

Lecture #6: Cryptography against an eavesdropper?

Reading: 4.5.1, 4.6.4, 4.8 possible secret keys

Announcement: Handout more a way to substitute

Cryptography: The art/science of keeping secrets

key ingredients: encryption, decryption and a secret key

Let's see how this works with some historical examples

Caesar Cipher: Modularly shift letters by k secret key

($k=3$) e.g. H A I L C A E S A R (message)

K D L O F H D V D U (ciphertext)

What would Z become?

This is called encryption: message \rightarrow ciphertext

How do we recover the message from ciphertext?

shift back

e.g. H W W X E A X W H

E T T U B R U T E

This is called decryption: ciphertext \rightarrow message

But is this scheme secure against an eavesdropper?

No, could just try all 26 possible secret keys

Substitution Cipher: Choose a way to substitute letters, one-by-one

e.g. $A \rightarrow R$ hence $BAD CAB$ becomes
 $B \rightarrow C$ becomes $CRQ DRC$
 $C \rightarrow D$
 $D \rightarrow Q$

This is vulnerable to frequency analysis (e.g. $E \rightarrow ?$)

Last example, from WWII

Enigma Machine: (show video)

Modern cryptography relies on modular arithmetic

messages \leftrightarrow numbers

e.g.	T	A	N	K	
	20	01	14	11	= m

Our first attempt will use primes (e.g. $n = 26170819$)

Let $k = 15318192$ more, note $b \neq 0 \pmod{n}$, then

then we compute $c = \text{rem}(km, n)$

$$15318192 * 20011411 \pmod{2617089}$$

$$= 16137645$$

Given ($c = \text{rem}(km, n)$), how can we recover m ?

From the pulverizer, we have:

$$\text{rem}(20sk + tn) = 1 \pmod{n}$$

$$\text{Here } s = 7993233, t = -4678565$$

Thus we decrypt as $\text{rem}(sc, n)$

$$7993233 * 16137645 \pmod{2617089}$$

$$= 20011411$$

Scheme #1: prime n , key k , message m

(□)

Enc: $c = \text{rem}(km, n) \quad (c \equiv km \pmod{n})$

Dec: $\text{rem}(sc, n) = \text{rem}(skm, n) = m$
 $sc \equiv skm \equiv m \pmod{n}$

where $sk \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

Let's prove something interesting about it

Lemma 1: Let n be prime, and $k \not\equiv 0 \pmod{n}$, then

$$\text{rem}(k, n), \text{rem}(2k, n), \dots, \text{rem}((n-1)k, n)$$

is a permutation of the sequence $1, 2, \dots, n-1$

Let's see an example first, $n=7, k=5$

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{rem}(5, 7), \text{rem}(10, 7), \text{rem}(15, 7) \\ \parallel \quad \parallel \quad \parallel \\ 5 \quad 3 \quad 1 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{rem}(20, 7), \text{rem}(25, 7), \text{rem}(30, 7) \\ \parallel \quad \parallel \quad \parallel \\ 6 \quad 4 \quad 2 \end{array}$$

All numbers 1-6 appear once and only once

Proof: The sequence contains $n-1$ numbers.

Moreover $ik \equiv jk \pmod{n} \Leftrightarrow i \equiv j \pmod{n}$
(why?)

Also zero does not appear, hence all numbers in sequence are distinct \square

So our scheme is a shuffling (of all numbers $1-26170818$)

Now let's break it using a plain text attack

If an eavesdropper knows a message and its encoding:

$$m, c = \text{rem}(km, n)$$

how can he recover k ?

Since $\gcd(m, n) = 1$, we can find integers s, t

$$sm + tn = 1$$

$$\text{then } sc \equiv skm \pmod{n}$$

$$\equiv r \pmod{n}$$

Now we're finally ready to introduce RSA, recall

Thm [Euler]: If $n = pq$ for different primes p, q
then for any k with $\gcd(k, n) = 1$

$$k^{(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

Last time we did an example, let's do one more
to make sure you're comfortable

$$n = 2 \cdot 5, k = 3, \text{ then}$$

$$(*) \rightarrow 3^{(2-1)(5-1)} = 3^4 = 81, \text{ and } 81 \equiv 1 \pmod{10}$$

Scheme #2 [RSA] $n = pq$, for different primes p, q

Setup: Select e so that $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$
and let $d \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

Enc: $c = \text{rem}(m^e, n)$

Dec: $\text{rem}(c^d, n) (= m)$

Lemma 2: $\text{rem}(c^d, n) = m$

Proof: Using modular arithmetic, we have:

$$c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}, \text{ then}$$

$$c^d \equiv (m^e)^d \equiv m^{ed} \pmod{n}$$

Using Euler's theorem

$$m^{ed} \equiv m^{\text{rem}(ed, (p-1)(q-1))} \pmod{n}$$

Now using $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ we have

$$\equiv m \pmod{n}$$

Since c^d and m differ by a multiple of n ,

and $0 \leq m < n$ we have $m = \text{rem}(c^d, n)$

(*)

Alternatively $k^s \equiv k^{\text{rem}(s, (p-1)(q-1))} \pmod{n}$

$$\text{e.g. } 3^{31} \equiv 3^{27} \equiv 3^{23} \dots \equiv 3^3 \equiv 7 \pmod{10}$$

In fact, this scheme is public key: Can tell everyone (e, n) which allows them to transmit to you, but only you know d and can decrypt

(□) Fact: $m \equiv \text{rem}(m, n) \pmod{n}$

Proof: By Division Algorithm

$$m = qn + r \quad 0 \leq r < n$$

$\stackrel{\text{"rem}}{\equiv} (m, n)$

then taking \pmod{n} on both sides

$$m \equiv qn + r \pmod{n} \quad \blacksquare$$

The security of RSA rests on:

Assumption: Given n (product of two primes),
it is hard to factor it

If we knew (or could compute) $n = pq$, then

we could use the Puverizer to find

$$de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$$

and decrypt secret messages

(Show Nash's declassified letter)

What else does the NSA know about?