Wreaking Havoc - CSCG2023

Category: Forensics Difficulty: Medium Author: Kolja

"One of our admins fell for a phishing site and downloaded malware. The attacker wreaked havoc on our system, but you might find out what was exfiltrated using the attached network capture."


Recon

Given to us is a singular PCAPNG file (wreaking-havoc.pcapng). As such, our first order of business is looking at this file in Wireshark.

There aren't too many packages captured in this file, but filtering them out by usefullness still provides a good start. The description mentions that an admin fell for a phishing site and that we have to find the data, which a piece of malware exfiltrated.

Luckily for us, the phishing website seems to have been using HTTP without TLS, so filtering with http actually yields us the website traffic without encryption.


We can now follow the traffic of the very first HTTP GET packet and download its result to see how the index page looks like.



It seems to be a replica of the keepass download webpage.

Clicking the download links actually works and yields us the malware. This is because it is embedded into the website's HTML as a base64 string.

Once we have our malware keepass.exe downloaded, let's see what virustotal has to say about this file.



That does look rather malicious, and it seems to have a name befitting the name of the challenge, Havoc.

After a bit of looking around with various search engines on what this malware is and how it behaves, two important links can be found.

For one, the actual source code of the malware is on Github, neat!

And possibly even better, a blogpost on zscaler.com about an attack involving just this malware.

In figure 28 of the blogpost, the metadata structure of the packets the malware sends is shown. When trying to find a TCP package that looks like this however, Wireshark will come up with no results.

All relevant traffic happens on port 80 and port 443. Since port 443 will be encrypted, all that is left is plain http traffic.

And that's exactly where we can find these packets. The blogpost explains that a magic value <code>0xdeadbeef</code> is at position 4 of the initialization package. In the later HTTP POST request, we can find just this pattern.

```
50 4f 53 54 20 2f 73 74
                                 61 74 75 73 2e 70 68 70
                                                             POST /st atus.php
                                                              HTTP/1. 1 ·· Cache
      20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e
                                 31 0d 0a 43 61 63 68 65
      2d 43 6f 6e 74 72 6f 6c
                                 3a 20 6e 6f 2d 63 61 63
                                                             -Control: no-cac
      68 65 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e
                                 65 63 74 69 6f
                                                 6e
                                                    3a 20
                                                             he . . Conn ection:
      4b 65 65 70 2d 41 6c 69
                                 76 65 0d 0a 50 72 61 67
                                                             Keep-Ali ve Prag
      6d 61 3a
               20 6e 6f 2d 63
                                 61 63 68 65 0d 0a
                                                             ma: no-c ache ·· Co
                                                             ntent-Ty pe: text
0060
      6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 54 79
                                 70 65 3a 20 74 65 78 74
0070
      2f 70 6c 61 69 6e 0d 0a
                                 55 73 65 72 2d 41 67 65
                                                                      User-Age
                                                             /plain·
      6e 74 3a 20 4d 6f 7a 69
28 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73
                                 6c 6c 61 2f 35 2e 30 20
                                                             nt: Mozi lla/5.0
                                 20 4e 54 20 36 2e 31 3b
                                                             (Windows
                                                                       NT 6.1:
      20 57 4f 57
                  36 34 29 20
                                 41 70 70 6c 65 57 65 62
                                                              W0W64)
                                                                      AppleWeb
      4b 69 74 2f 35 33 37 2e
                                33 36 20 28 4b 48 54 4d
                                                             Kit/537. 36 (KHTM
      4c 2c 20 6c 69 6b 65 20
                                 47 65 63 6b 6f 29 20 43
                                                             L, like Gecko) C
      68 72 6f 6d 65 2f 39 36
                                 2e 30 2e 34 36 36 34 2e
                                                             hrome/96 .0.4664.
      31 31 30 20 53 61 66 61
                                 72 69 2f 35 33 37 2e 33
                                                             110 Safa ri/537.3
00f0
      36 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65
                                6e 74 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74
                                                             6 · · Conte nt-Lengt
      68 3a 20 32 30 33 0d 0a
                                 48 6f 73 74 3a 20 6b 65
                                                             h: 203 ·· Host: ke
0110
      65 70 61 73 73 2e 78 79
                                7a 0d 0a 0d 0a 00
                                                             epass.xy z···
0120
                  2e b4 66 5c
bc 36 9a 6c
                                80
22
0130
                                    40
8e
                                          76 9a 1c
6c de 70
                                                                       ·@>v ·
0140
```

Marked in blue is the HTTP POST data, and in red the signature we were looking for. This is package number 1716 in the attached PCAPNG file. Supposedly, behind this signature there is supposed to be an AES key and IV. This lines up with us not being able to read any of the data of this or subsequent packages.

We can also observe this in the source code of Demon.c:129.

Exploitation

This knowledge, when applied to package 1716, means that the key and IV are the following: Key: 4aba74dcf286fc2eb4665c80403e769a1ca800a4da9a5cbc369a6c228e926cde IV: 709c2c3a74a6580a722cacfc8c5e26ca With these, we should be able to decrypt the data the malware sent, finding what was exfiltrated.

The last issue will be finding said data and also finding what type of AES was actually used. According to figure 29 of the blogpost, the encrypted data should be right behind the IV.

But instead of finding which AES algorithm was used, I've decided to compile against Havoc to use their crypto library directly.

```
unsigned char KEY[] = {
    74, 186, 116, 220, 242, 134, 252, 46,
    180, 102, 92, 128, 64, 62, 118, 154,
    28, 168, 0, 164, 218, 154, 92, 188,
    54, 154, 108, 34, 142, 146, 108, 222
};

unsigned char IV[] = {
    112, 156, 44, 58, 116, 166, 88, 10,
    114, 44, 172, 252, 140, 94, 38, 202
};

unsigned char DATA[] = {
    68, 247, 23, 41, 250, 195, 163, 95,
    94, 56, 45, 249, 11, 33, 116, 47,
    150, 160, 37, 19, 121, 170, 30, 51,
    56, 107, 44, 136, 206, 243, 19, 25,
    170, 115, 120, 143, 172, 115, 1, 215,
    41, 173, 104, 22, 211, 170, 24, 193,
    4, 124, 139, 203, 15, 204, 3, 11,
    61, 16, 193, 252, 116, 28, 100, 162,
    62, 44, 233, 42, 48, 47
};

int wmain(int argc, WCHAR* argv[])
{
    AESCTX AesCtx = { 0 };

    int wmain(int argc, WCHAR* argv[]);
}

description (int i = 0; i < 70; i++) {
        printf("%02X", DATA[i]);
}

printf("\n");
}</pre>
```

This snippet of code uses the key and IV we found in number form, along with the DATA variable that contains any encrypted data we want to decrypt.

We can now try to run several of the encrypted packages through it.

And with one of the later packages, that being number 1839, the program yields us the flag.

```
sw1tchb14d3@pts/10 [~/githubs/Havoc/Teamserver/data/implants/Demon/Source/Crypt] %
sw1tchbl4d3@pts/10 [~/qithubs/Havoc/Teamserver/data/implants/Demon/Source/Crypt] %
wine <u>aes.exe</u>
0000000A0000001866006C00610067002E007400780074002E00740078007400000000022435343477B3
16E35336375
72335F5472346E35703072745F336E6372707431306E7D
[10] swltchbl4d3@pts/10 [~/githubs/Havoc/Teamserver/data/implants/Demon/Source/Cryp
t] % python3
Python 3.10.9 (main, Dec 25 2022, 21:29:15) [GCC 12.2.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import binascii
>>> binascii.unhexlify("0000000A0000001866006C00610067002E007400780074002E007400780
0740000000022435343477B316E3533637572335F5472346E35703072745F336E6372707431306E7D")
b'\x00\x00\x00\n\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18f\x001\x00a\x00g\x00.\x00t\x00x\x00t\x00.\x00t
\x00t\x00\x00\x00\x00"CSCG{1n53cur3_Tr4n5p0rt_3ncrpt10n}'
>>>
```

Mitigations

On the attacker's side: Don't exchange symmetric keys through an unsecured channel. To make this challenge unsolvable, the attacker could pregenerate a secure, asymmetric key pair, keeping the private key secret, and encrypting all data with a public key embedded into the program.

This could be done with RSA, Elliptic curves and more asymmetric cryptography algorithms.

On the defender's side, things could've been mitigated by thorough teaching of phishing methods. Anyone with a higher role in such a system should be taught how to identify phising sites to avoid having critical data get stolen.

~sw1tchbl4d3, 01/05/2023 (dd/mm/yyyy)