Leaving a Footprint:

European Immigration, Political Preferences, and Social Capital in Brazil *

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of historical immigration on medium- and long-term political outcomes in Brazil. Using a unique dataset containing vote shares of presidential elections at the municipal level from 1955 to 2018, we find that municipalities with a higher inflow of immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century exhibited increased support for left-wing parties in the first democratic elections (1955-1960). We show that these political preferences persisted in the long run (1989-2018) when the country transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democracy. Our analysis highlights the role of immigrants' influence on the labor movement as a mechanism for transmitting values and preferences to the native population. We show that Brazilians living in municipalities with higher exposure to historical immigration are more likely to support democracy, exhibit higher levels of trust in institutions, and report preferences for redistribution.

JEL Classification: J15, J61, D72, Z1, N36

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1 Introduction

Over the past years, international migration and its impact on destination countries have received significant attention, especially in the United States and Europe, where the inflow of immigrants from culturally distinct countries increased the support for populist right-wing parties (Barone et al., 2016; Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019). While most of the literature analyses the consequences of immigration in the short run, much less is known about its long-run effects. In addition, even less attention has been paid to the impact of migration on the transmission of political preferences to the local population in countries with a long history of non-democratic institutions, especially the absence of free and fair elections.

This is particularly relevant for two main reasons. First, the impacts of immigrants on natives' political preferences may vary depending on the time immigrants spend in the receiving country (Allport, 1954). As natives and immigrants interact, it may become more feasible for natives to accept immigrants and assimilate their political, economic, and social preferences (Dustmann et al., 2019; Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020; Steinmayr, 2021). Second, a country's political history can impact the persistence of political ideology. Longer periods of democratic stability can foster the development and transmission of democratic values and beliefs across generations. In contrast, countries that have experienced more abrupt political changes, such as transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, often experience significant institutional, political, and social transformations that can disrupt the continuity of political ideologies and values.

In this paper, we study the role of European Mass Migration in shaping electoral outcomes in the long run in Brazil, which provides a compelling setting to investigate these issues. First, from 1890 to 1930, the country experienced a significant inflow of approximately 4 million immigrants, a remarkable number considering the total population of around 14.3 million in 1890. During this period, immigrants represented an overwhelming fraction of the workforce, with growth rates exceeding those observed in the United States (Merrick and Graham, 1979, p. 109). Interestingly, while European immigrants to the United States and Argentina were primarily young males traveling alone to urban centers, Brazil attracted predominantly agricultural workers from Italy, Portugal, and Spain who migrated with their families to work in the coffee farms.¹

¹The type of immigration, whether involving families or single individuals, affects the demand for public goods. For instance, immigrant families are more motivated to invest in education and support schooling opportunities for their children as they are likely to stay in the host country. In contrast, single young males, who are more inclined to return to their home country, may have less incentive to pressure local politicians for investments in public education (Craig and Faria, 2021).

Second, unlike the United States, Brazil experienced long periods of authoritarian regimes characterized by limited voting rights. Throughout the twentieth century, the country witnessed a cycle of transitions between democratic and authoritarian governments, with the democratic periods being relatively shorter and less frequent than the authoritarian ones. Since Brazil completed its transition to democracy in 1989 with the election of Fernando Collor de Mello as the first democratically-elected president after decades of authoritarian rule, one might expect less persistence of values among specific social groups in Brazil compared to countries with established democratic traditions like the United States (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020). Nevertheless, this paper shows that this also occurred in Brazil.

To investigate the influence of immigrants on the political preferences of the native population, we focus on two distinct democratic periods in Brazilian history. Specifically, we digitize a novel dataset containing electoral outcomes at the municipality level from the 1955 and 1960 presidential elections, which marked the return of democratic elections following a period of authoritarian government (1930-1945). What makes these elections particularly intriguing for our analysis is the adoption of a unique system wherein voters could cast separate votes for the president and vice president using a plurality voting system.² Moreover, these elections introduced an official ballot for both presidential and vice presidential elections, which released voters from the influence of local elites and enabled a more democratic and authentic representation of their choices.³ We then leverage these distinctive institutional characteristics to explore the impact of immigrants on the electoral outcomes of both presidential and vice presidential elections. To assess the long-term persistence of political preferences, we complement the analysis with electoral results of the presidential elections after the second wave of democratization (1989-2018).

By combining these novel electoral data with variation at the municipality level in the exposure to historical immigration, we can assess the long-run impacts of immigrants on political ideology and whether the political preferences persisted even after long periods of non-democratic regimes in the country. To estimate a causal effect of immigration on political outcomes, we follow Card (2001) and Tabellini (2020) and use census data to construct a "leave-out" version of the shift-share instrument to predict the inflows

²This arrangement resulted in the election of a president supported by the main right-wing party and a vice president member of a left-wing party in 1960. This unusual combination of ideological groups would be one of the causes of the political crisis in subsequent years.

³Before 1955, voters would arrive at polling stations with pre-filled ballots provided by the candidates, a system that tended to favor larger parties and candidates with greater economic power. The act of voting then consisted of placing the pre-filled ballot into an official envelope and subsequently inserting the envelope into the ballot box (Nicolau, 2022).

of immigrants between 1872 and 1920 based on preexisting migration patterns in each Brazilian municipality. Specifically, we combine the share of foreign-born individuals for each country living in a given municipality in 1872 with the number of new immigrants moving to Brazil between 1872 and 1920. The identifying assumption of the empirical design depends on exogenous shares (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). In particular, the strategy is valid if municipality-specific characteristics associated with the initial distribution of immigrant population across municipalities are uncorrelated with the long-run evolution of political preferences at the local level. We conduct several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our results.

We begin our analysis by studying the political effects of immigration on the 1955 elections. First, we find that the presence of immigrants increased the vote share of candidates aligned with left-wing parties both in presidential and vice presidential elections. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the inflow of immigrants led to a 6.2 percentage points increase in the vote share of Juscelino Kubitscheck, the winning candidate representing a center-left populist party. This effect corresponds to approximately 15.9% of the candidate's average vote share. Conversely, we observe a negative impact on the vote share of Plínio Salgado, the founder of the Brazilian Integralism political movement, which drew inspiration from Italian fascism. We document similar results for the vice presidential elections. In particular, we find that the local exposure to historical immigration led to higher support for João Goulart, the candidate of a party originating from the urban labor movement, accompanied by negative effects on the vote share of Milton Campos, the candidate of the main right-wing party in Brazil. Next, we investigate the impacts of immigration on the 1960 elections. The results are consistent with higher support for left-wing candidates, especially in the presidential elections.

Having established the impact of immigration on political outcomes in the medium term, we then investigate the persistent nature of these effects in the long run. To do so, we focus on the first rounds of the presidential elections between 1989 and 2018. This exercise allows us to assess the persistence of political preferences under a non-democratic regime since Brazil was ruled under a military dictatorship from 1964 until 1985. We follow Ogeda et al. (2021) and classify all political parties in Brazil into two groups: left-wing and non-left-wing. Consistent with our earlier findings, we document positive effects of immigration on the support for left-wing parties in the long run. These results provide compelling evidence that political preferences in Brazil persisted over time, even following an extended period of military dictatorship characterized by limited voting rights and the absence of party representation.

One concern with our empirical analysis is that it considers the whole country, even though European immigration was concentrated in the Southernmost parts of Brazil. To address this issue, we examine whether our estimated effects vary across different regions of the country. Intuitively, we expect that the mechanisms driving our main results to be stronger in the states of the South and Southeast, which experienced the highest inflows of European immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration. Indeed, our findings confirm this intuition, as we observe statistically significant coefficients only for these specific regions in the long run.

In the second part of the paper, we investigate the mechanisms through which immigration influenced political outcomes in Brazil. We hypothesize that European immigrants brought democratic values, social norms, and political ideology that influenced the native Brazilian population (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020; Craig and Faria, 2021). Specifically, we explore the role of immigrants in the labor movement as a plausible mechanism through which immigrants may have impacted the support for left-wing parties (Hall, 1975; Maram, 1977). First, immigrants faced a challenging political environment characterized by manipulated elections during the First Republic (1891-1930) and an authoritarian regime with no elections in the 1930s. Consequently, immigrants relied on their ability to mobilize and exert pressure as the primary mechanisms to have their demands addressed (Witzel de Souza, 2018; Colistete, 2019). Second, the overwhelming presence of the foreign-born population in the workforce in the early decades of the twentieth century had a relevant role in the formation of the labor movement in Brazil, especially in the Southern and Southeastern states (Hall, 1975; Maram, 1977). Third, most immigrants who arrived in Brazil between 1890 and 1920 were Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards. These immigrants had higher levels of education and prior experience with labor movement, political groups, and other organizations, which positioned them to play significant roles in shaping ideologies, leadership, and membership within the Brazilian labor movement (Baily, 1969; Maram, 1977; Gabaccia, 1994).

Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the presence of immigrants positively affected the number of unionized workers in the manufacturing sector in 1938. We also provide evidence that the political impacts of immigration in Brazil are consistent with long-lasting effects on social capital and political attitudes. By combining respondent-level data from the Latinobarómetro survey from 2002 to 2020 with historical data on the prevalence of immigration at the municipality level, we show that individuals living in municipalities with a higher historical presence of immigrants are more likely to support democracy, exhibit higher levels of trust in institutions, and report greater preferences for redistribution. These findings suggest that specific skills or cultural norms associated with immigrants may have persisted and influenced subsequent generations' political attitudes and behaviors.

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the

literature on the Age of Mass Migration. Previous studies have examined the selection and assimilation of European immigrants in the United States (Abramitzky et al., 2014; Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Abramitzky et al., 2020). Similarly, Lafortune et al. (2019) and Sequeira et al. (2020) have explored the short- and long-run effects of historical immigration on economic development. Tabellini (2020) has investigated the causes of anti-immigration sentiments in the short run, highlighting the initial backlash triggered by ethnic diversity brought about by European immigrants. In Argentina, Droller (2018) finds that European immigration positively affected economic development in the long run. The author shows that European immigrants had higher levels of human capital compared to native Argentinians, which in turn facilitated the supply of skilled labor for the country's industrial sector. Research for Brazil has focused on the link between immigrants' human capital and long-term economic and educational outcomes (Carvalho Filho and Monasterio, 2012; Stolz et al., 2013; Rocha et al., 2017; Witzel de Souza, 2018). We contribute to this literature by providing new evidence on the long-lasting impact of immigration on cultural norms and political attitudes (Craig and Faria, 2021). Understanding the formation and transmission of values and beliefs across generations is crucial since cultural traits established in the distant past can have significant implications for contemporary economic and institutional outcomes (Guiso et al., 2006, 2008, 2016; Alesina et al., 2013).

This paper also contributes to the literature on the intergenerational transmission of immigrant characteristics (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Alesina et al., 2013; Hornung, 2014). Many studies have focused on the short-term effects of immigration on political preferences (Dustmann et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020; Calderon et al., 2021). A few exceptions include Ochsner and Roesel (2020), who study the effects of migrating extremists within regions of Austria on the vote share for far-right parties, and Dippel and Heblich (2021), who examine the role of former leaders of the failed German revolution of 1848-1849 in anti-slavery campaigns that culminated in the United States Civil War. Most closely related to our paper is Giuliano and Tabellini (2020), who investigate the long-term transmission of preferences for redistribution from European immigrants to Americans. We contribute to this literature by showing that immigrants' ideology can have a lasting impact on political outcomes, even in a non-democratic context. Our findings provide insights into the origins of political ideology in Brazil and emphasize its enduring nature over time through a different mechanism: the influence of immigrants on the labor movement. Another relevant study in the context of Latin America related to this paper is Lazzaroni (2021), who presents evidence that Italian immigrants played a role in the emergence of Peronism in Argentina by disseminating populist ideologies.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical

background. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 contains the main results on political outcomes in the medium- and long run. Section 6 summarizes the main robustness checks. Section 7 documents evidence of the mechanisms underlying the results, and Section 8 presents some concluding remarks.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Age of Mass Migration

Following Brazil's declaration of independence in 1822, the constitutional monarchy actively promoted European immigration to populate uninhabited lands in the Southern regions of Brazil (Cameron, 1931; Hall, 1969). The policies to encourage the establishment of small settlements gained further support in the second half of the nineteenth century due to the ban on the international slave trade in 1850 and the subsequent abolition of slavery in 1888 (Andrews, 1988). The rapid expansion of coffee plantations created a significant demand for free labor, particularly in the state of São Paulo, which emerged as one of the world's largest coffee producers and the most developed region in the country (Love, 1980; Luna et al., 2016). To meet the increasing labor demands of the expanding coffee plantations, the government implemented various policies to encourage immigration, focusing on attracting individuals from Southern European countries like Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Holloway, 1980; Leff, 1997). These policies included financial incentives such as transportation subsidies and land grants. Additionally, industrialization and demographic transitions in Europe contributed to a significant outflow of Europeans seeking opportunities abroad in the late nineteenth century (Hatton and Williamson, 1998).

Figure 1 presents the annual arrival of immigrants in Brazil. Between 1877 and 1903, more than 1.9 million Europeans moved to Brazil, averaging around 71,000 immigrants per year (Levy, 1974). Until 1876, most immigrants came from Portugal, but in the late 1880s, there was a steady increase in Italian immigration. Between 1886 and 1903, 1,688,480 immigrants arrived at Brazilian ports, with Italians accounting for the vast majority (58.49%). Notably, from 1886 to 1895, the annual average of Italians entering Brazil exceeded those entering the United States and Argentina (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). Concerns about the poor living conditions of migrants in Brazil led some sending countries to impose limitations or bans on subsidized immigration. The Prinetti Decree of 1902 effectively banned subsidized immigration from Italy, while Spain implemented a similar restriction in 1908.

Although sponsored immigration continued until 1927, spontaneous immigration sur-

passed subsidized immigration from 1905 to 1929, resulting in approximately 2.1 million immigrants coming to Brazil with a more diverse distribution of nationalities. During the first decade of this period, around fifty percent of the foreign-born population originated from Portugal and Spain. Additionally, this period marked the arrival of the first Japanese immigrants. While World War I significantly reduced the inflow of immigrants, the 1920s witnessed another significant wave of migration with the arrival of immigrants from other regions of Europe, including Poland, Russia, and Romania (Levy, 1974).

2.2 The Impact of European Immigration on Brazil

A growing body of research has documented the impacts of European immigration on Brazilian development. For instance, Carvalho Filho and Colistete (2010) and Rocha et al. (2017) find positive and significant long-lasting effects of European immigration on human capital accumulation and the supply of educational inputs in the state of São Paulo. The second study also shows that the subsidizing policies attracted immigrants with higher levels of schooling to specific regions of the state, which positively affected income per capita in the long run. These results are similar to those of Stolz et al. (2013), who find positive and persistent effects of the human capital endowments of immigrants for the whole country. Complementing this literature, Craig and Faria (2021) document the role of immigrants' nationality traits in shaping demand and supply for education in Brazil. These findings support the notion that human and social capital play a crucial role in economic growth and institutional development (Glaeser et al., 2004).

Moreover, apart from their higher levels of education, research suggests that European immigrants also positively influenced educational investments, which had long-term effects on economic development (Witzel de Souza, 2018; Colistete, 2019). In particular, Witzel de Souza (2018) finds that the mere presence of German immigrants in São Paulo was insufficient to impact human capital accumulation in the state. Conversely, the founding of schools by these immigrants was an essential condition for the emergence of positive effects. As argued by the author, this evidence emphasizes the importance of considering not only the direct influence of immigrants through cultural traits but also the specific actions and institutions they introduce in the receiving country (Acemoglu et al., 2014). These results are similar to those of Carvalho Filho and Monasterio (2012), who find that regions close to German colonies in the Rio Grande do Sul state have less inequality and high educational levels today. The authors show that a more egalitarian land distribution system within the official state-sponsored settlements and not the higher human capital of these immigrants appeared to be the most important mechanism to explain the positive outcomes in the long term.

This paper contributes to the literature by exploiting whether immigrants affected political preferences in Brazil. We argue that the influence goes beyond formal education, encompassing social norms, culture, and political attitudes that immigrants brought with them and gradually transmitted to native Brazilians. For instance, the prior experience with social welfare reforms may have contributed to the successful mobilization of citizens in Brazil for the establishment and enhancement of primary schools and other public goods, given the absence of a social security system in the country (Stolz et al., 2013; Witzel de Souza, 2018; Colistete, 2019; Craig and Faria, 2021).⁴ The ability to mobilize is particularly significant in an environment where the immigrant working class did not participate directly in politics.⁵

Similarly, while agriculture employed a significant amount of immigrants in Brazil, many found work in unskilled positions across various urban industries such as food, clothing, construction, and transportation (Baily, 1969). In São Paulo, 80 percent of the workers in the textile industry in 1912 were foreign-born individuals, and 65 percent Italians (São Paulo, 1912, p. 74-75).⁶ Additionally, Dean (1969) argues that immigrants and their descendants played a significant role as entrepreneurs in the industrialization of São Paulo, and Pereira (1974) highlights that Italians from the first and second generations formed the largest ethnic group among the entrepreneurs. Considering that immigrants accounted for large fractions of the workers in manufacturing activities in São Paulo, they might have brought with them previously acquired manufacturing skills and cultural traits possibly associated with entrepreneurship that added to the local labor force and affected the long-run political preferences in Brazil (Hall, 1975; Maram, 1977).

Finally, European immigrants significantly influenced Brazil's early labor movement by taking up key positions concerning ideologies, leadership, and membership (Baily, 1969; Maram, 1977). Although most workers in Italy did not vote before 1913, socialist movements had already gained significant strength since the 1870s (Baily, 1969; Gabaccia,

⁴Bandiera et al. (2019) show that by 1890 many European countries like Italy, Germany, and Spain had already implemented compulsory schooling policies.

⁵Under the 1824 Constitution, only Brazilians or naturalized citizens (not resident foreign immigrants) were eligible to vote. The 1891 Republican Constitution excluded the majority of adult Brazilians from politics by denying the vote to illiterates. Although there were few formal barriers to voting by immigrants, they showed little interest in political participation (Hall, 1975).

⁶In São Paulo, Italians were the most dominant group in the labor market before other immigrant groups arrived in large numbers (Maram, 1977). The composition of Italian immigrants varied over time, with distinct patterns in different waves of migration. In the first wave between 1876 and 1900, around three-quarters of the immigrants were from the Northern regions of Italy. However, in the subsequent wave from 1901 and 1913, the number of Southern Italians surpassed that of Northern Italians, with Southern accounting for twice as many immigrants during this period (Merrick and Graham, 1979, p. 95).

1994). Nonetheless, it was not only in São Paulo that immigrants played a significant role in the labor movement. Groups from various countries were involved in the 1917 railroad strikes in Rio Grande do Sul (Bak, 1998). The Brazilian labor movement then inherited a wealth of experience from European immigrants, who introduced diverse ideologies and organizational structures.⁷ These immigrants promoted different forms of socialism, established mutual aid associations, and actively engaged in strikes. The publication of newspapers and magazines in German, Italian, and Spanish, individual activism, and the formation of trade unions facilitated the propagation of these ideologies (Carone, 1989).

The economic conditions prevailing in the country may also explain the significant influence of immigrants on the ascending labor movement. As highlighted by Baily (1969), the less developed state of the Brazilian economy compared to the United States, for example, meant that labor unions had broader roles and functions, as there were no existing working-class institutions during the period of mass immigration. When considering the transmission of political preferences over time, it is important to recognize that labor movements during the First Republic had a broader relevance than just voting given the limited ability to influence electoral outcomes and elect pro-labor candidates (Maram, 1977; Conniff, 1981).

2.3 Brazil's Political History

Brazil has a long history of electoral inequality characterized by restrictive voting rights. Following its independence, under the 1824 Constitution, only wealthy literate Catholic men born in Brazil and aged twenty-five or older were granted the right to vote. The first extension of suffrage occurred in 1891, when the new Republican Constitution allowed all literate men aged twenty-one and above to vote, regardless of their income level. However, this reform still excluded a large fraction of the population from participating in the political process, including women, illiterate individuals, and literate poor, who comprised approximately 85% of the population (Love, 1970).

The second suffrage reform came with the 1934 Constitution, which granted voting rights to women, lowered the minimum voting age to eighteen, and introduced compulsory voting. However, the new electoral law maintained the literacy requirement from the 1891 reform. Despite these improvements, political participation did not experience a significant increase. The engagement in the electoral process was limited even among the

⁷Brazilian historiography erroneously assigns exaggerated importance to anarchists within the labor movement during the First Republic (Pinheiro and Hall, 1979; Viotti da Costa, 1982). The authors argue that other groups, particularly syndicalists, the socialists, and the Catholics, were more numerous and active when the labor movement gained strength in the 1920s.

literate working class (Conniff, 1981). In 1930, Getúlio Vargas came to power through a coup d'état supported by the states of Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraíba. He ruled from 1930 to 1945, during which no direct presidential elections were held.⁸ In 1937, Vargas established an authoritarian regime known as "Estado Novo", in which the president appointed interventors as state governors, who, in turn, assigned municipal mayors.

The end of the Vargas dictatorship in 1945 marked the beginning of a relatively democratic period in Brazil. Under the 1946 Constitution, three elections were held for the president and vice president of the Republic: in 1950, 1955, and 1960. The new electoral legislation introduced secret voting, allowed the emergence of new political parties, and extended the right to vote to all men and literate women over 18 years old. As a result of the expansion of literacy, voter participation notably increased during this period. However, despite these democratic advances, the proportion of voters remained relatively low. In the 1960 presidential election, approximately 19% of the total population voted, compared to 5.7% at the end of the First Republic (Love, 1970).

Under the new regime, Brazil adopted a plurality voting system for the presidential and vice presidential elections. Interestingly, voters who went to the polls had to make two independent choices: one name for president and another for vice president. In 1960, this rule resulted in a unique outcome of electing a president and vice president from different ideological groups. Among the growing number of parties, three dominated national politics: the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), a left-wing party closely associated with the urban labor movement; the Social Democratic Party (PSD), a center-left populist party founded by Vargas supporters; and the National Democratic Union (UDN), a conservative right-wing party composed by the political elite opposed to Vargas (Lavareda, 2012).

In 1964, Brazil experienced a military regime that abolished the elections for president and state governors, dissolved the political parties, and adopted a two-party system consisting of the National Renovation Alliance (ARENA) as the governing party and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) as the opposition party. In some periods, direct elections were allowed for legislative positions at the state, federal, and municipal levels, and only authorized candidates could participate (Skidmore, 1989). In the early 1980s, the military government abandoned the two-party system allowing the creation of new parties. During this period, the literacy rate in Brazil had significantly increased,

⁸The National Constituent Assembly elected Vargas as president in indirect elections in 1934.

 $^{^9{}m The~Law~2.582/1955}$ introduced the uniform, official, and secret ballot initially for presidential and vice-presidential elections in 1955 and to all other elected offices attained by a plurality vote on the following year.

and universal suffrage was achieved with the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1988. In 1989, Brazil returned to direct elections for president, and 22 candidates ran for office, many with no significant representativeness. For the first time, the presidential election took place in two rounds, with Fernando Collor and Lula as the main contenders representing right and left-wing parties, respectively. Under the new Republic, political participation stabilized at around 80% of the population, indicating a relatively high level of engagement in the political process. Figure 2 presents Brazil's political history graphically in a timeline format.

3 Data

To examine the impact of mass immigration on political preferences and the formation of social capital and political attitudes in Brazil, we combine historical and contemporary data from multiple sources. First, we obtain data from Demographic Censuses to construct various municipality characteristics, including the inflow of immigrants between 1872 and 1920. Second, we digitize novel electoral data at the municipality level containing electoral outcomes for the 1955 and 1960 presidential and vice presidential elections. We complement these data with electoral results of presidential elections after the second wave of democratization (1989-2018). These data enable us to assess voting patterns and political outcomes concerning the historical presence of immigrants. Third, we obtain individual-level data from recent surveys to measure cultural norms and political attitudes. Finally, we incorporate geographic characteristics into our analysis. These variables provide relevant characteristics that may influence the relationship between immigration, political outcomes, and social capital. Appendix B provides comprehensive details on the variables' definitions and their sources.

The administrative division in Brazil has become increasingly fragmented over time. The number of municipalities increased from 642 in 1872 to 5,565 in 2010. To guarantee consistent observations over time, despite changes in the boundaries of municipalities, we adjust all data to conform to the 1920 boundaries. Appendix B explains in detail the procedure.

Historical Characteristics. We obtain data on population and the inflow of immigrants by nationality at the municipality level from the Brazilian Demographic Censuses of 1872 and 1920. To capture the socioeconomic characteristics before the significant inflow of European immigrants following the abolition of slavery in 1888, we use the 1872 census to construct the following variables: the (i) share of foreign-born population, the (ii) share of slaves, (iii) literacy rate among individuals aged five or older, (iv) share of workers

in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors relative to the total number of occupied workers, (v) share of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and (vii) population density. Our main variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants, which we measure as the difference in the number of immigrants between 1920 and 1872 relative to the total population. In addition, we use the 1920 census data to construct the land Gini coefficient, the share of workers in manufacturing, and the literacy rate.

Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the historical characteristics of the municipalities. On average, the inflow of immigrants between 1872 and 1920 corresponds to 1.6% of the total population in our sample. Figure 3 shows that immigrants primarily settled in the Southern regions of Brazil, while fewer immigrants established themselves in the Northern areas. Notably, it is worth mentioning that the majority of immigrants who moved to the Mato Grosso state in the Center-West were from Bolivia and Paraguay, while a significant number of Argentinians and Uruguayans migrated to the Southwest areas of Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná. Nonetheless, Europeans represented approximately ninety percent of all immigrants that moved to Brazil during this period. Most importantly, the historical presence of immigrants exhibited variation among municipalities within the same state, which is important since our analysis relies on within-state variation.

Political Variables. To investigate the effects of immigration on political outcomes in Brazil, we compile a comprehensive dataset on vote shares at the municipality level obtained from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). Our dataset covers all presidential elections from 1955 to 2018. Specifically, we digitize data from the seven-volume collection published between 1945 and 1965 (TSE, 1963), which contains information on the voting of candidates in all municipalities for the 1955 and 1960 presidential and vice presidential elections. We assume the classification proposed by Nicolau (2004) to identify candidates affiliated with either left-wing or right-wing political parties during this period.

To examine the political preferences in the long run, we obtain the electoral results of the presidential elections from 1989 to 2018 directly from the TSE. Following Ogeda et al. (2021), we categorize all political parties that participated in at least one presidential

¹⁰In our empirical analysis, we consider the following ethnicities: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, England, France, German, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru. The results are qualitatively the same if we consider only the European ethnicities, but the first stage is weaker.

¹¹Nicolau (2022) uses these data to provide a qualitatively analysis of the 1960 presidential elections.

election into left-wing and non-left-wing parties. Left-wing parties are those identified as communist, socialist, or left-wing based on their official sources.¹² Our analysis focuses on the vote share of left-wing parties in the first round of each presidential election, considering the absence of runoff elections in 1994 and 1998, when the winning candidate received more than fifty percent of the valid votes in the first round.

Panels B and C in Table 1 report the summary statistics for our main outcome variables. Since not all municipalities ran elections or provided data between 1955 and 1960, the number of observations for this period is slightly lower than the sample from 1989 to 2018. On average, Juscelino Kubitschek, the candidate from the center-left party, received 39.2 percent of the valid votes in the 1955 presidential elections. Similarly, João Goulart, the elected vice president from the Labor Party, received 45.6 percent of the votes, which remained relatively stable in the subsequent election when he faced Fernando Ferrari, a strong competitor capable of attracting left-wing votes. In 1960, Ferrari received, on average, 14.4 percent of the votes, while the right-wing candidate Milton Campos ended with 39.4 percent of the votes. Over the long run, there was a noticeable increase in the vote share of left-wing parties.

In addition to the electoral results, we compile data on legislators ideology between 1998 and 2018 from Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2019) to map each party's position in a left-to-right scale. The index is constructed from congressmen's answers to the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS) and ranks parties from minus one to one. Power and Zucco (2009) argue that lower scores in the index are associated with parties that support more redistributive policies. We then combine the ideological positions of Brazilian parties with election results to the lower house of Congress and municipal councils ("Câmara dos Vereadores") to map the ideological preferences of Brazilian voters over time. ¹³ Data for legislative elections also come from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE).

Civic Capital and Political Attitudes. To capture the various dimensions of social capital, we use individual-level data from the Latinobarómetro surveys conducted between 2002 and 2020. The Latinobarómetro is a nationally representative opinion survey car-

$$I_m = \sum_{p=1}^n v_{pm} \cdot i_p,$$

where v_{pm} represents the vote share of party p in municipality m in (local or national) legislative elections and i_p is the ideological score for that party in the closest year when the BLS was conducted. A similar procedure is adopted by Fujiwara (2015).

 $^{^{12}}$ Table B1 presents the classification of political parties according to their left-right ideology position.

 $^{^{13}}$ We calculate a measure of vote-revealed ideology index at the municipality level as follows:

ried out in eighteen countries across Latin America. This survey provides a valuable database with information on individuals' perceptions, attitudes, and assessments on broad categories related to politics, the state, and its institutions. We specifically focus on eight measures that reflect cultural norms and political attitudes collected over multiple waves of the Latinobarómetro survey. By matching this individual-level data with our municipality-level dataset, we can analyze the associations between these measures and historical immigration.

The variables we consider include attitudes toward democracy, interpersonal and institutional trust, and political attitudes. To facilitate analysis, we normalize respondents' answers to these questions, assigning higher values to indicate stronger support for democratic values and higher satisfaction levels. Subsequent sections provide detailed discussions of these variables.

Geographic Controls. To account for the possibility that geographic conditions could be correlated either with the presence of immigrants or future political outcomes, we build a set of variables based on shapefiles for municipality boundaries in 1920, obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2011). These variables include: (i) latitude and longitude of each municipality's centroid, (ii) distance to the closest state capital, (iii) distance to the nearest coast, and (iv) municipality area. Moreover, we obtain data on the average municipalities' altitude from the WorldClim database and the Human Mobility Index (HMI) developed by Ozak (2010, 2018), which enables us to calculate the potential average travel time (measured in hours) within each municipality accounting for geographical and technological factors, as well as human biological constraints, providing insights into the transportation costs in the region.

Finally, we collect agricultural suitability data for specific crops such as coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. These variables capture the suitability and historical significance of these crops in different municipalities, which may have implications for economic activities, population distribution, and local development. This information is obtained from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones database provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO-GAEZ).

Additional Data. To explore potential confounders of our main results, we obtain data on employment by sector and the urban population at the municipality level. Specifically, we collect employment data from the Brazilian Demographic Census between 1920 and 1960. These data allow us to analyze the distribution of employment across different sectors of the economy within each municipality. Additionally, we use data from the census to capture the level of urbanization at the municipality level, which can shed light

on the extent of urban development and its potential impact on political dynamics.

Given the importance of European immigrants to the labor movement in the early twentieth century, we collect data on union membership from the Brazilian statistical yearbook of 1940 (Brazil, 1940). This yearbook provides valuable information on the number of unionized workers by industry at the national level. We create the number of unionized workers variable at the municipality level by following a two-step procedure. First, we use the 1940 Census to calculate the share of workers employed in each municipality for each industry. Then, we multiply this proportion by the corresponding number of unionized workers in the same industry. We then normalize these measures by the municipality population.

4 Empirical Strategy

The main interest of this paper is to evaluate the political implications of European immigration in Brazil. As discussed in Section 2, European immigrants were more literate than Brazilian natives, which impacted the supply of educational inputs (Rocha et al., 2017). Nonetheless, human capital encompasses not just formal education but also other valuable skills, cultural attributes, and social norms that are significant for long-term development (Craig and Faria, 2021). Hence, it is plausible that these immigrants leveraged these attributes to mobilize and organize to demand public goods and services that they were used to in their home countries (Witzel de Souza, 2018; Colistete, 2019).

Therefore, in addition to the direct impact of immigrants on development, foreigners' preferences might have gradually influenced the Brazilian population through a process of horizontal transmission facilitated by inter-group interactions (Allport, 1954; Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020). Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we examine the effects of immigration on electoral outcomes. Then, we study the main mechanisms through which immigrants may have affected Brazilian political preferences.

Political Preferences. To investigate the medium- and long-run effects of European immigration on political preferences, we exploit variations in a cross-section of Brazilian municipalities. More specifically, we compare municipalities with different levels of historical immigration but similar initial characteristics to examine the relationship between immigration and political outcomes. We estimate a specification of the form:

¹⁴The Brazilian statistical yearbook provides data on the total number of unionized workers for the following industries: agriculture, extractive, manufacturing, construction, transport and communication, retail, personal services, and public services.

$$y_{mst} = \eta_s + \beta \Delta Imm_{ms,1920} + \gamma X_{ms} + u_{mst}, \tag{1}$$

where y_{mst} is the outcome of interest for municipality m in state s at year t. In particular, we estimate the above equation separately for each election year $t \in \{1955, 1960, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018\}$. The main outcome variables of our analysis are the vote shares of candidates in both presidential and vice presidential elections during the first democratic period (1955 and 1960) and the vote share of left-wing parties in presidential elections following the second wave of democratization (1989-2018).

We are interested in the parameter β , which is interpreted as the average response of the outcome to changes in the inflow of immigrants over municipality population in 1920, $\Delta Imm_{ms,1920}$.¹⁵ The variable η_s stands for state fixed effects, which controls for unobserved fixed characteristics of each state potentially correlated with political preferences. The vector X_{mt} is a set of initial conditions obtained from the 1872 census that includes the population density, share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, share of workers in agriculture, and manufacturing, workers in public administration and legal professions relative to the total population, and the fraction of literate individuals. We also control for relevant geographical characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, distance to the nearest coast, distance to the nearest state capital, human mobility index, and land suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. We estimate the regressions with the 1920 administrative division and report the standard errors clustered at the 1872 boundary level since these municipalities in 1920 were originally part of a less fragmented area.

Instrument for Historical Immigration. The identification assumption is that conditional on geography and baseline socioeconomic characteristics, the distribution of the immigrant population across municipalities is uncorrelated with the error term. By incorporating state fixed effects, we estimate β by exploiting within-state variations, thereby mitigating potential confounding factors and endogeneity issues across states. Nonetheless, including the fixed effects and controls does not guarantee the validity of the identification assumption. One may consider potential unobserved confounding factors within states, which could simultaneously influence the distribution of immigrants and long-term political outcomes. One such confounding factor, for instance, could be that immigrants deliberately chose to settle in municipalities where local agrarian elites had less political power creating a more favorable environment for the mobilization and propagation of

¹⁵Our results are robust considering the stock of immigrants in 1920 instead of the inflow between 1872 and 1920.

political preferences.

To address these concerns, we employ an instrumental variable strategy using a Bartik-like instrument that exploits cross-section variation in past settlements of distinct ethnic groups across Brazilian municipalities and the supply-push component of migration patterns across different nationalities, which is plausibly exogenous to municipality-specific conditions. Following the approach of Burchardi et al. (2019) and Tabellini (2020), we construct a "leave-out" version of the shift-share instrument, in which the predicted number of immigrants received by each municipality m in 1920 is calculated as:

$$Z_{ms} = \frac{1}{\hat{P}_{ms,1920}} \sum_{j} \alpha_{mj,1872} \Delta I_{j,1920-1872}^{-m}, \tag{2}$$

where $\alpha_{mj,1872}$ is the share of immigrants from country j living in municipality m of state s in 1872 and $\Delta I_{j,1920-1872}^{-m}$ is the inflow of immigrants of ethnic group j from 1872 to 1920, net of those that settled in municipality m. $\hat{P}_{ms,1920}$ is the predicted population of municipality m in 1920.¹⁷ The identifying assumption of the empirical design depends on exogenous shares (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). In particular, the strategy is valid if municipality-specific characteristics associated with the initial distribution of immigrant population across municipalities are uncorrelated with the long-run evolution of political preferences at the local level. Intuitively, municipalities would have had similar electoral results without the immigration shock.

Instrument Validity. One potential concern is that certain municipality characteristics may have influenced both the inflow of immigrants and long-term political preferences. In our baseline specification, we mitigate this concern by including a vector of municipality characteristics that are likely to have contributed to attracting more immigrants and could have had an impact on long-term ideology. In particular, many immigrants ended up working in coffee farms to substitute slave labor in Brazil's Southeast region. To deal with the possibility that municipality-specific shocks may have affected the inflows of immigrants from each European country, we include in our baseline specification measures for labor demand (Borusyak et al., 2022). More specifically, we control for the share of

¹⁶Similar shift-share instruments have been used in the immigration literature to address endogeneity concerns in immigrants' location (see Burchardi et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020; Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020).

 $^{^{17}}$ The predicted municipality population is calculated as $\hat{P}_{ms,1920} = P_{ms,1872} \cdot (1 + g_s^{-m}),$ where $P_{ms,1872}$ is the 1872 municipality population and $g_s^{-m} = \frac{P_{s,1920}^{-m} - P_{s,1872}^{-m}}{P_{s,1872}^{-m}}$ is the state population growth between 1872 and 1920, net of the municipality m.

slaves in 1872 and the coffee land suitability index.

In addition, we also include in our baseline specification the initial share of immigrants in each municipality. This variable not only mechanically predicts higher future immigration through our instrumental variable, but it may also be associated with local political preferences (Seyler and Silve, 2021). By controlling for the initial stock of immigrants, we then identify the impacts of immigration by exploiting variations in the ethnic composition of the foreign-born population across municipalities (Tabellini, 2020). As a robustness check, we extend our baseline specification by controlling separately for the initial share of immigrants from each sending country, $\alpha_{mj,1872}$. These exercises allow us to address the concerns that immigrants from specific nationalities settled in municipalities with similar cultures or social norms, which may have affected the long-run evolution of ideology (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020).

To address the possibility that factors other than the presence of immigrants may explain our results, we conduct several robustness checks by including additional controls in our baseline specification. Specifically, we separately account for land inequality, the share of workers in manufacturing, the literacy rate in 1920, and the urbanization rate in 1940. However, it is important to interpret these results cautiously as these variables may be "bad controls". By controlling for land inequality, we try to capture the potential influence of economic inequality on political preferences. Previous research has shown mixed findings regarding the relationship between economic inequality and the implementation of redistributive policies. While some studies have found a positive association (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Boustan et al., 2013), others suggest that economic inequality harms the size of the government (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Benabou, 2000; Galor et al., 2009; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016).

Controlling for the share of workers in manufacturing allows us to account for the potential direct influence of industrialization on political preferences. This is important because studies have shown that industrialization can increase the support for left-wing parties, which are often associated with the interests of the working class. For example, Albanese and de Blasio (2021) find that industrialization was associated with higher turnout and a rise in the vote share for left-wing parties in Italy after World War II. Additionally, we account for the literacy rate in 1920 as a proxy for human capital. This control variable helps us to capture the distribution of educational attainment across municipalities, which can have significant implications for political preferences (Gethin et al., 2022). We also consider alternative ways to construct our instrument and show that results are stable across different specifications. Finally, we conduct heterogeneous effects analyses by dividing the sample into geographic regions, allowing us to examine how the impact of immigration on political preferences varies across different parts of

Brazil.

Civic Capital and Political Attitudes. To study the long-run effects of European immigration on civic capital and political attitudes, we use an alternative dataset that combines respondent-level data from the Latinobarómetro for the period 2002-2020 with the historical prevalence of immigration at the municipality level. This specification includes state and survey wave fixed effects and the same geographic and historical controls included in Equation (1). We also introduce an additional set of controls covering the respondent's characteristics. The specific model that we estimate is

$$y_{imst} = \eta_s + \phi_t + \beta \Delta Imm_{ms,1920} + \gamma X_{ms} + \mu W_{imst} + u_{imst}, \tag{3}$$

where i indexes an individual and t indicates the survey year. Here, the variables ϕ_t and W_{imst} represent the survey wave fixed effects and a vector of individual characteristics of the respondents, which includes age, age squared, gender, and indicators for educational attainment, employment, and socioeconomic status. All other terms of the specification are the same as in Equation (1). We also use the same instrument in Equation (2) to address endogeneity issues regarding the location of the immigrants.

5 Main Results

Baseline Estimates. We begin our analysis by investigating the effects of immigration on the 1955 presidential and vice presidential elections. In Panel A of Table 2, we present the OLS estimates for Equation (1) from our preferred specification, which includes a comprehensive set of historical and geographic controls. The results suggest that larger inflows of immigrants are associated with higher vote shares for right-wing candidates in both the presidential (column 4) and vice presidential (column 7) elections - with either negative or statistically insignificant effects on the vote share of left-wing candidates (columns 1-2 and 5-6). However, these relationships may be biased due to confounding factors that simultaneously impact political preferences and immigration patterns. To address this concern, Panel B presents the 2SLS estimates using the "leave-out" shift-share instrument from our preferred specification.¹⁸

¹⁸Panel C of Table 2 reports the first stage estimates. The coefficients suggest a positive relationship between the inflow of immigrants and the predicted inflow of the foreign-born population. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 19.03, indicating that the instrument has sufficient explanatory power. Figure A1 presents a graphical representation of these results, showing a binned scatter plot of the first stage after controlling for state fixed effects and all other controls.

Interestingly, we find that the presence of immigrants increased the vote share of candidates aligned with left-wing parties both in presidential and vice presidential elections. Specifically, our point estimates suggest that increasing the inflow of immigrants by 7.9 percentage points (pp) - which corresponds to one standard deviation of the distribution of immigration patterns between 1872 and 1920 - led to a 6.2 pp (0.788×0.079) increase in the vote share of Juscelino Kubitscheck, the winning candidate representing a centerleft populist party (PSD). Conversely, we observe a negative impact on the vote share of Plínio Salgado (PRP) of about 4.5 pp (0.567×0.079) , the founder of the Brazilian Integralism political movement, which drew inspiration from Italian fascism. These effects correspond to approximately 15.9% and 59.7% of the average vote shares obtained by the candidates, respectively. We document similar results for the vice presidential elections. In particular, we find that the local exposure to historical immigration led to higher support for João Goulart (6.4 pp, or 14.1% of the mean), the candidate of a party originating from the urban labor movement (PTB), accompanied by negative effects on the vote share of Milton Campos (6.0 pp, or 14.8% of the mean), the candidate of the main right-wing party in Brazil (UDN).

Next, we turn our attention to the 1960 elections. The results reported in Panel B of Table 3 are consistent with higher support for left-wing candidates, particularly in the presidential elections. Specifically, our point estimates imply that a 7.9 pp increase in the inflow of immigrants corresponds to a 3.9 pp (0.496 × 0.079) increase in the vote share of Henrique Lott, the ruling candidate from Social Democratic Party (PSD) supported by center-left parties. Conversely, we find that the same variation in immigrant inflow led to a decrease of about 2.7 pp (0.339 × 0.079) in the vote share of Jânio Quadros, the elected president representing the UDN. These effects represent approximately 10.4% and 5.6% of the average vote share of these candidates, respectively. We do not find statistically significant effects in the vice presidential elections. However, it is worth noting that the coefficient estimated for the candidate João Goulart is also positive, albeit slightly smaller than the point estimate we obtained for the 1955 election. Notably, in the 1960 elections, João Goulart faced a strong competitor in Fernando Ferrari, who had broken with the Labor Party and attracted many left-wing voters from Goulart (Skidmore, 1982, p. 238).

Having established the influence of immigration on political outcomes in the medium term, we then focus on the long run by examining the effects in the first rounds of the

¹⁹Henrique Lott was a left-wing nationalist who defended several causes, such as granting the right to vote to illiterates and restricting the remittances of profits from foreign companies abroad. However, he was a weak candidate lacking political experience and charisma (Skidmore, 1982, p. 234).

presidential elections after the re-democratization in 1985. Figure 4 presents the 2SLS estimates (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) obtained from estimating separate regressions based on the specification in Equation (1), with the dependent variables corresponding to vote share of left-wing parties in each election $t \in \{1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018\}$. Table A1 reports the complete results. Consistent with our earlier findings, we observe that the estimated effects of immigration on the vote share of left-wing candidates persisted in the long run, albeit the point estimates are not always statistically significant. Specifically, our point estimates imply that an increase of 7.9 pp in immigrants' inflow is associated with an increase of 6.3 pp (0.792 × 0.079) in the vote share of left-wing parties in the 2018 election, with effects of similar magnitudes in 2014 (5.9 pp).

Our findings suggest that immigration increased the support for left-wing candidates in municipalities where European immigrants settled more than one hundred years ago. To rationalize these results, one should consider the characteristics of the Age of Mass Migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this period, there was a significant inflow of Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards, who formed a working-class group in Brazil with prior experience in labor unions, political organizations, and other social groups, particularly among Italians (Baily, 1969; Gabaccia, 1994; Pinheiro and Hall, 1979). Our results suggest that the overwhelming presence of these immigrants in the workforce played a role in spreading their values and social norms to the native population, contributing to the increased support for left-wing candidates.

Moreover, our findings highlight the remarkable stability of political preferences over time, even after a long non-democratic regime (1964-1985) characterized by limited voting rights and the absence of party representation in the country. As discussed in Section 2, Brazil's democracy is relatively young, and individuals from different generations had limited opportunities to express their preferences through voting. Initially, the Brazilian constitution did not grant voting rights to foreign-born individuals, effectively excluding the first-generation immigrant population. Even those who naturalized and obtained Brazilian citizenship faced a challenging political environment, characterized by manipulated elections during the First Republic (1891-1930) and an authoritarian regime without elections in the 1930s (Maram, 1977). Consequently, immigrants relied on their ability to mobilize and exert pressure as primary mechanisms to address their demands. Therefore, the interactions between different groups may have facilitated the transmission of these values and behaviors to native Brazilians (Allport, 1954; Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020).

Heterogeneous Effects. Now, we conduct heterogeneous effects analyses to examine whether our estimated effects vary across different Brazilian regions. Intuitively, we ex-

pect that the mechanisms driving our main results would be stronger in the Southern and Southeastern states, which experienced the highest inflows of European immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration. São Paulo state was the primary destination for European families, attracting approximately 1.8 million immigrants between 1872 and 1920 (roughly 53% of the total immigrants entering the country) (Rocha et al., 2017). The Southern Brazilian states also attracted relevant numbers of European immigrants to the government-sponsored settlements characterized by a more equitable land distribution among small landowners (Carvalho Filho and Monasterio, 2012). In contrast, the presence of immigrants was relatively limited in the Northern and Northeastern states, where immigrants concentrated in the urban areas. Although the Mato Grosso state, located in the Center-West, received descendants of Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards who had initially migrated to São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraná, border immigration impacted the composition of the foreign population. Paraguayans and Bolivians constituted a substantial fraction of immigrants in this region (Levy, 1974).

Then, by exploiting regional specificities, we can gain insights into the differential impact of immigration on political preferences across different parts of Brazil. Specifically, we estimate our baseline specification for Equation (1) on two subsamples: one comprising the North, Northeast, and Center-West states and the other containing the South and Southeast regions. In Figures 5 to 7, we report the 2SLS estimates with the corresponding 95% confidence interval for the main dependent variables discussed above. Our analysis reveals interesting patterns in the political preferences across regions. Starting with the 1955 elections, we find positive but statistically insignificant effects for the candidate Juscelino Kubitscheck in both regions, with larger magnitudes observed in the South/Southeast. In contrast, we document opposing effects for the right-wing candidate Plínio Salgado. The coefficients suggest higher support for Salgado in the states of the North and a negative effect in the South, where European immigrants had a significant presence. We observe a similar pattern in the vice presidential elections, where the right-wing candidate Milton Campos appears to have received relatively less support in the Southern regions of Brazil, albeit the point estimate is not statistically significant.

We do not observe significant differences in voting patterns between these regions in the 1960 elections. However, as expected, the estimated effects on the vote share of left-wing parties in the long run (1989-2018) are statistically significant only in the states that received a higher inflow of European immigrants (South/Southeast). In particular, a 7.9 pp increase in the inflow of immigrants led to an increase in the vote share of left-wing candidates of about 10.1 pp (1.284×0.079) in 2018, with similar impacts in 2006, 2010, and 2014. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that European immigrants introduced distinct values, norms, and preferences with enduring effects on the political

6 Robustness Checks

To assess the sensitivity of our main findings, we perform several robustness checks where we include to our baseline specification additional socio-economic variables that may be associated with both immigrant inflows and political preferences in Brazil. In the interest of space, we present the Tables with the results of the robustness exercises in Appendix A.

Land inequality. Literature suggests that land inequality plays a significant role in explaining long-term development outcomes (Engerman and Sokollof, 1997; Galor et al., 2009; Carvalho Filho and Monasterio, 2012). To examine whether our findings are explained by differences in the agrarian structure rather than the values and social norms brought by immigrants to Brazil, we include two measures of land inequality in 1920 as additional controls. The first measure is the standard index based solely on landowners, and the second one is the overall land Gini coefficient, which takes into account the families of agricultural workers who did not own any land.²⁰ Tables A5-A7 demonstrates that our main results remain robust to these alternative measures of land inequality.

Manufacturing. Previous literature has documented positive effects of immigration on the industrialization process that began in São Paulo in the 1920s (Rocha et al., 2017). As discussed in Section 2, immigrants played a significant role in the workforce and entrepreneurial activities within the manufacturing industries. Since industrialization is associated with increased support for left-wing parties (see Albanese and de Blasio, 2021), and these often align with the interests of the working class, we aim to address the potential influence of industrialization on our findings. Tables A8-A10 report the robustness of our results by including the share of workers in manufacturing in 1920 as a control variable.

Human Capital. Another possibility is that the support for left-wing parties is a product of the higher literacy rates in the regions that received large inflows of immigrants. In a comparative analysis of electoral behaviors in 21 Western democracies from 1948 to 2020,

²⁰To calculate the land Gini coefficient for each municipality, we follow the methodology used by Nunn (2008). For the overall Gini coefficient, we assume that each family of rural workers consists of ten members and has zero hectares of land.

Gethin et al. (2022) demonstrate that highly educated voters have shifted their support towards left-wing parties. Throughout the twentieth century, literacy rates in Brazil experienced a substantial increase. To examine whether education, rather than other cultural factors, such as specific skills or social norms associated with human capital, is driving our results, we extend our baseline specification by incorporating the share of literate individuals in 1920 as an additional control. Nonetheless, Tables A11-A13 suggest that immigrants brought other dimensions of culture and social capital other than formal education that may be related to political preferences over time.

Urbanization. As industrialization deepened in Brazil, urbanization intensified, and municipalities with a higher inflow of immigrants appeared to urbanize faster than the rest of the country (Rocha et al., 2017). To address the potential confounding effects of urbanization on our main findings, we include the 1940 urbanization rate in our baseline specification. Tables A14-A16 show that our main results are robust, suggesting that urbanization was not the sole driver of the shift towards the left.

Country Shares and State-Sponsored Settlements. To address the concerns raised by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) regarding potential selection biases in immigrant destinations based on municipality-specific characteristics that could influence the long-term evolution of ideology in Brazil, we augment our baseline specification by introducing separate controls for the initial share of immigrants from each sending country (Tabellini, 2020). Figures A2-A4 presents the 2SLS estimates (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for each of these individual regressions. Overall, our findings remain close to the baseline results. Furthermore, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Brazilian government established official settlement colonies in the southernmost parts of the country. Since these municipalities were more likely to attract new immigrants, we conduct an additional robustness test by including a control variable indicating the presence of an official state-sponsored settlement and show in Tables A17-A19 that our results remain the same.

Alternative instrument. Finally, we address the robustness of our findings by considering alternative approaches to constructing our instrument. In our baseline specification, both the variable of interest and the instrument use the inflow of foreign-born individuals between 1872 and 1920, with the instrument scaled by the predicted population in 1920. First, we replicate our main specification by dividing the predicted number of immigrants by the 1872 population, offering a different scaling approach for the instrument. Second, we test an alternative specification focusing on the stock of immigrants in 1920 instead

of the inflow. Tables A20 -A22 present the results of these alternative exercises. The results are roughly robust.

Legislative elections. We extend our analysis to examine whether the effects of immigration vary across different types of elections. Specifically, we now focus on the influence of immigration on the ideological preferences of Brazilian voters by investigating the performance of political parties in elections for the national lower house and city councils in the long run. While executive offices, such as the president, state governors, and municipal mayors, hold significant importance in the Brazilian political landscape, the personalized nature of their campaigns can present challenges when studying ideological preferences (Power and Rodrigues-Silveira, 2019). In contrast, proportional elections for legislative positions involve a larger pool of candidates, which can give us a more comprehensive understanding of voter support for political parties in Brazil. Additionally, a uniform methodology to measure partisanship ideology enables us to address the challenge of measuring ideology in a multilevel political system.

In Table A23, we report the 2SLS estimates (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for our basic specification in Equation (1), with the dependent variables corresponding to the vote-revealed ideology index at the municipality level in each national legislative election $t \in \{1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018\}$. Overall, the long-run impact of historical immigration on the ideology of federal deputies is negative, which indicates an increase in the share of valid votes for parties with a relatively left-wing inclination. However, only the coefficient for the 2018 elections is statistically significant at conventional levels. Table A24 presents similar patterns for the estimated effects in the elections to the city councils $t \in \{2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016\}$. Specifically, we find a negative effect of immigration on the vote-revealed ideology index (or an increase in the share of valid votes for parties with a relatively left-wing inclination) with statistical significance in 2004, 2008 and 2012. In sum, the results indicate that voters in municipalities with higher inflows of immigrants tended to vote for representatives who supported more redistributive policies (Fujiwara, 2015).

7 Mechanisms

In previous sections, we have shown that immigration significantly affected the political preferences of Brazilian voters in the medium and long run. We now exploit the possible mechanisms that explain the shift towards a left-leaning ideology focusing, in particular, on the transmission of values and preferences to the native population.

Labor Movement. The labor movement provides a plausible mechanism through which immigrants could have influenced the support for left-wing parties. As discussed in Section 2, European immigrants brought with them skills and experience in manufacturing, labor unions, and political organizations, which contributed to their active participation in the early stages of industrialization and the labor movement in Brazil (Baily, 1969; Maram, 1977). As shown by Colistete (2007), former union leaders played a significant role in founding the major left-wing parties in the country. Given the connections between immigration, industrialization, and the labor movement, we argue that immigrants may have shaped the political preferences of native Brazilians through their contributions to the development of the labor movement in Brazil.

Table 4 provides evidence supporting our argument. The results show that the presence of immigrants positively impacted the number of unionized workers per thousand people in the manufacturing sector in 1938 (columns 5 and 6). We also find a positive effect of immigration on the number of unionized workers in the services sector (columns 7 and 8). Although the coefficient for the total number of unionized workers is not statistically significant, its positive sign indicates that immigrants had an overall impact on the labor movement in Brazil. Interestingly, we find a negative and statistically significant effect of immigration on the number of unionized workers in the agriculture sector (columns 3 and 4), which is not surprising since the manufacturing industries dominated the labor movement in the early twentieth century. Together, these findings provide evidence that immigrants influenced the support for left-wing parties among native Brazilians by fostering the organization of labor unions within the urban centers and the manufacturing industries.

Civic Culture and Political Attitudes. The findings discussed in previous sections suggest a potential connection between the presence of immigrants and the persistence of political preferences. In municipalities where significant numbers of immigrants settled, the immigrants' capacity to organize and contribute to public goods provision fostered a culture of cooperation, potentially influencing native Brazilians. These long-term effects on civic capital²¹ may have been transmitted through intergroup interactions (Allport, 1954; Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020). Consistent with this idea, Craig and Faria (2021) find that the impact of immigrants on human capital accumulation in Brazil differed depending on the immigrants' characteristics, such as their nationality, religious background, and the size of their community. To test this hypothesis, we then examine the

 $^{^{21}}$ Guiso et al. (2011) define civic capital as those shared values and beliefs that promote coordination and cooperation within society.

effects of immigration on different aspects of civic capital, including attitudes toward democracy, interpersonal and institutional trust, and political attitudes.

Figure 8 presents the standardized 2SLS beta coefficients and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals obtained from regressions based on the specification in Equation (3). These coefficients are computed in standard-deviation units and represent the estimated effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in the independent variable. Table A25 reports the complete results. Our findings indicate that historical immigration is associated with higher support for democracy. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the share of immigrants is related to a 0.077 standard deviation increase in the belief that democracy is a better form of government.²² Citizen support for democracy correlates to the acceptance of institutional functioning. We find that individuals residing in areas with a higher prevalence of immigrants exhibit greater confidence in the government. The point estimate suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the share of immigrants is associated with a 0.136 increase in the level of confidence in the national government.²³

Consistent with our earlier findings on the impact of immigrants on the labor movement during the early twentieth century, we observe positive and statistically significant effects on confidence in trade unions. Although we find a positive effect on interpersonal trust, the point estimate is not statistically significant. It is important to note that the question used to measure interpersonal trust is relatively broad and may not capture the specific nuances related to trust in individuals who share similar values.²⁴

Finally, we explore the relationship between historical immigration, political attitudes, and social values. We investigate individuals' self-positioning on the left-right scale, their inclination to protest for higher wages and their opinions on taxes and abortion. Consistent with our earlier findings regarding the increase in vote share for left-wing parties, we observe that individuals from regions with a high prevalence of immigration tend to self-position themselves towards the left, but the effect is not statistically significant. We also find a positive and statistically significant impact on the willingness among these individuals to engage in protests for higher wages and improved working conditions. We also find a positive impact on individuals' belief in the justifiability of abortion, a social value often associated with left-leaning ideologies. Additionally, we observe a negative as-

²²We measure the support for democracy based on respondents' agreement with the statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best form of government."

 $^{^{23}}$ We find similar effects for trust in other institutions such as Congress, Judiciary, and political parties.

²⁴We measure interpersonal trust from the following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust must people, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?".

sociation between historical immigration and the likelihood of considering taxes in Brazil to be excessively high. This finding suggests that regions with a historical tradition of the immigrant organization tend to exhibit a greater willingness to pay taxes, which means that stronger norms of cooperation may be associated with higher support for more redistributive policies.

8 Concluding Remarks

A large and growing literature has studied the transmission of immigrant culture and values to the receiving countries. However, the evidence of the persistence of the political ideology in the long term is still scant, especially under a non-democratic regime. In this paper, we contribute to this literature by studying the medium- and long-term effects of historical immigration on political outcomes in Brazil, which received a significant inflow of European immigrants between 1890 and 1930 and has a long history of electoral inequality characterized by restrictive voting rights.

In particular, using a "leave-out" version of the shift-share instrument (Tabellini, 2020) and a novel dataset on Presidential elections in Brazil, we find that municipalities with a higher presence of European immigrants observed an increase in the vote share for candidates associated with left-wing parties. We document that immigration also increased the vote share of more liberal representatives at the national and local levels after the democratization in 1985. Although immigrants in Brazil did not have direct political participation, they could indirectly participate in politics by mobilizing others. Our findings suggest that this mobilization impacted the communities where immigrants settled, creating stronger cooperation norms and civic engagement, which led to higher preferences for redistribution, a larger number of unionized workers in the manufacturing sector, and long-term effects on civic capital.

Existing research has demonstrated the positive and persistent effects of foreign-born immigrants on economic outcomes, which operate through mechanisms such as human capital acquisition (Rocha et al., 2017) or more equitable land distribution (Carvalho Filho and Monasterio, 2012). This paper sheds light on the origins of political ideology in Brazil and emphasizes its enduring nature over time. Specifically, our findings highlight that immigrants brought with them distinct cultures, traditions, and prior political experiences that significantly influenced the political preferences of Brazilians. Remarkably, these effects persisted even during extended periods of non-democratic governments.

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Figures




Figure 1: Annual Arrival of Immigrants in Brazil, 1872-1940

Notes: This figure presents the annual arrival of immigrants in Brazil between 1872 and 1940, measured in thousands. Source: Levy (1974).






Figure 2: Timeline of Brazil's Political History

Figure 3: Inflow of Immigrants, 1872-1920




Notes: This figure presents the inflow of immigrants between 1872 and 1920 as a fraction over total population. Source: Author's calculations using data from Brazilian Demographic Census.

Figure 4: Main Results: Vote Share of Left-Wing Parties, 1989-2018




Notes: This figures presents the 2SLS point estimates (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872.

Figure 5: Heterogeneous Effects: Presidential Elections in 1955




Notes: This figure presents the 2SLS estimates of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections separated for two different regions of the country: municipalities in the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions, and municipalities in the South and Southeast regions. See Table A2 for the complete description of the results.

Figure 6: Heterogeneous Effects: Presidential Elections in 1960



Notes: This figure presents the 2SLS estimates of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections separated for two different regions of the country: municipalities in the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions, and municipalities in the South and Southeast regions. See Table A3 for the complete description of the results.

Figure 7: Heterogeneous Effects: Share of Left-Wing, 1989-2018



Notes: This figure presents the 2SLS estimates of historical immigration on the share of left-wing parties in presidential elections from 1989 to 2018 separated for two different regions of the country: municipalities in the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions, and municipalities in the South and Southeast regions. See Table A4 for the complete description of the results.




Figure 8: Social Values and Political Attitudes

Notes: This figures presents the 2SLS point estimates (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of historical immigration on social values and political attitudes. The dependent variables come from Latinobarómetro surveys. See Appendix B for the exact wording of the survey questions. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. Individual controls include respondents' age, age squared, gender, and indicators for educational attainment, employment, and socioeconomic status. The analysis is conducted at the individual level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. All coefficients are standardized (beta coefficients).

-0.50

0.00

0.50

-1.50

-1.00

1.00

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Panel A. Historical and Geographic Charact	eristics				
- Inflow of immigrants (1872-1920)	1,270	0.016	0.080	-0.813	0.631
- Fr. immigrants 1872	1,270	0.014	0.040	0.000	0.500
- Share slaves 1872	1,270	0.133	0.096	0.001	0.574
- Share literate 1872	1,270	0.157	0.088	0.014	0.625
- Share emp. in agriculture 1872	1,270	0.532	0.162	0.013	0.937
- Share emp. in manufacturing 1872	1,270	0.137	0.077	0.000	0.467
- Share of workers in legal professions 1872	1,270	0.689	0.634	0.000	5.259
- Share of Workers in public admin. 1872	1,270	1.034	1.892	0.000	35.249
- Population density 1872	1,270	0.228	0.521	0.000	9.440
- Latitude	1,270	-15.361	8.372	-33.179	2.259
- Longitude	1,270	-44.621	5.950	-71.592	-34.84
- Log distance to the state capital	1,270	5.046	0.850	1.413	7.191
- Log distance to the coast	1,270	4.760	1.402	-1.967	7.675
- Log altitude	1,270	5.671	1.130	1.396	7.225
- Human mobility index	1,270	0.285	0.033	0.119	0.375
- Coffee attainable yield (ton/ha)	1,270	0.229	0.112	0.000	0.568
- Cotton attainable yield (ton/ha)	1,270	0.060	0.033	0.000	0.178
- Sugarcane attainable yield (ton/ha)	1,270	1.401	0.506	0.000	3.262
Panel B. Historical Elections (1955-1960) Presidential Elections 1955 - Juarez Tavora	1,238	0.324	0.171	0.004	0.912
- Adhemar de Barros	1,238	0.209	0.171	0.005	0.766
- Plinio Salgado	1,238	0.205 0.075	0.081	0.001	0.745
- Juscelino Kubitschek	1,238	0.392	0.199	0.005	0.987
Vice-Presidential Elections 1955	1,200	0.002	0.100	0.000	0.501
- Joao Goulart	1,238	0.456	0.179	0.022	0.988
- Milton Campos	1,238	0.406	0.159	0.007	0.927
- Danton Coelho	1,238	0.138	0.153	0.000	0.766
Presidential Elections 1960	1,200	0.100	0.101	0.000	0.100
- Janio Quadros	1,259	0.476	0.124	0.006	0.932
- Adhemar de Barros	1,259 $1,259$	0.148	0.124	0.000	0.691
- Henrique Lott	1,259 $1,259$	0.140 0.375	0.161	0.019	0.990
Vice-Presidential Elections 1960	1,200	0.010	0.101	0.010	0.000
- Fernando Ferrari	1,259	0.144	0.116	0.000	0.673
- Joao Goulart	1,259	0.462	0.115	0.051	1.000
- Milton Campos	1,259	0.394	0.144	0.000	0.912
Panel C. Vote Share of Left-Wing Parties (198	•				
- Election in 1989	$1,\!270$	0.276	0.158	0.038	0.825
- Election in 1994	1,270	0.243	0.100	0.041	0.573
- Election in 1998	$1,\!270$	0.274	0.105	0.046	0.652
- Election in 2002	1,270	0.581	0.130	0.140	0.909
- Election in 2006	$1,\!270$	0.589	0.173	0.199	0.934
- Election in 2010	$1,\!270$	0.676	0.141	0.340	0.954
- Election in 2014	1,270	0.686	0.175	0.204	0.976
- Election in 2018	1,270	0.524	0.242	0.125	0.929

Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables considered in our analysis. Panel A reports summary statistics for the historical and geographical characteristics of the municipalities. Panel A reports summary statistics for the candidates' vote share in the 1955 and 1960 presidential elections. Panel C presents summary statistics for the vote share of left-wing parties in presidential elections from 1989 to 2018. Following Ogeda et al. (2021), we consider parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources as left-wing parties. The sample in all panels is based on the 1920 administrative division. Appendix B provides detailed descriptions and sources of the data.

Table 2: Main Results: Presidential Elections in 1955

		Presider	nt		7	vice Presid	ent
	Left-	Wing	Right-	Wing	Left-V	Ving	Right-Wing
	Adhemar	Juscelino	Juarez	Plínio	João	Danton	Milton
	de Barros	Kubitschek	Távora	Salgado	Goulart	Coelho	Campos
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: OLS							
Inflow of immigrants	0.007	-0.147^{***}	-0.018	0.158***	* -0.070	-0.136***	0.206***
	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.059)
Panel B: 2SLS							
Inflow of immigrants	-0.121	0.788**	-0.099	-0.567**	* 0.816**	-0.054	-0.762**
	(0.214)	(0.350)	(0.215)	(0.194)	(0.325)	(0.142)	(0.299)
Panel C: First stage							
Pred. Inflow of immigrants	0.312***	0.312***	0.312***	0.312***	* 0.312***	0.312***	0.312***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
KP F-stat	19.034	19.034	19.034	19.034	19.034	19.034	19.034
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	0.209	0.392	0.324	0.075	0.456	0.138	0.406
Observations	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 3: Main Results: Presidential Elections in 1960

		President			Vice Preside	ent
	Left-V	Ving	Right-Wing	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing
	Adhemar de Barros	Henrique	Jânio	João	Fernando	Milton
	(1)	Lott (2)	Quadros (3)	Goulart (4)	Ferrari (5)	Campos (6)
Panel A: OLS						
Inflow of immigrants	0.014	-0.034	0.020	-0.131***	0.175***	-0.044
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.043)
Panel B: 2SLS						
Inflow of immigrants	-0.157	0.496*	-0.339**	0.309	-0.424	0.115
	(0.215)	(0.256)	(0.170)	(0.207)	(0.340)	(0.249)
Panel C: First stage						
Pred. Inflow of immigrants	0.311***	0.311***	0.311***	0.311***	0.311***	0.311***
_	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
KP F-stat	19.057	19.057	19.057	19.057	19.057	19.057
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	0.148	0.375	0.476	0.462	0.144	0.394
Observations	1,259	$1,\!259$	$1,\!259$	1,259	$1,\!259$	1,259

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 4: Mechanisms: Unionized Workers, 1938

	Total		Agricu	ılture	Manufac	turing	Retail and services	
	OLS (1)	2SLS (2)	OLS (3)	2SLS (4)	OLS (5)	2SLS (6)	OLS (7)	2SLS (8)
Inflow of immigrants	1.672*** (0.400)	(-0.140) (1.339)	-0.052^{**} (0.014)	* $-0.248***$ (0.088)	5.901*** (2.228)	17.282* (8.907)	2.610*** (0.444)	6.550** (2.561)
KP F-stat		18.294		18.294		18.294		18.294
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	8.935	8.935	0.092	0.092	3.986	3.986	4.135	4.135
Observations	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the labor movement. The dependent variables are the number of unionized workers in 1938. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Odd columns present the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Even columns report the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Appendix A Additional Figures and Tables

Regression coefficient (se) = 0.307 (0.072)

-0.10


0.00

Predicted inflow of immigrants

Figure A1: First Stage


Notes: This figure presents a binned scatter plot showing the relationship between the predicted inflow of foreign-born population over municipality population in 1920 (x-axis) and the actual inflow (y-axis). Each point on the plot represents the residuals of these variables, accounting for state fixed effects, geographic and historical controls. The solid line represents the slope of the first stage coefficient. Standard errors are clustered at the 1872 municipality level.

Figure A2: Robustness: Controlling for Initial Shares of Immigrants




Notes: This figure presents the 2SLS point estimates along with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections, using the baseline specification reported in Table 2 and augmenting it with the 1872 immigrant share from each sending country separately. The first point estimate plotted corresponds to the baseline specification.

Figure A3: Robustness: Controlling for Initial Shares of Immigrants



Notes: This figure presents the 2SLS point estimates along with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections, using the baseline specification reported in Table 3 and augmenting it with the 1872 immigrant share from each sending country separately. The first point estimate plotted corresponds to the baseline specification.

Figure A4: Robustness: Controlling for Initial Shares of Immigrants



Notes: This figure presents the 2SLS point estimates along with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 and 2018, using the baseline specification reported in Table A1 and augmenting it with the 1872 immigrant share from each sending country separately. The first point estimate plotted corresponds to the baseline specification.

Table A1: Main Results: Vote Share of Left-Wing Parties, 1989-2018

		Γ	ep. var.: '	Vote share	of left-win	g parties		
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: OLS								
Inflow of immigrants	0.127***	0.147***	0.237***	0.166***	0.026	-0.011	-0.151***	-0.109*
	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Panel B: 2SLS								
Inflow of immigrants	0.042	0.298	0.698***	0.321	0.619**	0.397^{*}	0.750***	0.792*
-	(0.224)	(0.192)	(0.239)	(0.211)	(0.247)	(0.219)	(0.255)	(0.320)
Panel C: First stage								
Pred. Inflow of immigrants	0.307***	0.307***	0.307***	0.307***	0.307***	0.307***	0.307***	0.307**
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
KP F-stat	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	0.276	0.243	0.274	0.581	0.589	0.676	0.686	0.524
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A2: Heterogeneous Effects: Presidential Elections in 1955

		Preside	nt			Vice Presid	dent
	Left	-Wing	Right-	Wing	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Juscelino Kubitschek (2)	Juarez Távora (3)	Plínio Salgado (4)	João Goulart (5)	Danton Coelho (6)	Milton Campos (7)
Panel A: North/North	east/Center-	West					
Inflow of immigrants	-0.562 (0.410)	0.214 (0.463)	-0.201 (0.498)	0.548* (0.332)	0.495 (0.482)	-0.621 (0.433)	0.126 (0.676)
KP F-stat	72.955	72.955	72.955	72.955	72.955	72.955	72.955
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	0.163	0.429	0.354	0.053	0.496	0.114	0.391
Observations	645	645	645	645	645	645	645
Panel B: South/Southe	east						
Inflow of immigrants	0.072 (0.298)	0.554 (0.433)	0.415 (0.304)	-1.041^{**} (0.382)	* 0.442 (0.382)	0.218 (0.148)	-0.660 (0.403)
KP F-stat	11.109	11.109	11.109	11.109	11.109	11.109	11.109
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	0.258	0.352	0.292	0.098	0.412	0.165	0.423
Observations	593	593	593	593	593	593	593

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections separated for two different regions of the country. Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4, for the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument for the South and Southeast regions. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A3: Heterogeneous Effects: Presidential Elections in 1960

		President			Vice Presid	lent
	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Henrique Lott (2)	Jânio Quadros (3)	João Goulart (4)	Fernando Ferrari (5)	Milton Campos (6)
Panel A: North/North	east/Center-	West				
Inflow of immigrants	-0.177 (0.271)	0.347 (0.333)	-0.170 (0.319)	0.316 (0.359)	-0.222 (0.394)	-0.094 (0.403)
KP F-stat	89.083	89.083	89.083	89.083	89.083	89.083
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	0.102	0.437	0.461	0.501	0.112	0.387
Observations	655	655	655	655	655	655
Panel B: South/Southe	ast					
Inflow of immigrants	-0.262 (0.357)	0.445 (0.331)	-0.183 (0.266)	0.341 (0.301)	-0.620 (0.527)	0.279 (0.374)
KP F-stat	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All
Mean dep. var.	0.198	0.308	0.493	0.420	0.179	0.401
Observations	604	604	604	604	604	604

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections separated for two different regions of the country. Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4, for the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument for the South and Southeast regions. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A4: Heterogeneous Effects: Vote Share of Left-Wing Parties, 1989-2018

		-	Dep. var.:	Vote share	e of left-wir	ng parties		
	1989 (1)	1994 (2)	1998 (3)	2002 (4)	2006 (5)	2010 (6)	2014 (7)	2018 (8)
Panel A: North/Northe	east/Center	- West						
Inflow of immigrants	0.157 (0.405)	0.295 (0.355)	0.603 (0.382)	0.359 (0.347)	0.379 (0.375)	0.545 (0.420)	0.544 (0.363)	0.421 (0.676)
KP F-stat	24.311	24.311	24.311	24.311	24.311	24.311	24.311	24.311
Controls & FE Observations Mean dep. var.	All 666 0.266	All 666 0.245	All 666 0.265	All 666 0.549	All 666 0.698	All 666 0.760	All 666 0.816	All 666 0.710
Panel B: South/Southe	ast							
Inflow of immigrants	0.073 (0.319)	0.426 (0.270)	0.810** (0.376)	0.404 (0.325)	1.213** (0.508)	0.991** (0.410)	1.241** (0.508)	1.284** (0.545)
KP F-stat	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713	11.713
Controls & FE Mean dep. var. Observations	All 0.286 604	All 0.241 604	All 0.283 604	All 0.617 604	All 0.468 604	All 0.583 604	All 0.543 604	All 0.318 604

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018 separated for two different regions of the country. Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4, for the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument for the South and Southeast regions. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A5: Robustness: Controlling for Land Inequality, 1955

		Preside	nt		Ţ	Vice Presid	lent
	Left	-Wing	Right-	Wing	Left-V	Ving	Right-Wing
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Juscelino Kubitschek (2)	Juarez Távora (3)	Plínio Salgado (4)	João Goulart (5)	Danton Coelho (6)	Milton Campos (7)
Panel A: Controlling for	or land gini						
Inflow of immigrants	-0.097 (0.210)	0.759** (0.340)	-0.115 (0.214)	-0.546^{***} (0.186)	0.797** (0.318)	-0.013 (0.133)	-0.784^{***} (0.301)
Land Gini	-0.035 (0.023)	0.043 (0.033)	0.023 (0.025)	-0.030 (0.020)	0.027 (0.033)	-0.058** (0.023)	0.032 (0.033)
KP F-stat	19.031	19.031	19.031	19.031	19.031	19.031	19.031
Panel B: Controlling for	or alternative	e land gini					
Inflow of immigrants	-0.100 (0.208)	0.717^{**} (0.321)	-0.094 (0.212)	-0.524^{***} (0.176)	0.743** (0.297)	-0.019 (0.136)	-0.724^{**} (0.286)
Overall land Gini	-0.050 (0.055)	0.163** (0.071)	-0.013 (0.043)	-0.101^{**} (0.045)	0.166** (0.069)	-0.080 (0.054)	-0.086 (0.062)
KP F-stat	19.024	19.024	19.024	19.024	19.024	19.024	19.024
Controls & FE Observations	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections, controlling for alternative measures of land inequality in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A6: Robustness: Controlling for Land Inequality, 1960

		President			Vice Presid	lent
	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Henrique Lott (2)	Jânio Quadros (3)	João Goulart (4)	Fernando Ferrari (5)	Milton Campos (6)
Panel A: Controlling for	or land gini					
Inflow of immigrants	-0.159	0.503^{*}	-0.344**	0.329	-0.426	0.097
_	(0.215)	(0.258)	(0.171)	(0.211)	(0.339)	(0.243)
Land Gini	0.003	-0.011	0.008	-0.032	0.004	0.028
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)
KP F-stat	19.088	19.088	19.088	19.088	19.088	19.088
Panel B: Controlling for	or alternative	e land gini				
Inflow of immigrants	-0.147	0.487^{*}	-0.340**	0.310	-0.405	0.096
	(0.209)	(0.251)	(0.169)	(0.206)	(0.326)	(0.239)
Overall land Gini	-0.024	0.021	0.003	-0.002	-0.043	0.045
	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)
KP F-stat	19.133	19.133	19.133	19.133	19.133	19.133
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections, controlling for alternative measures of land inequality in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A7: Robustness: Controlling for Land Inequality, 1989-2018

		D	ep. var.: V	ote share	for left-wi	ng parties		
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Controlling for	r land gini							
Inflow of immigrants	0.003	0.254	0.643***	0.251	0.603**	0.399*	0.739***	0.823**
	(0.223)	(0.180)	(0.229)	(0.204)	(0.243)	(0.218)	(0.253)	(0.331)
Land Gini	0.052***	0.060***	0.074***	0.094***	0.023	-0.003	0.015	-0.042^*
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.025)
KP F-stat	18.320	18.320	18.320	18.320	18.320	18.320	18.320	18.320
Panel B: Controlling fo	r alternativ	e land gini	į					
Inflow of immigrants	0.001	0.253	0.658***	0.274	0.595**	0.397^{*}	0.730***	0.789**
<u> </u>	(0.223)	(0.181)	(0.231)	(0.205)	(0.240)	(0.216)	(0.249)	(0.316)
Overall land Gini	0.089**	0.100***	0.087***	0.102**	0.052	-0.001	0.044	0.006
	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.041)
KP F-stat	18.276	18.276	18.276	18.276	18.276	18.276	18.276	18.276
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018, controlling for alternative measures of land inequality in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A8: Robustness: Controlling for Manufacturing, 1955

		Preside		7	Vice Presid	dent		
	Left	-Wing	Right-	Wing	Left-Wing		Right-Wing	
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Juscelino Kubitschek (2)	Juarez Távora (3)	Plínio Salgado (4)	João Goulart (5)	Danton Coelho (6)	Milton Campos (7)	
Inflow of immigrants	-0.121 (0.251)	0.772* (0.407)	0.080 (0.252)	-0.731^{***} (0.257)	0.733** (0.365)	0.025 (0.160)	-0.758** (0.351)	
Share emp. manufacturing in 1920	-0.000 (0.079)	0.024 (0.110)	-0.262^{***} (0.074)	,	(/	-0.114^* (0.064)	-0.006 (0.102)	
KP F-stat	16.530	16.530	16.530	16.530	16.530	16.530	16.530	
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	
Observations	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections, controlling for the share of workers in manufacturing in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A9: Robustness: Controlling for Manufacturing, 1960

		President			Vice Presid	ent
	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing	Left-	Right-Wing	
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Henrique Lott (2)	Lott Quadros Goulart Ferra		Fernando Ferrari (5)	Milton Campos (6)
Inflow of immigrants	-0.158 (0.251)	0.477 (0.298)	-0.320 (0.198)	0.302 (0.243)	-0.562 (0.421)	0.260 (0.312)
Share emp. manufacturing in 1920	0.001 (0.063)	0.026 (0.079)	-0.027 (0.066)	0.010 (0.075)	0.198** (0.099)	-0.208^{**} (0.083)
KP F-stat	16.438	16.438	16.438	16.438	16.438	16.438
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections, controlling for the share of workers in manufacturing in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A10: Robustness: Controlling for Manufacturing, 1955-2018

		Ι	Dep. var.:	Vote share	for left-wi	ng parties		
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Inflow of immigrants	-0.100	0.184	0.590**	0.190	0.634**	0.368	0.813***	0.955^{*}
	(0.267)	(0.214)	(0.271)	(0.240)	(0.291)	(0.254)	(0.311)	(0.406)
Share emp. manufacturing in 1920	0.200***	0.161**	0.152*	0.184**	-0.020	0.041	-0.089	-0.229
	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.106)
KP F-stat	15.876	15.876	15.876	15.876	15.876	15.876	15.876	15.876
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018, controlling for the share of workers in manufacturing in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A11: Robustness: Controlling for Human Capital, 1955

		Presider	•	Vice Presid	dent		
	Left	-Wing	Right-	Wing	Left-V	Right-Wing	
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Juscelino Kubitschek (2)	Juarez Távora (3)	Plínio Salgado (4)	João Goulart (5)	Danton Coelho (6)	Milton Campos (7)
Inflow of immigrants	-0.126	0.804**	-0.095	-0.583***		0.00-	-0.775***
Share literate in 1920	(0.208) 0.110 (0.089)	$ \begin{array}{c} (0.321) \\ -0.347^{***} \\ (0.133) \end{array} $	(0.223) -0.104 (0.099)	$ \begin{array}{c} (0.185) \\ 0.341^{***} \\ (0.079) \end{array} $	(0.312) -0.238^* (0.131)	(0.144) -0.044 (0.065)	(0.280) 0.282^{**} (0.121)
KP F-stat	30.008	30.008	30.008	30.008	30.008	30.008	30.008
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections, controlling for the share of literate individuals in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A12: Robustness: Controlling for Human Capital, 1960

		President			Vice Preside	ent	
	Left-	Left-Wing		Left-	Wing	Right-Wing	
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Henrique Lott (2)	Jânio Quadros (3)	João Goulart (4)	Fernando Ferrari (5)	Milton Campos (6)	
Inflow of immigrants	-0.161 (0.214)	0.503** (0.248)	-0.342^{**} (0.169)	0.316 (0.196)	-0.440 (0.328)	0.123 (0.254)	
Share literate in 1920	0.080 (0.086)	-0.153 (0.100)	0.073 (0.075)	-0.151^{*} (0.085)	0.318** (0.131)	-0.167 (0.106)	
KP F-stat	30.057	30.057	30.057	30.057	30.057	30.057	
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	
Observations	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259	1,259	

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections, controlling for the share of literate individuals in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A13: Robustness: Controlling for Human Capital, 1989-2018

		Dep. var.: Vote share for left-wing parties									
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			
Inflow of immigrants	0.027	0.288	0.692***	0.305	0.628**	0.399*	0.774***	0.823**			
	(0.221)	(0.197)	(0.250)	(0.227)	(0.249)	(0.226)	(0.250)	(0.321)			
Share literate in 1920	0.202**	0.136*	0.085	0.211**	-0.111	-0.030	-0.310***	-0.414**			
	(0.089)	(0.080)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.127)			
KP F-stat	28.030	28.030	28.030	28.030	28.030	28.030	28.030	28.030			
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All			
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270			

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018, controlling for the share of literate individuals in 1920. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or leftwing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A14: Robustness: Controlling for Urbanization Rate, 1955

		Preside	7	Vice Presid	dent		
	Left-	Wing	Right-	Wing	Left-V	Right-Wing	
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Juscelino Kubitschek (2)	Juarez Távora (3)	Plínio Salgado (4)	João Goulart (5)	Danton Coelho (6)	Milton Campos (7)
Inflow of immigrants	-0.279	0.926**	0.094	-0.740**	0.799**	0.023	-0.822**
Urbanization rate in 1940	(0.296) 0.099** (0.046)	(0.468) -0.081 (0.071)	(0.292) $-0.127***$ (0.047)	(0.292) $0.109**$ (0.044)	(0.405) 0.011 (0.064)	(0.168) -0.048 (0.032)	(0.387) 0.036 (0.062)
KP F-stat	15.157	15.157	15.157	15.157	15.157	15.157	15.157
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections, controlling for the urbanization rate in 1940. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.0, *** p < 0.0, *** p < 0.0.

Table A15: Robustness: Controlling for Urbanization Rate, 1960

		President			Vice Presid	ent	
	Left-	Wing	Right-Wing	Left-	Left-Wing		
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	de Barros Lott		João Goulart (4)	Fernando Ferrari (5)	Milton Campos (6)	
Inflow of immigrants	-0.272 (0.294)	0.518 (0.329)	-0.246 (0.205)	0.365 (0.273)	-0.663 (0.486)	0.297 (0.353)	
Urbanization rate in 1940	0.072 (0.045)	-0.013 (0.051)	-0.058 (0.039)	-0.034 (0.046)	0.148** (0.069)	-0.114^{**} (0.052)	
KP F-stat	14.803	14.803	14.803	14.803	14.803	14.803	
Controls & FE Observations	All 1,253	All 1,253	All 1,253	All 1,253	All 1,253	All 1,253	

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections, controlling for the urbanization rate in 1940. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A16: Robustness: Controlling for Urbanization Rate, 1955-2018

		D	ep. var.: V	Vote share	for left-wi	ng parties		
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Inflow of immigrants	-0.116	0.109	0.506*	0.079	0.691**	0.456	0.969**	1.235**
	(0.288)	(0.212)	(0.277)	(0.245)	(0.332)	(0.289)	(0.383)	(0.533)
Urbanization rate in 1940	0.096**	0.114***	0.116***	0.147***	-0.043	-0.035	-0.130**	-0.263*
	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.076)
KP F-stat	14.671	14.671	14.671	14.671	14.671	14.671	14.671	14.671
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018, controlling for the urbanization rate in 1940. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A17: Robustness: Controlling for State-Sponsored Settlements, 1955

		Preside		7	Vice Presid	lent	
	Left	Left-Wing		Wing	Left-V	Right-Wing	
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Juscelino Kubitschek (2)	Juarez Távora (3)	Plínio Salgado (4)	João Goulart (5)	Danton Coelho (6)	Milton Campos (7)
Inflow of immigrants	-0.111 (0.200)	0.723** (0.330)	-0.108 (0.203)	-0.504***	0.766** (0.305)	-0.055	-0.711**
Settlement (1829-1889)	0.010	-0.051^{**}	$-0.011^{'}$	(0.186) 0.052^{***}	$-0.040^{'}$	(0.134) -0.000	(0.279) 0.041
Settlement (1890-1920)	(0.019) 0.009	(0.025) -0.008	(0.017) -0.020	(0.020) 0.019	(0.026) -0.011	(0.012) 0.003	(0.025) 0.008
VD D	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.016)
KP F-stat Controls & FE	19.645 All	19.645 All	19.645 All	19.645 All	19.645 All	19.645 All	19.645 All
Observations Observations	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238	All 1,238

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections, controlling for the presence of state-sponsored settlements. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A18: Robustness: Controlling for State-Sponsored Settlements, 1960

		President			Vice Preside	ent
	Left-	Left-Wing		Left-	Wing	Right-Wing
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Henrique Lott (2)	Jânio Quadros (3)	João Goulart (4)	Fernando Ferrari (5)	Milton Campos (6)
Inflow of immigrants	-0.149	0.457*	-0.309*	0.276	-0.393	0.117
Settlement (1829-1889)	(0.203) 0.010	(0.235) -0.027	(0.159) 0.017	(0.189) -0.024	(0.326) 0.032	(0.242) -0.008
Settlement (1890-1920)	(0.017) 0.019 (0.016)	(0.018) -0.001 (0.014)	(0.016) -0.017 (0.015)	(0.016) -0.006 (0.011)	(0.024) 0.048*** (0.017)	$ \begin{array}{c} (0.019) \\ -0.041^{***} \\ (0.015) \end{array} $
KP F-stat	19.693	19.693	19.693	19.693	19.693	19.693
Controls & FE Observations	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections, controlling for the presence of state-sponsored settlements. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A19: Robustness: Controlling for State-Sponsored Settlements, 1955-2018

		I	Dep. var.: '	Vote share	for left-wir	ng parties		
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Inflow of immigrants	0.037	0.288	0.659***	0.311	0.602***	0.395^{*}	0.698***	0.732**
	(0.211)	(0.182)	(0.226)	(0.198)	(0.232)	(0.205)	(0.238)	(0.304)
Settlement (1829-1889)	0.001	-0.003	-0.024	-0.001	-0.013	0.001	-0.040^*	-0.049**
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Settlement (1890-1920)	0.021	0.019^*	0.014	0.027**	-0.004	0.011	-0.017	-0.031
, ,	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)
KP F-stat	18.873	18.873	18.873	18.873	18.873	18.873	18.873	18.873
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on presidential elections from 1989 to 2018, controlling for the presence of state-sponsored settlements. The dependent variables are the vote shares of left-wing parties, which are the parties that self-identify as communist, socialist, or left-wing in their official sources (Ogeda et al., 2021). The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A20: Robustness: Alternative Instruments, 1955

		Preside	nt		7	Vice Presid	dent
	Left	-Wing	Right-	Wing	Left-V	Ving	Right-Wing
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Juscelino Kubitschek (2)	Juarez Távora (3)	Plínio Salgado (4)	João Goulart (5)	Danton Coelho (6)	Milton Campos (7)
Panel A: Scaling by 18	72 population	n					
Inflow of immigrants	-0.509 (0.364)	1.545** (0.646)	-0.121 (0.289)	-0.915^{**} (0.396)	1.455** (0.596)	-0.161 (0.218)	-1.294^{***} (0.490)
KP F-stat	13.104	13.104	13.104	13.104	13.104	13.104	13.104
Panel B: Stock in 1920)						
Fr. immigrants	-0.209 (0.485)	1.673* (0.879)	-0.194 (0.498)	-1.270^{**} (0.532)	1.756** (0.844)	-0.114 (0.318)	-1.642^{**} (0.799)
KP F-stat	8.686	8.686	8.686	8.686	8.686	8.686	8.686
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1955 presidential elections using alternative instruments. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the 2SLS estimates with the instrumend scaled by the 1872 population. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the stock immigrants in 1920 instead of the inflow as an instrument. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A21: Robustness: Alternative Instruments, 1960

		President		Vice President				
	Left-Wing		Right-Wing	Left-	Right-Wing			
	Adhemar de Barros (1)	Henrique Lott (2)	Jânio Quadros (3)	João Goulart (4)	Fernando Ferrari (5)	Milton Campos (6)		
Panel A: Scaling by 18	72							
Inflow of immigrants	-0.536 (0.411)	$0.942^{**} $ (0.471)	-0.406^* (0.212)	0.700^* (0.357)	-0.968 (0.645)	0.269 (0.379)		
KP F-stat	13.405	13.405	13.405	13.405	13.405	13.405		
Panel B: Stock in 1920)							
Fr. immigrants	-0.271 (0.454)	1.014^* (0.568)	-0.743^* (0.418)	0.598 (0.456)	-0.863 (0.732)	0.265 (0.548)		
KP F-stat	8.634	8.634	8.634	8.634	8.634	8.634		
Controls & FE Observations	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259	All 1,259		

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections using alternative instruments. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the 2SLS estimates with the instrumend scaled by the 1872 population. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the stock immigrants in 1920 instead of the inflow as an instrument. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A22: Robustness: Alternative Instruments, 1989-2018

	Dep. var.: Vote share of left-wing parties							
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Scaling by 18	72							
Inflow of immigrants	-0.134	0.288	0.722**	0.408	0.881**	0.428	1.113**	1.044*
_	(0.324)	(0.284)	(0.310)	(0.267)	(0.421)	(0.306)	(0.473)	(0.567)
KP F-stat	13.541	13.541	13.541	13.541	13.541	13.541	13.541	13.541
Panel B: Stock in 1920								
Fr. immigrants	0.145	0.714*	1.638***	0.719	1.379**	0.904	1.681**	1.830**
Ü	(0.507)	(0.430)	(0.622)	(0.511)	(0.631)	(0.559)	(0.717)	(0.830)
KP F-stat	8.055	8.055	8.055	8.055	8.055	8.055	8.055	8.055
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on the 1960 presidential elections using alternative instruments. The dependent variables are the vote shares of each candidate. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the 2SLS estimates with the instrumend scaled by the 1872 population. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the stock immigrants in 1920 instead of the inflow as an instrument. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A23: Additional Results: Partisanship Ideology, 1998-2018

	Chamber of Deputies							
	1998 (1)	2002 (2)	2006 (3)	2010 (4)	2014 (5)	2018 (6)		
Panel A: OLS								
Inflow of immigrants	-0.361**	* -0.296**	* -0.172**	* -0.086*	-0.039	-0.119**		
<u> </u>	(0.102)	(0.095)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.045)		
Panel B: 2SLS								
Inflow of immigrants	-0.628	-0.561	-0.309	-0.377	-0.146	-0.505**		
<u> </u>	(0.401)	(0.403)	(0.401)	(0.387)	(0.325)	(0.215)		
KP F-stat	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290		
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All		
Mean dep. var.	0.246	0.145	0.102	0.025	0.077	0.099		
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	$1,\!270$		

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on partisanship ideology between 1998 and 2018. The dependent variables are the vote-revealed ideology index calculated as a weighted average of the parties' left-right ideology placement in Brazilian Legislative Surveys, where the weights are the share of votes of each party in national legislative elections at the municipality level. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A24: Additional Results: Partisanship Ideology, 2000-2016

	Municipal Councils						
	2000 (1)	2004 (2)	2008 (3)	2012 (4)	2016 (5)		
Panel A: OLS							
Inflow of immigrants	-0.224**	* -0.229**	* -0.185***	-0.150***	-0.117**		
	(0.073)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.039)		
Panel B: 2SLS							
Inflow of immigrants	-0.262	-0.360^{*}	-0.595**	-0.458**	-0.260		
g	(0.279)	(0.210)	(0.236)	(0.204)	(0.171)		
KP F-stat	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290	18.290		
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All		
Mean dep. var.	0.199	0.130	0.056	0.084	0.103		
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270		

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on partianship ideology between 2000 and 2016. The dependent variables are the vote-revealed ideology index calculated as a weighted average of the parties' left-right ideology placement in Brazilian Legislative Surveys, where the weights are the share of votes of each party in national legislative elections at the municipality level. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. The analysis is conducted at the municipality level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A25: Main Results: Social Values and Political Attitudes

	View democracy (1)	Trust government (2)	Trust trade unions (3)	Trust people (4)	Ideology (5)	Protest for wages (6)	Taxes are high (7)	Abortion (8)
Panel A: OLS	, ,		. ,	, ,		, ,	, ,	
Inflow of immigrants	0.019 (0.012)	$0.016 \\ (0.016)$	0.031** (0.015)	0.032*** (0.010)	(0.022)	0.058^* (0.034)	-0.049^{**} (0.021)	0.057*** (0.020)
Panel B: 2SLS								
Inflow of immigrants	0.077^* (0.042)	0.136*** (0.043)	0.137 (0.084)	0.083 (0.083)	-0.042 (0.045)	0.303^{**} (0.127)	-0.440^{***} (0.119)	0.282^{**} (0.102)
Panel C: First stage								
Pred. Inflow of immigrants	0.426^{***} (0.095)	0.420*** (0.094)	0.411*** (0.103)	0.418*** (0.094)	0.426*** (0.094)	0.314*** (0.113)	0.509*** (0.105)	0.517^{**} (0.124)
KP F-stat	20.027	19.809	15.949	19.637	20.450	7.787	23.285	17.285
Controls & FE	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17,452	18,841	9,174	18,814	13,459	3,497	4,709	4,465

Notes: This table presents the estimated effects of historical immigration on social values and political attitudes. The dependent variables come from Latinobarómetro surveys. See Appendix B for the exact wording of the survey questions. The variable of interest is the inflow of immigrants relative to the municipality population in 1920. Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions using Equation 1. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates using the predicted inflow of immigrants as an instrument, as described in Section 4. Panel C reports the first stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted inflow of immigrants. All regressions include state fixed effects and a comprehensive set of socioeconomic characteristics from the 1872 census: the share of foreign-born population, share of slaves, literacy rate among individuals aged five or more, the share of workers in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, the fraction of workers in legal professions and public administration relative to the total population, and population density. Regressions also control for relevant geographic characteristics, including latitude, longitude, altitude, human mobility index, distance to the closest state capital, distance to the nearest coast, and agricultural suitability for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. Individual controls include respondents' age, age squared, gender, and indicators for educational attainment, employment, and socioeconomic status. The analysis is conducted at the individual level based on the 1920 administrative division. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in 1872. * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Appendix B Data

B.1 Definitions and Sources

Table B1: Classification of Political Parties

Election	Left-Wing Parties		Non-Left-Wing Parties		
1955-1960	PTB	PCB	PRP	PR	UDN
	PSB	PSP	PL	PDC	PSD
1989-2018	PT	PDT	PRN	PSDB	PSD
	PV	PSB	PSL	PRONA	PCdoB
	PPS	PSOL	PDS	PMDB	PRTB
	PCO	PSTU	PL	PTN	PFL
	PCB	PMN	PPR	PCN	PSC
	PPL		PP	PSDC	PPB
			PTB	PN	PSN
			PSP	PTdoB	PRP
			PLP	REDE	PATRI
			NOVO	PODE	DC

Notes: This table presents the classification of political parties according to their left-right ideology position. For the 1955 and 1960 elections, the classification follows Nicolau (2004), while for the elections between 1989 and 2018, the classification is based on Ogeda et al. (2021).

Outcome variables

Vote share of left-wing parties. The percentage of votes cast for left-wing parties in a given election (1989-2018). Source: TSE.

Partisanship ideology. The party ideological index at the municipality level is calculated by summing the product of the vote shares won by each party in a given municipality by the respective left-right ideological placement as recorded in Brazilian Legislative Surveys. Source: Power and Zucco (2009) and TSE.

Unionized workers. The number of unionized workers over total population in 1938. The number of unionized workers at the national level come from Brazil (1940), while the population data come from the 1940 Brazilian Demographic Census. We create the number of unionized workers at the municipality level by following a two-step procedure. First, we use the 1940 Census to calculate the share of workers employed in each municipality for each industry. We then multiply this proportion by the corresponding

number of unionized workers in the same industry and normalize these measures by the municipality population.

Share of urban population. The percentage of population living in urban areas. Source: Brazilian Demographic Census.

Democracy is better. Equals 1 if "Strongly disagree", 2 if "Disagree", 3 if "Agree", and 4 if "Strongly agree" to the question: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? Democracy may have problems but it is the best system of government". Original data from Latinobarómetro.

Confidence in the national government. "Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no trust? - The government" The answer is coded from 1 (no trust) to 4 (a lot). Original data from Latinobarómetro.

Confidence in trade unions. "Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no trust? - Trade unions" The answer is coded from 1 (no trust) to 4 (a lot). Original data from Latinobarómetro.

Trust people. "Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust must people, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?". Indicator equal to 1 if "One can trust most people". Original data from Latinobarómetro.

Ideology. "In politics, people normally speak of "left" and "right". On a scale where 0 is left and 10 if right, where would you place yourself?". Original data from Latinobarómetro.

Protest for wages. "On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means "not at all" and 10 "very", how willing would you be to demonstrate and protest about...? - Higher wages and better working conditions". Original data from Latinobarómetro.

How justifiable is abortion. "Please use this card to tell me whether you think abortion can always be justified, never be justified, or somewhere in between." The answer is coded from 1 (never justified) to 10 (always be justified). Original data from Latinobarómetro.

Taxes are high. "Everything considered, do you think the levels of tax paid in (country) are very high, high, low or very low, or alright as they are?". The answer is coded from 1 (alright as they are) to 5 (very high). Original data from Latinobarómetro.

Geographic controls

Latitude. Latitudinal distance from the Equator in decimal degrees, calculated from the centroid of each municipality using GIS software and shapefiles from IBGE (2011).

Longitude. Longitudinal distance from the Greenwhich meridian in decimal degrees, calculated from the centroid of each municipality using GIS software and shapefiles from IBGE (2011).

Altitude. Municipality-level average terrain elevation measured in meters. Source: World-Clim.

Human Mobility Index. Potential average travel time (measured in hours) required to walk across each square kilometer of land, accounting for human biological constraints, as well as geographical and technological factors that determined travel time before the widespread use of steam power. Source: Ozak (2010, 2018).

Distance to the closest state capital. Log of the linear distance to closest state capital, calculated from the centroid of each municipality using GIS software and shapefiles from IBGE (2011).

Distance to the nearest coast. Log of linear distance from the centroid of each municipality to the nearest coast using GIS software and shapefiles from IBGE (2011) and CPRM.

Crop suitability. Based on an agronomic model and considering climatic conditions (temperature, rain, and humidity), these data report at the grid cell level of about 9.25 x 9.25 kilometers the potential output possible to harvest in a cell by assuming the use of the best suitable land. To construct a measure of the suitability at the municipality level for coffee, cotton, and sugarcane, we compute the mean value of each grid cell that falls within the border of each municipality by superimposing a map with the boundaries of Brazilian municipalities on the grid of soil suitability for each crop. FAO-GAEZ's version 4 calculates the potential yields under two assumptions about the input use, "low" and "high". We use data for rain-fed conditions under low input technology because this is the one that better characterizes Brazil's agriculture over the period we analyze. Original data from FAO-GAEZ.

Baseline socioeconomic controls

Share of foreigners Number of foreigners over total population. Source: 1872 Demographic Census.

Share of slaves: Number of slaves over total population. Source: 1872 Demographic Census.

Literacy rate. Number of literate individuals aged five or more over total population aged five or more. Source: 1872 Demographic Census.

Share of workers in agriculture. Number of workers in agriculture over total number of occupied workers. Source: 1872 Demographic Census.

Share of workers in manufacturing. Number of workers in manufacturing over total number of occupied workers. Source: 1872 Demographic Census.

Legal professionals. Number of workers in legal professions over total population *1000. Source: 1872 Demographic Census.

Population density. Number of individuals by municipality area. Source: 1872 Demographic Census.

B.2 Adjustment for Changes in Municipality Boundaries

The administrative division in Brazil significantly changed over time. The number of municipalities increased from 642 in 1872 to 5,570 in 2018. To maintain municipal boundaries constant at the 1920 level, we use official information on historical changes in administrative division (IBGE, 2011). Specifically, we locate the urban center of each municipality between 1920 and 2018 and then determine its corresponding origin in 1920 to aggregate the data. The underlying assumption is that the population concentrates primarily on the urban centers. We employ a similar procedure to match municipalities from 1920 to the original locality it belonged to in the 1872 administrative division.

Some municipalities were incorporated into others over time. To account for these changes in municipal boundaries, we adopt the following procedure to keep the 1920 boundaries unchanged. For municipalities permanently merged with others, we aggregate the absorbed municipalities data to those that incorporated them since the 1872 census. In the case of temporarily merged municipalities, we assign them the values of the variables from the absorbing municipality.