Securing LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection Attacks

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12/11/2025

These slides are an extended version of a talk presented at the *Safer with Google Summit 2025*.

Roadmap

- Formalizing prompt injection attacks
- Examples of prompt injection
- Defenses
  - Prevention
  - Detection
  - Localization

Formalizing Prompt Injection Attacks

- Existing work
  - Blog posts
  - Social media posts
  - Case studies
- Our work
  - Formalizing prompt injection
    - Scientific foundation for rigorous study
  - Comprehensive benchmarking
  - Take-aways
    - Prompt injection attacks are pervasive threats
    - No existing defenses are sufficient

Liu et al. “Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses”. In *USENIX Security Symposium*, 2024.

Formalizing Prompt Injection Attack

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Formalizing Prompt Injection Attack



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

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

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

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

Formalizing Prompt Injection Attack



Naïve Attack, i.e., empty separator

Escape Characters, e.g., “\n”

Context Ignoring “Ignore previous instructions.”

Fake Completion “Answer: task complete.”

Combined Attack “\n Answer: task complete. \n Ignore previous instructions.”

Experimental Results on GPT-4

Naive Attack	Escape Characters	Context Ignoring	Fake Completion	Combined Attack
0.62	0.66	0.65	0.70	0.75

Attack Success Value: likelihood that LLM accomplishes injected prompt correctly

More powerful LLMs are more vulnerable

Roadmap

- Formalizing prompt injection attacks
- **Examples of prompt injection**
- Defenses
  - Prevention
  - Detection
  - Localization

Examples of Prompt Injection Attacks: Stealing System Prompts in LLM-integrated Applications



LLM-integrated applications

Hui et al. “PLeak: Prompt Leaking Attacks against Large Language Model Applications”. In *ACM CCS*, 2024.

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

55% of applications on Poe set system prompts confidential

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

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

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Examples of Prompt Injection Attacks: Malicious Tool Selection in LLM Agents



Shi et al. “Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-Judge”. In *ACM CCS*, 2024.
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

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

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Examples of Prompt Injection Attacks: Manipulate Web Agents



Wang et al. “WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents”. In *EMNLP*, 2025.

Examples of Prompt Injection Attacks: Manipulate LLM Agents with Multi-source Data









Wang et al. “OBLIInjection: Order-Oblivious Prompt Injection Attack to LLM Agents with Multi-source Data”. In *NDSS*, 2026.

Roadmap

- Formalizing prompt injection attacks
- Examples of prompt injection
- **Defenses**
  - Prevention
  - Detection
  - Localization
  - *Note: applicable to any LLM-integrated applications and agents*

Preventing Prompt Injection via Inference-time Scaling



Liu et al. “SecInfer: Preventing Prompt Injection via Inference-time Scaling”. *arXiv, 2025*.

Sampling

- Intrinsic randomness of LLM generation
  - Temperature sampling
  - Top-k sampling
  - …
- + Chain-of-thought system prompts
  - “Think step by step in less than 150 words and conclude with the answer to the question asked in the very beginning”
  - “Try to interpret the user-asked question in a slightly different way than usual in less than 150 words and conclude with the answer to the question asked in the very beginning”
  - …

Aggregation

- Existing methods
  - Best-of-N
  - Majority vote
  - …
  - Limitation: not consider target task



Target-Task-Guided Aggregation

Experimental Results

LLM	Attack	AG News		
		U	UA	ASR
LLaMA 3.1-8B-Instruct	NA	0.86	0.72	0.00
	EC		0.82	0.00
	CI		0.70	0.00
	FC		0.72	0.00
	CA		0.81	0.00
	GCG		0.67	0.00
	NE		0.75	0.00

Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks

- Given a data sample from an untrusted source
  - A tool name/description
  - A tool call result
  - An email
  - A webpage
  - A paper
  - A resume
  - A user input to LLM-integrated applications
  - …
- Determine whether the data sample is contaminated by injected prompts

Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks



Note: red text corresponds to injected prompt

Liu et al. "DataSentinel: A Game-Theoretic Detection of Prompt Injection Attacks". In *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2025. *Distinguished Paper Award.*

Experimental Results on OpenPromptInjection

Injected Task	**FPR**	**FNR**						
		Naive Attack	Escape Character	Context Ignoring	Fake Completion	Combined Attack	Universal	NeuralExec
Dup. sentence detection	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Grammar correction		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Hate detection		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Nat. lang. inference		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Sentiment analysis		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spam detection		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Summarization		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks

- Given a data sample detected as contaminated by injected prompts
  - A tool name/description
  - A tool call result
  - An email
  - A webpage
  - A paper
  - A resume
  - A user input to LLM-integrated applications
  - …
- Determine the locations of the injected prompts within the contaminated data sample

Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks



Jia et al. “PromptLocate: Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks”. To appear in *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2026.

Three Steps of our PromptLocate



Summary

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Acknowledgements

Yupei Liu Yuqi Jia Jinyuan Jia Dawn Song
Reachel Wang Xilong Wang John Bloch Jiawen Shi etc.