

Components of recent universal SNARKs

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30 seconds of philosophy: SNARKs and the meaning of life

As the world gets increasingly distributed and digital, SNARKs help us “keep a grip on reality”, by ensuring the data we receive is anchored in reality.

In this context, they are vast generalization of hashes and digital signatures.

Evaluating prover polynomials succinctly

Since the beginning of time (LFKN, 1990) humanity has been trying to verify prover polynomial evaluations.

Evaluating prover polynomials succinctly

Verifier: - “Choose a degree 10 polynomial f and keep it in your head”

Prover: - “OK”

Verifier: - “What is $f(7)$?”

Prover: - “10”

Evaluating prover polynomials succinctly

The hard-working honest way - Low degree testing [BFL91,...] (also PCPPs/IOPPs)

Evaluating prover polynomials succinctly

The hard-working honest way - Low degree testing/PCPP/IOPPs

The correct* way - Polynomial commitment scheme (with SRS).

*The opinions expressed in this presentation are objective reality

Notation: “an encoding of \mathfrak{x} ”

$$[\mathfrak{x}] := \mathfrak{x} \cdot \mathfrak{g} = \mathfrak{g} + \dots + \mathfrak{g} \text{ (}\mathfrak{x} \text{ times)}.$$

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You can imagine it means $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}}$, if it helps you sleep better.

The KZG polynomial commitment scheme

SRS: $[1], [\mathbf{x}], \dots, [\mathbf{x}^d]$, for random $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}$.

$$\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=0}^d \mathbf{a}_i \mathbf{X}^i$$

$$\text{cm}(\mathbf{f}) := \sum_{i=0}^d \mathbf{a}_i [\mathbf{x}^i] = [\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})]$$

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exercise - using pairing, define:

$\text{verify}(\text{cm}, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{i})$, where \mathbf{z} is allegedly $\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{i})$

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$$\mathbf{e}(\text{cm} - [\mathbf{z}], [1]) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(\boldsymbol{\pi}, [\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{i}])$$

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Thm_[KZG, MBKM]: *This works.*

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Client: Time-to-time query \mathbf{f} at a random point \mathbf{r} .

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Probability of server computing $\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{r})$ correctly w/o remembering all coeffs of \mathbf{f} is negligible.

Application: The Sonic helper [MBKM19]

Bi-variate $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y})$, evaluation points
 $\{(\mathbf{x}_j, \mathbf{y}_j)\}_{j \in \{1..t\}}$, values $\{\mathbf{z}_j\}$

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\mathcal{V} 's work: only *one* evaluation of \mathbf{S} !

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If \mathcal{H} would convince \mathcal{V} \mathbf{S}_j 's are correct, he could just open them at \mathbf{x}_j .

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2. \mathcal{V} chooses random $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}$.
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3. \mathcal{H} sends $\mathbf{C} := \text{cm}(\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{Y}))$.
4. $\forall j$, \mathcal{H} opens \mathbf{C} at \mathbf{y}_j and S_j at \mathbf{u} . \mathcal{V} checks they open to same value.

At this point \mathcal{V} knows S_j 's are correct if \mathbf{C} is correct.

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5. \mathcal{V} chooses random $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}$ and computes $\mathbf{s}(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v})$.
6. \mathcal{H} opens \mathbf{C} at \mathbf{v} , and \mathcal{V} checks it opens to $\mathbf{s}(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v})$.

3rd application: sumchecks

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\mathcal{P} has polynomial \mathbf{f} . $\mathbf{H} \subset \mathbb{F}$.

\mathcal{V} wants to check:

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{H}} \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}) = 0$$

The Aurora trick for sumcheck [BCRSVW19]

Lemma

When $\mathbf{H} \subset \mathbb{F}$ is a multiplicative subgroup of size \mathfrak{n} ,
and $\deg(\mathbf{g}) < \mathfrak{n}$

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{H}} \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x}) = 0$$

iff \mathbf{g} has constant coefficient 0.

The Aurora trick for sumcheck [BCRSVW19]

$$\mathbf{Z}_H := \prod_{\mathbf{x} \in H} (\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{x})$$

By lemma suffices to show $\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{g}_2$,
 $\deg(\mathbf{g}_2) < \mathbf{n} - 1$ such that

$$\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{X}) \equiv \mathbf{g}_1(\mathbf{X}) \cdot \mathbf{Z}_H(\mathbf{X}) + \mathbf{X} \cdot \mathbf{g}_2(\mathbf{X})$$

AuroraLight [G19]

Check \mathbf{f} has this form by sending commitments to $\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{g}_2$, and opening $\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{g}_2$ at random point.

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Check f has this form by sending commitments to g_1, g_2 , and opening f, g_1, g_2 at random point.

Using Aurora+Sonic ideas:

Corollary

Universal SRS SNARK with prover almost as fast as [Groth16] (But longer proofs than Sonic, and no fully succinct mode).