PLONK: Permutations over Lagrange-Bases for Oecumenical Noninteractive arguments of Knowledge

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Prelude: Trusted setups for pairing-based SNARKs

- Want to prove statements about circuit satisfiability
- Generate CRS of elements $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{s})}$ for secret $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}$ nobody knows, for some polynomials $\mathbf{P}$ (potentially depending on circuit).

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- If CRS only contains elements $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s^i}}$ setup is **universal and updatable**.

Plonk in two sips

1. All you need is a permutation check.
2. Permutations are easier to check on mutliplicative subgroups

Part 1: All you need is a permutation check

Our setting: want short proofs about fan-in 2 unlimited fan-out circuits, trusted setup is updatable depends only on circuit size.

example: Prove knowledge of $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}$ with

$$(\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b}) \cdot \mathbf{c} = 7$$

Left values: $\mathbf{l}_1, \mathbf{l}_2$
Right values: $\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2$
Output values: $\mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2$

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Gate checks: $\mathbf{l}_1 + \mathbf{r}_1 = \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{l}_2 \cdot \mathbf{r}_2 = \mathbf{o}_2$
Wire/copy checks: $\mathbf{o}_1 = \mathbf{l}_2$
Public input checks: $\mathbf{o}_2 = 7$.

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Gate checks: $\mathbf{l}_1 + \mathbf{r}_1 = \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{l}_2 \cdot \mathbf{r}_2 = \mathbf{o}_2$ **(easy)**
Wire/copy checks: $\mathbf{o}_1 = \mathbf{l}_2$ **(hard)**
Public input checks: $\mathbf{o}_2 = 7$ **(easy)**

Copy checks with permutations

similar to [Groth09,BCGGHJ17]

$$\mathbf{V} = (\mathbf{l}_1, \mathbf{l}_2, \mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2, \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2)$$

Copy checks with permutations

similar to [Groth09,BCGGHJ17]

$$\boldsymbol{V} = (\mathbf{l}_1, \mathbf{l}_2, \mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2, \mathbf{o}_1, \mathbf{o}_2)$$

$\mathbf{o}_1 = \mathbf{l}_2$ iff $\boldsymbol{V} = \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{V})$

For permutation $\boldsymbol{\sigma} = (25)$

Part 2: Permutations are easier to check on mutliplicative subgroups

[Bayer-Groth12] - perm checks with products

example: Given $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{F}^3$, want to check $(\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2, \mathbf{b}_3) = (\mathbf{a}_3, \mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2)$

[Bayer-Groth12] - perm checks with products

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step 1: Choose random $\boldsymbol{\beta} \in \mathbb{F}$. Let

$$\mathbf{a}'_1 = \mathbf{a}_1 + \boldsymbol{\beta}, \mathbf{a}'_2 = \mathbf{a}_2 + 2\boldsymbol{\beta}, \mathbf{a}'_3 = \mathbf{a}_3 + 3\boldsymbol{\beta}$$

$$\mathbf{b}'_1 = \mathbf{b}_1 + 3\boldsymbol{\beta}, \mathbf{b}'_2 = \mathbf{b}_2 + \boldsymbol{\beta}, \mathbf{b}'_3 = \mathbf{b}_3 + 2\boldsymbol{\beta}$$

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If claim false - w.h.p as mutliset $\{\mathbf{a}'_1, \mathbf{a}'_2, \mathbf{a}'_3\} \neq \{\mathbf{b}'_1, \mathbf{b}'_2, \mathbf{b}'_3\}$:

[Bayer-Groth12] - reducing permutation checks to products

step 2: Choose random $\gamma \in \mathbb{F}$. Let

$$a_i'' = a_i' + \gamma, b_i'' = b_i + \gamma$$

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$$a_i'' = a_i' + \gamma, b_i'' = b_i' + \gamma$$

If $\{a_1', a_2', a_3'\} \neq \{b_1', b_2', b_3'\}$ as multiset - w.h.p

$$a_1'' \cdot a_2'' \cdot a_3'' \neq b_1'' \cdot b_2'' \cdot b_3''.$$

Idealized Polynomials Protocols

Preprocessing: $\mathcal{V}$ chooses polynomials $\mathbf{g_1}, \ldots, \mathbf{g_t} \in \mathbb{F}_{<\mathbf{d}}[\mathbf{X}]$.

Protocol:

1. $\mathcal{P}$'s msgs are to ideal party $\mathbf{I}$. Must be $\mathbf{f_i} \in \mathbb{F}_{<\mathbf{d}}[\mathbf{X}]$.
2. At protocol end $\mathcal{V}$ asks $\mathbf{I}$ if some identities hold between $\{\mathbf{f}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{f}_\ell, \mathbf{g}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{g_t}\}$. Outputs $\mathbf{acc}$ iff they do.

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Using [KZG10], can compile to real protocol with each msg of $\mathcal{P}$ being 32-64 bytes according to your NFSPL.

$\mathbf{H}$-ranged Polynomials Protocols

Preprocessing: $\mathcal{V}$ chooses polynomials $\mathbf{g_1}, \ldots, \mathbf{g_t} \in \mathbb{F}_{<\mathbf{d}}[\mathbf{X}]$, $\mathbf{H} \subset \mathbb{F}$.

Protocol:

1. $\mathcal{P}$'s msgs are to ideal party $\mathbf{I}$. Must be $\mathbf{f_i} \in \mathbb{F}_{<\mathbf{d}}[\mathbf{X}]$.
2. At end, $\mathcal{V}$ asks $\mathbf{I}$ if some identities hold between $\{\mathbf{f}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{f}_\ell, \mathbf{g}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{g}_\mathbf{t}\}$ **on** $\mathbf{H}$.

$\mathbf{H}$-ranged protocol using polynomial protocol:

$\mathcal{V}$ wants to check identities $\mathbf{P}_1, \mathbf{P}_2$ on $\mathbf{H}$.

- After $\mathcal{P}$ finished sending $\{\mathbf{f_i}\}$, $\mathcal{V}$ sends random $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2 \in \mathbb{F}$.
- $\mathcal{P}$ sends $\mathbf{T} \in \mathbb{F}_{<\mathbf{d}}[\mathbf{X}]$.
- $\mathcal{V}$ checks identity $\mathbf{a}_1 \cdot \mathbf{P}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2 \cdot \mathbf{P}_2 \equiv \mathbf{T} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_\mathbf{H}$.

Checking permutations with $\mathbf{H}$-ranged protocols

Permutation $\boldsymbol{\sigma} : [\mathbf{n}] \to [\mathbf{n}]$. $\mathbf{H} = \left\{\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}^2, \ldots, \boldsymbol{\alpha}^{\mathbf{n}}\right\}$.

$\mathcal{P}$ has sent $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{F}_{<\mathbf{d}}[\mathbf{X}]$.

Wants to prove $\mathbf{f} = \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\mathbf{f})$:

$$\forall \mathbf{i} \in [\mathbf{n}], \mathbf{f}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{\mathbf{i}}) = \mathbf{f}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{\boldsymbol{\sigma}(\mathbf{i})})$$

Using [BG12] reduces to:

$H = \{\alpha, \alpha^2, \ldots, \alpha^n\}$.

$\mathcal{P}$ has sent $f, g \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X]$.

Wants to prove:

$$\prod_{i \in [n]} f(\alpha^i) = \prod_{i \in [n]} g(\alpha^i)$$

Checking products with $\mathbf{H}$-ranged protocols

1. $\mathcal{P}$ computes $\mathbf{Z}$ with
   $\mathbf{Z}(\alpha) = 1, \mathbf{Z}(\alpha^{\mathbf{i}}) = \prod_{\mathbf{j}<\mathbf{i}} \mathbf{f}(\alpha^{\mathbf{j}})/\mathbf{g}(\alpha^{\mathbf{j}})$,
   $\mathbf{i} = 2..\mathbf{n}+1$.
2. Sends $\mathbf{Z}$ to $\mathbf{I}$.

Checking products with $\mathbf{H}$-ranged protocols

1. $\mathcal{P}$ computes Z with $Z(\alpha) = 1, Z(\alpha^i) = \prod_{j<i} f(\alpha^j)/g(\alpha^j)$.
2. Sends Z to $\mathbf{I}$.
3. $\mathcal{V}$ checks following identities on $\mathbf{H}$.
   - 3.1 $L_1(X)(Z(X) - 1) = 0$
   - 3.2 $Z(X)f(X) = Z(\alpha \cdot X)g(X)$
   - 3.3 $L_n(X)(Z(\alpha \cdot X) - 1) = 0$

The bottom line (on BLS-381 curve)

600 byte proofs with one trusted setup for all fan-in two circuits of $\mathbf{n}$ gates.

Prover does $11\mathbf{n}$ $\mathbf{G}_1$ exp (or $9\mathbf{n}$ $\mathbf{G}_1$ exp with 700 byte proof).

For batch of proofs on same circuit only $3\mathbf{n}$ $\mathbf{G}_1$ exp and 240 bytes for each additional proof.

Bonus material: The KZG polynomial commitment scheme

SRS: $[1]$,$[x]$,. . . , $\left[x^d\right]$, for random $x \in \mathbb{F}$.

$f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{d} a_i X^i$

$\mathsf{cm}(f) := \sum_{i=0}^{d} a_i \left[x^i\right] = [f(x)]$

SRS: $[1]$,$[\mathbf{x}]$,. . . , $\left[\mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{d}}\right]$,
for random $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}$.

$\mathsf{cm}(\mathbf{f}) := [\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})]$

$\mathsf{open}(\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{i}) := [\mathbf{h}(\mathbf{x})]$, where $\mathbf{h}(\mathbf{X}) := \frac{\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{X}) - \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{i})}{\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{i}}$

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$\mathsf{verify}(\mathsf{cm}, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \boldsymbol{z}, \mathbf{i})$:

$$\boldsymbol{e}(\mathsf{cm} - [\boldsymbol{z}], [1]) \stackrel{?}{=} \boldsymbol{e}(\boldsymbol{\pi}, [\boldsymbol{\alpha} - \mathbf{i}])$$

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Thm[KZG,MBKM]: *This works in the Algebraic Group Model.*