SQL injection has been one of the top 10 security vulnerabilities in the world for the last 10 years

In 2013 it was the number #1 attack as determined by the Open Web Application Security Project

SQL injection is a code injection technique used to attack data driven applications where malicious SQL statements are inserted into fields for execution

## SQL injection is a code injection technique used to attack data driven

Just like XSS injects scripts into web pages, SQL injection involves injecting snippets into SQL statements that may be executed on your database

SQL injection is a code injection technique used to attack data driven applications where malicious SQL

Websites are dynamic, they have a database attached to it which holds all kinds of information

SQL injection is a code injection technique used to attack data driven applications where malicious SQL

The information can be sensitive personal information, financial information anything!

SQL statements to query this data are usually constructed with user input applications where malicious SQL statements are inserted into fields for execution

The user can inject malicious content to be executed agains the site's technique use database, data driven applications where malicious SQL statements are inserted into fields for execution


SQL injection is a code injection technique used to attack data driven applications where malicious SQL statements are inserted into fields for execution

# Before we get to understanding how SQL injection works, there is an important thing you should know


### WHO IS BOBBY TABLES?


### SQL INJECTION WHO IS BOBBY TABLES?

http://xkcd.com/327/










### SQL INJECTION WHO IS BOBBY TABLES?

http://xkcd.com/327/



# And this in one single, awesome comic is what SQL injection is all about


Examplel 3-SQLInjection-simple.php

Account inforn	nation page at your trusted bank
1234 Account details	

Account infor	mation page at your trusted bank
1234	
Account details	

### This allows you to view your own account details

# The input is not editable and clicking on account details should display your balance



# The account id to display is passed as a GET parameter in the url

### The account id to display is passed as a GET parameter in the url

> Account id User Balance 1234 Janani 12345

http://localhost/security/Example14-SQLInjection-simple.php? account\_id=1234

### What if you edited the URL to be:

#### What if you edited the URL to be:

http://localhost/security/Example14-SQLInjection-simple.php?

account\_id=1234 AND TRUE

Account id	User	Balance
1111	Pradeep	100953
1234	Janani	12345
2222	Vitthal	997

### We've just accessed all the accounts and balances in the database!

http://localhost/security/Example14-SQLInjection-simple.php?

account\_id=1234 AND TRUE

е
}



```
$account_id = $_GET['account_id'];
if (!empty($account_id)) {
try {
  $conn = getDatabaseConnection();
  $result = $conn->query("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = " . $account_id);
  if ($result->num_rows > 0) {
     echo '<br>';
     echo '' . "<b>Account id</b>" . '';
     echo '' . "<b>User</b>" . '';
     echo '' . "<b>Balance</b>" . '';
     while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
      echo '';
      echo '' . $row['account_id'] . '';
      echo '' . $row['user_name'] . '';
      echo '' . $row['account_balance'] . '';
      echo '';
     echo '';
  } else {
     echo "<br>>No results match your search:-(";
  mysqli_close($conn);
 } catch (Exception $e) {
  echo 'Error! ' + $e->getCode();
```

```
$account_id = $_GET['account_id'];
if (!empty($account_id)) {
try {
 $conn = getDatabaseConnection();
   $result = $conn->query("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = " . $account_id);
 if ($result->num_rows > 0) {
   echo '<br>';
   echo '' . "<b>Account id</b>" . '';
   echo '' . "<b>User</b>" . '';
   echo '' . "<b>Balance</b>" . '';
   while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
    echo '';
    echo '' . $row['account_id'] . '';
```

```
$account_id = $_GET['account_id'];
if (!empty($account_id)) {
try {
 $conn = getDatabaseConnection();
   $result = $conn->query("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = " . $account_id);
  if ($result->num_rows > 0) {
    echo '<br>';
    echo '' . "<b>Account id</b>" . '';
    echo '' . "<b>User</b>" . '';
    echo '' . "<b>Balance</b>" . '';
     hile($row = $result->fetch_assoc() \_ {
                   POella Spx" a Did Celand'S the accountid
                    neukl parameter to the
               d of the SQL statement
```

```
"SELECT *
FROM BackAccounts
WHERE AccountId = " . $_GET['account_id']
```

## The user input is appended to the very end

```
SELECT *
FROM BackAccounts
WHERE AccountId = 1234
```

# Which means the user can add in anything he wants in place of the account id

```
SELECT *
FROM BackAccounts
WHERE AccountId = 1234 OR TRUE
```

# This selects all the rows in the database because the WHERE clause is TRUE

Non-validated string literals are used to construct dynamic SQL statements and interpreted as code by the SQL engine

Other examples

```
"SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='" + name + "' AND password='" + pass + "'"
```

### This is a highly vulnerable SQL statement

```
"SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='" + name + "' AND password='" + pass + "'"
```

### If our input in the password table looked something like

password' OR 1=1 -

password' OR 1=1 -

```
SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='someusername'
AND password='password' OR 1=1 -
```

The user specified password has been literally placed into the SQL statement

```
SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='someusername'
AND password='password' OR 1=1 -'
```

## This once again matches all the rows in the Users table

```
SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='someusername'
AND password='password' OR 1=1 -'
```

The "—" comments out the rest of the SQL statement, so even if the query was more complicated and had additional clauses they are commented out!

```
SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='someusername'
AND password='password' OR 1=1 -
```

## In this example the extra single quote 'is commented out

### The comment character is different for different databases

```
-- MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle, PostgreSQL, SQLite
' OR '1'='1' --
' OR '1'='1' /*
-- MySQL
' OR '1'='1' #
-- Access (using null characters)
' OR '1'='1' %00
' OR '1'='1' %16
```

### Getting back to Bobby Tables If a student were named:

```
Robert'); DROP TABLE Students; --
```

# Say this entire name was inserted into a table

### Getting back to Bobby Tables If a student were named:

```
Robert'); DROP TABLE Students;--
```

# This SQL would have been executed!

Getting back to Bobby Tables If a student were named:

Robert'); DROP TABLE Students; --

Everything else commented out

```
Robert'); DROP TABLE Students; --
```

# No wonder the school was unhappy...

Thanks to <a href="http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/sql-injection.html">http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/sql-injection.html</a> for this example

# So how does an attacker go about a SQL injection attack?

Anatomy of an attack

# The objective is to log into a website using a valid username and password

# Consider an example where a website has a "email me my password" feature

in case the user has forgotten his password

Anatomy of an attack

Consider an example where a website has a "email me my password" feature

# The user enters an email address and if it is found

The password associated with that email is mailed to that address

Anatomy of an attack

Consider an example where a website has a email me my password feature if the user has forgotten his password

The user enters an email address and if it is found

The password associated with that email is mailed to that address

Seems fairly straightforward...

# An attacker preparing an attack will first check to see whether the input data is being sanitized or not

### SQL INJECTION Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = '<user input email>'
```

# Assume this is what the basic structure of the query looks like

# SQL INJECTION Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = '<user input email>'
```

# The cuser input emails comes from the user input in a form

# SQL INJECTION Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = '<user input email>'
```

We enter:

jan@loonycorn.com'

**SELECT** \* **FROM Users** 

#### SQL INJECTION

Anatomy of an attack WHERE email = '<user input email>'

jan@loonycom.com'

### This addition of a quote serves to check whether the data is used literally or not

### SQL INJECTION And Section

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'jan@loonycorn.com''
```

#### If the server runs this statement this will be a SQL error

#### SQL INJECTION

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'jan@loonycorn.com''
```

If the server runs this statement this will be a SQL error

How the error is handled by the server is information for the attacker

#### SQL INJECTION

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'jan@loonycorn.com''
```

If a nice message is returned to the user it means the server sanitized the input or handled the error

### SQL INJECTION

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'jan@loonycorn.com''
```

If the site returns an error - then it means that the input was used literally without sanitization

### SQL INJECTION

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'jan@loonycorn.com''
```

The attacker will probably see "Internal error" or "Patabase error" or an exception stack trace

Anatomy of an attack

# It seems like the email comparison is in the WHERE clause

We enter:

some email or '1'='1

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' or '1'='1'
```

1' = 1' will always be true - the nature of the clause has been changed in an entirely legal way

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' or '1'='1'
```

From a single component clause this becomes a 2 component clause where 1' = 1' is always true!

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' or '1'='1'
```

### So what happens now?

There will be at least one match for this query - let's say an email is sent to the first match

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' or '1'='1'
```

The attacker gets a message "Password has been mailed to someemail@email.com"

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' or '1'='1'
```

Some user has possibly received his password which should make him suspicious

but people often ignore such emails

So far we know:

1. Unsanifized inputs leading to SQL errors give some kind of server error

z. Valid inputs give no error and possible a nice message on screen

# Now we want to figure out what the column names are in this table

Anatomy of an attack

Use the email input field as before and the fact that correct SQL queries do not result in a server error

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' AND email is NULL -
```

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' AND email is NULL -'
```

# We don't care about matching the email

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' AND email is NULL -'
```

# We want to check whether "email" is a valid column name in this table

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' AND email is NULL -'
```

#### If email is a valid column name then this is a valid query and there should be no error from the server

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' AND email is NULL -'
```

# This comments out the rest of the query, whatever it was

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email' AND username is NULL -'
```

# Try different column names till you find the ones which cause no errors

Anatomy of an attack

#### Collect a list of valid column names

email user\_id password name

#### Now to find the table name

# The query changes but the principle remains the same

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email'
AND 1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM table_name); --'
```

## If the table exists then there will be no error

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email'
AND 1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM table_name); --'
```

If we find a valid table there is no guarantee that this is the table which stores the email information - it is simply a table in the database

## Let's say we find the table name Users

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email'
AND AND Users.email IS NULL;; ---'
```

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email'
AND AND Users.email IS NULL;; --'
```

This will be error free only if there is a match between the table queried and the table we guessed

Anatomy of an attack

So far we know:

1. Valid Column names for the table queried

2. Valid table name

# Now we want to figure out any users that might exist in this table

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email'
OR name LIKE '%bob%'
```

We can try a whole bunch of common names and email extensions such as gmail.com, yahoo.com etc

Anatomy of an attack

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email'
OR name LIKE '%bob%'
```

If we get a match we'll get a message of the type "your password has been mailed to someemail@email.com"

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email'
OR name LIKE '%bob%'
```

# We now have a valid user email from this website!

Anatomy of an attack

## At this point we can cause a whole lot of havoc in this database

# Delete entire tables if the database is not readonly

# Delete entire tables if the database is not readonly

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email';
DROP TABLE Users; --'
```

# There is a tricky way the blog used to get access to the username + password

Anatomy of an attack

1. Updated the email address to the email of the attacker i.e his own email

2. Mailed himself the password by clicking on lost password

# Now the attacker's email is present in the web site's database!

Now just enter this email into the "email me my password" input box and receive email with the password

#### We have a valid login to the site!

# This is a classic example of a blind SQL injection attack!

# SQL INJECTION Anatomy of an attack This is a classic example of a blind SQL injection attack!

The attacker cannot see the result of the attack but can use the response of the server to make guesses

Anatomy of an attack

This is a classic example of a blind SQL injection attack!

This involves a lot patient maneuvering and crafting of SQL statements for every piece of data recovered

Second order SQL injection occurs when submitted values contain malicious commands which are stored in the site's database

Anatomy of an attack

Second order SQL injection occurs when submitted values contain malicious commands which are stored in the site's database

Another part of the site which does not have injection controls might execute those commands and expose data

# SQL INJECTION Types of SQL Injection

SQL INJECTION
Types of SQL Injection

I. In-band SQLi

2. Blind SQLi

3. out-of-band SqLi

This is a kind of SQL attack when an attacker is able to use the same communication channel to both

launch the attack gather the results

As in the anatomy of an attack the form input field is used to launch the attack and the results of specifying the input is used to gaininformation

# This is the most common and easy to launch attack

This can be of two types:

Error based SqLi

Union based SqLi

Union based SQLi

SQL INJECTION

In-band SQLi

Error based SQLi

# This relies on error messages thrown by the database server to obtain information about its structure

Union based SQLi

SQL INJECTION

In-band SQLi

Error based SQLi

The type of error, or even the very existence of the error is information to the attacker

Union based SQLi

## SQL INJECTION In-band SQLi

#### Error based S9Li

While errors are great during development, the production environment should not display errors to the user - they can be logged to a restricted file instead Error based SQLi

SQL INJECTION

In-band SQLi

Union based SQLi

# This involves use of a UNION to include another SELECT statement with the original SQL command

Error based SQLi

SQL INJECTION

In-band SQLi

Union based SQLi

The response will contain the results of the original statement as well as the results of the new statement which was injected

#### Union based SQLi

```
SELECT name, email
FROM Users
WHERE email = 'some email';
        UNION
SELECT name, email
FROM Users;
-';
```

If you know the original format of the statement you can just append your own!

## SQL INJECTION Types of SQL Injection

I. In-band SQLi
Error based SQLi
Union based SQLi

2. Blind SQLi
3. Ouf-of-band SQLi

## SQL INJECTION Blind SQLi

# In such an attack no data is transferred along with the web application

the attacker may not necessarily see the result of his attack

## SQL INJECTION Blind SQLi

The attacker tries to reconstruct the database structure by sending payloads, observing the server response and the resulting behavior

## SQL INJECTION Blind SQLi

# This might take much longer to figure out an exploit, based on trial and error

SQL INJECTION
Blind SQLi

This can be of two types:

Boolean based SqLi

Time based SqLi

Time based SQLi

#### SQL INJECTION Blind SQLi Boolean based SQLi

This relies on sending a SQL query which forces the server to return a different result if the query evaluates to TRUE or FALSE

Time based SQLi

#### SQL INJECTION Blind SQLi Boolean based SQLi

The server response changes based on whether the query was TRUE or FALSE allowing the attacker to infer the payload response

Boolean based SQLi

## SQL INJECTION Blind SQLi

Time based SQLi

This involves sending a query to the server which forces the database to wait a specified amount of time before responding

Boolean based SQLi

## SQL INJECTION Blind SQLi

Time based SQLi

The attacker draws inferences based on whether the server response was immediate or delayed

## SQL INJECTION Types of SQL Injection

I. In-band SQLi
Error based SQLi
Union based SQLi

#### 2. Blind SQLi

Boolean based SQLi Time based SQLi

3. out-of-band SqLi

## SQL INJECTION Out-of-band SQLi

This is not a commonly used attack as it relies on the database server having certain features enabled

## SQL INJECTION Out-of-band SQLi

# Perhaps the database server's can make PNS or HTTP requests to deliver data to an attacker

## SQL INJECTION Out-of-band SQLi

An example is Microsoft SQL server's xp\_dirtree command which can be used to make PNS requests to the attacker's server

## SQL INJECTION Types of SQL Injection

I. In-band SQLi
Error based SQLi
Union based SQLi

2. Blind SQLi

Boolean based SQLi Time based SQLi

3. out-of-band SqLi

## SQL INJECTION Mitigation

#### SQL INJECTION Mitigation

- 1. Parameterized statements
  - 2. Stored procedures
  - 3. Escaping user input
    - 4. Least privilege
  - 5. Whitelist Validation

The use of prepared statements with parameters is the safe and correct way to write SQL queries

The use of prepared statements with parameters is the safe and correct way to write SQL queries

## These are simpler and easier to write than dynamic queries

The use of prepared statements with parameters is the safe and correct way to write SQL queries

This forces the developer to think through what the entire SQL query structure looks like and what parts are filled in with user data

The use of prepared statements with parameters is the safe and correct way to write SQL queries

#### It differentiates clearly between code (the actual query) and data (user input)

#### SQL INJECTION

Example 14-SQLInjection-parameterized Queries.php

```
$conn = getDatabaseConnection();
$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("i", $account_id);
$stmt->execute();
$stmt->bind_result($account_id, $user_name, $account_balance);
echo '<br>';
echo '' . "<b>Account id</b>" . '';
echo '' . "<b>User</b>" . '';
echo '' . "<b>Balance</b>" . '';
while($stmt->fetch()) {
 echo '';
 echo '' . $account_balance . '';
 echo '';
echo '';
```

```
$conn = getDatabaseConnection();
   $stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = ?");
   $stmt->bind_param("i", $account_id);
   $stmt->execute();
   $stmt->bind_result($account_id, $user_name, $account_balance);
Set up the query to make to the
                       database
```

```
$conn = getDatabaseConnection();

$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("i", $account_id);
$stmt->execute();

$stmt->bind_result($account_id, $user_name, $account_balance);

***Connection of the parameter of the parame
```

## The? is a placeholder for the user input account id

#### Bind the user specified account id to the prepared statement

```
$conn = getDatabaseConnection();
                       $stmt = $conn->prpare("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = ?");
                      $stmt->bind_param("i", | $account_id);
                       $stmt->execute();
                      $stmt->bind_result($account_id, $user_name, $account_balance);
  echo '<td style="width lax"; height: 18py he
account id should be interpreted
                                                                                                                                     as an integer
```

#### Execute the prepared statement

```
$conn = getDatabaseConnection();

$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM BankAccounts WHERE account_id = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("i", $account_id);
$stmt->execute();

$stmt->bind_result($account_id, $user_name, $account_balance);

***Stmt->bind_result($account_id, $user_name, $account_id, $user_name, $account_id, $user_name,
```

#### And bind the result to variables

# Prepared statements allow the user to specify the intent and the attacker cannot change this intent

```
SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username= ?
AND password= ?
```

## Let's say input to username is "jan OR TRUE"

SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='jan OR TRUE'
AND password= ?

And the input in the password field is "password' OR 1=1 --"

```
SELECT id FROM Users
WHERE username='jan OR TRUE'
AND password='password OR 1=1 -'
```

The statement will actually look for a user name and password which literally matches the string passed in

In some cases prepared statements can harm performance - in such specific circumstances we can resort to other techniques to protect against SQL injection

#### SQL INJECTION Mitigation

- 1. Parameterized statements
  - 2. Stored procedures
  - 3. Escaping user input
    - 4. Least privilege
  - 5. Whitelist Validation

#### SQL INJECTION Stored procedures

A stored procedure is a bunch of SQL statements which are logically grouped to perform a specific task

#### SQL INJECTION Stored procedures

# The statements are compiled and work kind of as a function does in a programming language

#### SQL INJECTION Stored procedures

Typically stored procedures work like parameterized statements - unless the developer goes out of the way to do something different

#### SQL INJECTION Mitigation

- 1. Parameterized statements
  - 2. Stored procedures
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# This involves escaping any characters which have a special meaning in SQL

Typically every database has a list of characters which should be escaped

There usually is a method which is the right one to use to escape user input

```
$mysqli = new mysqli('hostname', 'db_username', 'db_password', 'db_name');
$query = sprintf("SELECT * FROM `Users` WHERE UserName='%s' AND Password='%s'",
$mysqli->real_escape_string($username),
$mysqli->real_escape_string($password));
$mysqli->query($query);
```

## If you use PHP and MySQL the real\_escape\_string() method on the connection escapes user input for MySQL

# PHP has other escaping functions for different database types such as pg\_escape\_string() for PostgreSQL

Another way of validating input is to check whether the input is a valid representation of the type i.e. integer for integer columns and so on

Instead of placing the burden on every developer to escape inputs, typically a layer between the database and application should take care of this

## One particular variation of escaping input is to hex-encode all input data

One particular variation of escaping input is to hex-encode all input data

This means only characters 0-9 and a-f are valid in user input, SQL special characters also get encoded to this format

One particular variation of escaping input is to hex-encode all input data

This means only characters 0-9 and a-f are valid in user input, SQL special characters also get encoded to this format

## The comparison with values in the database should account for the hexencoded form

### SQL INJECTION Mitigation

- 1. Parameterized statements
  - 2. Stored procedures
  - 3. Escaping user input
    - 4. Least privilege
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#### SQL INJECTION Least privilege

Every database account in the database should only be given sufficient privilege to perform the tasks required

The least privilege possible

#### SQL INJECTION Least privilege

Po not give any application level accounts admin privileges

Determine whether accounts need read or write privileges

Determine which tables each account requires access to

#### SQL INJECTION Least privilege

## Start from the ground up to accord privileges to accounts

If an account needs access to only some data from a table use views instead

### SQL INJECTION Mitigation

- 1. Parameterized statements
  - 2. Stored procedures
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  - 5. Whitelist Validation

## SQL INJECTION Whitelist validation

## Whitelist validation involves figuring out what exactly is valid and only allowing inputs which adheres to that

## SQL INJECTION Whitelist validation

For structured data like dates, social security numbers, email addresses etc a very strong validation pattern can be defined

## SQL INJECTION Whitelist validation

Of these free text is the hardest to validate, even this can have minimal validation like having a max length defined, allowing only printable characters etc.

### SQL INJECTION Mitigation

- 1. Parameterized statements
  - 2. Stored procedures
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    - 4. Least privilege
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