B. Withdrawing the sources of political power

The theoretical analysis of the sources of political power and their withdrawal by noncooperation, which was developed on Chapter One, now merges with our analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle. In this section we shall recall the sources of political power which have already been discussed and examine how each of these may be restricted or severed by nonviolent action. Some of the examples which illustrate the restriction or severance of the particular source of power are from cases of nonviolent coercion, while others simply show the potential of nonviolent struggle to affect the particular power source. The discussion in this section will show the practical relevance of the earlier power analysis and will also help to explain how nonviolent coercion is possible. It is precisely the remarkable convergence of the necessary sources of political power with the ways in which nonviolent action strikes at the opponent's strength and position which gives this technique the potential for high effectiveness and greater political power than violence.

As the analysis in Chapter One showed, political power emerges from the interaction of all, or several, of the following sources of power, each of which derives from the cooperation, support and obedience of the subjects: *authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources* and *sanctions.* As was noted, changes in the degree to which these sources are available to the ruler will determine the degree of the ruler's political power. Our earlier catalogue of the methods of nonviolent action and our analysis of the dynamics of this technique show that these sources are potentially highly vulnerable to a widespread, yet qualitative, application of nonviolent action.

It is the capacity of the nonviolent technique to cut off these sources of power which gives it the power of coercion. The precise ways in which these sources of power are restricted or severed, and the extent to which they are cut, will vary. This technique can both restrict and sever the availability of those sources of power to the opponent, and also reveal the loss of those sources by other means. This technique becomes coercive when the people applying it withhold or withdraw to a decisive degree the necessary sources of the opponent's power. Nonviolent action makes possible "coercion through nonparticipation."[165] This potential is of the greatest political significance and requires detailed attention, even at the risk of repeating points made earlier, to show how each of these sources of power may be cut off.

1. Authority Nonviolent action affects the opponent's authority in three ways: 1) it may show how much authority the opponent has already lost, and a demonstrated major loss of authority will by itself weaken his power; 2) nonviolent action may help to undermine his authority still further; and 3) people who have repudiated his authority may transfer their loyalty to a rival claimant in the form of a parallel government, which may in turn weaken his authority yet more as well as create or aggravate other serious problems. Any of these consequences for the opponent's power may be serious.

Bloody Sunday—which produced a loss of authority—was followed by a warning to the Tsar from Minister of Finance Vladimir Kokovstev that something had to be done at once to regain public confidence, and also by the expressed fear of Count Witte, chairman of the Committee of Ministers, that the "aureole of the ruler would be destroyed" if Nicholas II did not publicly dissociate himself from the day's events.[166] Their warnings proved correct. Katkov points also to the Russian liberals' campaign over some years of denouncing and discrediting the autocracy, that is destroying its authority, as paving the way for the success of the February 1917 "popular rising and the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison [which] resulted in the bloodless collapse of the monarchy . . ."[167]

In his account of the East German Rising, Brant observes:

> To the people of the Soviet Zone it [the declaration of the state of emergency by the Red Army, not the East German regime] was confirmation of what they already knew: after seven years in command the Red republicans were still dependent on power lent them by their protectors. But lasting domination depends less upon power than upon authority; power demands constant submission, and submission can

quickly turn to mutiny. Authority requires and is granted respect, which in time of trouble and unrest is confirmed in willing obedience.[168]

In an extreme case, loss of authority in a system or regime may lead to recognition of the authority of a rival, nascent regime, and therefore the transfer of loyalty and obedience from the old to the new government. (At times loyalty may also be transferred, not to a rival regime, but to a more abstract authority, as a religious or moral system, or to a principle or ideology.)

A parallel government will emerge only in unusual instances of nonviolent action in clearly revolutionary situations. To be successful, the new government must possess widespread and deep support, and the old regime must have lost its authority among the vast majority of the populace. However, when a parallel government develops in a serious way, the opponent's remaining authority and power will also be severely threatened.

Such a parallel government obviously faces a number of difficult problems, and whether it succeeds or not will depend on how they are answered. Little analytical work has been done to date on the factors leading to success or failure of this particular method, or on the ways in which, when successful, the replacement may take place.

2. Human resources Nonviolent action may also cut off the human resources necessary to the opponent's political power. Usually, in "normal times," rulers assume that they will receive general obedience and cooperation among the subjects who will obey and do all the things that need to be done to maintain them as rulers and to enable the system to operate. The widespread practice of nonviolent action, however, may shatter that assumption. The sheer numerical multiplication of noncooperating, disobedient and defiant members of the subordinate group and general population is likely not only to create severe enforcement problems but also to influence the ruler's power position. Nonviolent action is likely to lead not only to an increase in the refusal of consent among the subordinates directly affected by the grievance, but also to a related withdrawal of consent among the opponent's usual supporters (assuming there is a distinction between the two).

This withdrawal of human resources will be most effective in 1) conflicts within the opponent's country in which the noncooperation of his own home population denies him the only available source of the human assistance he requires, and 2) in conflicts, as in a foreign occupation, in which the opponent is denied the assistance of *both* population groups,

that is his usual supporters (the home population) and the grievance group (the people of the occupied country). However, even when two population groups are involved, and only one of these (as in an occupied country) withholds its human assistance, the noncooperation may nevertheless prove effective given the presence of certain other favorable conditions.

The increased withholding of human resources both in absolute and proportionate terms may lead to a disastrous situation for the opponent. These human resources, along with other sources of power, are likely to be reduced simultaneously with an increase in the demands upon that power which have been produced by the growth of noncooperation and defiance. The opponent then may lose control of the situation and the regime may become powerless. When this happens in politics nonviolent action has produced in the political arena results comparable to an effective strike in the industrial arena. Nonparticipation may paralyze the opponent's political system. This potentiality was clearly foreseen by Gandhi:

I believe, and everybody must grant, that no Government can exist for a single moment without the cooperation of the people, willing or forced, and if people suddenly withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the Government will come to a stand-still.[169]

For major periods during the Russian 1905 Revolution the situation was completely out of the control of the government and the police were powerless to intervene, so massive was the popular defiance.[170]

In face of massive nonviolent defiance in Peshawar in April 1930 and the Garwali mutiny, already cited, the British temporarily gave up the attempt to control the city and withdrew their troops, abandoning the city for nearly ten days until reinforcements were available.[171]

The Devlin Commission's report to the British Government in 1959 revealed that the real reason for the 1958 Emergency in Nyasaland (now called Malawi) was fear that widespread African noncooperation and disobedience would lead to collapse of the government—not the "murder plot" which was so widely publicized at the time. By early March the situation reached the point where "the Government had either to act or to abdicate."[172] The Commission declared: "The decision to suppress Congress, we think, owed more to the belief that its continued activities were making government impossible than to the feeling that it was, or might be, a terrorist organization."[173]

3. Skills and knowledge People do different jobs, have different skills and knowledge, and a particular regime or system needs some of these more than others. A withdrawal, therefore, by key personnel, tech-

nicians, officers, administrators, etc., of their assistance to the opponent (or their reduced assistance) may have an impact on the opponent's power quite disproportionate to the numbers actually noncooperating.

Refusal of assistance by key subjects may make it difficult for the opponent to develop and carry out policies appropriate to the situation he faces. This may lead to the acceptance of policies which prove to be political mistakes or to an inability to implement chosen policies, or difficulties in doing so.

For example, during the Inquisition imposed by Spain's Charles V on the Netherlands which Spain then ruled, the opposition of officials and magistrates, as well as of regular citizens, seems to have been decisive in blocking its implementation. In 1550 there was an attempt to impose the most severe measure yet, the "edict of blood," which imposed the death sentence for all trespasses. It proved, however, impossible to carry out the edict on a large scale. Pieter Geyl reports that both officials and magistrates opposed it and declined to give their cooperation. "In the opinion of those who designed the system, religious persecution in the Netherlands never worked anything but defectively."[174]

Gandhi maintained that if the Indians who held official posts under the British Raj were to resign them, the result would probably be the end of foreign rule without the need for the noncooperation of the masses. The alternative for Britain, he said, would be a pure despotic military dictatorship which, he argued, Britain did not dare contemplate.[175] Pleas were often made during the Indian struggle for officials to resign.[176] The key contribution made to the defeat of the Kapp Putsch by the noncooperation of civil servants and the refusal of experts to join the new cabinet has already been described above. The German government in 1923 recognized the special role of civil servants in the official passive resistance struggle against the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, as it forbade all State, provincial and local authorities and civil servants from obeying the occupation officials' orders.[177]

Doubtless in some political and social situations the chances of the administrators and officials—the bureaucracy—shifting their loyalty are greater than in other situations, but if it happens, it may prove decisive. The opponent's political power may be weakened also by internal conflicts within his own regime, both at upper and lower levels. These conflicts may be independent of the nonviolent action, or may be accentuated by it, or perhaps even created by it—as on such questions as whether to make concessions and what repression should be applied. While the regime may give the impression to the outside world that it is firmly united, the

actual situation may be quite different, with or without a major nonviolent action movement.

The theoretically omnipotent Russian Tsar, for example, in 1904 could neither impose his will on his advisors nor stop their intrigues and disputes.[178] The split inside the Soviet Communist Party and the regime in 1924-27 is another example.[179] Various splits also occurred within the Nazi regime over policy and administration of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union.[180] Khrushchev's admission of disputes within the Russian leadership on how to react to the Hungarian Revolution is confirmation that such conflicts may exist in response to a major challenge outside the regime. The mere existence of such internal conflicts under various conditions may accentuate the impact of nonviolent action.

The analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent action suggests that for a variety of reasons such internal conflicts may be *more* probable in face of major nonviolent action, although documentary proof is at present not available. Where they occur, such internal conflicts in the opponent's regime will affect detrimentally the degree to which the regime's full potential of skills, knowledge, insight, energy, etc., is available for dealing with the challenge.

4. Intangible factors Such factors as habits of obedience, political beliefs and the like may be significantly threatened by widespread nonviolent action. Such a movement involves the destruction of the habit of *unquestioning* obedience and the development of conscious choice to obey or disobey. This development would tend to make the opponent's political power more dependent upon the active and deliberate support of the subjects.

Nonviolent action may also be associated with changes in outlook and political beliefs. Nonviolent action in some situations (not necessarily the majority) *reflects* the spread among the subjects of views which challenge officially blessed doctrines. In most situations, however, the actionists are likely to be concerned instead with either particular grievances or a single broad political principle or objective, or with both. Even such cases may contribute to *further* erosion of unquestioning belief in an official doctrine. In such a struggle, events may refute official dogmas. For example, effective nonviolent challenge to the dictatorship may refute the view that violence is omnipotent. Or, the doctrine that the dictatorship reflects the will of the "people," or is a "workers' State," may be questioned when the general population, or the workers, demonstrate in the streets against it, go on strike, or noncooperate politically. Or, a belief that the dictatorship is benevolent and humanitarian may be shattered by

repression against nonviolent people whose demand seems reasonable. The degree to which members of the population as a whole, and particularly members of the dominant group (the government, the Party, etc.) will be able and willing to re-examine the official political ideology will vary. At times firm adherence to the official ideology may ensure that repression is swift and harsh, although this may be a temporary phase. In other conflicts the actionists may be seen as trying to implement the "real" principles underlying official doctrines, while the existing regime is viewed as violating and distorting them to support despicable policies.

This discussion is only illustrative of ways nonviolent action may alter the intangible factors which help to secure the subjects' obedience and to preserve the ruler's power.

5. Material resources Nonviolent action also may regulate the degree to which material resources are available to the opponent. These resources include control of the economic system, transportation, means of communication, financial resources, raw materials, and the like. The capacity of nonviolent action to impose economic penalties on the opponent should already be clear, for of the 198 methods of this technique described in earlier chapters[61] are directly economic, boycotts, strikes or intervention. In addition certain other methods may also have indirect economic effects, as from political disruption or by increasing costs of enforcement, or by losing goodwill for the opponent, or public confidence, so that third parties withhold loans, investments, trade and the like. A view popular among economic determinists—that nonviolent action is inevitably ineffective and irrelevant because financial and material factors determine the course of politics—is therefore based upon a fundamental gap in their understanding of this technique.

The Townshend duties, against which the American colonists complained so harshly, had been imposed to reduce the burdens on the British taxpayer by raising revenue in North America. The colonists' campaign of noncooperation not only blocked achievement of that objective, but also imposed additional economic losses on the Mother Country. A correspondent (probably Benjamin Franklin) pointed out in the London Public Advertiser on January 17, 1769, that only a maximum revenue of £3,500 had been produced in the colonies, while the British business loss due to the American nonimportation and nonconsumption campaign was estimated at £7,250,000. He also pointed to the possibility of war if the policy were continued, which would take the British at least ten years to win, cost at least £100,000,000, and leave a loss of life and a legacy of hatred. In Britain by that time, says Gipson, ". . . most men in public life were

persuaded that to attempt to collect such duties in face of colonial opposition was economically unsound and politically unwise."[181]

It would be possible to offer innumerable examples from the two centuries since 1769 in which nonviolent action has inflicted such material losses on opponents that their economic, and consequently their power position, were both placed in jeopardy. Many examples described in Chapters Five and Six are of this type, especially of generalized strikes, general strikes and economic shutdowns.

However, only one more example of how nonviolent action affects the economic resources of the opponent will be offered: the nonviolent Indian struggles against British rule. These economic losses are in the main attributed to three sources: direct revenue refusal, increased expenditure for administration and enforcement, and deliberate economic boycotts.

During the Indian 1930-31 struggle, as a result of tax refusal and boycott of goods providing government revenue, and with increased expenditure to deal with the civil disobedience movement, the British regime faced deficits in the provincial governments. At various times the government of the Punjab faced a deficit of Rs. 10,000,000, the Bombay government faced a deficit of Rs. 10,250,000, the Central provinces Rs. 5,000,000, Madras Rs. 8,700,000, Bengal Rs. 9,482,000 and Bihar Rs. 4,200,000.[182] Gandhi's Young India commented: "When we check the nourishment from passing from the victim to the parasite the latter naturally weakens and dies while the former revives."[183] It is clear that revenue refusal was an important aspect of that movement.[184]

Year	*Total Exports of the United Kingdom to British India in Millions of Pounds*
1924	90.6
1925	86.0
1926	81.8
1927	85.0
1928	83.9
1929	78.2
1930 (boycott year)	52.9185

People who argue that Gandhi's nonviolence had nothing to do with the British leaving India, that the real reasons were instead economic, erroneously assume that there was no contact between the two. There was,

however, a close relationship, which included an immediate reduction of trade and profits.

A survey of exports to India over several years is instructive.

For certain specific items the decrease in imports from Great Britain between 1929 and 1930 ranged from eighteen percent to forty-five percent.[186] The Secretary of State for India told the House of Commons at the end of 1930 that the general depression in world trade accounted for a drop of twenty-five percent in exports to India, while he credited a drop of a further eighteen percent to the Congress' boycott.[187] Even eighteen percent is a significant figure, but the boycott may have been even more effective. Imports of British cotton cloth to India dropped far more that year than imports of cotton cloth from all foreign countries combined.[188] Between October 1930 and April 1931, when the boycott was at its height, there was a decline of eighty-four percent in imports of British cloth. Lancashire mill owners and workers petitioned the Secretary of State for India to "do something about India."[189]

These cases are simply illustrative, and quite mild at that. Large-scale strikes and economic shutdowns affect much more severely the economic resources available to the opponent and the degree of political power he can wield, as the Great October Strike of 1905 or the 1944 economic shutdowns in El Salvador and Guatemala illustrate. International consumers' boycotts and embargoes may also influence the outcome of the struggle.

6. Sanctions Even the opponent's ability to apply sanctions may on occasion be influenced by nonviolent action. We saw in Chapter One that fear of the ruler's sanctions is one of the reasons for obedience. We also noted that the threat or use of sanctions does not necessarily produce obedience, and that they can be neutralized by massive defiance.

In addition, sanctions as a source of the ruler's power may be reduced or removed by nonviolent action by those who help to provide the sanctions. Usually, this means that police and troops carry out orders for repression inefficiently, or disobey them completely. Sometimes the actions of others may also cut off the supply of weapons and ammunition, as when foreign suppliers halt shipments, or when strikes occur in domestic arms factories and transport. These means of control may be very important in certain situations.

The opponent's ability to apply sanctions may also be influenced by the degree to which his agents of repression—police and troops—are willing to carry out orders. In some situations there may be too few such agents because they have not volunteered or because conscripts have re-

fused duty. In other situations, the existing police or troops decline to carry out orders efficiently, or refuse them completely—i.e., mutiny. Mutinies have occurred in wartime, in face of violent revolution, and in cases of mixed violent and nonviolent struggle.

As we have already discussed, there is good reason to believe that mutiny is much more likely in face of nonviolent resistance. The troops or police then do not face injury or death from the "rebels" and they must decide whether to obey orders to inflict severe repression against nonviolent people. Laxity in obedience and finally open mutiny will only occur in special circumstances, however. Police and troops will vary in their sensitivity or callousness to the sufferings they inflict on the nonviolent group. The potential for reduced reliability of the agents of repression nevertheless exists; this may be described as a tendency in nonviolent conflicts. Gandhi was quite convinced that soldiers who wound and kill nonviolent actionists undergo a traumatic experience which in time will bring them to contrition: ". . . an army that dares to pass over the corpses of innocent men and women would not be able to repeat that experiment."[190]

Efforts to convert the opponent group may produce both laxity in obeying orders for repression and open mutiny among police and troops, which may lead to nonviolent coercion of the opponent leadership. In other cases, mutiny may occur without conscious efforts at conversion. In any case, disobedience by the agents of repression will reduce the opponent's power, in some cases decisively. Widespread mutinies of Russian troops during the revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 have already been described above.[191] In the latter case they played a major role in achieving the disintegration of the tsarist regime.

The Nazis recognized well that if they lost control of the Army their power would be drastically weakened; Goebbels reveals that in early February 1938 the Nazis feared most of all not a coup d'etat but the collective resignation of all high-ranking officers[192] —a form of noncooperation.

During the predominantly nonviolent East German Rising of June 1953 police sometimes withdrew completely or willingly gave up their arms. Among the East German armed forces there were some cases of mutiny and laying down of arms. There were even evidences of sympathy from Russian soldiers and of reluctance to fire on the civilians. The overwhelming number of Russians who obeyed orders apparently suffered reduced morale.[193] It is reported that some one thousand Soviet officers and other ranks refused to fire at demonstrators, and that fifty-two Party members and soldiers were shot for disobeying orders.[194]

Large-scale deliberate inefficiency among troops and police is likely to reduce the regime's power. When officials realize that obedience is uncertain, especially if small mutinies have already occurred, they may hesitate before ordering severe repressive actions which might provoke mutiny. That hesitation also limits sanctions as a source of power. A major mutiny is bound to alter power relationships radically, and the opponent is unlikely then to be able to withstand the demands of the nonviolent actionists. In fact, his regime may then disintegrate.

C. Some factors influencing nonviolent coercion

There is no single pattern for producing nonviolent coercion. The factors which produce it occur in different combinations and proportions; there appear to be at least eight such factors. The role and combination of these will not be the same when the nonviolent coercion has been largely produced by mutiny, for example, as when the coercion has been achieved by economic and political paralysis. The contribution of each factor will depend upon the degree to which it regulates one or more of the opponent's necessary sources of power.

Generally speaking, nonviolent coercion is more likely where the *numbers* of nonviolent actionists are very large, both in absolute numerical terms and in proportion to the general population. It is then possible for the defiance to be too massive for the opponent to control; paralysis by noncooperation is more likely. There, too, may be a greater chance of interfering with the sources of power which depend upon manpower, skilled or unskilled.

The *degree of the opponent's dependence* on the nonviolent actionists for the sources of his power is also important. The greater the dependence, the greater the chances of nonviolent coercion. It therefore becomes important to consider exactly *who* is refusing assistance to the opponent. "The extent of nonparticipation required to produce measurable political effects varies with the strategic position of the strikers," argued Hiller.[195] Under certain circumstances the opponent may be relatively indifferent to large numbers of noncooperating subjects and in other circumstances he may be nonviolently coerced by the action of a relatively few.

The *ability* of the nonviolent group *to apply the technique* of nonviolent action will be very important. The role of fighting skill here is comparable to its importance in any other type of combat. Skill here includes the capacity to choose strategy, tactics and methods, the times and places for action, etc., and ability to act in accordance with the dynamics and requirements of this nonviolent technique. Ability to apply nonviolent

action skillfully will help to overcome the weaknesses of the nonviolent group, to capitalize on the opponent's weaknesses, and to struggle against the opponent's countermeasures.

Whether or not nonviolent coercion is achieved will also depend on how long the defiance and noncooperation can be maintained. A massive act of noncooperation which collapses after a few hours cannot nonviolently coerce anyone. Willingness and ability to maintain nonviolent action for a sufficient duration despite repression are necessary to reduce or sever sources of the opponent's power.

The sympathy and support of *third parties* for the nonviolent group may be important in producing nonviolent coercion if the opponent depends on them for such things as economic resources, transportation facilities, military supplies and the like. Such supplies may then be cut off and his power position thereby undermined.

The *means of control and repression* which the opponent can use, and for how long, in an attempt to force a resumption of cooperation and obedience are also important. Even more important is the actionists' response to them.

The final factor contributing to nonviolent coercion is *opposition within the opponent group* either to the policies at issue or to the repression, or to both. The number of dissidents, the intensity of their disagreement, the types of action they use, and their positions in the social, economic and political structure will all be important here. On occasion splits in the ruling group itself may occur. Should this happen, or should a general strike or major mutiny of troops or police take place in opposition to repression of the nonviolent actionists, it would be a major factor in producing nonviolent coercion.