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Social Power and Political Freedom

SEEKING CONTROLS OVER GOVERNMENTS

One of the most urgent general problems in politics today is how to control the actions of modern governments. Their uncontrolled power threatens us in various ways -- most blatantly in the forms of modern tyranny and war. The traditional means of controlling rulers -- constitutional limitations, elections, self-restraint in the rulers themselves, and violent revolution -- have been demonstrated to have significant limitations and disadvantages, regardless of their other

contributions. In extreme situations in which control is most needed, we can no longer rely upon those traditional means as our only options. If we are not to become helpless political automatons, or to be annihilated, we must find and implement effective means of control over the power of rulers.

If we are to discover, develop, and implement such means of control we must *think* about this problem. To do this, we need to go back to a much more basic level of discussion of political power than is usual these days in discussions of the problems of war, tyranny, and oppression. We need to locate and consider the various elements of the problem of uncontrolled political power and examine their interrelationships. In doing this we must be careful not to accept unconsciously the commonly held views about political power. These views will impose limits on our thinking which may prevent us from successfully developing effective means of control. Instead, as we seek to understand and examine the social and political realities related to political power, we need consciously to try to go beyond the conceptual boundaries imposed by automatic acceptance of traditional assumptions. We need to explore whether other means of controlling rulers may exist or be developed in addition to the means of control relied upon in the past.

Before we can even begin to think about ways to control political power in extreme situations, we must look at political power itself. What is it, and what is its nature? These questions are basic to considerations of the means which can be used to control political power when its wielders do not wish to be controlled. Different views of political power and its nature will lead to corresponding perceptions of the options which may be available to those who wish to apply controls.

It is often assumed that the power of a "ruler" (including, of course, not only chief executives but also ruling groups and all bodies in command of the State structure) is rather like a granite mountain: solid, monolithic, long-lasting, or virtually permanent. From that perspective, such power is in extremities subject only to certain possible means of control. One might exercise some control b changing the "ownership" or "management" of the State structure. This could be done legally (as through elections) or illegally (as through coup d'état). Both ways would usually leave the structure and available power to the "owner" or "manager" virtually intact. Or,

one might threaten or implement a direct explosive attack of great magnitude (as a violent revolution or an international war) intended to destroy at least part of the mighty structure. It has been widely assumed that against a ruler unwilling to accept limits or to abdicate voluntarily only such destructive means are capable of weakening or abolishing the power of the regime.

THE SOURCES OF THE POWER OF RULERS CAN BE SEVERED

An alternative view of the nature of the power of rulers is almost the opposite. The political power of a ruler is perceived to be nothing like a granite mountain requiring explosive capacity for control. According to this other theory, the ruler (or ruling group) is a human being (or group of human beings). The ruler has in his own person no more power than any other human being. This insight is so elementary that it is often never noticed. Recognition of it, however, leads to new insights and options. If the ruler has in his own body and mind no more power than has any other individual, then his power to rule must come from outside of his person. That power must therefore have sources in the society, and these can be located. These sources include the acceptance of the ruler's right to rule ("authority"), economic resources, manpower, military capacity, knowledge, skills, administration, police, prisons, courts, and the like. Each of these sources is in turn closely related to, or directly dependent upon, the degree of cooperation, submission, obedience, and assistance that the ruler is able to obtain from his subjects. These include both the general population and his paid "helpers" and agents. That dependence makes it possible, under certain circumstances, for the subjects to reduce the availability of these sources of power, or to withdraw them completely, by reducing or withdrawing their necessary cooperation and obedience.

If the acceptance, submission, and assistance of the paid "helpers" and agents and also of the general population are withdrawn partially or completely, the sources of power are consequently restricted, and therefore the ruler's effective power is weakened. That weakening will be roughly in proportion to the degree to which the availability of the necessary sources of power is restricted. If the withdrawal of acceptance, submission, and help can

be maintained in face of the ruler's punishments for disobedience ("sanctions") then an end of the regime is in sight. Thus, all rulers are dependent for their positions and political power upon the obedience, submission, and cooperation of their subjects. This is an extremely condensed summary of a much longer (and somewhat less simple) analysis.[1] It should be sufficient, however, to suggest that the ruler's power' not only isn't monolithic or permanent, but instead is always based upon an intricate and fragile structure of human and institutional relationships. The implications of this insight are obvious, although immense practical problems in implementing withdrawal of support as a means of control still require serious attention.

This principle of withdrawing sources of power from rulers when practically applied, Could supply the needed effective means of struggle to impose control over rulers who do not wish to be controlled. Means of struggle against that type of ruler are obviously among the most crucial components in the general capacity of a society to control its rulers.

THE SOCIETY'S STRUCTURE AFFECTS THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONTROL

Another highly important component in such a capacity is the institutional or structural condition of the society. This refers to the existence or absence of various institutions, their numbers, the degree of their centralization or decentralization, their internal decision-making processes, and the degree of their internal strength and vitality. One extreme condition would be a society in which every institution was either a part of the centralized State structure or effectively subordinated to it and controlled by it. The other extreme would be a society in which all of its needs were met by a great variety of independent institutions and in which forms of government were present but the centralized State was not. ("State" here refers to a particular form of government which possesses, among other elements, a permanent bureaucracy, a permanent military system and a permanent police force utilizing violent means of control, backed by prison system.) Those extreme structural conditions of high centralization or decentralization rarely or never exist, however. Virtually all political societies have a structure somewhere between

those extremities. The degree of concentration or diffusion of effective power capacity in the society, the degree to which that capacity is centralized in the State or decentralized among the independent institutions of the society, is the important question.

The structural condition of the society affects the capacity of the society to control the power of rulers in two ways. If power: is highly decentralized among strong and vital independent institutions, that condition will be of great assistance in emergencies in which struggle is required to control a ruler. It will greatly strengthen the capacity of the subjects and their institutions to withdraw the sources of the ruler's power in order to impose such control. Also, the structural condition will set the broad boundaries of a ruler s potential power beyond which he may not go without structural changes or deliberately increased active assistance from the subjects and their institutions.

Any particular ruler occupying the position o~ command of the State structure will not necessarily extend his exercised power, domination and control over the society as far or deep as the structural condition may permit. Lack of motivation, respect for constitutionally determined limits, moral or religious convictions, or adherence to certain theories or philosophies of politics may cause the ruler deliberately to refrain from utilizing the full power potential which the structural condition of the society makes available to him. However, if the ruler's views change, if conditions appear to him to require more extreme actions, if personality needs cause him to become more power hungry, or if a new person or group by usurpation seizes the position of ruler, then the ruler may push his exercise of power potential fully to the boundaries determined by the structural condition of the society. The ruler may even seek to undermine or attack the institutions which by their strength set those limits.

This all suggests, therefore, that a technique of struggle to control rulers who do not wish to be controlled and also a structural condition of the society which sets effective boundaries on the power potential of rulers are both needed over and above constitutional arrangements and self-imposed limits of the ruler himself In order to establish effective control over the power of modern rulers.

A technique of struggle exists which is based upon the above view of the nature of power (that it has sources which may be

restricted by withdrawal of cooperation and obedience). This is called nonviolent action. It includes nonviolent symbolic protest; economic, social, and political noncooperation; and nonviolent intervention in psychological, physical, social, economic, and political forms. This technique when refined, developed, and implemented in a multitude of specific situations, may constitute the heart of the solution to the need for a technique of struggle to control the power of rulers who are unwilling to accept voluntarily limits to their power. A great deal of research, analysis, policy studies, and development are needed .on the nature and potential of that technique of control.

This chapter, however, is primarily focused on the role of the underlying social structure in determining the boundaries of the power potential of the ruler. Central to this discussion is consideration of the long-term consequences of the relative concentration of the society's power potential in the State, as compared to the long-term consequences of the relative diffusion of power among the non-State institutions of the society as a whole.

At times, though not often, individuals can significantly influence the course of social and political events by their personal power of persuasion, their connections with persons in key positions in the structure, and their capacity to use particular types of nonviolent action. Some of Mohandas K. Gandhi's individual acts illustrate this latter capacity. However, those instances are rare, especially against rulers who are determined to rule as they wish without limitations. In those cases their power may' only be seriously curtailed or dissolved by restriction of their sources of power. Such restriction however cannot be produced by isolated individuals. The sources of the ruler's power are normally only threatened significantly when assistance, cooperation, and obedience are withheld by large numbers of subject at the same time, that is, by social groups and institutions. The ability of such bodies to withhold the sources they supply is then pivotal.. That abi1ity will be influenced by various factors, including the subjects' skill in applying the technique of struggle, and also the ruler's relative need for the sources of power which they may provide. Important, too, is the degree to which these groups possess the capacity to act independently against the ruler.

Two broad possibilities exist at that point. Power may be so concentrated in the State, and the subjects so atomized, that no significant social groups or institutions exist which are capable of withholding the sources of the ruler's power, and therefore controlling the actions of the ruler. On the other hand, if such groups capable of independent action, and therefore control, do exist to a significant degree in the society, their presence and strength will significantly increase the chances of success in a struggle to control the ruler's power. Such groups and institutions capable of independent action are called "*loci* (or places) of power."

"Power" here obviously refers to political power, a sub-type of social power. Political power here is defined as the totality of means, influences, and pressures -- including authority, rewards, and sanctions -- available for use to achieve the objectives of the power-holder, especially the institutions of government, the State, and groups opposing either of them. Political power may be measured by the ability to control the situation, people, or institutions, or to mobilize people and institutions for some activity. Power may be used to enable a group to achieve a goal, to implement or change policies, to induce others to behave as the wielders of power wish to engage in opposition, to maintain the established system, policies, and relationships, or to alter, destroy, or replace the prior power relationships. Sanctions - which may be either violent or nonviolent -- are usually a key element in power. It is not always necessary to apply the capacity to wield sanctions in order for it to be effective. The mere ability to apply sanctions and to utilize other components of power may be sufficient to achieve the objective. In such cases power is no less present than when it is applied with direct infliction of sanctions.[3]

THE ROLE OF DIFFUSED LOCI OF POWER IN THE CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER

The precise form and nature of loci of power (or places in which power is located, converges, or is expressed) vary from society to society and from situation to situation. However, they are likely to include such social groups and institutions as families, social classes, religious groups, cultural and nationality groups, occupational

groups, economic groups, villages, towns, cities, provinces and regions, smaller governmental bodies, voluntary organizations, and political parties. Most often they are traditional, established, formal social groups and institutions. Sometimes, however, loci of power may be less formally organized, and may even be recently created or revitalized in the process of achieving some objective or of opposing the ruler (as the workers' councils during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). Their status as loci will be determined by their capacity to act independently, to wield effective power, and to regulate the effective power of others, such as the ruler, or of some other locus or loci of power.

The capacity of these loci to control the ruler's actions, then, will be influenced by (1) the extent of the existence of such loci, (2) the degree of their independence of action, (3) the sources of power which they control, (4) the amount of social power which they can independently wield or control, and (5) sometimes other factors. If all of these factors are extensively present, the loci may make freely available the sources of power needed by the ruler, or instead they may elect to restrict or sever those sources which the ruler requires.

LOCI OF POWER SET LIMITS TO THE RULER'S POWER CAPACITY

The power structure of the society as a whole includes both the relationships among these loci of power and between those and the ruler. The society's power structure, that is, these relationships, in the long run determines the spheres and the strength of the ruler's maximum effective power.[4] When power is effectively diffused throughout the society among such *loci* the ruler's power is most likely to be subjected to controls and limits. This condition is associated with political "freedom." When, on the other hand, such loci have been seriously weakened, effectively destroyed, or have had their independent existence and autonomy of action destroyed by some type of superimposed controls, the ruler's power is most likely to be uncontrolled. This condition is associated with "tyranny." "When a man sees and feels one human authority only is the condition furthest removed from liberty," Bertrand de Jouvenel has written.[5]

When the *loci* of power are too numerous and strong to permit the ruler to exercise unlimited control or to destroy them, it may still be possible for the ruler to obtain from them the sources of power which he needs. In order to do so, however, the ruler must keep such social groups and institutions sufficiently sympathetic to him, his policies and measures, and his regime as a whole, so that they are willing to submit, cooperate, and make available the sources power. To achieve this, the ruler must adjust his behavior and policies in order to keep the goodwill and cooperation of the people who constitute the groups and institutions of the society. This is one type of indirect control which these *loci* of power exercise over a ruler, If such an adjustment is not attempted or is unsuccessful!, and the ruler offends the population he would rule, then the society s strong *loci* of power may, in open conflict, withhold the sources of power which they control and which the ruler requires. In this way the population acting through their groups and institutions may impose control over an ambitious antidemocratic ruler or even disintegrate the regime and dissolve the ruler's power.

The reverse is also true. When these social groups and institutions lose their capacity for independent decision and action, their control of the sources of power, or are themselves drastically weakened or destroyed, such loss will contribute significantly to making the ruler's power unlimited and uncontrollable. Under conditions in which such *loci* of power do not significantly exist and the subjects are a mass of atomized individuals incapable of effective group action, the ruler's power will be the least controllable by the subjects.

DELIBERATE ATTACKS AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS MAY WEAKEN THE *LOCI* OF POWER

Quite different causes may weaken or destroy the society’s *loci* of power. Deliberate policies of the ruler to attack their independence, undermine their strength, or even destroy them are only one possibility. Similar results may follow as a secondary unintended effect of the operation of other social, economic, or political polices or forces.

Where the attack is deliberate, it may be launched because the ruler perceives such groups and institutions as rivals, and recognizes that they impose limits to his power and ambition to be omnipotent.

The ruler may then deliberately seek to destroy their independence and even to dissolve the body itself. The German sociologist Georg Simmel argued that the desire of the rulers to "equalize" their subjects was not due to a moral preference for equality, but was instead due to a desire to weaken those groups capable of limiting the power of the rulers. , The particular body may disappear from the ranks of the society's social groups and institutions, especially if it is incapable of effective resistance to the ruler's efforts. More likely, however, the group or institution will formally continue to exist, but will be deprived of the qualities which gave it independence and ability to control a source of power. Less extremely, the group may continue to exist with its independence and power drastically reduced but not eradicated. The ruler who seeks unlimited and unchallenged power may attempt to replace an independent *locus* with an institution firmly controlled by his system.

When such attacks on the society's loci of power are recognized as attempts to achieve an egoistic power aggrandizement for the ruler, to impose a dictatorial regime, or to extend control by an already oppressive regime, then those attacks may be widely viewed as alarming. This is not always the case, however. When the particular group or institution under attack has itself been widely seen to have been oppressive, exploitative, or antisocial, or was otherwise in disfavor, an attack upon it by the ruler who can apply the resources of the more powerful State is often widely approved and seen to be progressive and even liberating. This does not in any way refute the above view that a weakening or destruction of loci of power will enhance the power potential of the ruler in command of the State.

The attacked *loci* may have operated to the detriment or to the welfare of the society as a whole; in either case they will also have restricted the power capacity of the ruler. This in no way means that groups and institutions which operate to harm the general population or sections of it should be passively accepted and permitted to continue their past practices. It is not control over such bodies, or even their abolition, which itself creates the problem. It is the specific way the control or abolition is achieved which may enhance the capacity of the ruler to be dictatorial and oppressive. The problem is created when the control or abolition is carried out by the State apparatus and without the creation of new *loci* of power, or the

strengthening of the power of other existing *loci* which are at least equally outside the control of the ruler as was the attacked *locus*. On this particular point it matters little whether the old locus has been brought to subjection by liberal democratic legislation, by decree of an autocrat, or by edict of a revolutionary leadership. Under a variety of systems the effect is broadly the same. The effect is both to increase the size and capacities of the State apparatus and also to weaken or remove a group or institution which was capable of resisting and limiting the power capacity of the ruler who is in command of the State structure.

So long as the *locus* of power has been drastically weakened or destroyed *without a balancing increase in power by existing groups and institutions or the creation of new ones independent of the State*, the result is in one sense essentially the same: an increase in the power of the ruler and a reduced capacity of the subjects to limit or to control that power. This does not only apply to the present ruler immediately in control of the State. Such a ruler may in fact have humanitarian aims and no desire to become dictatorial. The result applies also to those future rulers who inherit the State's expanded power potential, who may be far less humanitarian than their predecessors, and who may in fact have seized control of the State apparatus by usurpation, as a coup d'état. The same general process operated in the very different situations in the destruction of the nobility and feudal lords in revolutionary France and in the destruction of independent trade unions and political parties in both Communist Russia under Lenin and Stalin, and also Nazi Germany under Hitler. The result in these cases was increased centralization of power in the society, expansion of the power capacity of the State, and a reduction of the de facto limitations and popular controls on the ruler's effective power capacity.

OTHER FACTORS MAY INFLUENCE RULERS BUT NOT CONTROL THEM

This does not mean that a strict mathematical relationship will exist between the degree to which power is diffused among these *loci* or is concentrated in the State, and the degree to which the ruler's power is either controllable or autocratic. As previously indicated,

other factors may also influence the actual behavior of a given ruler, including any self-imposed limitations he may accept on the exercise of his power and any limitations set by established institutional procedures, such as elections, constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions, *provided that the ruler is willing to abide by them*.

This analysis does mean, however, that the relative strength and internal condition of such loci will set the rough boundaries within which the ruler may exercise his power. He may not go beyond them in virtual indifference to the opinions of the subjects. Those limits may under those conditions only be exceeded with the willing consent and assistance of the society's social groups and institutions and not against their demonstrated opposition. *The condition of the society's loci of power will in large degree determine the long-run capacity of the society to control the ruler's power.* A society in which groups and institutions exist which possess significant social power and are capable of independent action is more capable of controlling the ruler's power, and thus of resisting tyranny, than a society in which the subjects are all equally impotent.

INSTITUTIONAL FORMS SECONDARY TO THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

The formal institutional framework and procedures of government remain important in the context of this insight, but the underlying structural condition is in the long run dominant over the formal political arrangements. It is the distribution of power throughout the society's structure as a whole which determines the de facto power of the ruler, regardless of the principles which are avowed for the system or its institutional forms.

Even though the formal political structure of the government may be highly dictatorial, if significant effective power is diffused among various social groups and institutions, the society will probably be internally strong enough to maintain a relatively "free" political system and to limit and control the ruler's effective power. Even a formally "autocratic" regime may be thereby subjected to strict limits and controls. Conversely, where loci of power are weak, the society is likely to be unable to prevent domination by a despotic regime, whether of internal or external origin. A society which

possesses a democratic constitution but which lacks strong *loci* of power is thus especially vulnerable to a would-be dictator, while a constitutionally "democratic" regime may have virtually unlimited and uncontrolled power. Allowing for a time lag, the degree of actual diffusion or concentration of power throughout the society is likely to be reflected at some point in the formal political arrangements of the society.

STRONG *LOCI* OF POWER MAY CONTROL TYRANTS

Examples from the French and Russian feudal monarchies will illustrate how the power of rulers which is theoretically unlimited may be controlled when power is diffused among various *loci* throughout the society.

The important early nineteenth century French political analyst Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that among the “barriers which formerly arrested the aggressions of tyranny"[7] were these three: (1) religion, which once helped both rulers and ruled to "define the natural limits of despotism,"[8] (2) respect for the rulers, the absence of which once it was destroyed by revolutions, allowed the rulers to fall back unashamed upon "the seductions of arbitrary power,"[9] and --: the one with which we are here concerned -- (3) the existence of *loci* of effective power throughout the society, such as the provinces, towns nobles, and families.[10]

Prior to the French Revolution, under the *ancien régime*, at the very time when "the laws and the consent of the people had invested princes with an almost unlimited authority,"[11] the "power of a part of his subjects was an insurmountable barrier to the tyranny of the prince…"[12] Among the sources of this limiting power, Tocqueville continued, were "the prerogatives of the nobility… the authority of the supreme courts of justice,…provincial privileges, which served to break the blows of the sovereign authority, and to maintain a spirit of resistance in the nation."[13] In that age people were closely bound to their fellow citizens; if one was being unjustly assailed, one's associates would offer assistance.[14] The provinces and towns were relatively independent, and "each of them had a will of its own, which was opposed to the general will of subjection."[15] The nobles possessed considerable power, and even after that power was lost

they continued to wield considerable influence. They "dared to cope single-handed with the efforts of the public authority."[16] When family feeling was strong, the "antagonist of oppression was never alone" but could find support among relatives, hereditary friends, and clients.[17] Even when these were weak, one gained confidence from one's ancestry and hope for one's posterity. [18] These and other influences of the independent *loci* of power in the society served to limit the de facto political power of the theoretically omnipotent ruler.

The contemporary French political philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel has described this condition in similar terms. In seventeenth century France, while theoretically the sovereign was all powerful, his political power was, in fact, sharply limited. This limitation was effected in ways which cannot be attributed simply to variations in technology between that time and our own.

> It was ... everywhere denied that it lay with the sovereign will to lay down rules as it pleased; it was not believed that its wishes, whatever they happened to be, had power to bind. Everyone knew that the ordinance of a temporal power was not morally binding in virtue of its form, if its adherence did not satisfy certain conditions.
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> In a word, the sovereign, or his spokesman, were less free under the *ancien régime* than they are at present, and command was less arbitrary. [19]

Similarly, the twentieth century Italian political sociologist Gaetano Mosca argued:

> The head of a feudal state will be able to wrong anyone of his barons, but he will never be absolute master of them all. They have at their disposal a certain amount of public force ....and will always be able to exercise *defacto* a right of resistance." The individual barons, in their turn, find that there is a limit to the tyranny which they can exercise over the masses of their subjects. U unreasonableness on their part may provoke a desperate unrest which may easily become rebellion. So it turns out that in all truly federal countries the rule of the masters may be violent and arbitrary by fits and starts, but on the whole it is considerably limited by customs.[20]

Although the constitution was itself despotic under feudalism, the combined power of social groups and institutions throughout the society, and the influence of less tangible limitations on the power of the ruler, operated to restrain effectively the power of the kings. "Princes had the right, but they had neither the means nor the desire of doing whatever they pleased," wrote TocQueville.[21] Some of these

groups, such as the nobility, might have been opposed to personal liberty. Nevertheless their independence and power generally served, he argued, to keep alive the love and condition of freedom.[22] The very existence of multiple authorities and claimants to the subject's loyalty - instead of a single one - allowed the subject a certain degree of choice and ability to maneuver. In such a situation, Simmel maintained, the person "gains a certain independence in respect to each of them and, as far as his intimate feelings are concerned, even, perhaps, in respect to their totality."[23]

A comparable situation existed in the Russian Empire under the nineteenth century tsarist system. The respected historian of that society and its revolutionary movements, Franco Venturi, wrote: "... the extraordinary power held by Nicholas I, the most despotic of contemporary European sovereigns, was in fact extremely limited when it came to tampering with the foundations of Russia's social structure."[24] For example, when the Tsar, prior to the emancipation of the serfs, sought means to improve the lot of the peasants, he faced opposition from the various groups and classes whose support or acquiescence he required to make the changes he wished.[25] The State was in fact unable to intervene in the relations between the peasants and the nobles. This was "only one more proof of the weakness of Nicholas I's despotism; strong only when it remained static, and weak as soon as it tried to take action."[26]

The potentially active opposition to the Tsar's schemes arose from both the peasants and the nobles. The peasants on private estates almost universally believed that although *they* belonged to the nobles and landlords, the *land* belonged to the serfs themselves. They therefore rejected any attempt to "free" them personally while giving the land to the nobility. Such an attempt could have led to revolution with the serfs attempting to hold their land and also claiming complete liberation from taxation.[27] That prospect was serious because the peasants possessed their own organizations of self-administration, the *obshchina* and *mir* - that is, effective *loci* of power. They were experienced in meeting, discussing, making decisions, and acting together, capacities which had a long history, Venturi reported:

> The State brought into being by Peter the Great's reforms had never succeeded in striking roots throughout the country. Parallel to it, there survived a system of local self-administration dating from medieval times with its organized groups of peasants and merchants.[28]

"It was through these organizations, the only ones at its disposal, that peasant society defended itself."[29] Therefore, the Tsar's government sought control over the *obshchina.*[30]

While the opposition of the nobles to reform has been exaggerated in the West, it was still significant. Their opposition, Venturi wrote, placed the Tsar in a "weak position,"[31] The nobles, too, feared a peasant revolution, and their opposition was intensified by the perception that the Tsar was more desirous for reform than was the case. "The resistance of the nobles was proportionate to the weakness of the autocracy...."[32] The nobles, individually and also as a group, were obviously too powerful for the Tsar to ignore or crush.

The peasants feared dispossession from their land, and the nobles feared dispossession from their serfs. Both groups possessed the capacity for corporate action and constituted significant *loci* of power which could not be ignored. These *loci* of power thus effectively limited and controlled the power of the theoretically omnipotent Tsar.

These French and Russian examples are simply illustrations of the general capacity of *loci* of power of any type, if sufficiently strong and independent, to restrain the power of a ruler no matter how omnipotent he theoretically is supposed to be. The examples should by no means be interpreted as apologies for feudalism. Although Tocqueville has been accused of being an apologist for feudalism, he was quite clear in his own mind that control exercised by *loci* of power in France under the *ancien regime* was not the result of the aristocratic system per se. Instead, the capacity for control came from the effective diffusion of power throughout the society, which in this particular case was a quality of the aristocratic system. Such diffusion of power among the society's groups and institutions could also operate under different systems, and result in similar control over the ruler. The capacity for control is made possible by diffusion of power.

Tocqueville perceived that the impact of diffused power over the power of rulers extended beyond internal politics. It. also potentially included the ruler's ability to wage foreign wars without the support of the subjects, and even the capacity of an invading ruler to conquer a country with a diffused power structure.

> A great aristocratic people cannot either conquer its neighbours, or be conquered by them, without great difficulty. It cannot conquer them, because all its forces can never be collected and held together for a considerable period: it cannot be conquered, because an enemy meets at every step small centres of resistance by which invasion is arrested, War against an aristocracy may be compared to war in a mountainous country; the defeated party has constant opportunities of rallying its forces to make a stand in a new position.[33]

While effective *loci* of power may impose limits and controls over a ruler's power, if they are weak, absent, or destroyed the ruler's power will to that degree be uncontrolled.

THE DESTRUCTION OF *LOCI* OF POWER MAY ASSIST TYRANNY

In the absence of significant power-wielding social groups and institutions it will be much more difficult to exercise effective control over a ruler by regulating the availability of the necessary sources of his power. This applies to any system, whatever its avowed nature or doctrine. If the ruler - whether a king, representatives of an economic oligarchy, or a group of avowed revolutionaries - deliberately weakens or destroys *loci* of power without creating others at least as strong as the old ones, the result will be a weakening of the limits on the power of the ruler. This applies whatever the espoused political philosophy or constitutional arrangements may be.

Tocqueville argued that this is what happened during the destruction of the *ancien régime* in France. Previously, the provinces and towns were able to resist the ruler. The revolution, however, destroyed their immunities, customs, traditions, and even names, and subjected them all to the same laws. Consequently, "it is not more difficult to oppress them collectively than it was formerly to oppress them singly."[34] Whereas family feeling previously supported the individual in opposing the ruler, the drastic weakening or destruction of family feeling left the individual alone in a constantly changing society.[35] Formerly the nobility could challenge and restrain the king. With the destruction of that class their power became concentrated in the new occupants of the position of ruler.[36]

> I perceive that we have destroyed those independent beings which were able to cope with tyranny single-handed; but it is the Government that has inherited the privileges of which families, corporations, and individuals have been deprived; the weakness of the whole community has therefore succeeded that influence of a small body of citizens, which, if it was sometimes oppressive, was often conservative. [37]

Thus, said Tocqueville, the French Revolution overthrew both the "despotic power and the checks to its abuses ... its tendency was at once to overthrow and centralise."[38] The destruction of the nobility and the upper middle class made possible the centralization of power under Napoleon.[39] Jouvenel similarly pointed to the post-revolutionary concentration of power and the destruction of significant loci of power as acts which laid the foundation for the monolithic State.[40] Specifically, he pointed to the destruction of the middle class as "the proximate cause of modern despotisms,"[41] and argued in some detail that revolution in the past has generally contributed to an increase in the power at the disposal of the central government. [42]

It should be emphasized that it is not simply the abolition of the oppressing classes or the establishment of approximate equality which leads to centralization. It is, rather, as Tocqueville wrote, "the manner in which this equality has been established."[43] ("Equality" is used here in a highly relative sense, of course.) Usually this "equality" is achieved by the destruction of the existing loci of power (such as the French nobility) *without the creation of new social groups and institutions with sufficient independence and power to resist the central ruler*. Further, as we shall see, the violent means of struggle and violent State sanctions relied upon to produce such "equality" have frequently contributed to increased concentration of power in the State. It is these particular types of changes in the name of a movement toward equality which constitute a significant contribution to the modern forms of tyranny.

When the diffused *loci* of social power are destroyed without the creation of new ones of at least equal importance and strength, the result tends to be a society composed of relatively equal, but atomized, helpless individuals.

Those individuals will then be without groups and institutions with whose members they can consult, from whom they can receive support, and with whom they can combine for action. Atomized individuals, unable to act together, cannot unite to make significant protest, to withhold by their noncooperation the ruler's needed sources of power, and, in some cases, to intervene to disrupt the status quo. Those individuals are therefore unable to limit or control the political power wielded by the present ruler, or by any new one who may seize control of the State apparatus and place himself at its pinnacle of command.

This process of weakening and destroying those groups and institutions capable of resisting the State, with the resulting weakness of the society and powerlessness of the individual citizens, was clearly recognized by Tocqueville in the early' stages of its development. He pointed out that while the citizen of a democratic country may feel pride in being the equal of anyone of the other fellow citizens, that is not the entire picture. When the person compares himself as an individual to the huge number of citizens, "he is instantly overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance and weakness."[44] The individual tends to "disappear in the throng and is easily lost in the midst of a common obscurity...."[45] No longer a part of a group which is capable of genuine independence of action and of opposition to the ruler, the individual subject becomes but one of a multitude of equally weak and equally dependent citizens. Each has only "his personal impotence to oppose to the organised force of the Government."[46] Under such conditions, "every man naturally stands alone ... and he is trampled on with impunity."[47] In democratic countries, therefore, the power of the State is "naturally much stronger" than elsewhere.[48] Whatever the constitutional arrangements, the capacity of that society to maintain genuine freedom is weak once the State machinery has been captured, whether by election, executive usurpation, coup d'état, or invasion by a would-be tyrant. "What resistance can be afforded to tyranny in a country where every private individual is impotent, and where the citizens are united by no common tie?"[49] How far this actually exists will of course vary with the degree to which that process has extended. The condition will not be so severe if groups and institutions with some autonomy have survived, been revitalized, or newly created. Also, people may in certain more limited aspects of their lives retain a capacity to influence events, while concerning the larger issues affecting the society as a whole and the policies of the Government, they may see themselves as incapable of exerting any effective control. The feeling of impotence of ordinary people, even in constitutional democracies, to influence the actual course of political events is perhaps much more widely and deeply felt today than it was in Tocqueville's time.[50]

This condition has been called to our attention by both Karen Horney and Erich Fromm, among others. A basic conflict exists, Horney wrote, "between the alleged freedom of the individual and all his factual limitations .... The result for the individual is a wavering between a feeling of boundless power in determining his own fate and a feeling of entire helplessness."[51] Fromm similarly warned: " ... in our own society we are faced with the same phenomenon that is fertile soil for the rise of Fascism anywhere: the insignificance and powerlessness of the individual."[52] "In spite of a veneer of optimism and initiative, modern man is overcome by a profound feeling of powerlessness which makes him gaze towards approaching catastrophes as though he were paralyzed."[53]

The reasons offered by various analysts to explain this condition vary. In political terms, however, they all relate to the weak power position of the isolated individual who faces a powerful ruler, of whatever type. The individual does not feel a part of social groups and institutions with sufficient power and independence of action to resist effectively and together to control the ruler's power, because society's independent social groups and institutions are weak, have been brought under control, or do not exist. In modern political societies a relative atomization of the subjects has occurred. The degree to which this has happened, and the stage of its development, vary with the country, the political system, and the forces operating to produce or prevent that process. These variations are important, often highly so. Also, at times the process of atomization may be reversed, either as an unintended consequence of changes in the society's structure or of deliberate changes to create or strengthen independent institutions. In Western constitutional democracies, the relative independence and power of social groups and institutions outside of State control are significantly greater than under totalitarian systems in which atomization reached its zenith to that point in history. At the time of Stalin's purges, for example, "no one could trust his fellow or feel secure in the protection of any institution or individual on whom he had hitherto relied," Leonard Schapiro has written. "The 'atomization' of society, which some have seen as the most characteristic feature of totalitarian rule, was completed in the years of terror."[54]

Such deliberate atomization results from measures of the ruler to weaken or destroy the significant *loci* of power which are structurally

situated between the individual and the ruler. A ruler who wishes to make his regime all powerful may deliberately initiate measures to achieve that objective. This was true in both Nazi Germany[55] and the Soviet Union.[56] "Despotism ... is never more secure of continuance," Tocqueville wrote, "than when it can keep men asunder; and all its influence is commonly exerted for that purpose."[57] Or, the ruler may seek to maintain dominance not by destroying *loci* of power but by modifying their strengths so as to keep himself on top. Simmel suggested that a ruler may encourage "the efforts of the lower classes which are directed toward legal equality with those intermediate powers."[58] This will produce a new *locus* of power strong enough to balance the influence of the "intermediate powers" on the ruler, thereby creating a relative leveling, and thereby assisting the ruler in maintaining his domination over the whole. [59]

The relative atomization of the subjects may also follow as an unintended result of other policies or social changes, designed neither to atomize the population nor to contribute to unlimited power for the ruler. This is especially likely to occur where reformers and revolutionaries use the State apparatus to control certain social and economic groups, such as the nobility, landlords, or capitalists, and where the State is used as the primary instrument for controlling the economic and political development of the country. The concentration of power in the State may successfully control the particular group against whom the measures were instituted. However, other long-term consequences follow from that concentration of power for that control or development. Reliance on the State to achieve those objectives not only utilizes the existing concentration of power in the State, but also contributes to its growth both absolutely and in comparison to the other institutions of the society. Further, that reliance on the State not only does not strengthen the population and its independent institutions, but is likely to weaken them both absolutely and relatively. For example, the establishment of State control over the economy may provide the present or a future ruler with the means by which to "hold in closer dependence the population which they govern," as Tocqueville put it.[60] State ownership of the economy has, for example, provided Communist regimes with the capacity to apply a massive blacklist against political dissidents. The capacity far exceeds that of earlier capitalists, who used such lists far less efficiently to keep trade union organizers from obtaining jobs.

The concentration of effective power in the State not only provides a ruler with means of direct control over the population. That concentration will also tend to exert a variety of psychological pressures and influences on the people which will not only reduce their ability to control the ruler, but even there desire to do so. The individual is subject to the extreme influence of the mass and is under pressure to accept opinions without the opportunity for reasoned consideration,[61] especially pressure in the form of pleas of morality, ideology, patriotism, and expertise. Those who attempt to act together to change the society, or to challenge the ruler's omnipotence are regarded as dangerous and antisocial.[62] The population accepts more and more that it is the right, and even the duty, of the ruler "to guide as well as govern each private citizen."[63] That doctrine is dangerous for freedom, and for the maintenance and development of controls over the ruler's political power.

Whatever the apparent short-term benefits, the long-term results of reliance on concentrated State power to deal with the society's problems may be disastrous for the society's political future.

THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER MAY INFLUENCE THE GOVERNMENT'S INSTITUTIONAL FORMS

The actual power structure of the society is likely in the long run to help determine the formal institutional form of government. A diffused power structure in the society as a whole with multiple *loci* of effective power will tend to produce a more democratic form. On the other hand, a society of atomized individuals and concentrated power in the hands of the State will facilitate a despotic form of government. "What we call the constitution is only the crowning story of the social structure; and where the lower stages are utterly different the uppermost stages must also differ," wrote F.C. Montague.[64] Similarly, Mosca argued that the de facto limits on the ruler's power, or the absence of them, may lead to their later formal recognition in the constitution and the law.[65] The *loci* of diffused power may be so strong that the ruler must officially recognize his dependence on them by institutional changes. "The meeting of parliament had, then, from the start this essential characteristic," wrote Jouvenel, "that it was the convocation of authorities, great and small, to which the king could not give orders and with which he had to parley."[66] Conversely, where such social groups and institutions are relatively absent or weak, unable to resist the central ruler and unable to control the sources of his power, the formal political structure may change from nominally democratic and become openly highly centralized and despotic.

Changes in the formal framework of government to reflect the actual distribution of power and structural condition of the society as a whole are usually made only after a time gap. It may be a lengthy one under appropriate conditions. The outward forms of one political system may continue long after the distribution of power in the society, which originally helped to produce those governmental forms, has significantly altered. The formal machinery of constitutional democracy may continue for some time after the effective diffusion of power among groups and institutions of the society has been replaced by effective concentration of power in the hands of the ruler. If so, the power potential of the ruler may be as uncontrolled in practice as if the constitution were frankly autocratic. Although the old constitution may continue long after the conditions which produced it have changed, this situation is potentially highly unstable. In a society in which the social groups and non-State institutions are weak, already controlled by the ruler, or otherwise incapable of independent action and resistance to the ruler, and the population either does not wish to resist usurpations or feels powerless to do so, a frankly autocratic form of government may be easily accepted. This may be introduced as a "temporary" arrangement to meet a particular need or emergency, or as a permanent change. In the latter case, the change may emerge from gradual constitutional changes, shifts in practice, judicial decisions, legislation, and the like. Alternatively, the change may follow an executive usurpation, coups d'état, or foreign invasion. Sometimes the change may follow directly from the "requirements" for conducting an effective foreign or internal war.

The reverse situation may also occur. A formally dictatorial type of government which originated much earlier may continue to exist for some time after the society's social groups and non-State institutions, which have continued under that system, have grown in strength and in their capacity for independent action; and perhaps after quite new ones with those qualities have come into existence. In

such a case, while the formal constitution is still dictatorial, in practice those *loci* of power would exert a significant degree of control over the ruler. That is, the society in practice would have become more democratic than indicated by the surviving formal governmental form. In this case as well, the altered power relationships and the new structural condition would tend in time to be formally recognized by a constitutional change.

In both cases, the structural condition of the society and the actual distribution of effective power are likely in practice to modify the operation of the ruler's exercise of power away from the formal constitutional provisions and governmental structure.

At times the incongruence between the society's structural condition and the formal governmental structure may exist when a ruler - especially in the form of an ideologically oriented political party --seizes control of the State to impose a dictatorship aimed at remolding the society's underlying structure. The success or failure of that effort would then be significantly influenced by the society's structural condition: whether the social groups and institutions were strong enough to resist that dictatorship's efforts, were too weak to succeed or even to try, or whether they willingly assisted in their own demise in favor of the ruler's objective.

CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER AS A RESULT OF INTERNAL STRENGTH

The degree, then, to which a ruler's power can be controlled by the subjects depends primarily upon the internal strength of the social order and of the subjects themselves. This view is contrary to the currently favored explanations of the ways to control power. It is common today to place nearly complete reliance on the formal constitution, legislation, and judicial decisions to establish and preserve political freedom. It is also common to assume that only the intentions, acts, and policies of a dictator or oppressor (whether an individual or a group) are responsible for the existence of a dictatorship or oppression. In addition, it is also commonly assumed that the removal of a dictator or oppressor will itself bring about a condition of freedom. In light of this analysis, however, those views

are all erroneous. Worse, they are likely to lead to policies which are incapable of producing the desired results.

The view that a ruler's power is ultimately the consequence of the condition of the society itself is neither original nor new. This view has been argued by a variety of political theorists and observers over the centuries.

William Godwin, a late eighteenth century English political thinker, for example, was of the opinion that the character of political institutions is largely determined by the state of the people's social and political understanding. If that understanding is limited, then to that degree the institutions will be imperfect. If their understanding is great, then the accepted institutions will be improved, and those institutions which are rejected will lapse through lack of support.[67] Changes in the opinion of the public therefore necessarily precede social and political changes, if the changes are to last.[68] The degree of immaturity or maturity of the populace will be reflected in the political system, Godwin wrote, producing a dictatorial regime or a condition of freedom. Internal weakness makes a people easy prey to a conqueror, while the effort to hold down a people prepared for freedom is likely to be short-lived.[69]

Niccolo Machiavelli, the sixteenth century Italian "realist" thinker and advisor to princes, pointed to the inability of people unaccustomed to responsible self-rule to maintain liberty. [70] It was, he wrote, a situation comparable to that of an animal brought up in captivity which when set free is unable to fend for itself. It becomes the prey of the first person seeking to restore it to the former condition.[71] "For it was neither the name nor the rank of dictator that made Rome servile, but the loss of authority of which the citizens were deprived by the length of his rule."[72] The degree of accustomed passive obedience under a former prince, or instead the degree of the vitality and participation of the subjects in a republic, is significant, Machiavelli argued, in determining the relative ease or difficulty which a new ruler will encounter in attempting to establish himself.[73]

Baron de Montesquieu, the French eighteenth century political philosopher noted for his views on the importance of a division of powers within government, also contributed to the understanding of the relationship between a society's internal strength and the type of government which it has. Montesquieu emphasized the importance of "virtue" (defined as love of country and of equality) in the

maintenance of freedom and popular government.[74] He added: "The customs of an enslaved people are a part of their servitude, those of a free people are a part of their liberty."[75] Mosca cited, among the factors which are necessary to make resistance to, and control over, the ruler possible, the presence of "organized social forces" not controlled by the ruler.[76] Tocqueville argued that the "passion and the habit of freedom" contribute to the preservation of liberty. On the other hand, he wrote, "I can conceive nothing better prepared for subjection, in case of defeat, than a democratic people without free institutions."[77] Jouvenel associated the condition of liberty with the active vigilance of the citizens,[78] and asserted that when the qualities of liberty exist to a high degree, it comes from "a man's own assertion of his own rights ...."[79]

Significantly, the views of Mohandas K. Gandhi, nonviolent strategist and leader in the Indian nationalist movement, are fully compatible with these theorists on this view of the relation between social power and political freedom. Gandhi repeatedly argued that genuine self-rule *(swaraj)* was not simply a matter of the governmental arrangements and the identity of the ruler. Instead, democracy was based upon the inner strength of the society.[80] He attributed the Indian subjection to English rule to the weak condition of India herself.[81] Because "after all a people has the government which it deserves," self-government could "only come through self-effort."[82] Before self-rule could be established, the people had to rid themselves of "the feeling of helplessness"; they could not act to change the political structure without self-confidence.[83] "A perfect constitution super-imposed upon a rotten internal condition will be like a whitened sepulchre."[84] Therefore, a nonviolent revolution was not a program of seizure of power, but one of "a transformation of relationships ending in a peaceful transfer of power."[85] An internally strengthened, self-supporting, self-reliant India would be secure from foreign powers even without armaments, Gandhi argued.[86]

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS FOR THE CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER

At least three conclusions can be drawn from this discussion about the means by which political power may be controlled:

1. Societies in which strong loci of power are not present and in which the subjects are relatively atomized are, despite formal constitutions, highly susceptible to tyranny and other forms of uncontrolled political power.

2. Under those circumstances, simple replacement of the person, or group, which occupies the position of ruler is inadequate to establish effective control over the power of whoever occupies that position.

3. In order for effective control over the ruler's power to be possible in the long run, power must be effectively devolved and diffused among various social groups and institutions throughout the society.

Let us now consider each of these in more detail.

CONSTITUTIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO CONTROL A RULER'S POWER

We have seen that in the effort to control a ruler's power, the institutional forms of government are secondary in importance to the actual distribution of power throughout the society. Also, the weakening or destruction of *loci* of power is likely to increase significantly the difficulties of the subjects in controlling their ruler.
Not even a democratic constitution, which sets limits on the legitimated powers of the government, which establishes regular procedures for the conduct of government and for the choice of ruler, and which guarantees certain liberties and rights to the subjects, is sufficient to reverse this tendency. Where the society is weak and the democratic ruler powerful, traditional or written constitutional limits to the powers of government and barriers to the prerogatives of the ruler will not be able to prevent seizure of the reins of government by an antidemocratic regime, as by coup d'état or invasion. Nor in that same condition in which the society is structurally weak will the subjects be able even to prevent rulers chosen by constitutional

means from gradually extending their power beyond its legitimated limits, or from imposing an executive usurpation. When a powerful group is willing to violate the "rules" in a democracy, the clauses of the constitution and laws cannot by themselves prevent the usurpation.

However, a structurally strong society with effective power capacity diffused among the society's groups and institutions has the potential to regulate the ruler's sources of power and to struggle effectively to maintain or restore a democratic governmental system. This insight into the structural requirements of constitutional democratic systems is today inadequately recognized even by ardent opponents of dictatorship and advocates of freedom. Instead, democrats of several varieties see a constitution outlining the structure and proper scope of government to operate the State to be the key to the establishment and preservation of a democratic political society. Despite such constitutions, however, a large number of constitutional democracies have been displaced by authoritarian or dictatorial regimes of domestic or foreign origin. This should demonstrate that when a powerful group is unwilling to abide by such a constitution, its provisions and restrictions by themselves are insufficient to control a ruler's powers. The society needs also the capacity to control rulers who are unwilling to conform voluntarily to the limits and procedures established by the constitution.

In a society which is internally weak with power concentrated in the State, constitutional barriers cannot prevent an antidemocratic seizure of power. Under those conditions the subjects will also be incapable of preventing a constitutionally chosen ruler from engaging in gradual illegitimate extensions of his power, or from suspending the constitution itself - perhaps by pleading a national crisis. What do the subjects do, for example, if their elected president, backed by the military forces, declares an Emergency to deal with a supposed crisis, disbands the legislature, cancels elections, arrests opposition leaders, and applies controls on newspapers, radio, and television?

To meet such situations, the subjects must be able to counter the usurper's power with their own power. To do so, they must be able to struggle effectively. That requires possession of effective *loci* of power throughout the social structure.

That necessary condition may not be present, however. The non-State institutions of the society may be weak and already subject

to governmental controls. No group relevant to defeating the usurpation may have retained or developed the capacity for independent action and resistance to the ruler. The normal workings of the whole society may be inextricably bound to the State apparatus. Large portions of the population may be directly or indirectly dependent for their economic livelihood on that same apparatus. People may have become accustomed to passing their problems to "the government" instead of dealing with them themselves. If this condition exists then the chances of resistance to the usurpation - much less successful resistance - are very small. The society's structure and distribution of effective power capacity in normal times, and how it deals with its social and economic problems, will very strongly influence and even determine its ability to resist efforts to impose a dictatorship.

In that situation, the motives of those whose policies and acts have weakened the society's *loci* of power and enhanced the power of the State apparatus are irrelevant. Usurpers will not find their task more difficult simply because those changes were implemented by a government sincerely seeking to correct injustices, to promote welfare, or to provide effective military and administrative capacity to deter and defeat international military threats, or internal terrorist or guerrilla attacks.

In constitutional democracies, diverse groups have constantly tended to give the State greater responsibilities for the society as a whole, and greater power over it. Almost all groups have relied upon the State's military capacity to deal with foreign dangers. Social reformers and revolutionaries of various types have relied upon the State to effect the changes they desired and to deal with the groups which they saw as responsible for social evils or which opposed the desired changes. This reliance on the State has been justified in democratic terms by claims that the legislature or other policy-determining bodies were exercising democratic control for the benefit of the whole society. In those cases, such social groups and institutions as the family, trade unions, religious groups, and industrial corporations have continued to exist outside of the State. However, their *relative* independence and power have almost always been significantly reduced in comparison with the power of such *loci* in earlier periods to control the ruler. Sometimes, the independence and strength of such groups and institutions have been undermined for less noble motives. While the consequences of such undermining

and subjection for whatever motive will differ with the case, in this one respect they are always the same: the power potential of the ruler is increased at the expense of the society.

When the *loc*i are weakened and the ruler's power potential expanded, the possibility of a change in the constitution and form of government toward dictatorship has been created. An immediate change will not necessarily occur, and is often unlikely. At least a semblance - and often some of the reality - of popular control over government has usually been maintained for some time. When this happens the control usually depends on the ruler's own willingness to conform to certain standards-or limits required by the constitution, laws, tradition, or moral code. However, even an elected ruler may be unwilling to adhere to such limits. Or, the ruler's power may be extended gradually in a series of small or apparently innocent ways, so that no one seems to notice or be disturbed by it. Or, the reins of government may be abruptly seized from a ruler who has deliberately behaved with self-restraint by a group eager to utilize more fully the power potential of the position. In such cases as these, the ruler once in control of the State apparatus will have at his disposal the full governmental machinery and system of controls over the subjects and their institutions which have been forged in "normal" times,[87] albeit for very different motives. The populace will then be weak in comparison to the ruler and less capable of effective resistance than they would have been had not the social institutions been weakened and the power of the State increased.[88]

On the basis of his 'analysis of the political effects of the weakening of the independent loci of power in democratic societies, Tocqueville predicted that if absolute power were reestablished in such societies it would "assume a new form and appear under features unknown to our forefathers."[89] He made this prediction over a century before the rise of totalitarian systems in Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

Our experience with the demonstrated inadequacy of constitutional limits on the power of rulers and the severity of the threat of modern tyranny are both sufficiently grave to prod us to look beyond constitutional and legal provisions for additional means to control rulers who are unwilling to accept those limits.

In democratic theory, the right of the citizens to resort to violent revolution against tyrants has been recognized. Against foreign

threats, constitutional democracies have relied upon the military forces. Grounds now exist to make us dissatisfied with the adequacy of those means of dealing with an emergency. Both violent mass revolution against tyrants and military resistance to invaders may face practical impediments to success. When unarmed subjects attempt a violent revolution against a well armed ruler, they are almost always at a severe disadvantage most likely to lead to their predictable defeat. Against a coup which has attacked the constitutional government, they are no better a match, for usually the military forces have initiated or supported the coup. In the case of a foreign invasion, the invading ruler of a foreign State will usually have determined that his regime has clear military superiority over the attacked country, so that defensive military resistance has severe odds against its success.

Guerrilla warfare is sometimes seen as a replacement for those means. However, it suffers from grave limitations due to the tendency toward immense casualties, the dubious prospects of success, the frequency of very long struggles, and the structural consequences. The regime under attack is immediately made still more dictatorial, and the regime which follows even a successful struggle also is more dictatorial due to the centralizing impact of the expanded military forces and to the weakening or destruction of the society's *loci* of power during the struggle.*

Thus, it is necessary to look beyond both the formal constitutional arrangements and such violent sanctions for means by which the population can in crises exercise effective control over rulers, domestic or foreign.

If at the time of such crises the society does not possess strong social groups and institutions capable of independent action, able to wield effective power, and capable of controlling the central ruler, then reliance on formal constitutional arrangements alone to set limits on the ruler may prove disastrous. Tocqueville warned of the plight in such a situation:

> ... democratic nations ... easily bring their whole disposable force into the field, and when the nation is wealthy and populous it soon becomes victorious; but if ever it is conquered, and its territory invaded, it has few

* For a fuller discussion of these problems with violent revolution, coup d'état, and guerrilla warfare, see Chapter Twelve, "Popular Empowerment," subchapter: Sanctions and Society.

> resources at command; and if the enemy takes the capital, the nation is lost. This may very well be explained: as each member of the community is individually isolated and extremely powerless, no one of the whole body can either defend himself or present a rallying point to others. Nothing is strong in a democratic country except the State; as the military strength of the State is destroyed by the destruction of the army, and its civil power paralysed by the capture of the chief city, all that remains is only a multitude without strength or government, unable to resist the organised power by which it is assailed .... (A)fter such a catastrophe, not only is the population unable to carryon hostilities, but it may be apprehended that they will not be inclined to attempt it.[90]

SIMPLE CHANGE OF RULERS IS ALSO INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH LASTING CONTROL

By now it should be clear that the establishment of real and lasting control over the power of rulers is not to be achieved simply by exchanging one ruler for another to occupy the pinnacle of command. More basic changes are required. Yet, in constitutional democracies most of the political debate focuses on *who* should control the formal political structure. If we are concerned with implementation of democratic principles, the more fundamental question is instead this: what kind of a social and political order is in the long run desirable and capable of solving the problem of the control of political power?

The primary focus on personnel or faction rather than on structure has resulted in part from a lack of clear thinking. We have usually failed to distinguish between a specific tyrant and the condition and system of tyranny.[91] From this it has followed that whereas major efforts may have been made to remove the tyrant, little or no attention was given to changing the condition which made the tyranny possible. At those times when people have sought active means of struggle to combat a domestic or intruding foreign tyrant, little or no attention has been given to the conscious choice of means of struggle which would not only have the chance of immediate effectiveness but also would in the long run help to establish firm control capacity over the power of any ruler. In some cases, to the contrary, the means of combat used actually appear to have made long-term control more difficult.

We have also failed to distinguish between popular elections to choose the personnel or party to occupy the position of ruler and the condition in which people possess the opportunity for active participation in the political society.[92] As a result, major attention has been focused on periodic elections. However, little or no attention has been given to the need for diffused power among various social groups and institutions, nor to strengthening the capacity of the people to make important decisions for themselves and to maintain effective control over the ruler's power.

A change in the personnel or party occupying the position of ruler mayor may not make a difference. Sometimes the difference will be significant, for better or for worse. Whether the change makes a difference, and if so what it is, appears to vary with such factors as these: (1) the degree of the ruler's self-control; (2) his social and political aims; and (3) the means used to obtain the position of ruler, to maintain that position, and to implement policies. If differences exist between a former and a new ruler, it is these three factors which are influential, not just a simple change in the personnel occupying the position of ruler, nor even in the capacity of the subjects to influence the choice of the new personnel. Neither such a change nor such influence necessarily demonstrate the capacity of the population to *control* their ruler if he is *unwilling* to be controlled. The political situations in which rulers do not wish to submit to restrictions and limitations on the exercise of their power are the most crucial and dangerous ones, and urgently require solutions.

Often the ability of the subjects to help to select their ruler, and to influence the political policies and practices of a ruler who is willing to be influenced, will be confused with the ability actually to *control* the exercise of power by a ruler who is determined to proceed without restrictions. That confusion is likely to create the illusion of greater democratic control than is in fact the case. This illusion may make it easier for the ruler to extend his control and power, while the subjects become more complacent and less interested in asserting control themselves and less willing to resist.[93] This confusion may also help to create the impression that there is greater difference between rivals for the position of ruler than is in fact the case. Tocqueville's insight is still valid: "Our contemporaries are therefore much less divided than is commonly supposed; they are constantly disputing as to the hands in which the supremacy is to be vested, but they readily agree upon the duties and the rights of that supremacy."[94]

Since the degree to which the ruler's capacity to wield power is actually exercised will vary with the factors listed above, a change of ruler may result in a short-term change in the extent and manner in which the ruler's power is applied. Very importantly, however, a change of personnel occupying the position of ruler does not itself reduce the *capacity* of whoever is ruler to wield power uncontrolled by the subjects. That change will only accompany the change of ruler if both the *loci* of power throughout the society and also the subjects' capacity to resist the ruler have been strengthened before the change in personnel, or during the efforts to achieve that change. Otherwise, no change in the potential for tyranny will have occurred. A growth of the society's capacity for freedom is therefore necessary if tyranny itself is to be ended as well as the regime of a particular tyrant.

> For a revolution formed by liberty becomes a confirmation of liberty [wrote Montesquieu]. A free nation may have a deliverer: a nation enslaved can have only another oppressor. For whoever is able to dethrone an absolute prince has a power sufficient to become absolute himself.[95]

Even when there appears to be some change in the outward form and constitution of the political system, the actual change may be more limited than it appears to be if the underlying power structure itself remains intact. The change from monarchy to a republic, said Jouvenel, maintained the whole monarchical State intact, while the position of the king was taken by "the representatives of the Nation."[96] "…[O]nce the principle of the unchecked and unbounded sovereignty of a human will is admitted, the resulting regime is in substance the same, to whatever person, real or fictive, this sovereign will is attributed."[97] Because of this, systems which appear most opposed, but which confer comparable uncontrolled power on the person or group occupying the position of ruler, have much in common.[98]

Under a system with a firm structure in which one group is superordinate and another subordinate, Simmel wrote, unless "a fundamental change in the social form" occurs, even "the liberation of the subordinates often does not entail general freedom ... but only the rise of the subordinates into the ruling stratum."[99] Unless "the liberation of the subordinates" has been preceded or accompanied by the break-up of the concentration of effective power and its diffusion throughout the society and by the strengthening of the institutions of

the society in comparison to the ruler, the simple change of persons in the position of ruler will not increase the subjects' capacity to control the ruler's power capacity. This is true whether the position of ruler continues to be occupied by the same personnel for a long time, or the personnel in that position are periodically changed while the society's power structure remains essentially unaltered.[100] If the political power of rulers is to be brought under control, clearly some more fundamental changes are required.

DEVOLUTION OF POWER IS ESSENTIAL FOR LASTING CONTROL

The establishment of a lasting capacity to exercise effective control over political power - especially in crises - requires strengthening the society at the expense of the ruler. That is to say, the establishment of such control requires significant devolution of effective power capacity among a variety of social groups and institutions. Those *loci* of power then will be able to play significant roles in the normal functioning of the society, and also be capable of wielding effective power, and of controlling the availability of the sources of power to the ruler.

It is not sufficient that these groups and institutions be permitted to make suggestions to the ruler, and to help administer his policies. They must be capable of making independent decisions and of carrying them out themselves. "How," asked Tocqueville, "can a populace unaccustomed to freedom in small concerns, learn to use it temperately in great affairs?"[101] Thus, the establishment of the capacity to wield effective control over the power of rulers requires social changes contrary to important trends in modern politics.

Where *loci* with such capacities still exist in a society, it would normally be important to preserve and improve them. Or, if they are for some reason unsuitable, it would be important to build up alternative groups and institutions. Where it is deemed necessary to weaken or remove certain existing groups and institutions which are themselves engaged in undesirable activities - say, oppressing other parts of the population - it would be important to do this by means which would not concentrate further power with the ruler and weaken relatively the general populace. In those cases it would be necessary to replace the old *loci* with new voluntary groups, associations, and

institutions with effective independent power capacities. The new *loci* would then help to make the liberty of the individual subjects more secure while not diminishing their equality.[102] If freedom is to be preserved, each citizen must "combine with his fellow-citizens for the purpose of defending it. ... "[103]

Many - probably most - rulers are likely to discourage or actively oppose this devolution of power and strengthening of the society's voluntary groups and institutions. The idea itself may be regarded as subversive. However, at times a ruler may genuinely believe in democratic principles and may therefore even encourage and facilitate the process of devolution. The regime alone cannot carry out the process, however; it requires the active initiative, participation, and acceptance of responsibility by the groups, associations, and institutions of the society. In most other cases, the development and strengthening of such *loci* may be achieved quite independently by voluntary efforts alone, as Gandhi envisaged the development of a decentralized society through his constructive program.[104] Also, existing groups may contribute to such devolution by their struggles to achieve a relatively greater freedom of action, self-determination, or local control for neighborhoods, towns, and regions, and full autonomy for nationalities under external rule.

The means of struggle used in such situations and the type of ultimate sanction relied upon by the society and by the *loci* in crises will also be important in influencing the devolution or concentration of power in that political society, as we shall examine in more detail. Other means of achieving devolution may be developed and old ones refined. But whatever may be the variety of means which are instrumental to that end, the devolution of effective power throughout the social structure as a whole is one of the requirements for a lasting capacity to prevent tyranny and other expressions of uncontrolled political power.*

For establishing effective control over rulers, both questions of social organization and of techniques of action (including ultimate sanctions) are relevant. In seeking to solve the problem of the control of political power, and in trying to find means to develop the kind of

* This discussion of institutional devolution of power is developed more fully in Chapter Twelve, “Popular Empowerment,” subchapter: Developing Strategies of Empowerment.

society which facilitates that control, we need to seek answers to these questions:

1. How can people organize a free society in ways that preserve and improve its capacity to remain free?

2. How can people produce social and political changes in ways which will both deal with the particular problem and also facilitate, not hinder, the long-term control of political power?

3. How can a society deal with particular instances of uncontrolled political power (as in oppression, tyranny, and war) by means which both help to solve the immediate problem and also help to control and diffuse -- not concentrate -- political power in the long run?

These and other such questions are closely related to the technique of action used to produce changes and the type of sanction relied upon to maintain the social system. This is because the nature of the sanctions applied in conflicts and for enforcement has a close causal connection to the degree of concentration or diffusion of power in the society. We need increased insight into that connection between sanctions and structure.

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE POWER

The two broad alternative types of sanctions may be called political violence[105] and nonviolent action. These two types are likely to have quite different effects on the future concentration of power in the society. Setting aside for the moment other questions related to violent and nonviolent action in politics, let us consider briefly how the choice of one or the other of these types of sanctions as the technique of control of a ruler or of an institution may significantly influence the long-term capacity of the subjects to control political power.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE CONTRIBUTES TO THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER

It has been widely recognized that violent revolutions and wars have been accompanied by and followed by increased centralization of power in the ruler. This recognition has by no means been limited to

opponents of political violence and centralization. However, even when critics of the established social and political system - such as Karl Marx - have had this insight, they have rarely asked *why* centralized power was associated with political violence. Furthermore, they have rarely asked whether political violence was then compatible with the establishment of lasting effective control over the power of rulers. To the contrary, it has often happened that those persons sharply aware of the existing tendencies toward centralization have pressed for policies and measures which seem to have ensured that the centralization of power in the ruler and the difficulties of controlling that power would be *increased.* Both Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin did so. Little attention has been paid to the very possible connection between the technique of action relied upon in struggle and the degree to which effective power is diffused among social groups and institutions or concentrated in the position of ruler.

Marx referred to the French State as "an immense bureaucratic and military organization" and as a "frightful parasitic body ...."All political upheavals" in France from the first French Revolution to the coup of Louis Napoleon "perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that strove in turn for mastery regarded possession of this immense state edifice as the main booty for the victor."[106] Lenin - who intended to use this centralized State apparatus in Russia for his own ends - in 1917 referred to this passage from Marx as a "tremendous step forward" in Marxism: " ... all revolutions which have taken place up to the present have helped to perfect the state machinery, whereas it must be shattered, broken to pieces." Lenin declared: "This conclusion is the chief and fundamental thesis in the Marxist theory of the State."[107] His basic Jacobin theory of revolution and his practice were, however, very different from that view, although he presented them as compatible.

Following a violent revolution in which a new group has seized control of the State, the new rulers have sometimes been regarded for a time as more humanitarian and less oppressive than the former regime. There has been no guarantee, however, that they would remain so. Lenin did not. Nor was any barrier established in his system to prevent others who somehow obtained the position of ruler after Lenin from behaving far more autocratically, as Stalin did.

The weakening of the society's groups, associations, and institutions, and the concentration of effective power capacity in the hands

of the position of ruler consequently did not - could not - bring to the subjects increased ability to control the power of any future ruler who did not wish to be controlled. This process, argued Jouvenel, laid the foundation for the "monolithic State."[108]

Although the centralizing effect of war has been especially obvious in the twentieth century, the tendency had certainly been demonstrated earlier.[109] Technological changes and the near complete breakdown of the distinction between civilians and the military forces have accentuated this tendency. Effective mobilization of manpower and other resources into an efficient war machine, the necessity of centralized planning and direction, the disruptive effect of dissention and incomplete control, and the increase in the military might available to the ruler, all contribute to the strong tendency of modern war to concentrate more and more effective power in the hands of the ruler.

Other types of political violence may also contribute to this centralizing process. Modern developments in technology and political organization appear to be accentuating the tendencies of political violence toward centralization of effective power capacity.[110] Among these factors are the following:

1. Centralized direction and control of the preparations for and the waging of political violence is generally necessary if the violence is to be applied efficiently.

2. This requires centralized control of the weapons (and other material resources), the active combatants, and the groups and institutions on which these depend.

3. Such control (as in factors I and 2) means increased power during the struggle for those exercising that control, including the ability to apply physical violence to maintain it.

4. After a successful struggle by political violence, the group which controlled the conduct of the struggle is likely to retain the power capacity which it accumulated during the struggle. Or, if a coup d'état takes place, others, or a section of the original group, will obtain control of that institutionalized power capacity. *

5. The taking-over of the old State, strengthened by the newly accumulated additional power capacity, will mean an overall increase

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* For an extended analysis of some of the consequences of institutionalized political violence see Chapter Eleven, "The Societal Imperative," and Chapter Twelve, "Popular Empowerment."

in the effective power capacity of future rulers as compared to the old ones.

6. That power capacity is also likely to be increased by the destruction or weakening during the struggle of effective *loci* of power, with the result that the subjects are left relatively weakened vis-à-vis the ruler.

7. The new regime born out of violence will require reliance on violence, and therefore centralization, to defend itself from internal and external enemies.

8. In a society in which subjects and ruler alike regard violence as the only kind of effective power and the only real means of struggle, and in which the ruler has a vast capacity to wield political violence, the subjects are likely to feel helpless.

These factors and others help to reduce the capacity of subjects to control a ruler's power in a society which has relied upon political violence as its supreme sanction and means of struggle.

NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE DIFFUSION OF POWER

Nonviolent action appears to have a quite different long-term effect on the distribution of power in the society. Not only does this technique not have the centralizing effects of political violence, but it appears to contribute significantly to the diffusion of effective power throughout the society. This, in turn, is likely to make it easier in the long run for the subjects to control their ruler's exercise of power. Widespread application of nonviolent action in place of political violence appears to diffuse power capacity among the subjects for these reasons: [111]

1. Although strong leadership may play an important role m initiating a nonviolent struggle movement, as the conflict develops and the original leadership is imprisoned or otherwise removed by the opponent, a continuing central leadership group frequently ceases to be necessary and, indeed, is often impossible to maintain. In other cases in which leadership continues, participants still require a greater self-reliance. The movement as a whole thus tends to become self-reliant, and in extreme situations effectively leaderless. Especially under severe repression, efficiency in nonviolent action

requires that the participants be able to act without dependence on a central leadership group.

2. The movement cannot be centrally controlled by the regulation of the distribution of weapons and ammunition to the combatants, because in nonviolent action there are no material weapons. Instead, the actionists depend on such qualities as their bravery, ability to maintain nonviolent discipline, and skill in applying the technique. These qualities and skills are more likely to develop with use. Thus, such practice helps to produce greater self-reliance than in the case of troops who rely on replenishment of equipment, ammunition, and orders from commanding officers.

3. The centralizing forces operating in political violence are not present in nonviolent action. The degree of dependence on the nonviolent leaders is reduced as the campaign proceeds. If they are to continue as leaders, it is only because of their voluntarily accepted moral authority and of people's perception of them as skillful leaders and strategists, not because of any capacity to enforce their will by threats or infliction of violence against the participants themselves.

4. Where the leaders do not accumulate in the course of the struggle the capacity to wield political violence, there are no such institutionalized means of repression ready to apply against their followers and others in the poststruggle period.

5. Where some of the leaders following the nonviolent struggle accept positions in the State, including that of ruler, as occurs following a national independence struggle, it is true that they will have at their disposal the police and military capacities of that State, but these will not have been increased by their own accumulated military forces and capacity to wage political violence.

6. The social groups and institutions throughout the society will not have been weakened or destroyed by political violence, or subordinated to its requirements. To the contrary, in nonviolent struggle these *loci* of power are likely to have been strengthened. The experience of working closely together in the struggle, demonstrating greater self-reliance, and gaining experience in means of asserting their ability to continue and to resist the opponent's repression and regimentation, are likely in a successful nonviolent struggle to have strengthened such *loci* appreciably. Gandhi often described a nonviolent action campaign as a means by which the people would generate

the strength to enable them to advance toward achieving their political goals.[112]

7. A nonviolent campaign for a specific political objective cannot be expected to be followed immediately by the full rejection of violence by that political society in all situations. However, it is a step in that direction which may, or may not, be later followed by other substitutions of nonviolent sanctions for violent ones.

Changes won by political violence are likely to require continued political violence to defend them. Those changes "given" without effort can be as easily taken away. However, in the course of achieving changes by nonviolent struggle, the populace also generates the capacity to defend those changes nonviolently.[113] Changes achieved by nonviolent action are therefore likely to be more lasting. Such changes also contribute to freeing the society in that specific area from the "necessity" of relying on political violence to maintain the social structure.[114]

8. Whereas following a struggle with political violence, the subjects are likely to feel relatively helpless when they compare their own power capacity with that of the ruler, a quite different situation is likely to have developed during a successful nonviolent struggle. In the first place, they are likely to have experienced a transformation of their *potential* power into *effective* or real power by successful nonviolent action. Such experience will give them confidence, resources, and skill which will enhance their future ability to change their society and to control their ruler's effective power. This kind of training in "battle" helps to increase the subjects' capacity to apply the technique in future crises, contributes to the devolution of effective power and power capacity in the society,[115] and enhances the ability of that society as a whole to control rulers of domestic or foreign origin who would seek to impose their will against the will of the citizenry.

If valid, the discussion in this section has various important practical consequences. Even if we assume equal short-term effectiveness for the two types of sanctions, the choice of one or the other will have quite different long-term consequences for the society.*

* For further discussion of the long-term effects of violent and nonviolent sanctions, and of deliberate replacement of violent with nonviolent sanctions, see Chapter Twelve, "Popular Empowerment," subchapter: Sanctions and Society, and subchapter: Developing Strategies of Empowerment.

THE NEED TO THINK

This chapter has been an attempt to offer in broad outlines some thoughts about the relationship between the ruler's power capacity and the underlying distribution of power capacity throughout the social structure. The influence of alternative sanctions and means of struggle on the distribution of power capacity has also been explored. The dangers of uncontrolled political power are so severe that solutions to that problem are imperative. However, not every proposal for dealing with a problem is likely to have the same results when put into action. Past proposals for controlling political power have had very limited success, have proven to be impotent, or have even been counterproductive. Even when "successful," the frequency with which past efforts appear to have contributed to reduced capacity for long-term control of power should stimulate us to seek more satisfactory solutions. That search requires that, among other things, we think about the nature of the problem and the requirements of a satisfactory solution.

Such attempts to think again about long-standing problems are at times unsettling. We are left often with a feeling of dissatisfaction. The adequacy of traditional "solutions" is thrown into doubt, while the alternative analysis of the nature of the problem and the alternative proposed "solution" both remain inadequately developed. Such unease may, however, be beneficial if it stimulates us to think, and ours 'elves to contribute to the effort to solve the problem before us.

NOTES

1. See Gene Sharp, **The Politics of Nonviolent Action** (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), Chapter One.
2. See ibid., Chapters Two-Fourteen for an analysis of the nature of nonviolent struggle.
3. For some related definitions of power, see Robert M. MacIver, **The Web of Government** (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 82 and 87; Martin J. Hillenbrand, **Power and Morals** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 4-5; Jacques Maritain, **Man and the State** (London: Hollis & Carter, 1954), p. 114; and Harold D. Lasswell, **Power and Personality** (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1948), p. 12.
4. MacIver writes: "What power the government wields and to what ends it directs this power depends on these other forces [loci of power], on the manner in which they are operatively adjusted to one another in the

struggle and clash, the convergence and divergence, of power-possessing interests." (MacIver, **The Web of Government**, p. 91.)

5. Bertrand de Jouvenel, **Sovereignty: An Enquiry into the Public Good** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, and Cambridge at the University Press, 1957), p. 71.
6. Georg Simmel writes: "The ruler's chief motive in equalizing hierarchical differences derives from the fact that relations of strong superordination and subordination among his subjects actually and psychologically compete with his own superordination. Besides, too great an oppression of certain classes by others is as dangerous to despotism as is-the too great power of these oppressing classes." (Georg Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simmel** [Trans, ed., and with an Introduction by Kurt H. Wolff; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950], p. 198.)
7. Alexis de Tocqueville, **Democracy in America** [Trans. by Henry Reeve, C.B.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), vol. I, p. 332.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 333.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 332.
12. Ibid., p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 332.
14. Ibid., vol. II, p. 296.
15. Ibid., vol. I, p. 333.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 334.
18. Ibid.
19. Jouvenel, **Sovereignty**, p. 200.
20. Gaetano Mosca, **The Ruling Class *(Elementi de Scienza Politica)*** (Trans. by Hannah D. Kahn; ed. and rev. with an Introduction by Arthur Livingstone; New York and London: McGraw-HilI, 1939), p. 141.
21. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. I, p. 332.
22. Ibid.
23. Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simmel**, p. 232.
24. Franco Venturi, **Roots of Revolution** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, and London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), p. 66.
25. See ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 67.
27. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
28. Ibid., p. 198.
29. Ibid., p. 70.
30. Ibid., p. 71.
31. See ibid., pp. 72-73.
32. Ibid., p. 72.
33. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 258.
34. Ibid., vol. I, p. 333.
35. Ibid., p. 334.
36. Ibid., p. 9.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 93.
39. Ibid., vol. II, p. 271.
40. Bertrand de Jouvenel, **Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth** (Trans. by J. F. Huntington; Boston: Beacon Paperback, 1962, and London: Batchworth Press 1952 [1945]), pp. 244-246.
41. Ibid., p. 295.
42. See ibid., pp. 185-200.
43. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II., p. 272.
44. Ibid., p. 9; see also p. 47.
45. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 333-334.
46. Ibid., p. 334.
47. Ibid., vol. 11, p. 296.
48. Ibid., p. 258.
49. Ibid., vol. I, p. 92.
50. See, for example, Karen Horney, **The Neurotic Personality of Our Time** (New York: W.W. Norton, 1937), p. 289; and Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1941), pp. 240 and 253-254. British ed.: The Fear of Freedom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 207 and 220.
51. Horney, **The Neurotic Personality of Our Time**, p. 289.
52. Fromm, **Escape From Freedom,** p. 240, and **The Fear of Freedom**, p. 207.
53. Fromm, **Escape From Freedom**, pp. 255-256 and **The Fear of Freedom**, p. 220.
54. Leonard Schapiro, **The Communist Party of the Soviet Union** (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960), p. 431.
55. On *Gleiehschaltung* in Nazi Germany see Franz Neumann, **Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944** (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1963); and Arthur Schweitzer, **Big Business in the Third Reich** (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964).
56. See Leonard Schapiro, **The Origins of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opp~sition in the Soviet State: First Phase 1917-1922** (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1956), and Schapiro, **The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.**
57. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 93.
58. Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simmel**, p. 199.
59. See ibid., p. 198.
60. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 284.
61. Ibid., p. 9.
62. Ibid., p. 93.
63. Ibid., p. 265.
64. F.C. Montague, Introduction to Jeremy Bentham, **A Fragment on Government** (Ed. by F.C. Montague. London: Humphrey Milford, 1931 [1891]), p. 48.
65. Mosca, **The Ruling Class**, p. 141.
66. Jouvenel, **Power**, p. 206.
67. See William Godwin, **Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness** (Sec. ed.; London: G.G. and J. Robinson, 1796), vol. I, pp. 275-276.
68. See ibid., vol. I, pp. 257-261 and 304, and vol. II, pp. 221-222 and 244.
69. See ibid., vol. I, p. 108 and 254-255, and vol. II, p. 153.
70. Niccolo Machiavelli, **The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli** ("Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy") (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), vol. I, p. 252.
71. Ibid., pp. 252-253.
72. Ibid., p. 289.

73. Machiavelli, **The Prince** (London: J.M. Dent & Sons [Everyman Library], 1948), p.38.
74. Baron de Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Laws** (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1959), vol. I, pp. 20-23 and 34.
75. Ibid., p. 307.
76. Mosca, **The Ruling Class**, p. 134.
77. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 260.
78. Jouvenel, **Power**, p. 277.
79. Ibid., p. 293.
80. See M.K. **Gandhi, Non-violence in Peace and War** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1949), vol. II, pp. 187-188. Here he suggests that an India internally so weak as to be torn by riots would be easy prey to a new foreign ruler. See also N.K. Bose, Studies in Gandhism (Calcutta: Indian Associated Publishing Co., 1947), pp. 62-63.
81. See Gandhi, "Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule" (pamphlet, Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1958), pp. 38-41, and Gene Sharp, "Gandhi on the Theory of Voluntary Servitude," in **Gandhi as a Political Strategist** (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1979).
82. Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1948), vol. I, p.36.
83. Ibid., p. 12.
84. Bose, **Selections from Gandhi** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1948), p. 118. See also ibid. pp. 121 and 123; Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War**, vol. I, p. 351; and Gandhi, Satyagraha (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1951), p. 283.
85. Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War**, vol. II, p. 8.
86. See ibid., vol. I, pp. 103-104,
87. See Jouvenel, **Power**, pp. 22-23.
88. See Tocqueville, **Democracy in Americ**a, vol. I, p. 93, and vol. II, p. 258.
89. Ibid., vol. I, p. 332, see also p. 334, and vol. II, pp. 288-290 and 294.
90. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 258.
91. See Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Law**s, vol. I, p. 21.
92. Jouvenel, **Power**, p. 220, and Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963).
93. Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Laws**, pp. 21-22.
94. Tocqueville, **Democracy in Americ**a, vol. II, p. 266.
95. Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Laws**, vol. I, p. 309.
96. Jouvenel, Power, p. 101.
97. Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 199.
98. Ibid.
99. Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simme**l, p. 274.
100. As in Pareto's theory of the circulation of the elites. See Vilfredo Pareto, **The Mind and Society** (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1935), vol. IV, pp. 17871798.
101. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. I, p. 92.
102. See ibid., vol. II, pp. 295-296.
103. Ibid., p. 97.
104. See Gene Sharp, "The Theory of Gandhi's Constructive Program," in **Gandhi as a Political Strategist**, Chapter Five.
105. Political violence here refers to physical violence or the threat of it used to further political objectives, whether by the State, non-State groups, or individuals, including imprisonment, execution, rioting, guerrilla war, conventional war, assassination, coup d'état, civil war, bombing, terrorism, and police and military action against opposition groups.

106. Karl Marx, **The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapart**, pp. 238-239, in David Fernbach, ed., Karl Marx: Political Writings, vol. II, Surveys from Exile (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1974).
107. V.I. Lenin, **The State and the Revolution** (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 25.
108. See Jouvenel, **Power**, pp. 18-22 and 244-246.
109. See Quincy Wright, **A Study of War** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), vol. I, pp. 232-242, 302, and esp. 311; Bronislaw Malinowski, "An Anthropological Analysis of War," American Journal of Sociology, vol. XLVI, no. 4, esp. p. 545; and Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization (New York: Roy publishers, 1944), esp. pp. 265 and 305.
110. The following list of factors appears in similar form in Gene Sharp, **The Politics of Nonviolent Action**, pp. 800-802.
111. This list of factors also appears in similar form in ibid., pp. 802-806. See Part Three, "The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action" for analysis and data supporting these insights.
112. See Gandhi, **Satyagraha**, p. 356, and Gene Sharp, **Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral power** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960), pp. 72 and 100.
113. See Sharp, **Gandhi Wields The Weapon of Moral Power**, p. 125, and Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War**, vol. II, p. 340.
114. See Richard Gregg, **The power of Non-violence** (Sec. rev. ed.: New York: Schocken, 1966, and London: James Clarke, 1960), p. 146.
115. Bose has written that experience in nonviolent action puts the people: "on their own legs. And when power comes with the revolution, it spreads evenly among the masses; for, under non-violence, any unarmed man, woman, or child can be effective provided the heart is stout. Under violence, this cannot be so; those who make the most effective use of violence gain the upper hand." (Bose, **Studies in Gandhism**, p. 148.)

4

Facing Dictatorships With Confidence

The seriousness of the problem of dictatorships, the dangers they pose, and the need for effective means to deal with them have all increased since the First World War. Ordinary dictatorships - brutal though they have been for thousands of years - were superseded by the Hitler and Stalin regimes. With these developments totalitarianism became a far more formidable opponent. These totalitarian rulers attempted to engulf and control the whole life of each subject and every aspect of the society. The degree of control over individuals, transportation, communications, weapons, and entire social, economic, and political systems, increased dramatically over traditional dictatorships. Power became concentrated. Adolph Hitler

and Josef Stalin are now dead, the Nazi system is only a relic for historians, and the Soviet system is evolving. Nevertheless, the problem which dictatorships pose to people who believe in human dignity and freedom continues to grow.

The willingness of governments and political groups aiming to seize the State to deal ruthlessly with opposition and innocent people has not diminished. It may in fact have increased. Too often it is assumed that genocide was safely buried in 1945 under the rubble of Berlin. Various doctrines and ideologies, and fear of others, have provided political groups and .regimes with a rationale and "justification" for policies and actions which otherwise would be seen as naked brutality. Recent technological advances in communication, transportation, data storage and retrieval, political organization, electronic surveillance, subliminal controls of populations, and the capacity to kill, have increased the capability of modern governments to establish and maintain effective dictatorships.

DANGERS OF NEW DICTATORSHIPS

Present liberal constitutional democracies are all imperfect, but remain clearly preferable to dictatorial regimes which are expanding in number. Yet severe problems within such democracies cast doubt on their durability. Internal imperfections, highly centralized controls, and decision-making "by small elites often raise doubts about the vitality and effectiveness of democratic processes. This is true even in the countries which pride themselves in their democratic traditions and institutions. Many people feel powerless and unable to control their own lives and influence major political decisions. Direct attacks in a variety of forms continue to be made on democratic structures. The United States is not exempt; "Watergate" was an attempt to subvert the American constitutional processes of free elections. In various countries internal coups d'etat by political and military groups, activities of police and foreign agents, political terrorism, and minority guerrilla wars continue to assault democratic systems, with the intent of replacing them with dictatorships. The groups using these means espouse diverse doctrines and wave various political flags. The growth in various countries and systems of powerful intelligence organizations, institutions of foreign agents, and central

government police bodies creates the potential of those bodies, or some section of them, to defy and to attack the legal government, instead of serving its will.* Military forces have done this repeatedly in dozens of countries as they have launched coups d'etat.

The underlying social conditions on which democratic structures rest have also changed. Social, economic, and political systems of all types have altered drastically since the advent of constitutional democracy in every country in which it has had a long history. The "grass roots" institutions of society, and even local and state or provincial governments, are increasingly subordinated to centralized administration. Powerful multinational corporations are taking control of the national economies outside of the countries themselves, and are using that control to manipulate governments in order to serve their own financial interests. All these conditions are inimical to freedom.

In the future, the tyrant will be able to use more subtle, yet no less diabolical, means of control through such methods as conditioning, psychological manipulation, and drugs provided by modern science to keep the subjects submissive and "happy." Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* may not be far away; dictatorships using such psychological means may supersede totalitarianism. Other signs of future dangers also exist. The expanding breakdown and even active destruction of traditional societies and indigenous cultures in those parts of the world emerging from European colonialism are creating the condition of *anomie*, psychological, ethical, and personal confusion, and social disintegration. This condition, especially when combined with deep genuine grievances, nurtures various kinds of mass movements - social, religious, and political. They can presage a new political messiah or doctrine of salvation which leads directly to political enslavement.

If effective means are not soon found to destroy dictatorships, and to alter the conditions which make them possible, the task of preventing and resisting them will rapidly become yet more difficult. The future may thus be one in which the word "freedom" will have no meaning, or will be only the remnant of a forgotten dream.

Many cultures and countries have their own traditions of love of freedom and opposition to all tyranny, even though the practice does

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* On the capacity of such bodies to be shifted to different purposes, see Chapter Eleven, "The Societal Imperative,"

not always live up to the ideal. Opposition to political dictatorship was a basic American principle well before the adoption of the Constitution. The creation of new political structures on this continent, the colonial struggles against perceived tyranny, and the drafting of the basic frameworks for new governments were all motivated by belief in human freedom, whatever additional motives may have been present. The colonial fathers believed in a moral and political imperative to oppose existing dictatorships and to prevent the establishment of new tyrannies. ('they were simultaneously, of course, often blind to their own imposition of tyrannical conditions on the Native Americans from whom they seized the land, and the Africans whom they enslaved, as well as the oppression of their own women.)

Since the time that the European settlers gained independence, American government policies and foreign alliances have not always followed that commitment to freedom and opposition to tyranny. However, the belief has remained fundamental for many Americans. The compromises that were made in practical policies were often perceived as necessary in face of a larger dictatorial threat. The First World War was fought, it was said, "to make the world safe for democracy." The Second World War was waged, most people were convinced, to defeat three dictatorial expansionist regimes, liberate conquered peoples, and, specifically, defeat the Nazi system - one of the most extreme forms of dictatorship yet known. The Cold War has been officially aimed at halting the expansion of Communist forms of dictatorship. Even the most interventionist United States activities in recent decades have been excused by their advocates as required to com bat still more serious dictatorial threats. Although critics may at times, with justification, point to other motives, we still must confront the real dangers to freedom posed by all types of dictatorships.

INADEQUACIES OF THE TRADITIONAL ANSWERS

No easy answer to the problem of dictatorship exists. There are no effortless, safe ways by which people living under dictatorships can liberate themselves, or by which other people can defend themselves from future dangers. Nor do we have a simple way by which we can prevent the development of new tyrannies. Passivity in the face of such threats is clearly no guarantee of safety. In fact it is often

the opposite. In any case, passivity is neither an effective nor a democratic response to this challenge. Every possible course of action in support of liberation and in defense of freedom will involve risks, and potential suffering, and take time to operate. Nor can any means of action ensure success in every situation.

How, then, are we to deal with dictatorships? The spontaneous answer most people who believe in freedom give is that you must fight and destroy them. If your country is the victim of a dictatorial regime, native or foreign, you fight against it. If your country is attacked by a dictatorial State, you resist that attack. If the subjects of a tyrant are in rebellion, you provide help. If a chance exists that your country might be attacked by a dictatorship, you prepare in advance to repel it, hoping that if you become strong enough you will deter attack. These are the common answers of most people who believe in freedom and oppose tyranny throughout the world. While these broad answers may in principle still be as valid as ever, the changes in military technology and political organization now make it necessary - whatever was true before - to implement them in quite different ways than were usual in previous times.

To enable us to confront the dangers of dictatorships, we have created massive military systems with hitherto unthinkable destructive capacities. We have organized ourselves to conduct many of the same antidemocratic activities against dictatorial forces as they themselves have done. We have supported one dictatorial group against another. And we have lamented the erosions of freedoms and democratic processes in other countries and in our own.

Despite these measures, few signs exist that the antidemocratic trends of this century are being slowed, let alone being contained or reversed. In fact, our policies may even have facilitated consolidation of old dictatorships and the emergence of new ones. The problem is not how to achieve "peaceful coexistence" with extreme dictatorships. The problem is how to reassert popular control over them, even over totalitarian systems: how to defeat and disintegrate them.

Ironically, at the very moment in history when the greatest need exists for effective means of struggle against tyranny, the traditional means of last resort in international conflicts - war - has, because of modern technology, become a highly dangerous option. Yet, if effective alternative ways are not found to replace war in such conflicts, people will persist in threatening and using war despite its

dangers.* Similarly, very serious internal dangers also exist in attempts to revolt against domestic dictatorships. These are related to the concentration and destructiveness of military weaponry, the extreme costliness of civil wars generally, and guerrilla wars particularly, in casualties and social destruction, and the structural consequences of such violence.† Past means have often been inadequate even when they destroyed a specific dictatorship, for they allowed others to continue, facilitated their growth, or contributed to the development of new ones. The inadequacies of present means for dealing with dictatorships are so serious that we ought to consider how to develop alternative means. We require new policies, courses of action and conceptions of liberation and defense in order to face the dangers of modern dictatorships and to deal with them. The view that one must choose between massively destructive war and passive submission to tyranny is false.

Our past understanding of the nature of the problem of modern dictatorships, totalitarian movements, genocide, and political usurpation has been inadequate. Similarly, our understanding of the possible means of struggle against them, and of preventing their development has been incomplete. With inadequate understanding as the foundation of our policies, it is no wonder that they have proven ineffective.

Other options must, of course, be evaluated fairly. For example, in weighing alternative policies it is important to compare the worst possible results of each, as well as the best, and not (as happens) simply the best of one with the worst of the other. Also, one must consider not only the odds for or against certain results of optional policies occurring; attention is also required to the nature of those results, including possible corrective and remedial measures to counteract them. Inadequacies in present policies and in proposed new policies will need full examination, as will claims of strengths and effectiveness of each. By using such means of comparison, a fair evaluation becomes possible.

* See Chapter Ten, "Seeking a Solution to the Problem of War."

†See Chapter Twelve, "Popular Empowerment," subchapter: Sanctions and Society.

LESS THAN OMNIPOTENT

Our capacity to discover and to develop new ways of preventing dictatorships in the first place, and of destroying them once they exist, may be increased if we can locate characteristics of such systems which already constitute problems for the dictators, hindering their efforts to hold their systems together, or hindering implementation of their will. Remarkably, while great attention has been given to the means of police repression and to the military capacities of dictatorships, almost no attention has been given to their weaknesses. Indeed, we have constantly given dictatorial regimes credit for being far more efficient, effective, powerful, and durable than in fact they are. All dictatorships, including totalitarian ones, contain inherent weaknesses which, over time, even without deliberate efforts to aggravate them, tend to make the system less effective and less dictatorial. In some cases these weaknesses could cause the dictatorship to disintegrate.

Dictatorships, even totalitarian systems, are not fully monolithic, and certainly not omnipotent or eternal. It is really nothing completely new to say that dictatorships do not always accomplish their objectives. David Riesman and Karl W. Deutsch both pointed to this fact in the 1950s.

In 1952 David Riesman wrote that we often overestimate the capacity of totalitarians "to restructure human personality."! While people under pressures may play certain roles and often conform outwardly, they also may be apathetic and even indifferent to ideological appeals and indoctrination. They may reject the dictator's "ethics" which all are supposed to accept. People may retreat from politics - the process of "privatization." Instead of being determined by the doctrines and programs of the system, people's behavior may be motivated by their greed. Corruption and even crime may become widespread. People may deliberately behave with excessive enthusiasm to support edicts of the system in order to disrupt it, as by accusing everyone in the Party of deviationism. Power conflicts may emerge within the regime or Party.[2] Such responses involve, Riesman wrote, "sheer unheroic cussed resistance to totalitarian efforts" to remake human beings into the new image.[3] Not even the terror can completely "destroy all bonds of organization among its victims."[4] These limitations on the effectiveness of controls affect those systems

detrimentally, he wrote. However, our own absence of realism in understanding those limitations affects us also, for it leads us to "be unduly cowed or unduly aggressive ...."[5] Instead, we ought to "seek ways to bring those regimes down without war ...."[6]

We have assumed in the past that dictatorships, especially in their extreme forms, differ from other systems of government more than they actually do. Contrary to popular opinion, a totalitarian ruler is, in common with all rulers, dependent on his subjects. All rulers depend upon the cooperation, submission, and obedience of the subjects for their positions and power. Their power is drawn from sources in society, such as economic resources, military capacity, knowledge, skills, administration, and authority. These in turn are each closely related to, or directly dependent upon, the degree of cooperation, submission, obedience, and assistance which the would-be ruler is able to obtain from his subjects - both from the general corps of full-time agents and aides and from the population as a whole. This submission may be induced by the use of terror, but the underlying dependence of the ruler on the subjects is nevertheless present. If the help and submission of either or both of these groups is withdrawn, the ruler's power is seriously weakened. If the withdrawal can be maintained in face of various sanctions, an end to the regime is in sight.[7] This principle applies even to totalitarian rulers. This dependency may have considerable significance in the eventual solution of our problem.

Most people assume that this view is nonsense. They believe that with sufficient threats, intimidation, punishment, brutality, killings, and terror, the dictator can enforce his will upon any population without their having any choice or chance to change the situation. That view of enforced obedience and cooperation induced by repressive measures is very incomplete. It implies that this is always a one-way relationship. While on the surface that appears at times to be the case, the reality is fundamentally different. In special situations the regime in fact becomes incapable of enforcing its will. This may occur because too many people are defying it simultaneously, because its administrators are refusing to help, or because its agents of repression are not obeying orders to inflict the punishments. In some cases, these may all happen simultaneously.

In 1953 Karl W. Deutsch applied this view of the interdependency of enforcement and obedience to totalitarian systems. The passage is highly important:

> The ... enforcement of decisions [by totalitarian government] depends to a large extent on the compliance habits of the population. Compliance and enforcement are interdependent; they reinforce each other, and the varying proportions in which they do so, form as it were a continuous spectrum. At one end of this spectrum, we could imagine a situation where everybody obeys habitually all commands or decisions of the totalitarian regime, and no enforcement is necessary; at the other end of this spectrum, we could imagine a situation where nobody obeys voluntarily any decision of the totalitarian system, and everybody has to be compelled to obey at pistol point, or under conditions of literally ever-present threat and ever-present supervision.
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> In the first of these cases, enforcement would be extremely cheap and, in fact, unnecessary; in the second, it would be prohibitively expensive, and in fact no government could be carried on, on such a basis .... Somewhere in the middle between these extremes of universal compliance and ubiquitous enforcement is the range of effective government. There a majority of individuals in a majority of situations obeys the decisions of the government more or less from habit without any need for immediate supervision.[8]
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> These considerations apply to totalitarianism as they apply to all types of government, but in their application to totalitarianism they again suggest a paradox. Totalitarian power is strong only if it does not have to be used too often. If totalitarian power must be used at all times against the entire population, it is unlikely to remain powerful for long. Since totalitarian regimes require more power for dealing with their subjects than do other types of government, such regimes stand in greater need of widespread and dependable compliance habits among their people; more than that they need to be able to count on the active support of at least significant parts of the population in case of need.[9]

Severe problems exist in transforming this general insight into deliberate concrete resistance actions to undermine and destroy the totalitarian system. It is not easy, for example, to maintain the withdrawal of support in the face of severe repression from still faithful police and troops. As present policies for dealing with dictatorships also have their own problems, the existence of difficulties in possible options is no reason to halt exploration of their potential for dealing with modern dictatorships.

WEAKNESSES IN EXTREME DICTATORSHIPS

On the basis of what we know of the Nazi and Communist systems, and certain lesser dictatorships, it is possible to indicate various specific weaknesses in them. These are factors which will in time, even without deliberate efforts to aggravate them, produce changes which in differing degrees will modify the capacities and characteristics of the dictatorship. For example, these weaknesses may produce the following results:

- restrict the freedom of action of the regime;
- induce the regime to be more considerate of the needs and wishes of the population;
- reduce the brutality and repression;
- contribute to the regime's becoming less doctrinal in its own actions;
- reduce the degree to which the regime is in effective control of the society;
- destroy the myth of the regime's omniscience;
- at the mildest, cause the system to become somewhat "liberalized" or even democratized; and
- at the extremity, cause the system to disintegrate.

The following are some of the weaknesses of extreme dictatorships, including totalitarian systems:

1. The cooperation of a multitude of different people and groups which is needed to operate the system may be restricted or withdrawn.
2. The regime's freedom of action may be limited by past policies, the requirements and effects of which still continue.
3. The system may become routine in its operation, therefore more moderate and less able to shift its activities drastically at the service of doctrinal imperatives and sudden policy shifts.
4. The allocation of personnel and resources for existing tasks will limit their availability for new ones.
5. The central command may receive from the lower echelons inaccurate or incomplete information on which to make decisions, for subordinates may be fearful of inducing displeasure from higher echelons.
6. The ideology may erode, and the myths and symbols of the system become unstable.

7. Firm adherence to the ideology may lead to decisions injurious to the system because insufficient attention is given to actual conditions and needs.
8. The system may be inefficient due to deteriorating competency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy, or to excessive controls and red tape; consequently, the system's policies and normal operations may become ineffective.
9. The system's internal conflicts of various types may detrimentally affect and even disrupt its operation.
10. Intellectuals and students may become restless in response to conditions, restrictions, doctrinalism, and repression.
11. The general public may over time become apathetic or skeptical.
12. Regional, class, cultural, or national differences may become acute.
13. The power hierarchy will always be to some degree unstable, at times highly so.
14. Sections of the political police or the military forces may possess sufficient power to exert pressures to achieve their own ends, or even to act against the established rulers.
15. In the case of a new dictatorship, time is required for it to become firmly established, which allows an especially vulnerable period.
16. The extreme concentration of decision-making and command means that too many decisions will be made by too few people to avoid errors.
17. If the regime, in order to avoid some of these problems, decides to diffuse decision-making and administration, this will lead to further erosion of central controls, and often to the creation of dispersed new power centers which may seek to expand their power at the cost of the center.

Such weaknesses of extreme dictatorships do not, of course, mean that disintegration occurs quickly, or even at all, regardless of other factors at play in the situation. Dictatorial systems are often aware of at least some of their weaknesses, and take measures to counteract them. Also, under appropriate circumstances even very inefficient and incompetent regimes often manage to survive for remarkably long periods of time, and people may, as Riesman said, "mistake blundering compulsions or even accidents of ' the system' for conspiratorial genius." [10]

It should be possible, however, to learn much more than we now know about dictatorships and about alternative forms of opposition and resistance to them. With this knowledge, people living under

dictatorships might be able to aggravate deliberately such inherent weaknesses in order to alter the system drastically or to disintegrate it. In such efforts, the interdependence of enforcement and patterns of obedience is especially important. Nonviolent forms of struggle are premised on the capacity of the populace to withhold its obedience and cooperation. This withholding makes it possible for the required sources of power of the dictatorship to be restricted or severed.

UNPREPARED RESISTANCE TO TYRANNY

Severe problems would be involved in such disobedience and noncooperation struggles against extreme dictatorships. We must remember that we do not have available an option without difficulties and dangers. The problems of this type of struggle need to be viewed in the perspective of the present limitations of the various types of political violence for resisting and destroying dictatorships. Serious exploration of the future potential of disobedience and noncooperation for aggravating weaknesses of dictatorships in order to control and destroy them needs to begin on the basis of an understanding of dictatorships, of the nature of nonviolent struggle, and of the history of the previous nonviolent struggles against dictatorships. Though still insufficient, all of these are necessary for a beginning. Instances of nonviolent action against lesser oppression are therefore relevant: one cannot understand how a major nonviolent struggle operating against a totalitarian system could be conducted, or what would be all of its problems, weaknesses, and strengths, without first studying its application against lesser obstacles. The general history of this technique is therefore relevant. Considerable understanding of the range of particular methods, strategic principles, basic requirements for effectiveness, and the dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent action is necessary background for this exploration.* Without this, it is impossible to appreciate adequately

* See the introductory discussions of some of these aspects in Chapter Nine, •• 'The Political Equivalent of War' - Civilian-based Defense," subchapter: Control of Political Power and Conduct of Open Struggle, and Chapter Ten, "Seeking a Solution to the Problem of War." However, more in depth understanding is required. For this, see Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973).

the general characteristics and capacities of this technique. These include:

- how nonviolent action wields power and counteracts the power of the opponent;
- how use of this technique breaks the spell of conformity and fear;
- the roles of symbolic and psychological resistance;
- the many ways in which economic and political noncooperation wield and affect power;
- the necessity of maintaining nonviolent discipline in order to apply political jiu-jitsu to counter violent repression and to use it to aid the resisters;
- the constantly changing strengths of the contending parties during a nonviolent struggle;
- the ways in which the struggle can continue after any recognizable leadership has been seized;
- the processes by which additional support can be aroused during the conflict from members of the general populace, the opponent's own camp, and third parties; and
- the mechanisms of change which may bring success (the operative mechanism is rarely conversion, more often accommodation, sometimes nonviolent coercion, and even disintegration of the opponent's regime).

In a number of important cases, nonviolent struggle has been applied against totalitarian systems, either alone or in combination with political violence. While no totalitarian system has been permanently overthrown by nonviolent struggle, more such resistance has occurred than is generally recognized. These cases establish that nonviolent struggle against extreme dictatorships including totalitarian systems is possible. The degree of success and failure of these cases has varied, depending in part on one's criteria. In several instances this type of struggle presented formidable problems for the regime. Sometimes it forced concessions and won at least partial victories.

The following cases are among the more significant ones:

- the civil disobedience, political noncooperation, and rescue of Jews by the Norwegian Resistance during the Nazi occupation 1940-45;

- the political noncooperation, labor strikes, psychological resistance, rescue of Jews, and the Copenhagen general strike, 1944, by the Danish Resistance, 1940-45;
- the political noncooperation, mass .circulation of underground newspapers, massive adoption of new identities, religious opposition, and major strikes of 1941, 1943, and 1944 by the Dutch Resistance, 1940-45;
- the protest marches, strikes, and sit-downs before tanks during the East German Revolt, June 1953;
- the strikes in the political prisoners' camps (especially at Vorkuta) in the Soviet Union in 1953;
- the street demonstrations, general strikes, political defiance, formation of workers' councils, and establishment of a federated council substitute national government during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956-57;[11]
- the popular pressure and street demonstrations for political liberalization and on economic grievances in Poland in 1956 and 1970-71;
- the leafleting, public demonstrations, and sit-ins by Soviet civil rights activists and by Soviet Jews seeking permission to emigrate in the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s;
- the refusal of collaboration, street demonstrations, resistance radio and television broadcasts, Government and Party defiance, student protests, and efforts to undermine the morale of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968-69 against the Soviet invasion and measures to reimpose a rigid Communist dictatorship.*

All of these cases occurred without advance preparations. They were waged by people who had little or no real understanding of the nonviolent technique, its dynamics and requirements, except perhaps that gained by extremely limited experience or hearsay. It is, therefore, reasonable to explore whether by using increased knowledge of this technique with (where possible) advance training and other preparations based upon deep knowledge of extreme dictatorships and their weaknesses, we might be able to aggravate those weaknesses· seriously and increase the effectiveness of nonviolent struggle against totalitarian systems.

* For a brief survey. with references, of the Czech and Slovak resistance, see Chapter Nine, " 'The Political Equivalent of War' - Civilian-based Defense."

PROBLEMS OF RESISTANCE UNDER TOTALITARIANISM

A host of difficult problems arises as soon as one begins to think seriously about waging nonviolent struggle in a liberation movement against a totalitarian system. Since variations in circumstances will influence to a high degree the course of a struggle against the system, we will need to know the particular situation as well as possible in order to deal with those problems. These variations will be revealed by the answers to such questions as the following:

Is the totalitarian system newly formed or long established? Have the subjects ever had any type of experience or previous practice which would constitute advance training, or preparation for nonviolent struggle? Has informative, analytical, and instructional literature on nonviolent struggle been circulated and read, as by *zamizdat*?* To what degree have any independent groups and institutions not under State or Party control (loci of power) survived the system or been newly created? Is the totalitarian system of domestic or foreign origin, or in what combination? Was the regime originally established with foreign assistance, or is it now foreign supported? How did the system originally develop: was it initiated by a coup d'etat, guerrilla war, foreign invasion, gradual evolution, or in another way? To what degree are the present administrators bureaucrats, civil servants, police, and troops loyal to the system and satisfied. in. their present positions? Do any significant groups or institutions exist, such as labor, religious, cultural, and the like, which are presently or potentially opposed to the system? What are the attitudes of the general public to the system as a whole, to any specific grievances or positive points of support, and how do they see the future?

PROBLEMS OF STRUGGLE REQUIRING RESEARCH

In addition to the background understanding of the particular situation revealed by the above questions, we also need greater knowledge about the problems of nonviolent struggle against extreme

* The Russian term for illegally reproduced and circulated manuscripts and publications.

dictatorships and the options available to the resisters. Here, advance research, analysis, and strategic planning can provide helpful insights for later use in actual struggles. These are the kinds of questions we can research to aid advance planning:

1. In face of the system's control over communications and publication and dissemination of literature, how can one spread information and understanding about nonviolent struggle? What role may exist for illegal literature, foreign-based radio broadcasts, and "teaching by example" through small planned actions or by spontaneous ones?
2. In face of effective political police, how can one solve the problem of leadership for nonviolent struggle? What role is there for an underground movement, for individuals and small groups setting examples, for spontaneous "leaderless" actions, or for "anonymous" or radioed instructions?
3. In face of the political police, censorship, and other controls, how can one plan action and resistance, and spread knowledge of such plans and instructions among the people who are expected to carry them out? What role is there for "underground" communications, spontaneous actions, and consensus on the types of issues to be resisted?
4. How are the particular problems related to the dynamics of nonviolent action operating under extreme dictatorships to be solved? These problems .may be associated, for example, with the absence of civil liberties, and lack of access to public means of communication. Other problems may be linked to the strong ideological basis for the systems; this suggests a lesser role for attempts to "convert" the leaders and believers, and a greater role for actions which mobilize increased support for resistance, or which restrict or sever the ruler's sources of power.
5. How can one destroy confidence in the Leader and the Party, and achieve widespread and deep dissatisfaction? How can one at appropriate stages turn such dissatisfaction into withdrawal of cooperation and defiance of the regime?
6. How can one best approach the problem of the totalitarian ideology? Is it most effective to question it, reinterpret it, criticize it, or repudiate it? To what extent does the official ideology give meaning and direction to the lives of individuals? Is it better to offer a clear rival ideology with a different outlook on life, or to refuse to do that, encouraging people to develop a variety of outlooks and philosophies as they find most desirable?

7. How, under those political circumstances, can opposition and resistance be most effectively organized and conducted: with considerable openness, as in Russian Jewish and civil rights cases in the 1960s and 1970s, or with secrecy, as in many cases of resistance to the Nazis? What are the real implications and consequences of both positions? This is more complex than it might first appear.
8. How can one determine the optimal strategy for resistance during a crisis and in advance of one? Are there advantages to a prior determination of the points and conditions at which resistance will be offered without specific instructions? Under what conditions should a strategy of total noncooperation be practiced? When should selective noncooperation at particularly important points and issues be applied instead?
9. In the early stages of extreme dictatorships moving toward totalitarianism, how can one prevent the "atomization" of the population and the destruction of the society's loci of power?* In advanced stages of a totalitarian system when the destruction of independent institutions has gone very far, how can new groups and institutions outside of the system's control be created and strengthened?
10. How can one resolve the problems imposed on a resistance movement by the atmosphere of fear in a totalitarian society? Based on past experience and on analysis, under what conditions can subjects cast off such fear or act defiantly despite it? In a political atmosphere of extreme fear, what impact do acts of brazen defiance conducted apparently fearlessly have? How and why?
11. How can resisters withstand severe repression while continuing their defiance? Repression may include imprisonment, internment in concentration camps, execution, reprisals on nonparticipants, treatment with drugs, detention as mental cases, control of food, water, and fuel supplies, agents provocateurs, and selective and massive deportations. What different problems for the resisters may be produced by other responses by the system to the nonviolent challenges? These may include: (a) milder control measures applied to avoid creating martyrs or attributing exaggerated strength to the opposition, or (b) extremely severe repression and terror applied to force restoration of cooperation, obedience, and

* See the discussion on loci of power in Chapter Two, "Social Power and Political Freedom,"

submission, their withdrawal being perceived as the most severe threat possible to the system. How can these problems be solved? Can some kind of balance be achieved between the need for action to win immediate objectives and the capacity of the subjects to defy and to withstand the resulting sanctions?

12. Ought external assistance to the struggle movement - such as radio broadcasts, smuggled literature, headquarters for exiled leaders, and international economic and political noncooperation with the dictatorial regime - be accepted? Can it benefit the struggle movement? Or, would external aid discredit the movement by allowing the resisters to be labeled "foreign agents"? Could such aid contribute either to dependence on, or to control by, foreign political groups or regimes? How could a resistance movement against an extreme dictatorship be completely independent of all foreign help in the internal struggle itself, while accepting external aid by embargoes and diplomatic sanctions, for example? What problems would this position present and how might they be resolved?
13. Does the extreme conformity and interdependence within a totalitarian system increase disproportionately the impact of acts of defiance and resistance, making very limited acts become very significant? Or, does the extreme conformity instead make it possible to dismiss the resisters as mentally ill, antisocial persons, or foreign agents, and easily to quarantine the acts themselves?
14. What are the implications for opposition strategy and tactics, and for the general course of the movement, of the fact that the nonviolent defiance may produce differing reactions among various sections of the population and types of personnel and officials in the system? For example, responses may vary among fully committed Party members, "soft" Party members, idealistic followers of the Party who lack real understanding, differing social classes, various religious, national, or cultural sections of the population, members of different branches and levels of the military forces, members of the political police, and the top hierarchy.
15. How can one maintain the necessities of life, such as food, water, fuel, against State restriction of them, and of employment and money, as repression to control resisters?
16. How can resistance strategy be deliberately aimed at aggravating identified inherent weaknesses in the system, thereby damaging the system fundamentally in ways which will be difficult to counteract?
17. Can resistance be designed to create conflicts, or aggravate existing ones, within the ruling echelons of the system? Could such internal conflicts help the resistance movement even though the resisters would rarely if ever know about them at the time unless they produced major changes in personnel, policies, or structures?
18. How can one encourage deliberate inefficiency, laxity in carrying out duties, and perhaps eventual mutiny among the system's officials, bureaucrats, administrators, police, and soldiers? What different effects on these possibilities tend to be produced by passivity, violent action, and nonviolent action? How might such failures and refusals to supply information to the center, to relay orders to lower personnel, to carry out policies and instructions, and even to carry out repression, be developed on a sufficient scale to be catastrophic to the dictatorship?

These eighteen questions illustrate the many practical problems which require investigation if we wish to learn how to destroy extreme dictatorships, including totalitarian systems. This effort to find solutions to extreme dictatorships and to explore the potential of nonviolent struggle against them must be based upon full appreciation of the diverse and serious problems involved. If the required research and analysis are carried out on a sufficient scale and are of the needed quality, however, we can obtain the knowledge required to enable people to formulate effective nonviolent struggle strategies to resist and destroy extreme dictatorships.

USING KNOWLEDGE FOR FREEDOM

The continuation and revitalization of political democracy require that we take deliberate measures to enrich it and to counter those developments and forces which restrict and endanger it. These measures include both the conscious cultivation of necessary underlying social and political conditions, and the improvement of democratic institutions, constitutional processes, and laws. Examination is urgently needed of democratic means of correcting social and economic injustices. This is because justice ought to be closely associated with freedom and democracy, and because many of the attacks on democratic government are launched in the name of

justice. The development of new measures for emergency action against internal and external dictatorial threats to practicing democracies is also required.

The development of such means requires major research on the nature of dictatorships. This research should include both their means of control and their weaknesses, so that opposition might be concentrated on vulnerable points. The research should also focus on political violence in its various forms and its impacts on political systems, on possible alternatives to violence in serious domestic and international struggles against dictatorships, and on genocide. We need to know much more about the conditions under which genocide can occur and about past efforts to undermine and to defeat it. More knowledge is required on the viability of political freedom and optional forms of vitalized democratic structures and processes, and on underlying conditions which may be requirements for a practicing political democracy. Capacity to resist dictatorial attacks may. be enhanced by greater knowledge of the modes of attack and requirements for success of the various forms of usurpation.

We also need to give attention to the ways to structure and prepare our society so that in the future we will be more able to avoid the development of dictatorships and more able to deal With them when we encounter them. These are some of the important long-term policy questions which we should examine:

1. How we should structure our social, economic, and political institutions to facilitate a free and democratic system, and to make most difficult or impossible any internal or external imposition of a dictatorship.
2. How we should organize people's resistance capacities to enable them to defeat attempts at internal usurpation and foreign rule which might occur.
3. How we should - without dangerous internal political violence or international war - assist people in other parts of the world to defend their independence and their abilities to maintain or to achieve democratic political systems and social justice without our doing it for them, and without dominating or manipulating them.
4. How people should act internally to undermine effectively a dictatorship which is already established - as by concentrating resistance on its inherent weaknesses, aggravating its internal problems, or creating dissension within the regime, rather than by using means which unify the regime and arouse the population to support it.
5. How we can develop alternatives to modern military struggle to provide effective self-reliant defense, even for smaller countries.
6. How we can develop ways to improve societies, increase justice, and distribute power more equitably among the population without dictatorial means.

Such research and policy studies may reveal some blind alleys which could be by-passed in the future. However, this work is very likely to provide fundamentally significant new political options which can contribute to the revitalization of political democracy, the development of programs of dictatorship prevention, and the introduction of new, more effective policies for constitutional and national defense.

We need not only to rededicate ourselves to basic political principles of freedom and justice; we need also to discover and develop policies and means of action which in the face of the dangers of modern dictatorships will enable those principles to survive, to be implemented, and to become revitalized both in theory and in practice. This will enable us to face both the internal and foreign threats of dictatorships with the confidence that we can withstand their assaults and triumph over them.

NOTES

1. David Riesman, "Some Observations on the Limits of Totalitarian Power" in David Riesman, Abundance for What? And Other Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 81 and 89.
2. Ibid., pp. 81.82.
3. Ibid., p. 92.
4. Ibid., p. 8 I.
5. Ibid., p. 92.
6. Ibid.
7. For a fuller presentation of this power theory, see Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), Chapter One, "The Nature and Control of Political Power."
8. Karl W. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 313-314.

9. Ibid., pp. 314-315.
10. Riesman, "Some Observations on the Limits of Totalitarian Power," p. 81.
11. For references to various of the above cases, see Sharp, **The Politics of Nonviolent Action.**

WEAKNESSES IN EXTREME DICTATORSHIPS

On the basis of what we know of the Nazi and Communist systems, and certain lesser dictatorships, it is possible to indicate various specific weaknesses in them. These are factors which will in time, even without deliberate efforts to aggravate them, produce changes which in differing degrees will modify the capacities and characteristics of the dictatorship. For example, these weaknesses may produce the following results:

- restrict the freedom of action of the regime;
- induce the regime to be more considerate of the needs and wishes of the population;
- reduce the brutality and repression;
- contribute to the regime's becoming less doctrinal in its own actions;
- reduce the degree to which the regime is in effective control of the society;
- destroy the myth of the regime's omniscience;
- at the mildest, cause the system to become somewhat "liberalized" or even democratized; and
- at the extremity, cause the system to disintegrate.

The following are some of the weaknesses of extreme dictatorships, including totalitarian systems:

1. The cooperation of a multitude of different people and groups which is needed to operate the system may be restricted or withdrawn.
2. The regime's freedom of action may be limited by past policies, the requirements and effects of which still continue.
3. The system may become routine in its operation, therefore more moderate and less able to shift its activities drastically at the service of doctrinal imperatives and sudden policy shifts.
4. The allocation of personnel and resources for existing tasks will limit their availability for new ones.
5. The central command may receive from the lower echelons inaccurate or incomplete information on which to make decisions, for subordinates may be fearful of inducing displeasure from higher echelons.
6. The ideology may erode, and the myths and symbols of the system become unstable.

7. Firm adherence to the ideology may lead to decisions injurious to the system because insufficient attention is given to actual conditions and needs.
8. The system may be inefficient due to deteriorating competency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy, or to excessive controls and red tape; consequently, the system's policies and normal operations may become ineffective.
9. The system's internal conflicts of various types may detrimentally affect and even disrupt its operation.
10. Intellectuals and students may become restless in response to conditions, restrictions, doctrinalism, and repression.
11. The general public may over time become apathetic or skeptical.
12. Regional, class, cultural, or national differences may become acute.
13. The power hierarchy will always be to some degree unstable, at times highly so.
14. Sections of the political police or the military forces may possess sufficient power to exert pressures to achieve their own ends, or even to act against the established rulers.
15. In the case of a new dictatorship, time is required for it to become firmly established, which allows an especially vulnerable period.
16. The extreme concentration of decision-making and command means that too many decisions will be made by too few people to avoid errors.
17. If the regime, in order to avoid some of these problems, decides to diffuse decision-making and administration, this will lead to further erosion of central controls, and often to the creation of dispersed new power centers which may seek to expand their power at the cost of the center.

Such weaknesses of extreme dictatorships do not, of course, mean that disintegration occurs quickly, or even at all, regardless of other factors at play in the situation. Dictatorial systems are often aware of at least some of their weaknesses, and take measures to counteract them. Also, under appropriate circumstances even very inefficient and incompetent regimes often manage to survive for remarkably long periods of time, and people may, as Riesman said, "mistake blundering compulsions or even accidents of 'the system' for conspiratorial genius."[10]

It should be possible, however, to learn much more than we now

7

What Is Required to Uproot Oppression?

Strategic Problems of the South African Resistance

The problem of how to uproot oppression effectively with minimal casualties and maximum long-range benefits to the liberated people still remains without an adequate solution. The people of South Africa have long awaited its resolution. Although this chapter is an edited synopsis of four articles published in 1963, with only a few changes and additions, its major points are, in 1980 - seventeen years later - still as relevant as when they were written, despite certain very limited new signs of Government flexibility.

In whatever way the South African conflict may be finally resolved, many people throughout the world will continue for many years to face the general problem of how to uproot oppression. It is hoped that- this chapter will raise questions and suggest possible

directions for consideration by people who are still seeking more adequate answers to the question of what is required to end oppression.

* * *

The situation in South Africa is now a desperate one. The Government, backed by the "opposition" United Party, * has for years increased its dictatorship over the predominantly non-European population. Every means of change has been dammed up. The flood waters are rapidly rising. For South Africa there is no way out which does not involve severe suffering and bloodshed. If nothing is done the situation will grow worse, and the constant suffering of the people and violence of the Government will increase, contributing finally to a terrifying explosion. Whether nonviolent or violent means of resistance are used, great suffering will be incurred by the non-European people. Anyone who opposes action on the grounds that it will lead to suffering is profoundly ignorant of the situation. The problem is how to act effectively to change that situation, and whether the suffering will help to achieve a free, humane society.

This chapter is an attempt to contribute to an understanding of that problem, and thereby shed some light on its solution. My aim, therefore, is not to "judge" or "condemn" or "instruct" but to contribute a few thoughts to the general quest for a solution. The problem of South Africa is one for all humanity. We all have much to learn from the South African experience.

In seeking a course of action we must accept the fact that no matter what is done, there will be a hard core of Afrikaners who will never agree voluntarily to the abolition of apartheid. One must also accept that many European South Africans are so committed to their position of power and wealth that they will continue to react to every challenge, by whatever means, with increased rigidity. One must, therefore, expect that they will respond by vigorous repression, and that the abolition of apartheid and European domination will come only after a protracted struggle.

*The United Party collapsed in 1977 as the result of internal dissension. Two new parties were created: the New Republic Party and the South African Party. Other former United Party members joined the Progressive Reform Party, which was renamed the Progressive Federal Party, now the second largest party in the country.

Simple moralizing about how to deal with this problem will not suffice. A course of action is required. In addition to specific methods of action in particular situations, attention must be given to the tactics to operate in particular phases of the struggle, and to the overall strategy to guide the course of the struggle.

A consideration of some of the problems of an overall strategy should include three areas:

1. How to achieve the maximum strength and involvement in the struggle by the non-Europeans, mainly the Africans. *

2. How to split some of the Europeans from support for the Afrikaner Nationalists and European domination, and move them toward action in support of the non-Europeans.

3. How to bring the maximum international pressures to bear on the South African Government toward change compatible with the self-determination of the South African people as a whole and their future development.

There are two main techniques of struggle which could be applied by the non-Europeans of South Africa: some form of revolutionary violence, or large-scale noncooperation and defiance without violence - that is, nonviolent action. The violence would probably follow the general model of the Algerian struggle, a type of terrorist guerrilla warfare. An exact model for the nonviolent alternative does not exist, although there are experiences and thought both within and without South Africa on which to draw.

RECONSIDERING THE EFFICACY OF VIOLENCE

The pendulum has swung heavily in favor of violence. "On all sides now there is a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of vio-

*Despite the time-honored practice of referring to persons of European descent as "white" and of African descent as "black," I have resisted this. These terms are themselves a product of a racist society, and make it inevitable that we see not the actual color variations with infinite gradations - which make dichotomous racism extremely difficult - but instead two clear separate groups. That makes racism, and its practices of prejudice, discrimination, slavery, segregation, and apartheid thinkable, and therefore possible. The view of reality behind our words often has grave consequences when it results from false preconceptions, distorts reality, and is a precursor of disastrous practices.

The term "non-Europeans" was used by the Unity Movement to refer to Africans, Cape Colored people, Indians, and other Asians.

lence," wrote Colin Legum in The Observer. "The long period of support for [African National] Congress's methods of nonviolent struggle (as embodied in Chief Luthuli) is past. All talk now is about the tactics of violence, no longer about its relevance."[1] Bitterness, frustration, and helplessness build up to the point where a violent explosion becomes almost inevitable. The past failure of nonviolent action to achieve major victories leads to its rejection. The Government attempt to prevent all forms of protest leads to the understandable feeling that one must strike back.

Despite widespread lip service, the world's response to the non-Europeans' pleas for economic boycott and political, diplomatic, and cultural ostracism of the Afrikaner Government has been pitifully small, so that non-Europeans naturally become disillusioned with the potential of such means. Despite some gestures, the world's nonviolence movement has been unable to offer any major assistance, whether in the form of spearheading the international boycott or by providing helpful information and analyses of problems of resistance, or consultants (where wanted) to contribute to the consideration of serious strategic and tactical problems in an effective nonviolent struggle.

Although they have obviously been inadequate, significant and sacrificial efforts to apply nonviolent struggle have been made by the non-Europeans. No one would deny that if a peaceful way out of the situation were believed possible, they would choose it.

Nevertheless, the doctrinal approach of salvation by violence has gained such a following that fair consideration of alternative courses of action may not be given unless the adequacy of violence is challenged on strategic grounds, and unless certain qualities of nonviolent action are examined. This consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of violent and nonviolent action is often difficult because of impatience with intellectual analysis of revolutionary problems and because of justified distaste for the vague generalizing and moralizing which has often been poured out by exponents of nonviolent means.

There are important reasons for not accepting the inevitability of the resistance movement's relying upon violence to achieve victory. It is not sufficient to have an emotional release of hatred in acts of violence, any more than it is enough to have a growth of self-respect in the person defying the government in nonviolent action. Consideration must also be given to the way in which the proposed course of action will contribute to the success of the movement.

Recognition of the difficulties and dangers of a future struggle by nonviolent resistance, and of the inadequacy of the past nonviolent movement, is not in itself an argument in favor of adopting violence. It is also necessary to consider the difficulties and dangers of a future struggle both by guerrilla warfare and terrorism and also by possible new types of nonviolent struggle. If a responsible consideration of the alternatives is to be made it must include a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of each technique of struggle, and a consideration of whether the disadvantages of each can be overcome or are counterbalanced by other factors. There is little evidence that this is taking place. Colin Legum wrote that "the loss of faith in the efficacy of the old methods does not always go with a realistic assessment of the chances that violence might prove to be equally unsuccessful."[2]

So many difficulties and dangers are involved in the choice of struggle by violence in South Africa that a reconsideration of its efficacy is now merited alongside an exploration of whether a struggle by nonviolent means can be developed which is more effective than that of the past. While military superiority does not guarantee victory ----, especially in guerrilla warfare - it is important to note that the South African Government possesses vast military superiority over anything that the non-European South Africans could hope to muster, barring extensive and highly dangerous international intervention.

Indeed it is in many ways an advantage to the South African Government for the non-Europeans to resort to violence. This provides the excuse for extremely harsh repression which could produce still further demoralization among the Africans, Cape Colored people, Indians, and other Asians. It has been suggested that in at least one instance the government may already have deliberately provoked violence by the use of agents provocateurs at the .end of the 1952 Defiance Campaign of civil disobedience. The riots between 18 October and 9 November 1952 - while the campaign was at its peak _ resulted in the deaths of six Europeans and thirty-three Africans. This greatly helped the Europeans to identify the nonviolent campaign with the violent African Mau Mau movement m Kenya - and thus counter the tendency of some Europeans to sympathize with it.

The riots also helped crush the spirit of resistance among the non-Europeans. In October 1952, for example, 2,354 volunteers defied apartheid laws, while in November and December combined, only 280 did so. This violence was not the only factor involved in the collapse of the movement. (Fear of increased severity of sentences was important, as were, it is suggested by some, internal activities of Communists within the movement.) Yet, said Leo Kuper in his study of this campaign, "Clearly the riots played a decisive role." They also "provided the opportunity for the government to take over the initiative and to assume far-r<:.aching powers with some measure of justification."[3]

The killing of African demonstrators at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 is often cited as a justification for abandoning nonviolent action. This view is, however, based upon a lack of understanding of the dynamics of nonviolent action. (It is not widely remembered that the shootings at Sharpeville began after some Africans broke nonviolent discipline, throwing stones at the police, and that this was preceded by a riot at Cato Manor not long before, which may have made the police more jumpy, and may have increased their brutality at Sharpeville.) It was, however, precisely because the killings were perceived as committed against peaceful unarmed demonstrators that there was aroused in South Africa and throughout the world such deep feeling and vigorous protests. Had the same number of Africans been killed in police firings against an undisciplined mob invading a European residential area to commit arson and murder there would have been no such reaction. Compare, for example, the attention and protests aroused over the deaths of less than a hundred Africans at Sharpeville with the indifference to the deaths of any particular hundred Algerians in the Algerian struggle.

The murders at Sharpeville revealed, to those who had not yet realized it, the real nature of the South African Government and its policies. Immediately following this there was very considerable international support for the boycott programs. In Norway, flags all over the country were flown at half-mast after Sharpeville. This was symbolic of its impact - an impact that would have been sharply reduced if the South African Government could have shown that those shot were terrorists rather than courageous nonviolent demonstrators. Witness, for example, the comparatively small reaction to the executions of the Poqo terrorists.

COSTS AND EFFECTS OF NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

There are some very naive conceptions about the nature of nonviolent resistance prevalent among both its advocates and opponents. It is not true that if opponents of a regime struggle nonviolently the oppressive regime will be nonviolent too, and quietly acquiesce. It is not true that by being nonviolent one avoids suffering and sacrifices. It is not true that if the opponent reacts with brutal, violent repression, the struggle has been lost and the movement defeated. It is not true that the nonviolent way is an easy way.

Quite the contrary. One must expect that if the non-Europeans resist by nonviolent but militant means, there will be suffering and deaths. This is in part a consequence of the very violence of the social and political system which is being attacked. And violent repression is in part a tribute to the power of nonviolent action and a recognition of the threat it poses to the continued existence of that system.

At the time when the opponent intensifies his repression, the resisters must demonstrate great courage and not only continue but also increase their resistance. This has not always taken place in South Africa. This willingness to persist despite repression produces political jiu-jitsu. That is, the government's supposed greater power is made ineffective and turned to its own disadvantage. The repression of nonviolent people tends to alienate sympathy and support for the government - among those who might join the resistance, the government's usual supporters, and throughout the world - as the regime is seen as dependent upon, and willing to use, naked, brutal violence against nonviolent human beings. This may lead to increased numbers of people becoming determined to resist such a system. It may also lead to divisions within the government's own camp. Given a sufficient growth of numbers, the massiveness of the defiance by courageous resisters may, in an advanced stage, be so vast as to immobilize even the agencies of repression.

The cost of change may thus be a terrible one, but no worse than that incurred by violence. The indications are that although in a nonviolent resistance movement there is severe suffering, this is far less than in a violent resistance movement. In proportion to the numbers involved there were far fewer deaths in the nonviolent struggle in India than there were in the Mau Mau campaign in Kenya - both struggles waged against British rule. The information we

have about the series of strikes in Russian prison camps, occurring primarily in 1953, indicates that where the strikes were conducted largely nonviolently, the number of casualties was much lower than where a great deal of violence occurred. Similarly, among the Indian campaigns themselves, those in which there was little or no violence were accompanied by fewer injuries or deaths than those campaigns in which there was substantial violence. In the Indian struggle for independence as a whole, probably not more than eight thousand died directly or indirectly as a result of shootings and other injuries inflicted in the course of the struggle over a long period. The immense number of casualties in Algeria - estimated as high as one million in a population not exceeding ten million - a fraction that of India - is quite alarming. This is not explained by accusing the French of being by nature more savage than the English.

The cost of a violent revolt is likely to be much higher than that of a nonviolent revolt. Impatience with the expected slowness of change by nonviolent action (based only on South African experience) ought not to blind one to the length of time that a violent struggle would take. Defeats and stalemates also occur when violent means are used, and sometimes nonviolent means work rapidly. Both violent and nonviolent techniques of struggle require sacrifice and time in which to operate. In certain circumstances one technique may appear to be somewhat quicker than the other. But, even then, other important factors must be considered, such as the likely number of casualties and the kind of Ii society which will result from the struggle.

The South African struggle is a movement to cast off tyranny and achieve freedom. It is, therefore, very important whether the technique of struggle used is likely to do this, or whether, at best, it is likely to remove one dominating minority and replace it by another. Violent struggles tend to be followed by the concentration of power in the hands of those who control the effective means of violence °usually the army and the police. The population then disarmed and knowing no other means of struggle, is relatively helpless in the face of rulers with such means of violent repression.

The simple destruction of one form of tyranny does not in itself bring freedom. That would require the diffusion - not the further concentration - of power. The simple destruction of European domination in South Africa without diffusing power among the people and their organizations and institutions will mean that at least

as much power will be concentrated in the hands of the new government as is now the case. Probably it would be more, as there are constant pressures for centralization in newly liberated countries. This is serious, for we know from experience that the leaders of a resistance movement often do not remain rulers after victory, and that a single party or even a single man often becomes dominant. Even if this does not develop immediately in its extreme forms, the very concentration of power even in the hands of the most restrained and benevolent ruler makes it possible, if a coup d'etat takes place, for a usurping despot to impose an especially thorough and complete form of tyranny.

In contrast, nonviolent struggle tends to diffuse power through the population as a whole. The course of the struggle itself depends on voluntary widespread popular support and participation. After a successful conclusion to the struggle, the concentration of military power in the hands of the commanders (which could be used to bolster a new dictatorship) does not occur, and the population is trained in effective means of struggle by which it can maintain and extend its freedom against new usurpers. These considerations are highly important if one is really concerned with achieving freedom, and not simply with replacing one tyrannical system with another. The disastrous consequences of violence for political ends should prod us to seek other, nonviolent, solutions to even the most difficult problems.

INADEQUATE NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

These criticisms of violence by no means imply that the nonviolent movement in South Africa has been adequate. First, there has not been enough of it. That is, inaction, nonresistance, and an absence of violence are by no means to be equated with nonviolent action.

The Indian minority in South Africa, using nonviolent action under Mohandas K. Gandhi's leadership between 1906 and 1914, achieved great improvements in their situation. However, nonviolent action was not again used in South Africa on a comparable scale against segregation and discrimination until 1946, again by the Indians to gain relief from the "Ghetta Act." Since then there have been

several African bus boycotts (some successful), the 1952 Defiance Campaign (in which over 8,500 non-Europeans were imprisoned for civil disobedience of apartheid laws), the Pan-Africanists' defiance of the pass laws in 1960 which culminated in SharpevilIe, and attempts to organize widespread strikes (which were apparently more successful than the Government admitted at the time - for example, the three day general strike in 1961). There have been other similar actions. But it is clear that nonviolent action has been sporadic, and there have been long periods of inaction. This has often been for very understandable and necessary reasons. But where these periods of inaction have been necessary, that necessity has been produced by the weakness of the resistance movement and the non-European population. (Imagine an army which only fought scattered skirmishes after intervals of weeks or months in a war, or major campaigns only after intervals of months or years!)

Inaction, however, even in such situations as South Africa, sometimes tends not to strengthen but to weaken the subordinates still further. The belief that advances will be made as long as there is simple abstention from violence is false. If a resistance movement in situations such as South Africa only undertakes nonviolent action sporadically, it will not achieve significant results unless the subordinates are considerably strengthened and their organization grows in the "silent" periods.

Nor can a nonviolent struggle be successful if the participants and the population are unwilling to pay the price of resistance. This is something which is very similar in the case of a violent struggle. If in a war of the old type the infantry collapses under heavy enemy fire, that side cannot win. The fault in such a situation is not with war itself, but with the ability of the troops to wage war. Similarly, in nonviolent struggle, when the opponent applies repression and increases that repression, to have a chance of victory the nonviolent actionists must have the strength to persist and court the greater penalties for their defiance. If they lack sufficient strength to do so, the fault is not in the technique but in the actionists themselves.

Thus in 1952, when the Government instituted severe punishments for civil disobedience, it was a grave tactical error not to increase the defiance. Nor should the Pan-Africanists have been taken by surprise in 1960 when in response to their defiance the Government declared an emergency. Withdrawal at such a point

the Government to regain the upper hand and for an atmosphere of fear and conformity to become predominant among the once again. Yet another weakness existed in past nonviolent movements. One of the clever means which the Government has frequently adopted for dealing with nonviolent action has been to remove the non-European leaders from the political struggle without making them martyrs and sources of inspiration by imprisonment. For example, a person may be "named" and "liquidated" the Suppression of Communism Act and thereby be prohibited from maintaining or taking out membership in specific political organizations, exercising leadership of them, or attending political gatherings. National leaders were sometimes tried under that Act, found guilty, sentenced to several years' imprisonment, to be suspended provided they did not again commit an offense under that Act. Under the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act a person can be exiled to an area far from his or her home, work, and activities. The alternative for the non-European leaders has been years of imprisonment. This alternative is personally severe, but so also can be the political consequences of accepting withdrawal from political activities and even exile.

One of the objective results of the leaders' choice of accepting these limitations, instead of refusing to comply and going to prison, has been to set an example harmful to future resistance. The ordinary opponent of apartheid is not likely to risk a greater punishment than the leaders are seen to be suffering. Yet willingness to undergo imprisonment and other suffering is a primary requirement of change. It is significant that Robert Sobukwe, who founded the Pan-Africanist Congress, chose to be among the first to go to prison· for civil disobedience.4 Albert Luthuli, on the other hand, implied in his autobiography that he intended to conform to the ban until it expired in May 1964 (though it was doubtful under the circumstances that he would then be allowed to resume political activity).5 The Government thus achieved the advantages which come from imprisoning the non-European leaders without incurring any disadvantages.

All of these and other influences have tended to reduce the militancy and activity of the nonviolent resistance movement. Yet in such a situation if there is no vigorous nonviolent resistance and defiance, no sufficiently strong movement to be a source of real hope

(if not of major immediate victories), then it is virtually certain that in desperation a shift to violence will take place.

THE MAIN TASK: STRENGTHEN THE OPPRESSED

The South African Government - like every government no matter how democratic or how tyrannical - is dependent for its continued existence upon the willingness of its subjects to continue to cooperate with it and submit to it. This cooperation and submission may take various forms, such as helping to run the economic system, serving as government employees, and simple obedience of the laws and orders of the regime.

This consent may at times be "free" - based upon support for the regime or passive submission to it. At other times, it may be "forced" - that is, acquiescence may be procured because the people are afraid of the imprisonment or other sanctions which may be imposed upon them if they refuse to cooperate. But even "forced consent" reflects the choice that it is better to submit and avoid the penalties than to defy and incur the suffering. In either case the continued existence of any regime is the result, not simply of the wishes and determination of those persons and groups directly controlling the State machinery, but primarily of the submission and cooperation of the people as a whole. The cost of defiance may vary. In some situations, as South Africa, it may be terrifyingly high. The people's ability to withdraw their consent may also vary, depending upon their determination, strength, and willingness to pay the price for change.

The problem of altering the existing Government or of achieving a revolution is, therefore, not simply one of attacking the existing rulers and their immediate agents. The primary responsibility, both for continuing the present system and for producing change, thus falls on the majority of the population, without whose submission and cooperation the system - after a bloody attempt to force a resumption of cooperation - would collapse. The achievement of change in South Africa thus depends upon increasing the strength of the non-Europeans, predominantly the Africans.

Change can thus be achieved even if the present rulers are never convinced that it is desirable. *The main task is to strengthen the*

Their determination to abolish the system must be increased. The organizational strength and ability to act corporately and spontaneously must be improved. Their willingness to persist in defiance despite repression must be strengthened.

The condition of real liberty or tyranny in any political society is thus largely a reflection of the past and present strength or weakness of the people as a whole. If the people are now weak and fearful, unable or unwilling to pay the price of suffering for the withdrawal of their consent, then no real and lasting freedom can be achieved. Real freedom is not something which is given, but rather something which is earned and taken, and which can therefore be defended and extended even in the face of new attacks.

Therefore, those - including important non-European leaders - who now look to liberation of South Africa by solely external intervention are attempting to by-pass the most important single revolutionary problem and to achieve a short cut to freedom when there is none. Even if the present Afrikaner Nationalist Government is abolished by external intervention, and European domination is thereby ended, that will not necessarily bring an end to oppression in South Africa. If in the process the people as a whole are not strengthened and their own ability to win and defend their freedom is not increased, if no effective diffusion of power among them occurs, if no increase takes place in their ability to control their rulers themselves, then the succeeding Government - no matter what its color - will be at least as tyrannical as that which it replaced. Having depended on external aid to end one system, the people would then still lack the ability to achieve real freedom.

Terrorist and guerrilla movements often recognize to a considerable degree the importance of the withdrawal of cooperation and consent from the government. This helps to explain why so often the terror is directed not against the "enemy" as one might expect, but primarily against one's own people, to force them into resistance. (There are signs that this is already beginning in South Africa.) It is thus an attempt to force people to be free, an attempt to achieve the impossible. Even if politically successful in destroying the existing Government, the kind of society and the kind of liberation which is thereby produced is of highly questionable worth.

Evidence exists that nonviolent action can significantly assist in increasing the strength of oppressed people. Mohandas K. Gandhi

always argued that the primary aim of the nonviolent struggles he led in India was not to attack the British, who were an important but secondary factor in the situation, but to strengthen the determination, independence, and ability to resist of the Indians. They were the most important factor.

This was demonstrated in South Africa in 1952 in the Defiance Campaign, during which membership of the African National Congress jumped from 7,000 to 100,000. The number of members is not the only criterion for increased strength, but this is one indication of the contribution of nonviolent action to increased capacity to resist, and increased organizational strength. Similarly, in India the Indian National Congress was transformed under Gandhi's program from a tiny group passing yearly resolutions into a mass fighting organization capable of shaking the mighty British Empire.

Among the factors which could help strengthen the capacity of people to resist are:

• increased self-respect;

• strengthening of their institutions and capacity to act in solidarity;

• dissemination of knowledge on the use of nonviolent struggle, and how to organize for group action;

• awareness of what others have done elsewhere in difficult situations;

• the example of s9me people among themselves resisting the tyranny - which may inspire others and be contagious;

• an imaginative accepted leadership to spark the situation;

• a new idea (or a new insight into an old idea) which may suddenly give people a new confidence, especially if it relates something they can do to help solve the problem;

• unplanned actions, breaking the spell of conformity and moving others to action also; and

• participation in nonviolent action on a small scale: this may itself contribute to increased confidence in one's capacity to change the situation, especially if limited objectives can be won.

Often - though not always - as people begin to act, the qualities of courage, willingness to serve others, and concern about the social and political evils around them grow within themselves. Further, their example often helps others to gain these qualities. This,

along with other results of nonviolent action, helps to improve that society's capacity for freedom.

It has been argued, for example by Patrick Duncan, that because the South African Government has made all conventional political efforts by non-Europeans to produce change illegal and has forbidden the use of nonviolent action to alter apartheid, violence is now justified. It is, however, very superficial reasoning to conclude that because nonviolent action has been made illegal, violence should now be used. Violent resistance is equally unlawful, and this argument does not address in practical terms the need for effectiveness.

Increasing government repression now makes it much more difficult to organize nonviolent resistance - especially openly @than it was in 1952. But it is no easier to organize violent resistance. It is true that nonviolent resistance is usually most effectively organized openly. However, in a violent movement, agents and informers make secrecy less than totally effective. Also, while we should keep in mind the dangers involved, nonviolent resistance has been effectively organized secretly while practiced openly - as with much of the Norwegian resistance under the Nazi occupation. Furthermore, not all nonviolent resistance need be organized in advance to be effective. At times, highly effective resistance has been quite spontaneous. At other times, actions planned and initiated by a very small number of people may strike a responsive chord, and their example may be followed by large numbers of people.

FACTORS IN A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE

It is extremely difficult now to work out wise strategy and tactics for the struggle in South Africa, yet very important that serious efforts be made to do this. Only thus can a serious alternative to terrorism and guerrilla warfare and to military invasion gain a serious hearing. Unfortunately, we do not have all the knowledge we should have for developing wise strategy, one reason being the lack of interest in, and resources for, the kind of research and analysis which could have expanded our knowledge.

At least five major tasks need to receive careful consideration in working out that strategy:

1. Examine the present condition of South Africa, signs of

rigidity and flexibility, strengths and weaknesses, and in particular the condition and potentialities of various groups which may hinder or aid resistance, especially:

(a) the Government;

(b) the European opposition and potential opposition to the Government;

(c) the non-European activists and organizations;

(d) the potential non-European resistance; and

(e) the remainder of the population.

2. Study the technique of nonviolent action, its power theory, methods, dynamics, requirements for success, and possible relevant experience elsewhere.

3. Reduce present weaknesses among the non-Europeans which would increase their ability to cast off oppression. In particular, this includes such questions as:

(a) how to increase self-esteem;

(b) how to cast off fear and increase willingness to persist in resistance despite repression;

(c) how to increase knowledge and ability to resist most effectively;

(d) how to gain confidence in their ability to change the situation (as by winning small local victories, as has already been done in the earlier bus boycotts); and

(e) how to select the specific issues (especially limited economic ones) for immediate changes.

4. Separate sections of the European South African population from support for the Government, including especially liberals, religious groups, the English minority, and the industrialists. It is significant that the 1952 Defiance Campaign was effective in this direction, leading to the establishment of both the Liberal Party and the Congress of Democrats, and leading also to limited religious opposition.

5. Stimulate the maximum international assistance and make the most effective possible use of it. There are several concrete ways in which international assistance could be given to an internal nonviolent resistance movement. These suggestions are simply illustrative:

(a) communicate news, encouragement, resistance plans, etc. to the people of South Africa by, for example, a radio station based outside South Africa, newspapers and other literature printed outside South Africa for distribution within the country;

(b) improve effectiveness of publicity and educational campaigns directed toward the rest of the world about conditions in South Africa and the resistance movement there;

(c) provide selected literature on the characteristics, requirements, and options in nonviolent struggle and additional means of training people in the use of that technique;

(d) apply more effective economic pressures against South Africa, such as a much more serious boycott and embargo movement than has been practiced hitherto (recommended by the United Nations General Assembly as long ago as November 1962);

(e) exert more effective diplomatic and cultural pressures, such as the breaking of diplomatic relations (also recommended by the UN General Assembly) and refusal of cultural cooperation, except where this involves the breakdown of apartheid practices;

(f) cut off all supplies of military weapons, replacement parts, and ammunition to South Africa (also recommended by the UN General Assembly) and of supplies which could be used for their manufacture within South Africa;

(g) withdraw all foreign investments except where the industries are willing to pay reasonable wages to non-Europeans and to abandon apartheid practices; and

(h) apply throughout the world various types of nonviolent action, as well as conventional means, to achieve these objectives.

Naturally, the major role of people outside South Africa must be in advocating and participating in such international action. International action and internal action are, however, interdependent, and certain types of action within South Africa are more likely to stimulate international assistance than are other types of action or inaction.

These measures could be of great assistance in (1) strengthening the morale, determination, and capacity of the non-Europeans to resist; (2) weakening the morale, determination, and capacity of the Government to continue the present course; and (3) weakening the willingness of the European population in general to support the present Government and apartheid.

The alternative to this general course of action is doubtless some form of war, probably involving either a long terrorist campaign and guerrilla struggle on the Algerian model or major international mil-

itary intervention by a United Nations army, an all-African military alliance, or more direct Russian or Chinese military assistance. All of these are highly dangerous, especially where the East-West power struggle could become involved and where the conflict could degenerate into nuclear war.

At this late stage the odds are not great that the struggle will shift to a more effective application of nonviolent resistance internally, with powerful external aid. If it does not happen, however, it will be because of insufficient daring, understanding, strength, and initiative - not because, if intelligent1¥ and courageously applied, nonviolent action could not have been effective. If that does not happen, the tragedy of South Africa in the future may make the tragedy of South Africa in the past and present appear insignificant. There is still hope, however, and the opportunity. If these are seized, the world may be given a lesson in how to deal with tyranny and simultaneously to establish genuine and lasting freedom.

NOTES

I. **The Observer** (London), 5 May 1963.
2. Ibid.
3. Leo Kuper, **Passive Resistance in South Africa** (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957, and London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p. 145.
4. **Robert Sobukwe (1924-1978)**·became Secretary-General of the African National Congress youth league while attending Fort Hare University. He broke with the ANC in 1958 and formed the Pan-Africanist Congress, intended to conduct more militant nonviolent struggle against apartheid without the Communist influence he felt in the ANC. Under his leadership, the PAC organized mass nonviolent demonstrations and civil disobedience in 1959 and 1960 against the pass laws. He was convinced that violent resistance was suicidal and militant nonviolent struggle was the effective alternative.

Sobukwe was arrested on 21 March 1960 on charges of incitement. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, detained a further six years, then released in mid-1969 and sent to Kimberly. He died there on 27 February 1978 after a long illlness.

He was regarded as a gentle, humble, intellectually brilliant man, one of the great African nationalists. Sobukwe was wrongly accused of being a racist. He urged Africans to stand on their own feet, and look forward to a South Africa in which people of different colors could live in equality.
5. **Albert Luthuli (1898?-1967**) was elected Chief of the Unvoti Mission Reserve in 1936, after serving as Secretary and President of the African Teachers' Association. In 1952, at the time of the Defiance Campaign against segregation laws, he was President-General of the African National Congress. When he refused that year to resign from the ANC the Government stripped him of his chieftainship.

Luthuli was among the 155 arrested in 1956 for opposition to apartheid, but after the long Treason Trial was released. Under the Suppression of Communism Act he was restricted to an area around his home near Stanger, about thirty miles north of Durban. In March 1960, after the Pan-Africanists had initiated defiance of the pass laws, Luthuli burned his pass in Praetoria and urged all Africans to do so also. The South African Government allowed him to travel to Oslo, Norway in 1961 to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, but Luthuli was prohibited from leaving the country after that. Under his banishment, he was prohibited from making speeches and atttending public meetings. His statements were banned from publication in South Africa. His autobiography, **Let My People Go**, was banned in that country.

12

Popular Empowerment

HUMAN NEEDS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Most people in our society* do not participate to a significant degree in the decisions and actions which shape their lives and institutions, and which determine the direction of the society as a whole. This is a major indication that we do not yet implement adequately the ideals of our heritage.

* Our society here specifically refers to American society, but the discussion also applies to other Western societies, and also -- sometimes to an even larger degree -- to other modern large-scale political systems.

"We" - most members of our society - say that we believe in the worth of human beings, freedom, justice, peace, economic well-being, and related principles. If so, we have a responsibility both to try to implement these principles in the world in which we now live, and also to do what we can to build a society which more closely approximates those ideals for succeeding generations. Sometimes the effort to implement our ideals means preserving the best parts of our present society which put these principles into practice. That is insufficient, however, for despite these positive achievements, our society has major shortcomings which need to be corrected. In these cases, implementing our ideals means seeking fundamental changes.

CONSIDERING HUMAN NEEDS

Our society fails to meet basic human needs, and these are even understood far too narrowly. Our extremely restricted view of these needs is a major cause of the failures of past efforts to build a better society.

It is of course true that without food, clothing, shelter from the elements, and fuel for warmth and cooking - and work to produce or obtain them - life could not exist. It is shocking that these needs are not being met for all people, and that control over them is not usually in the hands of the people who need them. That fact should shock us even more than the hunger and other results of deprivation, for with control in their own hands people could provide their own physical necessities.

Physical necessities are not the only basic human needs, however, and providing them alone does not produce an ideal society. Those necessities can be effectively supplied in prisons. In addition to our basic physical needs, human beings have other biological, psychological, social, and even "political" needs. Let us look briefly at these. They may appear very simple, or inappropriate to structural analysis. Yet, without this broader awareness we are likely to repeat past mistakes in our efforts to build a society which meets human needs more adequately - mistakes which derive from concerns to provide only food, housing, or jobs, for example, while neglecting other less tangible needs.

As human beings, we need to love and to be loved. We need sharing, tenderness, and to be needed by others. As a species, we need to reproduce and to rear our children. We need to learn the ways of our society, and hopefully others, and to learn and share the heritages of our past. We need to learn who we are, to develop self-respect and appreciation of our capacities and worth. We need joys, relaxation, creativity, opportunities to grow and to change, and to satisfy our curiosities as we seek new knowledge, insights, and truths. We need to develop our minds, our intellectual capacitates, our ability to think and to reason. Our capacities to relate to each other, to other forms of life, and to the world and universe of which we are a part, all need developing. We need to identify with others, to belong to groups, and to have group pride. We need protection from dangers and attacks and from threats to our lives. Our groups need to survive against both cultural and physical threats.

Very importantly, as individuals and groups we also need the capacity for power to determine how we shall live. We need power to control our lives, to withstand the forces that would mold us, harm us, or destroy us, a capacity to shape our lives and futures, even in the face of hostile forces. Most of the proposed remedies for our social ills have given too little attention to these wider human needs and particularly to this need for effective power.

Unless we are able to meet these various needs that go beyond our physical necessities, we lack the qualities and capacities of human beings. Therefore, our efforts to meet human needs more adequately ought to be directed toward meeting all of them, not only our physical ones. Efforts to provide physical necessities must not negatively affect provision of our less tangible requirements or our need for power to control our lives. To the contrary, efforts to meet any human needs ought to be compatible with, and where possible actively to assist, the meeting of all of them. That will produce qualitatively different results from efforts based on a more restricted focus. Meeting these broader human needs more adequately will also help us to solve the problems of dictatorship, genocide, war, and systems of social oppression which have been discussed in previous chapters.

OUR PROBLEMS AND THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER

All of our grave social, economic, and political problems involve at some point a serious maldistribution of power.* That is to say that effective power has become highly concentrated in certain parts of the population and institutions, and, most seriously, in the hands of the State apparatus. Other groups, or even the general population, are then in comparison weak, and therefore vulnerable to the will of the power group.

The power capacity of specific groups in a society at a certain time is by no means inevitable or unchangeable. It is the result of: (I) the degree to which the various groups have mobilized the sources of power at their disposal ~ that is, their power potential; (2) the relationships between the different degrees of effective power which the respective groups currently possess; and (3) the degree to which the social, economic, and political structures are flexible and responsive to the will of all sections of the population. The existing distribution of power is very real, but it is not permanent, and it will not be sustained under all conditions. Indeed, it can at times change dramatically. Such a change occurs when the sources of power at the disposition of relatively weak groups are mobilized to a far greater degree than previously, so that their effective power increases and comes closer to realizing ~heir power potential. A major change in the distribution of power also happens when the sources of power at the disposal of the established powerful groups are weakened or withdrawn, thereby reducing drastically their effective power. Unless the sources of power of weaker groups are mobilized, or the sources of power of established powerful groups are reduced, or both, the subordinated and oppressed groups inevitably remain in essentially the same relative positions, despite any other particular changes in the society. (These other changes may even include the correction of specific grievances, provision of new services, and installation of a new person or group in the position of ruler.)

* "Power" here means the capacity of people to act in order to achieve objectives even in the face of opposition: the combination of all the various influences and pressures which they can exert. These include both sanctions and the capacity to work together, as well as other influences such as authority.

Wherever one looks at a situation which one group or another regards as a "problem," one encounters an actual or a perceived inequitable distribution of power. These groups may include, for example: exploited economic classes, harassed religious minorities, populations of attacked or occupied countries, the victims of attempts at genocide, suppressed peoples under domestic dictators, nations under colonial empires, despised ethnic or racial groups, and a large number of others. In all such cases the problem exists because one group has the power to impose its will on a weak group. "For the tyrant has the power to inflict only that which we lack the strength to resist," as Krishnalal Shridharani wrote.[1] The maldistribution of power makes such problems possible.

Therefore, if we are concerned not only with correcting a specific problem, but also with preventing the emergence in its wake of other potentially more grave ones, the distribution of power must be fundamentally altered.

Our society seems to be moving toward both increased concentration of effective power in the State and certain institutions, and -toward increased power for certain groups which traditionally have had little power. Clearly, there are opposing trends. On the one hand, for example, workers can organize, strike, and boycott, Afro-Americans can demonstrate and use their votes, and women are beginning to throw off their mantle of oppression, challenging stereotypes, and establishing new social patterns. As a result of such action, these and other groups now possess relatively more power than they did a few decades ago. On the other hand, however, much of the thrust of change in our society has been in the opposite direction, especially in our economic and political life. The overall trend has been toward larger institutions, increased centralization, and stronger elite controls. Furthermore, as discussed in several previous chapters, on the world level this century has seen a growth of dictatorships, often in more severe forms, the growth and permeation of violence throughout society, a failure to create a society with both economic well-being and political freedom, increased capacity for genocide, disrespect for human life and dignity, efforts to control human minds, and the multiplication of military weaponry and destructive capacity. Most people feel powerless to reverse these developments.

PAST REMEDIES INADEQUATE

Over the decades and centuries, people have become more aware of their responsibility to alleviate the shortcomings of society in meeting human needs, and they have advocated and instituted a variety of changes toward those ends. Often these have been emergency measures ~ to provide food during famines, shelter following floods and bombings, and clothing to protect against the cold. These measures are still important, and must be evaluated in terms of their capacity to relieve emergency needs. But programs which are instead intended to meet human needs in the long term, on a regular basis, require more rigorous standards of evaluation.

From this perspective, many programs, both past and present, have proven inadequate. First, existing programs and policies frequently ignore certain psychological, social, and "political" needs. Second, a program or policy may, for a variety of reasons, fail to accomplish the intended objective. Third, the effort may provide only temporary or limited relief from the most pressing consequences of the problem, while leaving the problem itself unresolved. At times, focus is shifted away from required fundamental changes. Fourth, even a well-designed program may be so mangled in application as to be ineffective; the substance of the program may be sacrificed to other considerations, such as powerful interest groups or incompatible political objectives.

In some cases, the present approaches to meet human needs suffer from more fundamental inadequacies. Probably the gravest of these is the failure of most programs and policies to empower people so that they gain positive control over their own lives and society. In fact, whatever else existing "remedies" may do, most of them contribute in the long run to the further disempowering of people.

PROBLEMS WITH RELIANCE ON THE STATE APPARATUS

Many people who want to resolve human problems and meet human needs more adequately assume that the basic way to act is to secure the intervention of some higher level of government. This may take a variety of forms: executive orders, a new law, a constitutional change, a government-financed and administered policy, State

ownership, or other means. The common aim is to provide the proper corrective action by doing something for people. This approach stands in sharp contrast to one which would actively involve people themselves in dealing independently and directly with their own problems.

State action of various types has differed in its effectiveness in dealing with the original specific problem or need. Even when such government programs are reasonably successful in meeting the particular immediate need -- hunger, housing, and the like -- it is the result of the power of the State or the institution responsible, while the people who have benefited remain themselves at least as powerless as before. They are at best the beneficiaries of the decisions and actions of others; they have not themselves reshaped their lives and society by their own efforts. The causal maldistribution of power has not been corrected, but often exacerbated. The result may be new, more severe, problems.

In contrast, changes resulting from their own efforts could have contributed significantly to increased self-respect, capacity to work together to provide their own needs, and ability to defend themselves -- in short the ability to wield effective power to control their own lives and society. Empowering change is likely to help people to deal with other problems in the future, and to ensure that the gains they make will not be reversed unless they choose to do so.

On the other hand, reliance on other groups and higher levels of government, executive orders, legislation, court decisions, and the like to make desired changes suffers from a very serious disadvantage: that which is thus given may be as easily, and even more quickly, taken away. At some time in the future when the mood of the country shifts, new problems take precedence, or new forces gain control of the legislature, courts, or executive, the policy may in the same manner be reversed. The State apparatus may be removed as the provider and protector. It may even be turned against those who had earlier benefited from the newly-abandoned policy.

THE GROWTH OF STATE POWER

It may be no accident that the problems of dictatorship, genocide, war, systems of social oppression, and popular powerlessness have grown in severity during the same time frame that our political,

economic, and even many social institutions have increased in size, have come more severely under elite control, and become highly centralized. The centralization in these institutions is often extreme and has widespread serious consequences. These centralizing tendencies are even more marked in the particular institution of the State. The most elemental view of twentieth century politics should reveal that it is precisely the concentration of power and expansion of control by the State which is a major source of the capacity to inflict the problems which have devastated so many people and societies. Rethinking politics and developing realistic measures to deal with our most grave problems require that we reconsider and reevaluate the expansion of the State to meet the various legitimate needs of people and society.

The growth of the State is continuing in most parts of the world, with only limited counter-tendencies. The State, of course, is not the same as the society as a whole. The State is a particular institution, a particular structure of government ~ there are other possible ones which includes as parts of the system of political control a permanent bureaucracy to administer its programs and measures, a permanent police and penal system to punish antisocial persons and often dissidents, and a permanent military system to threaten and fight against foreign enemies and domestic uprisings. All these are under the command of the person or group which occupies the position of "ruler" at the head of the State.

This growth of the State, and of other institutions, in absolute and relative size, elite control, and centralization, has taken a variety of forms, and is the result of diverse influences. It has often been in response to pressing needs, and to weaknesses and inadequacies of earlier less centralist institutions. At other times, the growth of central controls by ever larger institutions has come without conscious choice, and in response to other changes.

The scale, technology, and severity of modern wars, combined with the requirements of an effective military system, have contributed very significantly to the growth of political centralization. The need for effective command, control of resources, transportation, manpower, and military secrets is among the significant factors which have operated to produce that result. In the United States the Civil War clearly contributed to political centralization, which was later greatly accelerated by the First World War and the Second

World War. Two other major factors which have contributed to the general concentration of power and growth of centralized institutions are the large-scale technologies which have been chosen for development over smaller-scale technologies, and also the types of energy which have been selected for use in place of decentralized alternatives. Both of these have contributed to the massive growth of centralized, large-scale economic institutions, variously controlled by the elites of national and multinational corporations, or by heads of bureaus, Party leaders, and State officials. Commonly, when the growth of centralization and State power has occurred as a result of these various factors, the factors themselves, and sometimes even the process of centralization, have gone unnoticed, or have been seen as necessary. Hence, the resulting growth of centralism and State power has aroused little opposition.

Much expansion of the power of the State itself and weakening of the effective power of the populace has also resulted from ignoble motives and deliberate efforts by rulers to establish or perpetuate their domination. Also, the State often becomes interlocked with other institutions in controlling the society. When noticed, such expansion of the State is often seen as threatening and, when the populace is capable of resisting this expansion of State controls and the agencies of regimentation and repression, this growth of State power may arouse opposition in the name of freedom or justice.

STATE POWER FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

In contrast to those situations, much of the growth of the State apparatus has often occurred as a result of noble, and even humane, motives. Many people who have sought social change have viewed the single institution which combined a permanent bureaucracy with legitimated capacity for political violence as very useful to them - if only they could gain control of it and use it for their own ends. The State has therefore been used in order to meet more adequately various physical human needs, and often to control large-scale economic institutions, or oppressive practices of one section of the society against another. When reformers and revolutionaries have sought to impose controls over powerful economic groups, classes, or institutions, they have usually done so by establishing State regula-

tions over them or by transferring actual ownership of the economy to the State.

When the expansion of State controls and the State itself is instead carried out for humane purposes by a political democracy, and even by authoritarian systems, significant opposition may not develop. The expansion is often then intended, or perceived as aimed, to improve the lives of people; few persons will then wish to be, or be seen to be, supporters of past injustices and opponents of new social and economic services. The expansion may, therefore, meet very little opposition ~ except from adversely affected vested interests, and from persons more opposed to "big government" than to past injustices and deprivations. However, this is far from the whole story.

At times the advocates of social change by State action have relied upon liberal democratic processes. These reformers have accepted liberal constitutional democracy, with its procedures, restrictions, and individual rights. These people assume that political freedom and use of the State to effect social change are compatible. It is consequently common in American society and many others to assume that if we have a problem we must seek the intervention or take-over of an ever higher level of government which possesses the machinery of control, the legal apparatus, the financial resources, and the police and military systems, to utilize for that good cause.

More extreme advocates of change have resorted to coup d'état or guerrilla warfare to seize the State. Once they have gained control of the State, these advocates of social change have rarely been willing to exercise restraint in using the capacities of the State and to respect democratic procedures and the rights of those who disagree with them. To the contrary, generally no procedures, limitations, or calendars have been permitted to interfere with their perceived mission: to achieve total change by full use of State power.

Highly important differences exist in the consequences of these two approaches; those must not be minimized. However, both approaches contribute to the growth of State power -- neither contributes to empowerment of the populace. A major factor underlying the inadequacies of both approaches is the failure to appreciate sufficiently the importance of all of the human needs presented earlier in this chapter, not only the physical needs of food, shelter, clothing, and protection from the elements. Sometimes -- not always -- in terms of meeting human physical needs, the services and changes

provided by State intervention have been significantly improved in quantity and quality as compared to earlier arrangements. That cannot be ignored. Nor should we be satisfied with poverty, injustice, and inadequate provision of the material needs of people. The point instead is that even when a plan to deal with such problems by State action succeeds in correcting the outward effects of the specific problems, something else very serious happens which is not intended: one more step is taken in shifting effective power from the people themselves and from the nongovernmental institutions of the society to the State apparatus. Thereby, the people who were already too weak -- the problem itself is evidence of this -- become even weaker than they were, and the non-State institutions which were capable of limiting the power of the ruler become enfeebled without the compensating strengthening of other *loci* of power.

The strategy of relying upon the State to make needed social and economic changes, instead of using some other means of action and different institutions, not only does not empower the people who are already weak; that strategy actively contributes to increasing the concentration of effective power in the State. As discussed in Chapter Two, "Social Power and Political Freedom," this may strongly facilitate the development of dictatorships. Nor has State action contributed to democratization even within the economic institutions. While elite controls and the absence of participation by workers and consumers were characteristics of large corporations for many decades, and have been accentuated in multinational corporations, these are not corrected by State intervention. State regulation and ownership of economic institutions have reduced neither their size, the degree of centralization, nor elite controls within them. Instead, State intervention has increased all three of these within the specific enterprises and in the economy generally. The "solution" applied to genuine social and economic needs has resulted in consolidation, increased centralization, and yet another level of management, taking control still further from workers, consumers, and specialists. These people become less and less participants in those institutions, and more and more the "workers," "staff," "consumers," and "clients" of those who are "in charge" -- those who "know" what should be done.

On the political level, the extension of this centralization and elite control has been widely associated with a real or perceived reduction in the extent, quality, and effectiveness of popular partici-

pation and control of political institutions and public policies. This has often been accompanied by the denigration of localism, and outright dissolution of small-scale institutions and services - even schools, rail transportation, health facilities, and post offices. The growth of State controls over the economy has resulted in a major expansion of the size of the State itself, a growth of the scale of our institutions, enhancement of elite controls, centralization of decision-making, growth of bureaucratization, increases in the areas of society under State control or absorbed by the State, and an increasing powerless dependency of ·the people. The theory and slogans of democratic control are, however, often still espoused.

DANGERS FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM

That strategy is dangerous for political freedom, as well as for the ability to meet adequately the several human needs beyond basic physical requirements for life. In that strategy the loci of power come increasingly under centralized State control, or are outright destroyed. As a direct consequence, the rest of the society becomes weak in comparison to the State apparatus. This process can be a continuing and circular one. As the weakening of the independent institutions of the society and the lower levels of government continues, the concentration of effective power in the hands of the central State grows. The institutionalized capacity of the State for political violence and the bureaucracy also usually expand. The result is that the relative and absolute strength of the population declines. The population becomes increasingly powerless and subject to manipulation and control by those in command of the State apparatus. Without new influences to reverse the process, the increase in the maldistribution of effective power continues to grow cumulatively. The power of the State grows, while the capacity of people to act to save themselves continues to lessen.

When this has occurred, whoever can control the State apparatus is likely to have little trouble in controlling the society for their own purposes. This happens even when those purposes are very different ones from those of the earlier social reformers and revolutionaries who used the centralized State simply to meet human needs more adequately and to build a better society. A State apparatus which is strong enough to free us is also strong enough to enslave us.

Once the society's *loci* of power are weakened or destroyed, the bureaucracies are established and expanded, and the population is reduced to dependency on the State for its material needs, once the police systems are centralized and enlarged, and the military system is expanded as a separate institution from the rest of society which can be turned against the country's own people, then the State machinery is prepared for potential effective use by tyrants. At this point, the State may be used for different objectives, and with greater ruthlessness, than originally intended, and may be applied to oppress the population which it claimed to serve. That political machine may also be seized from democratically chosen rulers by usurpers. In the wrong hands this State can be highly dangerous, for it can impose tyranny, wage wars, establish or defend social oppression, control people's minds, and commit genocide. It is this machinery which makes modern tyranny possible. Bertrand de Jouvenel, a prominent French political philosopher, has perceived this more sharply than most of us:

> Had Hitler succeeded Maria Theresa on the throne, does anyone suppose that it would have been possible for him to forge so many up-to-date weapons of tyranny? Is it not clear that he must have found them ready prepared? The more we think on these lines, the better we can appreciate the problem which faces our Western world.[2]

It is possible, of course, that such developments may not occur; the State may not be shifted to autocratic purposes. Constitutional barriers, legal limitations, and traditions may be respected. No facilitating crisis may occur, and no would-be political savior, power-hungry leader, or messianic party may arise. The factors which prevent the shift to tyranny are highly important, and must not be neglected or go unappreciated. They must not, however, be permitted to comfort us into neglecting the problem.

The ways in which the State is operated and controlled vary widely. Liberal constitutional procedures may be very precise about provisions to allow popular participation in the selection of those who will make the decisions and issue the instructions in the name of the State. Such constitutions and laws may also set boundaries against the intrusion of the State into certain activities or aspects of individual or social life, and issue guarantees of personal liberties against State interference. Other systems in control of the State

apparatus not only may not have such procedures, restrictions, and guarantees, they may repudiate all such limits to full pursuit of the ruler's objectives. Those may include extension of the power and profit of the system, restructuring of the institutions of the society, extermination of an unwanted group, pursuit of a foreign enemy, or even remaking the nature of human beings. The differences between the systems which significantly limit the effective control by the State and those which reject such limits are highly important.

The growth of State power and the increase in centralization of power and controls throughout the world have occurred to a significant degree even in the United States. This is true in spite of the fact that its original political system was deliberately designed to be decentralized with a very weak State apparatus. The American political system was once an extreme example of a multilayered federalism with a relatively weak federal government. This was structured so as to maximize democratic qualities and to avoid the dangers of tyranny which were perceived to be intrinsic to highly centralized government which possessed the capacity for violent repression of the populace.

Even if the most severe dangers from the weakening of the society and strengthening of the State do not occur, that political society is not, to say the least, a vital practicing democracy. The people remain passive recipients of the benefactions of the administrators, without the vitality and participation of running their own lives and their own society.

VULNERABLE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS

When the society is weak and the State is strong traditional liberal democratic legal and constitutional measures are inadequate to prevent destruction of the constitution. There can be no guarantee against such attempts. It is not enough to establish electoral and governmental procedures of fair play, nor to seek to persuade all political bodies to adhere to democratic principles and practices. Laws and constitutional restrictions are insufficient barriers to those who are willing to violate the laws and to destroy the constitution.

The Watergate activities of the Nixon administration demonstrated that high American officials were willing deliberately to disobey existing laws, and to claim the right to do so, in order to

implement their will, and even to usurp the established electoral procedures. The proposal, therefore, of disturbed Congressmen and Senators to enact new laws to prohibit such activities demonstrated their failure even to understand the nature and gravity of the problem: how to prevent usurpation by those willing deliberately to disobey both statutes and the constitution and to manipulate elections, in order to remain in office. Something more than a new law is obviously required to do that.

It must be made impassible for those who wish to become tyrants and who are willing to sweep aside democratic institutions and humane considerations to seize and to maintain effective control of the State apparatus, and by means of that of the society as a whole.

Among the ways in which this expanded State apparatus may be shifted to imposition of tyranny are these: First, no abrupt shift may occur, but instead the governmental apparatus and the society may gradually be brought under progressively more thorough and severe elite control, and step by step the constitution altered in practice to become an increasingly authoritarian system. Second, persons chosen for executive positions by constitutional means, as a president, prime minister, or chancellor, may deliberately exceed or expand the constitutional boundaries. With or without a declaration of emergency, enabling legislation, or constitutional amendment, he or she may carry out an executive usurpation. Under certain conditions, this could be done in the United States by an elected president -- perhaps a more ruthless and intelligent "Richard Nixon" -- who wished to be free of constitutional barriers and to remain in office without the possibility of removal. Third, a political party, military group, police or intelligence body, or combination of these, with or without foreign assistance, may conduct a coup d'état, ousting the old ruler and establishing themselves in control of the State apparatus. Fourth, successful foreign military invaders may either establish themselves or their puppets at the head of the State in the occupied country, and use it for their own objectives.

The combination of bureaucracy, police, prisons, and military forces, all under a single command, makes possible the turning of that combined State power from serving the members of the society to control, repression, and on occasion, war, against its own population. In modern times, the State is always stronger than any other single institution of the society. Where those societies have been

weakened because of neglect, attrition, or deliberate attacks, or even because of a well-intentioned extension of controls over the society, the economy, and lower levels of government, those who have seized control of the State apparatus are likely thereby to gain the power to retain it. They can then use the State for their own ends. The only alternatives available for blocking their success seem to be the will and capacity to wage either a bloody civil war or a massive noncooperation struggle. Seizure of the State is an obvious and permanent danger to anything which might be called democracy, liberty, and freedom. A weak society facing a strong State apparatus commanded by a power-hungry ruler is in a most dangerous situation.

The long-term costs to a society of meeting its needs and correcting its ills by expansion of the State apparatus may therefore be extremely high: reduced democratic qualities, growth of alienation, an increased sense of powerlessness, greater vulnerability to further extension of elite domination, and even political usurpation. Advocates of social change therefore need to reverse the perpetual strategy of enlisting the State apparatus to provide human needs, to right wrongs, and to build a new society.

EMPOWERMENT FOR ACCEPTABLE CHANGE

In the light of the tragedies of recent decades, and the dangers in the future, we have at least three fundamental responsibilities which we need to fulfill if we are to meet human needs more adequately: (I) to right wrongs, lift oppression, and achieve positive conditions for human life; (2) to help ourselves to become empowered in order to achieve internal and societal self-liberation, and, (3) to remove from human society political violence which not only harms and kills people but also, as discussed in the previous chapter, provides the institutionalized capacity which is the prerequisite for some of our most serious problems. If we are to fulfill those responsibilities adequately, we can no longer repeat the programs of the past, but instead must seek new ways to meet the needs of people today, and those of tomorrow's societies.

We need to understand why a maldistribution of power has harmful effects on society which violate the ideals which most people in our society espouse. We also need to understand what produces

this maldistribution of power. Without understanding the causes which produce these effects, we are unlikely to be able to correct them. Similarly, if we are to have the capacity to achieve a more equitable distribution of power in our society, we need to examine more closely what components are involved in the distribution of effective power among people and institutions.

A seriously inequitable distribution of power may result from a variety of factors. Two such, closely interrelated, factors, are: which types of groups wield the power, and what kind of power it is. To a greater degree than has usually been thought, the type of power may at times strongly influence, or even determine, which types of groups wield that power. We shall explore this more fully later in this chapter. Both the types of power and which groups wield it are related to the type of ultimate sanction which is applied as a source of power. Therefore, the subject of sanctions requires major attention in any consideration of how to achieve acceptable social change, and of how to implement more fully our ideals in social and political life.

SANCTIONS AND SOCIETY

The provisions of the formal constitution concerning the selection of members of the ruling group and the right to individual liberties are not the ultimate determinants of the distribution of effective power in the political system, much less in the political society as a whole, as we saw in Chapter Two, "Social Power and Political Freedom." Nor, important as they are, do the number and vitality of the society's *loci* of power alone determine that distribution. The type of ultimate sanction relied upon also, to a high degree, helps to determine the distribution of effective power in the society.

Sanctions are clearly one of the important sources of political power.[3] Because that is so, and because the sanctions of institutionalized political violence are prerequisites for such grave problems as dictatorships, genocide, war, and systems of social oppression, we must give adequate attention to the possible impacts of different types of sanctions on the distribution of effective power in the social and political system. Our past failure to do so may explain to a

significant degree our inability to solve our gravest problems.

All societies require sanctions of some type.* Sanctions here mean punishments, pressures, and means of action used to penalize, thwart, and alter the behavior of other persons, groups, institutions, or States. Internally, sanctions are used to maintain stability and order in face of hostile and injurious behavior, to keep a subordinate group in subjection, to resist challenge to the established system, to conduct acute internal conflicts, and to achieve conformity to socially determined minimally acceptable behavior, especially when normative constraints have broken down. Externally, sanctions are used to achieve goals against an unwilling opponent, and to ward off external intimidation and attacks. That is, sanctions are applied as the final means of action to wield power in acute conflicts, either defensively or offensively, which have not been otherwise resolved under acceptable terms and conditions. People and institutions use sanctions to apply pressure and to wage conflict. Sanctions may be violent or nonviolent in form.

SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT SANCTIONS

Generally, sanctions have not been perceived as having social and political impact beyond their immediate influence on individuals, social conditions, and the objectives at issue. The nature of the ultimate sanction relied upon by the society - whether violent or nonviolent - has not been seen as a significant factor shaping the lasting character of the society itself, including its institutions and its internal distribution of effective power. Occasionally the influence of military systems and wars on political centralization has been noted, or even their impacts on the creation and growth of the State as a unique institution. Most people have usually assumed, however, that since violence was believed to be the only effective ultimate sanction, the best one could do in face of such influences was to apply ameliorative measures to limit, adjust, or regulate the use of such violence, as by legal and constitutional procedures and prohibitions. The political consequences of reliance on violent sanctions or the possibility of

* See the discussions on sanctions in Chapter Ten, "Seeking a Solution to the Problem of War," and Chapter Eleven, "The Societal Imperative."

effective alternatives to them have not usually been explored much further than this.

Increasingly, however, the widespread confidence in violent sanctions has been challenged by claims that they themselves create or aggravate several serious problems. For example, it is at times argued by a variety of people that: (1) the destructive capacity of violent sanctions has reached unacceptable levels; (2) satisfactory ways to deal with certain types of political violence - as terrorism, genocide, and nuclear weapons - have not been found; (3) reliance on violence to struggle against an opponent with continued superior capacity for violence tends to force one's own group into submission, self-destruction, or struggle by attrition of both sides; and (4) undesirable long-term structural consequences of political violence as the society's ultimate sanction appear to exist. These contentions are only illustrative of others which merit investigation.

To a degree hitherto unrecognized, the nature of the ultimate sanction used by a society may determine the nature of that society. Obviously, the sanctions will not be the only influential factors, and the degree to which they will shape the society and political system will differ from case to case. The nature of those sanctions, however, may be far more important in shaping the society than any other single factor, including both ideals and economics.

Violent sanctions and nonviolent sanctions appear to have very different consequences in shaping the nature of the society, the distribution of effective power within it, and the forms and character of its political system. Institutionalized violent sanctions appear to contribute causally to increased centralization of effective power. This occurs in the form of increased centralization in decision-making, in the structure of the political system, and in the control of the capacity to apply the sanctions themselves. On the other hand, nonviolent sanctions appear to contribute causally to decentralization and diffusion of effective power. This occurs in the form of decentralization in decision-making, in the structure of the society as a whole as well as the political system, and in the control of the capacity to apply the sanctions - even by members of the society who have long perceived themselves to be powerless. If this is true, the choice of violent or nonviolent sanctions will have profound long-term consequences for that society.

However, for most people the question of choosing between two

types of ultimate sanctions has never arisen. It has been assumed that the most serious and effective sanctions can only be violent. The ultimate sanction has been perceived, almost by definition, to be violent, both for the State apparatus and also for the people and revolutionaries, for whom it was believed to be the *ultima ratio populi*, the ultimate resource of the people. We have rarely even noticed the widespread existence of alternative nonviolent sanctions, nor examined whether they might be instrumentally effective for meeting the need of sanctions for objectives which benefit human beings, as distinct from those which harm or oppress them. As a result of these assumptions and this perception of political reality, the question has rarely been asked as to whether violent sanctions and nonviolent sanctions may have different consequences for the structure and character of the society as a whole.

PROBLEMS OF LIBERATION BY VIOLENCE

In earlier centuries, faced with an oppressive ruler, the population armed with the weapons of violence had a fair chance of winning by waging a violent mass revolution or civil war, using fairly conventional strategies. Karl Mannheim, a German political sociologist, argued that the nature of those weapons prior to the developments of the twentieth century effectively diffused power in the society, and that this was at the heart of the development of political democracy:

> The secret of the democratization which took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries lay in the simple fact that one man means one gun, the resistance of one thousand individuals one thousand guns.[4]

> The guarantee of the general democratization of the preceding century lay not only in industrialization but also in the fact of universal conscription which, especially after a lost war, could become the means of general insurrection.[5]

The capacity of the subjects to deal with internal rulers who had outraged the citizens, or with foreign invaders, was therefore considerable. The right of each man to be armed with the weapons of war was seen to be significantly related to the preservation of freedom and to popular control of the ruler. For example, the Swiss have the strong tradition of each home having a rifle above the hearth, and the

colonial and newly-independent Americans insisted on the right of the citizens to "bear arms."

In the intervening decades significant changes took place in the weaponry of violent conflict, in the technology of transportation and communication, and in political organization. The capacity to wield military power become concentrated in the hands of the ruler. This tended to restore the distribution of power to a condition similar to that of certain societies before the period of democratization described above. In some earlier social orders, wrote Mannheim, where minorities could gain control of the instruments of military power, they could monopolize effective power in the society. That earlier possibility under certain circumstances, with the changes in weaponry, technology, and political organization, now became almost universal, he argued. It was not the number of people willing to fight in a mass violent uprising or civil war, or in a war against an invader which was then most important. It was the weapons which were available. These were normally effectively concentrated under the control of the ruler. Therefore, Mannheim argued in 1949: "In the decisive political conflicts of the near future ... the greatest significance must be attached to the *concentration of the instruments of military power.*"[6] This meant that the traditional means of violent rebellion to achieve liberation became remnants of responses to an earlier stage of military technology and political organization, remnants which had little to do with current military and political realities.

> [T]he techniques of revolution lag far behind the techniques of Government. Barricades, the symbols of revolution, are relics of an age when they were built up against cavalry.[7]

Understandably, in response to this situation groups wishing to remove entrenched unpopular rulers have shifted to other means of doing so in place of mass violent revolution and civil war with relatively conventional strategies. These alternatives which have developed to a significantly greater degree than previously, in both use and sophistication, are coup d'état, guerrilla war, and nonviolent struggle. Before their fuller development, Mannhein had predicted that the concentration of military power would "be followed by a new kind of revolutionary strategy...."[8] Interest and practice of these objectives has grown for a variety of political objectives. This is especially true of coup d'état and guerrilla war. Both revolutionary

groups and established governments, including those of both the Soviet Union and the United States, have been actively interested in both techniques to advance their foreign policy objectives. Users of the coup d'état have accepted the concentration of weaponry, but sought to seize control of it quickly along with the rest of the State. Guerrilla warriors, on the other hand, have combined a political struggle for the loyalty and cooperation of the population with unorthodox military strategies. (These strategies are at least used at the initial stages of a struggle, until the guerrillas amass sufficient military weaponry and disciplined troops to shift to conventional frontal warfare.)

LIMITATIONS OF COUPS D'ETAT

As a quick seizure of the State from the previous ruling group, the coup d'état[9] appears to have certain advantages. It avoids protracted struggle and immense casualties. Once control of the State is consolidated, that apparatus with its bureaucratic, police, and military branches can be actively applied to maintain control over the population and society. Not only active supporters of the coup but also all those persons who simply wish to avoid protracted internal civil war are likely to submit to the new regime. Only a relatively small number of active conspirators and military or para-military units, along with widespread passive submission of government employees, minor officials, and the general population are required for success. The coup d'état, however, is not an instrument of popular empowerment.

When successful, a coup d'état will establish a new person or group in the position of ruler in command of the State apparatus. This ruler mayor may not exercise that power with more self-restraint or for different ends than did the earlier ruler. The coup may or may not accompany or follow expressions of popular discontent with the previous ruler. The coup may even take place against popular wishes and establish a more autocratic regime. A regime brought to power by a coup would clearly continue to depend upon institutionalized political violence for its existence and as its ultimate sanction. The coup maintains, and at times even furthers, the concentration of effective political and military power, rather than

diffusing power throughout the society. This technique possesses no characteristics which operate intrinsically in the short or long run to increase popular control over the ruler or to empower the population. To the contrary, the strong tendency is for continuation of the concentration of effective power in the hands of those occupying the position of ruler.

CENTRALIZING EFFECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

Guerrilla warfare[10] is different in many ways from coups d'état, and within the former are considerable variations. Guerrilla warfare requires considerable support among the civilian population, and in its early stages commonly involves small bands of guerrilla fighters using hit-and-run tactics in an apparently highly decentralized way. It is therefore thought by some persons that guerrilla warfare contributes to empowering people and to decentralizing effective power in the society. This effect may occur in early stages, although it is easy to exaggerate it even at that point.

The long-term results clearly concentrate effective power in the hands of the regime. If the guerrilla struggle fails, the old regime will have been forced to become increasingly autocratic and regimented in the military struggle against the attackers. If the guerrillas succeed, then in the later stages of the military struggle, the rebels' own military capacity grows significantly in numbers, weaponry, and centralized organization; it is transformed into conventional military forces able to fight positional war and to conquer and hold territory and cities. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) wrote of "the great strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare."

> Guerrilla warfare [he wrote] will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel war, but will rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold, to support regular warfare and to transform itself into regular warfare:[11]

The final stage of a successful guerrilla war is conventional frontal war, as occurred in Vietnam. This requires the development and expansion of organized and disciplined military institutions. These continue after the success against the enemy, even if in reconstituted forms. That means the creation of a powerful lasting military

system, powerful especially in relation to the other institutions of the society and other branches of the political system. They become a part of the new order's institutionalized capacity for political violence to advance its objectives and to defend itself against internal and external attackers. Hence, the military establishment would be capable of exerting effective pressures, controls, and even of seizing the State in a coup after victory.

One result of a successful guerrilla war is almost inevitable: a far more powerful military establishment relative to the society's civil institutions will exist after the revolution than the former oppressor wielded. As discussed in the previous chapter, the recently institutionalized political violence can be shifted to new purposes which it was never originally intended to serve. These may include repression of the population in service to either the new revolutionary regime or to a group which has seized or manipulated control of the State. In any case, the capacity for effective struggle is now concentrated in an institution of the State, rather than diffused among the population generally. Another guerrilla struggle against oppression by the new regime would at best take much time and - as in most guerrilla wars - involve immense casualties and social destruction. In addition, as long as the population accepts the belief that power derives from violence, the population will perceive itself to be powerless vis-à-vis the new State with its enhanced institutionalized capacity for political violence. Thus, guerrilla war cannot be described as contributing in the long run to increased popular empowerment, much less to reduced reliance on institutionalized political violence.

Therefore, both coup d'état and guerrilla war are types of political violence which become institutionalized and which, in the long run, concentrate effective power in the hands of whatever ruler can gain command of the State apparatus. Aldous Huxley argued:

> A violent revolution does not result in any fundamental change in human relations; it results merely in a confirmation of the old, bad relations of oppressor and oppressed, or irresponsible tyranny and irresponsible passive obedience. In de Ligt's own phrase, "the more violence, the less revolution."[12]

When coup d'état or guerrilla warfare succeed in removing a particular despot, that is all that has happened; those techniques are not capable of abolishing despotism itself, or of establishing lasting controls over the power of rulers. To do so would require changes in

the underlying social condition, the diffusion of effective power throughout the society, and increased ability of the population to control their rulers and any elite by possession of sanctions and means of struggle, and capacity to use them, to defend and advance themselves, their principles, and their institutions.

CONSEQUENCES, OF INSTITUTIONALIZED POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The failure of violent sanctions to empower people generally and to remove the capacity for central domination and dictatorship appears to be rooted in the nature of those sanctions as such, especially in their institutionalized forms. Only atomistic violence by isolated individuals, perpetrated for whatever reason, can be said to decentralize power and to empower individuals, and even then only those individuals who commit it. That empowerment is very limited, however, for the only power which accrues to those particular individuals is the power to kill and destroy, not to create or construct.

When violent sanctions are intended to enforce the established system, to oust an existing regime, to attack internal or foreign opponents, or to defend against attacks, that violence cannot be spontaneous, haphazard, atomized, or decentralized. It cannot be the Spontaneous expression of frustration and hostility. It cannot even be directed by diverse political wills. To succeed for such objectives, that violence must be organized and coordinated, and possess a command system. Such violence must be institutionalized. Advance preparations, a structure, and a command system are required not only to avoid chaos of numerous uncoordinated acts of small-scale violence; they are also required to produce the maximum instrumental effectiveness.

The institutions for applying political violence are unique in the society, precisely because only they are constantly equipped to apply their violence against the other institutions and the population of the society, that is, they can be turned to attack and suppress the rest of the society. Political violence, therefore, is not a neutral technique as has usually been assumed - which can be used for any and all causes without having special side-effects which help to shape the society which uses it, as well as the group or society against which it is used.

Institutionalized political violence in the State helps to determine who rules and who is ruled. That is to say, that capacity to apply violent sanctions helps to determine stratification by political class.* The consequences of the society's ultimate sanction on the distribution of effective power in the society therefore have profound significance for those persons and groups which wish to end oppression and enhance freedom and social justice.

Significant reasons exist which explain why the institutionalized capacity for political violence tends to structure the society toward elitist domination, toward centralized structures in society, economics, and especially politics, and toward the impotence and helplessness of the population. The pressure for centralization and the potential for internal oppression are produced by that institutionalization of political violence which can be shifted to other purposes than originally intended, as discussed in the previous chapter, by the command system and other requirements of those institutions (particularly in crises), and by the disproportionately large effective power capacity of those institutions vis-à-vis the civilian ones. (The last factor can be altered if the civilians do not accept violence as the ultimate source of power and if they learn to transform their power potential into effective power by organization and effective use of nonviolent forms of sanctions, such as economic and political noncooperation.)

The requirements of institutionalized political violence for effectiveness contribute directly and indirectly to wider centralization and regimentation. For example, during actual war the demands for military weaponry, manpower, efficiency, central decision-making, secrecy, economic controls, silencing of opposition, and clear lines of action regardless of legal provisions produce especially powerful centralizing influences. For the defeated side, the results may be more blatant in the form of a military government imposed by the victor. But even for the winning side similar effects are produced on the society and political system. Certain political sociologists and

* Attention must also be paid to social class and economic class dynamics and relationships, and their roles in politics. Stratification is, however, not only social and economic but also political, and it is valid to speak of "political class" in addition to other forms. (See Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class [New York and London: McGraw Hill, 1939], and Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959].)

anthropologists, such as Bronislaw Malinowski, have pointed to the apparent causal interrelationships between war and dictatorships, to the tendency for dictatorships often to be expansionist and belligerent, and, conversely, for war to erode or corrupt democratic processes and to increase the dictatorial characteristics of that society.[13] The developments in the technologies of modern military weaponry, transportation, communication, computers, police methods, and other fields continue to aggravate this problem. They combine to increase the capacity of institutionalized political violence to overwhelm, dominate, and suppress the rest of the society.

Countervailing forces to the centralizing impact of institutionalized political violence may exist which modify or restrain the tendencies toward centralization and expansion of the command system. These forces may even prevent the more extreme consequences of the institutionalized capacity for violence. The potential for internal violent action against the rest of the society, or even against the established government itself may not be utilized in a given situation. However, the potential and the pressures are there; they always exist when the society relies on institutionalized political violence to provide its ultimate sanction. Favorable conditions will increase the chances that that potential and those pressures will prevail. Those conditions exist when the independent institutions (*loci* of power) of the society are weak, when their capacity for resistance by other sanctions is negligible, when the crisis facing the society is severe, and when the scale and intensity of the political violence are extreme. When these all occur simultaneously the dangers of the growth of centralization and the expansion of the command system will be great. These may then overwhelm the rest of the society, and significantly modify the character of the society as a whole.

The danger becomes very real when those in command of the institutions of violence are unwilling to abide by established procedures and standards of legitimacy. Most of the coups d'état which have occurred in recent decades have been actively carried out by certain military units, while others acquiesced to the take-over.

In other contexts, too, the side effects of the use and expansion of institutionalized political violence have scarred the original objectives. In the Soviet Union, for example, efforts to achieve justice through the path of political dictatorship for the proletariat commanded by the elite of an elite Party, relying in part upon the army,

political police, prisons, camps, and executions, resulted in a tyranny and political terror under Josef Stalin which was far more extreme than any tsar had ever been capable of imposing. It included the deaths of millions of people in the 1930s in the collectivization and other programs, the creation of one of the world's largest military establishments, and a continuing elite control and regimentation of the economy and political system.

SUBMISSIVENESS AND THE DOCTRINE OF VIOLENCE

In addition to structural consequences, reliance on institutionalized political violence has other serious results for the society. These are psychological -- really political-psychological. They affect the attitudes and feelings of people whose resulting behavior may have profound political effects. If the population believes that the "real" power derives from violence, that it "comes out of the barrel of a gun," then whoever has the guns will find it much easier to control the population. Those who wield the guns are then seen to be nearly omnipotent by those persons without guns -- or at least with fewer guns, smaller ones, guns not wielded by professional troops or not backed by the technology and means of combined modern police, prison, and military systems. It is true that the power *potential* of the people without guns may be very great, and that under appropriate conditions they could mobilize that potential into effective power capacity by noncooperation and defiance to destroy a well-equipped dictatorship. Nevertheless, as long as the people *believe* in the omnipotence of those wielding superior violence, they will be unlikely to mobilize their own power potential. The doctrine that "power comes out of the barrel of a gun" therefore leads to the submission of the people to violent rulers.

The psychological effect on the perpetrator of violence caused by submission of the population to that violence is also extremely important. Submission to violence teaches the perpetrator of that violence to use it again next time. This may have severe political consequences, contributing to the expansion and increasing severity of violence by those who want their own way. Both Mohandas K. Gandhi and B. F. Skinner have pointed to this effect. On the other hand, both of them have insisted that the withholding of both counter violence and submission to the will of the attacker will tend to

reduce future attacks. This response teaches the attacker that the desired objectives cannot be gained by violent means.* Unless this happens, however, the continued application of violence, submission to it, and renewed application of the successful pattern of violence to gain one's objectives will in turn contribute to the centralizing institutional effects which we have discussed above.

The structural tendencies of institutionalized violence in the hands of the State being what they are, whoever uses the State's full capacities with the intent of developing an equalitarian society will fail. At the very least, if the *quantum* of institutionalized political violence remains approximately the same as before, the forces producing centralization, class rule, elitist controls, and the capacity to dominate the population which derive from this source will remain. If the *quantu*m of institutionalized political violence is increased -- as for such reasons as the use of significant violence to seize control of the State or to maintain that control, or expansion of police or military systems to deal with domestic or foreign crises - and if the society's *loci* of power have been weakened while effective power has been shifted to the State, then the distribution of effective power in the society resulting from the use of the State apparatus is likely to be more inequitable than under the previous system. The capacity of the State -- whoever controls it -- to impose domination on the populace will have grown, even under a new political flag which once symbolized the will of the people. Clearly, reliance on violence to empower the people does not work.

It is therefore especially ironic and tragic that the doctrine that "power comes out of the barrel of a gun" -- which is compatible with an oppressive elitist system -- was adopted by various groups which sought revolution against oppression in the name of the people. That doctrine is so crude a reflection of the nature of political power that not even Adolph Hitler subscribed to it. That doctrine ignores the diverse sources of power and the different kinds of power. It also ignores the very important question of who shall wield power, and the consequences of the doctrine on the society and political system. It leads directly to the expansion of institutionalized political violence and of State power, which can be applied to bring about dictatorship, genocide, war, and social oppression. That doctrine, when acted upon in politics, intrinsically leads to establishment of an elite in

* See Appendix C, "Skinner and Gandhi on Defeating Violence."

command of the institutionalized capacity for political violence. For all of the beautiful phrases about "the people" which sometimes accompany that doctrine, the nature of violent political sanctions, when institutionalized as required for effectiveness, actually excludes the general populace from actively exercising power.

By selecting the doctrine that power derives from violence, the so-called revolutionaries have chosen the distillation of the worst characteristics of the social system they denounced as inhuman, and which they wished to destroy, to be the foundation on which to build their new order. It need not, therefore, be wondered that the resulting political system resembles the old one so closely, only in more extreme forms. It is a shattering, but usually unnoticed, fact that in every country in which an avowed social revolution has occurred by means of violent struggle or political dictatorship, there exists a military establishment and system, and a police and prison system, which are more powerful absolutely in weaponry, combat strength, and in surveillance and control abilities, than were those of the *ancien régime*. The new institutionalized capacity for political violence is also relatively more powerful in comparison to the civil institutions of the society and other branches of the political system than was the case under the old order. That produces a society very like the old one, only more so.

In any society institutionalized political violence is intrinsically dangerous to free institutions and democracy. At the very minimum, extreme care must be taken with it. If one wishes to create a society in which people really do rule, and in which oppression is impossible, then one ought to explore alternative ways to meet the society's basic need for sanctions.

Pointing the finger at violence as a main culprit in the genesis of our serious problems is not a naive individualist approach derived from ignorance about politics and from romanticism. Quite the opposite: it puts the finger on a key to an explanation of why our society is the way it is despite our ideals, and may provide the key to discovery of how it can be changed to implement our ideals more adequately.

REQUIREMENTS OF LASTING LIBERATION

"[V]iolence may destroy one or more bad rulers," Gandhi wrote, "but ... others will pop up in their places, for the root lies elsewhere."[14] Real and lasting liberation requires changes in the internal power relationships within the society. These cannot be produced by violence, which will actually impede them. Exponents of liberation who ignore the likely long-term effects of their technique of struggle upon the society they seek to free can only be regarded as shortsighted and irresponsible.

It is also exceptionally important to be clear about whose task it is to liberate people from oppression, of whatever type. So long as the old regime or system is changed or abolished, we often assume that the means make relatively little difference. However, important differences in results tend to follow from alternative answers to that question. Without the direct participation of the population itself in the effort to change, no real changes in the relative power positions between the population and whoever occupies the position of ruler are likely to occur. At most, a new group will replace the old one as ruler. The new one mayor may not behave with greater restraint and concern about the welfare and liberties of the people at its *own discretion*. The liberation of oppressed people must, therefore, if it is to happen, be essentially self-liberation by means which are compatible with a lasting capacity of people to govern themselves and to shape their own society. Otherwise they face the likelihood of a new, even more, oppressive ruler waving a different flag.

The great Indian Gandhian socialist Rammanohar Lohia once wrote that he was tired of hearing only of the need to change the hearts of the oppressors. That was fine, but far more important was the effort to change the hearts of the oppressed, so that they would become unwilling to continue accepting their oppression, and become determined to build a better society. It is weakness in people's determination and ability to act which makes possible their continued oppression and submission. Change that, and they can never again be oppressed. Such self-liberation can only be done through the strengthening of the subordinates by their own efforts.*

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* In contrast to Lenin's confidence in the small elite Party of "professional revolutionaries," Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht argued: "Social revolution and reconstruction cannot be undertaken and realized except by the masses themselves .... The proletarian masses are called on to build Socialism stone by stone by their own efforts. Free, self-government [can only be achieved by] ... the work of the toilers themselves, not by the acts of despair of a minority." (Quoted by Barthelemy de Ligt, the Conquest of Violence [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938, and London: Geo. Routledge & Sons, 1937, and New York: Garland Publishing, 1972])

According to our understanding of the nature of all political power, people have immense *power potential* because ultimately their attitudes, behavior, and cooperation supply the sources of power to all rulers and hierarchical systems. Power potential is not always, however, transformed into *effective power*. What is required for this to happen? Once the subordinates wish to make changes, and once they are willing to act to do so, they require some type of sanctions. They then need a technique of action through which they can maintain and strengthen their existing independent institutions, create and defend new ones, -and, very importantly, resist, confront, and undermine the power of the ruler. Such a technique should preferably also be one which will in the long run, with repetition, give the subjects a lasting capacity to control any ruler or usurper, and to defend their capacity to rule themselves. The choice of the ultimate sanction to maintain and to change a society is highly important in shaping the resulting society. In contrast to the centralizing effects of violent sanctions, which in the long run disempower the populace, nonviolent sanctions tend strongly to diffuse and devolve power in the society, and particularly help to empower the oppressed and powerless. Let us, therefore, examine some of the structural consequences of nonviolent sanctions.

UNCERTAIN SOURCES OF POWER

An understanding of the nature of nonviolent sanctions is required at this point, although it cannot be repeated here.* These sanctions have major impacts on the distribution of effective power in political societies because of two major factors: (I) the nature of the power of all hierarchical systems and rulers which makes them vulnerable to nonviolent sanctions, and (2) the impact of nonviolent struggle, especially when successful, on the capacities of persons and groups which have waged it. The combined effect of these two factors on the distribution of effective power establishes without question the interrelationships between political power and nonviolent sanctions.

* See the brief discussions of the technique of nonviolent action in Chapter Nine, " 'The Political Equivalent of War' - Civilian-based Defense," and Chapter Eleven, "The Societal Imperative," and the extensive examination in my previous work The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973)

The power which rulers wield, their capacity to act, do great or terrible deeds, implement policies and punish, conquer and plunder, serve, dominate, and oppress, is not their power. It does not come from their persons. Nor does the ruler's power come from guns. Rather, it comes from sources in the society which can be located. They include: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctions. These sources are all rooted in the society itself, in its institutions, and ultimately in its people. People must accept the legitimacy of the power-wielder, and cooperate in providing the needed sources of power. They must also submit to orders and even to repression intended to intimidate the populace into obedience if the ruler is to maintain his or her control.

The sources of the ruler's power are derived from people who believe that they should submit because they are morally bound to do so, or because they believe themselves to be too weak to resist, from the people who provide economic resources, pay their taxes, and become the experts, administrators and aids, as well as from the people who staff the armies, courts, and prisons. All these people, and many others, provide the sources of power of all rulers, both beneficent and malevolent.

Hence, the most crucial problem for all rulers: people do not always do what they are told or are expected to do. If people reject the ruler's legitimacy, his or her authority is gone. If people withdraw their cooperation by disobedience, economic noncooperation, denial of needed knowledge and expertise, refusal to operate the bureaucracy, and to cooperate with the administration, then all those sources of power are weakened or removed.

If people are willing to defy both threats and the infliction of repression as the price of change, if police and soldiers become disturbed at their own deeds in repression and come to doubt the legitimacy of the regime already weakened by massive defiance, and, finally, if they then refuse further orders to punish or kill the defiant populace, then the regime is at its end. The people must continue to persist and defy, even in face of repression, until the sources of power are dried up, and therefore the regime is fatally weakened and disintegrated.

Without bestowed authority and ideological legitimacy, without aides and henchmen, without administrators, bureaucrats and a

myriad of helpers, without wealth and economic resources, without institutional backing and administration, without police, prisons, and armies, without obedient subjects, even the most autocratic ruler or ruthless tyrant becomes politically impotent.

Such a dissolution of the ruler's power by withdrawal of its sources demonstrates that the power of rulers, dominating elites, and oppressing classes is not theirs, but rather comes from the very people they would control. The power of rulers is therefore intrinsically fragile. This insight alone opens the way for a conscious choice by people whether to obey and cooperate, and awareness of such a choice prepares the way for a drastic change in power relationships. All the sources of political power are thereby directly vulnerable to nonviolent sanctions.

DECENTRALIZING EFFECTS OF NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS

Nonviolent sanctions often use the refusal by people to do their usual jobs and to behave in the expected ways, and their insistence on behaving in forbidden and unexpected ways, as weapons. These means of action frequently use people's usual roles and positions in society as power bases, and their accustomed functions as power levers. This type of weaponry can, under appropriate conditions, be far more effective than guns because it strikes directly at the sources of power of institutions and rulers. Nonviolent struggle is therefore primarily a power-wielding technique and set of sanctions, capable both of controlling the political power of others and of wielding power in its own right. Oppressors and tyrants fear the spread of this insight into the nature of all political power.

Nonviolent sanctions have several characteristics which contribute actively to decentralization and the diffusion of effective power capacity in the society. These characteristics are related to five main factors:

- the nature of leadership in applications of nonviolent sanctions;
- the qualities of specific nonviolent methods or "weapons";
- changes in the self-perception and attitudes of members of the nonviolent struggle group;

- increased self-reliance of those who wield nonviolent sanctions; and
- the growth of the non-State institutions of the society.

As compared to leadership in violent conflicts, leaders in movements applying nonviolent sanctions generally are less likely to have used violence to control their own group, if such means were available and otherwise acceptable. This factor is not only likely to influence the current conflict, but may also carryover into the poststruggle society because of its association with greater genuine commitment to humanitarian goals and principles. Also such leaders are less likely later to use violent sanctions autocratically to maintain and extend their power position, even if they then hold positions in the State apparatus. Some earlier nonviolent leaders - such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah and Kenneth Kaunda - have accepted positions as prime minister or president and used violent sanctions, while others - such as Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jayaprakash Narayan - have refused or not sought such positions.

In nonviolent struggle movements the leadership is intrinsically unstable, and tends to diffuse downward hierarchically, moving among increasing numbers of people. This occurs because under most such conditions the leadership is deliberately placed "in the front lines" in the struggle and is seized by arrest and imprisonment, or other repressive means. As this occurs, and as communications and transportation may be restricted, new layers of leaders are required, and more leaders are needed since they must operate more locally. This both produces new personnel in leadership positions and multiplies their numbers. Where the struggle movement is strong and repression is severe, as these larger numbers of leaders are seized, the diffusion of leadership may extend to such a degree that the movement becomes effectively "leaderless." This experience may have important long-term consequences for the society, increasing decentralized self-reliance and reducing the perception that centralized leadership is always necessary. (This factor is not present, of course, in cases where the nonviolent sanctions are both initiated and applied by central State decision and orders, such as in international economic embargoes.)

In contrast to that which often occurs in the application of violent sanctions in both civil and international wars, the sanctions which the nonviolent leadership may apply against the members of

their own group to maintain solidarity and to discourage defection to the opponent should be, and are more likely to be, nonviolent ones. Also, since violent sanctions are not used in the struggle against the opponent, no additional capacity to apply them will be developed to be carried over into the postconflict period for possible use for other objectives. For both of these reasons, even the nonviolent leaders who step into, or continue to hold, positions of State authority will not have at their disposal an *increased* capacity to apply violent sanctions which has accrued during the conflict. They may still use the regularly available State capacity for violent sanctions; that will, however, be more limited than it would have been following a violent struggle. That limitation will set certain restraints on internal repression.

Following violent struggles the new regime may aim to prevent unwanted challenges by taking possession of weapons and controlling the supply of weapons and ammunition. In these circumstances, with the population's faith placed in the efficacy of violent sanctions, even the most severe excesses of the regime are likely to go unchallenged by action of types which cannot be ignored. In the case of nonviolent sanctions, however, the weapons are not physical ones which can be seized, controlled by regulation of supply, or made inoperative by restriction of ammunition. Knowledge of various nonviolent weapons - nearly two hundred at least exist - once gained is not as easily controlled as physical weapons and ammunition. Previous experience in their application also operates as "training in battle." This will contribute significantly both to their actual ability to conduct such struggles in the future, and to their confidence in their ability to do so. Both of these may be very important in determining the distribution of effective power following that particular conflict. People who have, and know that they have, the capacity for independent effective struggle are more likely to be treated with some respect by governing elites than people who are in crises politically impotent. Experience in the application of nonviolent sanctions, especially when successful, arms the population with an ability to do so again should the need arise, as when the new ruler alienates the support of the majority of the subjects on matters of extreme importance.

When nonviolent sanctions are applied successfully, the people using them are likely to experience an enhanced perception of their

own qualities and capacities which reflect actual changes in them. Before subordinates in the relationship can begin to use nonviolent sanctions they must change their prior attitudes of submissiveness and acceptance of inferiority. The group very probably has previously been passive and believed itself to be helpless in face of perceived wrongs. When they then begin to act to correct their grievance they are likely to experience a liberation from that sense of powerlessness. This change is likely to grow as their movement continues and gains strength. At the beginning of the conflict, the actionists may need consciously to control their fear of the opponent's sanctions, but later they may discover that they are no longer afraid. This change is not only important for individuals; it is important politically, for it undermines hierarchical systems which have depended on fear of violent punishments to keep the subordinates "in place." Their own willingness to act and to persist in the face of dangers, and the recognition by the opponent and others of their new power are likely to contribute to an increase of the group's self-esteem. The group will see their qualities and capabilities to be more significant than they previously perceived. Knowledge that they possess genuine strength even vis-à-vis the power of the State is likely to nurture a new spirit and arouse a new hope that they can help shape their own future.

Somewhat less certainly, the nonviolent actionists may become more respectful of the life and person of others, even their opponents in extreme conflicts. The actionists may also become more able to think through problems for themselves, reach their own decisions, and adhere to them even in difficult circumstances. While these are highly personal qualities, to the degree that they develop they will in the long run indirectly affect the distribution of effective power in the society.

Effective nonviolent sanctions are likely to strengthen the group using them, both absolutely and in comparison to the opponent group. Internal group solidarity and ability to work together are likely to grow. Increased internal cooperation is both a requirement in many cases for effective use of nonviolent sanctions, and also the result of such action. Internal cooperation is needed to apply the nonviolent sanctions effectively, and also to provide those needs formerly met by the opponent with whom cooperation has been withdrawn. The latter may include alternative ways to maintain social order even in the midst of conflict, as well as various social,

economic, and political needs. To provide these, members of the group will need to increase their self-reliance and self-help, which will contribute further to self-empowerment. Existing institutions may be strengthened, they may be modified to meet needs more adequately, or changed in their internal operation. New institutions may also be created. These are constructive counterparts of noncooperation with the opponent. They can help to change existing power relations very quickly during an on-going conflict. The result could be lasting structural changes.

Sometimes this balance of noncooperation with cooperation is consciously planned and organized, while at other times it happens spontaneously and rapidly without plans or preparations. When the institutional changes are only temporary, they will contribute to changes in the power relationships between the contending groups while the struggle continues. When the institutional changes survive beyond the immediate conflict, they can have profound structural consequences contributing to the diffusion of effective power in both its institutional and its sanction forms.

One further factor may indirectly have long-term consequences for the power distribution of the society. The use of nonviolent sanctions will reduce the tendency for the struggle group to become themselves brutalized as a consequence of the struggle itself. Violent sanctions in a liberation struggle, revolution, or continuing defense effort mean a constantly increasing round of brutalities, retaliation, and counter-retaliation. The human personality becomes coarsened and hardened, until finally the human sensitivity and ability to react to human suffering wither, and all but die. The person who once struggled against inhumanities now pursues with ardent zeal the methods which when used by the opponent were once deplored, toward a goal the heart of which has been forgotten. This development is unlikely to occur in nonviolent struggles, which provide other sanctions which require abstinence from acts of violence and brutalities. This difference may have very important effects on the nature of the poststruggle society and political order.

Associated with this brutalization is one other factor important to the future society but probably not very consequential for the distribution of politically-significant power. Espousal of some type of political violence as the ultimate sanction of the society, and demonstrations of its practice in the legitimated forms of police shootings,

executions, and war, are likely to instruct individual members of the society, including antisocial and emotionally unstable ones, that violence is indeed the ultimate sanction. It is highly doubtful that our efforts to restrict its use to certain institutions of the State - and then only for designated purposes, and when authorized by established procedures - can be effective as long as certain people, rightly or wrongly, feel that their own objective is valid and can also only be gained by violence. Legitimated acts of violence on behalf of the system may therefore unintentionally contribute to non legitimated acts of violence by individuals and groups with their own problems and objectives. The use of nonviolent sanctions on behalf of the system would not have that effect; it might instead contribute to the use of nonviolent sanctions by individuals and groups acting on their own, even against the standards and principles of the rest of the society. That might not be ideal, but it would be a considerable improvement over the multiplication of individual and group violence.

As a consequence of the effects of nonviolent struggle on the opponent's own power capacity and also on the power capacity of the group applying nonviolent sanctions, a fundamental alteration in power relationships will occur under appropriate conditions. This differs fundamentally from the power situation following the institution of changes by other peaceful means, including conciliation, legislation, court decision, or executive decree. In those cases, unless power changes have been made independently by other forces, the relative distribution of power after the specific change will remain approximately the same as it was before. Nothing will have occurred to change it, and people will not have gained increased abilities to restrict the power of their opponent, nor to wield sanctions themselves. Even when a major limited demand or objective has been thus granted, the people themselves would still be no more capable of achieving their will against the opponent or ruler who is unwilling to grant their wishes. Similarly, the immediate item which has been granted may, when the occasion suits, be as easily withdrawn. That which is given, and not earned, can as easily as it was received be taken away. That which is earned by work and struggle has durability, and is capable of both defense and further development by the people who have become empowered during its achievement.

SHAPING A SOCIETY'S "POLITICAL CONDITION"

The structural influences of violent and nonviolent sanctions playa significant role in determining the political condition of the society as a whole. The "political condition" of a society can be defined as the configuration of three main factors: (1) the way in which the political system operates; (2) what it does; and (3) what it cannot do. A political condition includes such specific elements as: the degree of concentration or diffusion of effective power; the society's ideals and goals; the system's humane characteristics and accomplishments; its capacity to impose a dictatorship, commit genocide, wage wars, and impose or support social oppression, and the likelihood' of its doing any of these; conversely, its capacity to nurture and support freedom, democracy, social justice, and peaceful relationships internally and externally; the degree to which the society serves human beings or stultifies and harms them; and the extent to which it meets (or allows to be met) the diverse human needs outlined earlier in this chapter. Political conditions clearly differ widely, both within a single society from one time to another, and also between different societies.

These factors are not isolated and unrelated specific characteristics, but are interrelated in a variety of ways. On the basis of analyses in this and earlier chapters, it appears that the political condition of a society is closely associated with: (1) the actual distribution of effective power in the society (as distinct from the legal or constitutional allocation of decision-making authority); and (2) the type of ultimate sanction relied upon by the society and the extent to which it is developed into institutionalized capacities. Further attention is needed to the interrelationships between these two factors.

In Chapter Two, "Social Power and Political Freedom," it was argued that different types of institutional distribution of effective decision-making power, associated with the number and strength of the *loci* of power, supersede in importance the formal constitutional allocation of authority. The actual distribution of power in the political society and the actual practices of that society may differ from, or even be incongruous to, the formal constitution or the espoused ideals and doctrines of the society. Both of those are important, but are clearly secondary to the ways the society actually oper-

ates. Strong *loci* of power may impose actual limits on even a theoretically omnipotent autocrat. Conversely, weak or negligible *loci* of power will permit the ruler of a State with a formal democratic constitution to rule autocratically, or even to scrap the constitution, essentially at will.

In Chapter Eleven, "The Societal Imperative," it was also argued that the institutionalized capacity for political violence, once established for any purpose, can be shifted to other purposes not originally intended, and that this shift can be made essentially at the will of the persons in command of those institutions (unless other forces intervene). Hence, dictatorship, genocide, war, and systems of social oppression were viewed as closely interrelated, for they were four applications of institutionalized political violence; without that capacity they could not occur. Institutionalized political violence was seen to be the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the development of those four phenomena. The absence of such institutionalized capacity, on the other hand, should allow more positive conditions to develop. In addition, the decentralizing and empowering effects of nonviolent sanctions, as discussed in this chapter, will tend to produce new conditions and characteristics of the political society which will exceed those which we have termed freedom, respect for life, peace, and social justice.

Both institutions and sanctions are, therefore, seen to be highly important in shaping the political condition of a given society at all times, and they are interrelated. For example, in a society with strong *loci* of power people will be more able to use nonviolent sanctions effectively as they will have organizational bases for group struggle. These *loci* are likely to be especially important when they control sources of political power. On the other hand, the *loci* of power are likely to be strengthened and people's capacity to organize is likely to increase during significant nonviolent struggles, especially when they are strong enough to succeed.

In the following discussion we are primarily concerned with influences of the distribution of effective power and sanctions on the political condition of the society. As a key element in any power capacity, sanctions will be discussed as a separate phenomenon, and we will narrow the remainder of the elements of effective power down to "institutional distribution of effective decision-making capacity."

A SOCIETAL FORMULA

The basic hypothesis to be explored here is that the interaction between the institutional distribution of effective decision-making capacity and the society's sanctions - including their type, capacity, and practice - are the central factors which over time will tend to produce the society's "political condition." As the two factors will vary from time to time, and on occasion change significantly, so as a result the political condition will also change. We are referring to the situation of both factors in the political society as a whole - including the general populace, the independent organizations and institutions (the *loci* of power), and the governmental bodies (including the State). While it is most difficult or impossible to measure each factor with precision, that is not necessary for our purposes; we are dealing with the major characteristics of the distribution of decision-making and the sanctions used. It may help to express this relationship as a formula:

Institutional distribution of effective decision-making capacity	interacting with	Sanctions: type, capacity, and practice	over time produces	The political condition

In the long run, the political condition is created and modified by the interaction of the relative institutional distribution of effective decision-making capacity and the type of sanctions relied upon, including their capacity and practice. Other factors may also operate on the political condition, but these two are seen to be dominant.

The operation of this formula may be illustrated by showing the influence of particular combinations of institutional distributions of decision-making and sanctions, in cases in which these are relatively clear. We will present this for five different conditions which, although analytical models, approximate actual political conditions.

Condition One: In this type of situation, the *loci* of power are extremely weak, or have been systematically undermined and destroyed. Effective decision-making has been very highly centralized in the hands of a very small elite in command of the State apparatus,

which also controls any other significant institutions which are present. The sanctions of the political society are overwhelmingly violent ones. A highly developed institutionalized capacity for such violent sanctions has been developed in both police and military forms. Violent sanctions are widely applied by threat or practice for internal control and in international relations.

When that combination of types of decision-making and sanctions exists in the political society the resulting political condition will be a type of dictatorship capable of oppressing society, waging war, and inflicting genocide if the ruler of the system wishes to do so. This would be true even if the ideals espoused and the ultimate goals of the system were humane, and even if a written constitution still nominally in force established very different procedures and practices. In the latter case, the ruler could easily abolish the formal constitution and bring the official structure in line with the actual political system. Condition One can be illustrated by this diagram:

Highly centralized decision-making	interacting with	Strong violent sanctions	over time produces	Dictatorship capable of extreme action

Condition Two: In this type of situation the *loci* of power are very strong in comparison to the State structure and are capable of independent decision-making even in opposition to the ruler in command of the State apparatus. The sanctions of the State are violent ones, and the sanctions of the *loci* of power include nonviolent sanctions in their internal operations and most relationships with each other. However, the loci of power for extreme crises also rely upon violent sanctions. The resulting political condition will tend to be unstable.

The unstable political condition will include a high degree of freedom and democracy, an absence of systematic social oppression, and the like. However, should a crisis of serious proportions arise, it would result in major expansion of the capacity and practice of violent sanctions. The centralizing effects of such violent sanctions would tend to have institutional effects. As the military requirements

for effectiveness necessitate, and as the institutionalized capacity for political violence in the hands of the State is expanded and applied, the relative strength of the *loci* of power in comparison to the State is likely to decline. This is likely even if the violent struggle, as against an invader, is initially waged by guerrilla war; in major struggles the early decentralist stages of guerrilla warfare are in later stages supplanted by increasing centralization and transition to conventional military forces and combat.

On the other hand, given the initial unstable situation, if in a major crisis nonviolent sanctions are relied upon instead to combat the danger, with a resulting expansion of their capacity and practice, the effects on the political condition are likely to differ significantly from those following violent sanctions. Instead, assuming success, the decentralist institutional characteristics of the society are likely not only to be preserved but even to be expanded, thereby avoiding various consequences of violent sanctions and introducing those of nonviolent sanctions which we have discussed. These situations of Condition Two can be diagramed:

Basic situation

Decentralized decision-making among *loci*	interacting with	Violent State sanctions, limited nonviolent but mainly violent sanctions by *loci*	over time produces	Unstable condition

Alternative A

Unstable condition	affected by	Major expansion of violent sanctions	over time produces	Weakening of *loci* and expansion of State

Major expansion of violent sanctions

Alternative B

Unstable condition	affected by	Major expansion of nonviolent sanctions	over time produces	*Loci* strengthened and differing consequences of nonviolent sanctions

Condition Three: In this type of situation the institutional structure of the society is highly centralized, with *loci* of power few or weak, and decision-making concentrated in a small elite in command of the State apparatus. The State has in the past relied upon institutionalized violent sanctions, but this has ceased to be the case and nonviolent sanctions have become more important due to particular circumstances and responses. This situation is unstable.

The probable outcome of this unstable condition will vary with a number of factors, including the reasons for the shift to nonviolent sanctions and the thoroughness and permanence of the change. The shift might have resulted from a major policy change by those in command of the State apparatus because of the perception that against an impending attack by an overwhelmingly militarily superior enemy, military resistance was suicidal. Or, the shift might have occurred because of a successful nonviolent revolution against the previous system. In the former case, rapid planned or unplanned devolution of decision-making from the centralized State would be necessary for effective resilient nonviolent struggle against the attacker. In the latter case, the devolution of decision-making is likely already to have occurred; either existing independent institutions have become democratized and assumed for themselves significant decision-making authority, or new *loci* of power with decision-making capacity have been created prior to or during the revolution.

The longer-term effects of the shift to nonviolent sanctions on the political condition are then likely to be determined by the degree to which the changes are lasting. If the changes are temporary, and violent sanctions are reinstituted and again become the overwhelmingly predominant ultimate sanctions of the society, then the centralized structure dominated by a small elite is again likely to emerge. On the other hand, if the change to nonviolent sanctions is lasting, and

they become the predominant sanctions of the political society instead of violent sanctions, then the resulting political condition is likely to be one of enhanced popular empowerment, more adequately meeting human needs, and avoidance of the consequences of institutionalized political violence. These situations of Condition Three can be diagramed:

Basic Situation

Highly centralized decision-making in State structure	interacting with	Major shift from violent to nonviolent sanctions	over time produces	Unstable situation

Alternative A

Unstable condition	affected by	Reinstitution of violent sanctions	over time produces	Creation of new centralized elite-dominated structure and institutionalized political violence

Alternative B

Unstable condition	affected by	Expansion and institutional-ization of nonviolent sanctions	over time produces	Popular empowerment and decentralized society

Condition Four: In this type of situation the decision-making capacity is highly diffused among strong *loci* of power with the central State apparatus weak. Nonviolent sanctions have been systematically adopted and institutionalized in place of violent sanctions, and are highly developed with strong capacity to function when needed as reserve or applied sanctions. The resulting political condition is likely to be relatively stable, with high popular empowerment, without the dangers of institutionalized political violence, and with strong contributions to freedom, democracy, respect for life, domestic and international peace, and social justice. The situation of Condition Four may be diagramed:

Diffused decision-making structure	interacting with	Strong nonviolent sanctions	over time produces	Popular empowerment and positive social conditions

Unless completely new factors are introduced, the above Conditions One and Four are relatively stable, so that when one knows the distribution of decision-making and the type of sanctions one can predict fairly accurately their consequent political conditions. On the other hand, Conditions Two and Three are highly unstable. In those cases until the type of distribution of effective decision-making and the choice and development of ultimate sanctions are both settled, it is impossible to predict with any accuracy the ensuing political conditions.

Condition Five: The above four conditions involve either the strong reliance on one of the types of sanctions or a period of uncertainty in which the society hovers between reliance on one type or the other. In a fifth condition effective institutional decision-making is shared, in various possible proportions, between the State and the *loci* of power. The development and use of nonviolent sanctions are extremely limited or negligible; at the same time, however, the violent ones, although accepted as the society's ultimate sanction, are weak and relatively undeveloped. This can occur when perceived dangers and threats requiring strong sanctions of any kind are absent or weak. The resulting political condition is likely to be one of a moderate but significant degree of freedom, respect for life, without extreme social oppression, and few major violent conflicts and wars, if any. Pressures to decentralize and devolve power which come from nonviolent sanctions will be absent, although such pres-

sures could come from other sources, such as beliefs, philosophies, and institutional needs.

This political condition is likely to remain stable only so long as no crises arise which produce a major need for sanctions. If such crises occur, the capacity for violent sanctions is likely to be expanded quickly. Their development and large-scale use will exert pressures toward increased centralization of decision-making and institutional controls, and toward other consequences of large-scale institutionalized political violence. This condition can be diagramed:



Critical examination of this theory about the roles of the types of distribution of decision-making and of sanctions in shaping the political condition of a society is required. If the theory is valid, however, it will have fundamental ramifications for development of new grand strategies of social change which are more adequate than those of the past.

DEVELOPING STRATEGIES OF EMPOWERMENT

Many people readily accept that it is possible to change our political institutions to a significant degree by conscious choice. The capacity to make these choices to reshape our political societies also applies to the selection of the type of sanctions relied upon by our

society and to a decision as to whether our political systems are to be highly centralized or instead possess a diffused decision-making system. Analyses in earlier chapters have suggested that the existing ways to meet necessary functions of a society are not the only possible ones. If effective alternative ways can be found or developed they can replace the present ways as functional substitutes.* This insight, Robert K. Merton wrote, "unfreezes the identity of the existent and the inevitable."[15] With this emphasis on the possibility of functional substitutes that type of analysis becomes a key to basic change, rather than a status quo approach as some persons have charged. This approach then becomes an intellectual tool which makes it possible to develop ways to achieve fundamental change, including the resolution of the complex problem of political violence, which has not only not been resolved but has rarely been faced in its fullness.

RECOGNITION OF ALTERNATIVES AS A KEY TO BASIC CHANGE

Our failure to resolve the problems of institutionalized political violence, and various sub-problems such as war, has been largely rooted in our failure to perceive that violent sanctions are not the only possible ones, and that we can explore the potential of alternative nonviolent sanctions. This failure has been one of perception of both persons who strongly support Western liberal democracy and capitalism and also those who oppose them and support instead one of the socialist systems.

This type of analysis, however, points the way to examination of functional alternatives, or functional substitutes, which, if instrumentally effective, might do the needed jobs instead of the way they are presently done. This may be the key to basic change in our political sanctions. As we have seen in this and earlier chapters, nonviolent sanctions have been used in place of violent sanctions in many situations in the past in highly diverse societies. Alternative nonviolent sanctions therefore do exist. This opens the way for basic change to the extent that they are substituted for violent sanctions. If they are or can be made effective, and if they are adopted in a series of

* See Chapter Nine, " 'The Political Equivalent of War' -- Civilian-based Defense," and Chapter Ten, "Seeking a Solution to the Problem of War."

specific substitutions as discussed in the previous chapter, then the violent sanctions can be abandoned as unneeded. A series of such substitutions would contribute to systemic change involving increasing popular empowerment and institutional democratization.

This analysis of substitute ways to meet societal needs is not limited in its application only to sanctions, however. It can be applied also to our centralized large-scale institutions with their elitist decision-making processes and their disempowerment of the people affected or controlled by those institutions. These include both large-scale economic institutions and the State apparatus. To the degree that we can, step by step, vitalize, expand, and even create important substitute non-State institutions and lower levels of participatory government to meet the social, economic, and political needs of the society, we can reverse the extraordinary gravitation of effective power to the large corporations and the central State apparatus.

As we contemplate the problems of our society and the growth of centralized State power, we need to do more than to conserve those aspects of our society which originated in the past which remain valid and important today, and more than to make changes to right particular wrongs. We must deliberately act in ways which strengthen the non-State institutions of our society, and consciously refrain from increasing the concentration of effective power in the State.

Simple denunciation of the dangers of strong central government, the insensitivity of bureaucracies, or the high tax rates can produce no lasting solution· to the problem of elite control, centralization of power, and constant expansion of the size and prerogatives of massive corporations and the State apparatus. Institutional change is required. One way to do this is to develop alternative institutions to meet those desirable and necessary functions now provided by the large centralized institutions.

Some tasks now carried out by the central State apparatus are not really needed, or are even inappropriate to a society which speaks so often of freedom and democracy. Those functions, and those parts of the State apparatus which are involved in them could simply be abolished to the advantage and welfare of the society. However, most general functions which are (or are supposed to be) carried out by the central State apparatus, and many proposed additional ones, are seen by most people to be desirable and necessary. The State's involvement in meeting those needs will not be drastically reduced or terminated until and unless those functions are being otherwise successfully performed by other bodies. Consequently, if one wishes to halt further expansion of the central State apparatus, one needs to develop alternative ways to meet neglected genuine social, economic, and political needs which reformers propose can be remedied by State action. Expansion of the State into the society and economy cannot be blocked by abdication of social responsibility or by neglect. Nor can it be done by leaving everything to the huge centralized national and multinational corporations. Unless alternative institutions and solutions are developed, progressive expansion of the State apparatus still further into the society is inevitable.

In order to reduce progressively the size of the existing central State apparatus, and thereby its dangers, it will be necessary to create or strengthen smaller-scale institutions (*loci* of power) with decentralized decision-making to provide genuine needs, and then gradually to shift to them tasks now carried out by the State. We need to aim toward a much larger number of institutions, each individually operating on a smaller scale with high democratic participation, cooperating where needed with others on projects of regional and national concern.

None of this is meant to imply that small-scale organizations, institutions, and lower levels of government are always idyllic cases of humanity and participatory democracy. But, at their worst, smaller institutions can do less harm than large ones. With smaller bodies it is easier for their participants and constituents, acting directly, to correct problems. Smaller institutions make possible greater participation and control by those directly concerned than do large ones.

On the governmental level, despite or even because of the developments in politics during the past century, we need to consider carefully various ways to increase democratic control and participation. Hannah Arendt's ideas, discussed in Chapter Six, "Freedom and Revolution," merit particular consideration. Where organs of direct democracy have survived even in mangled forms - such as the New England town meetings or Midwestern farmers' organizations - we need to explore how to preserve them and bring new vitality and responsibilities to them. Where they do not exist, we may need to explore how to initiate responsible experiments in introducing them to deal, initially, with limited but significant matters.

The combination of the gradual development and adoption of

both substitute nonviolent sanctions, and of independent smaller-scale institutions in a stage-by-stage program of responsible change, would help to develop a political condition which implements to a far higher degree than at present the ideals which our society espouses.

NONVIOLENT LIBERATION STRUGGLES

The long-term structural consequences of both violent sanctions and nonviolent sanctions have strong implications for liberation struggles against various types of oppression. Two points are clear:

1. Liberation must be primarily self-liberation; and
2. Only liberation by means which strengthen the subordinate group can contribute to long-term changes in power relationships, and thereby prevent future oppression.

These are not comforting prospects. It would be much easier if one could find some "liberator" who would overthrow the oppression single-handed, without effort or costs being required from the oppressed. Although belief in that prospect is widespread, it is dangerous. That belief is based upon a failure to distinguish between a particular oppressor and a general condition of oppression. In that condition the populace is constantly vulnerable, because of weakness, to whoever might gain the position of ruler and use it to oppress them. In that condition, one oppressor may simply be replaced by another. "Liberation" which is given by the oppressor in a fit of magnanimity or for ulterior motives, or "liberation" which is delivered to the oppressed without major effort on their part by a third party which has intervened and defeated the old oppressor, does not strengthen the subordinates and their institutions, and can be taken away as easily as it was received. On the other hand, liberation which is won by the oppressed themselves, as a result of self-strengthening efforts and the waging of noncooperation and defiance, replaces the condition of oppression with a condition of self-reliant societal strength and therefore cannot easily be taken away. This latter condition will have far more beneficial and lasting long-term consequences.

As long as people are able to think for themselves and maintain their self-respect, they will struggle to achieve, preserve, and extend their freedom. Yet it happens that in many countries and under various systems the power of the ruler and the economic elite is so extensive and uncontrolled that the condition suffered by the general population can only be described as oppression. The particular type of system may vary. It may be the remnants of colonial rule, foreign occupation, economic exploitation, social domination (as of women and untouchables), racist systems, internal dictatorship, or have some other name. When people seek to throw off oppression, to establish popular control over political power, over social domination, and over elites of various kinds, they are struggling for liberation.

The problem of liberation has, therefore, not disappeared simply because most of the old European colonial regimes have been replaced by indigenous regimes. Freedom - in a wide social, economic, and political sense - still remains a goal imperfectly achieved at best, and in many cases blatantly violated in extreme ways under various systems and flags.

The important questions therefore become *how* the oppressed shall wage their struggle and achieve the change, whether they will succeed, what the costs will be, and whether a substantially better society will result in the long run, one which approximates freedom.

The question of how to struggle is often answered by the emotions derived from the pain of past oppression. Struggles for liberation of any kind always contain emotional and highly subjective elements. In any revolutionary situation something intangible is present which is difficult to analyze objectively. It is even more difficult to produce this intangible element by careful analysis and rational decision.

It is a spirit of a people rising against conditions which they can no longer tolerate and at the same time remain true to themselves, their beliefs, and their dreams of the future. It is the willingness at a given moment to stake all against odds which cannot be calculated, lest the intellect decree against the heart which is fundamentally the creator of revolutions. It is the courage to strike the first blow for freedom while others stand waiting for a sign. It is the willingness to go on, knowing, if one counts the odds, that one cannot win. It is a person willing to die for a future that only others will see.

While the emotional element is therefore strong in all types of social change movements, the avowed goal is not simple satisfaction of one's personal psychological needs but to produce change. Espe-

cially in major liberation and revolutionary movements, if one allows oneself to be guided solely by emotions, one may make serious errors in the choice of instruments - both sanctions and institutions - for achieving one's objectives. If one has a sense of responsibility for the results actually achieved, which will affect many people now living as well as future generations, one needs to consider carefully how to achieve one's goals instrumentally, as well as how to meet one's personal emotional needs.

This choice is not simply between the ways which appear easy and difficult. Often ease and difficulty in means are hard to predict, and if one is seeking basic change, there often is no easy way. Nor can one calculate solely on the basis of anticipated differences in suffering between the use of violent sanctions and nonviolent sanctions. Those differences must be considered, and it appears that nonviolent sanctions produce far less suffering and far fewer casualties than do violent sanctions. That is important, but cannot be the single factor considered. Whether one chooses to struggle or to do nothing, the victims of oppression will suffer.

In all cases of oppression, the most important single problem of liberation movements is how to act by means which will change the situation, end the unjust conditions, and establish lasting control by people over their own lives and society. The extent of the change required, whether minor or fundamental, will strongly affect the type and extremity of such action. In revolutionary situations, the problem is simply more severe, but it is essentially the same problem.* The problem is strategic: how to act so as to achieve maximum effectiveness to end the immediate oppression and to establish an alternative system with greater justice, popular control, and freedom. This problem requires the attention of all who would combat oppression and build a better society.

* Barthelemy de Ligt wrote: "The great problem of revolutionary action by the masses lies in this: how to find the methods of struggle which are worthy of men and which at the same time even the most heavily armed of reactionary powers will be unable to withstand." (Barthelemy de Ligt, The Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and Revolution [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938, and London: Geo. Routledge & Sons, 1937, and New York: Garland Publishing, 1972], p. 163.)

KEY FACTORS IN NONVIOLENT LIBERATION

These are a few of the significant factors which must be considered by persons and groups which wish to achieve liberation by nonviolent struggle:

1. They will need to understand as fully as possible the nature of the opponent and system, and of the wider situation in which both the opponent and the group which is struggling will operate. Lack of understanding, or errors in perception, may lead to serious strategic or tactical mistakes. Accurate and fuller understanding of the opponent and society may make possible the choice of the most effective courses of action.

2. The type of sanctions - the technique of action - to be used in the struggle needs to be consciously chosen with consideration of both short-term and long-term consequences, the strengths and weaknesses of the struggle group and of the opponent, and the wider context in which the conflict occurs. This choice should not be left to chance, the decision of small groups, the fruits of bitterness, or unexamined assumptions about power.

In the past, very often the type of sanctions has not been chosen consciously, and too often the rebels have relied upon political violence which their opponent was better equipped to use. That choice has often been immediately disadvantageous, and has contributed in the long run to a different type of society than desired, as discussed above.

3. Nonviolent sanctions - the methods of the technique of nonviolent action - need to be thoroughly understood. This includes the technique's theory of power, methods, dynamics, and mechanisms of change, requirements, conditions for effectiveness, principles of strategy, responses to repression, and alternative means of concluding individual conflicts.

4. Broad knowledge of the grand strategy of struggle and of the nature and requirements of nonviolent sanctions needs to be spread widely in the society. That will enable the general population to act in harmony with them, whatever may be the points of their action and level of participation.

5. Individual strategies, with supporting tactics, are needed for

each particular situation, to be developed with the background of the above, and additional, factors.

6. As large a group of people as possible needs to be developed with a dedication to the cause of liberation, a thorough understanding of nonviolent sanctions, and a willingness to use them in a disciplined manner.

7. Constant attention to the condition of the struggle movement in the constantly changing conflict situation will be required. Efforts will be needed to remedy its weaknesses. Particular campaigns will need to be evaluated for lessons.

8. Where a struggle has broken out spontaneously, it may be strengthened by intuitive and intellectual understanding of the technique which is already being used, and also by initiatives developed during the struggle by persons with greater understanding of this type of sanctions.

9. In a major struggle, to the degree that it is compatible with nonviolent discipline, militant initiatives and strategies of conflict are required, along with accurate perceptions that the nonviolent sanctions are being instrumentally effective. If these do not happen, demoralization or a shift to violence may develop, with harmful consequences.

10. Assuming sufficient strength, the nonviolent struggle movement must persist in the face of repression and intimidation, and refuse to submit. Leaders must set an example in this for all participants: they must not allow the opponent to make it appear that they have accepted reduced punishment in return for reduced resistance. Such behavior contributes to demoralization or to a shift to political violence; it can only be corrected by rejection of those leaders and by launching more militant nonviolent initiatives.

11. Unless the populace and *loci* of power are extraordinarily strong in comparison to the State apparatus, liberation cannot usually be achieved by a single brief struggle. Instead, it is likely to occur in phases. During these phases the subjects' strength increases, their ability to apply nonviolent sanctions grows, their social groups and institutions (loci of power) develop and strengthen, while the opponent's sources of power are restricted or severed, and while third parties have time to shift their loyalties and support. At certain points, dissension and weaknesses may appear within the opponent group. On the other hand, the nonviolent struggle group may

increase its effective power capacity to achieve its objectives.

12. It is essential to remember that this type of liberation struggle is one of constant development and change, with nothing remaining static permanently. At times rapid changes may occur.

13. The forms of final victory also vary, from a graceful negotiated agreement to a complete collapse of the opponent's position and power as the extreme possibilities.

Attention to such factors as these will ensure that attention is paid both to institutions and to sanctions in the course of the conflict in order that the type of society they will tend to produce is compatible with the ideals espoused by those who sought change in the first place.

NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS FOR "UNJUST" PURPOSES?

Nonviolent sanctions have been used for purposes which many people would call unjust, and on occasion nonviolent challenges to the established elite have been met with counter nonviolent sanctions or with other responses that did not involve violent repression. These developments have disturbed some people, especially persons who hold that only people who believe in an ethical or religious system enjoining moral nonviolence should or can use nonviolent action. Demonstrably, others *can* and have used nonviolent sanctions, often with initial effectiveness. Whether persons pursuing "unjust" causes, or persons and groups seeking to defeat a challenge by nonviolent action, *should* use nonviolent sanctions to that end is a more complicated question than might first appear. Our answers to these questions will affect the proposal made in this book to develop systematic substitutions of nonviolent sanctions for violent ones.

The first preference of the group engaged in nonviolent struggle would, of course, be that groups pursuing "unjust" causes, or seeking to defeat a nonviolent struggle movement, should adopt the aims espoused by the nonviolent group. Those types of nonviolent action which seek to convert the individual members of the opponent group, as distinct from those which seek settlements by accommodation or nonviolent coercion, are intended to achieve that end. However, not all people using nonviolent action can or should pursue change solely by the conversion mechanism. In any case, it is naive to expect that

every group which is challenged by nonviolent means will easily abandon their long-standing beliefs, practices, and goals. At times, it is even undesirable that they should do so. For example, the nonviolent group may be in the eyes of many on the "wrong" side of the issue; after all, at a certain point the Nazis organized economic boycotts of Jews, and advocates of integration in the Deep South were at times subjected to social and economic boycotts by segregationists. Even when the nonviolent group is on the "right" side, something more may be required than quick changes in the opponent's beliefs. Changes in power relationships may be required, for example, and these take time and effort to achieve.

It is a fact that persons, groups, powerful elites, and classes are going to continue to hold beliefs, persist in practices, and pursue goals which many of us would reject as "unjust," regardless of their being challenged by nonviolent sanctions. It is also a fact that when these bodies are challenged by nonviolent means those groups will usually refuse to capitulate and will react with application of sanctions. That is a basic "given" factor of the conflict situation which cannot be wished away by those who would prefer it to be otherwise.

It is in this context that the question of such groups using nonviolent sanctions must be viewed. Given their beliefs and situation, they will use sanctions of some type: the only question is *which* type. Does one prefer that such groups use violence? Since ultimate sanctions are of two types, violent sanctions and nonviolent sanctions, one or the other will be used. No third option is available. Therefore, within the constraints of the situation, one must ask whether it is "better" - by whatever standards of measurement - that the sanctions used are violent or are nonviolent.

When the groups and institutions which are backing "unjust" causes abandon violent sanctions to achieve their ends and substitute nonviolent sanctions, those bodies will still be "a problem." It would be far better, for example, if their outlooks, such as racism, which motivate their actions could be replaced by views and beliefs which recognize the human dignity of all people. When that does not happen, however, it is much to be preferred for the society as a whole, and for the group against which they vent their hostility, that the groups shift from violent sanctions to nonviolent sanctions to pursue their objectives. For example, if a "white" racist group is willing, in support of its beliefs, to march under strict nonviolent discipline

under all conditions during that organized demonstration and in the future, that can be a major advance in humanizing the way in which extreme conflicts are fought out in a racist society. That event must be compared not only with the ideal in which racism is abolished, but also with the earlier methods of racist groups, including lynchings, beatings, bombings, and other acts of physical violence to harm, kill, and intimidate people.

Occasionally when people realize for the first time the possibility that nonviolent sanctions not only can be powerful but can be adopted by racist and other groups whose outlooks and policies they detest, they ask: "What if Hitler had used nonviolent action to achieve his goals?" Had Adolph Hitler and his Nazi cohorts shifted from violent means to only nonviolent ones, they would still have been a serious threat but the whole nature of Nazism would have been changed. Racism, anti-Semitism, and elitism would still have been present and would have required vigorous countermeasures from those people and groups who rejected them and who wished to remove their influence. However, without violence the Nazis could never have established concentration camps, tortured and executed political opponents, exterminated Gypsies, Jews, Eastern Europeans, and others, or invaded or bombed other countries. Had the Nazis restricted themselves only to economic boycotts, marches, and hunger strikes, for example, they could in the atmosphere of that time still have done much harm, but there would have been no Holocaust and no war. The issues of racism, anti-Semitism, elitism, and the leadership principle could have been the direct objects of attack by the opponents of Nazism - in contrast to what actually happened during the Second World War. The adoption of nonviolent sanctions and abandonment of violent sanctions by groups whose views and objectives we regard as unjust is a change to be welcomed as a very limited but significant step toward the needed more fundamental changes.

It is far better that nonviolent sanctions be used for "unjust" causes, and that they be applied against a movement for change which is itself using nonviolent action than that those same groups Use violent sanctions for the same purposes. This is because the individual and societal consequences of even this use of nonviolent sanctions are preferable to those of violent sanctions.

CONSEQUENCES OF NONVOLENT SANCTIONS

Nonviolent sanctions, as compared to violent ones, will tend to:

- result in significantly less physical suffering, injury, and death;
- be psychologically far less injurious to the participants (Franz Fanon documented psychological damage to users of violence for revolutionary purposes,[16] and such injuries among United States soldiers in Vietnam are well known);
- affect profoundly the course of the conflict, reducing escalating physical and social destruction, and introduce very different dynamics with less harmful and even beneficial results;
- help to maintain the focus on the issues at stake in the conflict, rather than shifting it to other matters, thereby opening the way for a lasting resolution of those issues;
- contribute to major shifts in power relationships toward diffusion of power and popular empowerment; and
- contribute to the development of a new stage in the application of sanctions in political societies in which unresolved acute conflicts are fought out by use of nonviolent sanctions on both sides, instead of by violence and counterviolence.

This last factor is likely to lead to refinement of nonviolent sanctions in a variety of ways. These will include increased consideration of the factors contributing to success, of human factors involved in the conflict, and of the need for improved mutual understanding. Perhaps most importantly, the uses of nonviolent sanctions for "unjust" purposes and as countersanctions to challenges by nonviolent struggle will contribute to the break from the old pattern of violent sanctions against violent sanctions with its consequent centralization of effective power, great concentrations of institutionalized political violence, and potential for grave consequences.

REVERSING DIRECTION

Present policies intended to deal with our major problems give few grounds for encouragement, and are not easy or free of risks. If something new does not begin to reverse our present direction, the path toward our future is dim. The tools at the disposal of modern States for operating dictatorships, conducting genocide, waging war,

and supporting social oppression continue to be refined and continue to grow. It is our societal imperative that we reverse that direction.

We need not only ways to topple a particular dictatorship. We need to develop the capacity to prevent the development of any dictatorship. We need not merely bewail past genocide. The greatest honor to the victims of the Holocaust, the dead Armenians, and many others, would be to learn how to prevent genocide from ever occurring again. Our need is not only for policies which will enable us to survive or limit a war. We need to prevent wars by adopting a different means of combat and developing a capacity to deny future attackers their objectives. We do not need the types of opposition to social oppression or those programs for liberation which result in continuing powerlessness of people, or, worse, a new system of political enslavement in the name of the people. Instead, we need to restructure human institutions and facilitate self-empowerment so that no one can ever oppress us again.

The analyses in this volume have pointed toward a broad framework for changes to deal with these problems and to meet human needs more adequately, requiring both changes in institutions and in the type of sanctions on which we rely. We need now to develop these as key components of a comprehensive program for acceptable change:

1. A constructive program[17] to build new institutions and renovate and revitalize existing ones to meet human needs more adequately; and

2. Development of capacitites to apply nonviolent sanctions in place of violent ones for meeting particular needs in a progressive series of substitutions.

These main components of a grand political strategy of work, resolution, and renovation rely upon means which intrinsically diffuse, rather than centralize, decision-making and effective power, strengthen the independent institutions of the society, and stimulate self-reliance. Since empowerment of people is an essential part of ending oppression, these means are likely to be, in the long run, more effective to that end than either open political violence or reliance on central State action, whether by legislation, executive orders, or judicial decision. Experience in both types of activities is also likely to increase people's ability to tackle for themselves other problems which beset them and to resolve self-reliantly the difficulties of the future.

A CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM

A constructive program consists of a variety of activities to remedy social problems and meet human needs more adequately. It does this by changing attitudes, social practices, and institutions by means of voluntary organized action, including the building of new institutions and sometimes the renovation of existing ones. The constructive program has been described as the scaffolding upon which the structure of the new society will be built. The various aspects of a constructive program are conceived as an intermeshed program of social reconstruction, in which the autonomous activities of a variety of organizations and groups contribute to an integrated, but flexible, program for constructive development and change.

Examination of the potential of this possible contribution to change is merited, as an alternative to both existing situations and to continued expansion of State action to remedy social ills and meet human needs. The development of an encompassing constructive program requires major efforts of a variety of people and groups with diverse experiences, analytical abilities, expertise, and skills. Appropriate broad fields of work would include social, cultural, educational, political, economic, and environmental problems, issues, and alternatives. Specific areas of work and tasks to implement them need to be selected under such broad fields, depending on the needs of the individual society. These tasks would then be implemented by a combination of individual, group, and institutional action, independent of both massive corporations and the State apparatus, in order both to deal with the specific need and simultaneously to strengthen the society as a whole.

EXPLORING NONVIOLENT ALTERNATIVES

The second key component of a comprehensive program of acceptable change is development of capacities to substitute nonviolent sanctions for violent ones to meet a wide range of social and political needs for sanctions. This includes serious exploration of the potential of nonviolent sanctions, and, where they are or can be made to be feasible, development and implementation of plans to substitute them to meet particular needs for which people have generally relied

upon violent sanctions. This component will at times precede the constructive program and at times operate parallel to it. The exploration and adoption of nonviolent sanctions need not, and ought not, wait until institutional change is at an advanced stage.

Our responsibilities here include three tasks: (l) to survey the resources upon which we can draw, that is, to learn more about the nature, effectiveness, and potential of nonviolent sanctions; (2) to determine what at any given point are the extent and means by which they can be substituted for violent sanctions; and (3) to take those steps as part of a series of specific substitutions. In each of these tasks the active involvement of many people is needed in the investigation, education, thought, planning, work, and action. There is, therefore, a task and a responsibility for each of us.

The first of these tasks includes, among other parts, education about the nature of nonviolent alternative sanctions and noncentralist institutions. This education includes both that offered within our formal educational institutions and that which in more diffused and less institutionalized ways is offered to members of the general public. Let us discuss each of these.

Educational institutions must never become vehicles of indoctrination or distortion by a biased selection of subject matter. However, it is not only legitimate but imperative to correct the selective biases of the past in the choice of subject matter. These biases may have derived from the preconceptions people have held and from the views of special groups. Various topics and fields have been belittled, slanted, or excluded in the fields of study. These biases need to be corrected by the inclusion of important additional subject matter and knowledge. For example, a series of additions to our history courses and texts is required. The field of history is especially important, for on the basis of our understanding of what has happened in the past, we shape our perception of what can happen now and what are the options among which we can choose for shaping our society in the future. Consequently, the primary focus of so many of our text books and courses on wars and the actions of powerful kings, emperors, and presidents, to the neglect or deprecation of major nonviolent struggles, of popular self-government, non-State forms of government, and small political units, of the movements of people to correct the social evils of their day and to build a better society, is extremely serious and indeed politically dangerous. A whole series of additions

to our histories is required to balance the record. Comparable additions are required in courses in other fields.

There will also often be a need far special courses. These include ones which help students to learn haw to make group decisions, haw to develop the skills far effective group participation, haw to resolve conflicts, haw to analyze and resolve problems, and others. Courses specifically on nonviolent action are urgently required in our educational institutions an all levels from primary schools through graduate studies in universities.*

The general public remains largely ignorant of haw this nonviolent technique operates, its history, its requirements, haw to apply it to achieve maximum effectiveness, and its consequences. It is possible to correct past neglect, and to bring to nonviolent sanctions a variety of tools to increase our knowledge of them. This knowledge and various viewpoints about nonviolent alternatives can then be offered to the public through several means, including adult education courses, newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and books. These means can also be used to encourage critical discussion and evaluation of these options. This spread of knowledge of nonviolent sanctions will enable people to consider them intelligently. Ta the degree that people find merit and potential in these options, they are likely to become more sympathetic to serious exploration and adoption of nonviolent sanctions in place of violent ones. This would be a necessity, for example, prior to and during any serious consideration of the potential of a civilian-based defense policy, or any other official shift to substitute nonviolent sanctions.

With or without the opportunity for public and official consideration of the possible merits of shifting to nonviolent sanctions, increased public knowledge of them is likely to have significant effects on the distribution of effective power in the political society. Knowledge of the nature and use of nonviolent struggle is power potential. With new knowledge of this option and confidence in its capacity, people in situations in which they otherwise would passively submit, be crushed, or use violence, will mare likely apply alternative nonviolent sanctions. This will bath help them to deal with the serious and genuine conflicts of our age by their actions, and simultaneously avoid the destructiveness and pitfalls of political violence.

* See Appendix E, "Twenty Steps in the Development and Evaluation of Nonviolent Sanctions."

Knowledge of how to act, how to organize, and how skillfully to transform one's power potential into effective power in nonviolent struggle enables even otherwise disfranchised people, to whom the doors of participation in the institutions which affect their lives have been shut or never opened, to wield effective power and to participate in the determination of their awn lives and society, When blockages are placed in development and operation of parts of the constructive program, people will be able to act peacefully to remove them in order to resume work to resolve present problems and build democratic institutions.

SUBSTITUTING NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS

Effectiveness in this type of sanctions is not the result simply of spirit or the will to change. In addition to emotional components, an almost technical element exists in how to apply nonviolent sanctions with maximum effectiveness. This includes such questions as organization, strategy and tactics, choice of specific leverages, group discipline, and responses to the sanctions of the opponent. In these and other aspects we can learn haw to utilize them more skillfully. We can develop resources, make preparations, and develop training programs far the efficient application of nonviolent sanctions for diverse purposes in place of violent ones. These various steps are important in the substitution of nonviolent for violent sanctions.

As discussed earlier, nonviolent sanctions have already been substituted for violent sanctions in many situations. These substitutions are therefore, in principle, possible.* With the foundation of the recommended research, policy studies, training, and preparations, further deliberate substitutions should be possible. These include both those which are noninstitutionalized initially (as struggles for changes in the society and political system), and those which are from the beginning institutionalized (as deliberate shifts to nonviolent sanctions to operate and maintain the system). These substitutions may begin slowly and with considered deliberation in same situations. They may develop rapidly in other cases.

* See Chapter Nine, " 'The Political Equivalent of War' - Civilian-based Defense," and Chapter Eleven, "The Societal Imperative." For fuller treatment, see Sharp, The Politics 0f Nonviolent Action.

With the emergence of effective substitute nonviolent sanctions a new path for the resolution of the problem of political violence would open. People would not then have to choose between use of political violence and acceptance of political irrelevancy. They will have the option of effective nonviolent sanctions. These alternative sanctions would break the cycle of presumed necessity that each side in a conflict use violence against the violence of the opponent. It would no longer be necessary to postpone removal of violence from politics until the arrival of some distant condition of political nirvana, or vainly to attempt to gain massive numbers of converts to moral doctrines prohibiting all violence. It would become possible to begin specific important changes in this highly imperfect and dangerous world by developing and substituting nonviolent sanctions for violent ones.

Some of the general needs for which substitute nonviolent sanctions might replace violent sanctions are:

- enforcement of minimal standards of acceptable social behavior;
- conducting conflicts in which both sides believe they cannot compromise without violating their principles;
- righting wrongs against particular groups;
- defense of basic liberties;
- liberation and revolution against oppression;
- defense of the constitutional system against internal usurpations (as coup d'état); and
- national defense against foreign invasions and occupations.

Several of these are discussed in earlier chapters.

Two important questions arise from this: Could nonviolent sanctions be effective for meeting these specific needs for sanctions in each particular situation? Could the substitutions be successfully achieved, and if so how? Those questions will require major attention in each instance in which a substitution is contemplated.

The change in sanctions therefore would *not* be a sweeping adoption of a new way of life by the whole population, nor a sudden sweeping transformation of the whole society. It would instead be a phased comprehensive attempt over some years or decades to develop and substitute nonviolent sanctions for violent ones, moving from one particular substitution to another, for those functions for which our society legitimately requires effective sanctions and today

relies upon political violence. At times more than one such changeover might take place simultaneously. As these specific changes proceeded, a demonstrated viability of the substitute nonviolent sanctions for one purpose could facilitate consideration of similar substitutions for other purposes. However, specific adaptations and preparations would be required for each specific changeover where the shift was to be institutionalized in the system. There by, the changes would by stages reduce the overall reliance on institutionalized political violence and on noninstitutionalized political violence for all purposes. The consequences of this, as discussed in the previous chapter, would be profound.

POPULAR EMPOWERMENT

The substitution of nonviolent sanctions for violent ones on a major scale will likely have far-reaching and fundamental ramifications for the society. These will extend beyond meeting the particular need for sanctions and beyond short-term effectiveness for the nonviolent sanctions on the particular issue and occasion. The decentralizing effects on the structure of the political society have already been discussed earlier in this chapter. Nonviolent sanctions will also contribute significantly to the more equitable distribution of power by empowering the people as a whole who learn how to apply them. The combination of these two consequences of nonviolent sanctions can have profound results. This offers an important "handle" for getting a hold on the problem of how to move our society closer to the ideals which it espouses.

People "armed" both with the ability to organize and work together to achieve positive goals in aspects of the constructive program and also with the ability to apply the technique of nonviolent action will not need to seek "someone" to save them - "the government," "the Party," or the most recent political "leader." They will instead be capable of saving themselves, even in extreme situations. Richard Gregg pointed to this consequence of nonviolent action in the 1930s when he wrote:

> Reforms will come to stay only if the masses acquire and retain the ability to make a firm veto by mass nonviolent resistance.... Hence, reformers would be wise to lay less stress upon advo-

cacy of their special changes and concentrate on the teaching of nonviolent resistance. Once that tool is mastered, we can make all sorts of permanent reforms.[18]

Popular empowerment will enable people to revitalize freedom, to make it more durable and genuine. It will make it possible for them to end social oppression by direct popular efforts which turn helpless victims into masters of their own destinies. This capacity can also empower potential victims of genocide and others to resist successfully any future attempts at extermination. Popular empowerment will also help people to cast off, and remain free from, internal and foreign elite domination, by defeating attempted internal take-overs and international aggression by civilian modes of struggle. Because these sanctions build on the basic nature of all social and political power, when bolstered by training and preparations, they provide the capacity to make quickly major acceptable changes in political societies which people have commonly thought would not be possible except in the very distant future.

This type of social change cannot be implemented *for* the people, by whatever means, no matter who makes the attempt - "good people," "true conservatives," "the Party," "real liberals," or "genuine radicals." Instead, this exercise in rethinking politics points toward a process which the general population, consisting of people of diverse talents working through many institutions, may initiate and implement on a long-term basis. It is a process in which people are acting to shape the present, and simultaneously are increasing their ability to act to determine their future.

The conception of acceptable change as presented in this volume can offer no panaceas, no easy path, no guaranteed safety, no assurances of success in every respect and on each occasion. However, the possibility exists that we can deliberately contribute to the development of a new stage of human history. We can resolve the acute problems with which we have been confronted for so long. We can be on the verge of a new departure of human capacities, which we can develop if we wish, in order that people can regain, or perhaps for many achieve for the first time, the capacity to control their own destinies.

NOTES

[1] Krishnalal Shridharani, War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and Its Accomplishments (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939, and reprint New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1972), p. 260.
[2] Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962 [1948]), pp. 12-13.
[3] See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), pp. 10-11.
[4] Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 48
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid. Italics are Mannheim's
[7] Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist (London: Routledge, 1966 [1943]), p. 10. For earlier discussions of the difficulties of violent liberation struggles under modern conditions, see also Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means: An Inquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods Employed for their Realization (London: Chatto & Windus, 1938), and Barthelemy de Ligt, The Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and Revolution (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938, and London: Geo. Routledge & Sons, 1937, and New York: Garland Publishing, 1972), pp. 70-85.
[8] Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, p. 49, n. 2.
[9] On the coup d'état, see D. J. Goodspeed, The Conspirators: A Study in the Coup d'Etat (Toronto: Macmillan, 1962), William Andrews and Uri Ra'anan, The Politics of the Coup d'Etat: Five Case Studies (New York: Van Nostrand Reinnhold, 1969); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, and Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1976 [1962]); Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); Ruth First, Power in Africa: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970); and Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, 1977).
[10] On guerrilla warfare, see Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966); John Gerassi, ed., Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), Chapters 2, 7, 9,21,23,31, and 35; Charles W. Theyer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina (London: Methuen, 1962); and Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (Rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1962).
[11] Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, p. 246. See also pp. 210-217 and p. 247.
[12] Aldous Huxley, "Introduction" to Barthelemy de Ligt, The Conquest of Violence, p. x.
[13] See Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), vol. I, pp. 232-242, 302, and esp. 311; Bronislaw Malinowski, "An Anthropological Analysis of War," American Journal of Sociology, vol. XLVI, no.

4, esp. p. 545; and B. Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization (New York: Roy Publishers, 1944), esp. pp. 265 and 305.

[14] Harijan, 21 September 1934, p. 250; quoted in Gopi Nath Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Third rev. ed.; Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1962 (1957]), p. 276.

[15] Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), p. 52.

[16] Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth (trans. by Constance Farrington; New York: Grove Press, Evergreen Black Cat Edition, 1968), "Colonial War and Menntal Disorders," pp. 249-310.

[17] On the theory and components of Gandhi's constructive program, see Gene Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist, with Essays on Ethics and Politics (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1979), Chapter Five, "The Theory of Gandhi's Constructive Program," pp. 77-86.

[18] Richard Gregg, The Power of Non-violence (Second rev. ed.; New York: Schocken, 1966, and London: James Clarke, 1960), p. 146.