**CWN coding as of 2021**

**AUSTRALIA**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Australia 1959*: The Governor and the Deputy Governor: (a) shall be appointed by the Governor-General; (b) shall be appointed for such period, not exceeding 7 years, as the Governor-General determines but are eligible for re‑appointment; and (c) hold office subject to good behaviour. (Art. 24, 1) Coded as .75

*Australia 2010*: (1)  The Governor and the Deputy Governor:

(a)  are to be appointed by the Treasurer; and

(b)  shall be appointed for such period, not exceeding 7 years, as the Treasurer determines but are eligible for re‑appointment; and

(c)  hold office subject to good behaviour. (Article 24) Coded as .75  
*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Australia 1959*: The Governor and the Deputy Governor: (a) shall be appointed by the Governor-General; (b) shall be appointed for such period, not exceeding 7 years, as the Governor-General determines but are eligible for re‑appointment; and (c) hold office subject to good behaviour. (Art. 24, 1) Coded as 0

*Australia 2010*: (1)  The Governor and the Deputy Governor:

(a)  are to be appointed by the Treasurer; and

(b)  shall be appointed for such period, not exceeding 7 years, as the Treasurer determines but are eligible for re‑appointment; and

(c)  hold office subject to good behaviour. (Article 24) Coded as 0  
*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

1. ***Dismissal***

*Australia 1959*: If the Governor or the Deputy Governor: (a) becomes permanently incapable of performing his or her duties; (b) engages in any paid employment outside the duties of his or her office; (c) becomes bankrupt, applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors, compounds with his or her creditors or makes an assignment of his or her salary for their benefit; or (d) resigns his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor-General; the Governor-General shall terminate his appointment. (Art. 25) Coded as .83

*Australia 2010*: If the Governor or the Deputy Governor:

(a)  becomes permanently incapable of performing his or her duties; or

(b)  engages in any paid employment outside the duties of his or her office; or

(c)  becomes bankrupt, applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors, compounds with his or her creditors or makes an assignment of his or her salary for their benefit;

the Treasurer shall terminate his appointment. Coded as .83

*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Australia 1959*: If the Governor or the Deputy Governor: (a) becomes permanently incapable of performing his or her duties; (b) engages in any paid employment outside the duties of his or her office; (c) becomes bankrupt, applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors, compounds with his or her creditors or makes an assignment of his or her salary for their benefit; or (d) resigns his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor-General; the Governor-General shall terminate his appointment. (Art. 25) Coded as 1

*Australia 2010*: If the Governor or the Deputy Governor:

(a)  becomes permanently incapable of performing his or her duties; or

(b)  engages in any paid employment outside the duties of his or her office; or

(c)  becomes bankrupt, applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors, compounds with his or her creditors or makes an assignment of his or her salary for their benefit;

the Treasurer shall terminate his appointment. Coded as 1

*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Australia 2010*:     (1)  The Government is to be informed of the Bank’s policy as follows:

(a)  the Reserve Bank Board is to inform the Government, from time to time, of the Bank’s monetary and banking policy;

(b)  the Payments System Board is to inform the Government, from time to time, of the Bank’s payments system policy.

(2)  In the event of a difference of opinion between the Government and one of the Boards (the ***relevant Board***) about whether a policy determined by the relevant Board is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia, the Treasurer and the relevant Board shall endeavour to reach agreement.

(3)  If the Treasurer and the relevant Board are unable to reach agreement, the relevant Board shall forthwith furnish to the Treasurer a statement in relation to the matter in respect of which the difference of opinion has arisen.

(4)  The Treasurer may then submit a recommendation to the Governor‑General, and the Governor‑General, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, may, by order, determine the policy to be adopted by the Bank.

(5)  The Treasurer shall inform the relevant Board of the policy so determined and shall, at the same time, inform the relevant Board that the Government accepts responsibility for the adoption by the Bank of that policy and will take such action (if any) within its powers as the Government considers to be necessary by reason of the adoption of that policy.

(6)  The relevant Board shall thereupon ensure that effect is given to the policy determined by the order and shall, if the order so requires, continue to ensure that effect is given to that policy while the order remains in operation.

(7)  The Treasurer shall cause to be laid before each House of the Parliament, within 15 sitting days of that House after the Treasurer has informed the relevant Board of the policy determined under subsection (4):

(a)  a copy of the order determining the policy;

(b)  a statement by the Government in relation to the matter in respect of which the difference of opinion arose; and

(c)  a copy of the statement furnished to the Treasurer by the relevant Board under subsection (3). (Section 11) Coded as .33 following CWN

*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Australia 1959*: In the event of a difference of opinion between the Government and one of the Boards about whether a policy determined by the relevant Board is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia, the Treasurer and the relevant Board shall endeavour to reach agreement. If the Treasurer and the relevant Board are unable to reach agreement, the relevant Board shall forthwith furnish to the Treasurer a statement in relation to the matter in respect of which the difference of opinion has arisen. The Treasurer may then submit a recommendation to the Governor-General, and the Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, may, by order, determine the policy to be adopted by the Bank. The Treasurer shall inform the relevant Board of the policy so determined and shall, at the same time, inform the relevant Board that the Government accepts responsibility for the adoption by the Bank of that policy and will take such action (if any) within its powers as the Government considers to be necessary by reason of the adoption of that policy. The relevant Board shall thereupon ensure that effect is given to the policy determined by the order and shall, if the order so requires, continue to ensure that effect is given to that policy while the order remains in operation. The Treasurer shall cause to be laid before each House of the Parliament, within 15 sitting days of that House after the Treasurer has informed the relevant Board of the policy determined under subsection (4): (a) a copy of the order determining the policy; (b) a statement by the Government in relation to the matter in respect of which the difference of opinion arose; and (c) a copy of the statement furnished to the Treasurer by the relevant Board under subsection (3). (Section 11, 1-7) Coded as .2

*Australia 2010*:     (1)  The Government is to be informed of the Bank’s policy as follows:

(a)  the Reserve Bank Board is to inform the Government, from time to time, of the Bank’s monetary and banking policy;

(b)  the Payments System Board is to inform the Government, from time to time, of the Bank’s payments system policy.

(2)  In the event of a difference of opinion between the Government and one of the Boards (the ***relevant Board***) about whether a policy determined by the relevant Board is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia, the Treasurer and the relevant Board shall endeavour to reach agreement.

(3)  If the Treasurer and the relevant Board are unable to reach agreement, the relevant Board shall forthwith furnish to the Treasurer a statement in relation to the matter in respect of which the difference of opinion has arisen.

(4)  The Treasurer may then submit a recommendation to the Governor‑General, and the Governor‑General, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, may, by order, determine the policy to be adopted by the Bank.

(5)  The Treasurer shall inform the relevant Board of the policy so determined and shall, at the same time, inform the relevant Board that the Government accepts responsibility for the adoption by the Bank of that policy and will take such action (if any) within its powers as the Government considers to be necessary by reason of the adoption of that policy.

(6)  The relevant Board shall thereupon ensure that effect is given to the policy determined by the order and shall, if the order so requires, continue to ensure that effect is given to that policy while the order remains in operation.

(7)  The Treasurer shall cause to be laid before each House of the Parliament, within 15 sitting days of that House after the Treasurer has informed the relevant Board of the policy determined under subsection (4):

(a)  a copy of the order determining the policy;

(b)  a statement by the Government in relation to the matter in respect of which the difference of opinion arose; and

(c)  a copy of the statement furnished to the Treasurer by the relevant Board under subsection (3). (Section 11) Coded as .2

*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Australia 1959*: It is the duty of the Reserve Bank Board, within the limits of its powers, to ensure that the monetary and banking policy of the Bank is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia and that the powers of the Bank under this Act and any other Act, other than the *Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998* and the *Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998*, are exercised in such a manner as, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank Board, will best contribute to: (a) the stability of the currency of Australia; (b) the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and (c) the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia.. (Section 10, 2) Coded as .4

*Australia 2010*: It is the duty of the Reserve Bank Board, within the limits of its powers, to ensure that the monetary and banking policy of the Bank is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia and that the powers of the Bank under this Act and any other Act, other than the *Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998*, the *Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998* and Part 7.3 of the *Corporations Act 2001*, are exercised in such a manner as, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank Board, will best contribute to: (a)  the stability of the currency of Australia; (b)  the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and (c)  the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia. (Article 10) Coded as .4

*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Australia 2010*:The Bank has such powers as are necessary for the purposes of this Act and any other Act conferring functions on the Bank and, in particular, and in addition to any other powers conferred on it by this Act and such other Acts, has power:

(a) to receive money on deposit;

(b) to borrow money;

(c) to lend money;

(d) to buy, sell, discount and re‑discount bills of exchange, promissory notes and treasury bills;

(e) to buy and sell securities issued by the Commonwealth and other securities;

(f) to buy, sell and otherwise deal in foreign currency, specie, gold and other precious metals;

(g) to establish credits and give guarantees;

(h) to issue bills and drafts and effect transfers of money;

(i) to underwrite loans; and

(j) to do anything incidental to any of its powers. (Section 8)

*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

# 

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Australia 2010*:The Bank has such powers as are necessary for the purposes of this Act and any other Act conferring functions on the Bank and, in particular, and in addition to any other powers conferred on it by this Act and such other Acts, has power:

(e) to buy and sell securities issued by the Commonwealth and other securities;(Section 8) Coded as 0

*Australia 2021*: No change since 2010

**AZERBAIJAN**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Azerbaijan 1999*: In accordance with the item 32, article 109 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic the chairman of the National Bank Board is to be appointed from the members of the National Bank Board for five year term by the President of the Azerbaijan Republic. (Article 9, 3) Coded as .5

*Azerbaijan 2010*: Members of the Management Board shall be appointed for 5 year term. (Article 21, 5) Coded as .5

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Azerbaijan 1999*: In accordance with the item 32, article 109 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic the chairman of the National Bank Board is to be appointed from the members of the National Bank Board for five year term by the President of the Azerbaijan Republic. (Article 9, 3)

*Azerbaijan 2010*: The Chairman of the Central Bank Management Board shall be appointed from among the Board members for a period equal to the term of office of its member according to Item 32 of Article 109 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (Article 21, 6) (Item 32 of Article 109 vests the appointment power in the President, but the Board members are appointed by the President and the parliament) Coded as 0

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Azerbaijan 1999*: In accordance with the item 32, article 109 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic the chairman of the National Bank Board is to be appointed from the members of the National Bank Board for five year term by the President of the Azerbaijan Republic. The chairman and members of the Board are dismissed from their posts in the same order. (Article 9, 3) Coded as .17

*Azerbaijan 2010*: The Chairman and other members of the Central Bank’s Management Board may be released from office prior to expiry of their respective terms of office in the order specified by Item 10 of Article 109 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the following cases:

1) if a resignation letter has been submitted to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan;

2) when failure to discharge his/her responsibilities within a period of over 6 months due to an illness, which can be evidence by an appropriate medical confirmation, provided the Management Board duly petitions the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan;

3) when considered unfit for work or with limited work ability through the decision of the court;

4) if an effective court ruling has been adopted that recognizes the person concerned guilty of crime;

5) requirements and limitations as imposed in Article 21 hereof have been defaulted;

A board member who disagrees with his/her earlier termination from the office may apply to court as determined by the legislation. (Article 25) Coded as .83 from 2004 for now

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Azerbaijan 2010*: Members of the Milli Majlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan, members of the Parliament of the Nakhicevan Autonomous republic, members of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, as well as elected members of municipal bodies, as well as persons employed with state executive authorities or municipalities shall not be eligible for membership with the Central Bank’s Management Board. (Article 21, 3)

Board members may not be members of political parties and hold positions with public organizations. (Article 21, 10) Coded as 1

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Azerbaijan 1999:* General aims of the National Bank’s activity include: 2) preparation and submitting of general directions of monetary-credit polict to the President of the Azerbaijan Republic; (Article 3)

Neither state body, local self-governing body or another governing body has the right to interfere with the National Bank’s activity during the fulfillment by the bank or its structures their powers. The National Bank reports only to the President of the Azerbaijan Republic. (Article 5, 2)

*Azerbaijan 2010*: Central Bank shall be independent in discharge of its responsibilities and exercise of its authorities prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan and no state authority or self-administration body, physical persons or legal entities may directly or indirectly by any reason constrain, illegally influence or interfere with its activities. (Article 6)

Central Bank shall, within its authorities, assist in pursuing economic policy of the country according to the goals specified by the present Law. (Article 15) Coded as 1

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *Resolution of conflict*

*Azerbaijan*: Recoding as – because nothing in law about resolution. Not sure whether president can override CB or CB is guaranteed autonomy (follows CMN and overrides Bodea)

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

Nothing. Coded as 0

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Azerbaijan 2010*: The primary goal of the Central Bank's activity is to ensure price stability within its authorities. (2) The goal of the Central Bank's activity shall also be to ensure stability and development of the banking and payment systems; (3) Profit making shall not be the primary goal of the Central Bank. (Article 4) Coded as .6 from 2004

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Azerbaijan 2010*: Central Bank shall not issue loans to the state to directly fund the state

budget deficit. (Article 16, 1) Coded as 1 from 2004

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Azerbaijan 2010*: Central Bank shall not issue loans to the state to directly fund the state budget deficit.

In the event of the funds short-term shortfall in the state budget, the Central Bank may extend a 6 month loan to the government under an agreement with the appropriate executive power against collateral of interest-bearing government securities and provided to be repaid in the national currency (manat) in the current year. Total amount of repaid and outstanding portion of such loans may not exceed 3 percent of average yield of the state budget for the past three years.

Purchase of securities issued by the Azerbaijani government by the Central Bank is considered as an issue of loans to the state. Such transactions may be made in the secondary market only except for the cases specified in Article 49-1.2 of the present Law and provisions of Article 16.2 thereof shall apply to them.

In cases related to implementation of monetary policy provisions of Article 16.2 of the present Law shall not apply, provided that government securities shall be traded in the secondary market. (Article 16) Coded as .67 from 2004

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*Azerbaijan 2010*: In the event of the funds short-term shortfall in the state budget, the Central Bank may extend a 6 month loan to the government under an agreement with the appropriate executive power against collateral of interest-bearing government securities and provided to be repaid in the national currency (manat) in the current year. Total amount of repaid and outstanding portion of such loans may not exceed 3 percent of average yield of the state budget for the past three years. (Article 16) coded as .33

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Azerbaijan 1999*: 1. The National Bank grants annual credits to state bodies in the amount, fixed by the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic “About confirmation of the state budget”

2. Credits of the National Bank are secured with valuable promissory notes, yielding interests. Each credit is drawn with a contract between the organization, authorized by the corresponding state body and the National Bank. The contract states the value of the credit, terms of its payment and interest rates. (Article 40) [removed by the 2010 law] Coding borrowers as 1 from 2004 for now

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*Azerbaijan 2010*: In the event of the funds short-term shortfall in the state budget, the Central Bank may extend a 6 month loan to the government under an agreement with the appropriate executive power against collateral of interest-bearing government securities and provided to be repaid in the national currency (manat) in the current year. Total amount of repaid and outstanding portion of such loans may not exceed 3 percent of average yield of the state budget for the past three years. (Article 16) Coded as .33

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *Maturity of loans (.025)*

*Azerbaijan 2010*: In the event of the funds short-term shortfall in the state budget, the Central Bank may extend a 6 month loan to the government under an agreement with the appropriate executive power against collateral of interest-bearing government securities and provided to be repaid in the national currency (manat) in the current year. Total amount of repaid and outstanding portion of such loans may not exceed 3 percent of average yield of the state budget for the past three years. (Article 16) Coded as 1

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*Azerbaijan 2010*: In the event of the funds short-term shortfall in the state budget, the Central Bank may extend a 6 month loan to the government under an agreement with the appropriate executive power against collateral of interest-bearing government securities and provided to be repaid in the national currency (manat) in the current year. Total amount of repaid and outstanding portion of such loans may not exceed 3 percent of average yield of the state budget for the past three years. (Article 16) Coded as .25

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Azerbaijan 2010*: Purchase of securities issued by the Azerbaijani government by the Central Bank is considered as an issue of loans to the state. Such transactions may be made in the secondary market only except for the cases specified in Article 49-1.2 of the present Law and provisions of Article 16.2 thereof shall apply to them. (Article 16, 3) Coded as 0

*Azerbaijan 2021*: No change

**BULGARIA**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Bulgaria 2010*: The term of office of the members of the Governing Council shall be six years. (Article 12, 4; amended; Darjaven Vestnik, issue 10 of 2005) Coded as .75

*Bulgaria 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Bulgaria 2010*: The Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank shall be elected by the National Assembly (Article 12) Coded as .5

*Bulgaria 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Bulgaria 2010*: The competent authority under Article 12 may relieve from office a member of the Governing Council only if he no longer fulfills the conditions required for the performance of his duties under Article 11, paragraph 4, if he is in practical inability to perform his duties for more than 6 months, or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct. (Article 14, 1) Coded as .83

*Bulgaria 2018:* The competent authority under Article 12 may only remove a member of the Governing Council from office if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been found guilty of serious misconduct. (Article 14,1) Coded as .83

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Bulgaria 2010*: The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall not engage in any activity, other than teaching, or as members of the bodies in companies where the Bulgarian National Bank participates or in international organizations related to Bulgarian National Bank activities. They may perform a non-remunerative activity following a unanimous decision of the Governing Council insofar as there is no conflict of interest. (Article 12, 5; amended; Darjaven Vestnik, issue 54 of 1999, issue 10 of 2005) Coded as 1

*Bulgaria 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Bulgaria 2010*: In the formulation of the general outlines of the monetary policy, the Bulgarian National Bank and the Council of Ministers shall inform each other. (Article 3; amended, Darjaven Vestnik, issue 10 of 2005)

*Repealed in 2021*

When exercising their powers and carrying out their duties under this Law, the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor and the members of the Governing Council shall be independent and neither the Bank, nor the Governor, nor the members of the Governing Council shall seek or take any instructions from the Council of Ministers or from any other bodies and institutions. The Council of Ministers and other bodies and institutions shall not give instructions to the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor or the members of the Governing Council. (Article 44) Coded as 1

*Bulgaria 2018:* When exercising their powers and carrying out their duties under this Law, the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor and the members of the Governing Council shall be independent and neither the Bank, nor the Governor, nor the members of the Governing Council shall seek or take any instructions from European Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies, from the Council of Ministers or the governments of other EU Member States, as well as from any other bodies and institutions. The Council of Ministers and other bodies and institutions under sentence one shall not has the right to influence the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor or the members of the Governing Council. (Article 44) Coded as 1

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Bulgaria 2010*: In the formulation of the general outlines of the monetary policy, the Bulgarian National Bank and the Council of Ministers shall inform each other. (Article 3; amended, Darjaven Vestnik, issue 10 of 2005)

*Repealed in 2021*

When exercising their powers and carrying out their duties under this Law, the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor and the members of the Governing Council shall be independent and neither the Bank, nor the Governor, nor the members of the Governing Council shall seek or take any instructions from the Council of Ministers or from any other bodies and institutions. The Council of Ministers and other bodies and institutions shall not give instructions to the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor or the members of the Governing Council. (Article 44) Coded as 1

*Bulgaria 2018:* When exercising their powers and carrying out their duties under this Law, the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor and the members of the Governing Council shall be independent and neither the Bank, nor the Governor, nor the members of the Governing Council shall seek or take any instructions from European Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies, from the Council of Ministers or the governments of other EU Member States, as well as from any other bodies and institutions. The Council of Ministers and other bodies and institutions under sentence one shall not has the right to influence the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governor or the members of the Governing Council. (Article 44) Coded as 1

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

Could not find anything. Coding as 0

*Bulgaria 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Bulgaria 2010*: (1) The primary objective of the Bulgarian National Bank shall be to maintain price stability through ensuring the stability of the national currency and implementing monetary policy as provided for by this Law.

(2) The Bulgarian National Bank shall act in accordance with the principle of the open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources. From the date of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union and without prejudice to the primary objective of price stability, the Bulgarian National Bank shall support the general economic policies in the European Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the European Community as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

(3) Without prejudice to the objectives under paragraphs 1 and 2, the Bulgarian National Bank shall support the policy of sustainable and non-inflationary growth. (Article 2, amended; Darjaven Vestnik, issue 10 or 2005) Coded as .6

*Bulgaria 2018*: (1) The primary objective of the Bulgarian National Bank shall be to maintain price stability through ensuring the stability of the national currency and implementing monetary policy as provided for by this Law.

(2) The Bulgarian National Bank shall act in accordance with the principle of the open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources. Without prejudice to the primary objective of price stability, the Bulgarian National Bank shall support the general economic policies in the European Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the European Community as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.

(3) Without prejudice to the objectives under paragraphs 1 and 2, the Bulgarian National Bank shall support the policy of sustainable and non-inflationary growth. (Article 2, amended; Darjaven Vestnik, issue 10 or 2005) Coded as .6

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Bulgaria 2010*: (1) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not extend credits and guarantees in any form whatsoever, including through purchase of debt instruments, to the Council of Ministers, municipalities, as well as to other government and municipal institutions, organizations and enterprises.

(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply to extension of credits to state-owned and municipal banks in the cases under Article 33, paragraph 2. (Article 45; amended 2005) Coded as 1 (goes back to 1999)

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Bulgaria 2010*: The Bulgarian National Bank may extend credits to the government against purchases of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund, extended by the Governing Council under the following terms:

1. the decision by the Governing Council shall be taken no later than seven days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

2. the time limit for the utilization of the credit by the State shall be 90 days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

3. payments of the principal and interest shall be effected no later than the dates whereon the Bulgarian National Bank must effect the relevant payments to the International Monetary Fund and up to amounts required for the said payments.

(4) Upon the expiry of the time limit under paragraph 3, item 2, the right of the State on the unutilized portion of the extended credit shall be extinguished. (Article 45) Coded as .67

*Bulgaria 2021*: Article 45:3,4 removed in 2018. Now reads:

(3) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not purchase in the primary and secondary markets debt instruments issued by the Bulgarian government and municipalities, as well as by Bulgarian government and municipal institutions, organizations and public sector entities. (Article 45, 3) Coded as 1.

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*Bulgaria 2010*: The Bulgarian National Bank may extend credits to the government against purchases of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund, extended by the Governing Council under the following terms:

1. the decision by the Governing Council shall be taken no later than seven days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

2. the time limit for the utilization of the credit by the State shall be 90 days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

3. payments of the principal and interest shall be effected no later than the dates whereon the Bulgarian National Bank must effect the relevant payments to the International Monetary Fund and up to amounts required for the said payments.

(4) Upon the expiry of the time limit under paragraph 3, item 2, the right of the State on the unutilized portion of the extended credit shall be extinguished. (Article 45) Coded as 1 – Bank decides whether to loan

*Bulgaria 2021*: Article 45:3,4 removed in 2018. Now reads:

(3) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not purchase in the primary and secondary markets debt instruments issued by the Bulgarian government and municipalities, as well as by Bulgarian government and municipal institutions, organizations and public sector entities. (Article 45, 3)

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Bulgaria 2010*: (1) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not extend credits and guarantees in any form whatsoever, including through purchase of debt instruments, to the Council of Ministers, municipalities, as well as to other government and municipal institutions, organizations and enterprises. (Article 45) Coded as 1

*Bulgaria 2021*: Article 45:3,4 removed in 2018. Now reads:

(3) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not purchase in the primary and secondary markets debt instruments issued by the Bulgarian government and municipalities, as well as by Bulgarian government and municipal institutions, organizations and public sector entities. (Article 45, 3)

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

No mention of limits. Coded as – (different from Bodea)

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

*Bulgaria 2010*: The Bulgarian National Bank may extend credits to the government against purchases of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund, extended by the Governing Council under the following terms:

1. the decision by the Governing Council shall be taken no later than seven days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

2. the time limit for the utilization of the credit by the State shall be 90 days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

3. payments of the principal and interest shall be effected no later than the dates whereon the Bulgarian National Bank must effect the relevant payments to the International Monetary Fund and up to amounts required for the said payments.

(4) Upon the expiry of the time limit under paragraph 3, item 2, the right of the State on the unutilized portion of the extended credit shall be extinguished. (Article 45) Coded as 1

*Bulgaria 2021*: Article 45:3,4 removed in 2018. Now reads:

(3) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not purchase in the primary and secondary markets debt instruments issued by the Bulgarian government and municipalities, as well as by Bulgarian government and municipal institutions, organizations and public sector entities. (Article 45, 3)

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*Bulgaria 2010*: The Bulgarian National Bank may extend credits to the government against purchases of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund, extended by the Governing Council under the following terms:

1. the decision by the Governing Council shall be taken no later than seven days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

2. the time limit for the utilization of the credit by the State shall be 90 days after the date of the relevant purchase of Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund;

3. payments of the principal and interest shall be effected no later than the dates whereon the Bulgarian National Bank must effect the relevant payments to the International Monetary Fund and up to amounts required for the said payments.

(4) Upon the expiry of the time limit under paragraph 3, item 2, the right of the State on the unutilized portion of the extended credit shall be extinguished. (Article 45) Coded as .25

*Bulgaria 2021*: Article 45:3,4 removed in 2018. Now reads:

(3) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not purchase in the primary and secondary markets debt instruments issued by the Bulgarian government and municipalities, as well as by Bulgarian government and municipal institutions, organizations and public sector entities. (Article 45, 3)

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Bulgaria 1999*: Under terms agreed upon with the Minister of Finance, the Bank shall act as an agent for

public debts or for debts guaranteed by the State. (Article 43,3) Coded as 0 until 2005

*Bulgaria 2010*: (1) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not extend credits and guarantees in any form whatsoever, including through purchase of debt instruments, to the Council of Ministers, municipalities, as well as to other government and municipal institutions, organizations and enterprises. (Article 45) Coded as 1 from 2005

*Bulgaria 2021*: Article 45:3,4 removed in 2018. Now reads:

(3) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not purchase in the primary and secondary markets debt instruments issued by the Bulgarian government and municipalities, as well as by Bulgarian government and municipal institutions, organizations and public sector entities. (Article 45, 3)

**CANADA**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Canada 1934*: The Governor and Deputy Governor (a) shall each be appointed for a term of seven years during good behaviour. (Sec. 6, 2) Coded as .75

*Canada 1999*: The Governor and Deputy Governor

(a) shall each be appointed for a term of seven years during good behavior (section 6, 3) Coded as .75

*Canada 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Canada 1934*: The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be appointed by the directors with the approval of the Governor in Council. (Sec. 6, 1) Coded as .75

*Canada 1999*: The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be appointed by the directors with the approval of the Governor in Council. (Section 6, 1) Coded as .75

*Canada 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Canada 1934*: Where any director, in the opinion of the Board, becomes permanently incapacitated, he may be removed from office by resolution of the Board approved by the Governor in Council. (Art. 10, 3) Coded as .83

*Canada 1999*: Where a director, in the opinion of the Board, becomes permanently incapacitated, that director may be removed from office by resolution of the Board approved by the Governor in Council. (Article 10, 5) Coded as .83; Removed in 2001.

Canada 2021 law implies that Governor can be removed but only for not meeting qualifications. Keeping coding as .83

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Canada 1934*: The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be men of proven financial experience and each shall devote the whole of his time to the duties of his office under this Act or any other Act of Parliament. (Art. 6, 2) Coded as 1

*Canada 1999*: The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be persons of proven financial experience and shall devote the whole of their time to the duties of their offices under this Act or any other Act of Parliament. (Section 6,2) coded as 1

*Canada 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Canada 1935*: The Minister and the Governor shall consult regularly on monetary policy and on its relation to general economic policy. If, notwithstanding the consultations provided for in subsection (1), there should emerge a difference of opinion between the Minister and the Bank concerning the monetary policy to be followed, the Minister may, after consultation with the Governor and with the approval of the Governor in Council, give to the Governor a written directive concerning monetary policy, in specific terms and applicable for a specified period, and the Bank shall comply with that directive. (Art. 14—Computer version) Coded as .33

*Canada 1999*: (1)The Minister and the Governor shall consult regularly on monetary policy and on its relation to general economic policy.

(2) If, notwithstanding the consultations provided for in subsection (1), there should emerge a difference of opinion between the Minister and the Bank concerning the monetary policy to be followed, the Minister may, after consultation with the Governor and with the approval of the Governor in Council, give to the Governor a written directive concerning monetary policy, in specific terms and applicable for a specified period, and the Bank shall comply with that directive.

(3) A directive given under this section shall be published forthwith in the Canada Gazette and shall be laid before Parliament within fifteen days after the giving thereof, or, if Parliament is not then sitting, on any of the first fifteen days next thereafter that either House of Parliament is sitting. (Section 14) Coded as .33

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Canada 1935*: The Minister and the Governor shall consult regularly on monetary policy and on its relation to general economic policy. If, notwithstanding the consultations provided for in subsection (1), there should emerge a difference of opinion between the Minister and the Bank concerning the monetary policy to be followed, the Minister may, after consultation with the Governor and with the approval of the Governor in Council, give to the Governor a written directive concerning monetary policy, in specific terms and applicable for a specified period, and the Bank shall comply with that directive. (Art. 14—Computer version) Coded as .2

*Canada 1999*: (1)The Minister and the Governor shall consult regularly on monetary policy and on its relation to general economic policy.

(2) If, notwithstanding the consultations provided for in subsection (1), there should emerge a difference of opinion between the Minister and the Bank concerning the monetary policy to be followed, the Minister may, after consultation with the Governor and with the approval of the Governor in Council, give to the Governor a written directive concerning monetary policy, in specific terms and applicable for a specified period, and the Bank shall comply with that directive.

(3) A directive given under this section shall be published forthwith in the Canada Gazette and shall be laid before Parliament within fifteen days after the giving thereof, or, if Parliament is not then sitting, on any of the first fifteen days next thereafter that either House of Parliament is sitting. (Section 14) Coded as .2

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

Nothing found. Coded as 0

*Canada 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Canada 1934*: Whereas it is desirable to establish a central bank in Canada to regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial welfare of the Dominion. (Preamble) Coded as .4

*Canada 1999:* WHEREAS it is desirable to establish a central bank in Canada to regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial welfare of Canada; (preamble) coded as .4

*Canada 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Canada 1999*: The Bank may (j) make loans to the Government of Canada or the government of any province, but such loans outstanding at any one time shall not, in the case of the Government of Canada, exceed one-third of the estimated revenue of the Government of Canada for its fiscal year, and shall not, in the case of a provincial government, exceed one-fourth of that government's estimated revenue for its fiscal year, and such loans shall be repaid before the end of the first quarter after the end of the fiscal year of the government that has contracted the loan; (Section 18) Coded as .33

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *Securitized lending (.10)*

*Canada 1999*: The Bank may (i) make loans or advances for periods not exceeding six months to the Government of Canada or the government of any province on the pledge or hypothecation of readily marketable securities issued or guaranteed by Canada or any province; (Section 18) Coded as .33

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*Canada 1999*: The Bank may (i) make loans or advances for periods not exceeding six months to the Government of Canada or the government of any province on the pledge or hypothecation of readily marketable securities issued or guaranteed by Canada or any province;

The Bank may (j) make loans to the Government of Canada or the government of any province, but such loans outstanding at any one time shall not, in the case of the Government of Canada, exceed one-third of the estimated revenue of the Government of Canada for its fiscal year, and shall not, in the case of a provincial government, exceed one-fourth of that government's estimated revenue for its fiscal year, and such loans shall be repaid before the end of the first quarter after the end of the fiscal year of the government that has contracted the loan; (Section 18) Coded as .67

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Canada 1999*: The Bank may (j) make loans to the Government of Canada or the government of any province, but such loans outstanding at any one time shall not, in the case of the Government of Canada, exceed one-third of the estimated revenue of the Government of Canada for its fiscal year, and shall not, in the case of a provincial government, exceed one-fourth of that government's estimated revenue for its fiscal year, and such loans shall be repaid before the end of the first quarter after the end of the fiscal year of the government that has contracted the loan; (Section 18) Coded as .67

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*Canada 1999*: The Bank may (j) make loans to the Government of Canada or the government of any province, but such loans outstanding at any one time shall not, in the case of the Government of Canada, exceed one-third of the estimated revenue of the Government of Canada for its fiscal year, and shall not, in the case of a provincial government, exceed one-fourth of that government's estimated revenue for its fiscal year, and such loans shall be repaid before the end of the first quarter after the end of the fiscal year of the government that has contracted the loan; (Section 18) Coded as .33

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

*Canada 1999*: The Bank may (j) make loans to the Government of Canada or the government of any province, but such loans outstanding at any one time shall not, in the case of the Government of Canada, exceed one-third of the estimated revenue of the Government of Canada for its fiscal year, and shall not, in the case of a provincial government, exceed one-fourth of that government's estimated revenue for its fiscal year, and such loans shall be repaid before the end of the first quarter after the end of the fiscal year of the government that has contracted the loan; (Section 18) Coded as .33 (different from CWN)

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*Canada 1934*: The Bank shall at all times make public the minimum rate at which it is prepared to make loans or advances. (Art. 18,3)

*Canada 2010*: The Bank shall at all times make public the minimum rate at which it is prepared to make loans or advances. (Art. 21) Coded as .75 (following CWN)

*Canada 2021*: No change

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Canada 1999*: The Bank may (c) buy and sell securities issued or guaranteed by Canada or any province (Section 18) Coded as 0

*Canada 2021*: No change

# CYPRUS

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

***Term of office****Cyprus 2007*: (3) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be appointed for a renewable term of office of five years: (Article 18) (Coded as .5) (same in 2002)

***Who appoints CEO?****Cyprus 2007*: (1) Subject to paragraph 1 of Article 118 of the Constitution, the Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. (Article 18)  
[Constitution Article 118: 1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall appoint jointly two fit and proper persons one to be the Governor and the other to be the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic:

Provided that the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall not belong to the same Community. ] (Coded as 0) (same in 2002)

***Dismissal****Cyprus 2007*: (4) Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 118 of the Constitution, the Governor and the Deputy Governor may be relieved from office, only if in the opinion of the Council established under paragraph 8 of Article 153 of the Constitution, they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or they are guilty of serious misconduct. (Article 18)  
[Constitution Article 118, 4: The President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting jointly may, at any time, terminate the appointment of either the Governor or the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic or both as such Governor or Deputy-Governor, as the case may be.] (Coded as .83) (same in 2002)

***(d) May CEO hold other offices in government?****Cyprus 2007*: (1) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall, while in office, devote their entire time exclusively to the service of the Bank and shall not engage in any other business, profession or undertaking.

(2) The Governor and Deputy Governor shall not take in the Republic any office or accept interest in any banking or other financial institution or their subsidiary operating in the Republic or controlled by an organisation operating in the Republic and which is supervised by the Bank or receive therefrom any remuneration whatsoever for a period of two years after the termination of their appointment. (Article 19) (coded as 1) (same in 2002)

Policy Formation (weight = .15)

*(a) Who formulates monetary policy?   
Cyprus 2002*: 6.(1) The Bank shall perform all tasks required for the achievement of its objectives and shall perform any other tasks performed by central banks.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), the main tasks of the Bank shall be the following:

(a) The definition and implementation of monetary policy:

Provided that, monetary policy shall be deemed to include credit policy. (Article 6)  
When carrying out the tasks conferred upon them under this Law, neither the Bank nor any member of its decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from the Government or any other body. (Article 7)***Cyprus 2007*:** When carrying out the tasks conferred upon them under this Law, neither the Bank nor any member of its decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from the Community institutions or bodies, from the Government or any government of a Member State or from any other body. (Article 7) (Coded as 1)

*(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Cyprus 2002*: 53.(1) The Bank may render advice to the Government and to the Minister on any matter which in its opinion is likely to affect the attainment of the objectives of the Bank as defined in section 5.   
(2) The Government and the Minister may request from the Bank to provide them with data on the prevailing economic conditions or advice on any particular measures which may be taken and information on the general conditions of money and the banking system. (Article 53) [same in 2007] (Coded as .8)

*(c) Role in government’s budgetary process* (No mention – coded as 0)

**Objectives (weight = .15)  
*Cyprus 2007*:** (1) The primary objective of the Bank shall be to ensure price stability.

(2) Without prejudice to this primary objective and subject to the fulfilment of its obligations under Article 105 paragraph (1) of the Treaty, the Bank shall support the general economic policy of the State. (Article 5) (Coded as .8)

Limitations on lending to the government

*Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Cyprus 2007*: (1) (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) and in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 as amended from time to time –  
(i) overdraft facilities or any type of credit facility with the Bank in favour of Community institutions or bodies, the Government, regional, local or other public authorities, public corporations or public undertakings

(ii) the purchase directly from the institutions or agencies referred to in paragraph (i) by the Bank of debt instruments at their issue shall be prohibited.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply to publicly-owned banks which shall be given by the Bank the same treatment as the other banks which are not publicly-owned.

(3) The total claims of the Bank on the Government outstanding on the date that this Law shall enter into force, shall be converted to a long-term loan with a maturity of thirty years, with the first five years being a grace period with regard to the capital and with an annual interest rate of three per cent (3%), on the basis of a formal agreement between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance. (Article 49) (Coded as 1) (same in 2002)

*(b) Securitized lending (.10)   
Cyprus 2007*: (1) (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) and in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 as amended from time to time –  
(i) overdraft facilities or any type of credit facility with the Bank in favour of Community institutions or bodies, the Government, regional, local or other public authorities, public corporations or public undertakings

(ii) the purchase directly from the institutions or agencies referred to in paragraph (i) by the Bank of debt instruments at their issue shall be prohibited.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply to publicly-owned banks which shall be given by the Bank the same treatment as the other banks which are not publicly-owned.

(3) The total claims of the Bank on the Government outstanding on the date that this Law shall enter into force, shall be converted to a long-term loan with a maturity of thirty years, with the first five years being a grace period with regard to the capital and with an annual interest rate of three per cent (3%), on the basis of a formal agreement between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance. (Article 49) (Coded as 1) (same in 2002)

*(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

*(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)  
Cyprus 2002*: (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the Bank in favour of the Government, local authorities, public corporations or public undertakings and the purchase directly from them by the Bank of debt instruments at their issue shall be prohibited. (Section 49)

***Cyprus 2007***: (1) (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) and in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 as amended from time to time –

(ii) the purchase directly from the institutions or agencies referred to in paragraph (i) by the Bank of debt instruments at their issue shall be prohibited. (Section 49) (coded as 1)

**CZECH REPUBLIC**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Czech Republic 2010*: The members of the Bank Board shall be appointed for a term of six years. (Article 6, 5) Coded as .75

*Czech Republic 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Czech Republic 2010*: The Governor, Vice-Governors and other members shall be appointed and relieved from office by the President of the Republic. (Article 6, 2) Coded as 0

*Czech Republic 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Czech Republic 2010*: The Governor shall be relieved from office by the President of the Republic if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct. The President of the Republic may also relieve the Governor from office if he fails to perform his duties for a period exceeding six months. A decision to this effect may be referred to the European Court of Justice by the Governor concerned or the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on grounds of infringement of the Treaty on European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or of any rule of law relating to its application. (Article 6, 13) Coded as .83

*Czech Republic 2021*: A Bank Board member may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct. The decision to relieve the Governor from office shall also be delivered to the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. (Article 6, 10). Coded as .83

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Czech Republic 2010*: Membership of the Bank Board shall be incompatible with the position of member of a legislative body, member of the Government and membership of the governing, supervisory or inspection bodies of other banks or commercial undertakings, and the performance of any independent gainful occupation, except for scientific, literary, journalistic, artistic and pedagogical activities and except for management of own assets. Membership of the Bank Board shall be incompatible with any activity which might cause any conflict of interest between the performance of this activity and membership of the Bank Board. (Article 6, 6) Coded as 1

*Czech Republic 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Czech Republic 2010*: In accordance with its primary objective, the Czech National Bank shall: a) set monetary policy (Article 2, 2)

When providing for the primary objective of the Czech National Bank and when carrying out other activities, neither the Czech National Bank nor the Bank Board shall seek or take instructions from the President of the Republic, from Parliament, from the Government, from administrative authorities or from any other body. (Article 9, 1) Coded as 1

*Czech 2021*: When carrying out the primary objective of the Czech National Bank and when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Statute and when performing other activities, neither the Czech National Bank, nor the Bank Board, nor any member of the Bank Board shall seek or take instructions from the President of the Republic, from Parliament, from the Government, from administrative authorities of the Czech Republic, from the bodies, institutions or other entities of the European Union, from governments of Member States of the European Union or from any other body. (Article 9,1) Coded as 1

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Czech Republic 1998*: In pursuit of its main objective (section 2), the Czech National Bank shall be independent of any instructions from the Government of the Czech Republic. (Section 9,1) Coded as 1

*Czech Republic 2010*: When providing for the primary objective of the Czech National Bank and when carrying out other activities, neither the Czech National Bank nor the Bank Board shall seek or take instructions from the President of the Republic, from Parliament, from the Government, from administrative authorities or from any other body. (Article 9, 1) Coded as 1

*Czech 2021*: When carrying out the primary objective of the Czech National Bank and when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Statute and when performing other activities, neither the Czech National Bank, nor the Bank Board, nor any member of the Bank Board shall seek or take instructions from the President of the Republic, from Parliament, from the Government, from administrative authorities of the Czech Republic, from the bodies, institutions or other entities of the European Union, from governments of Member States of the European Union or from any other body. (Article 9,1) Coded as 1

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Czech Republic 2010*: Nothing. Coded as 0

*Czech 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Czech Republic 2010*: The primary objective of the Czech National Bank shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to its primary objective, the Czech National Bank shall support the general economic policies of the Government leading to sustainable economic growth. The Czech National Bank shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy. (Article 2) Coded as .6

*Czech 2021*: The primary objective of the Czech National Bank shall be to maintain price stability. In addition, the Czech National Bank shall work to ensure financial stability and the safe and sound operation of the financial system in the Czech Republic. Without prejudice to its primary objective, the Czech National Bank shall support the general economic policies of the Government leading to sustainable economic growth and the general economic policies in the European Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the European Union. The Czech National Bank shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy. (Article 2,1) Coded as .6

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Czech Republic 1998*: Should the Bank Board so decide, the Czech National Bank may grant the Czech Republic a short-term credit by buying state treasury bills payable within three months of the date of their purchase. The total sum of these credits may not exceed 5% of the state budget's revenues in the previous year. (Section 30, 2)

*Czech Republic 2010*: The Czech National Bank may not provide returnable funds or any other financial support to the Czech Republic or its bodies, or to regional authorities, bodies governed by public law or legal entities under the control of the state, a regional authority or a body governed by public law, with the exception of banks, not even through the purchase of debt securities from such entities where such entities are the issuers thereof. Moreover, it may not carry on transactions with such entities that might give rise to a Czech National Bank claim against such entities. (Article 30; goes back to 2000) Coded as 1

*Czech 2021*: 1) In accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union27) and the directly applicable implementing legislative act of the European Union,28) the Czech National Bank shall be prohibited from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the bodies, institutions or other entities of the European Union, central governments, regional or local authorities or other bodies governed by public law, other entities governed by public law or public undertakings29) of the Member States of the European Union; direct purchase of their debt instruments by the Czech National Bank shall also be prohibited.

(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned banks, foreign banks and credit unions, which, in the context of the supply of reserves, shall be given the same treatment by the Czech National Bank as privately owned banks, foreign banks and credit unions.27) (Article 34a) Coded as 1

# *Securitized lending (.10)*

*Czech Republic 2010*: The Czech National Bank may not provide returnable funds or any other financial support to the Czech Republic or its bodies, or to regional authorities, bodies governed by public law or legal entities under the control of the state, a regional authority or a body governed by public law, with the exception of banks, not even through the purchase of debt securities from such entities where such entities are the issuers thereof. Moreover, it may not carry on transactions with such entities that might give rise to a Czech National Bank claim against such entities. (Article 30; goes back to 2000) Coded as 1

*Czech 2021*: 1) In accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union27) and the directly applicable implementing legislative act of the European Union,28) the Czech National Bank shall be prohibited from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the bodies, institutions or other entities of the European Union, central governments, regional or local authorities or other bodies governed by public law, other entities governed by public law or public undertakings29) of the Member States of the European Union; direct purchase of their debt instruments by the Czech National Bank shall also be prohibited.

(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned banks, foreign banks and credit unions, which, in the context of the supply of reserves, shall be given the same treatment by the Czech National Bank as privately owned banks, foreign banks and credit unions.27) (Article 34a) Coded as 1

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Czech Republic 2010*: The Czech National Bank shall offer government bonds for sale pursuant to a legislative act governing the issuance of bonds3) and by agreement with the Ministry of Finance may perform on its behalf and for an agreed remuneration activities relating to the management, redemption and transfer of government bonds, the payment of interest on such bonds and other activities as required. (Article 31; goes back to at least 2005) Coded as 0

*Czech 2021*: No change

**DENMARK**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Denmark 1936*: The Governor nominated by the King as well as the Governors elected by the Board of Directors shall be appointed for an unlimited time, but they may be dismissed by the King and the Board of Directors, respectively. A majority of two thirds of the whole Board of Directors shall be required in the latter case. (By-laws Sec. 9) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2010*: The Governor nominated by the King as well as the Governors elected by the Board of Directors shall be appointed for an unlimited time, but may be dismissed by the King and the Board of Directors respectively. A majority of 2/3 of the whole Board of Directors shall be required in the latter case.

The Governors shall be entitled to pension from the Old-age Pension Fund of the National Bank of Denmark. (By-laws Section 9) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Denmark 1936*: The chairman of the Board of Governors shall be nominated by the King. (Sec. 6) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2010*: The Board of Governors shall consist of 3 members. One of the Governors shall be nominated by the King, and the other Governors appointed by the Board of Directors on the recommendation of the Committee of Directors. The first mentioned Governor shall be chairman of the Board of Governors. (Article 6) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Denmark 1936*: The Governor nominated by the King as well as the Governors elected by the Board of Directors shall be appointed for an unlimited time, but they may be dismissed by the King and the Board of Directors, respectively. A majority of two thirds of the whole Board of Directors shall be required in the latter case. (By-laws Sec. 9) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2010*: The Governor nominated by the King as well as the Governors elected by the Board of Directors shall be appointed for an unlimited time, but may be dismissed by the King and the Board of Directors respectively. A majority of 2/3 of the whole Board of Directors shall be required in the latter case. (By-laws Section 9) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Denmark 1936*: They [the Governors] shall not have a seat in the management of trade organizations or companies nor carry on or take part in private trading activity. (Sec 6) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2010*: The Governors shall reside in Copenhagen or in places closely connected with Copenhagen. They shall not have a seat in the management of trade organisations or companies nor carry on or take part in the working of private trading activities. The Governors shall be under the obligation to send in their resignation before the expiration of the month in which they complete their 70th year. (Section 6) coded as 0

*Denmark 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Denmark 2010:* Nothing found. Coded as 0

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Denmark 1936*: The National Bank of Denmark, which, at the coming into force of this Act, takes over The National Bank in Copenhagen, shall as the central bank of this country have the object in conformity with this Act and the regulations issued under this Act of maintaining a safe and secure currency system in this country and facilitating and regulating the circulation of money and the extension of credit. (Sec. 1) Coded as .6

*Denmark 2010*: "Danmarks Nationalbank" (The National Bank of Denmark) which, at the coming into force of this Act, confer § 33, takes over the "Nationalbanken i Kjøbenhavn" (The National Bank in Copenhagen) shall as the Central Bankof this country have the object in conformity with this Act and the regulations given under this Act to maintain a safe and secure currency system in this country, and to facilitate and regulate the traffic in money and the extension of credit. (Section 1) Coded as .6

*Denmark 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Denmark 2010*: Advances are normally granted for 1 to 3 months, but never exceeding 6 months, and against such security as may be considered satisfactory. Renewal of advances may take place. The Board of Governors shall decide what securities may be accepted as security for advances, and what percentage of the value of the security may be granted as an advance. (By laws Section 27) Coded as 1

*Denmark 2021*: No change

# *Securitized lending (.10)*

*Denmark 2010*: Advances are normally granted for 1 to 3 months, but never exceeding 6 months, and against such security as may be considered satisfactory. Renewal of advances may take place. The Board of Governors shall decide what securities may be accepted as security for advances, and what percentage of the value of the security may be granted as an advance. (By laws Section 27)

*Denmark 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Denmark 2010*: Advances are normally granted for 1 to 3 months, but never exceeding 6 months, and against such security as may be considered satisfactory. Renewal of advances may take place. The Board of Governors shall decide what securities may be accepted as security for advances, and what percentage of the value of the security may be granted as an advance. (By laws Section 27) Coded as 0

*Denmark 2021*: No change

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

*Denmark 2010*: Advances are normally granted for 1 to 3 months, but never exceeding 6 months, and against such security as may be considered satisfactory. Renewal of advances may take place. The Board of Governors shall decide what securities may be accepted as security for advances, and what percentage of the value of the security may be granted as an advance. (By laws Section 27) Coded as 1

*Denmark 2021*: No change

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*Denmark 1936*: The Board of Governors shall fix the rate of discount and the rate of interest for advances. (Sec. 25)

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Denmark 2010*: Nothing found prohibiting bank from buying or selling government securities. Coded as 0

**GEORGIA – New law signed September 24, 2009. Assuming no change between 2004 and then.**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Georgia 2010*: Members of the Board of the National bank as nominated by the President of Georgia shall be elected by the Parliament of Georgia for 7 year term of office with the majority of votes of total number of the Parliament Members. (Article 7,4) Coded as .75

*Georgia 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Georgia 2010*: Members of the Board of the National bank as nominated by the President of Georgia shall be elected by the Parliament of Georgia for 7 year term of office with the majority of votes of total number of the Parliament Members. (Article 7,4)

The President of the National Bank shall be appointed among the Board members and dismissed by the President of Georgia upon the nomination of the Board of the National Bank; and the Vice-Presidents of the National Bank shall be appointed among the Board members and dismissed by the President of Georgia upon the nomination of the President of the National Bank. (Article 7, 7) Coded as .5

*Georgia 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Georgia 2010*: President of the National Bank shall be dismissed if s/he:

a) is not the member of the Board of the National Bank any more;

b) has been deprived of the right to serve the position of the member of the Board of the National Bank pursuant to Article 13 of this Organic Law;

c) is unable to perform his duty due to his/her health or the court has found him/her incapable;

d) dies. (Article 7, 8) Coded as .83

*Georgia 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Georgia 2001*: During their employment by or work with the National Bank, neither its President, nor any of its Vice-Presidents, employees or support staff shall be granted any loan or credit accommodation from any bank other than the National Bank. (Article 20, 4) COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING SIMILAR IN 2010 LAW

*Georgia 2021*: 1. A member of the Board of the National Bank (except for the President and Vice-presidents) may not at the same time be a state employee, a state political official, a political official, a public servant, head of a legal entity, an employee of a representative of the financial sector of Georgia or of a related legal entity. (Article 13) coded as 0

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Georgia 2001*:

Pursuant to the general directions of financial and monetary policy as formulated by the Parliament and aimed at the maintenance of price stability, the tasks of the National Bank shall be:

a) to formulate, adopt and execute monetary policy; (Article 2)

*Georgia 2010*:

The duties of the National Bank shall be to: a) develop and implement monetary-credit and currency policies in accordance with basic directions as defined by the Georgian Parliament (Article 3, 3)

National Bank shall be independent in its activity. Legislative, executive and other authorities shall not be entitled to interfere in its activity or to monitor it except in cases as prescribed under the Georgia Constitution and this Organic Law. (Article 4, 1) Coded as 1

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Georgia 2001*: 2. If, after consultation with the National Bank, the Parliament or the President of Georgia is of the opinion that the monetary policies being pursued by the National Bank are not adequate for the achievement of the general objective of price stability set forth in Article 2 of this law, the Parliament or the President of Georgia may submit to the National Bank a recommendation for a change in monetary policy and after consultation with the National Bank it shall be determined whether a change in monetary policy should be adopted by the National Bank. If the Parliament decides that a change in monetary policy should be adopted by the National Bank, the National Bank shall thereupon give effect to such change in monetary policy while the decision of the Parliament remains in effect. The decision of the Parliament shall specify such proposed change in monetary policy, along with the essential policy reasons supporting it as well as the period during which such change shall be effective unless withdrawn or amended by the Parliament. (Article 28, 2; this provision was removed by 2010 law; coded as .4 until 2004 – until we find when CB law reformed)

Coded as 1 from 2010

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Georgia 2010*: Before submitting the draft state budget of Georgia or draft changes to the state budget of Georgia to the Parliament of Georgia, the Minister of Finance of Georgia consults with the President of the Bank on main parameters of the state budget of Georgia covering:

a) the volume and structure of aggregate revenues;

b) the volume and structure of surplus state budget of Georgia;

c) changing financial assets;

d) structure of expenses of the state budget of Georgia

The consultations shall necessarily take into account the information on the plans on receipt of domestic and foreign loans for government sector for the next financial year including on issues of agreement on the volume of credit funds, their acceptance and distribution and expected conditions of loans. The central and local self-government bodies of Georgia shall notify the National Bank about the assumed debt liabilities.

After consultations the President of the National Bank shall send to the Parliament of Georgia and the Government of Georgia the opinion on the main parameters of the state budget of Georgia. (Article 42) Coded as 1

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Georgia 2010*: The main task of the National Bank shall be to ensure price stability.

The National Bank shall ensure stability and transparency of financial system and shall facilitate stable economic growth in the country provided this is possible in a manner to avoid threatening of its main task. (Article 3) Coded as .6

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Georgia 2010*: 1. The National Bank shall not financially assist the Government of Georgia and state institutions except in the case of paying of dividends out under Article 25 of this Organic Law. National Bank, in the purposes of monetary-credit policy, shall purchase government securities only on secondary market.

2. The National Bank of Georgia shall have the right to purchase government securities on primary market only in exchange for securities already existing in its portfolio unless their payment day coincides with the date of issuance of new securities. They shall be purchased at average weighted price identified at the auction. The volume of securities purchased by the National Bank in each auction shall be the additional issuance of securities offered for sale on auction and shall not exceed 20% of total volume of securities sold at this auction. (Article 46)

Except for the cases directly provided for under this Organic Law, the National Bank shall be prohibited to:

d) issue loan to Government of Georgia and public institutions. (Article 65) Coded as 1 from 2010

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Georgia 2010*: 1. The National Bank shall not financially assist the Government of Georgia and state institutions except in the case of paying of dividends out under Article 25 of this Organic Law. National Bank, in the purposes of monetary-credit policy, shall purchase government securities only on secondary market.

2. The National Bank of Georgia shall have the right to purchase government securities on primary market only in exchange for securities already existing in its portfolio unless their payment day coincides with the date of issuance of new securities. They shall be purchased at average weighted price identified at the auction. The volume of securities purchased by the National Bank in each auction shall be the additional issuance of securities offered for sale on auction and shall not exceed 20% of total volume of securities sold at this auction. (Article 46)

Except for the cases directly provided for under this Organic Law, the National Bank shall be prohibited to:

d) issue loan to Government of Georgia and public institutions. (Article 65) Coded as 1 from 2010

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Georgia 2010*: When implementing monetary-credit policy the National Bank shall be authorized to carry out operations on open market with government securities and securities issued by the National Bank by way of direct purchase or sale or under the condition of their further alienation or repurchase (repo and reverse repo transactions). (Article 28; in 2001 was Article 29) Coded as 0

**HUNGARY – New law in 2001. Assuming no changes between then and 2004.**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Hungary 2010*: The Governor of the MNB shall be appointed by the President of the Republic for a term of six years, at the proposal of the Prime Minister. (Article 50, 3) Coded as .75

*Hungary 2021*: No change (but in article 10)

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Hungary 2010*: The Governor of the MNB shall be appointed by the President of the Republic for a term of six years, at the proposal of the Prime Minister. (Article 50, 3) Coded as 0

*Hungary 2021*: No change (but in article 10)

1. ***Dismissal***

*Hungary 2010*: The mandate of a member of the Monetary Council pursuant to Article 49 (4) *a)* and *b)* [Governor and Deputy Governors] may only be revoked by the President of the Republic and the mandate of a member of the Monetary Council pursuant to Article 49 (4) *c)* may only be revoked by the Parliament if the member of the Monetary Council no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or has been guilty of serious misconduct. (Article 49, 10) Coded as .83

*Hungary 2021*: The president of the republic shall dismiss members of the Monetary Council specified under paragraph (4) subsections a) and b), and the Parliament shall dismiss members of the Monetary Council specified under paragraph (4) subsection c))exclusively for reasons specified in Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute. (Article 9,10) Coded as .83

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Hungary 2010*: (1) Members of the Monetary Council of the MNB may only carry out other activities which are compatible with their central bank decision making duties. Such members may not hold office in political parties, may not carry out public activities on behalf of or in the interest of political parties, may not be representatives in Parliament or in local governments and may not be senior officers or public officials in the national or local government. (Article 58) Coded as 1

*Hungary 2021*: Members of the Monetary Council of the MNB may only perform other activities

which are compatible with their central bank decision-making duties, they may not hold office in political

parties, carry out public activities on behalf of or in the interest of political parties, may not be members

of the Parliament or representatives of a local government, or managers or civil servants in local

governments or state organisation. (Article 156, 1)

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Hungary 2010*: The MNB and the members of its decision-making bodies shall be independent in carrying out the tasks and meeting their obligations conferred upon them by this Act, and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the Government, the institutions and bodies of the European Union, the governments of its Member States and any other bodies, except from the European Central Bank. (Article 1, 2)

The Government may not instruct the MNB in relation to its scope of tasks as set forth in this Act. (Article 38) Coded as 1

*Hungary 2021*: The MNB, and the members of its bodies shall be independent in carrying out their task and meeting their obligations conferred upon them by this Act, and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the government, or from the institutions, bodies and offices of the European Union, with the exception of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘ECB’) and the instances described in paragraph (3) below, or from the governments of Member States or any other organisation or political party. The government as well as all other organisation shall adhere to this principle and shall not attempt to influence the MNB and the members of its bodies in the course of the performance of their tasks. (Article 1,2) Coded as 1

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Hungary 2010*: The MNB and the members of its decision-making bodies shall be independent in carrying out the tasks and meeting their obligations conferred upon them by this Act, and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the Government, the institutions and bodies of the European Union, the governments of its Member States and any other bodies, except from the European Central Bank. (Article 1, 2)

The Government may not instruct the MNB in relation to its scope of tasks as set forth in this Act. (Article 38) Coded as 1

*Hungary 2021*: The MNB, and the members of its bodies shall be independent in carrying out their task and meeting their obligations conferred upon them by this Act, and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the government, or from the institutions, bodies and offices of the European Union, with the exception of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘ECB’) and the instances described in paragraph (3) below, or from the governments of Member States or any other organisation or political party. The government as well as all other organisation shall adhere to this principle and shall not attempt to influence the MNB and the members of its bodies in the course of the performance of their tasks. (Article 1,2) Coded as 1

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Hungary 2010*: The Minister shall provide the MNB with preliminary information regarding the budget proposal. The MNB may express its opinion on the budget proposal to the Government and to the competent parliamentary committee following submission of the budget draft to the Parliament. (Article 37) Coded as 1

*Hungary 2021*: Following the adoption of the proposal on the central budget (hereinafter referred to as ‘draft’) by the government, the minister shall without delay provide information to the MNB on the draft. The MNB shall be entitled to send its opinion on the draft directly to the minister. The governor of the MNB shall present this opinion at the meeting of the Budgetary Council. The governor of the MNB shall not be bound by this opinion in the course of freely exercising his rights as a member of the Budgetary Council. (Article 133) Coded as 1

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Hungary 2010*: (1) The primary objective of the MNB shall be to achieve and maintain price stability.

(2) Without prejudice to its primary objective, the MNB shall support the economic policy of the Government, using the monetary policy instruments at its disposal.(Article 3) Coded as .6

*Hungary 2021*: (1) The primary objective of the MNB shall be to achieve and maintain price stability.

(2) Without prejudice to its primary objective, the MNB shall support the maintenance of the stability of the system of financial intermediation, the enhancement of its resilience, its sustainable contribution to economic growth; furthermore, the MNB shall support the economic policy of the government using the instruments at its disposal. (article 3) Coded as .6

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Hungary 2010*: (1) The MNB – with due consideration of the provisions of Article 101 of the Treaty establishing the European Community on the prohibition of monetary financing and of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty – may not extend overdrafts or any other types of credit facilities to the State, to local governments, to other budgetary organs, to the institutions and bodies of the European Union, to the central governments and the regional, local or other administrative bodies of the Member States, to other public bodies, as well as to economic associations operating under the dominant influence of the above, and may not purchase the securities of the above institutions directly from the issuer (prohibition of monetary financing). (Article 16; in Jacome’s law dated 2001) Coded as 1 from 2004

*Hungary 2021*: The MNB may not extend overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector as defined in Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and shall not purchase debt instruments directly from them with consideration of the provisions of Council Regulation No 3603/93/EC of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty. (Article 146) Coded as 1

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Hungary 2010*: (1) The MNB – with due consideration of the provisions of Article 101 of the Treaty establishing the European Community on the prohibition of monetary financing and of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty – may not extend overdrafts or any other types of credit facilities to the State, to local governments, to other budgetary organs, to the institutions and bodies of the European Union, to the central governments and the regional, local or other administrative bodies of the Member States, to other public bodies, as well as to economic associations operating under the dominant influence of the above, and may not purchase the securities of the above institutions directly from the issuer (prohibition of monetary financing). (Article 16; in Jacome’s law dated 2001) Coded as 1 from 2004

*Hungary 2021*: The MNB may not extend overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector as defined in Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and shall not purchase debt instruments directly from them with consideration of the provisions of Council Regulation No 3603/93/EC of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty. (Article 146) Coded as 1

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Hungary 2010*: (1) The MNB – with due consideration of the provisions of Article 101 of the Treaty establishing the European Community on the prohibition of monetary financing and of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty – may not extend overdrafts or any other types of credit facilities to the State, to local governments, to other budgetary organs, to the institutions and bodies of the European Union, to the central governments and the regional, local or other administrative bodies of the Member States, to other public bodies, as well as to economic associations operating under the dominant influence of the above, and may not purchase the securities of the above institutions directly from the issuer (prohibition of monetary financing). (Article 16; in Jacome’s law dated 2001) Coded as 1 from 2004

*Hungary 2021*: The MNB may not extend overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector as defined in Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and shall not purchase debt instruments directly from them with consideration of the provisions of Council Regulation No 3603/93/EC of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty. (Article 146) Coded as 1

**ICELAND**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office****Iceland 2001*: The Prime Minister appoints the Chairman of the Board of Governors and other Governors for a seven-year term at a time. (Article 23, 2) Coded as .75  
   *Iceland 2009*: The Minister shall appoint the Governor and Deputy Governor for a term of five years. (Article 23) Coded as .5  
   *Iceland 2019*: The Minister shall appoint the Governor for a term of five years. (Article 4) Coded as .5
2. ***Who appoints CEO?****Iceland 2001*: The Prime Minister appoints the Chairman of the Board of Governors and other Governors for a seven-year term at a time. (Article 23, 2) Coded as 0  
   *Iceland 2009*: The Minister shall appoint the Governor and Deputy Governor for a term of five years.   
   When appointments are made to the positions of Governor and Deputy Governor, the [Minister]1) shall appoint a committee of three to evaluate the qualifications of the applicants. One committee member shall be appointed following nomination by the Standing Committee of Rectors of Icelandic Higher Educational Institutions, one following nomination by the Supervisory Board of the Central Bank of Iceland, and one member without nomination to chair the committee. (Article 23) Coded as .75  
   *Iceland 2019*: The Minister shall appoint the Governor for a term of five years.   
   The Minister shall appoint a three-member committee to consider the qualifications of applicants for the positions of Governor and Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy. One member shall be appointed pursuant to nomination by the Icelandic Rectors’ Conference, one shall be appointed pursuant to nomination by the Central Bank of Iceland Supervisory Board, and one, who shall chair the committee, shall be appointed without nomination (Article 4) Coded as .75
3. ***Dismissal****Iceland 2001*: No provision for dismissal (same in 2017 and 2019). Coded as 1
4. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?****Iceland 2001*: The Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland are not permitted to be members of the boards of institutions or business firms outside the Bank or otherwise engage in business unless stipulated in law or if the institution or firm concerned is one to which the Central Bank is a party. In the event of a dispute over the provisions of this Article, the Prime Minister shall decide the issue. (Article 25) Coded as .5  
   *Iceland 2009*: The Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank may not sit on the Board of Directors of an institution or commercial enterprise outside the Bank, nor otherwise participate in commercial operations except as required by law or in the case of an institution or commercial enterprise in which the Bank is involved. Should a dispute arise concerning the application of this provision, the [Minister]1) shall decide the issue. (Article 25)

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

*(a) Who formulates monetary policy?   
Iceland 2001*: The main objective of the Central Bank of Iceland is to promote price stability. By agreement with the Prime Minister, the Central Bank can declare a numerical target for inflation.

The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the economic policy of the government as long as it does not regard it to be inconsistent with its main objective as described in Paragraph 1 above. (Article 3) ( coded as .67)  
*Iceland 2009*: The principal objective of the Central Bank of Iceland is to promote price stability. With the approval of the [Minister]1), the Central Bank may declare a quantitative target for inflation. The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the Government’s economic policy as long as it does not consider this inconsistent with its main objective as described in Paragraph 1 above. (Article 3) (coded as .67)  
*Iceland 2019*: The Central Bank of Iceland shall promote price stability, financial stability, and sound and secure financial activities. The Bank shall also undertake such tasks as are consistent with its role as a central bank, such as maintaining international reserves and promoting a safe, effective financial system, including domestic and cross-border payment intermediation. With the approval of the Minister, the Central Bank may declare a quantitative target for inflation. The Central Bank is authorised, with the approval of the Minister, to declare a target for the exchange rate of the Icelandic króna versus foreign currencies. The Central Bank shall undertake those tasks that are entrusted by law and Governmental directives to the Financial Supervisory Authority, and the Financial Supervisory Authority shall be part of the Central Bank. The Bank shall monitor supervised entities to ensure that their activities are in compliance with the law and with Governmental directives, and that they are in other respects consistent with sound and appropriate business practice; cf. the Act on Official Supervision of Financial Activities. The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the Government’s economic policy as long as it does not consider this inconsistent with its objectives. (Article 2) (coded as .67)

*(b) Resolution of conflict   
Iceland 2001*: The main objective of the Central Bank of Iceland is to promote price stability. By agreement with the Prime Minister, the Central Bank can declare a numerical target for inflation.

The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the economic policy of the government as long as it does not regard it to be inconsistent with its main objective as described in Paragraph 1 above. (Article 3) ( coded as .8)  
*Iceland 2009*: The principal objective of the Central Bank of Iceland is to promote price stability. With the approval of the [Minister]1), the Central Bank may declare a quantitative target for inflation. The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the Government’s economic policy as long as it does not consider this inconsistent with its main objective as described in Paragraph 1 above. (Article 3) ( coded as .8)  
*Iceland 2019*: The Central Bank of Iceland shall promote price stability, financial stability, and sound and secure financial activities. The Bank shall also undertake such tasks as are consistent with its role as a central bank, such as maintaining international reserves and promoting a safe, effective financial system, including domestic and cross-border payment intermediation. With the approval of the Minister, the Central Bank may declare a quantitative target for inflation. The Central Bank is authorised, with the approval of the Minister, to declare a target for the exchange rate of the Icelandic króna versus foreign currencies. The Central Bank shall undertake those tasks that are entrusted by law and Governmental directives to the Financial Supervisory Authority, and the Financial Supervisory Authority shall be part of the Central Bank. The Bank shall monitor supervised entities to ensure that their activities are in compliance with the law and with Governmental directives, and that they are in other respects consistent with sound and appropriate business practice; cf. the Act on Official Supervision of Financial Activities. The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the Government’s economic policy as long as it does not consider this inconsistent with its objectives. (Article 2) ( coded as .8)

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process Iceland 2001*: Nothing found

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Iceland 2001*: The main objective of the Central Bank of Iceland is to promote price stability. By agreement with the Prime Minister, the Central Bank can declare a numerical target for inflation.

The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the economic policy of the government as long as it does not regard it to be inconsistent with its main objective as described in Paragraph 1 above. (Article 3) ( coded as .4)  
*Iceland 2009*: The principal objective of the Central Bank of Iceland is to promote price stability. With the approval of the [Minister]1), the Central Bank may declare a quantitative target for inflation. The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the Government’s economic policy as long as it does not consider this inconsistent with its main objective as described in Paragraph 1 above. (Article 3) ( coded as .4)  
*Iceland 2019*: The Central Bank of Iceland shall promote price stability, financial stability, and sound and secure financial activities. The Bank shall also undertake such tasks as are consistent with its role as a central bank, such as maintaining international reserves and promoting a safe, effective financial system, including domestic and cross-border payment intermediation. With the approval of the Minister, the Central Bank may declare a quantitative target for inflation. The Central Bank is authorised, with the approval of the Minister, to declare a target for the exchange rate of the Icelandic króna versus foreign currencies. The Central Bank shall undertake those tasks that are entrusted by law and Governmental directives to the Financial Supervisory Authority, and the Financial Supervisory Authority shall be part of the Central Bank. The Bank shall monitor supervised entities to ensure that their activities are in compliance with the law and with Governmental directives, and that they are in other respects consistent with sound and appropriate business practice; cf. the Act on Official Supervision of Financial Activities. The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the Government’s economic policy as long as it does not consider this inconsistent with its objectives. (Article 2) ( coded as .4)

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15) Iceland 2001*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the State Treasury, municipalities or government institutions other than credit institutions. (Article 16) *Iceland 2017*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the National Treasury, municipalities, or Government institutions other than credit institutions. Securities that are listed on an official securities exchange and issued by parties specified in Paragraph 1 and are purchased by the Central Bank on a securities market or from credit institutions in order to achieve its monetary policy objectives shall not be considered credit pursuant to this Article. (Article 16) *Iceland 2019*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the Treasury, municipalities, or Government institutions other than credit undertakings. Securities that are listed on a regulated securities exchange or market for financial instruments and are issued by parties specified in Paragraph 1, and are purchased by the Central Bank on a securities exchange or from credit undertakings in order to achieve its objectives, shall not be considered credit pursuant to this Article. (Article 26)

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10) Iceland 2001*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the State Treasury, municipalities or government institutions other than credit institutions. Bonds listed on an official securities exchange and issued by those institutions referred to in Paragraph 1 above and which the Central Bank purchases in a securities market or in direct transactions with credit institutions in order to promote its monetary policy objectives shall not be deemed to be credit according to the stipulations of this Article. (Article 16) *Iceland 2017*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the National Treasury, municipalities, or Government institutions other than credit institutions. Securities that are listed on an official securities exchange and issued by parties specified in Paragraph 1 and are purchased by the Central Bank on a securities market or from credit institutions in order to achieve its monetary policy objectives shall not be considered credit pursuant to this Article. (Article 16) *Iceland 2019*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the Treasury, municipalities, or Government institutions other than credit undertakings. Securities that are listed on a regulated securities exchange or market for financial instruments and are issued by parties specified in Paragraph 1, and are purchased by the Central Bank on a securities exchange or from credit undertakings in order to achieve its objectives, shall not be considered credit pursuant to this Article. (Article 26)

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025) Iceland 2001*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the State Treasury, municipalities or government institutions other than credit institutions. Bonds listed on an official securities exchange and issued by those institutions referred to in Paragraph 1 above and which the Central Bank purchases in a securities market or in direct transactions with credit institutions in order to promote its monetary policy objectives shall not be deemed to be credit according to the stipulations of this Article. (Article 16) *Iceland 2017*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the National Treasury, municipalities, or Government institutions other than credit institutions. Securities that are listed on an official securities exchange and issued by parties specified in Paragraph 1 and are purchased by the Central Bank on a securities market or from credit institutions in order to achieve its monetary policy objectives shall not be considered credit pursuant to this Article. (Article 16) *Iceland 2019*: The Central Bank of Iceland may not grant credit to the Treasury, municipalities, or Government institutions other than credit undertakings. Securities that are listed on a regulated securities exchange or market for financial instruments and are issued by parties specified in Paragraph 1, and are purchased by the Central Bank on a securities exchange or from credit undertakings in order to achieve its objectives, shall not be considered credit pursuant to this Article. (Article 26)

**INDIA**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*India 1934*: The Governor and a Deputy Governor shall hold office for such term not exceeding five years as the Central Government may fix when appointing them, and shall be eligible for reappointment. (Art. 8, 4) Coded as .5

*India 2010*: The Governor and a Deputy Governor shall hold office for such term not exceeding five years as the Central Government may fix when appointing them, and shall be eligible for reappointment. (Art. 8, 4) Coded as .5

*India 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*India 1934*: The Central Board shall consist of the following Directors, namely: (a) a Governor and three Deputy Governors to be appointed by the Central Government; (b) four directors to be nominated by the Central Government, one from each of the four Local Boards as constituted by section 9; (c) six Directors to be nominated by the Central Government; and (d) one Government official to be nominated by the Central Government. (Sec. 8, 1) Coded as .25

*India 2010*: The Central Board shall consist of the following Directors, namely: -

(a) a Governor and not more than four Deputy Governors to be appointed by the Central Government (Sec 8, 1) Coded as .25  
*India 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*India 1934*: The Central Government may remove from office the Governor, or a Deputy Governor or any other Director or any member of a Local Board. (Sec. 11, 1) Coded as 0

*India 2010*: The Central Government may remove from office the Governor, or a Deputy Governor or any other Director or any member of a Local Board. (Sec. 11, 1) Coded as 0

*India 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*India 1934*: The Governor and Deputy Governors shall devote their whole time to the affairs of the Bank, and shall receive such salaries and allowances as may be determined by the Central Board, with the approval of the Central Government. (Sec. 8, 2) Coded as 1

*India 2010*: The Governor and Deputy Governors shall devote their whole time to the affairs of the Bank, and shall receive such salaries and allowances as may be determined by the Central Board, with the approval of the Central Government.

Provided that the Central Board may, if in its opinion it is necessary in the public interest so to do, permit the Governor or a Deputy Governor to undertake, at the request of the Central Government or any State Government, such part-time honorary work, whether related to the purposes of this Act or not, as is not likely to interfere with his duties as Governor or Deputy Governor, as the case may be (Sec. 8, 2)

No person may be a Director or a member of a Local Board who -

(a) is a salaried Government official **4**[\* \* \*] **5**[\* \* \*], or (Section 10) Coded as 1

*India 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*India 1934*: The Central Government may from time to time give such direction to the Bank as it may, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank, consider necessary in the public interest. (Sec. 7, 1)

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*India 1934*: The Central Government may from time to time give such direction to the Bank as it may, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank, consider necessary in the public interest. (Sec. 7, 1) Coded as 0

*India 2010*: (1) If in the opinion of the **2**[Central Government] the Bank fails to carry out any of the obligations imposed on it by or under this Act **3**[\* \* \*] **4**[the Central Government] may, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare the Central Board to be superseded, and thereafter the general superintendence and direction of the affairs of the Bank shall be entrusted to such agency as the **5**[Central Government] may determine, and such agency may exercise the powers and do all acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Central Board under this Act.

(2) When action is taken under this section the **6**[Central Government] shall cause a full report of the circumstances leading to such action and of the action taken to be laid before **7**[Parliament] at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case within three months from the issue of the notification superseding the Board. (Section 30) Coded as 0

*India 2021*: No change

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

Nothing found. Coded as 0

*India 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*India 1934*: Whereas it is expedient to constitute a Reserve Bank of India to regulate the issue of Bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage. (Preamble; no change) Coded as .4

*India 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*India 2010*: The Bank shall be authorized to carry on and transact the several kinds of business hereinafter specified, namely:- (5) the making to the **1**[Central Government] **2**[**3**[\* \* \*] **4**[and **5**[State Governments]] of advances repayable in each case not later than three months from the date of the making of the advance; (Section 17) Coded as .33

*India 2021*: No change

# *Securitized lending (.10)*

*India 2010*: The Bank shall be authorized to carry on and transact the several kinds of business hereinafter specified, namely:- (8) the Purchase and sale of securities **2**[of the Central **3**[Government or a **4**[State] Government]] of any maturity or of such securities of a local authority **5**[\* \* \*] as may be specified in this behalf by the **6**[Central Government] on the recommendation of the Central Board:

Provided that securities fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by 7[any such Government **8**[or authority]] shall be deemed for the purposes of this clause to be securities of such government **9**[or authority]; (Article 17, 8) Coded as 0

*India 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*India 2010*: The **14**[Central Government] **15**[\*\*\*] shall entrust the Bank, on such conditions as may be agreed upon, with the management of the public debt and with the issue of any new loans.

(3) In the event of any failure to reach agreement on the conditions referred to in this section the **1**[Central Government] shall decide what the conditions shall be.

**2**[(4) Any agreement made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before Parliament.] (Article 21) Coded as .33

*India 2021*: No change

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*India 2010*: The Bank shall be authorized to carry on and transact the several kinds of business hereinafter specified, namely:-

(4) the making to **5**[\* \* \*] local authorities, scheduled banks **6**[**7**[\* \* \*] **8**[State] co-operative banks **1**[and State Financial Corporations **2**[\* \* \*]] of loans and advances, repayable on demand or on the expiry of fixed periods not exceeding ninety days, against the security of – (section 17) Coded as .33

*India 2021*: No change

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*India:* Nothing found. Coded as – from beginning

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

*India 2010*: The Bank shall be authorized to carry on and transact the several kinds of business hereinafter specified, namely:- (8) the Purchase and sale of securities **2**[of the Central **3**[Government or a **4**[State] Government]] of any maturity or of such securities of a local authority **5**[\* \* \*] as may be specified in this behalf by the **6**[Central Government] on the recommendation of the Central Board:

Provided that securities fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by 7[any such Government **8**[or authority]] shall be deemed for the purposes of this clause to be securities of such government **9**[or authority]; (Article 17, 8) Coded as .33

*India 2021*: No change

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*India 2010*: The Bank shall be authorized to carry on and transact the several kinds of business hereinafter specified, namely:- (5) the making to the **1**[Central Government] **2**[**3**[\* \* \*] **4**[and **5**[State Governments]] of advances repayable in each case not later than three months from the date of the making of the advance;

*India 2010*: The Bank shall be authorized to carry on and transact the several kinds of business hereinafter specified, namely:- (8) the Purchase and sale of securities **2**[of the Central **3**[Government or a **4**[State] Government]] of any maturity or of such securities of a local authority **5**[\* \* \*] as may be specified in this behalf by the **6**[Central Government] on the recommendation of the Central Board:

Provided that securities fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by 7[any such Government **8**[or authority]] shall be deemed for the purposes of this clause to be securities of such government **9**[or authority]; (Article 17, 8) Coded as .25

*India 2021*: No change

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*India 2010*: The **14**[Central Government] **15**[\*\*\*] shall entrust the Bank, on such conditions as may be agreed upon, with the management of the public debt and with the issue of any new loans. (Section 21, 2) Coded as 0

*India 2021*: No change

**INDONESIA**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Indonesia 1998*: The member of the Board of Governors shall be appointed for 5 (five) year term of office and may be reappointed for the same office at the maximum of one subsequent term of office. (Art. 41, 5) Coded as .5

*Indonesia 2010*: The member of the Board of Governors shall be appointed for 5 (five) year term of office and may be reappointed for the same office at the maximum of one subsequent term of office. (Article 41, 5) Coded as .5

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Indonesia 1998*: (1) The Governor and the Senior Deputy Governor shall be nominated and appointed by the President upon the approval of the House of Representatives. (Ch. 7, Art. 41) Coded as .5

*Indonesia 2010*: (1) The Governor and the Senior Deputy Governor shall be nominated and appointed by the President upon the approval of the House of Representatives. (Article 41) Coded as .5

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Indonesia 1998*: Any member of the Board of Governors shall not be discharged during his/her term of office, unless it is conducted upon a resignation of such member, or upon any evidence which proves that such member have committed a crime, or permanently prevented from serving his/her office. In the event that a member of the Board of Governors is presumed to commit a crime, a prior written approval of the President shall be obtained in order to summon, to hold a hearing, and to conduct an investigation. (Art. 48-49) Coded as .83

*Indonesia 2010*: Any member of the Board of Governors shall not be discharged during his/her term of office, unless it is conducted upon a resignation of such member, or upon any evidence which proves that such member have committed a crime, or permanently prevented from serving his/her office. In the event that a member of the Board of Governors is presumed to commit a crime, a prior written approval of the President shall be obtained in order to summon, to hold a hearing, and to conduct an investigation. (Articles 48-49) Coded as .83

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Indonesia 1998*: The member of the Board of Governors shall, individually or collectively, be prohibited from: a. having any direct or indirect interests on any enterprises; b. holding any other position concurrently in other entities, except his/her tasks require him/her to hold such position; c. holding a position in the management of and or being a member of a political party. (Art. 47, 1) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2010*: The member of the Board of Governors shall, individually or collectively, be prohibited from: a. having any direct or indirect interests on any enterprises; b. holding any other position concurrently in other entities, except his/her tasks require him/her to hold such position; c. holding a position in the management of and or being a member of a political party. (Article 47, 1) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Indonesia 1998*: The Government shall request Bank Indonesia’s opinion and or invite Bank Indonesia in a cabinet meeting which discusses economic, banking and financial matters related to the tasks of Bank Indonesia or other matters within the authority of Bank Indonesia. (Art. 54, 1)

*Indonesia 2010*: Bank Indonesia is an independent state institution, which is free from any interferences of the Government and or other parties, except for matters explicitly prescribed in this act. (Article 4, 2)

Other parties shall not interfere with the implementation of the tasks of Bank Indonesia as referred to in Article 8.

Bank Indonesia shall refuse and or ignore any form of interferences conducted by any parties in the implementation of its tasks. (Article 9) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Indonesia 1953*: A member of the Monetary Board whose opinion is with the minority of votes shall, during a period of one week, have the right to request that the dispute be submitted for decision to the Cabinet Council. Pending this decision, said member shall be entitled to claim suspension of the decision of the Monetary Board, which request shall be complied with expect in very urgent cases. Should the Governor of the Bank at any time be placed in the wrong in such a way as referred to in paragraph (4) of this article, he shall have the right to publish his opinion in “Berita Negara”, unless the Cabinet Council decides this to be incompatible with the interests of the country. (Art. 24, 4-5) Coded as .2

*Indonesia 2010*: There is nothing allowing the government to override CB decisions. Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Indonesia 1998*: Bank Indonesia shall provide an opinion and consideration to the Government concerning the State Budget and other policies related to the tasks and authority of Bank Indonesia. (Art. 54, 2)

*Indonesia 2010*: Bank Indonesia shall provide an opinion and consideration to the Government concerning the State Budget and other policies related to the tasks and authority of Bank Indonesia. (Article 54, 2) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Indonesia 1953*: It shall be the Bank’s duty to regulate the value of the Indonesian currency in a way as will be most expedient to the welfare of the State, and in so doing, to aim at the utmost stability of the currency. (Article 7, 1) Coded as .4

*Indonesia 2010*: The objective of Bank Indonesia is to achieve and maintain the stability of the rupiah value. (Article 7) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Indonesia 2010*: Bank Indonesia shall not provide any credit to the Government.

In the event that Bank Indonesia violate the provision as referred to in paragraph (1), the agreement to extend credit to the Government shall be null and void. (Article 56) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Indonesia 2010*: Bank Indonesia shall not provide any credit to the Government.

In the event that Bank Indonesia violate the provision as referred to in paragraph (1), the agreement to extend credit to the Government shall be null and void. (Article 56) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Indonesia 1998*: Bank Indonesia shall not purchase for itself the state debt securities as referred to in paragraph (1), except in a secondary market. (Art. 55, 4) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2010*: Bank Indonesia shall not purchase for itself the state debt securities as referred to in paragraph (1), except in a secondary market. (Article 55, 4) Coded as 1

*Indonesia 2021*: No change

**ISRAEL**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Israel 1954*: The appointments of the Governor and of a Deputy Governor shall be for five years, and they may be re-appointed, provided that the first appointment of a Deputy Governor shall be for four years. (Sec. 12) Coded as .5

*Israel 2010:* The Governor shall be appointed to a five-year term and may be reappointed to one term only (sec 10a). Coded as .5

*Israel 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Israel 1954*: The Governor of the Bank shall be appointed by the President of the State on the recommendation of the Government. (Sec. 8) Coded as .25

*Israel 2010:* The Governor of the Bank shall be appointed by the President of the State on the recommendation of the Government. (Sec. 6) Coded as .25

*Israel 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Israel 1954*: The President of the State may, on the written proposal of the Government, terminate the tenure of the Governor if – (1) such disagreement exists between the Government and the Governor on basic questions of policy relating to the functions of the bank defined in section 3, as in the opinion of the Government prevents efficient cooperation; (2) he has done an act which in the opinion of the Government is unbecoming to his status as Governor; (3) he has acted in contravention of section 13; (4) he has become incapable of carrying out his functions. (b) A proposal by the Government to the President under subsection (a) shall be brought to the notice of the Finance Committee of the Knesset at the time of its submission to the President. (Sec. 15) Coded as .5

*Israel 2010*: (a) The President of the State may, per motion of the Government, terminate the term in office of the Governor if he deems the Governor unfit to continue his term in office for one of the following reasons:

(1) committing an act unbefitting his status as Governor;

(2) violating the provisions of Section 11;

(3) permanent incapacity.

(b) A motion of the Government to the President as per Subsection (a) shall be notified to the Knesset Finance Committee when it is submitted to the President. (Section 13) Coded as .83

*Israel 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Israel 1954*: The Governor and a Deputy Governor shall devote the whole of their working hours to the affairs of the Bank, and they may not – (1) be members of the Knesset or members of a local authority; (2) hold shares or have any other similar right, in a banking corporation; (3) be public officers within the meaning of the Interpretation Ordinance, or hold any governmental or other office, whether with or without remuneration; (4) engage in any business; but they may – (1) without remuneration, represent the Government or the Bank in a Government-controlled company or carry out a function in a public or scientific institution or be appointed and act as members of a commission set up by the Government or the Knesset; (2) accept an academic office; (3) with the consent of the Government, without remuneration, be members of an international commission or institution. (Sec. 13) Coded as .5

*Israel 2010*: (a) During any and all of their terms in office the Governor and the Deputy Governor shall not be members of the Knesset, members of a municipal authority council, or candidates for either of the foregoing;

(b) During any and all of their terms in office the Governor and the Deputy Governor may not **-**

(1) be members in the management body of a group of individuals managing a business for profit;

(2) be members in the management body of a group of individuals managing a non profit business, if this creates a conflict of interests with the discharge of their duties under this Law;

(3) hold any other post or engage, directly or indirectly, in any business or in any other occupation;

(4) own shares or any similar right in a Banking Corporation or in another corporation that is subject to supervision or regulation by the Bank under the Banking Laws;

(5) hold securities of a corporation registered in Israel and hold in Israel cash and securities in contravention of rules set forth by the Government to prevent conflict of interests on the part of ministers and deputy ministers,16 *mutatis mutandis*; the Audit Committee may approve exceptions to this provision for reasons which shall be recorded.

(c) The provisions of Subsection (b) notwithstanding, the Governor or the Deputy Governor may hold any of the posts hereunder, provided that no prejudice is caused thereby to their ability to discharge their duties under this Law or to the Bank’s autonomy, objectives, and functions:

(1) member of a commission appointed by the Government or the Knesset and, regarding the Deputy Governor—the Bank’s representative to the Securities Authority;

(2) an academic teaching post;

(3) with the consent of the Government, a member of an international commission and an international institution;

and provided the function, except under Paragraph (2), is without any remuneration or other reward; in respect of a paid academic teaching post, the rules applicable to State employees who are employed under senior-official contracts in respect to private employment, *mutatis mutandis*. (Section 11) coded as .5

*Israel 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Israel 1954*: The President of the State may, on the written proposal of the Government, terminate the tenure of the Governor if (1) such disagreement exists between the Government and the Governor on basic questions of policy relating to the functions of the bank defined in section 3, as in the opinion of the Government prevents efficient cooperation. (Sec. 15) Coded as .67

*Israel 2010*: (b) The Government, in consultation with the Governor, shall determine the price-stability range for the purposes of Subsection (a)(1) (Section 3) Coded as .67

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Israel 1954*: If the government has decided to accept the resignation of the Governor after he has notified the Government that in view of the disagreement between him and the Government on basic questions of policy relating to the functions of the Bank defined in section 3 he sees no possibility of efficient cooperation, and if the Government has thereupon recommended to the President of the State to accept the resignation of the governor and the President has accepted it, the Governor shall be paid his salary until the expiration of the term of office for which he was appointed, and on the expiration of such term he shall be paid a pension to be determined in accordance with section 14. (Sec. 17) Coded as .2; is in the 2007 law

*Israel 2010*: To attain its objectives and discharge its functions, the Bank shall be autonomous in choosing its actions and exercising its powers. (Section 5) Coded as 1

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Israel 2010*: Nothing found. Coded as 0

*Israel 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Israel 1954*: The functions of the Bank shall be to administer, regulate and direct the currency system, and to regulate and direct the credit and banking system in Israel, in accordance with the economic policy of the Government and the provisions of this Law, with a view to promoting by monetary measures – (1) the stabilization of the value of the currency in Israel and outside Israel; (2) a high level of production, employment, national income and capital investments in Israel. (Sec. 3) Coded as .4

*Israel 2007*: The functions of the Bank shall be to administer, regulate and direct the currency system, and to regulate and direct the credit and banking system in Israel, in accordance with the economic policy of the Government and the provisions of this Law, with a view to promoting by monetary measures

(1) the stabilization of the value of the currency in Israel and outside Israel;

(2) a high level of production, employment, national income and capital investments in Israel. (Section 3) Coded as .4

*Israel 2010*: (a) The objectives of the Bank are:

(1) to maintain price stability as its central goal;

(2) to support other objectives of the Government’s economic policy, especially growth, employment and reducing social gaps, provided that, in the Committee’s opinion, this support shall not prejudice the attainment of Price Stability over the Course of Time; for this purpose, “Price Stability over the Course of Time” means a situation in which the Committee, on the basis of the monetary policy that it has established, expects the inflation rate to be within the price-stability range determined per Subsection (b) within no more than two years.

(3) to support the stability and orderly activity of the financial system.

(b) The Government, in consultation with the Governor, shall determine the price-stability range for the purposes of Subsection (a)(1) (Section 3) Coded as .6

*Israel 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Israel 2007*: (a) The Bank shall not make a loan to the Government to finance its expenditure.

(b) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a), the Bank may make to the Government, at its request

(1) a provisional advance to bridge temporary gaps in the Government's cash flow in the implementation of the budget (hereinafter: provisional advance), provided that the total of the provisional advance shall not exceed, at any time, 1.6 percent of the total ordinary annual budget at that time; however, during two periods of the Government's choice in the course of the fiscal year, neither of which shall last longer than 30 days, the total provisional advance may reach 3.2 percent of the total ordinary annual budget at that time;

(2) a loan by way of acquiring bonds issued by the Government to finance the excess of its expenditure in foreign currency over its revenue in foreign currency;

(3) a loan for the purpose of paying debts incurred by it to the Bank under law, other than debts under paragraph (1); the conditions of the loan and the times for its repayment shall be fixed by agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor.

(c) Bonds which the Government shall sell to the Bank in accordance with subsection (b)(2) shall be of one of the negotiable categories sold to the public under the State Loan Law 5739– 1979, as the Minister of Finance shall determine in consultation with the Governor, and the provisions of the said Law shall apply to them; however, the restriction on the balance of the loan in section 1 there shall not apply; the bonds shall be sold at market price as will be agreed by the Minister of Finance and the Governor.

(d) The Minister of Finance may prescribe, in consultation with the Governor, additional provisions and conditions for the implementations of subsection (c). (Section 45) No real change in law since 1954 – coded as .33 following CWN

*Israel 2010*: (a) The Bank shall not provide the Government with a loan to finance its expenditures, including via direct purchase of Government debentures at issuance.

(b) The provision of Subsection (a) notwithstanding, the Bank may provide the Government, at its request, with a temporary advance to bridge a gap in the Government’s cash flow in executing its budget, provided that the total temporary advance shall not exceed, at any time, NIS 10 billion, and shall not be extended for more than 150 days per year; this amount shall be updated on January 1 of each year starting January 1, 2013, based on the rate of change between the Index published in December of the year before the date of the adjustment and the Index published in December of the preceding year. (Section 49). Coded as .67

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Israel 2007*: No real change in law since 1954 – coded as 0 following CWN

*Israel 2010*: (a) The Bank shall not provide the Government with a loan to finance its expenditures, including via direct purchase of Government debentures at issuance.

(b) The provision of Subsection (a) notwithstanding, the Bank may provide the Government, at its request, with a temporary advance to bridge a gap in the Government’s cash flow in executing its budget, provided that the total temporary advance shall not exceed, at any time, NIS 10 billion, and shall not be extended for more than 150 days per year; this amount shall be updated on January 1 of each year starting January 1, 2013, based on the rate of change between the Index published in December of the year before the date of the adjustment and the Index published in December of the preceding year. (Section 49). Coded as 1

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*Israel 2007*: No real change in law since 1954 – coded as .67 following CWN

*Israel 2010*: Coded as .67

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Israel 2007*: Only borrowers mentioned are banks and the Government. Coded as 1

*Israel 2010*: Coded as 1

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*Israel 2007:* (a) The Bank shall not make a loan to the Government to finance its expenditure.

(b) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a), the Bank may make to the Government, at its request

(1) a provisional advance to bridge temporary gaps in the Government's cash flow in the implementation of the budget (hereinafter: provisional advance), provided that the total of the provisional advance shall not exceed, at any time, 1.6 percent of the total ordinary annual budget at that time; however, during two periods of the Government's choice in the course of the fiscal year, neither of which shall last longer than 30 days, the total provisional advance may reach 3.2 percent of the total ordinary annual budget at that time;

(2) a loan by way of acquiring bonds issued by the Government to finance the excess of its expenditure in foreign currency over its revenue in foreign currency;

(3) a loan for the purpose of paying debts incurred by it to the Bank under law, other than debts under paragraph (1); the conditions of the loan and the times for its repayment shall be fixed by agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor.

(c) Bonds which the Government shall sell to the Bank in accordance with subsection (b)(2) shall be of one of the negotiable categories sold to the public under the State Loan Law 5739– 1979, as the Minister of Finance shall determine in consultation with the Governor, and the provisions of the said Law shall apply to them; however, the restriction on the balance of the loan in section 1 there shall not apply; the bonds shall be sold at market price as will be agreed by the Minister of Finance and the Governor.

(d) The Minister of Finance may prescribe, in consultation with the Governor, additional provisions and conditions for the implementations of subsection (c). (Section 45) Coded as 0

*Israel 2010*: (a) The Bank shall not provide the Government with a loan to finance its expenditures, including via direct purchase of Government debentures at issuance.

(b) The provision of Subsection (a) notwithstanding, the Bank may provide the Government, at its request, with a temporary advance to bridge a gap in the Government’s cash flow in executing its budget, provided that the total temporary advance shall not exceed, at any time, NIS 10 billion, and shall not be extended for more than 150 days per year; this amount shall be updated on January 1 of each year starting January 1, 2013, based on the rate of change between the Index published in December of the year before the date of the adjustment and the Index published in December of the preceding year. (Section 49). Coded as 1

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *Maturity of loans (.025)*

*Israel 2007*: No real change in law since 1954 – coded as .67 following CWN

*Israel 2010*: (a) The Bank shall not provide the Government with a loan to finance its expenditures, including via direct purchase of Government debentures at issuance.

(b) The provision of Subsection (a) notwithstanding, the Bank may provide the Government, at its request, with a temporary advance to bridge a gap in the Government’s cash flow in executing its budget, provided that the total temporary advance shall not exceed, at any time, NIS 10 billion, and shall not be extended for more than 150 days per year; this amount shall be updated on January 1 of each year starting January 1, 2013, based on the rate of change between the Index published in December of the year before the date of the adjustment and the Index published in December of the preceding year. (Section 49).Coded as 1

*Israel 2021*: No change

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*Israel 2007*: No mention of interest rate. Coded as .25

*Israel 2010*: No mention of interest rate. Coded as .25

# *Israel 2021*: No change

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Israel 2007*: The Bank may purchase and sell on the market securities of the State and other securities which are obligations to make payment in Israel currency and which bear interest at a fixed rate. (Article 46) Coded as 0

*Israel 2010*: (a) The Bank shall not provide the Government with a loan to finance its expenditures, including via direct purchase of Government debentures at issuance. (Section 49) Coded as 1

*Israel 2021*: No change

**JAMAICA**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Jamaica 2010:* The Governor, Senior Deputy Governor and Deputy Governors shall be appointed by the Minister by instrument in writing for a period not exceeding five years on such terms and conditions as may be specified and --(a) shall be fully employed in the service of the Bank for that period; (b) shall be eligible for reappointment; and (c) while holding office, shall not, without the permission of the Minister and the Board, occupy any other office of employment, whether remunerated or not. (Article 6, sec 8) Coded as .5

*Jamaica 2014*: A person appointed as Governor shall hold office for a period of not less than seven years and may be reappointed. (Section 6A, 3) Coded as .75

*Jamaica 2020*: A person appointed as Governor shall, subject to section 6C, hold office for a term of five years and may be reappointed. (Section 6A, 3) Coded as . 5

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Jamaica 2010:* The Governor, Senior Deputy Governor and Deputy Governors shall be appointed by the Minister by instrument in writing for a period not exceeding five years on such terms and conditions as may be specified and --(a) shall be fully employed in the service of the Bank for that period; (b) shall be eligible for reappointment; and (c) while holding office, shall not, without the permission of the Minister and the Board, occupy any other office of employment, whether remunerated or not. (Article 6, sec 8) Coded as 0

*Jamaica 2014*: The Governor shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council by instrument under the Broad Seal. (Section 6A,1) Coded as 0

*Jamaica 2020*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

The Minister may terminate the appointment of any person as Governor, Senior Deputy Governor, Deputy Governor or Director if such person--(a) becomes of unsound mind or becomes permanently unable to perform his functions by reason of ill health; (b) becomes bankrupt or compounds with, or suspends payment to, his creditors; (c) is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment or to death; (d) is convicted of any offence involving dishonesty; (e) fails to carry out any of the functions conferred or imposed on him under this Act. (Schedule, article 5) Coded as .83

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Jamaica 2010:* The Governor, Senior Deputy Governor and Deputy Governors shall be appointed by the Minister by instrument in writing for a period not exceeding five years on such terms and conditions as may be specified and --(a) shall be fully employed in the service of the Bank for that period; (b) shall be eligible for reappointment; and (c) while holding office, shall not, without the permission of the Minister and the Board, occupy any other office of employment, whether remunerated or not. (Article 6, sec 8) Coded as .5

*Jamaica 2014*: The Governor, Senior Deputy Governor and Deputy Governors shall devote the whole of their professional services to the Bank and while holding office shall not, without the approval of the Board—(a) receive any salary or supplementation thereto from any source other than the Bank; or (b) occupy any other office or employment, whether remunerated or not. (Section 6D, 5) Coded as 1

*Jamaica 2020*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Jamaica 2010*: The Minister may from time to time after consultation with the Governor give to the Bank in writing such directions of a general nature as appear to the Minister to be necessary in the public interest, including without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions directions to review the state of credit in any sector of the economy and either to make recommendations for improving the supply of credit or to take steps to foster the provision of credit to that sector of the economy (Section 41) Coded as .67

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

*Jamaica 2020*: Subject to subsection (2), the Minister may, from time to time, after consultation with the Governor, issue to the Bank, in writing, such directions of a general nature as appear to the Minister to be necessary in the public interest.

Notwithstanding subsection (1), the Minister shall not issue to the Bank directions in relation to monetary policy, purchases and sales by the Bank of foreign exchange, decisions to increase or reduce external reserves, the management of external reserves or supervisory matters pursuant to the provisions of the Bank Services Act. (Section 41) Coded as 1

# *Resolution of conflict*

*Jamaica 2010*: The Minister may from time to time after consultation with the Governor give to the Bank in writing such directions of a general nature as appear to the Minister to be necessary in the public interest, including without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions directions to review the state of credit in any sector of the economy and either to make recommendations for improving the supply of credit or to take steps to foster the provision of credit to that sector of the economy (Section 41) Coded as .2

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

*Jamaica 2020*: Subject to subsection (2), the Minister may, from time to time, after consultation with the Governor, issue to the Bank, in writing, such directions of a general nature as appear to the Minister to be necessary in the public interest.

Notwithstanding subsection (1), the Minister shall not issue to the Bank directions in relation to monetary policy, purchases and sales by the Bank of foreign exchange, decisions to increase or reduce external reserves, the management of external reserves or supervisory matters pursuant to the provisions of the Bank Services Act. (Section 41) Coded as .8

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Jamaica 2010*: Nothing. Coded as 0

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Jamaica 2010*: The principal objects of the Bank shall be to issue and redeem notes and coins, to keep and administer the external reserves of Jamaica, to influence the volume and conditions of supply of credit so as to promote the fullest expansion in production, trade and employment, consistent with the maintenance of monetary stability in Jamaica and the external value of the currency, to foster the development of money and capital markets in Jamaica and to act as banker to the Government (article 5) Coded as .4

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

# *Jamaica 2020*: The principal objectives of the Bank shall be the maintenance of price stability and financial system stability with the primary objective being the maintenance of price stability.

# The Bank shall carry out its functions with a view to achieving the principal objectives specified under subsection (1) and shall do so in a manner that recognizes the growth and employment objectives of the Government. (Section 5) Coded as .6

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Jamaica 2010*: The Bank may in any financial year make temporary advances to the Government which shall—(a) not exceed in the aggregate thirty per centum of the estimated revenue of Jamaica for that financial year; and (b) be repaid not later than three months after the end of the financial year. (Section 36) Coded as .33

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

*Jamaica 2020*: Subject to subsection (2), the Bank may, in any fiscal year in which there occurs an event declared by the Minister by Order, to be a national emergency, make temporary advances to the Government which shall—(a) not cumulatively exceed five percent of the average of the recurrent revenue of Jamaica for the three fiscal years immediately preceding the year in which advances are made; (b) bear interest at a rate specified by the Bank, after giving consideration to prevailing market rates; and (c) be repaid not later than four months after the end of the fiscal year in which the advances are made, either in cash or with marketable securities, as determined by the Minister after consultation with the Governor. (Section 36) Coded as .67

# *Securitized lending (.10)*

*Jamaica 2010*: The Bank shall not in any financial year purchase or otherwise acquire, on a primary issue, securities issued or guaranteed by the Government of a nominal value exceeding forty per centum of the estimated expenditure of the Government in that financial year, or such other percentage as the House of Representatives may from time to time by resolution approve (Section 37) Coded as .33

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*Jamaica 2010*: The Bank shall, at the request of the Minister and subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the Minister and the Bank, act as agent for the Govenrment in the payment of interest and principal and generally in respect of the management of the public debt of Jamaica. (Section 38) Coded as .33

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Jamaica 2010*: Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Bank may for the purpose of the performance of its functions—(j) with the approval of the Minister grant loans and advances for fixed periods to, or subscribe to, hold and sell the shares of any corporation which with the approval of or under the authority of the Government is established for the purpose of promoting the development of a money market or securities market in Jamaica or of improving the financial machinery for the financing of economic development; (Section 23) Coded as 0

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

*Jamaica 2020*: Paragraph deleted

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*Jamaica 2010*: The Bank may in any financial year may temporary advances to the Government which shall -(a) not exceed in the aggregate thirty per centum of the estimated revenue of Jamaica for that financial year, and (b) be repaid not later than three months after the end of that financial year. (Article 36, 1) Coded as .33

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

*Jamaica 2020*: Subject to subsection (2), the Bank may, in any fiscal year in which there occurs an event declared by the Minister by Order, to be a national emergency, make temporary advances to the Government which shall—(a) not cumulatively exceed five percent of the average of the recurrent revenue of Jamaica for the three fiscal years immediately preceding the year in which advances are made; (b) bear interest at a rate specified by the Bank, after giving consideration to prevailing market rates; and (c) be repaid not later than four months after the end of the fiscal year in which the advances are made, either in cash or with marketable securities, as determined by the Minister after consultation with the Governor. (Section 36) Coded as .33

# *Maturity of loans (.025)*

*Jamaica 2010*: The Bank may in any financial year may temporary advances to the Government which shall -(a) not exceed in the aggregate thirty per centum of the estimated revenue of Jamaica for that financial year, and (b) be repaid not later than three months after the end of that financial year. (Article 36, 1) Coded as .33

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

*Jamaica 2020*: Subject to subsection (2), the Bank may, in any fiscal year in which there occurs an event declared by the Minister by Order, to be a national emergency, make temporary advances to the Government which shall—(a) not cumulatively exceed five percent of the average of the recurrent revenue of Jamaica for the three fiscal years immediately preceding the year in which advances are made; (b) bear interest at a rate specified by the Bank, after giving consideration to prevailing market rates; and (c) be repaid not later than four months after the end of the fiscal year in which the advances are made, either in cash or with marketable securities, as determined by the Minister after consultation with the Governor. (Section 36) Coded as .33

# *Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*Jamaica 2010*: No mention of interest rates. Coded as .25

*Jamaica 2020*: Subject to subsection (2), the Bank may, in any fiscal year in which there occurs an event declared by the Minister by Order, to be a national emergency, make temporary advances to the Government which shall—(a) not cumulatively exceed five percent of the average of the recurrent revenue of Jamaica for the three fiscal years immediately preceding the year in which advances are made; (b) bear interest at a rate specified by the Bank, after giving consideration to prevailing market rates; and (c) be repaid not later than four months after the end of the fiscal year in which the advances are made, either in cash or with marketable securities, as determined by the Minister after consultation with the Governor. (Section 36) Coded as .75

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Jamaica 2010*: Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Bank may for the purpose of the performance of its functions—(e) buy and sell (whether in the open market or otherwise) securities issued or guaranteed by the Government of Jamaica or by any other government or issued by international financial institutions of which Jamaica is a member; (Section 23) Coded as 0

*Jamaica 2014*: No change

*Jamaica 2020*: No change

**LITHUANIA**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Lithuania 2001*: The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall be appointed for a term of five years and dismissed prior to the expiration of his or her term of office by the Seimas on the recommendation of the President of the Republic. (Article 10) [same in 2009 law] Coded as .5

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Lithuania 2001*: The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall be appointed for a term of five years and dismissed prior to the expiration of his or her term of office by the Seimas on the recommendation of the President of the Republic. (Article 10) [same in 2009 law] Coded as .5

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Lithuania 2001*: The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, Deputy Chairpersons and Members thereof shall be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office only if they do not fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or they have been found guilty of serious misconduct. (Article 12, 1) no change to 2009. Coded as .83

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Lithuania 2001*: The President of the Republic, members of the Seimas and of the Government, as well as members of boards and councils of credit institutions may not be the Chairperson, Deputy Chairpersons and Members of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, except in the cases of the participation in the management of international financial institutions of which the Republic of Lithuania or the Bank of Lithuania is a member. (Article 10, 3)

The Chairperson and Deputy Chairpersons of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania may only work at the Bank of Lithuania, with the exception of cases when the Board gives its consent to engage into research and pedagogical activities. (Article 16, 1) Coded as 1 no change to 2009

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Lithuania 2001*: When implementing the objectives established by this Law and carrying out its functions, and pursuing activities necessary for that, the Bank of Lithuania shall be independent from state bodies and institutions of the Republic of Lithuania as well as other enterprises, institutions and organisations. (Article 3, 2)

Implementing its primary objective, the Bank of Lithuania shall perform the following functions:

2) formulate and implement monetary policy; (Article 8) No change to 2009 Coded as 1

*Lithuania 2021*: 2. When implementing the objectives and performing its functions as well as pursuing the activities necessary for that, neither the Bank of Lithuania, nor the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, the Deputy Chairpersons, the Members of the Board, nor other members of the staff of the Bank of Lithuania (hereinafter: ‘the Bank of Lithuania staff’) must seek and take instructions from the institutions and bodies of the European Union, the governments of the Member States of the European Union or any other institutions or bodies. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania and State institutions must respect the independence of the Bank of Lithuania and must not seek to influence the Bank of Lithuania and its staff in discharge of their duties. (Article 3, 2) Coded as 1

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Lithuania 2001*: When implementing the objectives established by this Law and carrying out its functions, and pursuing activities necessary for that, the Bank of Lithuania shall be independent from state bodies and institutions of the Republic of Lithuania as well as other enterprises, institutions and organisations. (Article 3, 2) No change to 2009 Coded as 1

*Lithuania 2021*: 2. When implementing the objectives and performing its functions as well as pursuing the activities necessary for that, neither the Bank of Lithuania, nor the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, the Deputy Chairpersons, the Members of the Board, nor other members of the staff of the Bank of Lithuania (hereinafter: ‘the Bank of Lithuania staff’) must seek and take instructions from the institutions and bodies of the European Union, the governments of the Member States of the European Union or any other institutions or bodies. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania and State institutions must respect the independence of the Bank of Lithuania and must not seek to influence the Bank of Lithuania and its staff in discharge of their duties. (Article 3, 2) Coded as 1

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Lithuania 2001*: Could not find anything. Nearest I could find is:

“The Bank of Lithuania may consult and give proposals to the Government on the issues related

to financial markets and State Treasury policy.” (article 41) in 2001 but not in 1994 law Coded as 0

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Lithuania 2001*: 1. The primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania shall be to seek price stability.

2. The Bank of Lithuania shall, within the range of its competence, support the economic policy carried out by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, without prejudice to the primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania. (Article 7) Coded as .8

*Lithuania 2021*: 1. In accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania shall be to maintain price stability.

2. Without prejudice to its primary objective, the Bank of Lithuania shall, within the range of its competence, support the general economic policies in the European Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the European Union established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and support the economic policy carried out by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, without prejudice to the primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania and to the extent this meets the objectives of the European Central Bank and of the European System of Central Banks. (Article 7) Coded as .8

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Lithuania 2001*: The Bank of Lithuania shall be prohibited from lending to the Government and other institutions of the executive authority, state and municipal enterprises, or to purchase securities thereof in the primary market. (Article 37) Coded as 1 (Removed in 2015)

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*Lithuania 2001*: The Bank of Lithuania shall be prohibited from lending to the Government and other institutions of the executive authority, state and municipal enterprises, or to purchase securities thereof in the primary market. (Article 37) Coded as 1 (Removed in 2015)

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Lithuania 1994*: Implementing its objectives, the Bank of Lithuania shall perform the following basic functions:

3) shall organise the sale and purchase of domestic bonds of the Government of the Republic and the payment of interest thereon, and act as the registrar of Government bonds;

*Lithuania 2001*: On the basis of an agreement with the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Lithuania may organise the issue and redemption of Government securities and the payment of interest thereon. (Article 39)

On the basis of an agreement with the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Lithuania may administer the national debt.. (Article 40) Coded as 0

*Lithuania 2021*: No change

**MACEDONIA – Assuming no major changes in law between 2002 and 2006 (**[**http://www.oenb.at/de/img/comparing\_central\_bank\_legislation\_in\_\_tcm14-39078.pdf**](http://www.oenb.at/de/img/comparing_central_bank_legislation_in__tcm14-39078.pdf)**)**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Macedonia 2010*: Members of the National Bank Council shall be appointed for a seven year term that may be renewed. (Article 49, 1) Coded as .75

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Macedonia 2010*: The Governor shall be appointed by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, on a proposal of the President of the Republic of Macedonia. (Article 49, 2) Coded as .5

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*Macedonia 2010*:

(1) Member of the National Bank Council shall be relieved from office only and when that member:

1) becomes ineligible to serve on the National Bank Council pursuant to Article 50; or

2) abuses, or makes serious misconduct in, the official duty, or

3) is unable to perform the tasks of such an office because of an infirmity of body or mind that has lasted for more than three months; or

4) fails to perform their duties for a consecutive period of more than three months without approval of the National Bank Council.

(2) A decision to relieve a member of the National Bank Council from office shall be taken by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia:

1) either on a recommendation from the National Bank Council, or on a recommendation from the President of the Republic of Macedonia and after consulting the National Bank Council, if the decision concerns the Governor, or

2) either on a recommendation from the National Bank Council, or on a recommendation from the Governor and after consulting the National Bank Council, if the decision concerns a Vice Governor or

3) on a recommendation of the National Bank Council or on a recommendation of the Governor and after consulting the National Bank Council or on a recommendation from the Government of Republic of Macedonia and after consulting the Governor if the decision concerns a nonexecutive member of the National Bank Council.

(3) Decisions of the National Bank Council pursuant to paragraph (2) of this Article require a majority of the members of the National Bank Council.

(4) A member of the National Bank Council relieved from office shall have a right of appeal to the Court within 15 calendar days of the date of the decision to remove that member from office. (Article 53) Coded as .83

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Macedonia 2010*: The Governor and the Vice Governor of the National Bank shall be professionally engaged at the National Bank, and shall not be engaged in any other occupation, whether gainful or not, except as a university professor or engagement in a scientific research institution, or a temporary arrangement in international financial institution, must not be owners of five percent or more of an equity interest in a financial institution in the Republic of Macedonia and during its term must not be members of political party or trade union. (Article 50, 3) Coded as 1

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Macedonia 2010*: In the pursuit of its objectives and the performance of its tasks, the National Bank shall be independent and accountable as provided for in this Law.

The National Bank, the National Bank Council members or the National Bank staff, shall not seek or take instructions from any government authorities, municipal bodies, bodies of the City of Skopje and any other legal entities and/or natural persons.

The decisions of the National Bank Council shall not be approved, revoked, annulled or amended by the entities set forth in paragraph (2) of this Article.

The independence of the National Bank shall be respected at all times and no person or entity set forth in paragraph (2) of this Article shall seek to influence National Bank Council members or the National Bank staff in the performance of their functions, i.e. operation, or to interfere in the activities of the National Bank. (Article 5) Coded as 1

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *Resolution of conflict*

*Macedonia 2006*: The National Bank is independent in performing the functions entrusted by this and other laws.

When performing its functions, the National Bank and the members of the decisionmaking bodies shall neither require nor get instructions from the central government and the administrative bodies. (Article 54) Coded as 1

*Macedonia 2010*: In the pursuit of its objectives and the performance of its tasks, the National Bank shall be independent and accountable as provided for in this Law.

The National Bank, the National Bank Council members or the National Bank staff, shall not seek or take instructions from any government authorities, municipal bodies, bodies of the City of Skopje and any other legal entities and/or natural persons.

The decisions of the National Bank Council shall not be approved, revoked, annulled or amended by the entities set forth in paragraph (2) of this Article.

The independence of the National Bank shall be respected at all times and no person or entity set forth in paragraph (2) of this Article shall seek to influence National Bank Council members or the National Bank staff in the performance of their functions, i.e. operation, or to interfere in the activities of the National Bank. (Article 5)

(1) The National Bank Council and each of its members shall be accountable to the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia for the achievement and maintenance of price stability and for performance the tasks of the National Bank stipulated by this Law.

(2) The Governor of the National Bank may, at the request of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, or on his own initiative, periodically speak in the Parliament or its committees, concerning monetary policy and financial system issues and the state of the economy.

(3) The National Bank may submit opinions to the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia concerning any draft laws related to the objectives and tasks of the National Bank. (Article 40) Coded as 1

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Macedonia 2010*: Nothing. Coded as 0

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Macedonia 2010*: The primary objective of the National Bank shall be to achieve and to maintain price stability.

The other objective of the Bank, subordinated to the primary objective, shall be to contribute to the maintenance of a stable, competitive and market-based financial system.

The National Bank shall support the general economic policies without endangering the achievement of the objective set forth in paragraph (1) of this Article and in conformity with the principle of open market economy and free competition. (Article 6) Coded as .6

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Macedonia 2006*: The National Bank shall not extend loans and credits to the central government and government administration bodies.

The National Bank shall not guarantee the assumed liabilities of the bodies under paragraph 1 of this Article and shall not purchase directly their debt instruments. (Article 51)

Provisions of Article 51 shall not pertain to:

- financing of the liabilities of the Republic of Macedonia to the International Monetary Fund

- credits or loans with up to one-day maturity, with no possibility to be renewed or extended. (Article 52)

*Macedonia 2010*: The National Bank shall not grant, directly or indirectly, credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia or any other government authority, public enterprise, public institutions, companies founded by the state or where the state is a dominant shareholder, municipality authorities, municipalities of the City of Skopje and the City of Skopje, with the exception of intra-day credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, to secure smooth functioning of the payment system. Such intra-day credit shall be guaranteed by negotiable government securities and shall be fully repaid before the end of the same day.

The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to state-owned banks and other supervised state-owned entities, which shall be given the same treatment as privately-owned banks and other supervised privately-owned entities.

The National Bank may purchase government securities provided that such purchases are only made in the secondary market. (Article 44) Coded as 1

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *Securitized lending (.10)*

*Macedonia 2010*: The National Bank shall not grant, directly or indirectly, credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia or any other government authority, public enterprise, public institutions, companies founded by the state or where the state is a dominant shareholder, municipality authorities, municipalities of the City of Skopje and the City of Skopje, with the exception of intra-day credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, to secure smooth functioning of the payment system. Such intra-day credit shall be guaranteed by negotiable government securities and shall be fully repaid before the end of the same day.

The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to state-owned banks and other supervised state-owned entities, which shall be given the same treatment as privately-owned banks and other supervised privately-owned entities.

The National Bank may purchase government securities provided that such purchases are only made in the secondary market. (Article 44) Coded as .67 from 2006 (similar language in 2006 law)

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Macedonia 2010*: The National Bank shall not grant, directly or indirectly, credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia or any other government authority, public enterprise, public institutions, companies founded by the state or where the state is a dominant shareholder, municipality authorities, municipalities of the City of Skopje and the City of Skopje, with the exception of intra-day credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, to secure smooth functioning of the payment system. Such intra-day credit shall be guaranteed by negotiable government securities and shall be fully repaid before the end of the same day.

The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to state-owned banks and other supervised state-owned entities, which shall be given the same treatment as privately-owned banks and other supervised privately-owned entities.

The National Bank may purchase government securities provided that such purchases are only made in the secondary market. (Article 44) Coded as 1 from 2006

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*Macedonia 2010*: Only intra-day loans/credits available. Coded as – from 2006

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

*Macedonia 2010*: The National Bank shall not grant, directly or indirectly, credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia or any other government authority, public enterprise, public institutions, companies founded by the state or where the state is a dominant shareholder, municipality authorities, municipalities of the City of Skopje and the City of Skopje, with the exception of intra-day credits to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, to secure smooth functioning of the payment system. Such intra-day credit shall be guaranteed by negotiable government securities and shall be fully repaid before the end of the same day.

The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to state-owned banks and other supervised state-owned entities, which shall be given the same treatment as privately-owned banks and other supervised privately-owned entities.

The National Bank may purchase government securities provided that such purchases are only made in the secondary market. (Article 44) Coded as 1

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*Macedonia 2010*: Only intra-day loans/credits available. Coded as – from 2006  
*Macedonia 2021*: No change

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Macedonia 2006*: The National Bank shall not extend loans and credits to the central government and government administration bodies.

The National Bank shall not guarantee the assumed liabilities of the bodies under paragraph 1 of this Article and shall not purchase directly their debt instruments. (Article 51) Coded as 1

*Macedonia 2010*: The National Bank may purchase government securities provided that such purchases are only made in the secondary market. (Article 44) Coded as 1 from 2010

*Macedonia 2021*: No change

**NEW ZEALAND**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*New Zealand 1989*: The Governor shall be appointed for a term of 5 years and may be reappointed for a further term or terms, each of up to 5 years. (Art. 42, 1) Coded as .5

*New Zealand 2010*: The Governor shall be appointed for a term of 5 years and may be reappointed for a further term or terms, each of up to 5 years. (Article 42, 1) Coded as .5

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*New Zealand 1989*: There shall be a Governor of the Bank who shall be appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the Board. (Art. 40, 1) Coded as .75

*New Zealand 2010*: There shall be a Governor of the Bank who shall be appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the Board. (Article 40, 1) Coded as .75

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*New Zealand 1989*: ---(1) The Governor- General may, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, remove the Governor from office. (2) The Minister may tender advice under subsection (1) of this section if the Minister is satisfied--- (a) That the Bank is not adequately carrying out its functions; or (b) That the Governor has not adequately discharged the responsibilities of office; or (Art 49) Coded as .33; no change in 2010

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*New Zealand 1989*: No person shall be appointed or reappointed, or continue to hold office, as Governor, Deputy Governor, or a Deputy Governor, if that person---(a) Is a member of Parliament; or (d) Is a chief executive of a Government department, or a member of the senior executive service, or an employee of a Government department, appointed under the State Sector Act 1988 (Art. 46) Coded as 1

*New Zealand 2010*: No person shall be appointed or reappointed, or continue to hold office, as Governor, Deputy Governor, or a Deputy Governor, if that person---(a) Is a member of Parliament; or (d) Is a chief executive of a Government department, or a member of the senior executive service, or an employee of a Government department, appointed under the State Sector Act 1988 (Art. 46) Coded as 1

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*New Zealand 1989*: *12. Bank may be directed to formulate and implement monetary policy for different economic objective*---(1) The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any economic objective, other than the economic objective specified in section 8 of this Act, for such period not exceeding 12 months as shall be specified in the order. (2) Notwithstanding anything in section 8 of this Act, the Bank shall formulate and implement monetary policy in accordance with any economic objective specified in an Order in Council in force under subsection (1) of this section. (3) The Governor-General may, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, before the period specified in an Order in Council made under subsection (1) of this section expires, extend the period specified in that order for a period, which shall be specified in the order, not exceeding 12 months, and may in the same manner extend that period on successive occasions. (Art. 12)

*New Zealnad 2010*: In formulating and implementing monetary policy the Bank shall—

(a) have regard to the efficiency and soundness of the financial system:

(b) consult with, and give advice to, the Government and such persons or organisations as the Bank considers can assist it to achieve and maintain the economic objective of monetary policy. (Section 10)

The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any economic objective, other than the economic objective specified in section 8, for such period not exceeding 12 months as shall be specified in the order.

Notwithstanding anything in section 8, the Bank shall formulate and implement monetary policy in accordance with any economic objective specified in an Order in Council in force under subsection (1). (Section 12, 1-2) Coded as .67

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*New Zealand 1989*: The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any economic objective, other than the economic objective specified in section 8 of this Act, for such period not exceeding 12 months as shall be specified in the order. (2) Notwithstanding anything in section 8 of this Act, the Bank shall formulate and implement monetary policy in accordance with any economic objective specified in an Order in Council in force under subsection (1) of this section. Coded as 0

*New Zealnad 2010*: The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any economic objective, other than the economic objective specified in section 8, for such period not exceeding 12 months as shall be specified in the order.

Notwithstanding anything in section 8, the Bank shall formulate and implement monetary policy in accordance with any economic objective specified in an Order in Council in force under subsection (1). (Section 12, 1-2) Coded as .2 (some sections give Bank opportunity to protest)

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

*New Zealand 1989*: Nothing found. Coded as 0

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*New Zealand 1989*: The primary function of the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the economic objective of achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices. (Art. 8) The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any economic objective, other than the economic objective specified in section 8 of this Act, for such period not exceeding 12 months as shall be specified in the order. (Art. 12, 1) Coded as .8

*New Zealand 2010*: The primary function of the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the economic objective of achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices. (Article 8)

The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any economic objective, other than the economic objective specified in section 8, for such period not exceeding 12 months as shall be specified in the order. (Article 12, 1) Coded as .8

*New Zealand 2019:* The Bank, acting through the MPC, has the function of formulating a monetary

policy directed to the economic objectives of—

(a) achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices over the

medium term; and

(b) supporting maximum sustainable employment. (article 8) Coded as .4

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

*New Zealand 1964*: The Bank shall make such loans to the Government and on such conditions as the Minister decides from time to time, in order to ensure the continuing full employment of labour and other resources of any kind. (Art. 8, 4)

*New Zealand 1989*: It appears that no financing of government by central bank is allowed. Coded as 1 (Dowd and Baker 1994)

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*New Zealand 1989*: It appears that no financing of government by central bank is allowed. Coded as 1

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

*New Zealand 1964*: The Bank shall make such loans to the Government and on such conditions as the Minister decides from time to time, in order to ensure the continuing full employment of labour and other resources of any kind. (Art. 8, 4)

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*New Zealand 1964*: The Bank shall make such loans to the Government and on such conditions as the Minister decides from time to time, in order to ensure the continuing full employment of labour and other resources of any kind. (Art. 8, 4)

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*New Zealand 1964*: The Bank shall make such loans to the Government and on such conditions as the Minister decides from time to time, in order to ensure the continuing full employment of labour and other resources of any kind. (Art. 8, 4) Coded as 0

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

*New Zealand 1964*: The Bank shall make such loans to the Government and on such conditions as the Minister decides from time to time, in order to ensure the continuing full employment of labour and other resources of any kind. (Art. 8, 4) Coded as 0

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

*New Zealand 1964*: The Bank shall make such loans to the Government and on such conditions as the Minister decides from time to time, in order to ensure the continuing full employment of labour and other resources of any kind. (Art. 8, 4)

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*New Zealand 1989*: It appears that no financing of government by central bank is allowed. Coded as 1

*New Zealand 2021*: No change

**NORWAY**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*Norway 1985*: They [the Governor and Deputy Governor] are appointed to full-time positions for terms of six years. (Sec. 6) Coded as .75

*Norway 2010*: The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be chairman and deputy chairman of the Executive Board. They are appointed to full-time positions for a term of six years. (Section 6) Coded as .75

*Norway 2020*: The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall be appointed by the King in Council for a fixed term of sixyears. The fixed-term appointment may be extended for a further term of up to six years. (Section 2-9) Coded as .75

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*Norway 1985*: The Executive Board consists of seven members, appointed by the King. Coded as 0

*Norway 2010*: The Executive Board consists of seven members, appointed by the King. (Section 6) Coded as 0

*Norway 2020*: The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall be appointed by the King in Council for a fixed term of sixyears. The fixed-term appointment may be extended for a further term of up to six years. (Section 2-9) Coded as 0

1. ***Dismissal***

*Norway 1892*: The appointments [of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman] are made subject to the reciprocal right to terminate the appointment on six months’ notice, with the reservation, however, that they may be removed from office immediately against payment of their salary for the said time. (Art. 22) Coded as 0

*Norway 2010*: No provisions for dismissal. Coded as 1

*Norway 2020*: The Governor, the Deputy Governors and the external members of the Monetary Policy and Financial Sta-bility Committee may only be dismissed or deselected if the person in question:

is permanently unable to properly perform his or her duties because of illness;

has shown gross misjudgement in the performance of duties;

has acted in gross dereliction of duties;

has repeatedly acted in dereliction of duties despite written warning;

has through improper conduct in or outside the performance of duties proven to be unfit for office orunworthy of the respect or trust necessary to hold such office. (Section 2-12) Coded as .83

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*Norway 1985*: Government ministers, state secretaries, and other political staff in the ministries and members of the Storting cannot serve as members of deputy members of the Executive Board. (Sec. 6) Coded as 1

*Norway 2010*: The following persons may not serve as members or deputy members of the Executive Board:

1. Government ministers,
2. state secretaries, and other political staff in the ministries,
3. ministry officials,
4. staff employed by the Ministry of Finance or the Office of the Prime Minister,
5. members of the Storting,
6. other political staff at the Storting,
7. committee secretaries at the Storting
8. staff at Norges Bank,
9. persons closely associated with the persons listed in 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. (Section 6) Coded as 1

*Norway 2020*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

*Norway 1985*: The Bank shall conduct its operations in accordance with the economic policy guidelines drawn up by the government authorities and with the country’s international commitments. Before the Bank makes any decision of special importance, the matter shall be submitted to the ministry.

The Council of State may adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the Bank. Such resolutions may take the form of general rules or instructions in individual cases. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to state its opinion before such resolutions are passed. The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as soon as possible. (Sec. 2) Coded as .33

*Norway 2010*: The Bank shall conduct its operations in accordance with the economic policy guidelines drawn up by the government authorities and with the country's international commitments.

Before the Bank makes any decision of special importance, the matter shall be submitted to the ministry.

The King in Council may adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the Bank. Such resolutions may take the form of general rules or instructions in individual cases. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to state its opinion before such resolutions are passed. The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as soon as possible (Section 2) Coded as .33

*Norway 2020*: (1) The King in Council may adopt resolutions on the objectives of Norges Bank, cf. Section 1-2 and Sec-tion 1-3. The Bank shall be invited to offer its opinion prior to the adoption of any such resolution. TheStorting shall be notified of such resolutions.

(2) Norges Bank shall not be instructed in the performance of its activities under the Act, cf. Section 1-3,except in extraordinary circumstances. Any resolution instructing the Bank shall be adopted by the King inCouncil. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to express its opinion prior to the adoption of any suchresolution. The Storting shall be notified of such resolutions as soon as possible. (Section 1-4) Coded as .67

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*Norway 1985*: The Council of State may adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the Bank. Such resolutions may take the form of general rules or instructions in individual cases. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to state its opinion before such resolutions are passed. The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as soon as possible. (Sec. 2) Coded as .2

*Norway 2010*: The King in Council may adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the Bank. Such resolutions may take the form of general rules or instructions in individual cases. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to state its opinion before such resolutions are passed. The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as soon as possible (Section 2) Coded as .2

*Norway 2020*: (1) The King in Council may adopt resolutions on the objectives of Norges Bank, cf. Section 1-2 and Sec-tion 1-3. The Bank shall be invited to offer its opinion prior to the adoption of any such resolution. TheStorting shall be notified of such resolutions.

(2) Norges Bank shall not be instructed in the performance of its activities under the Act, cf. Section 1-3,except in extraordinary circumstances. Any resolution instructing the Bank shall be adopted by the King inCouncil. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to express its opinion prior to the adoption of any suchresolution. The Storting shall be notified of such resolutions as soon as possible. (Section 1-4) Coded as .2

# *Role in government’s budgetary process*

*Norway 2010*: Nothing found. Coded as 0

*Norway 2020*: Nothing found. Coded as 0

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*Norway 1985*: Norges Bank is the country’s central bank. The Bank shall be an executive and advisory body for monetary, credit and foreign exchange policy. It shall issue banknotes and coin, promote an efficient payment system domestically as well as vis-à-vis other countries, and monitor developments in the money, credit and foreign exchange markets. (Sec. 1) Coded as 0

*Norway 2010*: Norges Bank is Norway's central bank. The Bank shall be an executive and advisory body for monetary, credit and foreign exchange policy. It shall issue banknotes and coin, promote an efficient payment system domestically as well as vis-à-vis other countries, and monitor developments in the money, credit and foreign exchange markets.

The Bank may implement any measures customarily or ordinarily taken by a central bank. To carry out its purposes the Bank may engage in any and all types of banking business and banking services. (Section 1) coded as 0

*Norway 2020*: The purpose of the central banking activities is to maintain monetary stability and to promote the stability of the financial system and an efficient and secure payment system.

The central bank shall contribute to high and stable output and employment. (Section 1-2) Coded as .4

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

*Norway 1985*: The Bank may grant seasonal and other short-term credit directly to the government within specific limits laid down by the Storting. In special cases, the Bank may grant long-term credit directly to the government within specific limits laid down by the Storting. The Bank's purchases of Treasury bills, government bonds and other government debt instruments do not fall within this provision. (Sec. 18)

*Norway 2003*: The Bank may not extend credit directly to the government. (Section 18)

*Norway 2010*: The Bank may not extend credit directly to the government. The first sentence shall not impede the Bank's extension of credit to the government with a maturity within a calendar day. (Section 18; second sentence added in 2010) Coded as 1 from 2003 until 2009

*Norway 2020*: No change

# *Securitized lending (.10)*

*Norway 2010*: The Bank may buy and sell debt instruments that are issued or guaranteed by the state and other easily negotiable debt instruments. Notwithstanding the rules in section 22, the Bank may enter into repurchase agreements and engage in other market operations using such instruments.

The Bank may issue and deal in its own debt instruments. (Section 21; amended 1999)

*Norway 2020*: Nothing there. Coded as --

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

*Norway 1985*: In special circumstances the Bank may make loans and extend other forms of credit to non-bank entities. The terms attached to such credit are laid down by the Bank. (Sec. 22) Coded as 0

*Norway 2010*: In special circumstances the Bank may make loans and extend other forms of credit to entities other than banks in the financial sector. The terms attached to such credit are laid down by the Bank. (Section 22) Coded as 0

*Norway 2020*: Nothing there. Coded as 1

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

*Norway 1985*: The Bank may grant seasonal and other short-term credit directly to the government within specific limits laid down by the Storting. In special cases, the Bank may grant long-term credit directly to the government within specific limits laid down by the Storting. The Bank's purchases of Treasury bills, government bonds and other government debt instruments do not fall within this provision. (Sec. 18)

*Norway 2020*: Nothing there. Coded as --

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

No mention of interest on securities. Coded as .25

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*Norway 2010*: The Bank may buy and sell debt instruments that are issued or guaranteed by the state and other easily negotiable debt instruments. Notwithstanding the rules in section 22, the Bank may enter into repurchase agreements and engage in other market operations using such instruments.

The Bank may issue and deal in its own debt instruments. (Section 21; amended 1999) Coded as 0

*Norway 2020*: Nothing there. Coded as 0

**UNITED KINGDOM – should make sure about economic variables, especially securitized lending**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*United Kingdom 1946*: The term of office of the Governor and of the Deputy Governor shall be five years. (Second Schedule, 1) Coded as .5

*United Kingdom 2009*: Appointment as Governor or Deputy Governor of the Bank shall be for a period of 5 years. (Schedule 1, 1) Coded as .5

*United Kingdom 2013*: Appointment as Governor of the Bank shall be for a period of 8 years. (Schedule 1,1) Coded as .75

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*United Kingdom 1946*: The Governor, Deputy Governor and other members of the court of directors shall be appointed by His Majesty. (Art. 2, 2) Coded as 0

*United Kingdom 2009*: The court shall consist of a Governor, 2 Deputy Governors and [.....] directors of the Bank, all of whom shall be appointed by Her Majesty. (Section 1,2) coded as 0

*United Kingdom 2021*: No change

1. ***Dismissal***

*United Kingdom 1998*: The Bank may, with the consent of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, remove a person from office as Governor, Deputy Governor or director of the Bank if it is satisfied- (a) that he has been absent from meetings of the court for more than 3 months without the consent of the court, (b) that he has become bankrupt, that his estate has been sequestrated or that he has made an arrangement with or granted a trust deed for his creditors, or (c) that he is unable or unfit to discharge his functions as a member. (Schedule 1, Art. 8) Coded as .83

*United Kingdom 2009*: A person appointed as Governor or Deputy Governor of the Bank shall vacate office if he becomes a person to whom paragraph 5(l) applies. (Schedule 1, Article 7,1)

The Bank may, with the consent of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, remove a person

from office as Governor, Deputy Governor or director of the Bank if it is satisfied –

(a) that he has been absent from meetings of the court for more than 3 months without

the consent of the court,

(b) that he has become bankrupt, that his estate has been sequestrated or that he has

made an arrangement with or granted a trust deed for his creditors, or

(c) that he is unable or unfit to discharge his functions as a member. (Schedule 1, Article 8) Coded as .83

*United Kingdom 2021*: No change

1. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

*United Kingdom 1998*: A person appointed as Governor or Deputy Governor of the Bank shall work exclusively for the Bank. (Schedule 1, Art. 1, 2) Coded as 1

*United Kingdom 2009*: A person appointed as Governor or Deputy Governor of the Bank shall work exclusively for the Bank. (Schedule 1, Art. 1,2)

5. -(1) A person is disqualified for appointment as Governor, Deputy Governor or director of the Bank if he is a Minister of the Crown or a person serving in a government department in employment in respect of which remuneration is payable out of money provided by Parliament. (Schedule 1, Article 5,1) Coded as 1

*United Kingdom 2021*: No change

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

*United Kingdom 1998*: The Treasury, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank, may by order give the Bank directions with respect to monetary policy if they are satisfied that the directions are required in the public interest and by extreme economic circumstances. (2) An order under this section may include such consequential modifications of the provisions of this Part relating to the Monetary Policy Committee as the Treasury think fit. (3) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section shall be laid before Parliament after being made. (4) Unless an order under this section is approved by resolution of each House of Parliament before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which it is made, it shall cease to have effect at the end of that period. (5) In reckoning the period of 28 days for the purposes of subsection (4), no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than 4 days. (6) An order under this section which does not cease to have effect before the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which it is made shall cease to have effect at the end of that period. (7) While an order under this section has effect, section 11 shall not have effect. (Art. 19) Coded as .2

*United Kingdom 2021*: No change

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

Nothing found. Coded as 0

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*United Kingdom 1998*: In relation to monetary policy, the objectives of the Bank of England shall be- (a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty's Government, including its objectives for growth and employment. (Art. 11) Coded as .6

*United Kingdom 2009*: In relation to monetary policy, the objectives of the Bank of England shall be –

(a) to maintain price stability, and

(b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government,

including its objectives for growth and employment. (Section 11) Coded as .6

*United Kingdom 2021*: No change

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

*UK 1997*: Debt management is now done by the Treasury. Coding as 1

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

*UK 1997*: Debt management is now done by the Treasury. Coding as 1

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*

*UK 1997*: It appears that the BoE can still buy government securities in the primary market. Keeping as 0

**UNITED STATES**

**Chief Executive Officer** (weight = .20)

1. ***Term of office***

*United States 2010*: Of the persons thus appointed, 1 shall be designated by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as Chairman of the Board for a term of 4 years, and 2 shall be designated by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as Vice Chairmen of the Board, each for a term of 4 years, 1 of whom shall serve in the absence of the Chairman, as provided in the fourth undesignated paragraph of this section, and 1 of whom shall be designated Vice Chairman for Supervision. (Section 10, 2) Coded as .25

1. ***Who appoints CEO?***

*United States 2010*: Of the persons thus appointed, 1 shall be designated by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as Chairman of the Board for a term of 4 years, and 2 shall be designated by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as Vice Chairmen of the Board, each for a term of 4 years, 1 of whom shall serve in the absence of the Chairman, as provided in the fourth undesignated paragraph of this section, and 1 of whom shall be designated Vice Chairman for Supervision. (Section 10, 2) Coded as .5

1. ***Dismissal***
2. ***May CEO hold other offices in government?***

# Policy Formation (weight = .15)

# *(a) Who formulates monetary policy?*

# *(b) Resolution of conflict*

# *(c) Role in government’s budgetary process*

# Objectives (weight = .15)

*United States 2010*: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. (Section 2A)

# Limitations on lending to the government

# *(a) Advances (Weight = .15)*

# *(b) Securitized lending (.10)*

# *(c) Terms of lending (.10)*

# *(d) Potential borrowers from bank (.05)*

# *(e) Limits on central bank lending determined by (.025)*

# *(f) Maturity of loans (.025)*

# *(g) Interest rates on loans must be? (.025)*

# *(h) Is central bank prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market? (.025)*