

Data-Driven Dialogue

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Collaborators:

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THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

1950s ~ 2010

Dialog systems mostly rule-based

Chatbots:

Rule-Based: Eliza
(Weizenbaum 1966)
Information Retrieval
(Isbell et. al. 2000)

Goal-Directed Dialogue Systems:


ATIS Dataset (Hemphill, 1990)
-Manually annotated



1990s ~ 2010s

Data-Driven Machine Translation

Learning from millions of bilingual documents on the web



2011 ~ Today

Data-Driven Dialogue

500 million conversations per month on Twitter alone



Alan Ritter, Colin Cherry, Bill Dolan (EMNLP 2011) “Data-Driven Response Generation in Social Media”

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(vs. 30m for French-English translation)




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Noisy Channel Model

Input:

Who wants to come over for dinner tomorrow?


Noisy Channel Model

Input:

Who wants to come over for dinner tomorrow?

Output:

Yum ! I



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Noisy Channel Model

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Who wants to come over for dinner tomorrow?

Output:

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want to

be there

tomorrow !

Neural Conversation

[Sordoni et. al. 2015] [Xu et. al. 2016] [Wen et. al. 2016]
[Li et. al. 2016] [Kannan et. al. 2016] [Serban et. al. 2016]




Google Research Blog

Computer, respond to this email.

Tuesday, November 03, 2015

Posted by Greg Corrado*, Senior Research Scientist



Another bizarre feature of our early prototype was its propensity to respond with “I love you” to seemingly anything. As adorable as this sounds, it wasn’t really what we were hoping for. Some analysis revealed that the system was doing exactly what we’d trained it to do, generate likely responses -- and it turns out that responses like “Thanks”, “Sounds good”, and “I love you” are super common -- so the system would lean on them as a safe bet if it was unsure. Normalizing the

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


Google Research Blog


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






How old are you?

i 'm 16 .





How old are you?

i 'm 16 .

16 ?

i don 't know what you
're talking about



How old are you?

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⋮



How old are you?

Bad Action



i 'm 16 .

16 ?


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

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





Bad Action



Outcome




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
Deep Reinforcement Learning

[Li, Monroe, Ritter, Galley, Gao, Jurafsky EMNLP 2016]



Deep Reinforcement Learning

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Learning: Policy Gradient


REINFORCE Algorithm (Williams, 1992)

$$J(\theta) = \mathbb{E}[R(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_N)]$$

$$\nabla J(\theta) = \nabla \log p(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_N) R(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_N)$$

What we want to learn


$$\nabla J(\theta) = \nabla \log \prod_i p(s_i | s_{i-1}) R(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_N)$$



Q: Rewards?


Q: Rewards?

A: Turing Test



Q: Rewards?


A: Turing Test



Adversarial Learning
(Goodfellow et al., 2014)


Adversarial Learning for Neural Dialogue

[Li, Monroe, Shi, Jean, Ritter, Jurafsky EMNLP 2017]




Adversarial Learning for Neural Dialogue [Li, Monroe, Shi, Jean, Ritter, Jurafsky EMNLP 2017]

(Alternate Between Training Generator and Discriminator)



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REINFORCE Algorithm (Williams, 1992)

Adversarial Learning Improves Response Generation



Human Evaluator:

vs vanilla generation model

Adversarial Win	Adversarial Lose	Tie
62%	18%	20%




Machine Evaluator:
[Bowman et. al. 2016]

Adversarial Success
(How often can you fool a machine)

Adversarial Learning	8.0%
Standard Seq2Seq model	4.9%

Another Approach: Distributional Constraints




Stop word	Likelihood score
a	-4.62
the	-5.69
in	-5.95
<unk>	-6.26
on	-6.97
an	-7.00
my	-7.31
not	-7.57

Topic word	Likelihood score
shot	-6.58
dead	-6.95
head	-11.67
died	-12.24
murder	-12.43
president	-12.56
evil	-12.66
father	-12.66

Another Approach: Distributional Constraints



See our paper!




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Takeaways


Takeaways

Open-Domain Dialogue




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


Learning from Delayed-Reward




Takeaways



Open-Domain Dialogue



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


Adversarial Learning for Dialogue




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

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Adversarial Learning for Dialogue



Thank You!