

# DYNAMIC SEARCHABLE SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

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## INTRODUCTION

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- Rise of cloud storage.
- Outsource data storage.
- Security concerns regarding data privacy.
- Naïve solution: Encrypt data before uploading.

## Searchable Symmetric Encryption

- Encrypt data such that it can still be searched.
- Generate search tokens to send as queries to server.
- Return appropriate encrypted files.
- Application: Cloud storage.

## DEFINITIONS

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### Symmetric Key Encryption

- Same key for encryption and decryption.

$$c = E_K(m)$$

$$m = D_K(c)$$

### Homomorphic Encryption

- Permit computations on encrypted data.
- Obtaining  $E_K(f(x))$  from  $E_K(x)$ .
- Server learns nothing about data it computed on.
- 2 types: Partially HE & Fully HE.

## Pseudorandom Function

- Polynomial time function whose output is indistinguishable from a random function.

$$F: \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^s \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$$

- Given  $F$ ,  $K$ ,  $x_1, \dots, x_a$  and  $F_K(x_1), \dots, F_K(x_a)$ ,  $F_K(x_{a+1})$  can't be predicted for any  $x_{a+1}$ .



## THE CONSTRUCTION

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- A private-key encryption scheme  $\text{SKE}$ .
- 2 pseudorandom functions  $F$  and  $G$ .
- $A_s$  - search array.
- $T_s$  - search table.

- Collection of files  $\mathbf{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_n)$
- Each file has unique identifier  $\text{id}(f_i)$
- $W =$  keyword space.
- Map each file to a list of keywords from  $W$ .
- $\mathbf{f}_w =$  set of files in  $\mathbf{f}$  that contain  $w$ .

- $\forall w \in W$ , construct  $L_w = (N_1, \dots, N_{|f_w|})$
- Each node stored at random locations in  $A_s$
- $N_i = \langle \text{id}, \text{addr}_s(N_{i+1}) \rangle$
- $K_1$  and  $K_2$  are the keys to the PRF  $F$  and  $G$ .
- $T_s[F_{K_1}(w)] = \text{head of } L_w$
- Each list encrypted using **SKE** under key  $G_{K_2}(w)$

- Send *search array*  $A_s$ , *search table*  $T_s$  and the collection of encrypted files  $\mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_n)$  to the server.
- To search for  $w$ , send  $F_{K_1}(w)$  and  $G_{K_2}(w)$ .
- Use  $F_{K_1}(w)$  to recover the pointer to head of  $L_w$ .
- Use  $G_{K_2}(w)$  to decrypt the list.
- Running time -  $O(|\mathbf{f}_w|)$
- Leakage of statistical information.

- Allow addition, deletion or modification of a file.
- Difficulties:
  1. Nodes corresponding to a file  $f$  are unknown.
  2. Can't modify pointer of the previous node as it is encrypted.
  3. Free locations in search array are unknown.

1. Store list of pointers to nodes in  $\mathbf{A}_s$  corresponding to a file  $f$  in the data structures  $\mathbf{A}_d$  and  $\mathbf{T}_d$  called the *deletion array* and *deletion table*.
2. Encrypt pointers with a homomorphic encryption scheme.
3. Keep track of free locations in  $\mathbf{A}_s$  in a *free list*.


**EXAMPLE**

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# EXAMPLE

Index



Search Table  $T_s$

$$F_{K_1}(w_1) \rightarrow 4$$

$$F_{K_1}(w_2) \rightarrow 0$$

$$F_{K_1}(w_3) \rightarrow 5$$


$$\text{free} \rightarrow 6$$

Deletion Table  $T_d$

$$F_{K_1}(f_1) \rightarrow 1$$

$$F_{K_1}(f_2) \rightarrow 5$$

$$F_{K_1}(f_3) \rightarrow 4$$




Search Array  $A_s$

Deletion Array  $A_d$

## EXAMPLE - ADDING A FILE

Index



Search Table  $T_s$

$$F_{K_1}(w_1) \rightarrow 4$$

$$F_{K_1}(w_2) \rightarrow 0$$

$$F_{K_1}(w_3) \rightarrow 5$$


Deletion Table  $T_d$

$$F_{K_1}(f_1) \rightarrow 1$$

$$F_{K_1}(f_2) \rightarrow 5$$


$$F_{K_1}(f_3) \rightarrow 4$$

$$F_{K_1}(f_4) \rightarrow 3$$



## EXAMPLE - DELETING A FILE

Index



Search Table  $T_s$

$$F_{K_1}(w_1) \rightarrow 4$$

$$F_{K_1}(w_2) \rightarrow 0$$


$$F_{K_1}(w_3) \rightarrow 5$$

Deletion Table  $T_d$

$$F_{K_1}(f_1) \rightarrow 1$$

$$F_{K_1}(f_2) \rightarrow 5$$

$$F_{K_1}(f_4) \rightarrow 3$$



QUESTIONS?

- [1] C. Bösch, P. Hartel, W. Jonker, and A. Peter.  
**A survey of provably secure searchable encryption.**  
*ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)*, 47(2):18, 2014.
- [2] S. Kamara, C. Papamanthou, and T. Roeder.  
**Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption.**  
In *Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security*, pages 965–976. ACM, 2012.