Safety and Reliability of Embedded Systems - SRES (WS 19/20) Problem Set 5

Problem 1: Fault Tree Analysis K out of N system

You have to evaluate the failure of a 2 out of 3 system with the help of Fault Tree Analysis. A 2 out of 3 system consists of 3 components and for the system to be operating at least two out of these 3 components have to be operating. Pl ease consider the following events for your analysis:


Event type			
Top event	Fsys	2 out of 3 system fails	f _{sys}
Intermediate event	F ₁₂ , F ₁₃ , F ₂₃	Two components fail	f ₁₂ , f ₁₃ , f ₂₃
Basic event	F_1, F_2, F_3	A single component fails	f_1, f_2, f_3

The probability of failure of each single component is assumed to be f_c = 0.03

a. Please draw the corresponding fault tree using the above event names.

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Draw a fault tree for a 2 out of 3 system



b. Try to calculate the probability of failure of the system f sys by applying standard gate formulas known from lecture in a bottom up fashion.

Calculate the failure probability f_{sys}

$$f_1 = f_2 = f_3 = 0.03$$

$$f_{12} = f_1 * f_2 = 0.0009 = 9 * 10^{-4} = f_{13} = f_{23}$$

$$f_{sys} = f_{12} \vee f_{13} \vee f_{23}$$

$$f_{sys} = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{3} (1 - P_i)$$

$$f_{sys} = 1 - (1 - 9 * 10^{-4})^3$$

$$f_{sys}\approx 0.002698=2.698*10^{-3}$$

c. Now determine the minimal cut sets and calculate an approximation for f_{sys} .

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Calculate the MCSs and approximate f_{sys}

MCSs: $\{F_1, F_2\}$, $\{F_1, F_3\}$, $\{F_2, F_3\}$

Recap:			
Cut set			Set of basic events that trigger the top events
Minimal	Cut	Set	Cut set where the removal of any element results
(MCS)			in the top event no longer being triggered.

Note:

 $\{F_1, F_2, F_3\}$ is also a Cut Set but not Minimal Cut Set (MCS)


Approximations: $f_{sys} \approx f_1 * f_2 + f_1 * f_3 + f_2 * f_3 = 0.0027 = 2.7 * 10^{-3}$

Note:

Approximation: $P(A \lor B) \approx P_A + P_B$ Correct: $P(A \lor B) \approx P_A + P_B - P_A$. P_B

d. Finally, draw a binary decision tree for f sys using the variable order $F_1 \to F_2 \to F_3$. Convert the tree e into a reduced ordered binary decision diagram (ROBDD). Annotate the diagram with probabilities and again calculate the availability f_{sys} .


Draw the BDD for $f_{\rm sys}$ (variable order: $F_1 > F_2 > F_3$)



Draw a ROBDD (variable order: $F_1 > F_2 > F_3$)

Note:

- Identify isomorphic subgroups
- Eliminate redundant nodes and edges




$\textbf{Calculate} \ f_{sys}$

$$P_1 = 0.97 * 0.03 * 0.03$$

$$P_2 = 0.03 * 0.97 * 0.03$$


$$P_3 = 0.03 * 0.03$$

$$f_{sys} = P_1 + P_2 + P_3 = 2.6 * 10^{-3}$$



Problem 2: Detailed – Fault Tree Analysis

The purpose of the following plant is to mix FLUID 1 and FLUID 2 within tank T1. If a particular mixing time has elapsed, the operator H1 manually sends a START signal to controller C3, which in turn opens valve V3 via an electric motor M3 and initiates the filling process of tank T2. The mixed product is pumped into tank T2 using pump P3 until the level at level sensor L2 is reached. Pump P3 is switched off and valve V3 is closed again automatically by the controller.



In order to exactly dose the amount of fluids mixed, two dosing units (DOSING UNIT 1, DOSING UNIT 2) with mass flow meters (F1, F2) are used. Each flow meter sends electrical impulses to a software counter (C1, C2), using the impulse frequency as a figure for the amount of mass transported per unit time. If a pre-defined impulse count is reached, the software counter switches off the corresponding pump (P1, P2) and shuts the corresponding valve (V1, V2) via an electric motor (M1, M2). It is assumed here that if both dosing units work properly, the amount of mixed fluid within tank T1 is always below level L1.

In order to avoid overfilling, tank T1 is equipped with a safety mechanism. This mechanism is realized by a level sensor L1 built into the tank. If the corresponding level is reached, a signal is sent to controller C3, which immediately starts an emergency filling process of tank T2. In addition, the alarm A1 is triggered, indicating the hazardous condition to the operator. Before tank T2 is completely filled, the operator must switch off pumps P1 and P2 manually by interrupting the emergency switches S1 and S2.


If the safety mechanism fails, the mixed product might exit the tank via pipe O1, thereby causing pollution to the environment.

In the following, a fault tree analysis for the top-event POLLUTION should be performed. For this, please assume that the emergency switches S1 and S2 never fail and that all basic events are stochastically independent.


e) As a first step, draw a high-level fault tree for the top-event p (POLLUTION), thereby only considering the intermediate events d1 (DOSING UNIT 1 FAILS UNSAFE), d2 (DOSING UNIT 2 FAILS UNSAFE) and sm (SAFETY MECHANISM FAILS). <u>Determine the corresponding Boolean function</u>. <u>What does "dosing unit fails unsafe" mean in this example?</u>

p: pollution

d1: dosing unit 1 fails unsafe d2: dosing unit 2 fails unsafe sm: safety mechanism fails



When does a dosing unit fail unsafe?
 If liquid leaks uncontrollably.



f) Refine the intermediate events d1 (DOSING UNIT 1 FAILS UNSAFE) and d2 (DOSING UNIT 2 FAILS UNSAFE) in separate fault tree diagrams. <u>Determine the corresponding Boolean functions</u>. <u>Eliminate repeated events</u> by restructuring your expressions and <u>redraw the diagrams accordingly</u>. For the dosing units we have two intermediate events, the pump not being switched off and the valve not being closed. The pump is dependent on the counter(c1/2) and the mass flow meter (f1/2). The valve is dependent on the motor(m1/2), the counter(c1/2), and a correct working valve(v1/2).


c1: software counter f1: flow meter m1: motor


v1: valve

- Determine the Boolean function $d1 = P \text{ (pump fails to close)} \land P \text{ (valve fails to close)}$ $d1 = (c_1 \lor f_1) \land (c_1 \lor m_1 \lor v_1)$
- Eliminate repeated events
 Problem: not a tree anymore

 $d1 = c_1 \vee (f_1 \wedge (m_1 \vee v_1))$


• Instead: Construct new tree $d1 = c_1 \lor (f_1 \land (m_1 \lor v_1))$





g) Refine the intermediate event sm (SAFETY MECHANISM FAILS) in a separate fault tree diagram. <u>Determine the corresponding Boolean function</u>. (Hint: the variable order in g) shows the involved events)

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- I1, I2: level sensors
- v3: value

h1: human

- p3: pump
- c3: controller
- t2: tank

- m3: motor
- a1: alarm

Boolean expression: $sm = l1 \lor l2 \lor p3 \lor m3 \lor v3 \lor c3 \lor a1 \lor h1 \lor t2$

- h) <u>Develop the ROBDD</u> for the Boolean expression <u>for p as obtained in question</u> e
 - a. using the variable order: d1 \rightarrow d2 \rightarrow sm

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
p: pollution

d1: dosing unit 1 fails unsafe

d2: dosing unit 2 fails unsafe

sm: safety mechanism fails

$$p = (d1 \lor d2) \land sm$$



- i) <u>Develop the ROBDD</u> for the Boolean expression <u>for d1 as obtained in question</u> f
 - b. using the variable order: $c1 \rightarrow f1 \rightarrow m1 \rightarrow v1$

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
c1: software counter

f1: flow meter

m1: motor

v1: valve

$$d1 = c_1 + f_1 \cdot (m_1 + v_1)$$



- j) <u>Develop the ROBDD</u> for the Boolean expression <u>for d2 as obtained in question f</u>
 - c. using the variable order: $c2 \rightarrow f2 \rightarrow m2 \rightarrow v2$

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Same process as i

k) <u>Develop the ROBDD</u> for the Boolean expression <u>for sm as obtained in question g</u>

d. using the variable order: $l1 \rightarrow l2 \rightarrow p3 \rightarrow m3 \rightarrow v3 \rightarrow c3 \rightarrow a1 \rightarrow h1 \rightarrow t2$

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l1, l2: level sensors

v3: value

h1: human


p3: pump

c3: controller

t2: tank

m3: motor

a1: alarm



I) Assuming the basic event probabilities as given in the table below, now <u>calculate the probability for the top-event p</u> (POLLUTION).

t2	TANK T2 FULL	0.1
c1/2	COUNTER C1/2 DEFECTIVE	0.05
al	ALARM AT DEFECTIVE	0.03
hl	OPERATOR HI SLEEPS	0.1
m1/2	MOTOR M1/2 DEFECTIVE	0.06
v1/2	VALVE V1/2 STUCK OPEN	0.08
f1/2	MASS FLOW METER F1/2 DEFECTIVE (NO IMPULSES)	0.05
11/2	LEVEL SENSOR L1/2 DEFECTIVE	0.05
р3	PUMP P3 DEFECTIVE	0.06
m3	MOTOR M3 DEFECTIVE	0.06
v3	VALVE V3 STUCK CLOSED	0.08
c3	CONTROLLER C3 DEFECTIVE	0.05

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p = (d1 + d2) * sm
d1 = d2 = 0.056422 \approx (c1 + f1 * (m1 + v1))
sm = 0.45289
So,
p = (0.05642 * 0.45289) + (0.9435 * 0.05642 * 0.45289)
p = 0.049
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