

NuCypher KMS: Mining

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NuCypher

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This paper describes mining mechanisms and economics in NuCypher KMS. It includes inflation rates, mechanisms to incentivise long-term stakers and estimates of the number of tokens generated by nodes running in typical modes. Also, optimal strategies for stakers who may be affected by market volatility are proposed.

I. MOTIVATION

In the future, NuCypher KMS will probably be fully paid by network fees. But initially, when the adoption isn't yet high, miners who run the nodes necessary for network operation and keep re-encryption keys, will need to be subsidised. This will be done through an inflation schedule, where all the inflation is given back to miners.

Distribution of miner compensations should have the following properties:

- All the inflation is distributed to stakers who run the nodes, proportionally to their stake;
- The amount of work (and, hence, fees earned) is proportional to stake;
- Stakers are incentivized (by a higher compensation rate) to run long-term nodes;
- High inflation doesn't depreciate the price in order to keep liquidity for new stakers;
- Stakers are incentivized to stay online all the time.

In the paper we address all these points, calculate expected earnings of miners who run nodes and devise optimal mining strategies.

II. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF INFLATION

Let's review inflation schedules of different cryptocurrency projects: DASH [1] and ZCash [2].




FIG. 1: Historical price of ZCash in logarithmic scale.

Note the minimum at 23 Feb 2017

DASH has a hybrid of Proof-of-Work (POW) and Proof-of-Stake (POS). It has 45% of inflation going to POW miners, 45% to staking master nodes, and 10% reserved for budget proposals [3]. After the first year, its emission was 18.42% APR, decreasing by 1/14 every 383 days. With this setting, 60% of DASH coins are locked in masternodes for staking, according to the node statistics. It's unclear how inflation rate affects the price (and if it does here), but the useful data point is that there are 60% of coins locked for staking. Perhaps, that is something to expect in a network where staking is an option.

ZCash is very interesting because it started with an extremely high inflation rate. This caused a short-term price drop (even though the market capitalization was growing) (Fig. 1). But at some point (23 Feb 2017), the price started going up. ZCash block rewards yield 50 ZEC every 10 min, and ZEC supply at Feb 23 was 727k ZEC. This corresponds to 360% APR. It is even more remarkable given the fact that miners who mined

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ZEC are probably those who dump and exchange the proceeds into something else (and also pay electricity bills). This gives us information about what would be the maximum allowable inflation which still doesn't create too much downward pressure on the price.

III. MINING PROTOCOL

A miner commits to stay available for at least time T . For that, he or she specifies the unlocking time t_1 . Minimal lock time $t_1 - t$ should be not less than $T_{\min} = 1$ month. Number of coins locked for staking l should be no less than some value S_{\min} .

At any point a miner can split his stake or any piece of his stake into two pieces (Fig. 2). The size of each piece should be not less than S_{\min} . The reason for the possibility of that splitting is dependence of compensation rate on the lock time T , which we'll discuss later. At any point the miner can increase (but not decrease) T and add more coins to stake.

IV. GENERAL INFLATION PROPERTIES


A. Initial inflation

Let's assume that we'll have the same number of tokens locked as DASH: $\lambda = 60\%$. Then we'll have $1 - \lambda = 40\%$ in circulation. If we have inflation rate I , then adjusted inflation rate (e.g. inflation as if the locked tokens didn't exist) of tokens in circulation will be:


$$I^* = \frac{I}{1 - \lambda}, \quad (1)$$

and we should be comparing I^* with historical examples of inflation. If we take $I^* = 350\%$ (turnover point of ZCash price in an overall bullish market), the corresponding inflation I will be 140% APR.

To be on the safe side, we choose the starting inflation to be $I_0 = 100\%$ APR (or, in other words, 1/365 per day).



(a) Unlocking in a single step



(b) Splitting into two steps

FIG. 2: When staked, an unlock time t_1 is specified. At any time the unlock time can be increased (but not decreased). The stake can optionally be split into two parts where only one part is extended till t_2 .

B. Inflation decay

Initially, the inflation subsidises mining, but payments for re-encryption services will generate the majority or all the revenues of miners in the long run. If all miners have the same, maximum compensation rate, we choose the inflation rate to decay by factor of 2 in $T_{1/2} = 2$ years. The inflation, depending on time passed from the Genesis t , looks like:

$$I(t) = I_0 \cdot 2^{-\frac{t}{T_{1/2}}} = I_0 \exp \left[-\ln 2 \frac{t}{T_{1/2}} \right]. \quad (2)$$

In this case, the dependence of the token supply on the time t is:

$$S(t) = S_0 + \int_0^t I(t) dt = S_0 + \frac{I_0 T_{1/2}}{\ln 2} \left[1 - 2^{-\frac{t}{T_{1/2}}} \right], \quad (3)$$

Let's call relative initial annual inflation i_0 , and then $I_0 = i_0 S_0$. For 100% APR, $i_0 = 1$ and $I_0 = S_0$ per year, and the maximum number of tokens which will ever be created is:

$$S_{\max} = S(\infty) = S_0 \left(1 + \frac{i_0 T_{1/2}}{\ln 2} \right) \approx 3.89 S_0, \quad (4)$$

where S_0 is initial number of tokens.

C. Implementation of the exponential decay in a smart contract

Complex functions like exponentials, if implemented in smart contracts, would be quite costly. Fortunately, the exponential is a solution of a differential equation where inflation is proportional to the amount of not yet mined tokens:

$$I(t) = \frac{\ln 2}{T_{1/2}} (S_{\max} - S(t)) \quad (5)$$

$$dS = I(t) dt, \quad (6)$$

where $S(t)$ is the current token supply with $S(0) = S_0$ and the time step dt can actually be equal to the mining period (1 day). Each mining node can trivially calculate its dS in a smart contract using very few operations and the coin supply S from the last period. So, the amount of tokens mined for the node i and the time period t will be:

$$ds_{i,t} = \frac{l_i \ln 2}{L T_{1/2}} (S_{\max} - S_{t-1}), \quad (7)$$

$$dS_t = \sum_i ds_{i,t}, \quad (8)$$

where l_i is the number of tokens locked by the miner i , L is the total number of tokens locked. Instead of calculating all the sum over i , each miner i can add her portion $ds_{i,t}$.

D. Mining rate and staking time

We want to incentivize miners to keep serving re-encryption policies for at least 1 year. However, short-




FIG. 3: Dependence of the compensation rate on staking duration. We assume 60% of all tokens locked for staking

term stakers are still useful and should be rewarded. We will give the full compensation ($\kappa = 1$) to the stakers who are committed to stake at least $T_1 = 1$ year, however those who stake for $T_{\min} = 1$ month will get close to half the compensation ($\kappa \approx 0.54$) (Fig. 3). The individual daily compensation rate for a miner looks as:

$$\kappa = \left(0.5 + 0.5 \frac{\min(T_i, T_1)}{T_1} \right) \quad (9)$$

$$T_{i,\text{initial}} \geq T_{\min}, \quad (10)$$

$$\delta s_{i,t} = \kappa \frac{l_i \ln 2}{L T_{1/2}} (S_{\max} - S_{t-1}). \quad (11)$$

$$(12)$$

The unlocking time T_i means the time left to unlock the tokens $t_1 - t$. The initial T_i cannot be set smaller than 1 month, but it eventually becomes smaller than that as the time goes on, and the miner gets close to unlocking the stake.

This has implications on the global token economy. Firstly, if stakers, despite smaller compensation, prefer to stake for shorter, that creates smaller daily token supply. Since this usually should coincide with bear market, reducing the issuance during that time sounds like a good idea.

Interestingly enough, $\kappa < 1$ prolongs the compensation half-decay time $T_{1/2}^* = T_{1/2}/\kappa^*$, where κ^* is the mean staking parameter. If all the stakers have $\kappa^* = \kappa = 0.5$, this prolongs $T_{1/2}$ to be 4 years instead of 2.

The total supply over time (Eq. 3) at $\kappa^* \neq 1$ will then

look like:

$$S(t) = S_0 \left[1 + \frac{i_0 \kappa^* T_{1/2}^*}{\ln 2} \left(1 - 2^{-\frac{t}{T_{1/2}^*}} \right) \right]. \quad (13)$$

V. MINING STRATEGIES AND EXPECTED COMPENSATIONS

In this section, we look at three possibilities: miner taking all the compensation while extending the lock time, miner adding all the compensation to what's currently staked and miner waiting for the node to stop to get all the tokens unlocked after the time T (while taking the compensation). Every of these possibilities could have different distributions of κ . Let's consider $\kappa = 1$ and $\kappa = 0.5$ as two marginal values. Let's take amount of tokens locked to be $\lambda = 60\%$, as in DASH. We'll plot graphs of daily compensation, as well as calculate the compensation during the first year in each of these scenarios.

A. Withdraw mining compensation

This is the simplest case. The total amount of tokens staked in the network can be expressed as $L = \lambda S$. The amount of stake stays constant in this case and equal to $s_i = l$, and the mining rate (e.g. the cumulative compensation) is:

$$\frac{dr}{dt} = \kappa \frac{l}{\lambda S(t)} \frac{\ln 2}{T_{1/2}} (S_{\max} - S(t)). \quad (14)$$

Daily compensation dr/dt plotted for $\lambda = 0.6$ is shown on Fig. 4.

When we substitute $S(t)$ from Eq. 13 and integrate over time, we find total compensation:

$$r(t) = l \frac{\kappa}{\kappa^* \lambda} \ln \frac{S(t)}{S_0}. \quad (15)$$

If $\kappa = 1$ (staking for 1 year+) and $\lambda = 60\%$ (60% of all nodes in the network are staking), miner's compensation starts from 0.46% per day in NKMS tokens, or 100.2% during the first year of staking.

We should note that if other miners stake for less than a year ($\kappa^* < 1$), the inflation rate decays slower, and the compensation over a given period will be higher.




FIG. 4: Daily compensation over time assuming 60% tokens locked for lock times of 1 year and 1 month

B. Restake mining compensation

Instead of taking all the mining compensation, it could be restaked into the node in order to get even more jobs and, provided that the hardware is maintained powerful enough to cope with those, get even higher compensation. In this case, the actual stake l is constantly increasing with time:

$$\frac{dl}{dt} = \kappa \frac{l}{\lambda S(t)} \frac{\ln 2}{T_{1/2}} (S_{\max} - S(t)). \quad (16)$$

If we substitute $S(t)$ from Eq. 13 and solve this differential equation against l , we get:

$$l(t) = l(0) \left[\frac{S(t)}{S_0} \right]^{\frac{\kappa}{\kappa^* \lambda}}. \quad (17)$$

If $\kappa = 1$ (staking for 1 year+) and $\lambda = 60\%$ (60% of all nodes in the network are staking), miner's compensation starts from 0.46% per day in NKMS tokens, or $l(1) - l(0) = 177.5\%$ during the first year of staking. The difference between restaking and taking the reward is shown at Fig. 5.

C. Take mining compensation and spindown

When the node spins down, the miner doesn't extend the time for end of staking t_1 , and the compensation is constantly decreased because the time left to unlock becomes smaller and smaller, effectively decreasing κ gradually towards 0.5. That's the default behavior: to avoid




FIG. 5: Total amount of compensation produced by staking with relocking (blue) and without (red), when staking for 1 year or more (solid lines) or 1 month.

that, the miner should set t_1 large enough, or increase t_1 periodically.

D. Edge case: connection problems

If the miner is found to be non-operational and/or cannot confirm the activity, the tokens aren't unlocked during the mining period when that happens (and the compensation isn't given). It's not too bad for the miner if that happens, however one cannot lock tokens for mining and get them unlocked, even without getting the compensation. So if the miner commits to stake for at least a year, it implies a year of operation.

The “connection problems” may also be the time when the miner upgrades the software, which is an absolutely legitimate reason to be offline for a short time.

VI. TLDR

A. How much will I be earning if I run a node

It depends on how early you start (the earlier, the better), and for how long you commit to provide re-

encryption services. If you commit to work for 1 month, you'll be getting approximately 54% of what you'll be getting if you commit for 1 year or more. Also the compensation is inversely proportional to the total amount of tokens staked by all the participants. Finally, if you choose to automatically add the tokens earned to the stake, this will increase the total compensation because your stake will be increasing as well as the amount of job done for the network.

For example, if 60% of tokens in the system are always staked, you'd be earning 0.46% in day 1. With this amount of stakers, if you withdraw all the earned tokens instead of re-staking them, in the first year you'd earn 100.2% of your stake. But if you restake all your tokens, in the same first year you'd earn 177.5% of the tokens you staked.

B. How many tokens will be in the existence

We'll start with 1 billion tokens, and the maximum amount of tokens ever mined will be 3.89 billions.

C. What's the inflation rate

The inflation rate will depend on how many short-term miners and long-term miners are in the system. Depending on this, the initial inflation will be between 50% APR (when all miners are very short term) and 100% APR (when everyone commits for a long term). The inflation will be decaying exponentially every day, halving in time between 2 years (when all the miners are long term) and 4 years (when all the miners are short term).

[1] Evan Duffield and Daniel Diaz, “Dash: A privacy-centric crypto-currency,” (2015).

[2] “Zcash documentation,” .

[3] “Official dash documentation: Emission rate,” .