

PLONK: Permutations over Lagrange-Bases for Oecumenical Noninteractive arguments of Knowledge

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Plonk in two sips

1. All you need is a permutation check.
2. Permutations are easier to check on multiplicative subgroups

Part 1: All you need is a permutation check

Our setting: want short proofs about fan-in 2
unlimited fan-out circuits, trusted setup depends
only on circuit size.

example: Prove knowledge of \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{b} , \mathbf{c} with

$$(\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b}) \cdot \mathbf{c} = 7$$

Left values: $\mathbf{l}_1, \mathbf{l}_2$

Right values: $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2$

Output values: $\mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2$

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Right values: $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2$

Output values: $\mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2$

Gate checks: $\mathbf{l}_1 + \mathbf{r}_1 = \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{l}_2 \cdot \mathbf{r}_2 = \mathbf{o}_2$

Wire/copy checks: $\mathbf{o}_1 = \mathbf{l}_2$

Public input checks: $\mathbf{o}_2 = 7$.

Left values: $\mathbf{l}_1, \mathbf{l}_2$

Right values: $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2$

Output values: $\mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2$

Gate checks: $\mathbf{l}_1 + \mathbf{r}_1 = \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{l}_2 \cdot \mathbf{r}_2 = \mathbf{o}_2$ (easy)

Wire/copy checks: $\mathbf{o}_1 = \mathbf{l}_2$ (hard)

Public input checks: $\mathbf{o}_2 = 7$ (easy)

Copy checks with permutations

similar to [Groth09,BCGGHJ17]

$$\mathbf{V} = (\mathbf{l}_1, \mathbf{l}_2, \mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2, \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2)$$

Copy checks with permutations

similar to [Groth09,BCGGHJ17]

$$\mathbf{V} = (\mathbf{l}_1, \mathbf{l}_2, \mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2, \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2)$$

$$\mathbf{o}_1 = \mathbf{l}_2 \text{ iff } \mathbf{V} = \sigma(\mathbf{V})$$

For permutation $\sigma = (25)$

Part 2: Permutations are easier to check on
multiplicative subgroups

[Bayer-Groth12] - perm checks with products

example: Given $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{F}^3$, want to check
 $(\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2, \mathbf{b}_3) = (\mathbf{a}_3, \mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2)$

[Bayer-Groth12] - perm checks with products

example: Given $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{F}^3$, want to check
 $(\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2, \mathbf{b}_3) = (\mathbf{a}_3, \mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2)$

step 1: Choose random $\beta \in \mathbb{F}$. Let

$$\mathbf{a}'_1 = \mathbf{a}_1 + \beta, \mathbf{a}'_2 = \mathbf{a}_2 + 2\beta, \mathbf{a}'_3 = \mathbf{a}_3 + 3\beta$$

$$\mathbf{b}'_1 = \mathbf{b}_1 + 3\beta, \mathbf{b}'_2 = \mathbf{b}_2 + \beta, \mathbf{b}'_3 = \mathbf{b}_3 + 2\beta$$

[Bayer-Groth12] - perm checks with products

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$$\mathbf{b}'_1 = \mathbf{b}_1 + 3\beta, \mathbf{b}'_2 = \mathbf{b}_2 + \beta, \mathbf{b}'_3 = \mathbf{b}_3 + 2\beta$$

If claim false - w.h.p as multiset
 $\{\mathbf{a}'_1, \mathbf{a}'_2, \mathbf{a}'_3\} \neq \{\mathbf{b}'_1, \mathbf{b}'_2, \mathbf{b}'_3\}$:

[Bayer-Groth12] - reducing permutation checks to products

step 2: Choose random $\gamma \in \mathbb{F}$. Let

$$\mathbf{a}_i'' = \mathbf{a}_i' + \gamma, \mathbf{b}_i'' = \mathbf{b}_i + \gamma$$

[Bayer-Groth12] - reducing permutation checks to products

step 2: Choose random $\gamma \in \mathbb{F}$. Let

$$a_i'' = a_i' + \gamma, b_i'' = b_i + \gamma$$

If $\{a_1', a_2', a_3'\} \neq \{b_1', b_2', b_3'\}$ as multiset - w.h.p

$$a_1'' \cdot a_2'' \cdot a_3'' \neq b_1'' \cdot b_2'' \cdot b_3''.$$

Idealized Polynomials Protocols

Preprocessing: \mathcal{V} chooses polynomials $g_1, \dots, g_t \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[\mathbf{X}]$.

Protocol:

1. \mathcal{P} 's msgs are to ideal party \mathbf{I} . Must be $f_i \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[\mathbf{X}]$.
2. At protocol end \mathcal{V} asks \mathbf{I} if some identities hold between $\{f_1, \dots, f_\ell, g_1, \dots, g_t\}$. Outputs **acc** iff they do.

Idealized Polynomials Protocols

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Using [KZG10], can compile to real protocol with each msg of \mathcal{P} being 32-64 bytes according to your NFSPL.

H-ranged Polynomials Protocols

Preprocessing: \mathcal{V} chooses polynomials $g_1, \dots, g_t \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[\mathbf{X}]$, $\mathbf{H} \subset \mathbb{F}$.

Protocol:

1. \mathcal{P} 's msgs are to ideal party \mathbf{I} . Must be $f_i \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[\mathbf{X}]$.
2. At end, \mathcal{V} asks \mathbf{I} if some identities hold between $\{f_1, \dots, f_\ell, g_1, \dots, g_t\}$ **on** \mathbf{H} .

H-ranged protocol using polynomial protocol:

\mathcal{V} wants to check identities $\mathbf{P}_1, \mathbf{P}_2$ on \mathbf{H} .

- ▶ After \mathcal{P} finished sending $\{\mathbf{f}_i\}$, \mathcal{V} sends random $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2 \in \mathbb{F}$.
- ▶ \mathcal{P} sends $\mathbf{T} \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[\mathbf{X}]$.
- ▶ \mathcal{V} checks identity $\mathbf{a}_1 \cdot \mathbf{P}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2 \cdot \mathbf{P}_2 \equiv \mathbf{T} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_H$.

Checking permutations with \mathbf{H} -ranged protocols

Permutation $\sigma : [\mathbf{n}] \rightarrow [\mathbf{n}]$. $\mathbf{H} = \{ \alpha, \alpha^2, \dots, \alpha^{\mathbf{n}} \}$.

\mathcal{P} has sent $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{F}_{<\mathbf{d}}[\mathbf{X}]$.

Wants to prove $\mathbf{f} = \sigma(\mathbf{f})$:

$$\forall i \in [\mathbf{n}], \mathbf{f}(\alpha^i) = \mathbf{f}(\alpha^{\sigma(i)})$$

Using [BG12] reduces to:

$$\mathbf{H} = \{\alpha, \alpha^2, \dots, \alpha^n\}.$$

\mathcal{P} has sent $\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[\mathbf{X}]$.

Wants to prove:

$$\prod_{i \in [n]} \mathbf{f}(\alpha^i) = \prod_{i \in [n]} \mathbf{g}(\alpha^i)$$

Checking products with \mathbf{H} -ranged protocols

1. \mathcal{P} computes \mathbf{Z}_f with
 $\mathbf{Z}_f(\boldsymbol{\alpha}) = 1, \mathbf{Z}_f(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^i) = \prod_{j < i} f(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^j), i = 2..n + 1.$
Computes \mathbf{Z}_g similarly.
2. Sends $\mathbf{Z}_f, \mathbf{Z}_g$ to \mathbf{I} .

Checking products with \mathbf{H} -ranged protocols

1. \mathcal{P} computes Z_f with
 $Z_f(\alpha) = 1, Z_f(\alpha^i) = \prod_{j < i} f(\alpha^j)$. Computes Z_g similarly.
2. Sends Z_f, Z_g to \mathbf{I} .
3. \mathcal{V} checks following identities on \mathbf{H} .
 - 3.1 $L_1(X)(Z_f(X) - Z_g(X)) = 0$
 - 3.2 $Z_f(X)f(X) = Z_f(\alpha \cdot X)$
 - 3.3 $Z_g(X)f(X) = Z_g(\alpha \cdot X)$
 - 3.4 $L_n(X)(Z_f(\alpha \cdot X) - Z_g(\alpha \cdot X)) = 0$

The bottom line (on BLS-381 curve)

700 byte proofs with one trusted setup for all fan-in two circuits of n gates.

Prover does $12n$ G_1 exp.

For batch of proofs on same circuit only $3n$ G_1 exp and 240 bytes for each additional proof.

Bonus material: The KZG polynomial commitment scheme

SRS: $[1], [\mathbf{x}], \dots, [\mathbf{x}^d]$, for random $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}$.

$$\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=0}^d \mathbf{a}_i \mathbf{X}^i$$

$$\text{cm}(\mathbf{f}) := \sum_{i=0}^d \mathbf{a}_i [\mathbf{x}^i] = [\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})]$$

SRS: $[1], [\mathbf{x}], \dots, [\mathbf{x}^d]$,
for random $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}$.

$$\text{cm}(\mathbf{f}) := [\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})]$$

$$\text{open}(\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{i}) := [\mathbf{h}(\mathbf{x})], \text{ where } \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{X}) := \frac{\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{X}) - \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{i})}{\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{i}}$$

$$\text{cm}(\mathbf{f}) := [\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})]$$

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$$\text{verify}(\text{cm}, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{i}) :$$

$$\mathbf{e}(\text{cm} - [\mathbf{z}], [1]) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(\boldsymbol{\pi}, [\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{i}])$$

$$\text{cm}(\mathbf{f}) := [\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})]$$

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Thm_[KZG, MBKM]: *This works in the Algebraic Group*

Model.