

Ethereum Roadmap




By domothy Twitter & Telegram: @domothy domothy@ethereum.org












- Merge: Better Proof of Stake
- Surge: More data (availability) for rollups
- Scourge: Less MEV downsides
- Verge: Easier verification
- Purge: Simpler protocol
- Splurge: Miscellaneous goodies


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
Beacon Chain

Active Validators 977,310 Staked ETH 31,273,550 ETH

(~\$110B)




https://github.com/ethereum/annotated-spec/blob/master/merge/beacon-chain.md



Sync committee / Light client protocol

- 512 validators, rotated every 256 epochs (~27 hours)
- Light-weight; 512 signatures to check vs. ~1M
- Trust-minimized rather than trustless


See a16z's Helios client https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/building-helios-ethereum-light-client/



Secret Leader Election

- Currently, leader/proposer is revealed a bit ahead of time
- Protection against Denial of Service attacks
- Low priority (unless...)

EIP-7441 – Whisk shuffling




Single Slot Finality


- From 12.6 minutes to 12 seconds
- Main problem: Too many signatures to check and aggregate

Solution paths:


- Fewer validators (MaxEB)
- Fewer active validators
- Way fewer validators (8192) + Distributed Validators Tech
- Better signature aggregation schemes



Quantum-proof Beacon Chain



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Rollups from 10,000 feet

- Safely scaling L1 execution is hard
- But safely scaling L1 data is easy(-er)
- Rollups convert L1 data into L2 execution with 1-of-N trust assumption!
- Rollup-centric roadmap

Optimistic Rollups


- Assume all transactions are valid
- Slash sequencer if not (fraud proofs)

Zero-Knowledge Rollups


- Sequencer proves transactions are valid
- Short proofs verified by L1

All rollup data must be **available** on Layer 1 (for those who *need/want* it)


Force L2 transaction inclusion (i.e. to exit back to L1)




- Upgradability / mutability
- Multisig / governance
- Permissioned elements




L2beat.com



Data Availability Sampling I "is the data available?"




- Two points make a line
- Three points make a parabola
- 4096 points make a... 4095-degree polynomial




Data: (1, 3, 2, 2) Extension: (7, 21, 48, 92)

50% of data + extension can recover 100% of data




Polynomial Commitment Schemes




Data: (1, 3, 2, 2) Extension: (7, 21, 48, 92) In practice, P(x) has thousands of coefficients C = commit(P) = a few bytes (like a hash) known to all nodes

- Ask for random data point (e.g. the 3rd one)
- Receive the value 2 along with proof π
- Verify proof π against C, is satisfied that P(3) = 2
- At most 50% odds of "being fooled"
- Ask for another random data point, odds become 25%
- Another sample: 12.5%
- 30 samples = $1/2^{30} = \sim 1$ in a billion chance of being fooled




Polynomial Commitment Schemes



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
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- Ask for another random data point, odds become 25%
- Another sample: 12.5%
- 30 samples = $1/2^{30} = ~1$ in a billion chance of being fooled

The node is quickly convinced that all the data is available, without having seen (downloaded) more than 30 samples



EIP4844 introduces Blobspace


- No fancy sampling yet, every node download all blobs (128 kilobytes*)
- Conservative initial values: Target of 3 blobs per block, max 6 (priced à la EIP1559, separately!)
- Sets the stage for Data Availability Sampling (using KZG commitment scheme)



1 wei per blob gas \times 2¹⁷ blob gas = 0.000131 *gwei* per blob

? Value: ♦ 0 ETH (\$0.00) Total Blob Size: 768 KiB (6) ? Transaction Fee: 0.004520571704823708 ETH \$16.21 (?) Gas Price: 25.956578212 Gwei (0.000000025956578212 ETH) Blob Fee: Base: 0.0000000000000786432 ETH (0.000786432 Gwei) 1 wei (0.000000001 Gwei) Blob Gas Price: ? Ether Price: \$3,641,61 / ETH 786,432 Blob Gas Used: Gas Limit & Usage by Txn: 226,610 | 174,159 (76.85%) 12,464,184 (15.85 times more expensive) (?) Gas Fees: Base: 24,956578212 Gwei Blob As Calldata Gas: (?) Burnt Fees: 6 Burnt: 0.004346412704823708 ETH (\$15.58)

https://dune.com/0xRob/blobs




Quantum-proof blobspace

- KZG drawbacks: Not quantum-proof and required a trusted setup (>140k contributors)
- Eventually hot-swap KZG for something based on STARKs or Lattices

Cross-rollup interopability


- Establish standards between rollups
- Based rollups, preconfirmations, shared sequencing

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


Proposer/Builder Separation

- MEV is inevitable, untamed MEV markets hurt solo stakers
- Goal: Minimize the choices validators have to make (reduce incentive to specialize)
- Out-of-protocol (today) with MEV Boost: Relays act as trusted brokers
- Enshrined PBS (ePBS): Remove relays, allow MEV burning to smooth the staking yield
- Inclusion lists: Put constraints on builders (reduce censorship by forcing inclusion)




https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2021/12/06/endgame.html



Execution Tickets

- Even more role separation (between attesting and proposing)
- tl;dr Sell the right to propose a block ahead of time (like lottery tickets)
- Attesters remain simple, proposers can specialize (constrained by ILs)
- Permissionless degen MEV lottery (cost of ticket ≈ expected value of MEV per block)

ETH Research: https://ethresear.ch/t/execution-tickets/17944




App-layer MEV minimization

Basically, develop better dapps with MEV in mind

Preconfirmations

- Receive next-block inclusion guarantee from builder
- Pairs well with execution tickets and restaking schemes



Raise max effective balance (*MaxEB*)

- Today: Minimum 32 ETH, maximum 32 ETH
 After MaxEB: Minimum 32 ETH, maximum 2048
 - + automatic compounding
 - + fewer validators for the same amount of stake (lower overhead)


Explore total stake capping

- Also related to overhead / SSF
- Research in progress: changing issuance curve (possibly negative), stake targetting


Liquid staking centralization

Research in progress: Enshrine? Cap slashing penalties?


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
Merkle -> Verkle





- State = all current balances (and more)
- History = all past transfers/transactions
- With the history, you can compute the state to check balances and validate new transactions
- Is there a better way?





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




















Verkle trees


- Much shorter state proofs
- Wider tree (256 vs 16 siblings)
- ZK-friendly proofs
- Allow stateless validators (no history needed – instant sync)
- Light clients become even lighter
- Lower dev reliance on centralized indexers





SNARKify all the things

- Light client protocol (sync committee transitions)
- All beacon chain transitions (signatures, balance changes, etc.)
- Verkle state access proofs / block witnesses
- Eventually all EVM execution (thank you zkRollups!)




First ever SNARK proving ASIC https://x.com/drakefjustin/status/17 55929540700807211

zkEVM opcode/precompile

Verify EVM execution proof inside the EVM (or inside an EVM execution proof...)

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History expiry (EIP-4444) – autoprune history older than 1 year

- Simplifies client codebases (no need to support earlier forks)
- Alleviate node storage requirements
- History must reliably be accessible by other means (Portal network, torrents, block explorers, etc.)


State expiry

- Lower priority now with PBS and Statelessness
- Requires many breaking changes (e.g. address length)

Various harmonizations

- Serialization: RLP (execution layer) vs SSZ (consensus layer)
- Slowly phase out old transaction types (e.g. pre-EIP1559 legacy type)

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


EVM improvements / EVM Object Format

 Series of EIPs to restructure aspects of EVM, makes future upgrades easier https://notes.ethereum.org/@ipsilon/evm-object-format-overview

Account Abstraction

- UX around Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) is bad (like, terrible)
 Gas sponsorship, tx batching, key security,
 spending conditions, social recovery
- EIP-3074 to delegate control of EOAs to smart contract
- ERC-4337 for smart wallet standards across EVM chains/rollups (potential eventual enshrinement)



Endgame EIP-1559

More like an AMM curve


- Track excess gas instead of previous block's gas usage
- Higher censorship cost (entire fee vs. just priority fee)

Multidimensional EIP-1559

- Like gas vs blobs today, but for more resources: call data, state reads/writes, block size, witnesses etc.
- More efficient pricing demand for one resource won't affect price for other resources

Time-Aware base fee calculation (EIP-4396)

· Avoid treating missed slots as sudden spike in demand



Deep crypto

- Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- One-Shot Signatures
- ...

Encrypted mempools

Toxic MEV disappears completely

Verifiable Delay Functions

- "Non-parallelizable proof of work" slow computation in one direction, fast verification after the fact
- Would enhance beacon chain randomness

Thabk you

Q&A