


Isabelle/Solidity: A Tool for the Verification of Solidity Smart Contracts (tool paper)

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Abstract

Smart contracts are an important innovation in Blockchain which allow to automate financial transactions. Every day, hundreds of thousands of new contracts are deployed managing millions of dollars' worth of transactions. Thus, bugs in smart contracts may lead to high financial losses and it is important to get them right before deploying them to the Blockchain. To address this problem we developed Isabelle/Solidity, a tool for the deductive verification of smart contracts in Isabelle. The tool is implemented as a definitional extension for the Isabelle proof assistant and thus complements existing tools in this area which are mostly based on axiomatic approaches. In this paper we describe Isabelle/Solidity and demonstrate it by verifying a casino contract from the VerifyThis long term verification challenge.

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1 Introduction

One important innovation which comes with blockchain are so-called *smart contracts*. These are digital contracts which are automatically executed once certain conditions are met and which are used to automate transactions on the blockchain. For instance, a payment for an item might be released instantly once the buyer and seller have met all specified parameters for a deal. Every day, hundreds of thousands of new contracts are deployed [9] managing millions of dollars' worth of transactions [15].

Technically, a smart contract is *code which is deployed to a blockchain* and which can be executed by sending special transactions to it. Thus, as for every computer program, smart contracts may contain bugs which can be exploited. However, since smart contracts are often used to automate financial transactions, such exploits may result in huge economic losses. In general, it is estimated that since 2019, more than \$5B was stolen due to vulnerabilities in smart contracts [5].

The high impact of vulnerabilities in smart contracts together with the fact that once deployed to the blockchain, they cannot be updated or removed easily, makes it important to “*get them right*” before they are deployed. To this end, we developed Isabelle/Solidity, a tool for the verification of Solidity smart contracts. The main aim of this paper is to introduce the tool and demonstrate it in terms of an example. To this end its contribution is two-fold:

- We provide an overview of the technical architecture of Isabelle/Solidity.
- We use it to verify the casino contract from the VerifyThis verification challenge.



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
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2 Overview

Figure 1 depicts an overview of our approach to verify Solidity smart contract. Isabelle/Solid-



■ **Figure 1** Isabelle/Solidity: theories (blue), commands (red), and generated artefacts (green).

ity is based on four Isabelle theories which are represented by the blue rectangles:

Formalization state monad We model Solidity programs as functions which manipulate states. Such functions are usually described in terms of state monads [14] and this theory contains our formalization of it based on [7].

Formalization memory model Solidity has a quite particular memory model with different types of stores which support different types of data structures. This theory contains our formalization of the Solidity memory model. It also defines the notion of a Solidity state as a collection of different stores.

Solidity embedding A Solidity statement is defined as a particular state monad manipulating a Solidity state. This theory contains definitions for all our Solidity statements.

WP calculus To support a user in the verification of properties for our Solidity programmes we provide a weakest precondition calculus [8] for our Solidity statements. This theory formalizes the calculus.

In addition to the theories described above, Isabelle/Solidity extends the Isabelle proof assistant by means of three new definitional commands represented by the red rectangles in Figure 1. Each of the commands generates lower-level definitions and theorems for Isabelle/HOL which are represented as green rectangles.

Contract This command allows a user to specify a new contract. It requires a user to specify a list of member variables, a constructor, and a list of methods. For each method the user can specify a list of parameters as well as a method body. The body is provided as a state monad using the monads defined in the corresponding Isabelle theory. The command then generates definitions for the *contract's methods*. To this end each method is mapped to a corresponding partial function definition [10].

Invariant This command supports a user in the specification of an invariant for the contract. An invariant is specified as a HOL formula over the store and balance of the contract. The command then uses the typing information of member variables to generate a corresponding *invariant definition*.

Verification This command triggers the verification of a contract. It requires a user to provide an invariant as well as postconditions for the methods. Then it presents the user with a list of *proof obligations* for each of the contract's methods. The users then

need to discharge these proof obligations by providing a corresponding *proof*. To this end they can use the WP calculus provided by our framework. After discharging these obligations Isabelle/Solidity proves an overall *correctness theorem* which guarantees that the invariant as well as postconditions are not violated.

3 Case Study

To demonstrate Isabelle/Solidity we use it to verify the casino contract from the VerifyThis long-term verification challenge [1]. The version of the contract used here is provided in Appendix A. The casino contract implements a betting game based on guessing the outcome of coin-tossing. At any time, the game is characterized by three states, i.e., `IDLE`, `GAME_AVAILABLE` and `BET_PLACED`. Initially, the game is in the `IDLE` state. The game has been implemented in Solidity using the following functions:

- The operator can create a new game by calling the `creatGame` function and provide the hash value of a secret number. The function stores the secret number and changes the state to `GAME_AVAILABLE`.
- Once in state `GAME_AVAILABLE`, a player can place a bet by invoking the `placeBet` function and provide a guess (`HEADS` or `TAILS`). This function stores the player's address, its guess, and the amount of the bet, and changes the state to `BET_PLACED`.
- Now, the operator can decide the bet anytime by calling the `decideBet` function and providing the secret number. The secret number is then used to decide the outcome of the coin tossing (`HEADS` or `TAILS`). If the player's guess is correct, the double of the amount of the bet is transferred to their address. Otherwise, the amount equal to the bet is added to the pot. The function also changes the state of the game to `IDLE`.
- The operator may add money to the bet, at anytime, using `addToPot` but can only remove money if the game is in not in state `BET_PLACED` by calling `removeFromPot`.

4 Specification

To verify a smart contract in Isabelle/Solidity we first need to specify it. To this end Isabelle/Solidity provides the `contract` command which supports a user in this task. The command requires a user to specify a list of member variables and corresponding types, followed by a specification of the constructor and the contract's methods.

Storage Variables

Listing 1 shows the specification of storage variables for the casino smart in Isabelle/Solidity.

Listing 1: Isabelle/Solidity data types for Casino

```
1 contract Casino
2   for state: StateT
3   and operator: AddressT
4   and player: AddressT
5   and pot: IntT
6   and hashedNumber: BytesT
7   and bet: IntT
8   and guess: CoinT
```

Isabelle/Solidity supports most of the basic Solidity data types, such as bit-sized integers, bytes, and addresses. Enums can be encoded as integers with corresponding abbreviations.

109 **Methods**

110 We do not show the specification for all of the methods of the casino contract here but we
 111 only discuss one. The others can be similarly translated from the original Solidity contract.

112 The specification of a new method can be done using the keyword `emethod`. To allow
 113 a method to receive funds we can set the payable flag by using the corresponding `payable`
 114 keyword. What follows is a specification of stack (`param`), memory (`memory`), and calldata
 115 (`calldata`) parameters and corresponding types. Finally, one can provide the body of the
 116 function using the `where` keyword followed by a corresponding monad specification (using
 117 "`do {...}`", notation).

118 Listing 2 shows the specification of the function `decideBet`.

Listing 2: Isabelle/Solidity method for Casino

```

1 emethod decideBet payable
2   param secretNumber: IntT
3   where
4     do {
5       byOperator;
6       inState (Sint BET_PLACED);
7       <assert> (hashedNumber ~s [] <=> (<keccak256> (secretNumber ~ [])));
8       decl TSint secret;
9       secret [] ::= IF ((secretNumber ~ []) <%> <sint> 2) <=> (<sint> 0)
10                  THEN <sint> HEADS ELSE <sint> TAILS;
11       IF (secret ~ []) <=> (guess ~s []) THEN
12         do {
13           decl TSint bet_old;
14           bet_old [] ::= bet ~s [];
15           bet [] ::= <sint> 0;
16           pot [] ::= (pot ~s []) <-> (bet_old ~ []);
17           <transfer> (player ~s []) ((bet ~s []) <*> (<sint> 2))
18         }
19       ELSE
20         do {
21           pot [] ::= pot ~s [] <+> bet ~s [];
22           bet [] ::= <sint> 0
23         };
24       state [] ::= <sint> IDLE
25     },

```

119
 120 It is declared to be payable and accepts one parameter `secretNumber`, of integer type.
 121 Lines 5-7, implement preconditions for deciding a bet, i.e., only the operator can call the
 122 function, the game should be in state `BET_PLACED` and `secretNumber` should be equal to
 123 the `hashedNumber`. For this purpose, Isabelle/Solidity employs `assert` which models the
 124 Solidity `require` command.

125 Isabelle/Solidity also supports other Solidity statements, such as control structures and
 126 assignment operators. For example, in Line 9, `IF...THEN...ELSE` reveals HEADS or TAILS
 127 by taking the modulus (`<%>`) of `secretNumber`. For assignment operators, Isabelle/Solidity
 128 distinguishes between stack (`::=`) and storage (`::=_s`) assignments along with corresponding
 129 lookup operators (`~` and `~s`).

5 Verification

Isabelle/Solidity facilitates the specification of invariants using the `invariant` command. This command requires a user to provide the name of the invariant, followed by the invariant as predicates formulated over the contract's store and balance. It then generates a definition for the invariant which, in addition to the predicate specified by the user, also requires the value of member variables to adhere to their types. The command also proves corresponding introduction and elimination rules which can be invoked for automated verification of the invariants.

Example 5.1 (Invariant). Assume that we want to ensure our contract has always enough funds to cover the payout of players. More formally, we want to ensure that, whenever the game is in the `BET_PLACED` state, the contract's internal balance satisfies:

$$\text{pot_balance}(s, b) = b \geq s(\text{"pot"}) + s(\text{"bet"}) \wedge s(\text{"bet"}) \leq s(\text{"pot"}) \quad (1)$$

and if it is not in `BET_PLACED`, then

$$\text{pot_balance}(s, b) = b \geq \text{pot} \quad (2)$$

The corresponding specification in Isabelle/Solidity is given in Listing 3.

Listing 3: Invariant in Isabelle/Solidity

```
1 invariant pot_balance sb where
2   (fst sb state = sdata.Value (Sint BET_PLACED)
3   → snd sb ≥ unat (valtype.sint (sdata.vt pot))
4     + unat (valtype.sint (sdata.vt bet))
5     ∧ valtype.sint (sdata.vt bet) ≤ valtype.sint (sdata.vt pot)) ∧
6   (fst sb state ≠ sdata.Value (Sint BET_PLACED)
7   → snd sb ≥ unat (valtype.sint (sdata.vt pot)))
8   for "casino"
```

To formally verify the invariant, Isabelle/Solidity provides the `verification` command. It requires the user to provide a name followed by an invariant specified using the `invariant` keyword. Moreover, a user can provide postconditions for the constructor and each of the contract's methods. The corresponding specification for our casino contract is shown in Listing 4. The postconditions require a method to update the corresponding state of the game properly.

Listing 4: Verification in Isabelle/Solidity

```
1 verification pot_balance:
2   pot_balance
3   "K (K (K True))"
4   "createGame" "createGame_post" and
5   "placeBet" "placeBet_post" and
6   "decideBet" "decideBet_post" and
7   "addToPot" "K (K (K True))" and
8   "removeFromPot" "K (K (K (K True)))"
9   for "casino"
```

In order to automate the verification task, Isabelle/Solidity provides proof automation support in terms of a weakest precondition calculus. Verification of the Casino smart contract using Isabelle/Solidity resulted in the exploration of a major vulnerability, i.e., Reentrancy. While verifying the invariant in Example 5.1, it was not possible to verify unless changing the order of the Line 32 and 33 (see Appendix A) which enabled the completion of the

151 verification task. It is due to possibility of calling the function `decideBet` without setting
 152 `bet=0` which may lead to unintended behaviour.

153 6 Related Work

154 Considering the mission-critical nature of the smart contracts in blockchain technology, formal
 155 methods techniques, e.g., Model Checking [3], theorem proving [4], have been employed to
 156 formally specify and verify Solidity smart contracts. Model checking [6] is a push-button
 157 automatic formal methods technique, however, has limited expressiveness due to finite-state
 158 machine modelling and is prone to state-space explosion. On the other hand, theorem proving
 159 is highly-expressive and has also been utilized for the verification of Solidity smart contracts.

160 In theorem proving literature, deep and shallow embedding are two common approaches
 161 for the verification of Solidity language. A deep embedding of operational semantic of Solidity
 162 in SolidiKeY [2] allows to formally specify and verify smart contracts using KeY theorem
 163 prover. Similarly, Jakab [16] formalizes a Coq interpreter, utilizing deep embedding of
 164 operational semantic of Solidity, for the smart contract verification. However, aforementioned
 165 works rely on the axiomatic verification approach therefore may lead to miss corner cases in
 166 verifying smart contracts. In this direction, Diego et al. [12] developed a deep embedding
 167 framework for denotational semantic of Solidity in Isabelle/HOL which support correct-by-
 168 construction approach for the formal verification of smart contracts. On the other hand, there
 169 are two notable efforts for shallow embedding of Solidity in Isabelle theorem prover. Ribeiro
 170 et al. [13] utilize mix of deep and shallow embedding to develop an intermediary low-level
 171 specification language, SOLI, for the specification and verification of Solidity smart contracts
 172 in Isabelle/HOL. Whereas [11] provides a shallow embedding of operational semantic of
 173 Solidity in Isabelle/HOL. The framework is equipped with complex data types, such as
 174 mappings and arrays, and verification of invariants as compared to SOLI.

175 Isabelle/Solidity tool, proposed in this paper, is based on the shallow embedding approach
 176 [11]. This is mainly due to the scope of the proposed tool. The objective of the proposed tool
 177 is to formally specify and verify the correctness of the Solidity smart contracts which is best
 178 served, in terms of effort and time, by shallow embedding as compare to deep embedding.
 179 This has been empirically shown in [11].

180 7 Conclusion

181 In this paper, we present Isabelle/Solidity tool for the formal specification and verification
 182 of Solidity smart contracts. The tool facilitates Solidity data-types, functions, modifiers,
 183 statements, expressions and post/pre-condition specifiers in Isabelle/HOL. The formal
 184 specification relies upon the underlying shallow embedding of Solidity expressions and
 185 statements as state-monads and storage models for different types of stores in Solidity. For
 186 the verification purpose, tool supports invariant specification for the contract that in turn is
 187 supported by verification condition generator to automate the verification process. Finally,
 188 we evaluated the approach by means of the Casino case study. The use of the Isabelle/Solidity
 189 resulted in the exploration of re-entrancy vulnerability in the original version of Casino smart
 190 contract. However, there are few challenges in order to fully cover the advanced features of
 191 Solidity.

192 In this regard, inheritance is one of the most notable Solidity feature which can be
 193 introduced in the proposed tool for verifying interesting properties of the smart contracts.
 194 Moreover, from the verification point-of-view, automation can be further improved by

providing specialized rules w.r.t the context of the smart contracts.

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A Casino: Solidity Smart Contract

Listing 5: Solidity source code for the Casino

```

1  contract Casino {
2      enum Coin { HEADS, TAILS } ;
3      enum State { IDLE, GAME_AVAILABLE, BET_PLACED }
4      State private state;
5      address public operator, player;
6      uint public pot;
7      bytes32 public hashedNumber;
8      uint public bet;
9      Coin guess;
10
11     function createGame(bytes32 hashNum)
12         public byOperator, inState(IDLE) {
13         hashedNumber = hashNum;
14         state = GAME_AVAILABLE;
15     }
16
17     function placeBet(Coin _guess) public payable inState(GAME_AVAILABLE) {
18         require (msg.sender != operator);
19         require (msg.value <= pot);
20         state = BET_PLACED;
21         player = msg.sender;
22         bet = msg.value;
23         guess = _guess;
24     }
25
26     function decideBet(uint secretNumber)
27     public byOperator, inState(BET_PLACED) {
28         require (hashedNumber == keccak256(secretNumber));
29         Coin secret = (secretNumber % 2 == 0)? HEADS : TAILS;
30         if (secret == guess) {
31             pot = pot - bet;
32             player.transfer(bet*2);
33             bet = 0;}
34         else {
35             pot = pot + bet;
36             bet = 0;
37         }
38         state = IDLE;}
39     function addToPot() public payable byOperator { pot = pot + msg.value;}
40
41     function removeFromPot(uint amount) public byOperator, noActiveBet {
42         operator.transfer(amount);
43         pot = pot - amount;}
44 }

```