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Social Power and Political Freedom

SEEKING CONTROLS OVER GOVERNMENTS

One of the most urgent general problems in politics today is how to control the actions of modern governments. Their uncontrolled power threatens us in various ways -- most blatantly in the forms of modern tyranny and war. The traditional means of controlling rulers -- constitutional limitations, elections, self-restraint in the rulers themselves, and violent revolution -- have been demonstrated to have significant limitations and disadvantages, regardless of their other

contributions. In extreme situations in which control is most needed, we can no longer rely upon those traditional means as our only options. If we are not to become helpless political automatons, or to be annihilated, we must find and implement effective means of control over the power of rulers.

If we are to discover, develop, and implement such means of control we must *think* about this problem. To do this, we need to go back to a much more basic level of discussion of political power than is usual these days in discussions of the problems of war, tyranny, and oppression. We need to locate and consider the various elements of the problem of uncontrolled political power and examine their interrelationships. In doing this we must be careful not to accept unconsciously the commonly held views about political power. These views will impose limits on our thinking which may prevent us from successfully developing effective means of control. Instead, as we seek to understand and examine the social and political realities related to political power, we need consciously to try to go beyond the conceptual boundaries imposed by automatic acceptance of traditional assumptions. We need to explore whether other means of controlling rulers may exist or be developed in addition to the means of control relied upon in the past.

Before we can even begin to think about ways to control political power in extreme situations, we must look at political power itself. What is it, and what is its nature? These questions are basic to considerations of the means which can be used to control political power when its wielders do not wish to be controlled. Different views of political power and its nature will lead to corresponding perceptions of the options which may be available to those who wish to apply controls.

It is often assumed that the power of a "ruler" (including, of course, not only chief executives but also ruling groups and all bodies in command of the State structure) is rather like a granite mountain: solid, monolithic, long-lasting, or virtually permanent. From that perspective, such power is in extremities subject only to certain possible means of control. One might exercise some control b changing the "ownership" or "management" of the State structure. This could be done legally (as through elections) or illegally (as through coup d'état). Both ways would usually leave the structure and available power to the "owner" or "manager" virtually intact. Or,

one might threaten or implement a direct explosive attack of great magnitude (as a violent revolution or an international war) intended to destroy at least part of the mighty structure. It has been widely assumed that against a ruler unwilling to accept limits or to abdicate voluntarily only such destructive means are capable of weakening or abolishing the power of the regime.

THE SOURCES OF THE POWER OF RULERS CAN BE SEVERED

An alternative view of the nature of the power of rulers is almost the opposite. The political power of a ruler is perceived to be nothing like a granite mountain requiring explosive capacity for control. According to this other theory, the ruler (or ruling group) is a human being (or group of human beings). The ruler has in his own person no more power than any other human being. This insight is so elementary that it is often never noticed. Recognition of it, however, leads to new insights and options. If the ruler has in his own body and mind no more power than has any other individual, then his power to rule must come from outside of his person. That power must therefore have sources in the society, and these can be located. These sources include the acceptance of the ruler's right to rule ("authority"), economic resources, manpower, military capacity, knowledge, skills, administration, police, prisons, courts, and the like. Each of these sources is in turn closely related to, or directly dependent upon, the degree of cooperation, submission, obedience, and assistance that the ruler is able to obtain from his subjects. These include both the general population and his paid "helpers" and agents. That dependence makes it possible, under certain circumstances, for the subjects to reduce the availability of these sources of power, or to withdraw them completely, by reducing or withdrawing their necessary cooperation and obedience.

If the acceptance, submission, and assistance of the paid "helpers" and agents and also of the general population are withdrawn partially or completely, the sources of power are consequently restricted, and therefore the ruler's effective power is weakened. That weakening will be roughly in proportion to the degree to which the availability of the necessary sources of power is restricted. If the withdrawal of acceptance, submission, and help can

be maintained in face of the ruler's punishments for disobedience ("sanctions") then an end of the regime is in sight. Thus, all rulers are dependent for their positions and political power upon the obedience, submission, and cooperation of their subjects. This is an extremely condensed summary of a much longer (and somewhat less simple) analysis.[1] It should be sufficient, however, to suggest that the ruler's power' not only isn't monolithic or permanent, but instead is always based upon an intricate and fragile structure of human and institutional relationships. The implications of this insight are obvious, although immense practical problems in implementing withdrawal of support as a means of control still require serious attention.

This principle of withdrawing sources of power from rulers when practically applied, Could supply the needed effective means of struggle to impose control over rulers who do not wish to be controlled. Means of struggle against that type of ruler are obviously among the most crucial components in the general capacity of a society to control its rulers.

THE SOCIETY'S STRUCTURE AFFECTS THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONTROL

Another highly important component in such a capacity is the institutional or structural condition of the society. This refers to the existence or absence of various institutions, their numbers, the degree of their centralization or decentralization, their internal decision-making processes, and the degree of their internal strength and vitality. One extreme condition would be a society in which every institution was either a part of the centralized State structure or effectively subordinated to it and controlled by it. The other extreme would be a society in which all of its needs were met by a great variety of independent institutions and in which forms of government were present but the centralized State was not. ("State" here refers to a particular form of government which possesses, among other elements, a permanent bureaucracy, a permanent military system and a permanent police force utilizing violent means of control, backed by prison system.) Those extreme structural conditions of high centralization or decentralization rarely or never exist, however. Virtually all political societies have a structure somewhere between

those extremities. The degree of concentration or diffusion of effective power capacity in the society, the degree to which that capacity is centralized in the State or decentralized among the independent institutions of the society, is the important question.

The structural condition of the society affects the capacity of the society to control the power of rulers in two ways. If power: is highly decentralized among strong and vital independent institutions, that condition will be of great assistance in emergencies in which struggle is required to control a ruler. It will greatly strengthen the capacity of the subjects and their institutions to withdraw the sources of the ruler's power in order to impose such control. Also, the structural condition will set the broad boundaries of a ruler s potential power beyond which he may not go without structural changes or deliberately increased active assistance from the subjects and their institutions.

Any particular ruler occupying the position o~ command of the State structure will not necessarily extend his exercised power, domination and control over the society as far or deep as the structural condition may permit. Lack of motivation, respect for constitutionally determined limits, moral or religious convictions, or adherence to certain theories or philosophies of politics may cause the ruler deliberately to refrain from utilizing the full power potential which the structural condition of the society makes available to him. However, if the ruler's views change, if conditions appear to him to require more extreme actions, if personality needs cause him to become more power hungry, or if a new person or group by usurpation seizes the position of ruler, then the ruler may push his exercise of power potential fully to the boundaries determined by the structural condition of the society. The ruler may even seek to undermine or attack the institutions which by their strength set those limits.

This all suggests, therefore, that a technique of struggle to control rulers who do not wish to be controlled and also a structural condition of the society which sets effective boundaries on the power potential of rulers are both needed over and above constitutional arrangements and self-imposed limits of the ruler himself In order to establish effective control over the power of modern rulers.

A technique of struggle exists which is based upon the above view of the nature of power (that it has sources which may be

restricted by withdrawal of cooperation and obedience). This is called nonviolent action. It includes nonviolent symbolic protest; economic, social, and political noncooperation; and nonviolent intervention in psychological, physical, social, economic, and political forms. This technique when refined, developed, and implemented in a multitude of specific situations, may constitute the heart of the solution to the need for a technique of struggle to control the power of rulers who are unwilling to accept voluntarily limits to their power. A great deal of research, analysis, policy studies, and development are needed .on the nature and potential of that technique of control.

This chapter, however, is primarily focused on the role of the underlying social structure in determining the boundaries of the power potential of the ruler. Central to this discussion is consideration of the long-term consequences of the relative concentration of the society's power potential in the State, as compared to the long-term consequences of the relative diffusion of power among the non-State institutions of the society as a whole.

At times, though not often, individuals can significantly influence the course of social and political events by their personal power of persuasion, their connections with persons in key positions in the structure, and their capacity to use particular types of nonviolent action. Some of Mohandas K. Gandhi's individual acts illustrate this latter capacity. However, those instances are rare, especially against rulers who are determined to rule as they wish without limitations. In those cases their power may' only be seriously curtailed or dissolved by restriction of their sources of power. Such restriction however cannot be produced by isolated individuals. The sources of the ruler's power are normally only threatened significantly when assistance, cooperation, and obedience are withheld by large numbers of subject at the same time, that is, by social groups and institutions. The ability of such bodies to withhold the sources they supply is then pivotal.. That abi1ity will be influenced by various factors, including the subjects' skill in applying the technique of struggle, and also the ruler's relative need for the sources of power which they may provide. Important, too, is the degree to which these groups possess the capacity to act independently against the ruler.

Two broad possibilities exist at that point. Power may be so concentrated in the State, and the subjects so atomized, that no significant social groups or institutions exist which are capable of withholding the sources of the ruler's power, and therefore controlling the actions of the ruler. On the other hand, if such groups capable of independent action, and therefore control, do exist to a significant degree in the society, their presence and strength will significantly increase the chances of success in a struggle to control the ruler's power. Such groups and institutions capable of independent action are called "*loci* (or places) of power."

"Power" here obviously refers to political power, a sub-type of social power. Political power here is defined as the totality of means, influences, and pressures -- including authority, rewards, and sanctions -- available for use to achieve the objectives of the power-holder, especially the institutions of government, the State, and groups opposing either of them. Political power may be measured by the ability to control the situation, people, or institutions, or to mobilize people and institutions for some activity. Power may be used to enable a group to achieve a goal, to implement or change policies, to induce others to behave as the wielders of power wish to engage in opposition, to maintain the established system, policies, and relationships, or to alter, destroy, or replace the prior power relationships. Sanctions - which may be either violent or nonviolent -- are usually a key element in power. It is not always necessary to apply the capacity to wield sanctions in order for it to be effective. The mere ability to apply sanctions and to utilize other components of power may be sufficient to achieve the objective. In such cases power is no less present than when it is applied with direct infliction of sanctions.[3]

THE ROLE OF DIFFUSED LOCI OF POWER IN THE CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER

The precise form and nature of loci of power (or places in which power is located, converges, or is expressed) vary from society to society and from situation to situation. However, they are likely to include such social groups and institutions as families, social classes, religious groups, cultural and nationality groups, occupational

groups, economic groups, villages, towns, cities, provinces and regions, smaller governmental bodies, voluntary organizations, and political parties. Most often they are traditional, established, formal social groups and institutions. Sometimes, however, loci of power may be less formally organized, and may even be recently created or revitalized in the process of achieving some objective or of opposing the ruler (as the workers' councils during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). Their status as loci will be determined by their capacity to act independently, to wield effective power, and to regulate the effective power of others, such as the ruler, or of some other locus or loci of power.

The capacity of these loci to control the ruler's actions, then, will be influenced by (1) the extent of the existence of such loci, (2) the degree of their independence of action, (3) the sources of power which they control, (4) the amount of social power which they can independently wield or control, and (5) sometimes other factors. If all of these factors are extensively present, the loci may make freely available the sources of power needed by the ruler, or instead they may elect to restrict or sever those sources which the ruler requires.

LOCI OF POWER SET LIMITS TO THE RULER'S POWER CAPACITY

The power structure of the society as a whole includes both the relationships among these loci of power and between those and the ruler. The society's power structure, that is, these relationships, in the long run determines the spheres and the strength of the ruler's maximum effective power.[4] When power is effectively diffused throughout the society among such *loci* the ruler's power is most likely to be subjected to controls and limits. This condition is associated with political "freedom." When, on the other hand, such loci have been seriously weakened, effectively destroyed, or have had their independent existence and autonomy of action destroyed by some type of superimposed controls, the ruler's power is most likely to be uncontrolled. This condition is associated with "tyranny." "When a man sees and feels one human authority only is the condition furthest removed from liberty," Bertrand de Jouvenel has written.[5]

When the *loci* of power are too numerous and strong to permit the ruler to exercise unlimited control or to destroy them, it may still be possible for the ruler to obtain from them the sources of power which he needs. In order to do so, however, the ruler must keep such social groups and institutions sufficiently sympathetic to him, his policies and measures, and his regime as a whole, so that they are willing to submit, cooperate, and make available the sources power. To achieve this, the ruler must adjust his behavior and policies in order to keep the goodwill and cooperation of the people who constitute the groups and institutions of the society. This is one type of indirect control which these *loci* of power exercise over a ruler, If such an adjustment is not attempted or is unsuccessful!, and the ruler offends the population he would rule, then the society s strong *loci* of power may, in open conflict, withhold the sources of power which they control and which the ruler requires. In this way the population acting through their groups and institutions may impose control over an ambitious antidemocratic ruler or even disintegrate the regime and dissolve the ruler's power.

The reverse is also true. When these social groups and institutions lose their capacity for independent decision and action, their control of the sources of power, or are themselves drastically weakened or destroyed, such loss will contribute significantly to making the ruler's power unlimited and uncontrollable. Under conditions in which such *loci* of power do not significantly exist and the subjects are a mass of atomized individuals incapable of effective group action, the ruler's power will be the least controllable by the subjects.

DELIBERATE ATTACKS AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS MAY WEAKEN THE *LOCI* OF POWER

Quite different causes may weaken or destroy the society’s *loci* of power. Deliberate policies of the ruler to attack their independence, undermine their strength, or even destroy them are only one possibility. Similar results may follow as a secondary unintended effect of the operation of other social, economic, or political polices or forces.

Where the attack is deliberate, it may be launched because the ruler perceives such groups and institutions as rivals, and recognizes that they impose limits to his power and ambition to be omnipotent.

The ruler may then deliberately seek to destroy their independence and even to dissolve the body itself. The German sociologist Georg Simmel argued that the desire of the rulers to "equalize" their subjects was not due to a moral preference for equality, but was instead due to a desire to weaken those groups capable of limiting the power of the rulers. , The particular body may disappear from the ranks of the society's social groups and institutions, especially if it is incapable of effective resistance to the ruler's efforts. More likely, however, the group or institution will formally continue to exist, but will be deprived of the qualities which gave it independence and ability to control a source of power. Less extremely, the group may continue to exist with its independence and power drastically reduced but not eradicated. The ruler who seeks unlimited and unchallenged power may attempt to replace an independent *locus* with an institution firmly controlled by his system.

When such attacks on the society's loci of power are recognized as attempts to achieve an egoistic power aggrandizement for the ruler, to impose a dictatorial regime, or to extend control by an already oppressive regime, then those attacks may be widely viewed as alarming. This is not always the case, however. When the particular group or institution under attack has itself been widely seen to have been oppressive, exploitative, or antisocial, or was otherwise in disfavor, an attack upon it by the ruler who can apply the resources of the more powerful State is often widely approved and seen to be progressive and even liberating. This does not in any way refute the above view that a weakening or destruction of loci of power will enhance the power potential of the ruler in command of the State.

The attacked *loci* may have operated to the detriment or to the welfare of the society as a whole; in either case they will also have restricted the power capacity of the ruler. This in no way means that groups and institutions which operate to harm the general population or sections of it should be passively accepted and permitted to continue their past practices. It is not control over such bodies, or even their abolition, which itself creates the problem. It is the specific way the control or abolition is achieved which may enhance the capacity of the ruler to be dictatorial and oppressive. The problem is created when the control or abolition is carried out by the State apparatus and without the creation of new *loci* of power, or the

strengthening of the power of other existing *loci* which are at least equally outside the control of the ruler as was the attacked *locus*. On this particular point it matters little whether the old locus has been brought to subjection by liberal democratic legislation, by decree of an autocrat, or by edict of a revolutionary leadership. Under a variety of systems the effect is broadly the same. The effect is both to increase the size and capacities of the State apparatus and also to weaken or remove a group or institution which was capable of resisting and limiting the power capacity of the ruler who is in command of the State structure.

So long as the *locus* of power has been drastically weakened or destroyed *without a balancing increase in power by existing groups and institutions or the creation of new ones independent of the State*, the result is in one sense essentially the same: an increase in the power of the ruler and a reduced capacity of the subjects to limit or to control that power. This does not only apply to the present ruler immediately in control of the State. Such a ruler may in fact have humanitarian aims and no desire to become dictatorial. The result applies also to those future rulers who inherit the State's expanded power potential, who may be far less humanitarian than their predecessors, and who may in fact have seized control of the State apparatus by usurpation, as a coup d'état. The same general process operated in the very different situations in the destruction of the nobility and feudal lords in revolutionary France and in the destruction of independent trade unions and political parties in both Communist Russia under Lenin and Stalin, and also Nazi Germany under Hitler. The result in these cases was increased centralization of power in the society, expansion of the power capacity of the State, and a reduction of the de facto limitations and popular controls on the ruler's effective power capacity.

OTHER FACTORS MAY INFLUENCE RULERS BUT NOT CONTROL THEM

This does not mean that a strict mathematical relationship will exist between the degree to which power is diffused among these *loci* or is concentrated in the State, and the degree to which the ruler's power is either controllable or autocratic. As previously indicated,

other factors may also influence the actual behavior of a given ruler, including any self-imposed limitations he may accept on the exercise of his power and any limitations set by established institutional procedures, such as elections, constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions, *provided that the ruler is willing to abide by them*.

This analysis does mean, however, that the relative strength and internal condition of such loci will set the rough boundaries within which the ruler may exercise his power. He may not go beyond them in virtual indifference to the opinions of the subjects. Those limits may under those conditions only be exceeded with the willing consent and assistance of the society's social groups and institutions and not against their demonstrated opposition. *The condition of the society's loci of power will in large degree determine the long-run capacity of the society to control the ruler's power.* A society in which groups and institutions exist which possess significant social power and are capable of independent action is more capable of controlling the ruler's power, and thus of resisting tyranny, than a society in which the subjects are all equally impotent.

INSTITUTIONAL FORMS SECONDARY TO THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

The formal institutional framework and procedures of government remain important in the context of this insight, but the underlying structural condition is in the long run dominant over the formal political arrangements. It is the distribution of power throughout the society's structure as a whole which determines the de facto power of the ruler, regardless of the principles which are avowed for the system or its institutional forms.

Even though the formal political structure of the government may be highly dictatorial, if significant effective power is diffused among various social groups and institutions, the society will probably be internally strong enough to maintain a relatively "free" political system and to limit and control the ruler's effective power. Even a formally "autocratic" regime may be thereby subjected to strict limits and controls. Conversely, where loci of power are weak, the society is likely to be unable to prevent domination by a despotic regime, whether of internal or external origin. A society which

possesses a democratic constitution but which lacks strong *loci* of power is thus especially vulnerable to a would-be dictator, while a constitutionally "democratic" regime may have virtually unlimited and uncontrolled power. Allowing for a time lag, the degree of actual diffusion or concentration of power throughout the society is likely to be reflected at some point in the formal political arrangements of the society.

STRONG *LOCI* OF POWER MAY CONTROL TYRANTS

Examples from the French and Russian feudal monarchies will illustrate how the power of rulers which is theoretically unlimited may be controlled when power is diffused among various *loci* throughout the society.

The important early nineteenth century French political analyst Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that among the “barriers which formerly arrested the aggressions of tyranny"[7] were these three: (1) religion, which once helped both rulers and ruled to "define the natural limits of despotism,"[8] (2) respect for the rulers, the absence of which once it was destroyed by revolutions, allowed the rulers to fall back unashamed upon "the seductions of arbitrary power,"[9] and --: the one with which we are here concerned -- (3) the existence of *loci* of effective power throughout the society, such as the provinces, towns nobles, and families.[10]

Prior to the French Revolution, under the *ancien régime*, at the very time when "the laws and the consent of the people had invested princes with an almost unlimited authority,"[11] the "power of a part of his subjects was an insurmountable barrier to the tyranny of the prince…"[12] Among the sources of this limiting power, Tocqueville continued, were "the prerogatives of the nobility… the authority of the supreme courts of justice,…provincial privileges, which served to break the blows of the sovereign authority, and to maintain a spirit of resistance in the nation."[13] In that age people were closely bound to their fellow citizens; if one was being unjustly assailed, one's associates would offer assistance.[14] The provinces and towns were relatively independent, and "each of them had a will of its own, which was opposed to the general will of subjection."[15] The nobles possessed considerable power, and even after that power was lost

they continued to wield considerable influence. They "dared to cope single-handed with the efforts of the public authority."[16] When family feeling was strong, the "antagonist of oppression was never alone" but could find support among relatives, hereditary friends, and clients.[17] Even when these were weak, one gained confidence from one's ancestry and hope for one's posterity. [18] These and other influences of the independent *loci* of power in the society served to limit the de facto political power of the theoretically omnipotent ruler.

The contemporary French political philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel has described this condition in similar terms. In seventeenth century France, while theoretically the sovereign was all powerful, his political power was, in fact, sharply limited. This limitation was effected in ways which cannot be attributed simply to variations in technology between that time and our own.

> It was ... everywhere denied that it lay with the sovereign will to lay down rules as it pleased; it was not believed that its wishes, whatever they happened to be, had power to bind. Everyone knew that the ordinance of a temporal power was not morally binding in virtue of its form, if its adherence did not satisfy certain conditions.
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> In a word, the sovereign, or his spokesman, were less free under the *ancien régime* than they are at present, and command was less arbitrary. [19]

Similarly, the twentieth century Italian political sociologist Gaetano Mosca argued:

> The head of a feudal state will be able to wrong anyone of his barons, but he will never be absolute master of them all. They have at their disposal a certain amount of public force ....and will always be able to exercise *defacto* a right of resistance." The individual barons, in their turn, find that there is a limit to the tyranny which they can exercise over the masses of their subjects. U unreasonableness on their part may provoke a desperate unrest which may easily become rebellion. So it turns out that in all truly federal countries the rule of the masters may be violent and arbitrary by fits and starts, but on the whole it is considerably limited by customs.[20]

Although the constitution was itself despotic under feudalism, the combined power of social groups and institutions throughout the society, and the influence of less tangible limitations on the power of the ruler, operated to restrain effectively the power of the kings. "Princes had the right, but they had neither the means nor the desire of doing whatever they pleased," wrote TocQueville.[21] Some of these

groups, such as the nobility, might have been opposed to personal liberty. Nevertheless their independence and power generally served, he argued, to keep alive the love and condition of freedom.[22] The very existence of multiple authorities and claimants to the subject's loyalty - instead of a single one - allowed the subject a certain degree of choice and ability to maneuver. In such a situation, Simmel maintained, the person "gains a certain independence in respect to each of them and, as far as his intimate feelings are concerned, even, perhaps, in respect to their totality."[23]

A comparable situation existed in the Russian Empire under the nineteenth century tsarist system. The respected historian of that society and its revolutionary movements, Franco Venturi, wrote: "... the extraordinary power held by Nicholas I, the most despotic of contemporary European sovereigns, was in fact extremely limited when it came to tampering with the foundations of Russia's social structure."[24] For example, when the Tsar, prior to the emancipation of the serfs, sought means to improve the lot of the peasants, he faced opposition from the various groups and classes whose support or acquiescence he required to make the changes he wished.[25] The State was in fact unable to intervene in the relations between the peasants and the nobles. This was "only one more proof of the weakness of Nicholas I's despotism; strong only when it remained static, and weak as soon as it tried to take action."[26]

The potentially active opposition to the Tsar's schemes arose from both the peasants and the nobles. The peasants on private estates almost universally believed that although *they* belonged to the nobles and landlords, the *land* belonged to the serfs themselves. They therefore rejected any attempt to "free" them personally while giving the land to the nobility. Such an attempt could have led to revolution with the serfs attempting to hold their land and also claiming complete liberation from taxation.[27] That prospect was serious because the peasants possessed their own organizations of self-administration, the *obshchina* and *mir* - that is, effective *loci* of power. They were experienced in meeting, discussing, making decisions, and acting together, capacities which had a long history, Venturi reported:

> The State brought into being by Peter the Great's reforms had never succeeded in striking roots throughout the country. Parallel to it, there survived a system of local self-administration dating from medieval times with its organized groups of peasants and merchants.[28]

"It was through these organizations, the only ones at its disposal, that peasant society defended itself."[29] Therefore, the Tsar's government sought control over the *obshchina.*[30]

While the opposition of the nobles to reform has been exaggerated in the West, it was still significant. Their opposition, Venturi wrote, placed the Tsar in a "weak position,"[31] The nobles, too, feared a peasant revolution, and their opposition was intensified by the perception that the Tsar was more desirous for reform than was the case. "The resistance of the nobles was proportionate to the weakness of the autocracy...."[32] The nobles, individually and also as a group, were obviously too powerful for the Tsar to ignore or crush.

The peasants feared dispossession from their land, and the nobles feared dispossession from their serfs. Both groups possessed the capacity for corporate action and constituted significant *loci* of power which could not be ignored. These *loci* of power thus effectively limited and controlled the power of the theoretically omnipotent Tsar.

These French and Russian examples are simply illustrations of the general capacity of *loci* of power of any type, if sufficiently strong and independent, to restrain the power of a ruler no matter how omnipotent he theoretically is supposed to be. The examples should by no means be interpreted as apologies for feudalism. Although Tocqueville has been accused of being an apologist for feudalism, he was quite clear in his own mind that control exercised by *loci* of power in France under the *ancien regime* was not the result of the aristocratic system per se. Instead, the capacity for control came from the effective diffusion of power throughout the society, which in this particular case was a quality of the aristocratic system. Such diffusion of power among the society's groups and institutions could also operate under different systems, and result in similar control over the ruler. The capacity for control is made possible by diffusion of power.

Tocqueville perceived that the impact of diffused power over the power of rulers extended beyond internal politics. It. also potentially included the ruler's ability to wage foreign wars without the support of the subjects, and even the capacity of an invading ruler to conquer a country with a diffused power structure.

> A great aristocratic people cannot either conquer its neighbours, or be conquered by them, without great difficulty. It cannot conquer them, because all its forces can never be collected and held together for a considerable period: it cannot be conquered, because an enemy meets at every step small centres of resistance by which invasion is arrested, War against an aristocracy may be compared to war in a mountainous country; the defeated party has constant opportunities of rallying its forces to make a stand in a new position.[33]

While effective *loci* of power may impose limits and controls over a ruler's power, if they are weak, absent, or destroyed the ruler's power will to that degree be uncontrolled.

THE DESTRUCTION OF *LOCI* OF POWER MAY ASSIST TYRANNY

In the absence of significant power-wielding social groups and institutions it will be much more difficult to exercise effective control over a ruler by regulating the availability of the necessary sources of his power. This applies to any system, whatever its avowed nature or doctrine. If the ruler - whether a king, representatives of an economic oligarchy, or a group of avowed revolutionaries - deliberately weakens or destroys *loci* of power without creating others at least as strong as the old ones, the result will be a weakening of the limits on the power of the ruler. This applies whatever the espoused political philosophy or constitutional arrangements may be.

Tocqueville argued that this is what happened during the destruction of the *ancien régime* in France. Previously, the provinces and towns were able to resist the ruler. The revolution, however, destroyed their immunities, customs, traditions, and even names, and subjected them all to the same laws. Consequently, "it is not more difficult to oppress them collectively than it was formerly to oppress them singly."[34] Whereas family feeling previously supported the individual in opposing the ruler, the drastic weakening or destruction of family feeling left the individual alone in a constantly changing society.[35] Formerly the nobility could challenge and restrain the king. With the destruction of that class their power became concentrated in the new occupants of the position of ruler.[36]

> I perceive that we have destroyed those independent beings which were able to cope with tyranny single-handed; but it is the Government that has inherited the privileges of which families, corporations, and individuals have been deprived; the weakness of the whole community has therefore succeeded that influence of a small body of citizens, which, if it was sometimes oppressive, was often conservative. [37]

Thus, said Tocqueville, the French Revolution overthrew both the "despotic power and the checks to its abuses ... its tendency was at once to overthrow and centralise."[38] The destruction of the nobility and the upper middle class made possible the centralization of power under Napoleon.[39] Jouvenel similarly pointed to the post-revolutionary concentration of power and the destruction of significant loci of power as acts which laid the foundation for the monolithic State.[40] Specifically, he pointed to the destruction of the middle class as "the proximate cause of modern despotisms,"[41] and argued in some detail that revolution in the past has generally contributed to an increase in the power at the disposal of the central government. [42]

It should be emphasized that it is not simply the abolition of the oppressing classes or the establishment of approximate equality which leads to centralization. It is, rather, as Tocqueville wrote, "the manner in which this equality has been established."[43] ("Equality" is used here in a highly relative sense, of course.) Usually this "equality" is achieved by the destruction of the existing loci of power (such as the French nobility) *without the creation of new social groups and institutions with sufficient independence and power to resist the central ruler*. Further, as we shall see, the violent means of struggle and violent State sanctions relied upon to produce such "equality" have frequently contributed to increased concentration of power in the State. It is these particular types of changes in the name of a movement toward equality which constitute a significant contribution to the modern forms of tyranny.

When the diffused *loci* of social power are destroyed without the creation of new ones of at least equal importance and strength, the result tends to be a society composed of relatively equal, but atomized, helpless individuals.

Those individuals will then be without groups and institutions with whose members they can consult, from whom they can receive support, and with whom they can combine for action. Atomized individuals, unable to act together, cannot unite to make significant protest, to withhold by their noncooperation the ruler's needed sources of power, and, in some cases, to intervene to disrupt the status quo. Those individuals are therefore unable to limit or control the political power wielded by the present ruler, or by any new one who may seize control of the State apparatus and place himself at its pinnacle of command.

This process of weakening and destroying those groups and institutions capable of resisting the State, with the resulting weakness of the society and powerlessness of the individual citizens, was clearly recognized by Tocqueville in the early' stages of its development. He pointed out that while the citizen of a democratic country may feel pride in being the equal of anyone of the other fellow citizens, that is not the entire picture. When the person compares himself as an individual to the huge number of citizens, "he is instantly overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance and weakness."[44] The individual tends to "disappear in the throng and is easily lost in the midst of a common obscurity...."[45] No longer a part of a group which is capable of genuine independence of action and of opposition to the ruler, the individual subject becomes but one of a multitude of equally weak and equally dependent citizens. Each has only "his personal impotence to oppose to the organised force of the Government."[46] Under such conditions, "every man naturally stands alone ... and he is trampled on with impunity."[47] In democratic countries, therefore, the power of the State is "naturally much stronger" than elsewhere.[48] Whatever the constitutional arrangements, the capacity of that society to maintain genuine freedom is weak once the State machinery has been captured, whether by election, executive usurpation, coup d'état, or invasion by a would-be tyrant. "What resistance can be afforded to tyranny in a country where every private individual is impotent, and where the citizens are united by no common tie?"[49] How far this actually exists will of course vary with the degree to which that process has extended. The condition will not be so severe if groups and institutions with some autonomy have survived, been revitalized, or newly created. Also, people may in certain more limited aspects of their lives retain a capacity to influence events, while concerning the larger issues affecting the society as a whole and the policies of the Government, they may see themselves as incapable of exerting any effective control. The feeling of impotence of ordinary people, even in constitutional democracies, to influence the actual course of political events is perhaps much more widely and deeply felt today than it was in Tocqueville's time.[50]

This condition has been called to our attention by both Karen Horney and Erich Fromm, among others. A basic conflict exists, Horney wrote, "between the alleged freedom of the individual and all his factual limitations .... The result for the individual is a wavering between a feeling of boundless power in determining his own fate and a feeling of entire helplessness."[51] Fromm similarly warned: " ... in our own society we are faced with the same phenomenon that is fertile soil for the rise of Fascism anywhere: the insignificance and powerlessness of the individual."[52] "In spite of a veneer of optimism and initiative, modern man is overcome by a profound feeling of powerlessness which makes him gaze towards approaching catastrophes as though he were paralyzed."[53]

The reasons offered by various analysts to explain this condition vary. In political terms, however, they all relate to the weak power position of the isolated individual who faces a powerful ruler, of whatever type. The individual does not feel a part of social groups and institutions with sufficient power and independence of action to resist effectively and together to control the ruler's power, because society's independent social groups and institutions are weak, have been brought under control, or do not exist. In modern political societies a relative atomization of the subjects has occurred. The degree to which this has happened, and the stage of its development, vary with the country, the political system, and the forces operating to produce or prevent that process. These variations are important, often highly so. Also, at times the process of atomization may be reversed, either as an unintended consequence of changes in the society's structure or of deliberate changes to create or strengthen independent institutions. In Western constitutional democracies, the relative independence and power of social groups and institutions outside of State control are significantly greater than under totalitarian systems in which atomization reached its zenith to that point in history. At the time of Stalin's purges, for example, "no one could trust his fellow or feel secure in the protection of any institution or individual on whom he had hitherto relied," Leonard Schapiro has written. "The 'atomization' of society, which some have seen as the most characteristic feature of totalitarian rule, was completed in the years of terror."[54]

Such deliberate atomization results from measures of the ruler to weaken or destroy the significant *loci* of power which are structurally

situated between the individual and the ruler. A ruler who wishes to make his regime all powerful may deliberately initiate measures to achieve that objective. This was true in both Nazi Germany[55] and the Soviet Union.[56] "Despotism ... is never more secure of continuance," Tocqueville wrote, "than when it can keep men asunder; and all its influence is commonly exerted for that purpose."[57] Or, the ruler may seek to maintain dominance not by destroying *loci* of power but by modifying their strengths so as to keep himself on top. Simmel suggested that a ruler may encourage "the efforts of the lower classes which are directed toward legal equality with those intermediate powers."[58] This will produce a new *locus* of power strong enough to balance the influence of the "intermediate powers" on the ruler, thereby creating a relative leveling, and thereby assisting the ruler in maintaining his domination over the whole. [59]

The relative atomization of the subjects may also follow as an unintended result of other policies or social changes, designed neither to atomize the population nor to contribute to unlimited power for the ruler. This is especially likely to occur where reformers and revolutionaries use the State apparatus to control certain social and economic groups, such as the nobility, landlords, or capitalists, and where the State is used as the primary instrument for controlling the economic and political development of the country. The concentration of power in the State may successfully control the particular group against whom the measures were instituted. However, other long-term consequences follow from that concentration of power for that control or development. Reliance on the State to achieve those objectives not only utilizes the existing concentration of power in the State, but also contributes to its growth both absolutely and in comparison to the other institutions of the society. Further, that reliance on the State not only does not strengthen the population and its independent institutions, but is likely to weaken them both absolutely and relatively. For example, the establishment of State control over the economy may provide the present or a future ruler with the means by which to "hold in closer dependence the population which they govern," as Tocqueville put it.[60] State ownership of the economy has, for example, provided Communist regimes with the capacity to apply a massive blacklist against political dissidents. The capacity far exceeds that of earlier capitalists, who used such lists far less efficiently to keep trade union organizers from obtaining jobs.

The concentration of effective power in the State not only provides a ruler with means of direct control over the population. That concentration will also tend to exert a variety of psychological pressures and influences on the people which will not only reduce their ability to control the ruler, but even there desire to do so. The individual is subject to the extreme influence of the mass and is under pressure to accept opinions without the opportunity for reasoned consideration,[61] especially pressure in the form of pleas of morality, ideology, patriotism, and expertise. Those who attempt to act together to change the society, or to challenge the ruler's omnipotence are regarded as dangerous and antisocial.[62] The population accepts more and more that it is the right, and even the duty, of the ruler "to guide as well as govern each private citizen."[63] That doctrine is dangerous for freedom, and for the maintenance and development of controls over the ruler's political power.

Whatever the apparent short-term benefits, the long-term results of reliance on concentrated State power to deal with the society's problems may be disastrous for the society's political future.

THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER MAY INFLUENCE THE GOVERNMENT'S INSTITUTIONAL FORMS

The actual power structure of the society is likely in the long run to help determine the formal institutional form of government. A diffused power structure in the society as a whole with multiple *loci* of effective power will tend to produce a more democratic form. On the other hand, a society of atomized individuals and concentrated power in the hands of the State will facilitate a despotic form of government. "What we call the constitution is only the crowning story of the social structure; and where the lower stages are utterly different the uppermost stages must also differ," wrote F.C. Montague.[64] Similarly, Mosca argued that the de facto limits on the ruler's power, or the absence of them, may lead to their later formal recognition in the constitution and the law.[65] The *loci* of diffused power may be so strong that the ruler must officially recognize his dependence on them by institutional changes. "The meeting of parliament had, then, from the start this essential characteristic," wrote Jouvenel, "that it was the convocation of authorities, great and small, to which the king could not give orders and with which he had to parley."[66] Conversely, where such social groups and institutions are relatively absent or weak, unable to resist the central ruler and unable to control the sources of his power, the formal political structure may change from nominally democratic and become openly highly centralized and despotic.

Changes in the formal framework of government to reflect the actual distribution of power and structural condition of the society as a whole are usually made only after a time gap. It may be a lengthy one under appropriate conditions. The outward forms of one political system may continue long after the distribution of power in the society, which originally helped to produce those governmental forms, has significantly altered. The formal machinery of constitutional democracy may continue for some time after the effective diffusion of power among groups and institutions of the society has been replaced by effective concentration of power in the hands of the ruler. If so, the power potential of the ruler may be as uncontrolled in practice as if the constitution were frankly autocratic. Although the old constitution may continue long after the conditions which produced it have changed, this situation is potentially highly unstable. In a society in which the social groups and non-State institutions are weak, already controlled by the ruler, or otherwise incapable of independent action and resistance to the ruler, and the population either does not wish to resist usurpations or feels powerless to do so, a frankly autocratic form of government may be easily accepted. This may be introduced as a "temporary" arrangement to meet a particular need or emergency, or as a permanent change. In the latter case, the change may emerge from gradual constitutional changes, shifts in practice, judicial decisions, legislation, and the like. Alternatively, the change may follow an executive usurpation, coups d'état, or foreign invasion. Sometimes the change may follow directly from the "requirements" for conducting an effective foreign or internal war.

The reverse situation may also occur. A formally dictatorial type of government which originated much earlier may continue to exist for some time after the society's social groups and non-State institutions, which have continued under that system, have grown in strength and in their capacity for independent action; and perhaps after quite new ones with those qualities have come into existence. In

such a case, while the formal constitution is still dictatorial, in practice those *loci* of power would exert a significant degree of control over the ruler. That is, the society in practice would have become more democratic than indicated by the surviving formal governmental form. In this case as well, the altered power relationships and the new structural condition would tend in time to be formally recognized by a constitutional change.

In both cases, the structural condition of the society and the actual distribution of effective power are likely in practice to modify the operation of the ruler's exercise of power away from the formal constitutional provisions and governmental structure.

At times the incongruence between the society's structural condition and the formal governmental structure may exist when a ruler - especially in the form of an ideologically oriented political party --seizes control of the State to impose a dictatorship aimed at remolding the society's underlying structure. The success or failure of that effort would then be significantly influenced by the society's structural condition: whether the social groups and institutions were strong enough to resist that dictatorship's efforts, were too weak to succeed or even to try, or whether they willingly assisted in their own demise in favor of the ruler's objective.

CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER AS A RESULT OF INTERNAL STRENGTH

The degree, then, to which a ruler's power can be controlled by the subjects depends primarily upon the internal strength of the social order and of the subjects themselves. This view is contrary to the currently favored explanations of the ways to control power. It is common today to place nearly complete reliance on the formal constitution, legislation, and judicial decisions to establish and preserve political freedom. It is also common to assume that only the intentions, acts, and policies of a dictator or oppressor (whether an individual or a group) are responsible for the existence of a dictatorship or oppression. In addition, it is also commonly assumed that the removal of a dictator or oppressor will itself bring about a condition of freedom. In light of this analysis, however, those views

are all erroneous. Worse, they are likely to lead to policies which are incapable of producing the desired results.

The view that a ruler's power is ultimately the consequence of the condition of the society itself is neither original nor new. This view has been argued by a variety of political theorists and observers over the centuries.

William Godwin, a late eighteenth century English political thinker, for example, was of the opinion that the character of political institutions is largely determined by the state of the people's social and political understanding. If that understanding is limited, then to that degree the institutions will be imperfect. If their understanding is great, then the accepted institutions will be improved, and those institutions which are rejected will lapse through lack of support.[67] Changes in the opinion of the public therefore necessarily precede social and political changes, if the changes are to last.[68] The degree of immaturity or maturity of the populace will be reflected in the political system, Godwin wrote, producing a dictatorial regime or a condition of freedom. Internal weakness makes a people easy prey to a conqueror, while the effort to hold down a people prepared for freedom is likely to be short-lived.[69]

Niccolo Machiavelli, the sixteenth century Italian "realist" thinker and advisor to princes, pointed to the inability of people unaccustomed to responsible self-rule to maintain liberty. [70] It was, he wrote, a situation comparable to that of an animal brought up in captivity which when set free is unable to fend for itself. It becomes the prey of the first person seeking to restore it to the former condition.[71] "For it was neither the name nor the rank of dictator that made Rome servile, but the loss of authority of which the citizens were deprived by the length of his rule."[72] The degree of accustomed passive obedience under a former prince, or instead the degree of the vitality and participation of the subjects in a republic, is significant, Machiavelli argued, in determining the relative ease or difficulty which a new ruler will encounter in attempting to establish himself.[73]

Baron de Montesquieu, the French eighteenth century political philosopher noted for his views on the importance of a division of powers within government, also contributed to the understanding of the relationship between a society's internal strength and the type of government which it has. Montesquieu emphasized the importance of "virtue" (defined as love of country and of equality) in the

maintenance of freedom and popular government.[74] He added: "The customs of an enslaved people are a part of their servitude, those of a free people are a part of their liberty."[75] Mosca cited, among the factors which are necessary to make resistance to, and control over, the ruler possible, the presence of "organized social forces" not controlled by the ruler.[76] Tocqueville argued that the "passion and the habit of freedom" contribute to the preservation of liberty. On the other hand, he wrote, "I can conceive nothing better prepared for subjection, in case of defeat, than a democratic people without free institutions."[77] Jouvenel associated the condition of liberty with the active vigilance of the citizens,[78] and asserted that when the qualities of liberty exist to a high degree, it comes from "a man's own assertion of his own rights ...."[79]

Significantly, the views of Mohandas K. Gandhi, nonviolent strategist and leader in the Indian nationalist movement, are fully compatible with these theorists on this view of the relation between social power and political freedom. Gandhi repeatedly argued that genuine self-rule *(swaraj)* was not simply a matter of the governmental arrangements and the identity of the ruler. Instead, democracy was based upon the inner strength of the society.[80] He attributed the Indian subjection to English rule to the weak condition of India herself.[81] Because "after all a people has the government which it deserves," self-government could "only come through self-effort."[82] Before self-rule could be established, the people had to rid themselves of "the feeling of helplessness"; they could not act to change the political structure without self-confidence.[83] "A perfect constitution super-imposed upon a rotten internal condition will be like a whitened sepulchre."[84] Therefore, a nonviolent revolution was not a program of seizure of power, but one of "a transformation of relationships ending in a peaceful transfer of power."[85] An internally strengthened, self-supporting, self-reliant India would be secure from foreign powers even without armaments, Gandhi argued.[86]

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS FOR THE CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER

At least three conclusions can be drawn from this discussion about the means by which political power may be controlled:

1. Societies in which strong loci of power are not present and in which the subjects are relatively atomized are, despite formal constitutions, highly susceptible to tyranny and other forms of uncontrolled political power.

2. Under those circumstances, simple replacement of the person, or group, which occupies the position of ruler is inadequate to establish effective control over the power of whoever occupies that position.

3. In order for effective control over the ruler's power to be possible in the long run, power must be effectively devolved and diffused among various social groups and institutions throughout the society.

Let us now consider each of these in more detail.

CONSTITUTIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO CONTROL A RULER'S POWER

We have seen that in the effort to control a ruler's power, the institutional forms of government are secondary in importance to the actual distribution of power throughout the society. Also, the weakening or destruction of *loci* of power is likely to increase significantly the difficulties of the subjects in controlling their ruler.
Not even a democratic constitution, which sets limits on the legitimated powers of the government, which establishes regular procedures for the conduct of government and for the choice of ruler, and which guarantees certain liberties and rights to the subjects, is sufficient to reverse this tendency. Where the society is weak and the democratic ruler powerful, traditional or written constitutional limits to the powers of government and barriers to the prerogatives of the ruler will not be able to prevent seizure of the reins of government by an antidemocratic regime, as by coup d'état or invasion. Nor in that same condition in which the society is structurally weak will the subjects be able even to prevent rulers chosen by constitutional

means from gradually extending their power beyond its legitimated limits, or from imposing an executive usurpation. When a powerful group is willing to violate the "rules" in a democracy, the clauses of the constitution and laws cannot by themselves prevent the usurpation.

However, a structurally strong society with effective power capacity diffused among the society's groups and institutions has the potential to regulate the ruler's sources of power and to struggle effectively to maintain or restore a democratic governmental system. This insight into the structural requirements of constitutional democratic systems is today inadequately recognized even by ardent opponents of dictatorship and advocates of freedom. Instead, democrats of several varieties see a constitution outlining the structure and proper scope of government to operate the State to be the key to the establishment and preservation of a democratic political society. Despite such constitutions, however, a large number of constitutional democracies have been displaced by authoritarian or dictatorial regimes of domestic or foreign origin. This should demonstrate that when a powerful group is unwilling to abide by such a constitution, its provisions and restrictions by themselves are insufficient to control a ruler's powers. The society needs also the capacity to control rulers who are unwilling to conform voluntarily to the limits and procedures established by the constitution.

In a society which is internally weak with power concentrated in the State, constitutional barriers cannot prevent an antidemocratic seizure of power. Under those conditions the subjects will also be incapable of preventing a constitutionally chosen ruler from engaging in gradual illegitimate extensions of his power, or from suspending the constitution itself - perhaps by pleading a national crisis. What do the subjects do, for example, if their elected president, backed by the military forces, declares an Emergency to deal with a supposed crisis, disbands the legislature, cancels elections, arrests opposition leaders, and applies controls on newspapers, radio, and television?

To meet such situations, the subjects must be able to counter the usurper's power with their own power. To do so, they must be able to struggle effectively. That requires possession of effective *loci* of power throughout the social structure.

That necessary condition may not be present, however. The non-State institutions of the society may be weak and already subject

to governmental controls. No group relevant to defeating the usurpation may have retained or developed the capacity for independent action and resistance to the ruler. The normal workings of the whole society may be inextricably bound to the State apparatus. Large portions of the population may be directly or indirectly dependent for their economic livelihood on that same apparatus. People may have become accustomed to passing their problems to "the government" instead of dealing with them themselves. If this condition exists then the chances of resistance to the usurpation - much less successful resistance - are very small. The society's structure and distribution of effective power capacity in normal times, and how it deals with its social and economic problems, will very strongly influence and even determine its ability to resist efforts to impose a dictatorship.

In that situation, the motives of those whose policies and acts have weakened the society's *loci* of power and enhanced the power of the State apparatus are irrelevant. Usurpers will not find their task more difficult simply because those changes were implemented by a government sincerely seeking to correct injustices, to promote welfare, or to provide effective military and administrative capacity to deter and defeat international military threats, or internal terrorist or guerrilla attacks.

In constitutional democracies, diverse groups have constantly tended to give the State greater responsibilities for the society as a whole, and greater power over it. Almost all groups have relied upon the State's military capacity to deal with foreign dangers. Social reformers and revolutionaries of various types have relied upon the State to effect the changes they desired and to deal with the groups which they saw as responsible for social evils or which opposed the desired changes. This reliance on the State has been justified in democratic terms by claims that the legislature or other policy-determining bodies were exercising democratic control for the benefit of the whole society. In those cases, such social groups and institutions as the family, trade unions, religious groups, and industrial corporations have continued to exist outside of the State. However, their *relative* independence and power have almost always been significantly reduced in comparison with the power of such *loci* in earlier periods to control the ruler. Sometimes, the independence and strength of such groups and institutions have been undermined for less noble motives. While the consequences of such undermining

and subjection for whatever motive will differ with the case, in this one respect they are always the same: the power potential of the ruler is increased at the expense of the society.

When the *loc*i are weakened and the ruler's power potential expanded, the possibility of a change in the constitution and form of government toward dictatorship has been created. An immediate change will not necessarily occur, and is often unlikely. At least a semblance - and often some of the reality - of popular control over government has usually been maintained for some time. When this happens the control usually depends on the ruler's own willingness to conform to certain standards-or limits required by the constitution, laws, tradition, or moral code. However, even an elected ruler may be unwilling to adhere to such limits. Or, the ruler's power may be extended gradually in a series of small or apparently innocent ways, so that no one seems to notice or be disturbed by it. Or, the reins of government may be abruptly seized from a ruler who has deliberately behaved with self-restraint by a group eager to utilize more fully the power potential of the position. In such cases as these, the ruler once in control of the State apparatus will have at his disposal the full governmental machinery and system of controls over the subjects and their institutions which have been forged in "normal" times,[87] albeit for very different motives. The populace will then be weak in comparison to the ruler and less capable of effective resistance than they would have been had not the social institutions been weakened and the power of the State increased.[88]

On the basis of his 'analysis of the political effects of the weakening of the independent loci of power in democratic societies, Tocqueville predicted that if absolute power were reestablished in such societies it would "assume a new form and appear under features unknown to our forefathers."[89] He made this prediction over a century before the rise of totalitarian systems in Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

Our experience with the demonstrated inadequacy of constitutional limits on the power of rulers and the severity of the threat of modern tyranny are both sufficiently grave to prod us to look beyond constitutional and legal provisions for additional means to control rulers who are unwilling to accept those limits.

In democratic theory, the right of the citizens to resort to violent revolution against tyrants has been recognized. Against foreign

threats, constitutional democracies have relied upon the military forces. Grounds now exist to make us dissatisfied with the adequacy of those means of dealing with an emergency. Both violent mass revolution against tyrants and military resistance to invaders may face practical impediments to success. When unarmed subjects attempt a violent revolution against a well armed ruler, they are almost always at a severe disadvantage most likely to lead to their predictable defeat. Against a coup which has attacked the constitutional government, they are no better a match, for usually the military forces have initiated or supported the coup. In the case of a foreign invasion, the invading ruler of a foreign State will usually have determined that his regime has clear military superiority over the attacked country, so that defensive military resistance has severe odds against its success.

Guerrilla warfare is sometimes seen as a replacement for those means. However, it suffers from grave limitations due to the tendency toward immense casualties, the dubious prospects of success, the frequency of very long struggles, and the structural consequences. The regime under attack is immediately made still more dictatorial, and the regime which follows even a successful struggle also is more dictatorial due to the centralizing impact of the expanded military forces and to the weakening or destruction of the society's *loci* of power during the struggle.*

Thus, it is necessary to look beyond both the formal constitutional arrangements and such violent sanctions for means by which the population can in crises exercise effective control over rulers, domestic or foreign.

If at the time of such crises the society does not possess strong social groups and institutions capable of independent action, able to wield effective power, and capable of controlling the central ruler, then reliance on formal constitutional arrangements alone to set limits on the ruler may prove disastrous. Tocqueville warned of the plight in such a situation:

> ... democratic nations ... easily bring their whole disposable force into the field, and when the nation is wealthy and populous it soon becomes victorious; but if ever it is conquered, and its territory invaded, it has few

* For a fuller discussion of these problems with violent revolution, coup d'état, and guerrilla warfare, see Chapter Twelve, "Popular Empowerment," subchapter: Sanctions and Society.

> resources at command; and if the enemy takes the capital, the nation is lost. This may very well be explained: as each member of the community is individually isolated and extremely powerless, no one of the whole body can either defend himself or present a rallying point to others. Nothing is strong in a democratic country except the State; as the military strength of the State is destroyed by the destruction of the army, and its civil power paralysed by the capture of the chief city, all that remains is only a multitude without strength or government, unable to resist the organised power by which it is assailed .... (A)fter such a catastrophe, not only is the population unable to carryon hostilities, but it may be apprehended that they will not be inclined to attempt it.[90]

SIMPLE CHANGE OF RULERS IS ALSO INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH LASTING CONTROL

By now it should be clear that the establishment of real and lasting control over the power of rulers is not to be achieved simply by exchanging one ruler for another to occupy the pinnacle of command. More basic changes are required. Yet, in constitutional democracies most of the political debate focuses on *who* should control the formal political structure. If we are concerned with implementation of democratic principles, the more fundamental question is instead this: what kind of a social and political order is in the long run desirable and capable of solving the problem of the control of political power?

The primary focus on personnel or faction rather than on structure has resulted in part from a lack of clear thinking. We have usually failed to distinguish between a specific tyrant and the condition and system of tyranny.[91] From this it has followed that whereas major efforts may have been made to remove the tyrant, little or no attention was given to changing the condition which made the tyranny possible. At those times when people have sought active means of struggle to combat a domestic or intruding foreign tyrant, little or no attention has been given to the conscious choice of means of struggle which would not only have the chance of immediate effectiveness but also would in the long run help to establish firm control capacity over the power of any ruler. In some cases, to the contrary, the means of combat used actually appear to have made long-term control more difficult.

We have also failed to distinguish between popular elections to choose the personnel or party to occupy the position of ruler and the condition in which people possess the opportunity for active participation in the political society.[92] As a result, major attention has been focused on periodic elections. However, little or no attention has been given to the need for diffused power among various social groups and institutions, nor to strengthening the capacity of the people to make important decisions for themselves and to maintain effective control over the ruler's power.

A change in the personnel or party occupying the position of ruler mayor may not make a difference. Sometimes the difference will be significant, for better or for worse. Whether the change makes a difference, and if so what it is, appears to vary with such factors as these: (1) the degree of the ruler's self-control; (2) his social and political aims; and (3) the means used to obtain the position of ruler, to maintain that position, and to implement policies. If differences exist between a former and a new ruler, it is these three factors which are influential, not just a simple change in the personnel occupying the position of ruler, nor even in the capacity of the subjects to influence the choice of the new personnel. Neither such a change nor such influence necessarily demonstrate the capacity of the population to *control* their ruler if he is *unwilling* to be controlled. The political situations in which rulers do not wish to submit to restrictions and limitations on the exercise of their power are the most crucial and dangerous ones, and urgently require solutions.

Often the ability of the subjects to help to select their ruler, and to influence the political policies and practices of a ruler who is willing to be influenced, will be confused with the ability actually to *control* the exercise of power by a ruler who is determined to proceed without restrictions. That confusion is likely to create the illusion of greater democratic control than is in fact the case. This illusion may make it easier for the ruler to extend his control and power, while the subjects become more complacent and less interested in asserting control themselves and less willing to resist.[93] This confusion may also help to create the impression that there is greater difference between rivals for the position of ruler than is in fact the case. Tocqueville's insight is still valid: "Our contemporaries are therefore much less divided than is commonly supposed; they are constantly disputing as to the hands in which the supremacy is to be vested, but they readily agree upon the duties and the rights of that supremacy."[94]

Since the degree to which the ruler's capacity to wield power is actually exercised will vary with the factors listed above, a change of ruler may result in a short-term change in the extent and manner in which the ruler's power is applied. Very importantly, however, a change of personnel occupying the position of ruler does not itself reduce the *capacity* of whoever is ruler to wield power uncontrolled by the subjects. That change will only accompany the change of ruler if both the *loci* of power throughout the society and also the subjects' capacity to resist the ruler have been strengthened before the change in personnel, or during the efforts to achieve that change. Otherwise, no change in the potential for tyranny will have occurred. A growth of the society's capacity for freedom is therefore necessary if tyranny itself is to be ended as well as the regime of a particular tyrant.

> For a revolution formed by liberty becomes a confirmation of liberty [wrote Montesquieu]. A free nation may have a deliverer: a nation enslaved can have only another oppressor. For whoever is able to dethrone an absolute prince has a power sufficient to become absolute himself.[95]

Even when there appears to be some change in the outward form and constitution of the political system, the actual change may be more limited than it appears to be if the underlying power structure itself remains intact. The change from monarchy to a republic, said Jouvenel, maintained the whole monarchical State intact, while the position of the king was taken by "the representatives of the Nation."[96] "…[O]nce the principle of the unchecked and unbounded sovereignty of a human will is admitted, the resulting regime is in substance the same, to whatever person, real or fictive, this sovereign will is attributed."[97] Because of this, systems which appear most opposed, but which confer comparable uncontrolled power on the person or group occupying the position of ruler, have much in common.[98]

Under a system with a firm structure in which one group is superordinate and another subordinate, Simmel wrote, unless "a fundamental change in the social form" occurs, even "the liberation of the subordinates often does not entail general freedom ... but only the rise of the subordinates into the ruling stratum."[99] Unless "the liberation of the subordinates" has been preceded or accompanied by the break-up of the concentration of effective power and its diffusion throughout the society and by the strengthening of the institutions of

the society in comparison to the ruler, the simple change of persons in the position of ruler will not increase the subjects' capacity to control the ruler's power capacity. This is true whether the position of ruler continues to be occupied by the same personnel for a long time, or the personnel in that position are periodically changed while the society's power structure remains essentially unaltered.[100] If the political power of rulers is to be brought under control, clearly some more fundamental changes are required.

DEVOLUTION OF POWER IS ESSENTIAL FOR LASTING CONTROL

The establishment of a lasting capacity to exercise effective control over political power - especially in crises - requires strengthening the society at the expense of the ruler. That is to say, the establishment of such control requires significant devolution of effective power capacity among a variety of social groups and institutions. Those *loci* of power then will be able to play significant roles in the normal functioning of the society, and also be capable of wielding effective power, and of controlling the availability of the sources of power to the ruler.

It is not sufficient that these groups and institutions be permitted to make suggestions to the ruler, and to help administer his policies. They must be capable of making independent decisions and of carrying them out themselves. "How," asked Tocqueville, "can a populace unaccustomed to freedom in small concerns, learn to use it temperately in great affairs?"[101] Thus, the establishment of the capacity to wield effective control over the power of rulers requires social changes contrary to important trends in modern politics.

Where *loci* with such capacities still exist in a society, it would normally be important to preserve and improve them. Or, if they are for some reason unsuitable, it would be important to build up alternative groups and institutions. Where it is deemed necessary to weaken or remove certain existing groups and institutions which are themselves engaged in undesirable activities - say, oppressing other parts of the population - it would be important to do this by means which would not concentrate further power with the ruler and weaken relatively the general populace. In those cases it would be necessary to replace the old *loci* with new voluntary groups, associations, and

institutions with effective independent power capacities. The new *loci* would then help to make the liberty of the individual subjects more secure while not diminishing their equality.[102] If freedom is to be preserved, each citizen must "combine with his fellow-citizens for the purpose of defending it. ... "[103]

Many - probably most - rulers are likely to discourage or actively oppose this devolution of power and strengthening of the society's voluntary groups and institutions. The idea itself may be regarded as subversive. However, at times a ruler may genuinely believe in democratic principles and may therefore even encourage and facilitate the process of devolution. The regime alone cannot carry out the process, however; it requires the active initiative, participation, and acceptance of responsibility by the groups, associations, and institutions of the society. In most other cases, the development and strengthening of such *loci* may be achieved quite independently by voluntary efforts alone, as Gandhi envisaged the development of a decentralized society through his constructive program.[104] Also, existing groups may contribute to such devolution by their struggles to achieve a relatively greater freedom of action, self-determination, or local control for neighborhoods, towns, and regions, and full autonomy for nationalities under external rule.

The means of struggle used in such situations and the type of ultimate sanction relied upon by the society and by the *loci* in crises will also be important in influencing the devolution or concentration of power in that political society, as we shall examine in more detail. Other means of achieving devolution may be developed and old ones refined. But whatever may be the variety of means which are instrumental to that end, the devolution of effective power throughout the social structure as a whole is one of the requirements for a lasting capacity to prevent tyranny and other expressions of uncontrolled political power.*

For establishing effective control over rulers, both questions of social organization and of techniques of action (including ultimate sanctions) are relevant. In seeking to solve the problem of the control of political power, and in trying to find means to develop the kind of

* This discussion of institutional devolution of power is developed more fully in Chapter Twelve, “Popular Empowerment,” subchapter: Developing Strategies of Empowerment.

society which facilitates that control, we need to seek answers to these questions:

1. How can people organize a free society in ways that preserve and improve its capacity to remain free?

2. How can people produce social and political changes in ways which will both deal with the particular problem and also facilitate, not hinder, the long-term control of political power?

3. How can a society deal with particular instances of uncontrolled political power (as in oppression, tyranny, and war) by means which both help to solve the immediate problem and also help to control and diffuse -- not concentrate -- political power in the long run?

These and other such questions are closely related to the technique of action used to produce changes and the type of sanction relied upon to maintain the social system. This is because the nature of the sanctions applied in conflicts and for enforcement has a close causal connection to the degree of concentration or diffusion of power in the society. We need increased insight into that connection between sanctions and structure.

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE POWER

The two broad alternative types of sanctions may be called political violence[105] and nonviolent action. These two types are likely to have quite different effects on the future concentration of power in the society. Setting aside for the moment other questions related to violent and nonviolent action in politics, let us consider briefly how the choice of one or the other of these types of sanctions as the technique of control of a ruler or of an institution may significantly influence the long-term capacity of the subjects to control political power.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE CONTRIBUTES TO THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER

It has been widely recognized that violent revolutions and wars have been accompanied by and followed by increased centralization of power in the ruler. This recognition has by no means been limited to

opponents of political violence and centralization. However, even when critics of the established social and political system - such as Karl Marx - have had this insight, they have rarely asked *why* centralized power was associated with political violence. Furthermore, they have rarely asked whether political violence was then compatible with the establishment of lasting effective control over the power of rulers. To the contrary, it has often happened that those persons sharply aware of the existing tendencies toward centralization have pressed for policies and measures which seem to have ensured that the centralization of power in the ruler and the difficulties of controlling that power would be *increased.* Both Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin did so. Little attention has been paid to the very possible connection between the technique of action relied upon in struggle and the degree to which effective power is diffused among social groups and institutions or concentrated in the position of ruler.

Marx referred to the French State as "an immense bureaucratic and military organization" and as a "frightful parasitic body ...."All political upheavals" in France from the first French Revolution to the coup of Louis Napoleon "perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that strove in turn for mastery regarded possession of this immense state edifice as the main booty for the victor."[106] Lenin - who intended to use this centralized State apparatus in Russia for his own ends - in 1917 referred to this passage from Marx as a "tremendous step forward" in Marxism: " ... all revolutions which have taken place up to the present have helped to perfect the state machinery, whereas it must be shattered, broken to pieces." Lenin declared: "This conclusion is the chief and fundamental thesis in the Marxist theory of the State."[107] His basic Jacobin theory of revolution and his practice were, however, very different from that view, although he presented them as compatible.

Following a violent revolution in which a new group has seized control of the State, the new rulers have sometimes been regarded for a time as more humanitarian and less oppressive than the former regime. There has been no guarantee, however, that they would remain so. Lenin did not. Nor was any barrier established in his system to prevent others who somehow obtained the position of ruler after Lenin from behaving far more autocratically, as Stalin did.

The weakening of the society's groups, associations, and institutions, and the concentration of effective power capacity in the hands

of the position of ruler consequently did not - could not - bring to the subjects increased ability to control the power of any future ruler who did not wish to be controlled. This process, argued Jouvenel, laid the foundation for the "monolithic State."[108]

Although the centralizing effect of war has been especially obvious in the twentieth century, the tendency had certainly been demonstrated earlier.[109] Technological changes and the near complete breakdown of the distinction between civilians and the military forces have accentuated this tendency. Effective mobilization of manpower and other resources into an efficient war machine, the necessity of centralized planning and direction, the disruptive effect of dissention and incomplete control, and the increase in the military might available to the ruler, all contribute to the strong tendency of modern war to concentrate more and more effective power in the hands of the ruler.

Other types of political violence may also contribute to this centralizing process. Modern developments in technology and political organization appear to be accentuating the tendencies of political violence toward centralization of effective power capacity.[110] Among these factors are the following:

1. Centralized direction and control of the preparations for and the waging of political violence is generally necessary if the violence is to be applied efficiently.

2. This requires centralized control of the weapons (and other material resources), the active combatants, and the groups and institutions on which these depend.

3. Such control (as in factors I and 2) means increased power during the struggle for those exercising that control, including the ability to apply physical violence to maintain it.

4. After a successful struggle by political violence, the group which controlled the conduct of the struggle is likely to retain the power capacity which it accumulated during the struggle. Or, if a coup d'état takes place, others, or a section of the original group, will obtain control of that institutionalized power capacity. *

5. The taking-over of the old State, strengthened by the newly accumulated additional power capacity, will mean an overall increase

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* For an extended analysis of some of the consequences of institutionalized political violence see Chapter Eleven, "The Societal Imperative," and Chapter Twelve, "Popular Empowerment."

in the effective power capacity of future rulers as compared to the old ones.

6. That power capacity is also likely to be increased by the destruction or weakening during the struggle of effective *loci* of power, with the result that the subjects are left relatively weakened vis-à-vis the ruler.

7. The new regime born out of violence will require reliance on violence, and therefore centralization, to defend itself from internal and external enemies.

8. In a society in which subjects and ruler alike regard violence as the only kind of effective power and the only real means of struggle, and in which the ruler has a vast capacity to wield political violence, the subjects are likely to feel helpless.

These factors and others help to reduce the capacity of subjects to control a ruler's power in a society which has relied upon political violence as its supreme sanction and means of struggle.

NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE DIFFUSION OF POWER

Nonviolent action appears to have a quite different long-term effect on the distribution of power in the society. Not only does this technique not have the centralizing effects of political violence, but it appears to contribute significantly to the diffusion of effective power throughout the society. This, in turn, is likely to make it easier in the long run for the subjects to control their ruler's exercise of power. Widespread application of nonviolent action in place of political violence appears to diffuse power capacity among the subjects for these reasons: [111]

1. Although strong leadership may play an important role m initiating a nonviolent struggle movement, as the conflict develops and the original leadership is imprisoned or otherwise removed by the opponent, a continuing central leadership group frequently ceases to be necessary and, indeed, is often impossible to maintain. In other cases in which leadership continues, participants still require a greater self-reliance. The movement as a whole thus tends to become self-reliant, and in extreme situations effectively leaderless. Especially under severe repression, efficiency in nonviolent action

requires that the participants be able to act without dependence on a central leadership group.

2. The movement cannot be centrally controlled by the regulation of the distribution of weapons and ammunition to the combatants, because in nonviolent action there are no material weapons. Instead, the actionists depend on such qualities as their bravery, ability to maintain nonviolent discipline, and skill in applying the technique. These qualities and skills are more likely to develop with use. Thus, such practice helps to produce greater self-reliance than in the case of troops who rely on replenishment of equipment, ammunition, and orders from commanding officers.

3. The centralizing forces operating in political violence are not present in nonviolent action. The degree of dependence on the nonviolent leaders is reduced as the campaign proceeds. If they are to continue as leaders, it is only because of their voluntarily accepted moral authority and of people's perception of them as skillful leaders and strategists, not because of any capacity to enforce their will by threats or infliction of violence against the participants themselves.

4. Where the leaders do not accumulate in the course of the struggle the capacity to wield political violence, there are no such institutionalized means of repression ready to apply against their followers and others in the poststruggle period.

5. Where some of the leaders following the nonviolent struggle accept positions in the State, including that of ruler, as occurs following a national independence struggle, it is true that they will have at their disposal the police and military capacities of that State, but these will not have been increased by their own accumulated military forces and capacity to wage political violence.

6. The social groups and institutions throughout the society will not have been weakened or destroyed by political violence, or subordinated to its requirements. To the contrary, in nonviolent struggle these *loci* of power are likely to have been strengthened. The experience of working closely together in the struggle, demonstrating greater self-reliance, and gaining experience in means of asserting their ability to continue and to resist the opponent's repression and regimentation, are likely in a successful nonviolent struggle to have strengthened such *loci* appreciably. Gandhi often described a nonviolent action campaign as a means by which the people would generate

the strength to enable them to advance toward achieving their political goals.[112]

7. A nonviolent campaign for a specific political objective cannot be expected to be followed immediately by the full rejection of violence by that political society in all situations. However, it is a step in that direction which may, or may not, be later followed by other substitutions of nonviolent sanctions for violent ones.

Changes won by political violence are likely to require continued political violence to defend them. Those changes "given" without effort can be as easily taken away. However, in the course of achieving changes by nonviolent struggle, the populace also generates the capacity to defend those changes nonviolently.[113] Changes achieved by nonviolent action are therefore likely to be more lasting. Such changes also contribute to freeing the society in that specific area from the "necessity" of relying on political violence to maintain the social structure.[114]

8. Whereas following a struggle with political violence, the subjects are likely to feel relatively helpless when they compare their own power capacity with that of the ruler, a quite different situation is likely to have developed during a successful nonviolent struggle. In the first place, they are likely to have experienced a transformation of their *potential* power into *effective* or real power by successful nonviolent action. Such experience will give them confidence, resources, and skill which will enhance their future ability to change their society and to control their ruler's effective power. This kind of training in "battle" helps to increase the subjects' capacity to apply the technique in future crises, contributes to the devolution of effective power and power capacity in the society,[115] and enhances the ability of that society as a whole to control rulers of domestic or foreign origin who would seek to impose their will against the will of the citizenry.

If valid, the discussion in this section has various important practical consequences. Even if we assume equal short-term effectiveness for the two types of sanctions, the choice of one or the other will have quite different long-term consequences for the society.*

* For further discussion of the long-term effects of violent and nonviolent sanctions, and of deliberate replacement of violent with nonviolent sanctions, see Chapter Twelve, "Popular Empowerment," subchapter: Sanctions and Society, and subchapter: Developing Strategies of Empowerment.

THE NEED TO THINK

This chapter has been an attempt to offer in broad outlines some thoughts about the relationship between the ruler's power capacity and the underlying distribution of power capacity throughout the social structure. The influence of alternative sanctions and means of struggle on the distribution of power capacity has also been explored. The dangers of uncontrolled political power are so severe that solutions to that problem are imperative. However, not every proposal for dealing with a problem is likely to have the same results when put into action. Past proposals for controlling political power have had very limited success, have proven to be impotent, or have even been counterproductive. Even when "successful," the frequency with which past efforts appear to have contributed to reduced capacity for long-term control of power should stimulate us to seek more satisfactory solutions. That search requires that, among other things, we think about the nature of the problem and the requirements of a satisfactory solution.

Such attempts to think again about long-standing problems are at times unsettling. We are left often with a feeling of dissatisfaction. The adequacy of traditional "solutions" is thrown into doubt, while the alternative analysis of the nature of the problem and the alternative proposed "solution" both remain inadequately developed. Such unease may, however, be beneficial if it stimulates us to think, and ours 'elves to contribute to the effort to solve the problem before us.

NOTES

1. See Gene Sharp, **The Politics of Nonviolent Action** (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), Chapter One.
2. See ibid., Chapters Two-Fourteen for an analysis of the nature of nonviolent struggle.
3. For some related definitions of power, see Robert M. MacIver, **The Web of Government** (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 82 and 87; Martin J. Hillenbrand, **Power and Morals** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 4-5; Jacques Maritain, **Man and the State** (London: Hollis & Carter, 1954), p. 114; and Harold D. Lasswell, **Power and Personality** (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1948), p. 12.
4. MacIver writes: "What power the government wields and to what ends it directs this power depends on these other forces [loci of power], on the manner in which they are operatively adjusted to one another in the

struggle and clash, the convergence and divergence, of power-possessing interests." (MacIver, **The Web of Government**, p. 91.)

5. Bertrand de Jouvenel, **Sovereignty: An Enquiry into the Public Good** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, and Cambridge at the University Press, 1957), p. 71.
6. Georg Simmel writes: "The ruler's chief motive in equalizing hierarchical differences derives from the fact that relations of strong superordination and subordination among his subjects actually and psychologically compete with his own superordination. Besides, too great an oppression of certain classes by others is as dangerous to despotism as is-the too great power of these oppressing classes." (Georg Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simmel** [Trans, ed., and with an Introduction by Kurt H. Wolff; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950], p. 198.)
7. Alexis de Tocqueville, **Democracy in America** [Trans. by Henry Reeve, C.B.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), vol. I, p. 332.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 333.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 332.
12. Ibid., p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 332.
14. Ibid., vol. II, p. 296.
15. Ibid., vol. I, p. 333.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 334.
18. Ibid.
19. Jouvenel, **Sovereignty**, p. 200.
20. Gaetano Mosca, **The Ruling Class *(Elementi de Scienza Politica)*** (Trans. by Hannah D. Kahn; ed. and rev. with an Introduction by Arthur Livingstone; New York and London: McGraw-HilI, 1939), p. 141.
21. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. I, p. 332.
22. Ibid.
23. Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simmel**, p. 232.
24. Franco Venturi, **Roots of Revolution** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, and London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), p. 66.
25. See ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 67.
27. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
28. Ibid., p. 198.
29. Ibid., p. 70.
30. Ibid., p. 71.
31. See ibid., pp. 72-73.
32. Ibid., p. 72.
33. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 258.
34. Ibid., vol. I, p. 333.
35. Ibid., p. 334.
36. Ibid., p. 9.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 93.
39. Ibid., vol. II, p. 271.
40. Bertrand de Jouvenel, **Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth** (Trans. by J. F. Huntington; Boston: Beacon Paperback, 1962, and London: Batchworth Press 1952 [1945]), pp. 244-246.
41. Ibid., p. 295.
42. See ibid., pp. 185-200.
43. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II., p. 272.
44. Ibid., p. 9; see also p. 47.
45. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 333-334.
46. Ibid., p. 334.
47. Ibid., vol. 11, p. 296.
48. Ibid., p. 258.
49. Ibid., vol. I, p. 92.
50. See, for example, Karen Horney, **The Neurotic Personality of Our Time** (New York: W.W. Norton, 1937), p. 289; and Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1941), pp. 240 and 253-254. British ed.: The Fear of Freedom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 207 and 220.
51. Horney, **The Neurotic Personality of Our Time**, p. 289.
52. Fromm, **Escape From Freedom,** p. 240, and **The Fear of Freedom**, p. 207.
53. Fromm, **Escape From Freedom**, pp. 255-256 and **The Fear of Freedom**, p. 220.
54. Leonard Schapiro, **The Communist Party of the Soviet Union** (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960), p. 431.
55. On *Gleiehschaltung* in Nazi Germany see Franz Neumann, **Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944** (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1963); and Arthur Schweitzer, **Big Business in the Third Reich** (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964).
56. See Leonard Schapiro, **The Origins of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opp~sition in the Soviet State: First Phase 1917-1922** (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1956), and Schapiro, **The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.**
57. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 93.
58. Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simmel**, p. 199.
59. See ibid., p. 198.
60. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 284.
61. Ibid., p. 9.
62. Ibid., p. 93.
63. Ibid., p. 265.
64. F.C. Montague, Introduction to Jeremy Bentham, **A Fragment on Government** (Ed. by F.C. Montague. London: Humphrey Milford, 1931 [1891]), p. 48.
65. Mosca, **The Ruling Class**, p. 141.
66. Jouvenel, **Power**, p. 206.
67. See William Godwin, **Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness** (Sec. ed.; London: G.G. and J. Robinson, 1796), vol. I, pp. 275-276.
68. See ibid., vol. I, pp. 257-261 and 304, and vol. II, pp. 221-222 and 244.
69. See ibid., vol. I, p. 108 and 254-255, and vol. II, p. 153.
70. Niccolo Machiavelli, **The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli** ("Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy") (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), vol. I, p. 252.
71. Ibid., pp. 252-253.
72. Ibid., p. 289.

73. Machiavelli, **The Prince** (London: J.M. Dent & Sons [Everyman Library], 1948), p.38.
74. Baron de Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Laws** (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1959), vol. I, pp. 20-23 and 34.
75. Ibid., p. 307.
76. Mosca, **The Ruling Class**, p. 134.
77. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 260.
78. Jouvenel, **Power**, p. 277.
79. Ibid., p. 293.
80. See M.K. **Gandhi, Non-violence in Peace and War** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1949), vol. II, pp. 187-188. Here he suggests that an India internally so weak as to be torn by riots would be easy prey to a new foreign ruler. See also N.K. Bose, Studies in Gandhism (Calcutta: Indian Associated Publishing Co., 1947), pp. 62-63.
81. See Gandhi, "Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule" (pamphlet, Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1958), pp. 38-41, and Gene Sharp, "Gandhi on the Theory of Voluntary Servitude," in **Gandhi as a Political Strategist** (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1979).
82. Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1948), vol. I, p.36.
83. Ibid., p. 12.
84. Bose, **Selections from Gandhi** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1948), p. 118. See also ibid. pp. 121 and 123; Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War**, vol. I, p. 351; and Gandhi, Satyagraha (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1951), p. 283.
85. Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War**, vol. II, p. 8.
86. See ibid., vol. I, pp. 103-104,
87. See Jouvenel, **Power**, pp. 22-23.
88. See Tocqueville, **Democracy in Americ**a, vol. I, p. 93, and vol. II, p. 258.
89. Ibid., vol. I, p. 332, see also p. 334, and vol. II, pp. 288-290 and 294.
90. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. II, p. 258.
91. See Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Law**s, vol. I, p. 21.
92. Jouvenel, **Power**, p. 220, and Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963).
93. Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Laws**, pp. 21-22.
94. Tocqueville, **Democracy in Americ**a, vol. II, p. 266.
95. Montesquieu, **The Spirit of the Laws**, vol. I, p. 309.
96. Jouvenel, Power, p. 101.
97. Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 199.
98. Ibid.
99. Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simme**l, p. 274.
100. As in Pareto's theory of the circulation of the elites. See Vilfredo Pareto, **The Mind and Society** (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1935), vol. IV, pp. 17871798.
101. Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, vol. I, p. 92.
102. See ibid., vol. II, pp. 295-296.
103. Ibid., p. 97.
104. See Gene Sharp, "The Theory of Gandhi's Constructive Program," in **Gandhi as a Political Strategist**, Chapter Five.
105. Political violence here refers to physical violence or the threat of it used to further political objectives, whether by the State, non-State groups, or individuals, including imprisonment, execution, rioting, guerrilla war, conventional war, assassination, coup d'état, civil war, bombing, terrorism, and police and military action against opposition groups.

106. Karl Marx, **The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapart**, pp. 238-239, in David Fernbach, ed., Karl Marx: Political Writings, vol. II, Surveys from Exile (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1974).
107. V.I. Lenin, **The State and the Revolution** (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 25.
108. See Jouvenel, **Power**, pp. 18-22 and 244-246.
109. See Quincy Wright, **A Study of War** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), vol. I, pp. 232-242, 302, and esp. 311; Bronislaw Malinowski, "An Anthropological Analysis of War," American Journal of Sociology, vol. XLVI, no. 4, esp. p. 545; and Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization (New York: Roy publishers, 1944), esp. pp. 265 and 305.
110. The following list of factors appears in similar form in Gene Sharp, **The Politics of Nonviolent Action**, pp. 800-802.
111. This list of factors also appears in similar form in ibid., pp. 802-806. See Part Three, "The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action" for analysis and data supporting these insights.
112. See Gandhi, **Satyagraha**, p. 356, and Gene Sharp, **Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral power** (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960), pp. 72 and 100.
113. See Sharp, **Gandhi Wields The Weapon of Moral Power**, p. 125, and Gandhi, **Non-violence in Peace and War**, vol. II, p. 340.
114. See Richard Gregg, **The power of Non-violence** (Sec. rev. ed.: New York: Schocken, 1966, and London: James Clarke, 1960), p. 146.
115. Bose has written that experience in nonviolent action puts the people: "on their own legs. And when power comes with the revolution, it spreads evenly among the masses; for, under non-violence, any unarmed man, woman, or child can be effective provided the heart is stout. Under violence, this cannot be so; those who make the most effective use of violence gain the upper hand." (Bose, **Studies in Gandhism**, p. 148.)