

# Design Document

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## 1 Problem 1

*Symbols used :*  $H()$  - SHA256 Hash Function,  $\parallel$  - concatenation,  $un$  - username,  $pw$  - password,  $userDS$  - user Data Structure,  $[K:V]$  - Key Value pair,  $E_k(X)$  -  $X$  encrypted using key  $k$


### 1.1 InitUser

- Compute  $H1 = H(un\parallel pw)$  and Generate RSA public private key pair(**pubKey**, **privKey**)
- Store pubKey in Keystore - [**un** : **pubKey**] and store privKey in userDS. The assumption here is that keystore is trusted so we have directly used username in plaintext form.
- Generate AES Key  $E_k = \text{Argon}(pw, un)$  and encrypt userDS with this key and place it in Datastore. - [**H1** :  $E_k(\text{userDS} + \text{HMAC})$ ] The assumption here is that keystore is trusted so we have directly used username in plaintext form.

### 1.2 GetUser

- Compute  $H1 = H(un\parallel pw)$  and if this exists in the datastore map as a key in a key-value pair, implies that verification is successful. Else return error.
- Compute  $E_k$  ( as done in InitUser). Decrypt value at the location H1 in the datastore using this key. Verify HMAC.
- Load userDS if verification is successful. Else return error.

### 1.3 StoreFile



#### New File Creation

- Generate two random numbers from `/dev/random`
- Compute  $\mathbf{Loc} = \mathbf{H}(\mathbf{r1})$  and generate AES Key  $E_{k1} = \mathbf{Argon}(\mathbf{pw}, \mathbf{r2})$ .  $E_{k1}$  is used to encrypt the actual location of the filestructure X.
- Generate actual location of filestructure  $\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{H}(\mathbf{r2})$  and place its encrypted version in the data store,  $[\mathbf{Loc} : E_{k1}(\mathbf{X} + \mathbf{HMAC})]$
- Generate AES Key to encrypt FileStructure  $E_{k2} = \mathbf{Argon}(\mathbf{X}, E_{k1})$  and place it in data store. Both file content and file structure is encrypted using  $E_{k2}$ .
- Store filename and  $E_{k1}$  in userDS. Also make this change in datastore's version of userDS.

#### File already present

- Get Loc and  $E_{k1}$  from UserDS. Access Loc and Verify HMAC.
- Generate  $E_{k2}$  (as done in StoreFile) and use this to decrypt value at X to get FileStructure. Verify HMAC. Return error if unsuccessful.
- Change file content to new content passed in StoreFile function. Encrypt it and place it back in datastore.

FileStructure is actually a table of locations, each location is generated by  $\mathbf{H}(\text{some random number})$ . Nth location in this table contains Nth append to the file, the contents of which are also encrypted using the same key  $E_{k2}$ . In the figure,  $\mathbf{HMAC}(Z_i)$  refers to  $\mathbf{HMAC}(\text{Content})$  at Loc(i).

## 1.4 LoadFile

Load File follows the same steps as above to get the location of FileStructure. It goes through each  $Loc_i$  to get the content of the entire file, verifies  $HMAC(FileStructure)$  and also  $HMAC(Content)$  in each location. If unsuccessful, it returns nil.

## 1.5 AppendFile

In Append File, since the user has  $E_{k2}$  derived using the above mentioned steps, he decrypts FileStructure and verifies  $HMAC(FileStructure)$ . If verification is successful, he adds a new row with the hash of a new  $Loc_i$  in the table where the appended content that user sent will be placed encrypted by  $E_{k2}$ .  $HMAC(FileStructure)$  is modified. There is a field of number of appends in the file which is saved in UserDS which is incremented.

# 2 Problem 2

## 2.1 ShareFile(f1,"B")

In "sharing" string we share loc and  $E_{k1}$  (symbols have their usual meaning as above). It is encrypted using receiver's public key, signed using sender's private key. Send it to B. Add the fact that you shared this with B in sender's userDS.

## 2.2 ReceiveFile(f2, "A", sharing)

- Decrypt "sharing" using B's RSA private key to get loc and  $E_{k1}$ . Verify signature using A's public key.
- Save Loc,  $E_{k1}$  and f2 to B's userDS and to its copy in datastore. So B can access the file under name f2.

## 2.3 RevokeAccess

In order to revoke access the key  $E_{k1}$  is changed by generating a new random number  $r2'$ . This will generate new  $X'$  and change  $E_{k2}$  as well. Use original  $X$  and decrypt filestructure using original  $E_{k1}$  and verify HMAC. If verification is successful, encrypt the file content using new  $E_{k2}$  and place it at new location  $X'$ . Change the value at Loc to the encrypted form of  $X'$  using new  $E_{k1}$ . Make all the modifications required in the userDS.

Note : We are assuming that the username and password entered by the client are being passed through a secure channel in the call to InitUser().

### 3 Modifications

- Generation of AES Key  $E_{k1}$  has been revised to  $E_{k1} = \mathbf{Argon}(\mathbf{pwhash}, \mathbf{r2})$  , where pwhash corresponds to  $H(\text{pw} + \text{salt})$ . Salt is randomly generated on the first call to Init User.
- Number of Appends to a file is stored in the File Structure itself.