

# Fun facts about Zero-Knowledge proofs

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# The deck of cards:

**A full deck with red and black cards, face down.**

**I take out a red three of hearts. How to convince you I took a red card, without showing which one**

# Proving color to the color blind:

**A red and green ball, otherwise indistinguishable**

**How to convince a color-blind friend they are different?.**

# Counting leaves in a tree:

How to prove you can instantly count the number of leaves on a tree, without disclosing the number of leaves?

Visual example: Where's Waldo?

# Video: the cave

# 3-coloring

# From interactive to non-interactive

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**Homomorphic encryption:** Give challenge in advance in homomorphically encoded form (Craig Gentry video)

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**Chicken and egg problem:** Alice has sudoku puzzle solution, Bob want's to buy it - who goes first?.

**ZKCP:** Protocol where money and solution change hands at exactly same time.

# ZK + bitcoin: Zero-Knowledge contingent payments (by Greg Maxwell)

1. Alice chooses cryptographic key  $\mathbf{K}$ , sends  $\mathbf{h} = \text{HASH}(\mathbf{K})$ .
2. Alice sends encrypted solution  $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{K}}(\mathbf{S})$  to Bob; and proves in ZK: “C is encryption of sudoku solution under key who’s hash is  $\mathbf{h}$ .”
3. Bob makes bitcoin “hash-locked-transaction” to Alice with  $\mathbf{h}$ .
4. Alice reveals  $\mathbf{K}$  to unlock her funds.
5. Bob can now use  $\mathbf{K}$  to decrypt solution.

# More on the mathy side: Schnorr's discrete log protocol

Given  $g^x$ , prove you know  $x$  without revealing it.

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Given  $\mathbf{X} := \mathbf{g}^x$ , prove you know  $x$  without revealing it.

1. Prover chooses random  $r$ , sends  $\mathbf{R} := \mathbf{g}^r$ .
2. Verifier chooses random  $c$
3. Prover sends  $u := x \cdot c + r$
4. Verifier checks  $\mathbf{X} \cdot \mathbf{R} = \mathbf{g}^u$ .