_1 , this satisfies Condition 2b.

Assumption 3 can only guarantee that an object is remeasured whenever one of its dependencies is remeasured. It cannot ensure that all orderings of S(Q) are preserved in $\mathcal{E}(Q)$. For this reason we introduce the notion of the core of a bottom-up specification. The *core* of a bottom-up specification S is the result of removing any orderings between measurement events $e_i \prec_S e_j$ whenever e_i is not in the support of e_j . That is, the core of S ignores all orderings that do not contribute to S measuring bottom-up.

Theorem 3. Let $E \in \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{Q})$ such that $S(\mathcal{Q})$ measures bottom-up, and let S' be its core. Suppose that \mathcal{Q} detects no corruptions, and that E satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3. Then one of the following holds:

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    E ∈ E(S'),
    there is some o<sub>t</sub> ∈ O such that

            a. some o<sub>2</sub> ∈ D<sup>2</sup>(o<sub>t</sub>) is corrupted, or
            b. some o<sub>1</sub> ∈ D<sup>1</sup>(o<sub>t</sub>) is corrupted after being measured.
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Proof. By Proposition 1, E contains a substructure $X_{\mathcal{Q}}$ of extend events that extends bottom-up. Thus by Theorem 2, Conditions 2a and 2b are possibilities. So suppose instead that E satisfies Condition 1 of Theorem 2. We must show that $E \in \mathcal{E}(S')$. In particular, we construct $\alpha: S' \to E$ and show that it is label-and order-preserving.

Consider the measurement events e_i^s of S'. By construction, each one comes from some measurement value v_i contained in Q. Similarly, the well-supported measurement events e_i^m of E guaranteed by Theorem 2 are reflected by extend events e_i of E which are, in turn, those events that record each v_i in Q. We let $\alpha(e_i^s) = e_i^m$ for each i.

To see that α is label-preserving, consider first the label of e_i^s . It corresponds to a measurement value v_i contained in some p_i of \mathcal{Q} . So e_i^s is labeled $\mathsf{ms}(o,o')$ where M(o,o'), $v_i \in \mathcal{MV}(o')$, and $L(o,p_i)$. The event e_i^m also corresponds to the same v_i . Lemma 3 ensures that $e_i = \mathsf{ext}(o,v,p_i)$ with $L(o,p_i)$, and so the measurement event it reflects is $e_i^m = \mathsf{ms}(o,o')$ with M(o,o') and $v_i \in \mathcal{MV}(o')$. Thus e_i^s and e_i^m have the same label.

We now show that if $e_i^s \prec_{S(\mathcal{Q})} e_j^s$ then $e_i^m \prec_E e_j^m$. The former ordering exists in S' because some quote $Q \in \mathcal{Q}$ is contained in p_j before v_j and v_i is contained in Q, and because e_i^s is in the support of e_j^s . By Corollary 1 $e_i \prec_E e_j$ and e_i is in the support of e_j and therefore Theorem 2 ensures that the measurements they reflect are also ordered, i.e. $e_i^m \prec_E e_j^m$.

Finally, consider any events $e = \mathsf{att\text{-}start}(n)$ in S'. They come from nonces n found as inputs to quotes $Q \in \mathcal{Q}$. By Lemma 4, E also has a corresponding event e^* with $out(e^*) = n$. Since $\mathsf{att\text{-}start}$ events are the only ones with output of the right kind, $e^* = \mathsf{att\text{-}start}(n)$ as well. Thus we can extend α by mapping each such e to the corresponding e^* . The rules for $S(\mathcal{Q})$ say that $e \prec_{S(\mathcal{Q})} e'$ only when Q has n in the nonce field, and Q occurs before the value recorded by e'. In E, e^* precedes the event producing Q (by Lemma 4) which in turn precedes e' by Lemmas 4 and 5. Thus the orderings in $S(\mathcal{Q})$ involving $\mathsf{att\text{-}start}$ events are also preserved by α .

8 Conclusion

In this paper we have developed a formalism for reasoning about layered attestations. Within this framework we have justified the intuition (pervasive in the literature on measurement and attestation) that it is important to measure a layered system from the bottom up (Theorem 1). We also proposed and justified a strategy for using TPMs to bundle evidence (Theorem 2). If used in conjunction, these two results guarantee an appraiser that if an adversary has corrupted a component and managed to avoid detection, then it must have performed a recent or deep corruption (Theorem 3).

Although we used our model to justify the proposed general and reusable strategies for layered attestations, we believe our model has a wider applicability. It admits a natural graphical interpretation that is straightforward to understand and interpret. Future work to develop reasoning methods within the model could lead to more automated analysis of attestation systems. We believe a tool that leverages automated reasoning and the graphical interpretation would be a useful asset.

For the present work we made several simplifying assumptions. For instance, we assumed that if measurers (or their supporting components) are corrupted, then they can always forge the results of measurement. This conservative, worst-case view does not account for a situation in which, say, even if the OS kernel is corrupted, it may still be hard to forge the results of a virus scan. Conversely, we also assumed that uncorrupted measurers can always detect corruptions. This is certainly not true in most systems. Adapting the model to account for probabilities of detection would be an interesting line of research that would make the model applicable to a wider class of systems.

Another issue of layered attestations that we did not address here, is the question of what to do when the system components fall into different administrative domains. This would be typical of a cloud architecture in which the lower layers are administered by the cloud provider, but the customers may provide their own set of measurement capabilities as well. A remote appraiser must be able to negotiate an attestation according several policies. Our model might be extended to account for the complexities that arise.

Finally, we chose to study the use of TPMs for bundling evidence. We believe other approaches leveraging timing-based techniques or other emerging

technologies including hardware-supported trusted execution environments such as Intel's new SGX instruction set could be captured similarly. This would allow us to formally demonstrate the security advantages of one approach over another, or understand how to build attestation systems that leverage several technologies.

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