

Arpita Saluja

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EDUCATION

Columbia University

Ph.D. in Economics	<i>(expected)</i> 2022
M.Phil. in Economics	2018
M.A. in Economics	2017

University of Delhi, India

M.A. in Economics, <i>Gold Medal</i>	2012
B.A. (Hons) in Economics, <i>Gold Medal</i>	2010

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Labour, Organizational Economics, Development Economics, Political Economy

JOB MARKET PAPER

Mentoring and Incentives

Managers play an important role in the human capital development of junior employees through mentoring initiatives and on-the-job training programs. However, little attention has been paid to the trade-off managers face in allocating their time between two competing tasks: production of own output and mentoring of juniors. This paper examines this question using a stylized model of multi-tasking and data of the elite civil servants in India where newly junior bureaucrats undergo training in district administration under a district head. The decentralized structure of administration creates a natural variation in the distance of district heads to their own supervisors. Exploiting this variation along with the random assignment of junior officers, I find that district heads that are in closer proximity to their supervisors and more easily monitored, exert relatively less effort in mentoring and more on their own output production. These differences in mentoring translate into long-term differences in productivity and effectiveness of juniors bureaucrats. Juniors that receive less mentoring are more likely to be suspended and less likely to take up training programs in future. Finally, I show that a country-wide policy reform that was introduced to bring greater transparency to the performance evaluation process distorts the incentives of district heads thereby leading to an unintended impact on the mentoring of junior employees.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Violence and Participation of Minorities in Social Programs
Peer Diversity and Bureaucratic Performance

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University	2020
Development Colloquium Grant, Columbia University	2019
Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2015-2020
Shri Ram Behari Rohatagi Memorial Gold Medal, Hira Lal Bhargava Gold Medal & K.C. Nag Memorial Prize, University of Delhi	2012
All India Post Graduate Scholarship, University Grants Commission	2011
Shri Mudiylpadmanabha Pillai Memorial Gold Medal, Vidyavati & Sohanlal Nayyar Gold Medal & Erachshah Maneckji Nanavutty Memorial Prize, University of Delhi	2010

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor

Industrial Organization	Summer 2018, 2019
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Teaching Assistant

Public Economics	Spring 2021
Industrial Organization	Fall 2019, 2016-2017
Principles of Economics	Fall 2017, 2018-2019

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant to Suresh Naidu, Columbia University	Summer 2017
Research Assistant to Bharat Ramaswami, Indian Statistical Institute	2014-2015
Analyst, Human Capital Analytics, Accenture Management Consulting	2012-2014

FIELD WORK

Pilot surveys of Potato cold storage owners (Agra, Uttar Pradesh)	IFPRI, 2014-2015
Surveys of Dairy farm owners (Punjab, Haryana) and retailers (Delhi)	

PERSONAL

Skills : STATA, Python, R, SAS, VBA
Citizenship: India, Canadian Permanent Resident

REFERENCES

Suresh Naidu

Professor of Economics, Columbia University
Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
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Michael Best

Assistant Professor of Economics, Columbia University
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Jonas Hjort

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