# Getting off the Scan-and-Fix Hamster Wheel with Generative Al

Asankhaya Sharma



#### Asankhaya Sharma, Co-Founder & CTO, https://patched.codes


























HIP/SLEEK : Automatic Verification and Specification Inference System







# building security tools for developers

v/s

developer tools for security

	2003/2004		2007		2010		2013		2017		2021
A1	Unvalidated Input	1	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	\ /	Injection		Injection	<u> </u>	Injection	\ <i>j</i>	Broken Access Control
A2	Broken Access Control		Injection Flaws	X	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	\/	Broken Authentication and Session Management	,	Broken Authentication		Cryptographic Failures
А3	Broken Authentication and Session Management	//	Malicious File Execution		Broken Authentication and Session Management	$\bigwedge$	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)		Sensitive Data Exposure		Injection
A4	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	$\bigvee$	Insecure Direct Object References		Insecure Direct Object References		Insecure Direct Object References		XML External Entities (XXE)		Insecure Design
A5	Buffer Overflow	$\bigwedge$	Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)		Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	\ /	Security Misconfiguration	$\bigwedge$	Broken Access Control	/ /	Security Misconfiguration
A6	Injection Flaws	\ \*	Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling		Security Misconfiguration	X	Sensitive Data Exposure		Security Misconfiguration	/ ;	Vulnerable and Outdated Components
A7	Improper Error Handling	/\	Broken Authentication and Session Management	1	Insecure Cryptographic Storage		Missing Function Level Access Control		Cross-Site Scripting		Identification and Authentication Failures
A8	Insecure Storage —	<b></b> →	Insecure Cryptographic Storage	/	Failure to Restrict URL Access	\	Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)		Insecure Deserialization		Software and Data Integrity Failures
A9	Application Denial of Service		Insecure Communications		Insufficient Transport Layer Protection		Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities		Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	( /*	Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
A10	Insecure Configuration Management		Failure to Restrict URL Access		Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards		Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards		Insufficient Logging & Monitoring	/	Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

### Breaking the Cycle: Beyond Scan-and-Fix in AppSec




- Old Ways, New Challenges
  - Stuck in a "scan and fix" loop, traditional SAST/DAST tools leave us chasing vulnerabilities, not proactive security.
- Shift Left Illusion
  - Moving security earlier in the SDLC doesn't stop the cycle; it starts it sooner, overburdening developers with endless issues to fix.
- IDE Interruptions
  - Real-time scanning in IDEs promises security but disrupts developer workflow, compromising productivity with constant alerts and system overhead.


# Introducing Patchwork

An open-source framework that effortlessly integrates into and automates your SDLC tasks, while giving you complete flexibility and control.

#### **Patchwork Overview**



# **Patchflow**



https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork

**AutoFix** 


5,000+ Vuls Patched



#### Patchwork

patchwork AutoFix sarif file path=results.sarif severity=critical patch template file=customprompts.json

# SAST + LLMs





## Why Patchwork?

Integrated with IDE, CLI and CI


Extensible with Steps




Works with any LLM

Customizable with prompt templates

#### Demo





https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork

https://patched.codes



# Thank You!

