

## **Chapter Thirty-two**

### **NONCOOPERATION AND POLITICAL JU-JITSU**

#### **An asymmetrical conflict situation**

The opponents' difficulties in dealing with nonviolent struggle are primarily associated with the special dynamics of this technique, as we have explored in the chapters of this Part. The main impact of the use of the methods of protest, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention is due to the leverages they produce as a result of the nature of those methods themselves, as we will discuss shortly.

In addition, under certain conditions, the impact of a disciplined nonviolent struggle that has been met with harsh repression may in some cases be supplemented by a process called political ju-jitsu. This process requires special attention, and we will discuss it in detail after we examine the processes operating in the majority of nonviolent struggles in which political ju-jitsu may be absent.

## The “weapons” of nonviolent struggle<sup>1</sup>

To be effective, the nonviolent resisters must apply only *their own* weapons system. These “weapons,” or specific methods of opposition and pressure, are capable of changing selected social, economic, or political relationships of power. There are a multitude of such methods. We shall now review these three classes, which were listed in Chapter Four, with primary attention devoted to the potential impact of noncooperation.

### Nonviolent protest and persuasion

The class of nonviolent protest and persuasion consists of mainly symbolic acts of peaceful opposition or attempted persuasion, extending beyond verbal expressions but stopping short of noncooperation or nonviolent intervention. Among these methods are parades, vigils, picketing, posters, teach-ins, mourning, and protest meetings.

Their use may simply show that the resisters are *against* something. For example, picketing may express opposition to a law that restricts dissemination of particular literature. The methods of this class may also be applied to express support *for* something. For example, group lobbying may support a clean-air bill pending in the legislature. Nonviolent protest and persuasion also may express deep personal feelings or moral condemnation on a social or political issue. For example, a vigil on Hiroshima Day may express penance for the American atomic bombing of that Japanese city on August 6, 1945. The point of concern for the nonviolent protestors may be a particular deed, law, policy, general condition, or a whole regime or system.

The act of protest may be intended primarily to influence the *opponents*—by arousing attention and publicity for an issue, with a hope to convince them to accept a proposed change. Or, the protest may be intended to warn the opponents of the depth or extent of feeling on an issue, which may lead to more severe action if a change the protesters want is not made. Or, the action may be intended primarily to influence the *grievance group*—the

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<sup>1</sup> The following discussion of the methods of nonviolent action—and of noncooperation in particular—is heavily based upon Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 109-445.

persons directly affected by the issue—to induce them to take action themselves, such as participating in a strike or an economic boycott. Sometimes, a method of nonviolent protest and persuasion, such as a pilgrimage, may also be associated with another activity, such as collection of money for famine victims. Or, fraternization within the context of resistance may be intended to help induce a later mutiny by occupation soldiers.

Unless combined with other methods, the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion usually remain expressions of a point of view, or an attempt in action to influence others to accept a point of view or to take a specific action. This attempt is distinguished from the social, economic, or political pressures imposed by noncooperation or nonviolent intervention.

There are political circumstances in which some of the forms of nonviolent protest, such as marches, are illegal. Under such circumstances, these methods would merge with civil disobedience and possibly other forms of noncooperation.

The impact of the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion will vary considerably. Also, where a particular method is common, its impact may possibly be less than where that method has hitherto been rare or unknown. The political conditions in which the method is applied are likely to influence its impact. Dictatorial conditions make an act of nonviolent protest and persuasion less possible, more dangerous, and rarer. Hence, a forbidden or less frequent act may be more dramatic and may gain greater attention than it would in conditions in which the act is common or acceptable. Demonstrations of protest and persuasion may precede or accompany acts of noncooperation or nonviolent intervention, or may be practiced in their absence.

## **The methods of noncooperation**

Noncooperation is the second and largest class of the methods of nonviolent action. Overwhelmingly, the methods of nonviolent action involve noncooperation with the opponents.

The many methods of noncooperation are acts of deliberate restriction, discontinuance, or withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation with the person, activity, policy, institution, or regime with which the resisters have become engaged in conflict. The resisters may reduce or cease existing cooperation, or

they may withhold new forms of assistance, or both. The noncooperation may be spontaneous or planned, and it may be legal or illegal.

With some forms of noncooperation, people may totally ignore members of the opponent group, looking through them as though they do not exist. With other forms, they may refuse to buy certain products, or they may stop working. The resisters may disobey laws they regard as immoral, refuse to disperse a street demonstration, or refuse to pay taxes.

By applying methods of this class, the resisters often can use their usual roles in the society as means of resistance. For example, consumers refuse to purchase, laborers refuse to work, citizens disobey orders or practice civil disobedience, civil servants stall or ignore illegitimate policies and orders, police and judges refuse to enforce illegitimate edicts, and on and on for a multitude of roles and usual activities.

Noncooperation on a large scale or at crucial points produces a slowing or halting of normal operations of the relevant unit, institution, government, or society. In very extreme applications of widespread determined noncooperation, even a highly oppressive regime can simply fall to pieces. This impact of noncooperation can be produced by extensively and persistently restricting or withholding the sources of political power that were identified in Chapter Two.

The degree of noncooperation practiced and its precise forms vary widely. Noncooperation includes three subclasses: social noncooperation, economic noncooperation (economic boycotts and strikes), and political noncooperation.

### **Social noncooperation**

These methods involve a refusal to continue normal social relations, either particular or general ones, with persons or groups regarded as having perpetrated some wrong or injustice. They may also involve a refusal to comply with certain behavior patterns or social practices. These methods include ostracism of persons, noncooperation with social events, customs and institutions, or withdrawal from the social system as means of expressing opposition. The impact of these methods depends on the previous importance of the affected social relationships.

## **Economic noncooperation**

Economic forms of noncooperation are much more numerous than the forms of social noncooperation. Economic noncooperation consists of a suspension of economic relationships. The first subclass within economic noncooperation is *economic boycotts*—the refusal to continue or to undertake certain economic relationships, especially the buying, selling, or handling of goods and services.

Economic boycotts may be spontaneous, or may be deliberately initiated by a particular group. In either case, they usually become organized efforts to withdraw, and to induce others to withdraw, economic cooperation by restricting the buying from or selling to an individual, group, or country.

Economic boycotts have been conducted by consumers, workers and producers, middlemen, owners and management, holders of financial resources, and governments. The issues in an economic boycott are normally economic, but they are not necessarily so. They can be political, for example. Motivations and objectives of economic boycotts have varied from economic and political to social and cultural.

The second subclass of economic noncooperation consists of various forms of *the strike*, which is the restriction or suspension of labor. The strike involves a refusal to continue economic cooperation through work. It is a collective, deliberate—and normally temporary—suspension of labor designed to exert pressure on others within the same economic, political, and, sometimes, social or cultural unit. A strike aims to produce some change in the relationships of the conflicting groups, usually the granting of certain demands made by the strikers as a precondition for their resumption of work.

The collective nature of the strike gives this type of noncooperation its characteristics and power. Strikes are largely associated with modern industrial organizations. They also occur, however, within agricultural societies and under various other circumstances. Strikes are possible wherever people work for someone else.

Strikes are almost always specific, in the sense of being for or against an issue that is important to the strikers. Theoretically, any number of workers might act together to hold a strike, but in

practice the number of strikers must be sufficiently large to disrupt seriously, or to halt completely, continued operations of at least a specific economic unit. As with violence and alternative powerful forms of nonviolent action, the threat of a serious strike may be sufficient to induce concessions from the opponent group. Strikes may be either spontaneous or planned.

Strikes have taken the forms of symbolic strikes, agricultural strikes, strikes by special groups, ordinary industrial strikes, restricted strikes, multi-industry strikes, and combinations of strikes and economic closures. Strikes may paralyze a single factory or the economy of a whole country.

### **Political noncooperation**

The methods of political noncooperation involve refusals to continue the usual forms of political participation under existing conditions. Sometimes they are called political boycotts. Individuals and small groups may practice methods of this class. Normally, however, political noncooperation involves large numbers of people in corporate, concerted, usually temporary, suspensions of normal political obedience, cooperation, and behavior. Political noncooperation may also be undertaken by government personnel—or even by governments themselves.

The purpose of political noncooperation may simply be to protest, or it may be personal dissociation from an issue seen as morally or politically objectionable, without much consideration of consequences. More frequently, however, an act of political noncooperation is designed to exert specific pressure on the government, or an illegitimate group attempting to seize control of the governmental apparatus. The aim of political noncooperation may be to achieve a particular limited objective or a change in broader government policies. Or, the aim may be to change the nature or composition of that government, or even to disintegrate it. Where political noncooperation is practiced against internal usurpers, as in a coup d'état, its aim will be to defend and to restore the legitimate government.

The political significance of these methods increases in proportion both to the numbers participating and to their needed cooperation for the operation of the political system. In actual

struggles, this class of methods is frequently combined with other forms of nonviolent action.

Political noncooperation may take an almost infinite number of expressions, depending on the particular situation. Basically, all of the expressions stem from a desire not to assist the opponents through performance or cessation of certain types of political behavior.

Political noncooperation includes the methods of rejection of authority, citizen noncooperation with government, citizen alternatives to obedience, action by government personnel, domestic governmental action, and international governmental action.

### **Nonviolent intervention**

The methods of nonviolent intervention are characterized by the nonviolent resisters taking the initiative to a greater degree than with the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion and the methods of noncooperation. Methods of nonviolent intervention may be used both defensively—to thwart an attack by opponents by maintaining independent initiative, behavior patterns, institutions, or the like—and offensively—to carry the struggle for the resisters' objectives into the opponents' own camp, even without any immediate provocation. In general, the methods of nonviolent intervention are more risky for the participants than the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion or noncooperation. Also, by their nature, most of the methods of nonviolent intervention can only be practiced by a limited number of people for a limited period of time. This is, in part, because of the form of action initiated and in part because the participants must exercise more courage and discipline in the face of severe repression than would usually be required, for example, from strike participants.

Nonviolent intervention has taken the forms of psychological, physical, social, economic, and political intervention. The impact of these may differ from their form. Psychological intervention (such as a fast) may have a political impact. A physical intervention (such as sitting down on the streets or in an office) may also make a political point. Social intervention (for example, establishing new relationships that violate separation of racial or ethnic groups) may have psychological or political consequences.

These methods may disrupt, and even destroy, established behavior patterns, policies, relationships, or institutions that are seen as objectionable. Or, they may establish new behavior patterns, policies, relationships, or institutions that are preferred.

Compared with the methods of the classes of protest and persuasion and of noncooperation, some methods of nonviolent intervention pose a more direct and immediate challenge to the status quo. For example, intervention by a sit-in at a lunch counter disrupts the established pattern of service more immediately and completely than would, say, picketing or a consumers' boycott, even through the objective of both types of action may be to end racial discrimination. Although the challenge by intervention is more direct, success is not necessarily more rapid, partly because more severe repression may be a first result—which, of course, does not necessarily mean defeat. Persistence in the intervention is likely to be both required and more costly to the resisters. If they are unwilling to pay that cost, the action may quickly end. However, with persistence and perhaps increased numbers, a victory may sometimes (but not always) come more quickly by the use of the methods of this class than with the use of methods of protest and noncooperation, because the disruptive effects of the intervention are harder for the opponents to tolerate or withstand for a considerable period.

In most cases, use of the methods of nonviolent intervention may induce change through the mechanisms of accommodation or nonviolent coercion, without the opponents' being convinced that they ought to change their policy on the question. However, certain of these methods (especially those classified as psychological intervention, such as the fast) may contribute to the opponents' conversion, or at least to the opponents becoming less certain of the validity of their previous views and policies. These mechanisms of conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration will be discussed in the next chapter.

### **The predominant impact of noncooperation**

From this review of the classes of methods of nonviolent struggle, it should be clear that the respective pressures exerted by each class operate whether or not political ju-jitsu is a significant factor in that particular conflict.



Also, determined and strong opponents may more easily withstand the persuasive and moral pressures of the methods of non-violent protest and persuasion and the more provocative actions of nonviolent intervention than the steady impact of powerful economic and political applications of noncooperation.

The ways noncooperation wields its power will vary with the particular conflict situation, the resisters' chosen strategy, and the forms of pressure they have chosen to apply. However, the opponents will have an extremely serious problem if

- the previous social, economic, or political patterns and institutions no longer function as they previously did;
- the people, groups, and institutions that are required to operate the system, to implement the opponents' policies and programs, and to enforce obedience refuse to do so;
- new programs, policies, and structures of the opponents remain stillborn;
- the supply of the sources of the opponents' power are seriously weakened or severed; and
- these conditions persist despite retaliatory repression.

The resisters are then in a strong position of power. As long as the noncooperation can persist and the resisters remain strong and able to withstand the retaliation for their defiance, there is an excellent chance that they will attain their objectives.

## **Political ju-jitsu**

Nonviolent action operates as though it were especially designed to be waged against opponents able and willing to use violent repression. Nonviolent struggle against violent repression creates a special, asymmetrical, conflict situation. In this situation, repression will not necessarily succeed in stifling the resistance.

In some nonviolent conflicts, but not all, the nonviolent resisters can use this asymmetry on a political level similar to the Japanese martial art of personal combat, ju-jitsu. In traditional ju-jitsu, the attacker's violent thrust is not met with physical blockage or a counter thrust. Instead, the attacked person pulls the opponent forward in the same direction the attacker has already

started to strike. This causes the opponent to lose balance and fall forward as a result of the acceleration of the force of the attacker's own forward thrust.

In a comparable sense, in political ju-jitsu the opponents' violent attack is not met with counter-violence, but instead with nonviolent defiance. This can cause their violent repression to rebound against their own position, to weaken their power, and also to strengthen the resisters. It can also turn third parties against the opponents, create internal opposition among the opponents' usual supporters, and even lead them to support the resisters.

There are no guarantees here. The outcome of the struggle depends on various important factors, just as the outcome of a military war does. However, the potential consequences of the operation of political ju-jitsu are so important that a solid understanding of the process is highly merited. In an actual conflict, it may be wise to try to facilitate the process.

For the above changes to occur, the nonviolent resisters must refuse to use violence, because that is where their opponents are stronger. The use of violence predictably makes these shifts of power much more difficult. Instead of using violence, the resisters must continue using nonviolent weapons only, with which they are stronger. This persistence can increase the resisters' power.

### **Using the opponents' power to weaken them**

When brutal repression is inflicted on strictly nonviolent resisters, this can cause the opponents to be exposed in the worst possible light. This exposure, in turn, may lead to shifts in opinion, then in actions, and finally to shifts in power relationships favorable to the nonviolent struggle group. These shifts occur as the result of withdrawal of supports for the opponents, while the supports for the nonviolent group become stronger. The resisters' maintenance of nonviolent discipline helps the opponents' repression to rebound and to throw the opponents off balance politically.

Political ju-jitsu operates in only some cases where major brutalities are inflicted on clearly nonviolent and courageous resisters. At times, political ju-jitsu does not operate at all, or does so in only one or two of the three possible ways. Even then, political

ju-jitsu may operate only partially, and not as a dominant factor in determining the outcome of the conflict.

Political ju-jitsu operates among three broad groups:

- The general grievance group and the usually smaller group of nonviolent resisters
- The opponents' usual supporters, on various levels, including among the general population, the opponents' functionaries, administrators, and enforcement agents, and at times even the top echelons of officials
- Uncommitted third parties, whether on the local or the world level

### **Increasing support and participation from the grievance group**

Harsh repression often has an intimidating effect on nonviolent resisters. For example, although various dispersed acts of popular defiance in Beijing followed the massacre in Tiananmen Square the night of June 4-5, 1989, such as attempts to block intersections, these efforts were too limited to develop into a wider struggle employing widespread and tenacious forms of noncooperation. However, such limited reactions to harsh repression are not the universal response in all nonviolent struggles. In another case, a similar massacre on January 9, 1905, in St. Petersburg led to a large-scale revolution that would earlier have been impossible.<sup>2</sup> A careful investigation is merited into the conditions under which these differing responses occur.

Sometimes, the harsh repression against courageous nonviolent resisters will motivate a larger number of people from the general grievance group to join in active resistance. There have been examples of this increase in the number of resisters from various nonviolent struggles, including the Norwegian resistance to Nazi occupation, the U.S. civil rights struggles, the 1944 struggle against the dictatorship in El Salvador, and the Indian struggles for independence from the British Empire.

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<sup>2</sup> See the quotations and references in Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston, Massachusetts: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 679-680.

Repression can legitimize the resistance movement because it “deepens the injustice” and “reveals the true nature of the opponents.” The consequences of this may strengthen the resistance in two ways. The determination of the existing nonviolent resisters may intensify, and they may become willing to take more extreme and dangerous actions. Also, the points at which resistance is conducted may be expanded. Additionally, members of the wider grievance group may decide at such times that they should no longer observe from the sidelines, but instead directly participate in the resistance. This process will increase the number of resisters.

Whether or not repression produces these effects varies from case to case. However, the behavior that is most likely to produce the effects of political ju-jitsu is the same type of behavior that is wise if the resisters aim to win. That is, the resisters must withstand the repression, maintain their resistance and nonviolent discipline, and adhere to the strategic plan for the conflict. The resisters at times may wisely change the specific methods they are using, but the resistance must not collapse and they must not resort to violence.

### **Arousing dissent and opposition in the opponents' own group**

Extreme repression against violent resisters is unlikely to provoke protests and opposition from persons and groups within the opponents' own group, who may see the severity of the repression to be necessary or justified. In contrast, extreme repression against nonviolent resisters *is* more likely to create opposition from within the opponents' own group. Harsh repression against nonviolent resisters may be perceived as unreasonable, distasteful, inhumane, or harmful to the opponents' own society.

When the resisters are nonviolent, it is much easier for members of the opponent group to advise caution in dealing with the situation, or to recommend responses other than current measures of repression, or even to dissent from the policy at issue. Severe repression may be seen as too high a price to pay for continued denial of the claims of the nonviolent group.

It has often been argued that the impact of the nonviolent struggles in India in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s was greater be-

cause the British were “gentlemen.” Therefore some people in Britain would protest against beatings and killings of Indian non-violent resisters. This argument is incorrect. The British populace mostly did not protest against harsh repression of the Mau Mau violent resisters in Kenya during British rule in the 1950s or against the saturation bombings of German residential districts during the Second World War. The Indian choice to use nonviolent struggle instead of violence greatly facilitated protests in Britain against harsh repression. Crowds of textile mill workers in Lancashire even welcomed Gandhi when he visited them while in England in 1931, even though their work had been hard hit by the Indian boycott of British and other foreign cloth.

The impact of repression against nonviolent resisters on members of the opponent group may take several positive forms.

### **A. Questioning both repression and the cause**

In the asymmetrical conflict situation—violent repression versus nonviolent struggle—some members of the opponents’ population and their usual supporters may begin to question the violent repression against the nonviolent resisters and also reexamine the issues at stake in the conflict. Members of the opponent group may have these reactions:

- feelings that the repression and the possible brutalities are excessive and that concessions are preferable to continuation of the repression
- an altered view of the nature of the opponents’ regime, possibly resulting in a new or intensified conviction that important internal changes are required
- active sympathy for the nonviolent group and its cause
- various types of positive assistance to the cause of the grievance group and aid to the nonviolent resisters

### **B. Defections in the opponents’ group**

Revulsion at the brutality of repression against courageous nonviolent resisters at times has caused individuals serving in the opponents’ government, police, or military forces to question both the opponents’ cause and the means being used to control

the resisters. This may result in unease, dissidence, and even defection and disobedience among these members of the opponents' group.<sup>3</sup>

### C. Mutiny

Defections sometimes extend to police and troops who are charged with inflicting repression. They may become deliberately inefficient in carrying out orders or may even mutiny. Sometimes only individuals disobey and desert, but there are historical cases where whole military units have deserted or defected to the cause of the nonviolent resisters.

### D. Splits in the opponents' regime

Brutalities against the nonviolent resisters at times may also lead the opponents' regime to split into factions with different views concerning policies, means of control, and personnel issues. Individuals or groups with long-simmering personal rivalries may then express those rivalries through legitimate policy differences.

## Winning over uncommitted third parties

Repression against nonviolent resisters may at times attract wide public and even international attention to the struggle and may elicit strong sympathy for the suffering nonviolent group. This widespread attention obliges the leaders of the opponents to explain and to justify their policies.

However, "public opinion" favorable to the resisters alone will not lead to their triumph. The nonviolent group should not expect such shifts in opinion and support to occur, much less that the opponent group will concede solely because of such shifts. For example, despite worldwide outrage following the slaughter in

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<sup>3</sup> Aware that brutal repression may cause the opponent group grave problems, some nonviolent resisters may deliberately take provocative actions with the expectation that brutal repression will provoke defectors from the opponents' forces. Also, the nonviolent group may directly appeal for support from members of the opponent group. Sometimes, new splits are created, and other times pre-existing ones are aggravated. In contrast, violence by resisters generally tends to unite the opponent group. It is a sound strategic principle not to unite your opponents against you. It is wise to act so as to aggravate internal problems and divisions among your opponents, and potentially to achieve some tolerance—or even support—of your position.

Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the Chinese officials for many years refused to admit any error in their actions.

Frequently, determined opponents can ignore hostile opinion until or unless it leads to, or threatens, shifts in power relationships. However, when international indignation is turned into concrete actions, such as withdrawal of credit, severance of supplies, or the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions, it becomes more powerful against the opponents and the indignation becomes much more difficult for them to ignore.

Public opinion favoring the nonviolent resisters can be a powerful supporting force, but it is no substitute for the mobilized capacity for nonviolent struggle by the nonviolent resisters and the wider grievance group.

### **Factors determining the impact of third party opinion**

Four groups of factors will determine whether or not the opponents are affected by changes in the opinion of third parties:

**(1) Are the third parties internal or international?** The impact of changes in opinion and the consequent actions of internal, as opposed to international, third parties will differ considerably. Generally, one can expect that internal dissention and opposition to repression are likely to pose a more immediate and serious problem than international opposition. The latter may take considerable time to have an impact, which the opponents may anticipate, leaving time for the resistance to be crushed and the international opposition to fade away. Individual analysis on a case-by-case basis is required, however.

**(2) The nature of the opponents and the conflict situation.** Opponents confronted by nonviolent struggle are not all alike. Some are far more sensitive to public opinion than others. The following questions should be considered: Is the regime democratic or autocratic? What is its ideology and who are the resisters and the grievance group? What is the regime's attitude towards the resistance? How important to the regime are the issues? How do the opponents perceive the role of repression? In what kind of social system are the events taking place? Are the opponents sensitive to the opinion of third parties, or dependent on them in any way?

**(3) Actions that result from changed opinions.** Once the change of opinion of third parties has been achieved, who takes action against the opponent regime, and what type of action is taken?

Third party actions may include protests, public declarations, demonstrations, diplomatic actions, economic sanctions, and the like. They ought to be seen as supplementary and complementary to the internal resistance, but never as the main actions of the struggle. The proportion of successes among past cases of international nonviolent action, especially by third parties, is extremely small. Third party actions have generally been symbolic, and therefore weak. More substantial types of supporting actions, especially among international third parties, have generally been limited to economic sanctions, while technical assistance to support the internal resistance to an oppressive regime has almost always been nonexistent, although that could change.

International action is not a substitute for internal action by the grievance group itself. It is in the nature of the nonviolent technique that the main brunt of the struggle must be borne by the grievance group immediately affected by the opponents' policies.

**(4) Shifts in third party opinion to support the cause of the nonviolent group.** These shifts may aid the resisters by boosting their morale and encouraging them to persist until they win. Such shifts may also help to undermine the morale of the opponent group.

### **The future of third party support**

Third party and international support has generally had limited use and effectiveness. Perhaps, in the future, new forms of support could be launched, such as a supply of literature and handbooks about nonviolent struggle, offering generic advice on how to conduct strategic planning for nonviolent action, providing printing facilities or services, making available radio broadcasting facilities and equipment, and providing bases and centers for study and training in this type of struggle.



## **Less severe repression and counter-nonviolent action?**

By choosing to fight with a technique that makes political ju-jitsu possible, the nonviolent resisters unleash forces that may be more difficult than violence for the opponents to combat.

In the light of the opponents' risks when using harsh repression, they may experiment with less severe control measures and even seek to minimize their own violence. Sometimes they may even use counter-nonviolent action. Such cases of counter-nonviolent action that have already occurred may be the first tentative attempts to move toward a new type of conflict situation in which *both* sides rely on nonviolent action as their ultimate sanction.

## **Summary: altering power relations**

The power of each contender in a conflict in which nonviolent action is used is continually variable. Sometimes this is a result of political ju-jitsu, as well as other forces unleashed by this technique. The shifts induced by political ju-jitsu may become obvious only after they have occurred.

The restriction or the withholding of support from the opponents and the nonviolent resisters will affect the sources of power available to each side. These shifts in power capacity can be extreme.

Whether this potential is realized depends on the circumstances and behavior of the participants. The factors related to the nonviolent resisters include the degree to which they assist the operation of political ju-jitsu by their nonviolent discipline, persistence, and choice of strategy and tactics.

Political ju-jitsu does not operate in all nonviolent struggles, as noted earlier. However, there are other means by which power relationships may be changed by nonviolent struggle. Even in the absence of extreme repression or political ju-jitsu, the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention can wield very significant power if competently applied.

