
Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era

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Monograph Series
Number 2

The Albert Einstein Institution

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This paper was first delivered at the National Conference
on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, held
February 8–11, 1990, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on Recycled Paper.

The Albert Einstein Institution
1430 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138

ISSN 1052-1054

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE is an alternative policy which uses nonmilitary forms of struggle, either as a supplement to military means, or as a full alternative to them to deter and defend a society against attacks. . . .

The term "civilian-based defense" indicates defense by civilians (as distinct from military personnel) using civilian means of struggle (as distinct from military and paramilitary means). Civilian-based defense is a policy intended to deter and defeat foreign military invasions, occupations, and internal usurpation. . . .

Deterrence and defense are to be accomplished by civilian forms of struggle—social, economic, political, and psychological. These are used to wage widespread noncooperation and to offer massive public defiance. The aim is to deny the attacker his desired objectives, and also to make impossible the consolidation of foreign rule, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers.

This noncooperation and defiance is also combined with other forms of action intended to subvert the loyalty of the attacker's troops and functionaries and to promote their unreliability in carrying out orders and repression, and even to secure their mutiny. . . .

Civilian-based defense is meant to be waged, on the basis of advance preparations, planning, and training, by the population and members of institutions. Preparations and training would be based upon the findings of basic research into these types of resistance and into the systems of the attacker, and upon intensive problem-solving research. The latter needs to focus on ways to improve the effectiveness of such resistance, to meet impediments, and to solve problems in its application, especially against ruthless regimes. Understanding of the requirements for effectiveness of these forms of struggle and of the ways to aggravate weaknesses of the attacker's system and regime is the foundation for developing successful strategies of civilian-based defense.

— Gene Sharp, *National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense*

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE IN A NEW ERA

by Johan Jørgen Holst

Introduction

I am honored and pleased to have been invited to give the keynote address to this important, timely, and also intriguing conference. I accepted the invitation with considerable humility. I am not a pacifist, nor do I have much personal experience as a participant in public protest movements. In fact I have often been on the "other side" of such movements, not because I disagreed with the objectives, but because I had a different view of the available alternatives, of the consequences of alternative policies, and of the relationship between ends and means. Throughout my adult life I have been concerned with and engaged in exploring or affecting the complex issues of peace and war. There are no easy solutions. There are probably no finite solutions, but there is a constant imperative to understand and shape the parameters of the human condition. My perspective is that of a European; my experience is that of a Scandinavian; my values are those of a social democrat. Before I consider some of the policy issues involved in civilian-based defense, I must establish a context within which to make the assessment.

The Nuclear Predicament

We are children of the nuclear age. Slowly our thinking is catching up with the awesome reality of nuclear weapons. Our comprehension has

made progress, but we still have miles to go before we understand. We do understand, however, that nuclear weapons have changed the grammar of military assessment, that they have severed the classical link between military power and political purpose: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Today that simple maxim seems obvious to most of us. It was not always so.

No rational purpose can be served by the use of nuclear weapons. No rational objective would justify the costs and the risks. We know, however, that accidents, irrational purposes, and unattainable objectives have moved human beings in the past and could do so again. But the way we think about the nuclear realities will influence those realities, particularly when thought is transformed into action. Realities can be organized so as to constrain and delimit the impact of accident and passion. No absolute assurance is available, however. Foolproof arrangements will forever remain a chimera, although we can persist in our efforts to approach perfection. Nuclear weapons do not lend themselves to disinvention, although we can persist in our efforts to approach abolition.

Nuclear weapons create common interests which transect, transcend, and transform the competition among nations. The notion of common security is predicated on the insight that security in the nuclear age is not only a competitive value, but essentially a common good. The whole idea of arms control is based on the idea of shared interests in preventing war, in bringing it to rapid termination were it to break out, and in reducing the costs, risks, and burdens of the arms competition. Arms control has become a centerpiece of East-West relations, a principal means of managing those relations in a non-violent way. It is in many ways the twin brother of civilian-based defense.

The Role of Arms Control in the Search for Common Security

But arms control cannot remove the basic sources of conflict, the incompatibility of views on who should get what, when, and how. Political and ideological conflicts always carry the seeds of military conflict. Agreements may be abrogated, understandings violated, and commitments broken. States will take out insurance against the breakdown of arms control regimes. They may also seek to exploit loop-

holes and available paths for circumvention. Demands for verification reflect the distrust which fuels the competition among nations, but successful verification also generates the trust which dilutes that competition. In a world of arms control, confidence-building measures become a nonviolent alternative to the pursuit of security through unilateral advantage. Confidence building is about predictability, transparency, and mutual reassurance. Increasingly it will involve the use of military means in nonviolent and non-offensive roles.

However, as long as the East-West confrontation provided the framework for the construction of arms control regimes the competitive perspective tended to overwhelm that of common security. The largely peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe have transformed that framework. Confrontation is giving way to reconstruction. The central front in Europe is in the process of being replaced by a European community of nations; walls and barbed wire have been torn down to give way to freedom of human movement and association. Europe divided is in the process of being replaced by an open Europe. In such circumstances military dispositions no longer serve the purpose of buttressing and protecting a fixed political order against violent change, but may become, rather, potential means for reinforcing and consolidating peaceful change. The relation between the military infrastructure and the political superstructure is a complex one which transcends the simple equations of the age of confrontation. Military stability will be necessary in order to prevent military dispositions from so constraining political choices in a crisis that nations may be catapulted into a war nobody wants. Crisis stability involves the removal of incentives for rapid military action in order to reap the benefits of surprise or avoid situations where they accrue to the adversary. The premium of the first strike must be reduced, in regard to strategic forces as well as to ground forces. In Europe this led to proposals for preferential removal of those force elements that contribute most to capacities for carrying out surprise attack and sustained offensive action: tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, offensive aircraft, and combat helicopters. Manpower became an incidental and primarily a symbolic category of reduction. However, the revolutions in Eastern Europe transformed the political landscape of Europe and the perspectives on security.

The Soviet Union could no longer count on its Eastern European

allies for support and cooperation in the event of offensive military operations into Western Europe. In fact the danger could not be discounted that the societies and armies of Eastern Europe would turn against the Soviets, breaking the momentum of offensive operations and exposing fault-lines and vulnerabilities which could be exploited by the adversary. From the point of view of the West the danger of invasion suddenly receded. Still, a restructuring of the military establishments, in the direction of removing premiums for surprise attack, would tend to provide mutual reassurance against the possibilities of a new confrontation. However, even more important in the present period would seem to be the objective of reducing the impact of the military calculus on the conduct of international relations in Europe, the political emasculation of military power. This perspective has given rise also to a growing interest in schemes for making the defense dominant through restructuring and arms control arrangements. Military capabilities more often than not are ambiguous with respect to the signalling of intentions. However, their composition, organizational structure, and associated doctrine contribute to the emphasis in the message conveyed. Some even hope for military forces with a structural incapacity for attack.

In the wake of the revolutions in Eastern Europe, manpower reductions assumed a new political significance. The issues were related to political order in Eastern Europe rather than the removal of capacities for attack across the old East-West line of division. Eastern and Western Europe shared an interest in removing the Red Army as an obstacle to the political changes in Eastern Europe and as a bridgehead for imperial restoration. Its withdrawal had become a symbol of national liberation. The American proposal for deep cuts in Soviet- and American-stationed forces in Central and Eastern Europe in a first phase agreement in the negotiations about conventional forces in Europe (CFE) responded to this political requirement.

Political changes necessitate changes in doctrine and strategy. Recently the chiefs of the defense staffs in thirty-two of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) countries with military forces in Europe met to discuss military doctrine, focussing on military policies, on how they relate to actual forces and structures in the field, to training practices, exercises, and budgets. It reflected a recognition that all the states represented are linked through a web of interdependence, that they influence each others' perceptions and

dispositions. It could be another step towards the ritualization of military activities. With a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the emergence of democratic regimes in that part of Europe, the confrontation recedes and concepts such as forward defense and deep strikes against follow-on forces in Eastern Europe not only sound outmoded but could become obstacles to a reconstitution of the political order in Europe in consonance with Western interests. Similarly, as the dangers flowing from confrontation are succeeded by the dangers flowing from pressures for secession and ethnic conflict, concepts such as the first use of nuclear weapons seem particularly inappropriate. Battlefield nuclear weapons are likely to be removed from Europe as they carry the danger of inadvertent escalation and rapid erosion of political control. The calls for modernization of short-range nuclear forces belong to an era of the past, albeit the recent past. Europe has changed.

The potential sources of future conflict in Europe may come to resemble those of pre-World War I Europe rather than the era of the cold war. The states of Europe would share the interest of preventing the possible Lebanonization of countries in South-Eastern Europe from becoming generalized conflicts. Hence, military forces may be required for peace-keeping under CSCE auspices, applying some of the same techniques and tactics as developed on UN missions. Armed forces will be needed also in the apparatus to verify compliance with agreements on arms control. The CSCE could become responsible for verifying arms control agreements that apply to Europe. The role of military force would change. However, cultural differentiation could cause perceptions in Western Europe to diverge from those in Eastern Europe where war and revolution might seem more relevant to the conditions at hand.

Towards a New Political Order in Europe

The overriding issue is the construction of a viable political order in Europe. That order must be able to cope with three sets of challenges: First, there is the challenge of Russian military power. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is unlikely to remain in its present configuration and construction. The constituent republics are likely to loosen their links to the center, and some may even leave the union

altogether. Nevertheless, the Russian nation is likely to remain a powerful military factor, perhaps even animated more by Great-Russian nationalism than communist ideology. The threat of Russian military power is likely to be residual rather than constituting a clear and present danger. Disintegration could further weaken its threat potential but could create other dangers associated with uncertainty and unpredictability. Second, there is the challenge of the centrifugal forces of nationalism, ethnic conflicts, and regional animosities. They led to destructive wars in the wake of the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. How will the states of Europe manage the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet empire? Third, there is the challenge of transnational processes surpassing the capacities of the nation-states, processes relating to the environment, nuclear weapons, economics, and technological developments.

It has become fashionable to design models of future European orders. However, the variations are so manifold and the present circumstances so ambiguous that architectural speculations seem particularly risky. We should focus rather on the trends and processes discernible at present, attempting to project them into the short- and medium-term future. Any future order will have to contend with the problems of military stability. It has to contain reasonable assurances against Russian military power and against invasion of Russia from the West. It has to provide a framework which can accommodate a unified Germany without raising the specter of German irredentism, or a "Mittel-Europa" led by Germany. A neutral Germany between East and West is a recipe for instability and revisionism. A classical balance of power, or European concert, system would neither have the carrying capacity to satisfy the two basic structural requirements concerning Russia and Germany nor the psychological capacity to align the imperatives of external balance and internal acceptance. The future order has to be based on other principles. It nevertheless must be able to prevent the problems of military balance and stability from disrupting the basic structure of interstate relations. Russian forces presumably would be withdrawn into the confines of the Soviet Union. NATO would not extend its military frontiers to the East. The Warsaw Pact would be transformed and possibly dissolved. The countries of Eastern Europe would probably form a security zone wherein there would be no deployment of foreign troops or nuclear weapons. The military forces west of the current borders of the Fed-

eral Republic and east of the Soviet-Polish border to the Urals would be essentially preferentially reduced and subject to inspection. American ground forces in Europe would probably be substantially reduced, but the infrastructure for reinforcement, such as pre-positioned equipment, ammunition, and fuel, would remain.

Germany would move rapidly towards unification. Austria is likely to become a member of the European Community. The latter would develop into an economic and political union embedding the German state and society (*Gesellschaft*) into a broader European community (*Gemeinschaft*) which would also include, over time, some of the states of Eastern Europe and most of the European Free Trade Association countries. The CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) could provide a framework for a future security community extending from Vladivostok to San Francisco.

Theater nuclear forces would probably be dramatically reduced, including the withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and a third zero solution for short-range missiles. Nuclear weapons may be barred from the area east of the Rhine and west of the Soviet-Polish border. The NPT (NonProliferation Treaty) regime should be reaffirmed.

In my view it is only an expanded community order in Europe which will be able to contain, transform, and rechannel the new national aspirations and assertions of ethnic identity without wrecking the peace. It is only that construction which will enable Europeans to recreate a balance between political decision-making authorities and the forces which shape European societies. It is also only a community order which can provide the framework for German unification, Eastern European reassociation with historical Europe, and reassurance to the Soviet Union against attacks from the West as well as to the rest of Europe against the reimposition of Soviet imperial power. It could perform the essential task of including Russia and the other nations of the Soviet Union in Europe through extensive cooperation agreements. It is only a community order which can create the transnational foundations for civilian-based defenses in Europe.

On Power and Purpose

Clausewitz was particularly insistent on the relation between war and political purpose. He stated that "since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in *magnitude* and also in *duration*. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow."¹ The destructiveness of warfare indeed has led to a declining utility of military force. It applies not only to nuclear weapons but also to modern conventional warfare. The urbanization of the European civilization, the large number of chemical plants and nuclear power stations, and the extensive use of synthetic materials in modern buildings all point in the direction of a major war constituting an ecological catastrophe for victor and vanquished alike. The cost effectiveness of war as a means of aggrandizement has disappeared. The cost of occupation is likely to be at least as high as that of invasion.

We cannot announce the end of war as a threat to the political order in Europe. However, the danger is more related to accident and inadvertence than to deliberate aggression. Arms control provides the most promising insurance. The levels of military forces in Europe are likely to be drastically reduced. However, the ceilings should be fixed in a manner which does not prevent nations from maintaining systems of national conscription. In many countries in Europe such systems are viewed as a democratic safety device, a means of rooting the army in society and preventing it from becoming a state within the state. The pattern of military service is likely to be modified in several countries, but the alternative of a professional army militates against tradition, ideology, and the idea of citizenship in many European countries, including those of Northern Europe.

The Peaceful Revolutions of Eastern Europe

The perceived price of occupation has risen as a result of the popular revolutions in Eastern Europe. With the partial exception of Romania they were peaceful revolutions, citizens applying nonviolent means to bring down antiquated and oppressive regimes. The very way in which the regimes were brought down constitutes insurance and

deterrence against military intervention and occupation. The events of 1989 were not isolated events. They formed a pattern. Nineteen eighty-nine became the most revolutionary year in the history of Europe since 1789. The so-called "people's republics" of Eastern Europe were reclaimed by the people, because they were the people.

After the ill-fated uprising in Berlin in 1953 Bertolt Brecht wrote a telling poem entitled "The Solution":²

After the uprising of the 17th June
The Secretary of the Writers' Union
Had leaflets distributed in the Stalinallee
Stating that the people
Had forfeited the confidence of the government
And could win it back only
By redoubled efforts. Would it not be easier
In that case for the government
To dissolve the people
And elect another?

In 1989 the people decided to dissolve the government and elect another. Free elections are now on the agenda in all of Eastern Europe, except in Albania. The power of nonviolent action has been demonstrated. It was the first revolution ever to become reality for all of Europe as it was happening, because of the mass media. In Romania the revolution was conducted from the television studio. The power of the media was for all to see. People were not alone. They formed a chain all through Eastern Europe. They joined in a common struggle against a common enemy. They stood for what Vaclav Havel has called the right "to live in truth." The mutual inspiration and identification that produced the revolutionary chain of events could possibly provide the cohesion and solidarity needed by the liberated nations to contain the ethnic pressures on the state structures. Much depends on their ability to preserve a sense of community, or common cause, in the post-revolutionary phase.

The prologue to revolution took place in Poland through the ten-year struggle of the free trade union movement Solidarity, from the shipyard in Gdansk to the round table in Warsaw. In the wake of that struggle the Communist Party slowly disintegrated to the point that, when the first free elections to the senate took place, Solidarity cap-

tured 99 out of the 100 seats. On August 24 Tadeusz Mazowiecki was sworn in as prime minister. Moscow remained quiet; obviously the "geopolitical realities," which had been invoked in the past, had been supplanted by the popular realities. The "Brezhnev doctrine" had been replaced by the "Sinatra doctrine"; from now on the East-Europeans would do it their way. The message was not lost.

The first act took place in Hungary where the process unfolded without strong expressions of popular pressure. Imre Pozsgay, the long-time heretic of the Communist regime, capitalized on the mood and arranged for a rendezvous with history. Imre Nagy and the popular revolt of 1956 were reinscribed in the annals of history. Hungarians could start to live in truth. On October 23 Hungary was declared a free republic.

In Czechoslovakia the world witnessed mass demonstrations in Wenceslas Square in Prague, where the people congregated with jangling keys and tinkling bells, signalling in the words of a Czech fairy tale that "the bells are ringing. And the story is over."³ Indeed the story was over for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. December 7-10 saw the dissolution of the Husak regime. Eventually Vaclav Havel moved to the Castle and Alexander Dubcek became the speaker in Parliament. The truth about 1968 permitted the brave people of Czechoslovakia to face their future with confidence and self-respect. They staged a "velvet revolution."

In Bulgaria the environmental destruction caused by blind policies produced "eco-glasnost," which mustered the popular pressures leading to the fall of Zhivkov on November 10 and the subsequent abolition of the monopoly position of the Communist Party. The slogans in Sofia heralded that "Communism cannot be reformed, it can only be dismantled."

In the German Democratic Republic the New Forum and the churches provided the leadership and direction for a remarkably peaceful revolutionary cadenza as the wall in Berlin came tumbling down on November 9. It seems that one month earlier it was touch and go in Leipzig as Erich Honnecker gave orders to execute a European Tiananmen Square. Moderate forces combined with the Russians to preempt it.

Instead the European version of the Tiananmen Square tragedy was staged in the western Romanian city of Timisoara. However, the violence served only to prove with grim certainty that change had

become inevitable. The army had to enter the battle, but it fought alongside and together with the brave, unarmed students and workers of Romania. The last oriental despots in Europe met their ugly fate in front of the firing squad.

In the course of a few months the strategic map of Europe had changed. It was not the result of military intervention, rollback or liberation by outside powers, nor was it the result of an armed uprising. It was a chain reaction of popular revolt by peaceful means; the result of the will of the people, of moral suasion. The power of the revolution did not grow out of the barrels of the guns, but from the spontaneous determination of the citizens. Once it became clear that the Red Army would not use its guns to crush the demonstrations, that 1989 was not 1956 or 1968, the swell of optimism and sense of invincibility broke the dams of entrenched oppression. Forty years of history were discarded on what Nikita Khrushchev used to call the dust heaps of history, to the shame of the oppressors and their apologists in the West.

We do not know what would have been the course of events had Moscow decided to commit the guns. History never reveals its alternatives. However, if the guns had spoken, the cold war once more would have descended upon Europe. The arms competition would have entered a new and intensive phase. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* would have been dead letters in the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances the Soviet Union would have been bound to lose the next qualitative round in the arms race and would possibly have been relegated to a third-rate civilian power by the year 2000.

Civilian resistance prevailed in Eastern Europe because it was consistent with the flow of history. The Communist regimes had become *ancien regimes*. Civilian resistance prevailed because Mikhail Gorbachev no longer saw Eastern Europe as a military *cordon sanitaire* protecting the Soviet Union against attacks from the imperialist powers of the West, or as a *place d'armes* enabling the Red Army to protect the Soviet fatherland in front of its borders. In the age of nuclear weapons the roof had been blown off the territorial state, no longer able to find security behind protective walls. Instead security had to be sought through mutual restraint and common endeavor. The new thinking in Moscow removed the "geopolitical realities" that had effectively prevented East European students and workers from transforming their dreams of freedom into reality.

It must be recognized, of course, that the revolutions in Eastern Europe did not take place under wartime conditions. The demonstrations were not contending with the power of occupants involved in a life and death struggle to prevail in war.

Hence we cannot draw general conclusions about the power of civilian-based defense on the basis of the East European revolutions. However, there are important lessons to be learned about the role of voluntary organizations, trade unions and churches in providing coherence to the popular demonstrations, about the powerful role of the media in creating attention and conveying inspiration and guidance, about the impact of societal politics on the calculations in Moscow concerning the foreign policy costs of repression, etc. There is a need to study and understand the dynamics and mechanics of the revolutions of 1989. The lessons are likely to sharpen our understanding of the potentials and limits of civilian-based defense, of the powerful contribution it could make as a complementary means of defense, particularly against the contingency of occupation, and thus as a contribution to deterrence.

The Broader Perspective

In South Africa the pressures on the apartheid regime, from inside the Republic of South Africa as well as from the outside, are paying off. The white minority seems finally to have understood that it was fighting the inevitable course of history by its unheroic stand, and that the deluge of revenge would be likely to consume it unless it returned to the official standards of the Western civilization from which it came. The toughening stance of American policy and the waning perceptions of a communist threat due to developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the fear of isolation as a pariah state in the international community, forced the Afrikaaner to announce the abolition of the inhuman policy of apartheid. But promise is not delivery. The Population Registration Act of 1950 must be repealed, as must the other legal instruments sustaining the system of apartheid, the Land Act of 1936, the Group Areas Act, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. There are many ambiguities in the references to *Volksregte* suggesting limits on majority rule. The world should keep South Africa to its promise of reform. Releasing Nelson

Mandela was a step in the right direction. It was a victory for the ANC (African National Congress) as well as the valiant warriors of nonviolent struggle like Bishop Tutu and Chief Luthuli. The changes on the horizon are at least as dramatic as those associated with *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Will Mr. de Klerk turn out to be the Gorbachev of Southern Africa?

The *intifada* in the Israeli-occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza threatens to transform Israel into a pariah state in the international community as well. Demography also threatens democracy as the policy of suppressing Palestinian rights and aspirations causes Israel to lose its soul. Attempts to compensate for the growing Palestinian population by settling emigrants from the Soviet Union in the occupied territories could cause the Soviet Union to constrain emigration and the United States to reconsider its extensive aid to Israel. Until now the number of such settlements has been relatively small, but the scale of the immigration is causing concern in the Arab world. The *intifada* is not solely nonviolent, nor has it been met with a nonviolent response. However, it is a rebellion of an oppressed people against its oppressor, using the jiu-jitsu tactics of the underdog attempting to use the superior power of the opponent to its advantage. The moral fiber of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has been severely tested in its battle with stone-throwing youngsters who have little or nothing to lose. The effectiveness of the policy of suppression is undermined by the networks of resistance created by Palestinians in the Israeli prisons. The end of the struggle is not in sight, but Israel is tragically losing its friends and sympathizers by her intransigence.

While the students and workers won their peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe, they were brutally beaten by the Chinese People's Army in Tiananmen Square. Gorbachev was a witness and he may have recalled that ugly spectacle when he subsequently was faced with a replay of the peaceful revolt in his own front yard. Civilian resistance can be broken, at least temporarily, by brutal force. However, such application of force may become a boomerang in the longer term as memories are stored in the same way that Deng Xiaoping stored the memory of his son's mutilation by the students of the Cultural Revolution.

The real challenge in Eastern Europe is a dangerous crisis of expectations. The new democratic regimes will face tremendous economic difficulties. Democracy could be the loser as revolutionary

enthusiasm erodes in an encounter with economic hardship. The basic economic restructuring—*perestroika*—which they attempt to undertake in making the transition from command economies to market economies, has never been undertaken before. We have seen transition from dictatorship to democracy. The next phase in Eastern Europe in many ways will be much more difficult. The revolution which brought down Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines is facing similar problems in reaffirming its legitimacy through actual delivery on promises. "People power" is being eroded by the poverty of the people. In technical terms the task of the East-Europeans is particularly difficult. However, they have certain comparative advantages in terms of cheap and highly educated labor as well as contiguity with and assistance from the European Community and other industrial nations. It is quite conceivable that some of the states in Eastern Europe will emerge as the new Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), the new dragons in Europe.

The real task ahead is to devise manageable structures around almost unmanageable complexities. How does one provide a European framework for German unification when the process of unification proceeds at a pace that outstrips the pace of integration in the European Community? How does one cope with the problem of economic differentiation, of the crystallization of a "Third World" within Europe? How does one create harmony and balance in an order where parts of the southern periphery are caught in the quagmire of poverty, debt, and ethnic strife? The European Common House could become a house dominated by upstairs-downstairs relations. The problem could become compounded by large-scale migrations of people trying to move upstairs. Violence could still become a problem in the new political order in Europe.

The Promise and Limits of Civilian-Based Defenses

Civilian-based defense has the potential of constituting an important complement to traditional military forms of defense. As the destructiveness of war makes deliberate large-scale war in Europe highly unlikely, civilian-based defense adds to the deterrence of occupation by increasing the costs and burdens for the potential occupant. Recent events in Eastern Europe have demonstrated the ability of modern

societies to mobilize their populations in a manner that attracts the immediate attention of the whole world. Societal pressure will impact on the policies of democratic states. They constitute a challenge also to the social order of non-democratic states. Hence, both could be compelled to put pressure on the occupant. The effectiveness of such pressure is likely to be greater in the event of *limited war* than in a general war for mastery in Europe. Deterrence of the latter is likely to rest essentially with other means and dispositions.

Furthermore, civilian-based defense is likely to be most effective against an aggressor whose objective involves *social occupation*, that is, establishing control over a foreign population and running society according to a particular *Weltanschauung*. The demise of communism causes that scenario to move down the ladder of probability. It would be a less effective means of deterring an aggressor who is aiming for a limited *territorial occupation* or the military exploitation of areas, or points, of special strategic significance.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe had certain similarities with the Norwegian opposition to the German occupation during the Second World War.⁴ It was not preplanned. The tactics were determined by the specific situation at hand, responding to the particular moves of the occupant. In fact Norwegians did not talk about resistance but rather about the home front, a complex phenomenon encompassing spontaneous, unorganized individual and collective acts of resistance. The occupation regime in Norway was both military and politico-ideological in nature. Civilian resistance was first and foremost directed against the attempts to institute a national-socialist revolution. Individual acts of resistance were guided by slogans issued by an anonymous leadership. They were part of what Norwegians called a *holdningskamp*, or an attitude struggle, which would also prevent the atomization of society, or the isolation and separation of the individual from a social context. Even symbolic acts contributed to a feeling of community working against the Nazi attempts to establish a new order. The illegal press played a very important role in communicating authoritative, alternative information to the propaganda of the occupant as did the free Norwegian radio in London. The struggle was channelled and conducted through the dense organizational infrastructure consisting of voluntary organizations of all types—professional organizations, trade unions, athletic associations, churches—cutting across the traditional political cleavages in Norwe-

gian society. Even when the organizations no longer existed as formal bodies they provided an informal network. It is likely therefore that preparations for civilian-based defense in peacetime would be most effectively conducted through the organizational network, not in the form of detailed plans, which could become vulnerable to penetration and capture by an enemy, but in the form of systematic instruction in the noble art of improvisation.

Experience from the Second World War also suggests the importance of maintaining confidence and trust in the utility of resistance, belief in eventual victory, that they will overcome. During the Second World War there was an important relation between the civilian attitude struggle and the armed part of the home front, which fought with the allies and became visible through acts of sabotage and assistance during raids from England. Such raids also kept alive the German fear of invasion which caused the *Wehrmacht* to maintain an army of some 350–400 thousand men in Norway throughout the war.

1989: The Dawn of a New Era?

Nineteen eighty-nine witnessed the triumph of the techniques of non-violent action in Eastern Europe. However, it should be recalled that the leaders did not express opposition to the need for arms in all circumstances. In Romania the army and the people fought together. Nevertheless, the post-war order, Yalta-Europe, that product of *raison d'état* and the bounds of the balance of power, received a decisive and unexpected blow. But futures are not created solely by the removal of *ancien regimes*. The revolutions of 1989 might still join those of 1848, that "Springtime of Nations," in the chronology of the episodes of history. Somehow we do not believe that, and we need to understand why. The methods of nonviolent action are more attuned to deposing unjust regimes than to the construction of their successors. That is why I insisted on drawing your attention to the urgent problems of political reconstruction in Europe. The methods of nonviolent action constitute the dialectical opposite of indiscriminate violence. That is why I insisted on drawing your attention to the dilemmas created by nuclear weapons.

Nonviolent action does not purport to provide answers to how to reconstruct a broken order or to constrain and reverse the nuclear

arms race. Nevertheless, we need to consider the relation, the synergy, between different and often complementary levels of action. Those who think about nonviolent action should ask how and whether their approach to the conduct of nonviolent struggle should be influenced by their answer to the question: "After victory, what?" Could the efforts be wasted in a spontaneous fission of the coalitions from the peaceful struggle over the spoils of victory?

The specter haunting Europe is that of being consumed by the passion and violence of nationalist sentiment, ethnic conflict, and communal strife following the thaw of the cold war. In such conflicts the methods of nonviolent action could come to naught. It happened in the last century following the breakup of the Vienna-system. However, reassurance was provided by the very way in which the revolutions of 1989 were conducted. They were revolutions of solidarity within and among nations, nations which have been rivals in the past and where political borders do not coincide with ethnic borders, although the congruence is greater now than after the Congress of Berlin or the Conference at Versailles. The revolutions of 1989, as Timothy Garton Ash has reminded us,⁵ expressed the desire of societies to be civil, reaffirmed the rights of the people as citizens. It remains to be seen whether *perestroika* can so change the Russian concept of the state, *gosudarstvo*, which makes no distinction between private and public, dominium and imperium;⁶ if Gorbachev will be but a reformer of the state in the tradition of Peter the Great and Alexander II, or rather a transformer of society, like Franklin Delano Roosevelt; if *perestroika* will be more like "The New Deal." Until now the evidence is overwhelming that Gorbachev will attempt to govern by consent rather than through a pervasive system of the *nomenklatura*. In Eastern Europe the revolutions are irreversible as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet imperial order. In the Soviet Union the future trajectories seem less certain.

The solidarity of the revolutions of 1989 inspires hope. They were patriotic revolutions; their symbols became the "clean" national flag. But patriotic assertion need not augur nationalist desertion. The distinctiveness of nations need not require separation and autonomy. The congruence of ethnic cultures and their states may seem less compelling in an age when the state itself is losing its contours as it is outrun and undermined by the transnational processes and challenges that are the fruits of the advanced stage of that very industri-

alization which caused modern man to strive for a fusion of culture and polity into coinciding space.⁷ In East Germany the banners announced that the demonstrators were the people ("*Wir sind das Volk*"), later escalating to the claim of constituting one people ("*Wir sind ein Volk*"). In Sofia we could see banners with the inscription "We are the world." They claimed the future. In any event they are intensely European, and they look to the European Community as their Common European Home. We must hope that the doors will not remain shut while the present occupants absorb themselves in the redecoration to be completed by 1992.

Towards a Strategy of Nonviolent Action?

Nonviolent action comprises a panoply of methods. Gene Sharp has identified 198, and there are many more.⁸ They do not aggregate to a master plan, or a fixed menu. People may choose from it *a la carte*. As we observed in Eastern Europe and learned through the struggle on the home front in Norway during the Second World War, flexibility and improvisation are at the essence of the nonviolent technique. Impatient calls for a "comprehensive strategic approach," unified systems of command and control, detailed operational planning and contingency plans, could prove incompatible with the essence of civilian-based defense. In some ways the latter constitutes an amalgam of the extensive everyday forms of peasant resistance and the intensive compression of armed insurrection. The former has been elegantly and eloquently described by James C. Scott in his book with the telling title *Weapons of the Weak*. In his words they are the forms which "require little or no coordination or planning, they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms. To understand those commonplace forms of resistance is to understand what much of the peasantry does 'between revolts' to defend its interests as best it can."⁹ The theorists of nonviolent struggle favor a more direct, symbolic, and substantive confrontation with what they perceive to be unjust authority and illegitimate norms. In much of the developing world nonviolent activists are likely to draw on experiences from peasant resistance. While it is useful and necessary to outline the elements of effective tactics, to think hard about how to

relate means to ends, it is equally important to avoid the pitfall of cultural overbearance, of patronizing from the framework of an abstract paradigm when assessing the failures, or assumed failures, of nonviolent struggles in distant lands.

I am not arguing against intellectual order, of course. Nor am I arguing against attempts to build theory, to develop generalizations from which may be derived normative prescriptions and operational principles. I want, however, to sound a note of caution about a propensity to derive those prescriptions and principles from abstract models by the deductive route. The specific character of nonviolent struggle requires it to be considered in specific cultural contexts. Hence, I favor the inductive route to generalization and I favor humility and caution about the scope for generalization. It is necessary to develop specific concepts and categories for the analysis of nonviolent action rather than merely borrow from other fields like that of military strategy, although borrowing is useful where alternative strategies of conflict are based on the same principles.

All social movements provide a cultural context for their participants. There is always the danger that the struggle becomes the message. The confrontations which take place could crystallize and perpetuate cleavages and conflicts rather than transform them; the participants could so identify with the struggle *per se* that they lose sight of the struggle as an instrument to change relations and exercises of power: expressive politics, or the experience of the struggle, could come to overshadow instrumental politics. There is also the danger that theoreticians of the technique will so retreat into the realm of abstract construction that their paradigms become conceptual and organizational straitjackets. The master plan may come to resemble a nostalgia for the armies of the military field commander. It is quite likely that nonviolent action is not, like employment, interest, and money, susceptible to being encompassed by a general theory. Gene Sharp has not attempted to emulate John Maynard Keynes and, I think, for good reason. It is necessary to deal with real situations rather than abstract principles or paradigms. Domino theories, as we learned in Southeast Asia, cannot substitute for substantive understanding of real nations which are neither rectangular nor deterministically connected. It is necessary to pay attention to the relations between strategy, tactics, and purpose. Is it possible that the methods of nonviolent action may be used for illegitimate purposes, that the

ends could corrupt the means? We have seen throughout human history how points of arrival often diverged sharply from original destinations, how journeys change voyagers. Those who embark upon nonviolent struggle must forever beware of the danger of being consumed by struggle itself, that even nonviolent resisters or their theorists could slide down the slopes leading to guerrilla war and terrorism, that nonviolent action could also breed violence in its practitioners. Nonviolent struggle requires a constant reaffirmation of an ethical choice; it is not a happening. When we consider the revolutions of 1989 we discover that the choice of nonviolent action was not a result of the lack of alternatives, rather it reflected a conscious, ethical choice, the choice of a peaceful social order and a Europe at peace. It is that choice which lit the lamps in Europe.

More attention should be devoted to exploring the synergy between military defense and civilian-based defense, particularly in the context of a restructuring of military defenses with strong defensive accents. This perspective comes, perhaps, quite naturally to a Scandinavian whose military defenses constitute but one component of the concept of "total defense," embracing the organizational, administrative, and economic infrastructure of society.

In the new Europe new synergies and complementarities need to be explored, particularly those between peace-keeping and civilian-based defense. Communal conflict and ethnic strife may be prevented from escalating to levels that would threaten the stability of the political order by the insertion of peace-keeping forces mandated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They typically would not attempt to impose an external will on eager combatants; rather, they would enable parties who prefer to disengage and maintain the peace, but who feel unable to without the assistance of an outside party providing mutual reassurance about mutual compliance, to do so. The power of peace-keeping forces is not a function of the strength of their arms, but of the nature of their mandating authority. It is possible that nonviolent action could contribute to mutual reassurance in the relations between antagonistic communities behind the screens provided by lightly armed peace-keepers. The need for enforcement of the collective will of the CSCE by peace-keeping forces could also arise and would raise other issues of complementary interaction with methods of nonviolent action.

The real power of civilian-based defense is the threat, or promise, to use the power of civilian society to prevent war and immobilize an occupant, rather than threaten to destroy that society in order to deny it to the enemy. In that sense it conveys a credible threat. In the age of nuclear weapons the potential destruction has become so awesome as to escape human comprehension. The threat of nuclear destruction in a way has made occupation a less likely contingency than in the past. However, in the shadow of nuclear deterrence we may come to experience threats designed to exploit the stand-off and the fear of nuclear catastrophe, threats which aim at cajoling states and societies into making concessions to an external will without resorting to the overt use of force. Civilian-based defense could become an effective instrument by which to combat, probably ambiguous and hidden threats, existential threats, which may be issued in the shadows of nuclear weapons. We may indeed experience a new and interesting interplay between military defense and complementary forms of civilian-based defense, exploiting the social power of democracy—people power. But people power could also be perverted by irresponsible, romantic populist impulses. Vision, realism, and discipline must be joined for civilian-based defense to become a viable complement to military defense.

The fruits of “people power” can rot if the people cease to pay attention, lose sight of the relation between ends and means, confuse single interests with the common good, withdraw before the battle is won, leave implementation to a new *nomenklatura* beyond their control. There is no halfway solution to the question of political power, the currency of civilian-based defense. Let me leave the closing words to the Russian poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko:

Half measures can kill when on the brink of precipices,
chafing in terror at the bit,
we strain and sweat and foam because we cannot
jump just halfway across.

Blind is the one who but half sees the chasm,
and half recoils because he lost his way,
half mutineer and half suppressor
of the rebellion he has given birth to.

There is no semi-fatherland,
 nor can we fathom semi-conscience
 half freedom is the trek to jail,
 and saving our fatherland halfway
 would fail.¹⁰

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Book I, Chapter two (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 92.

2. The poem "Die Lösung" in Bertold Brecht, *Gedichte* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1981), p. 396.

3. See the special supplement on Eastern Europe, "1989 The Year of Revolution," *The Independent*, December 29, 1989, p. 1.

4. See Thomas Christian Wyller, *Nyordning og motstand: Organisasjonenes rolle under okkupasjonen* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1958) and *Kompletterende forsoarsformer* (Oslo: Den norske atlantehavskomite, 1989).

5. Timothy Garton Ash, "Eastern Europe: The Year of Truth," *The New York Review of Books*, February 15, 1990, pp. 17–22.

6. Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), pp. 77–78.

7. For an extremely suggestive analysis of the phenomenon of nationalism see: Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). See also Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944); Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Carleton J. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1950); and Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1977).

8. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (3 Vols.) (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

9. James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 29.

10. From Yevgeny Yevtushenko's poem "Half Measures" translated by Alexis Obloenski and Victor Winston. Reprinted in *The New York Times*, February 7, 1990.