

Rust Cleaner

Rust Code Analysis as a Service

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


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Wormhole Hack




Wormhole Hack - Overview



- On February 2nd, 2022, a hacker exploited a vulnerability in the Wormhole bridge between Solana and Ethereum.
- 120000 Ethereum was stolen, worth ~\$320 million at the time.

Wormhole Hack - Causes

- Caused by a failure to verify validator accounts in the smart contract chain.
- Additionally, the “sysvar:instructions” API that Wormhole was using was deprecated.
- Patch was pushed just hours before the attack.





Wormhole Hack - Solution

- Cargo Clippy and free-use Soteria can warn the user of the deprecated API.
- Premium Soteria can warn the user of the unverified validator accounts.

```
=====This account may be UNTRUSTFUL!=====
Found a potential vulnerability at line 249, column 13 in bridge/src/processor.rs
The sysvar instructions API is unsafe and deprecated (wormhole exploit):

243|     }
244|
245|     // The previous ix must be a secp verification instruction
246|     let secp_ix_index = (current_instruction - 1) as u8;
247|     let secp_ix = solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at(
248|         secp_ix_index as usize,
>249|         &instruction_accounts.try_borrow_mut_data()?,
250|     )
251|     .map_err(|_| ProgramError::InvalidAccountData)?;
252|
253|     // Check that the instruction is actually for the secp program
254|     if secp_ix.program_id != solana_program::secp256k1_program::id() {
255|         return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);
>>>Stack Trace:
>>>spl_bridge::processor::<impl$u20$spl_bridge::state::Bridge$GT$::process::hf71455780127ef67 [bri
>>> spl_bridge::processor::<impl$u20$spl_bridge::state::Bridge$GT$::process_verify_signatures::he
or.rs:95]
```

```
***** attack surface #8: sol.verify_signatures *****
account: accs.instruction_acc
=====VULNERABLE: UnverifiedParsedAccount!=====
Found a potential vulnerability at line 103, column 9 in api/verify_signature.rs
The account is not validated before parsing its data:
97|     }
98|
99|     // The previous ix must be a secp verification instruction
100|     let secp_ix_index = (current_instruction - 1) as u8;
101|     let secp_ix = solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at(
102|         secp_ix_index as usize,
>103|         &accs.instruction_acc.try_borrow_mut_data()?,
104|     )
105|     .map_err(|_| ProgramError::InvalidAccountData)?;
106|
107|     // Check that the instruction is actually for the secp program
108|     if secp_ix.program_id != solana_program::secp256k1_program::id() {
109|         return Err(InvalidSecpInstruction.into());
>>>Stack Trace:
>>>sol.verify_signatures [lib.rs:94]
```





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Problem Overview



Problem Background



Significant security bugs can't be found from a compiler



Once code is deployed to the blockchain, code is immutable, so it can be difficult to change



Other tools require quotes and download times which take extra time and money from the average user



Solution


- Software-as-a-Service tool which allows users to quickly and clearly review their code before deployment
- Allows the user to freely use the service
- Easy to understand results that makes debugging quick and hassle-free





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User Cases





User case 1 : Blockchain Developer



Code can be analyzed before deployed



Save time from manually debugging security flaws with a test network



Give the developer a peace of mind that a obscure bug isn't present





User case 2 : Rust Hobbyist



Find security and runtime flaws not found through compilation




No time spent installing and configuring static analysis tools



Easy to read format makes warnings more approachable



Remove the need for powerful hardware





User case 3 : Rust-based Startup



Run code review nightly without server infrastructure



Hasten development by removing review infrastructure



Easy to share results with colleagues





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Product



[Tools](#)[Documentation](#)[Team](#)

Welcome to Rust Cleaner!

Solana Software as a Service - Host of multiple static analysis tools for the Solana blockchain

[Start Analyzing](#)[Learn more](#)

Software Analysis Tools:

☐ Cargo Audit

☐ Clippy

☒ Soteria

☐ Mirai

Enter GitHub URL

Or upload files to be analyzed (.zip)

📁 Rust-Website.zip

Submit

Loading Results...



This might take awhile. Sign up for email notification?

Send email

Receive email on completion

WARNINGS:

8

Correctness:

0

Suspicious:

0

Style:

4

Complexity:

1

Performance:

0

Low priority:

3

Warnings from Clippy

Filter by:

Priority

Files

▼ style

▼ ./client/src/client.rs

▼ redundant pattern matching, consider using `is_err()`

Severity: "warning"

Lint Rule: "clippy::redundant_pattern_matching"

Error Line Numbers: 103 - 103

```
98     program: &Keypair,  
99     connection: &RpcClient,  
100 ) -> Result<()> {  
101     let greeting_pubkey = utils::get_greeting_public_key(&player.pubkey(), &program.pubkey());  
102  
103     if let Err(_) = connection.get_account(&greeting_pubkey) {  
104         println!("creating greeting account");  
105         let lamport_requirement =  
106             connection.get_minimum_balance_for_rent_exemption(utils::get_greeting_data_size())?;  
107  
108         // This instruction creates an account with the key
```

Warnings from Cargo Audit:

Crates:

> chrono

▼ hyper

▼ Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

Description: `hyper`'s HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside `Content-Length` headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error. To be vulnerable, `hyper` must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

Solution: Upgrade to $\geq 0.14.10$

> Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

> regex

> time

> tokio

- .editorconfig
- .gitattributes
- > .github
- .gitignore
- .markdownlint.json
- Cargo.lock
- Cargo.toml
- CONTRIBUTING.md
- LICENSE.txt
- README.md
- > results
- ✓ src
 - bin
 - cleanup.rs
 - hacktoberfest.rs
 - main.rs

```
1 // Cleans up `README.md`
2 // Usage: cargo run --bin cleanup
3
4 use std::fs;
5 use std::fs::File;
6 use std::io::Read;
7
8 fn fix_dashes(lines: Vec<String>) -> Vec<String> {
9     let mut fixed_lines: Vec<String> := Vec::with_capacity(lines.len());
10
11     let mut within_content = false;
12
13     for line in lines {
14         if within_content {
15             fixed_lines.push(line.replace(" - ", " - "));
16         } else {
17             if line.starts_with("## Applications") {
18                 within_content = true;
19             }
20
21             fixed_lines.push(line.to_string());
22         }
23     }
24
25     return fixed_lines;
26 }
27
28 fn main() {
29     // Read the awesome file.
30     let mut file = File::open("README.md").expect("Failed to read the file");
31
32     let mut contents = String::new();
33     file.read_to_string(&mut contents)
34         .expect("Failed to read file contents");
35 }
```




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System Design




System Design

- Currently all on the same server
 - Could be split up for scalability
- Easy to add any tool in SARIF format



Subsystem Design



Future Improvements

Additional Tools



Additional Language Support

Submission History



Analyze On Code Change

QUESTIONS?



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