Reminders

- 14 days until the American election. I voted. Did you?
- HW5 due tonight at 11:59pm Eastern.
- Quiz 6 on Expectimax and Utilities is due tomorrow.
- Piazza poll on whether to allow partners on HW.

- Midterm details:
- * No HW from Oct 20-27.
  * Tues Oct 20: Practice midterm released (for credit)
  * Saturday Oct 24: Practice midterm is due.
  * Midterm available Monday Oct 26 and Tuesday Oct 27.
  * 3 hour block. Open book, open notes, no collaboration.

Policy Based Methods for MDPs





Slides courtesy of Dan Klein and Pieter Abbeel

University of California, Berkeley

[These slides were created by Dan Klein and Pieter Abbeel for CS188 Intro to AI at UC Berkeley. All CS188 materials are available at http://ai.berkeley.edu.]

Fixed Policies

Do the optimal action



Do what π says to do



- Expectimax trees max over all actions to compute the optimal values
- If we fixed some policy π(s), then the tree would be simpler – only one action per state
  - … though the tree's value would depend on which policy we fixed

Utilities for a Fixed Policy

- Another basic operation: compute the utility of a state s under a fixed (generally non-optimal) policy

- Define the utility of a state s, under a fixed policy π:

  $V^{\pi}(s)$ = expected total discounted rewards starting in s and following π

- Recursive relation (one-step look-ahead / Bellman equation):



$$V^{\pi}(s) = \sum_{s'} T(s, \pi(s), s')[R(s, \pi(s), s') + \gamma V^{\pi}(s')]$$

Example: Policy Evaluation

Always Go Right



Always Go Forward



Example: Policy Evaluation

Always Go Right

Always Go Forward

Policy Evaluation

- How do we calculate the V's for a fixed policy π?

- Idea 1: Turn recursive Bellman equations into updates (like value iteration)

$$V_0^\pi(s) = 0$$

$$V_{k+1}^\pi(s) \leftarrow \sum_{s'} T(s, \pi(s), s')[R(s, \pi(s), s') + \gamma V_k^\pi(s')]$$



- Efficiency: $O(S^2)$ per iteration

- Idea 2: Without the maxes, the Bellman equations are just a linear system
  - Solve with Matlab (or your favorite linear system solver)

Policy Extraction



Computing Actions from Values

- Let's imagine we have the optimal values V*(s)
- How should we act?
  - It's not obvious!
- We need to do a mini-expectimax (one step)

$$\pi^*(s) = \arg\max_a \sum_{s'} T(s,a,s')[R(s,a,s') + \gamma V^*(s')]$$

- This is called policy extraction, since it gets the policy implied by the values

Computing Actions from Q-Values

- Let's imagine we have the optimal q-values:



- How should we act?
  - Completely trivial to decide!

$$\pi^*(s) = \arg\max_a Q^*(s,a)$$

- Important lesson: actions are easier to select from q-values than values!

Policy Iteration



Problems with Value Iteration

- Value iteration repeats the Bellman updates:

$$V_{k+1}(s) \leftarrow \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s,a,s') \left[R(s,a,s') + \gamma V_k(s') \right]$$



- Problem 1: It's slow – $O(S^2A)$ per iteration
- Problem 2: The "max" at each state rarely changes
- Problem 3: The policy often converges long before the values

Policy Iteration

- Alternative approach for optimal values:
  - Step 1: Policy evaluation: calculate utilities for some fixed policy (not optimal utilities!) until convergence
  - Step 2: Policy improvement: update policy using one-step look-ahead with resulting converged (but not optimal!) utilities as future values
  - Repeat steps until policy converges

- This is policy iteration
  - It's still optimal!
  - Can converge (much) faster under some conditions

Policy Iteration

- Step 1 (Policy Evaluation): For fixed current policy π, find values with policy evaluation:
  - Iterate until values converge:

$$V_{k+1}^{\pi_i}(s) \leftarrow \sum_{s'} T(s, \pi_i(s), s') \left[R(s, \pi_i(s), s') + \gamma V_k^{\pi_i}(s') \right]$$

- Step 2 (Policy Improvement): For fixed values, get a better policy using policy extraction
  - One-step look-ahead:

$$\pi_{i+1}(s) = \arg\max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') \left[R(s, a, s') + \gamma V^{\pi_i}(s') \right]$$

Comparison

- Both value iteration and policy iteration compute the same thing (all optimal values)
- In value iteration:
  - Every iteration updates both the values and (implicitly) the policy
  - We don’t track the policy, but taking the max over actions implicitly recomputes it
- In policy iteration:
  - We do several passes that update utilities with fixed policy (each pass is fast because we consider only one action, not all of them)
  - After the policy is evaluated, a new policy is chosen (slow like a value iteration pass)
  - The new policy will be better (or we’re done)
- Both are dynamic programs for solving MDPs

Summary: MDP Algorithms

- So you want to….
  - Compute optimal values: use value iteration or policy iteration
  - Compute values for a particular policy: use policy evaluation
  - Turn your values into a policy: use policy extraction (one-step lookahead)

- These all look the same!
  - They basically are – they are all variations of Bellman updates
  - They all use one-step lookahead expectimax fragments
  - They differ only in whether we plug in a fixed policy or max over actions

Utilities

- Read Chapter 16 of the textbook (sections 16.1-16.3)



Maximum Expected Utility

- Why should we average utilities? Why not minimax?

- Principle of maximum expected utility:
  - A rational agent should choose the action that maximizes its expected utility, given its knowledge
- Questions:
  - Where do utilities come from?
  - How do we know such utilities even exist?
  - How do we know that averaging even makes sense?
  - What if our behavior (preferences) can't be described by utilities?

What Utilities to Use?



- For worst-case minimax reasoning, terminal function scale doesn't matter
  - We just want better states to have higher evaluations (get the ordering right)
  - We call this insensitivity to monotonic transformations

- For average-case expectimax reasoning, we need *magnitudes* to be meaningful

Utilities

- Utilities are functions from outcomes (states of the world) to real numbers that describe an agent's preferences

- Where do utilities come from?
  - In a game, may be simple (+1/-1)
  - Utilities summarize the agent's goals
  - Theorem: any "rational" preferences can be summarized as a utility function

- We hard-wire utilities and let behaviors emerge
  - Why don't we let agents pick utilities?
  - Why don't we prescribe behaviors?

Utilities: Uncertain Outcomes



Preferences

- An agent must have preferences among:
  - Prizes: A, B, etc.
  - Lotteries: situations with uncertain prizes

$$L = [p, A;\ (1-p), B]$$

A Prize

A Lottery



- Notation:
  - Preference: $A \succ B$
  - Indifference: $A \sim B$

Rationality



Rational Preferences

- We want some constraints on preferences before we call them rational, such as:

Axiom of Transitivity: $(A \succ B) \wedge (B \succ C) \Rightarrow (A \succ C)$

- For example: an agent with intransitive preferences can be induced to give away all of its money
  - If B > C, then an agent with C would pay (say) 1 cent to get B
  - If A > B, then an agent with B would pay (say) 1 cent to get A
  - If C > A, then an agent with A would pay (say) 1 cent to get C



Rational Preferences

The Axioms of Rationality

Orderability

$$(A \succ B) \vee (B \succ A) \vee (A \sim B)$$

Transitivity

$$(A \succ B) \wedge (B \succ C) \Rightarrow (A \succ C)$$

Continuity

$$A \succ B \succ C \Rightarrow \exists p\ [p, A;\ 1-p, C] \sim B$$

Substitutability

$$A \sim B \Rightarrow [p, A;\ 1-p, C] \sim [p, B; 1-p, C]$$

Monotonicity

$$A \succ B \Rightarrow$$
$$(p \geq q \Leftrightarrow [p, A;\ 1-p, B] \succeq [q, A;\ 1-q, B])$$

Theorem: Rational preferences imply behavior describable as maximization of expected utility

MEU Principle

- Theorem [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944]
  - Given any preferences satisfying these constraints, there exists a real-valued function U such that:

$$U(A) \geq U(B) \;\Leftrightarrow\; A \succeq B$$

$$U([p_1, S_1;\; \ldots\; ;\; p_n, S_n]) = \sum_i p_i U(S_i)$$



  - I.e. values assigned by U preserve preferences of both prizes and lotteries!

- Maximum expected utility (MEU) principle:
  - Choose the action that maximizes expected utility
  - Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU) without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities
  - E.g., a lookup table for perfect tic-tac-toe, a reflex vacuum cleaner

Human Utilities



Utility Scales

- Normalized utilities: $u_+ = 1.0$, $u_- = 0.0$
- Micromorts: one-millionth chance of death, useful for paying to reduce product risks, etc.
- QALYs: quality-adjusted life years, useful for medical decisions involving substantial risk
- Note: behavior is invariant under positive linear transformation

$$U'(x) = k_1 U(x) + k_2 \quad \text{where } k_1 > 0$$

- With deterministic prizes only (no lottery choices), only ordinal utility can be determined, i.e., total order on prizes

Micromort examples

Death from	Micromorts per exposure
Scuba diving	5 per dive
Skydiving	7 per jump
Base-jumping	430 per jump
Climbing Mt. Everest	38,000 per ascent

1 Micromort	
Train travel	6000 miles
Jet	1000 miles
Car	230 miles
Walking	17 miles
Bicycle	10 miles
Motorbike	6 miles

Human Utilities

- Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers?
- Standard approach to assessment (elicitation) of human utilities:
  - Compare a prize A to a standard lottery L_p between
    - "best possible prize" u_+ with probability p
    - "worst possible catastrophe" u_- with probability 1-p
  - Adjust lottery probability p until indifference: A ~ L_p
  - Resulting p is a utility in [0,1]





Money

- Money does not behave as a utility function, but we can talk about the utility of having money (or being in debt)
- Given a lottery L = [p, $X; (1-p), $Y]
  - The expected monetary value EMV(L) is p*X + (1-p)*Y
  - U(L) = p*U($X) + (1-p)*U($Y)
  - Typically, U(L) < U(EMV(L))
  - In this sense, people are risk-averse
  - When deep in debt, people are risk-prone



Example: Insurance

- Consider the lottery [0.5, $1000; 0.5, $0]
  - What is its expected monetary value? ($500)
  - What is its certainty equivalent?
    - Monetary value acceptable in lieu of lottery
    - $400 for most people
  - Difference of $100 is the insurance premium
    - There's an insurance industry because people will pay to reduce their risk
    - If everyone were risk-neutral, no insurance needed!
  - It's win-win: you'd rather have the $400 and the insurance company would rather have the lottery (their utility curve is linear and they have many lotteries)



Example: Human Rationality?

- Famous example of Allais (1953)
  - A: [0.8, $4k; 0.2, $0]
  - B: [1.0, $3k; 0.0, $0]
  - C: [0.2, $4k; 0.8, $0] ⇦
  - D: [0.25, $3k; 0.75, $0]
- Most people prefer B > A, C > D
- But if U($0) = 0, then
  - B > A ⇒ U($3k) > 0.8 U($4k)
  - C > D ⇒ 0.8 U($4k) > U($3k)