OWASP regularly compiles a list of the top 10 security vulnerabilities

#4 on this list is the Pirect Object Reference

This did not even make the list prior to 2004

Web applications have become more complicated with different parts of the application and different data accessible to each user

This vulnerability exists in an application if it exposes an internal implementation detail to the user

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This could be a database key, a file name, the name of an object - anything

DIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Let's take an example

A site allows users to send messages to each other

All messages are stored in a database - a simple one like this

| 17 | FROM | 10 | MESSAGE |
|-----|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 103 | a@gmail.com | jan@gmail.com | Hi how are you? |
| 104 | werl 23@yahoo.com | jeff@email.com | Shall I see you in an hour? |
| 105 | toby@hotmail.com | glenn@hotmail.com | This is a long message, hope you're doing well |
| 106 | jane@gmail.com | verna@hotmail.com | Thank you for your help! |

| 10 | FROM | 10 | MESSAGE |
|-----|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 103 | a@gmail.com | jan@gmail.com | Hi how are you? |
| 104 | werl 23@yahoo.com | jeff@email.com | Shall I see you in an hour? |
| 105 | toby@hotmail.com | glenn@hotmail.com | This is a long message, hope you're doing well |
| 106 | jane@gmail.com | verna@hotmail.com | Thank you for your help! |

A message id is a unique auto incremented value for every message, used to identify a message

| 17 | FROM | 10 | MESSAGE |
|-----|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 103 | a@gmail.com | jan@gmail.com | Hi how are you? |
| 104 | werl 23@yahoo.com | jeff@email.com | Shall I see you in an hour? |
| 105 | toby@hotmail.com | glenn@hotmail.com | This is a long message, hope you're doing well |
| 106 | jane@gmail.com | verna@hotmail.com | Thank you for your help! |

These are from and to fields, other fields like timestamp etc have been left out for simplicity

| 17 | FROM | 10 | MESSAGE |
|-----|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 103 | a@gmail.com | jan@gmail.com | Hi how are you? |
| 104 | werl 23@yahoo.com | jeff@email.com | Shall I see you in an hour? |
| 105 | toby@hotmail.com | glenn@hotmail.com | This is a long message, hope you're doing well |
| 106 | jane@gmail.com | verna@hotmail.com | Thank you for your help! |
| | | | |

And actual message contents

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=102

This is the URL to access one particular message

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=102

If the user is not logged in, this URL forces him to the login page for the site

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=102

On logging in a session variable is set up which stores the user id

This indicates that the user has logged in for this session

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=102

The message id is used to uniquely identify the message to view

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=154

This should allow the user to view the message with the unique id 154

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=154

As the user goes through the messages in his inbox - the message id in the URL changes to reflect the different messages he has received

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=154

But what if message id 154 did not have the current user in either its from or to fields?

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=154

We've basically allowed a user to view messages in our database which do not belong to him!

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=154

The message id is an internal implementation detail of the system, and the URL exposes this to the user

http://trustedmail.com/messages/?id=154

This is a direct object reference to an internal object

Here is an example from the real world - this is something which actually happened

Some years ago a financial company ended up inadvertently exposing financial data of its members

to other members who were not authorized to view it

Say you were logged and authenticated to your pension account

```
http://www.trustedfinancialsite.com/
viewdetails.php/?account_id=1234
```

This page showed you all details of your retirement funds

```
http://www.trustedfinancialsite.com/viewdetails.php/?account_id=1234
```

The account you view is specified by this URL parameter

```
http://www.trustedfinancialsite.com/viewdetails.php/?account_id=1234
```

Now if you edited the URL parameter to change the account id

```
http://www.trustedfinancialsite.com/viewdetails.php/?account_id=8123
```

The company's site let you access the details of the other account!

```
http://www.trustedfinancialsite.com/viewdetails.php/?account_id=8123
```

There was no additional check to see whether you were authorized to view those account details!

```
http://www.trustedfinancialsite.com/viewdetails.php/?account_id=8123
```

The account id is an internal implementation detail of the code

```
http://www.trustedfinancialsite.com/viewdetails.php/?account_id=8123
```

Exposing this information compromised millions of accounts linked to that financial company

DIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation

DIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation

1. Authorization

2. Indirection Layer

3. Randomized Identifiers

PIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation – Authorization

A direct object reference vulnerability of this kind has a basic authorization problem

PIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation – Authorization

Authorization refers to what a user has access to

what data, what components of a site

PIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation - Authorization

In the messages example or in the pension account example a simple check would have sufficed for authorization

PIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation – Authorization

Does the message have the user in the to, from or cc field?

Is the current user the owner of that pension account?

DIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation

1. Authorization

2. Indirection Layer

3. Randomized Identifiers

Internal ids and objects should not be exposed to the user directly

Instead a separate layer can map the internal ids to externally visible ids

Instead a separate layer can map the internal ids to externally visible ids

| LOCAL PER-USER MAPPING | 17 |
|------------------------|-----|
| 0 | 103 |
| 1 | 104 |
| 2 | 105 |
| 3 | 106 |

| LOCAL PER-USER MAPPING | | MAPPING | 17 |
|------------------------|---|---------|-----|
| | 0 | | 103 |
| | 1 | | 104 |
| | 2 | | 105 |
| | 3 | | 106 |
| | 1 | | |

Each user will have a specific id which maps to the message id

| LOCAL PER | -USER | MAPPING | 17 |
|-----------|-------|---------|-----|
| | 0 | | 103 |
| | 1 | | 104 |
| | 2 | | 105 |
| | 3 | | 106 |
| | | | |

The keys of this map is what will display in the URL parameter

| 17 |
|-----|
| 103 |
| 104 |
| 105 |
| 106 |
| |

A map like this should be generated for every user

| LOCAL PER-USER MAPPING | | MAPPING | 17 |
|------------------------|---|---------|-----|
| | 0 | | 103 |
| | 1 | | 104 |
| | 2 | | 105 |
| | 3 | | 106 |
| | | | |

So no user can even try and access messages he is not authorized to

DIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation

1. Authorization

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PIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation - Randomized Identifiers

Instead of using predictable, autoincremented ids the identifiers could also be randomly generated

PIRECT OBJECT REFERENCE Mitigation - Randomized Identifiers

This by itself is not enough mitigation but can be used along with the other techniques

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