

# OpenShift from a security perspective

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## About me ..

Alfred Bach  
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Living in Austria near Vienna

4 Years with Red Hat  
Coming from CA and SUSE/NOVELL


[abach@redhat.com](mailto:abach@redhat.com)




About you ?

<https://www.menti.com/7ykxr3eaid>


## Top Funding Priorities for 2019: Automation, Cloud, & Security




## The Cyber Security Challenge is not Getting Easier




Reported increased Severity of attacks



Said the time to resolve an incident has grown



Have their ideal security-skilled staffing level, making it the #2 barrier to Cyber resilience




Portio of alerts coming in that the average security team examines every day

<sup>1</sup> [The Third Annual Study on the Cyber Resilient Organization](#) - Ponemon Institute, 2018 (Sponsored by IBM)


<sup>2</sup> <https://venturebeat.com/2017/12/16/the-lesson-behind-2017s-biggest-enterprise-security-story/>

## Choosing a Container Platform Vendor? Security is Critical



# SECURITY MUST BE CONTINUOUS

And integrated throughout the IT lifecycle



# COMPREHENSIVE CONTAINER SECURITY



## CONTROL

Application  
Security

Container Content

CI/CD Pipeline

Container Registry

Deployment Policies



## DEFEND

Infrastructure

Container Platform


Container Host Multi-tenancy

Network Isolation

Storage

Audit & Logging

API Management



## EXTEND

Security Ecosystem

# Hardening tools & applicability guides

## OpenShift 3

- [NIST National Checklist for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 3](#)
- [FISMA Moderate](#)
- [ISO 27001](#)
- [PCI-DSS Reference Architecture](#)

## OpenShift Hardening Guide for 3.11

- Inspired by CIS Kubernetes benchmark v1.2

Targeted for 1H CY 2020


## OpenShift 4

- Target Q1 CY 2020
  - HIPAA
  - HITRUST
  - OCP Hardening Guide for 4.3
- Target Q2 CY 2020
  - FISMA
  - ISO 27001
  - PCI-DSS

# What Does It Take To Secure the Infrastructure?

## OpenShift security features include

- Host & Runtime security
- Identity and Access Management
- Role-based Access Controls
- Project namespaces
- Network isolation
- Integrated & extensible secrets management
- Logging, Monitoring, Metrics, Audit




# Securing Containerized Applications


## An opportunity to shift security left

### Best practices

- Use trusted sources for external content
- Use a private registry to manage images
- CI/CD must have security gates
- Application secrets management
- Apply runtime security policies
- Rebuild and redeploy - never patch a running container
- Ensure application logging, monitoring




# DEFEND INFRASTRUCTURE



# SECURING THE CONTAINER PLATFORM

## Security Features Include


- Host & Runtime security
- Identity and Access Management
- Role-based Access Controls
- Project namespaces
- Integrated SDN - Network Policies is default
- Integrated & extensible secrets management
- Logging, Monitoring, Metrics



# HOST OS CONTAINER MULTI-TENANCY

Container Security starts with Linux Security

- Security in the RHEL host applies to the container
- SELINUX and Kernel Namespaces are the one-two punch no one can beat
- Protects not only the host, but containers from each other
- RHEL CoreOS provides minimized attack surface



# SELINUX MITIGATES CONTAINER RUNTIME VULNERABILITIES

## SELinux Mitigates container Vulnerability

January 13, 2017 | Joe Brockmeier

[< Back to all posts](#)

A new CVE, ([CVE-2016-9962](#)), for the docker container runtime and runc were released. Fixed packages are being prepared and shipped for RHEL as well as Fedora, CentOS. This CVE reports that if you `exec`d into a running container, the processes in the container could attack the process that just entered the container.

<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/selinux-mitigates-container-vulnerability>

## Latest container exploit (runc) can be blocked by SELinux

February 28, 2019 | Dan Walsh

[< Back to all posts](#)

Tags:

Tags: [Security](#), [Containers](#)

[< Back to all posts](#)

A flaw in runc ([CVE-2019-5736](#)), announced last week, allows container processes to "escape" their containment and execute programs on the host operating system. The good news is that well-configured SELinux can stop it.

<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/latest-container-exploit-runc-can-be-blocked-selinux>

# Container Host Vision

An Ideal Container Host would be	RHEL CoreOS
Minimal	Only what's needed to run containers
Secure	Read-only & locked down
Immutable	Immutable image-based deployments & updates
Always up-to-date	OS updates are automated and transparent
Updates never break my apps	Isolates all applications as containers
Updates never break my cluster	OS components are compatible with the cluster
Supported on my infra of choice	Inherits majority of the RHEL ecosystem
Simple to configure	Installer generated configuration
Effortless to manage	Managed by Kubernetes Operators

# IMMUTABLE OPERATING SYSTEM

## OPENSHIFT 4


### Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS is versioned with OpenShift

CoreOS is tested and shipped in conjunction with the platform. Red Hat runs thousands of tests against these configurations.


### Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS is managed by the cluster

The Operating system is operated as part of the cluster, with the config for components managed by Machine Config Operator:

- CRI-O config
- Kubelet config
- Authorized registries
- SSH config



# DISCONNECTED “AIR-GAPPED” INSTALL & UPGRADE



## Overview

- 4.2 introduces support for installing and updating OpenShift clusters in disconnected environments
- Requires local Docker 2.2 spec compliant container registry to host OpenShift content
- Designed to work with the user provisioned infrastructure deployment method
  - *Note: Will not work with Installer provisioned infrastructure deployments*

## Installation Procedure

- Mirror OpenShift content to local container registry in the disconnected environment
- Generate install-config.yaml: \$ ./openshift-install create install-config --dir <dir>
  - Edit and add pull secret (PullSecret), CA certificate (AdditionalTrustBundle), and image content sources (ImageContentSources) to install-config.yaml
- Set the OPENSHIFT\_INSTALL\_RELEASE\_IMAGE\_OVERRIDE environment variable during the creation of the ignition configs
- Generate the ignition configuration: \$ ./openshift-install create ignition-configs --dir <dir>
- Use the resulting ignition files to bootstrap the cluster deployment

Generally Available

# OpenShift 4 and Fips 140-2

## FIPS ready Services


- When built with RHEL 7 base image

## OpenShift calls FIPS validated crypto

- When running on RHEL 7.6 in FIPS mode, OpenShift components bypass go cryptographic routines and call into a RHEL FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic library
- This feature is specific to binaries built with the RHEL go compiler and running on RHEL

## RHEL CoreOS FIPS mode

- Configure at install to enforce use of FIPS Implementation Under Test\* modules



\*When built with RHEL base images

[More about RHEL go and FIPS 140-2](#)

# RUNTIME SECURITY POLICIES

## SCC ([Security Context Constraints](#))

Allow administrators to control permissions for pods

Restricted SCC is granted to all users

By default, no containers can run as root

Admin can grant access to privileged SCC

Custom SCCs can be created

```
$ oc describe scc restricted
Name:                      restricted
Priority:                  <none>
Access:
  Users:                   <none>
  Groups:                  system:authenticated
Settings:
  Allow Privileged:        false 
  Default Add Capabilities: <none>
  Required Drop Capabilities: KILL,MKNOD,SYS_CHROOT,SETUID,SETGID
  Allowed Capabilities:    <none>
  Allowed Seccomp Profiles: <none>
  Allowed Volume Types:    configMap,downwardAPI,emptyDir,persistentVolumeClaim,projected,
                            ...
  Allow Host Network:       false
  Allow Host Ports:         false
  Allow Host PID:          false
  Allow Host IPC:          false
  Read Only Root Filesystem: false
  Run As User Strategy: MustRunAsRange
```

# IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT

OpenShift includes an OAuth server, which does three things:

- Identifies the person requesting a token, using a configured identity provider
- Determines a mapping from that identity to an OpenShift user
- Issues an OAuth access token which authenticates that user to the API  
[Managing Users and Groups in OpenShift](#)  
[Configuring Identity Providers](#)

Supported Identity Providers include

- Keystone
- LDAP
- GitHub
- GitLab
- GitHub Enterprise (new with 3.11)
- Google
- OpenID Connect
- Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) to support SSO flows on Windows (Kerberos)

# RESTRICT ACCESS BY NEED TO KNOW

## Role based authorization

- Project scope & cluster scope available
- Matches request attributes (verb,object,etc)
- If no roles match, request is denied ( deny by default )
- Operator- and user-level roles are defined by default
- Custom roles are supported





Figure 12 - Authorization Relationships

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
# Network security

# OPENSIFT NETWORKING

- Built-in internal DNS to reach services by name
- Software Defined Networking (SDN) for a unified cluster network to enable pod-to-pod communication
- OpenShift follows the Kubernetes Container Networking Interface (CNI) plug-in model
- Isolate applications from other applications within a cluster
- Isolate environments (Dev / Test / Prod) from other environments within a cluster




# OPENSHIFT POD to POD NETWORKING



# OPENShift SDN

## Network Policy enabled by default in OpenShift 4




### Example Policies

- Allow all traffic inside the project
- Allow traffic from green to gray
- Allow traffic to purple on 8080

```
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: allow-to-purple-on-8080
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      color: purple
  ingress:
  - ports:
    - protocol: tcp
      port: 8080
```


# PROJECTS ISOLATE APPLICATIONS

## across teams, groups and departments




# OPENShift SDN - OVS PACKET FLOW

Container to Container on the Same Host




# OPENSHIFT SDN - OVS PACKET FLOW

Container to Container on the Different Hosts




# OPENSHIFT SDN - OVS PACKET FLOW

Container Connects to External Host



# OpenShift cluster with multiple zones

Using multiple ingress controllers, network policies, multiple egress pods



Application pods run on one OpenShift Cluster.


Microsegmented with Network Security policies.

Infra Nodes in each zone run Ingress and Egress pods for specific zones.

If required, physical isolation of pods to specific nodes is possible with node-selectors. But that can reduce worker node density.

# EGRESS FIREWALL TO LIMIT ACCESS

Cluster admin can limit the external addresses accessed by some or all pods



Examples:

A pod can talk to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster) but cannot connect to public internet

A pod can talk to public internet, but cannot connect to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster)




A pod cannot reach specific subnets/hosts

# Multus

- Problem: Kubernetes only supports one network interface, “eth0”, but we need:
  - Functional separation of control/data planes
  - Link aggregation for network redundancy
  - Different network protocol stacks, capabilities, SLAs
  - Traffic isolation / Network segregation and security
  - QoS
- Solution: Multus “meta plug-in” for Kubernetes CNI
- Enables multiple network interfaces per pod, each assigned a different CNI plug-in defined in pod spec
  - Each with its configuration defined in CRD objects
- SR-IOV enablement

Pod with Multus




# BUILDING UPON MULTUS

Development is now unblocked for a number of customer use cases

- Functional separation of control/data planes
  - Default SDN on primary interface for management traffic
  - Data-plane traffic on secondary (or tertiary...) interface
- Link aggregation for network redundancy
- Different network protocol stacks, capabilities, SLAs
- Network traffic isolation, segregation and security
- User-space networking (e.g. VPP, OVS-DPDK)
- VLAN, MACVLAN, host device networking
- Video Streaming (Multicast)
- High Performance Networking - e.g. SR-IOV
  - Openshift-SDN/OVN-Kubernetes as primary interface for management traffic
  - SR-IOV Device Plugin for VF hardware resource scheduling
  - SR-IOV CNI plugs VFs assigned by device plugin into pods as data plane interfaces
- QoS
- CNV (kubenvirt) Networking
- SDN Migration (e.g. our next-gen SDN)

# OPENShift NETWORK PLUGINS



<sup>1</sup>Targeting GA at OCP 4.3 (not default SDN)

<sup>2</sup>Flannel is minimally verified and is supported only and exactly as deployed in the [OpenShift on OpenStack reference architecture](#)

<sup>3</sup>Available as an install-time option at 3.11.119 and 4.2.z (targeting 4.2.2)

# CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT

- Certificates are used to provide secure connections to
  - master and nodes
  - Ingress controller and registry
  - etcd
- Certificate rotation is automated
- Optionally configure external endpoints to use custom certificates
- For example:  
[Requesting and Installing Let's Encrypt Certificates for OpenShift 4](#)



# CLUSTER LOG MANAGEMENT

## Install the Elasticsearch and Cluster Logging Operators from OperatorHub

- EFK stack aggregates logs for hosts and applications
  - Elasticsearch: a search and analytics engine to store logs
  - Fluentd: gathers logs and sends to Elasticsearch.
  - Kibana: A web UI for Elasticsearch.
- Access control
  - Cluster administrators can view all logs
  - Users can only view logs for their projects
  - Central Audit policy configuration
- Ability to send logs elsewhere
  - External elasticsearch, Splunk, etc

### Create Operator Subscription

Keep your service up to date by selecting a channel and approval strategy. The strategy determines either manual or automatic updates.

#### Installation Mode \*

All namespaces  
This mode operator will be available in a single namespace only.

A specific namespace on the cluster  
Operator will be available in a single namespace only.

PR openshift-logging

#### Update Channel \*

preview

#### Approval Strategy \*

Automatic

Manual


Subscribe Cancel

```
# configure via CRD
apiVersion: "logging.openshift.io/v1"
kind: "ClusterLogging"
metadata:
  name: "instance"
  namespace: "openshift-logging"
spec:
  managementState: "Managed"
  logStore:
    type: "elasticsearch"
    elasticsearch:
      nodeCount: 3
      resources:
        limits:
          cpu: 800m
          memory: 1Gi
        requests:
          cpu: 800m
          memory: 1Gi
      storage:
        storageClassName: gp2
        size: 100G
        redundancyPolicy: "SingleRedundancy"
    visualization:
      type: "kibana"
      kibana:
        replicas: 1
    curation:
      type: "curator"
```

# Attached storage

Secure storage by using


- SELinux access controls
- Secure mounts
- Supplemental group IDs for shared storage
- Network bound disk encryption




# APPLICATION API MANAGEMENT

Consider configuring an API gateway for container platform & application APIs

- Authentication and authorization
- LDAP integration
- End-point access controls
- Rate limiting



# CONTROL APPLICATION SECURITY



# DEVSECOPS

## THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF CONTAINERS

We created Dev and Ops and Security user stories and tackled them together.



DEVELOPER

I can break builds if security and compliance rules aren't followed...



SECURITY

We're empowering the developers and ideally empowering them straight to production.



OPERATIONS

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# Next generation container tools

# NEXT-GEN CONTAINER TOOLS


Providing stability, flexibility and performance with containers and images

**Container-tools** - OCI tooling to create, run, and manage, Linux Containers with an enterprise life cycle.

- Conform to the OCI image and runtime specifications
- Daemon-less, OS-native container tooling
- Separation of concerns



**buildah**



Build OCI/docker Images




**skopeo**



Inspect, copy, & sign Images



**podman**



RHEL

run, manage, debug containers



# cri-o

A lightweight, OCI-compliant container runtime

Optimized for  
Kubernetes

Any OCI-compliant  
container from any  
OCI registry  
(including docker)

Improve Security and  
Performance at scale

[CRI - the Container Runtime Interface](#)

[OpenShift 4 defaults to CRI-O](#)


[Red Hat contributes CRI-O to the Cloud Native Computing Foundation](#)

# OPENShift LOVES CI/CD


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JENKINS-AS-A SERVICE  
ON OPENSIFT




HYBRID JENKINS INFRA  
WITH OPENSIFT



EXISTING CI/CD  
DEPLOY TO OPENSIFT


# USE THE OPENSOURCE PIPELINE



# OR USE EXISTING DELIVERY PROCESSES




GitLab  
GitHub  
Bitbucket  
Microsoft Visual Studio Team Foundation  
SOURCE VERSION CONTROL



JFrog Artifactory Nexus


JFrog Artifactory Nexus Sonatype QUAY by CoreOS AWS ECR

# DEPLOY IMAGES, APPLICATION BINARIES OR SOURCE CODE WITH OPENSHIFT




# JENKINS-AS-A-SERVICE ON OPENSHIFT

- Certified Jenkins images with pre-configured plugins
  - Provided out-of-the-box
  - Follows Jenkins 1.x and 2.x LTS versions
- Jenkins S2I Builder for customizing the image
  - Install Plugins
  - Configure Jenkins
  - Configure Build Jobs
- OpenShift plugins to integrate authentication with OpenShift and also CI/CD pipelines
- Dynamically deploys Jenkins slave containers



# SECURE & AUTOMATE THE CONTENT LIFECYCLE

Elements of the Openshift container pipeline



# EXTERNAL CONTENT: USE TRUSTED SOURCES

## Red Hat Container Images


- Signed Images
- Health Index (A to F grade)\*
- Security advisories & errata (patches)

The screenshot shows the Red Hat Container Catalog interface. At the top, there is a search bar with the text "python". Below the search bar, there are navigation links: "Explore", "Get Started", and "FAQ". On the right side of the header, there are "Service Accounts" and a user icon. The main content area displays a container image entry for "rhscl/python-36-rhel7". The title is "rhscl/python-36-rhel7" and the description is "Python 3.6 platform for building and running applications" by "Red Hat, Inc." It is listed as "in Product Red Hat Enterprise Linux". Below the title, there are tabs: "Overview" (which is selected), "Get This Image", "Tech Details", "Support", and "Tags". The "Description" section contains a detailed paragraph about Python 3.6 as a container. To the right, there is a sidebar titled "Most recent tag" with a list of tags: "Updated 6 days ago", "1-55", "Health Index A", and "Security Signed Unprivileged".

\*[More about the Health Index](#)


# CI/CD MUST INCLUDE SECURITY GATES

- Integrate security testing into your build / CI process
- Use automated policies to flag builds with issues
- Sign your custom container images



# MANAGING CONTAINER DEPLOYMENT

- Deployments: Containerized App Configuration as Code
- Whitelist / Blacklist external repos
- Apply runtime security policies
- Validate image signatures
- Monitor for new vulnerabilities
- Trust is temporal:  
rebuild & redeploy as needed



# Enhanced Visibility with the New Project Dashboard

## Project-scope Dashboard gives Developer Clear Insights


Drill down in context from the new project dashboard widgets:

- Project Details
- Project Status/Health
- Project External Links (Launcher)
- Project Inventory
- Project Utilization
- Project Resource Quota
- Project Activity (Top consumers)

The screenshot shows the Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform Project Details dashboard for the project 'tony'. The top navigation bar includes the Red Hat logo, 'OpenShift Container Platform', and user information ('kube:admin'). The left sidebar has a dark theme with a 'Administrator' dropdown, a 'Home' section (selected), and sections for 'Projects', 'Search', 'Explore', 'Events', and various operators like 'Operators', 'Workloads', 'Networking', 'Storage', 'Builds', 'Monitoring', 'Compute', 'User Management', and 'Administration'. The main content area is titled 'tony' and shows tabs for 'Dashboard' (selected), 'Overview', 'YAML', 'Workloads', and 'Role Bindings'. The 'Dashboard' tab contains several widgets: 'Details' (Name: tony, Requester: kube:admin, Labels: No labels), 'Status' (Active), 'Inventory' (4 Deployments, 4 Pods, 0 PVCs, 1 Service, 0 Routes, 4 Config Maps, 21 Secrets), 'Utilization' (CPU usage chart showing 8.39m over 1 hour, Memory usage chart showing 96.31 MiB over 1 hour, Pod count chart showing 4 over 2 hours), and 'Activity' (View events, Ongoing: There are no ongoing activities, Recent Events log). The 'Workloads' tab shows a table with columns 'Resource', 'Usage', and time points 15:10, 15:30, 15:50, with rows for CPU and Memory.

# SECURE & AUTOMATE THE CONTENT LIFECYCLE

Trust is temporal; rebuild and redeploy as needed



[Track updates & simplify management with ImageStreams](#)

Use [Image Change Triggers](#) to automatically rebuild custom images with updated (patched) external images

---

# Red Hat Quay

# RED HAT QUAY V3

## Quay v3 Key Features

- Full support for Docker Registry API v2\_s2
- Multi-arch (manifest) and Windows images
- Rebranded and rebased (RHEL)
- New config UI to save & upload Quay config
- Parallel upgrade (2x 5min downtime only)

## Red Hat Quay and OpenShift

Red Hat Quay and OpenShift work well together. This includes both running Quay **on** and using Quay **with** OpenShift.



[Introducing Red Hat Quay 3](#)

# REGISTRY FEATURES



- **Vulnerability Scanning (powered by Clair)**  
Continually scan your containers for vulnerabilities, giving you complete visibility into known issues and how to fix them
- **Geographic Replication**  
Reliably store, build and deploy a single set of container images across multiple geographies
- **Automated software deployments**  
Streamline your continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipeline with build triggers, git hooks, and robot accounts
- **Advanced Access Control Management**  
Fine-grain access control of the registry with multiple identity and authentication providers as well as support for teams and organization mapping

# VULNERABILITY SCANNING - CLAIR

Quay integrates with Clair to continually scan your containers for vulnerabilities.

You get complete visibility into known issues and how to fix them.

RED HAT QUAY EXPLORE REPOSITORIES TUTORIAL

search + 🔍 opentic...

← example/python 3f86e14b88f9

Quay Security Scanner has detected **718** vulnerabilities.  
Patches are available for **144** vulnerabilities.

47 High-level vulnerabilities.  
220 Medium-level vulnerabilities.  
177 Low-level vulnerabilities.  
266 Negligible-level vulnerabilities.  
8 Unknown-level vulnerabilities.


Vulnerabilities

CVE	SEVERITY	PACKAGE	CURRENT VERSION	FIXED IN VERSION	INTRODUCED IN LAYER
» CVE-2018-15686	10 / 10	systemd	232-25+deb9u6	232-25+deb9u10	ADD file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bc...
» CVE-2019-3855	9.3 / 10	libssh2	1.7.0-1	1.7.0-1+deb9u1	RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-i...
» CVE-2019-3462	9.3 / 10	apt	1.4.8	1.4.9	ADD file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bc...
» CVE-2017-16997	9.3 / 10	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	2.24-11+deb9u4	ADD file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bc...
» CAE-S011-19881	8.3 / 10	dpkg	2.19.1-1+deb9u3	2.19.1-1+deb9u4	ADD file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bc...
» CAE-S010-2465	8.3 / 10	ebf	1.4.8	1.4.9	ADD file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bc...


---

# Red Hat Service Mesh


# MICROSERVICES EVOLUTION



# RED HAT SERVICE MESH




# OBSERVABILITY WITH KIALI



# SECRETS MANAGEMENT


- Secure mechanism for holding sensitive data e.g.
  - Passwords and credentials
  - SSH Keys
  - Certificates
- Secrets are made available as
  - Environment variables
  - Volume mounts
  - Interaction with external systems (e.g. vaults)
- Encrypted in transit and at rest\*
- Never rest on the nodes




# OpenShift 4 etcd Encryption

## Encrypt secrets, config maps...

- Encryption of the etcd datastore is optional. Once enabled, encryption cannot be disabled.
  - The aes-cbc cipher is used.
  - Keys are created and automatically rotated by an operator and stored on the master node's file system.
  - Keys are available as a secret via the kube API to a cluster admin.
  - Assuming a healthy cluster: after enabling encryption, within a day, all relevant items in etcd are encrypted
  - Backup: The etcd data store should be backed up separately from the file system with the key.
  - Disaster recovery: a backup of both the encrypted etcd data and encryption keys must be available.



# EXTEND SECURITY



# THE SECURITY ECOSYSTEM

For enhanced security, or to meet existing policies, you may choose to integrate with enterprise security tools, such as

- Identity and Access management / Privileged Access Management
- External Certificate Authorities
- External Vaults / Key Management solutions
- Filesystem encryption tools
- Container content scanners & vulnerability management tools
- Container runtime analysis tools
- Security Information and Event Monitoring (SIEM)

# THE BROADER SECURITY ECOSYSTEM




BLACKDUCK  
BY SYNOPSYS®



THALES



# OpenShift network plugins




<sup>1</sup>Targeting GA at OCP 4.3 (not default SDN)

<sup>2</sup>Flannel is minimally verified and is supported only and exactly as deployed in the [OpenShift on OpenStack reference architecture](#)

<sup>3</sup>Available as an install-time option at 3.11.119 and 4.2.z (targeting 4.2.2)

# ROADMAP



# OpenShift Security Roadmap

## Near Term (4.3)


- VPC / VPN support
- Encrypt etcd datastore
- FIPS compliance
- RHCOS disk encryption
- Reference architecture for GitOps based cluster config management with [Argo CD](#)
- External DNS (DNS Forwarding)
- Ingress Cipher and TLS Policy API

## Longer Term (4.4+)

- Automate rotation of Service CA
- Global Options to Enable HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
- Full Support for IPv6, HTTP/2
- External Keycloak integration
- Service for application certificate lifecycle management
- Configure cipher suite for API server
- Integration workload identity with Cloud Provider IAM solutions
- Compliance operator
- Consume group membership from external Identity Provider

# RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE GOALS

*Automate compliance audit and remediation*



## Linux Host Security

- RHCOS Immutable user space & automated updates
- SELinux+
- LUKS volume encryption
- FIPS mode

## Authentication & Authorization

- Embedded OAuth Server
- Supports 9 Identity Providers including AD/LDAP
- Multi-Level Access Control (Users and Groups)
- Secrets and certificate management

## Data Protection

- Encrypt secrets at rest (etcd datastore)
- All API server traffic is encrypted
- Configure cipher suites\*
- Encrypt east / west traffic (Service Mesh)

## Image Security

- ImageStreams
- Scanning (Quay with Clair)
- Deployment policies (admission controllers)

## Integrated Audit, Logging, Monitoring


## Security Policies

- SCC (Security Context Controls)
- Non-Root Containers
- Controlled Access to Resources

## Networking Isolation

- Ingress / Egress control
- Network microsegmentation

# Defense in Depth with comprehensive security features



Ten Layers of Container Security

# Thank you

Red Hat is the world's leading provider of enterprise open source software solutions. Award-winning support, training, and consulting services make Red Hat a trusted adviser to the Fortune 500.



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