

CS2361: Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies

Project Milestone 1: M-Pin

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Introduction

We need authentication for primarily three reasons:

- authenticate the client to the server,
- authenticate the server to the client,
- and should result in a negotiated encryption key with which subsequent communications can be encrypted.

Until now we've been using Username/Password authentication for authenticating the client and the use of SSL/TLS protocols for authenticating the server. SSL even though now deprecated still had some good ideas but the Username/Password is extremely vulnerable to exploits and that's why there is a massive shift to Multi Factor Authentication (MFA).

The biggest exploit for username/password authentication is that the server stores either the hash of the password or the password itself in the database which if compromised can be used to gain access to the passwords.

The idea behind M-Pin is that each registered client is issued with a large cryptographic secret. They then prove to the server that they are in possession of this secret using a zero-knowledge proof. This removes the requirement for any information related to client secrets to be stored on the server.

Another crucial attribute of M-Pin is the use of third party authentication. Similar to how SSL uses a CA to verify the certificates, M-Pin uses Trusted Authority (TA) to store the secrets in contrast to Username/Password where the server performs regular operations as well as authentication.

Technical Details

Concepts Utilized

- Pairing Based Cryptography: It is based on pairing functions that map pairs of points on an elliptic curve into a finite field.
- Identity Based Encryption: When communicating with someone using their public key, there is always a concern whether the public key belongs to intended party or some adversary. We see the usage of CAs to verify the legitimacy of the public key in PKIs. IBE proposed that the public key should be composed of some identifying information such as email address.
- Replay Attack: The attacker can capture the encrypted message sent to a trusted party and send it again at a later time. For instance, if an attacker captures a request for a financial txn, they can send the request again to make another txn.

Working of M-Pin

Notations

- ID_a : The client's email address.
- q denotes the size of the field over which our elliptic curve E is defined.
- G_1 is a subgroup of $E(F_q)$, G_2 is a subgroup of $E(F_{q^k})$, where k is a parameter called the embedding degree.
- H_1 a hash function which maps to a point on G_1
- H_2 a hash function which maps to a point on G_2
- $e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
- $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$: The master secret stored with the TA.
- sA : The client's secret key.
- ' x ' a random number in \mathbb{Z}_q
- ' y ' a random number in \mathbb{Z}_q

Step 1: Key Generation

The client computes point A on the eclipse curve using a ID_a which is then sent to the TA to get client secret key sA where s is a master secret stored in the TA.

Process

1. Client: $A \leftarrow H_1(ID_a)$
2. TA: Calculates sA
3. Client: The client calculates the token $((s - \alpha)A)$ using his own PIN (α) and stores the token in local storage.

Step 2: Authentication

Communication between the client and the server takes place.

Process

1. Client: Receives pin α from the user, picks x .
2. Client: Computes $U \leftarrow xA$.
3. Client: Sends $\{ID_a, U\}$ to the server.
4. Server: Sends y to the client.
5. Client: Computes $V \leftarrow -(x+y)((s-\alpha)A + \alpha A)$ and sends V to the server.
6. Server: Computes $D \leftarrow H_1(ID_a)$ and $g \leftarrow e(V, Q)e(U + yD, sQ)$.
7. If $g = 1$ then the client is authenticated.

Analysis

Security

- The server does not store user's hashed password or any detail that may compromise their identity on the platform.
- There are two points of failure. An adversary even if acquire user's pin they would still require the token to generate the client secret.
- "The security of our system is based on a natural analogue of the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption on elliptic curves."
- "Based on this assumption we show that the new system has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model"
- "There is no efficiently computable $\psi: \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ in Type 3 Pairing.
(<https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/165.pdf>)"
- The pairing allows us to assume Symmetric External Diffie-Helman (SXDH) assumption which further imposes a set of assumption:
 - The discrete logarithm problem (DLP), the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH), and the computational co-Diffie-Hellman problem are all intractable in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2
 - There exists an efficiently computable bilinear map (pairing) $e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$
 - The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is intractable in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 .
- "er (aP, bQ) = er (P, Q)^{ab} for all a, b ∈ Fr (Bilinearity)
- "er (P, P) = 1" Non-supersingular curves where there is no bilinear pairing between points in the same subgroup that yields a non-trivial result i.e er (P, P) = 1
- We use BN-254 Elliptic Curve to implement M-Pin. The curve has an embedding degree of 12 and is known to be secure and calculating pairing is efficient and is used by Aztec for Ethereum.
(<https://github.com/AztecProtocol/weierstrudel>)

Plan for the Project

Our major inspiration for implementation of the project comes from the implementation by Apache's Milagro MFA which although is now deprecated but has clear implementation ideas.

Beforehand, the groups G_1, G_2 and G_T are fixed. Along with G_1, G_2 and G_T , their corresponding hashing functions are also generated which maps any data to a point on the curve. For example H_1 will map the email id of Alice to G_1 . $H_1(\text{alice@bob.com}) = A$.

1. Client Side:

- (a) We have created the client side for the app in React.js.
- (b) The client handles the input of the pin and the id (email) after which communication takes place between the TA to compute client secret. We primarily use `crypto-js` for the computation of the tokens and keys.

2. Server Side:

- (a) Due to ease of availability of crypto libraries and elliptic curve libraries, we are using Python to build our server.
- (b) The server also communicates with a small mongo database to store client ids, nonce which are deleted after expiry.
- (c) We store the server secret in server. The server returns a response with a success or failure message based on the result of authentication.

3. TA:

- (a) The TA will generate a master secret for each of its servers s , and will issue a server secret $S = sQ$.
- (b) When a client, Alice reaches out to the TA for the initial authentication, she will be assigned a client secret, $D = sA$, where A is Alice's email-id or any identification unique to Alice hashed to a point in G_1 .

Future Ideas / Plans for expansions

1. To implement mutiple TAs (DTA) to safegaurd against a single point of failure. This is possible due to pairing based cryptography.
2. Also, to implement a scoring based for multiple wrong attempts at authentication to prevent brute force attacks while also making the system more user friendly as suggested in the paper [3].
3. The entire process suffers from one flaw which is that it takes three passes between the client and the server which if the server also carries out username/password based authentication will find it difficult to change protocol. The paper titled "Milagro Multi-Factor Authentication" proposes e-M-Pin that uses a single pass between the client and the server.

The one pass authentication poses the problem of Replay Attack which is why we now also use current time: a) CCT: Current Client Time, b) SCT: Current Server Time and a single use arbitrary number, nonce.

The new process is only slightly different:

- (a) The client now also generates a nonce in Z_q along with x and stores the current time.
- (b) y is now computed as: $y \leftarrow H_q(ID_a || U || W || nonce || CCT)$.
- (c) and the client sends: $ID_a, U, W, V, nonce, CCT$ to the server.
- (d) The server first checks if the SCT - CCT falls within the expiration time (t) else fail the authentication. Secondly, verify if the nonce has been used already or not.
- (e) Finally, save the nonce and calculate y as $y \leftarrow H_q(ID_a || U || W || nonce || CCT)$.

References

- [1] Masahiro Matsui et al. Milagro multi-factor authentication. <https://www.ntt-review.jp/archive/ntttechnical.php?contents=ntr201612ra1.html>.
- [2] Alfred Menezes. An introduction to pairing-based cryptography. <https://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/pairings.pdf>.
- [3] Michael Scott. M-pin: A multi-factor zero knowledge authentication protocol. <https://miracl.com/assets/pdf-downloads/mpin4.pdf>.